diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-04-10-my-dialect-years.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-10-my-dialect-years.md
new file mode 100644
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@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "我的方言歲月"
+author: "東加豆"
+date : 2024-04-10 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LGPKGL5.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+一九七十、八十年代最能夠代表我成長的歲月，我的方言是廣東話，它是我最喜歡的語言及其音韻，每當我聽到別人說｛喜歡廣東話｝，我心裡是很高興的。現在，當我還聽到別人說：｛我喜歡香港｝，我衷心感激和感動。
+
+
+
+回想過去的成長過程中，我所用的語言確實是充滿了｛香土｝色彩的粵語｛香港土氣｝。我的家庭、我結交過的朋友，主要都是用粵語交流，偶爾會穿插一些廣東話的方言詞彙，大量的俚語，這讓人對於本土文化，有更深的連結和理解，而且引人發笑。除了粵語，我也學習了普通話和英語，這兩種語言在我的學習和工作中都有著重要的角色。不過，沒有保持用它的話，很快就會生疏了。我發覺自己不是一個聰明的人，每當學習一樣東西都很慢很慢，而且用很傳統的方式學習。
+
+語言不僅是一種溝通工具，它還能反映出一個人的文化背景和身份。每當與不同地域的人交流時，我都很留意他們的語言和表達方式，以及他們說話的節奏感，普通話讓我很深刻，尤其女的聲音，她們能說出一口漂亮的音色、節奏和韻律，優美動人，這讓我更了理解他們的文化，更珍惜自己的語言和文化傳統。
+
+每當回憶的時候，總會停留在我童年的階段，或者初踏進社會工作的時候，因為那時的我最無憂無慮，無牽無掛，無病無痛。
+
+我們經常使用｛香土｝俚語，香土俚語有什麼好？香土俚語可以增強溝通的趣味性和親切感。
+
+比如說｛搵食｝意思指｛賺錢｝。
+
+或者｛係咪出嚟撈架你！？｝意思指｛你是否想出來賺錢謀生呀！？｝
+
+不過｛撈｝這個字也有另類意味，比如｛撈女｝意指夜總會小姐。｛撈家｝從事非法勾當的人。
+
+以下有一些俚語是想當年的七十、八十年代聽過的話，說過的笑，就讓今天來重溫。
+
+__｛老點｝__
+
+｛老點｝的｛點｝字帶有｛點紅點綠｝或者亂點一通的意思。而｛老點｝即是解作欺騙、誤導，或是提供錯誤信息的意思。
+
+｛你老點我呀！？｝
+
+__｛蒲頭｝__
+
+｛蒲｝是一種水生植物--蒲草，生長在池沼中，它可長至約兩米高。開花結籽後，種子潛入水底再默默萌芽，最終破水而出忽然現身。因此，｛蒲頭｝可以指某人現身或漸露鋒芒。
+
+__｛豬標｝__
+
+｛豬｝=｛蠢｝= 不聰明。
+
+｛標｝=｛標記｝=｛嘜頭｝。
+
+它們湊在一起就是像一頭豬的｛嘜頭！｝。
+
+後來衍生了｛豬兜｝。
+
+｛兜｝可能是指一個狀態，頭耷耷、下垂、沒精打采等。
+
+｛豬兜｝= 迷迷糊糊、蠢蠢鈍鈍。
+
+__｛照住｝__
+
+這個詞裡的｛照｝字，有著陽光照射的意思。它的含義還可以擴展，就相當於照顧、關注的意思。｛照住｝、｛射住｝解釋及應用都是一樣。
+
+__｛疏乎｝__
+
+｛疏乎｝有人認為是英文單詞｛soft｝的粵語音譯，意思是舒適、輕鬆愜意或者柔軟。不過，六十年代粵語黑白片，即新馬仔、鄧寄塵常說的都是和夜生活的場景掛鉤的，有美女、有美酒。
+
+__｛去威｝__
+
+｛去威｝這個詞，就是指出去玩、到外面吃喝玩樂的意思。在八十年代有不少年輕人，他們大夥兒出去消費，是一件挺｛威風｝的事，有面子，也能展現派頭。
+
+所以，朋友間，或者該年代的電影常常出現這句對白：你今日｛去｝哪兒｛威｝？
+
+__｛兜踎｝__
+
+｛兜｝原本是指｛碗｝或者｛食盆｝。
+
+｛踎｝是蹲坐的意思。
+
+早期，｛兜踎｝是指一些人無所事事地在街上乞討，是乞丐常做的行為。後來，延伸出去來形容一個人處境窘迫、生活困難，表現出一種頹廢、失意的生活狀態。
+
+__｛標青｝__
+
+｛標青｝原指田中優異稻苗｛䅺｝。
+
+後用以形容人事物突出非凡、極為優秀、美麗俊俏。
+
+__｛擒青｝__
+
+這個詞來自傳統醒獅活動，醒獅經過一系列動作。
+
+比如發現目標｛見青｝、受驚模樣｛驚青｝、巧妙取得｛採青｝、慶祝碎裂｛碎青｝，再到最後的呈現成果｛吐青｝。不過，有人為了快點結束過程，就會提前去抓那個｛青｝，於是就有了｛擒青｝這個做法。它意味著一些人做事急急忙忙、一下子就要把事情搞定的個性子。
+
+__｛收皮｝__
+
+｛收皮｝起初是說要做完、落幕的意思。後來被廣泛用來叫對方停下手上的行為或是承認輸了，而且｛收皮｝是帶有一點負面情緒和挑戰的味道。後來有｛收嗲｝。
+
+｛收皮｝是行動。
+
+｛收嗲｝是聲音。｛收口吧！｝
+
+今天分享的｛香土｝俚語，都是我輕狂歲月時朗朗上口。
+
+｛見笑！｝
+
+當然不僅這些。
+
+一字、三字、五字是非常繁多，而且很動聽。
+
+我又怎會像個｛豬標｝只懂得二字｛香土｝俚語呢...
+
+謝謝閱讀！
+
+完
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-04-11-on-morality-as-long-as-saints-live-kleptocracy-will-not-stop.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-11-on-morality-as-long-as-saints-live-kleptocracy-will-not-stop.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ee369f28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-11-on-morality-as-long-as-saints-live-kleptocracy-will-not-stop.md
@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "论道德：圣人不死，大盗不止"
+author: "番茄米线"
+date : 2024-04-11 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/OgMcqAg.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+### 1、窃钩者诛，窃国者侯
+
+
+
+聪明的人为了防止财物被偷走，把财宝放在大箱子里，再上上锁、拴上铁链。
+
+可是一旦大强盗来了，直接把箱子整个搬走，此时还害怕锁不够结实、链子不够紧呢！
+
+既然是这样，那么先前所谓的聪明作法，不就是给大盗作好了积聚和储备吗？
+
+道德就像是箱子上的锁。只有对真的在乎道德的好人才会起作用。
+
+而大部分人只会把道德用作为自己谋利的工具。
+
+比如很常见的，丈夫想买个游戏机，妻子就会骂他“不务正业”；而如果妻子想买个包包，丈夫就会攻击妻子“爱慕虚荣”。
+
+但事实上，丈夫买游戏机是为了自己爽，而妻子不让丈夫买游戏机是真的为了丈夫好吗？并不是，妻子往往只是觉得丈夫花了钱，自己就失去了花那笔钱的机会。
+
+而且，丈夫买游戏机纯粹只能让丈夫一个人爽，但是却花的是夫妻二人共同的钱，妻子当然会不高兴，但是她不能赤裸裸地对丈夫说：“你不能给自己花钱，因为我要花。”
+
+有的读者已经看出来了，这就是道德绑架。
+
+在现代“文明”社会，个人使用暴力的权利被收归于利维坦，个人不能像原始人那样使用暴力解决利益冲突。
+
+但人与人之间依然会有利益冲突，怎么办？
+
+通过观察，不难发现当今大规模使用的平替就是吵架，从肢体暴力换成了语言暴力。
+
+而语言暴力如何发挥作用呢？当然不可能通过理性的逻辑论证来辩论，因为真理并不总是和自己的利益站在一起，而且理性思考与表达本身就是一个有门槛的能力，并不是所有人都有。
+
+所以人们要借助超级主体所代表的暴力来狐假虎威。
+
+比如父母为了自己的利益，为了让孩子这个投资产出足够的回报，就会说让孩子孝顺，是为了孩子好。
+
+再比如女拳本质就是道德绑架，我弱我有理。她们只是想要利益，至于从谁那里来不重要。
+
+还有普京入侵乌克兰，就是为了他自己和他代表的俄罗斯寡头集团的利益，但他还要说是为了乌克兰好，是帮他们“去纳粹化”。
+
+还如十字军、猎巫者、宗教判官、荣誉谋杀者，都打着上帝与安拉的名义大开杀戒！
+
+再比如网上的键盘侠们，看到别人有一点污点，就跑过去占领道德高地、对着别人大喷一通。难道他是为了帮别人改正错误吗？他只是想借此发泄情绪罢了。
+
+小市民们见到别人做了一点错事，就对那个人指指点点，好像他自己是什么圣人一样。但是他们贬低别人的目的不过是为了抬高自己、满足自己的自恋罢了：“看，他错了，我是对的，我多么优秀！”
+
+还有今天很多左翼，到处标榜自己是个好人、是个圣人，对别人的行为大加批判、上纲上线，动不动扣帽子，但本质上他就是为了自己的利益；如果不是，那为什么不为资本家无私奉献呢？如果不是，他为什么不亲自花时间花钱帮助别人“改正”，而只是动动嘴皮子、过个嘴瘾呢？
+
+本来道德是要维护正义的、让人无私的，结果反而成了人们用来满足自私的工具；
+
+本来就是为了自己的利益，披上道德的大旗之后，反而显得他是为了别人好了。
+
+这不就是窃钩者诛、窃国者侯吗？
+
+明面违反道德的人受到人们的谴责、暗地里利用道德的人反而成了圣人！
+
+道德到底是在主持正义，还是在为邪恶打掩护？
+
+
+### 2、圣人与大盗
+
+善与恶本来并不存在，这不过是人类进入文明时代后，发明了一个叫做“道德”的东西所包含的主要内容。
+
+后来为了更好地解释并让人们接受，善与恶又被意象化，例如西方人创造了上帝和撒旦，还有光明与黑暗、白色与黑色、喜羊羊与灰太狼、美队和灭霸、圣人与大盗等等，
+
+无一例外的是，“善”的形象都是美好的、令人崇拜与喜爱的、感到安心的，而“恶”的形象都是丑陋的、令人感到恐惧与厌恶的，由此一来，我们对善与恶的印象就越来越定格了。
+
+然而，圣人和大盗不过是一个硬币的两面，他们是一个东西。
+
+圣人和大盗、上帝与撒旦，不过是一个唱红脸一个唱白脸罢了：
+
+符合超级主体的利益，那么就说上帝会赏赐你，你是圣人；
+
+违反超级主体的利益，那么就说撒旦会惩罚你，你是大盗。
+
+但这本质上都是在一条单一标准上进行对比罢了。
+
+回到超级主体和利维坦的理论，他们的本质目的是维护假集体内的秩序、是为了维持和平。
+
+那么如果人们之间形成了利益共同体、不会再发生战争，超级主体和利维坦不就会被人们抛弃了吗？
+
+不维持底层的混乱，底层人谁还去依附上层的法律？
+
+不维持底层的贫穷，哪个底层人还会去讨好上层以求阶层跃迁？
+
+没有撒旦作乱，谁还去跪求上帝的庇佑？
+
+因此，只要假集体存在，陷入所有人对所有人的战争的危机就存在；
+
+这种危机存在，人们就需要利维坦；
+
+有利维坦，就会在基层制造权力真空；
+
+有权力真空，就需要超级主体维持秩序。
+
+所以说，道德和法律是假集体的上层建筑。
+
+道德的本质目的是为了维持假集体的存在。而假集体之所以被称为“假”，是因为它内部实际上并不是一个美好的文明国度，而依然是一个人吃人的丛林社会，只不过没有那么赤裸裸了。
+
+所以说，道德的本质目的是维护秩序，而不是伸张正义。因为正义本身就不存在，只有利益是存在的。
+
+这就是为什么正义总是迟到，为什么键盘侠会跑去网暴别人。
+
+哪怕是现代的资本主义社会，但是依然处在假集体之中，也就依然需要利维坦维持秩序，相应的也就需要一个超级主体来充当道德界的利维坦。
+
+但是现代国家把宗教打倒了，这就造成了矛盾，于是就需要新的超级主体，而这就是民族主义。
+
+民族主义符合一切超级主体的基本特点：调和两个阶级的对立、表面上是公正中立的第三方、似乎可以代表所有人的利益。
+
+只要大盗存在，一个圣人被打倒了，还会再造一个新的圣人出来，此二者是共生的。
+
+只要假集体存在，道德就会存在；只要道德存在，假集体就会被维护。
+
+只要大盗存在，人们就需要圣人来维持秩序；而如果大盗止了，圣人也就死了。
+
+
+### 3、真集体如何消灭道德
+
+真集体的定义和具体运作方式可以看《真集体》。
+
+当人们结成一个利益共同体时，他们此时就形成了一个全体社会保障制度。
+
+在这个保障制度下，即便一个人的生活状况陷入了危机，他也会受到社会上其他人的帮助；
+
+这个帮助不仅仅是出于讨好超级主体，而是因为在利益共同体中，增加别人的利益就是让自己得利。
+
+换句话说，利己与利他并不冲突。自私≠损人，无私≠舍己，利己与利他是可以同时存在的。
+
+牙签鸟给鳄鱼清理牙齿，看似是无私的；鳄鱼给牙签鸟提供食物，看似是无私的；但是牙签鸟是为了获取食物，是自私的；鳄鱼是为了自己的牙齿干净，也是自私的。
+
+这就是共生关系，利他的同时利己。连动物都懂的道理，很多人却不懂。
+
+还记得我在《利维坦》一文中提到的吗：
+
+> 在假集体中，由于人们不会把互帮互助当作责任，所以每个人实际上都是原子化的，人们不是利益共同体。
+
+> 所以每个人的利益只能靠自己来保障，这就意味着每个人都要尽可能多地去占有社会资源，以增强自己的抗风险能力和自由。
+
+> 因此每个人都必须变得贪婪，只有占有足够多的财富和权力才能抗风险。
+
+而在人类社会的共生关系下，人们没必要也没动力去无止境地追求财富和权力，因为财富和权力本质是为了在人们只能依靠自己的情况下对抗风险。
+
+而不需要给自己不断弄到财富和权力，人们也就没必要去对别人发动战争，混乱也就被消灭了。
+
+因为比起战争的消耗，通过利他来利己才是性价比最高的选择。这符合性恶论第一定律。
+
+而当人们不会再有陷入混乱的危机时，便不再需要利维坦这个强权来维持秩序了。
+
+此时，秩序的维持不再是利维坦自上而下的结果，而是人们自发的、平级的互相建立关系。
+
+也就是说，官僚阶层被消灭了。管理者只会被人们直接民主选举出来。
+
+此时，管理者的权力那是真的直接来自于人民，那么管理者才会真的发自内心地为人民服务。因为为人民服务对他有利。
+
+那么管理者与人民也就形成了利益共同体，人民也愿意接受他的管理。
+
+那么我在《超级主体》中提到的因“官僚不为老百姓负责、老百姓不想让官僚管”而造成的权力真空也就被消灭了。
+
+那么既然没有权力真空了，谁还需要超级主体呢？
+
+人们之间的关系是自发的共生关系，根本不需要“秩序”，因为秩序和混乱是一体两面的，就像圣人和大盗一样。
+
+消灭了混乱，不也就消灭了秩序了吗？
+
+那么秩序都被消灭了，谁还需要利维坦和超级主体呢？谁还需要法律和道德呢？
+
+在彼时，人们的利他行为才是发自内心的，而不是为了讨好超级主体、出于害怕才去做的。
+
+正如我在《现代心理学的困境》中提到的，亲密关系有两种：
+
+第一类是爱，双方对对方好、尊敬对方是出于自愿的、自主的，意思是认为对对方好对自己有利，是正面情绪；
+
+第二类是主体性投射，一方对另一方好是被迫的，认为不对对方好对自己有害，是恐惧一类的负面情绪，也就是讨好。
+
+道德的运作原理就是第二类关系：“上帝”这个超我是主体，我反而成了客体了。
+
+只有消灭了道德，才能解放爱。
+
+为建立地上天国，请上帝赴死！
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-04-12-eternal-home.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-12-eternal-home.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..71cbef1f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-12-eternal-home.md
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "永遠的家"
+author: "東加豆"
+date : 2024-04-12 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/VIeFJYm.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+｛小王｝不是一個男孩，她是一個女孩，樓下米舖老闆叫她｛𡃁仔！｝，是｛𡃁仔｝，不是｛靚仔？｝。
+
+
+
+｛𡃁仔｝和｛靚仔｝是有分別的。
+
+｛𡃁仔｝即是小男孩。
+
+｛靚仔｝是美貌出眾的。
+
+直到一天小王的媽媽說｛佢係女仔嚟架！｝
+
+後來，米舖老闆不再叫｛小王｝做｛𡃁仔｝，改口為｛𡃁妹｝了。
+
+香港人煙稠密，地少人多，幾乎所有街道瀰漫著一片白霧，可能是工廠的機械操作，或者小販檔的熱炸鑊所影響。
+
+1971年至1989年的歲月彷彿是一個被遺忘的角落。那時，小王一家住在一個叫｛牛頭角｝的公共屋村，小屋面積僅一百尺，而且簡陋，但卻充滿了家的溫馨與溫度。很難相信這個狹窄的空間裡，時常堆滿十幾二十人，爸媽的親朋好友，熱情款待朋友正是他們的特性這種性格。
+
+每當夜晚來到，一家人圍坐在破舊的餐桌旁，｛電視汁撈飯｝正屬於這個年代。媽媽追看的｛狂潮｝、｛家變｝，爸爸竟然喜歡看動畫的｛一休和尚｝，以往的TVB電視台是能夠滿足大多數人的心靈。屋內滿是的家常菜的香味，｛豆豉蒸排骨｝、｛梅菜蒸肉餅｝、｛青紅蘿蔔湯｝、｛煎紅杉魚｝、那是王媽的撚手小菜，她的廚藝，幾乎每個人都豎起一隻大拇指。溫暖著每個人的心田，父親則靜靜地抽著煙，他總是喜歡抽煙。
+
+屋子每個角落都充滿了生活的痕跡，牆上掛著家人的照片，記錄了他們曾有青春美好時光。從黑白電視機轉到彩色電視，這是一件令人非常興奮的事。
+
+半自動型的洗衣機，從左邊沾滿水滴的衣物放在右邊弄乾器，沒有冷氣的年代，會突然停水停電的年代，不會抱怨的年代。
+
+拉開鐵門，一條長廊，敲著鄰居的門，借鹽借油，不會尷尬的年代。
+
+鄰居的小朋友會戶送聖誕卡，悄悄放入門隙，今天收到小麗的聖誕卡，明天小王送她聖誕卡，後天小麗又送小王聖誕卡，然後笑哈哈，不管環保的年代。
+
+小王沒有自己的床，她和姐姐睡在一起，直到姐姐嫁去了，小王的漸漸建立了她的小天地，她睡的上架床和衣櫃頂同一水平線的高度，小王把空間延伸，在櫃頂放著相架、記事本、漫畫、雜誌、玩具等。床鋪整潔舒適，家裡溫暖安寧，無論走到那裡，每當別人問小王住在哪，她都自豪地說｛牛頭角！｝
+
+小王相信生活不會一帆風順，她有心理準備面對各種挑戰和困惑，她更自然地說過遇上了風風雨雨。
+
+後來，十年八載後，回想起來，只是清風一場。
+
+現在，每當別人問起小王兒時住在哪，她依然自豪地說｛牛頭角！｝
+
+完
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-04-13-on-competition-heavenly-way-and-human-way.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-13-on-competition-heavenly-way-and-human-way.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-13-on-competition-heavenly-way-and-human-way.md
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "论竞争: 天道与人道"
+author: "番茄米线"
+date : 2024-04-13 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/eyioDwn.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+### 1、两套规则
+
+世界有两套规则。第一套是天定的，宇宙的自然法则、社会运行的客观规律，称为天道。第二套是人定的，道德、法律、文化、习俗，称为人道。因为人是群居动物，所以有了法律和道德来协调群体之中成员们的行为。
+
+
+
+这两套规则最大的区别在于，人道是可以违反的，而没有任何一种生物、任何一样东西能够违反天道。
+
+法律和道德都是要靠人来执行的。当你违法的时候，得有警察过来抓你，法律才起作用；当你违反道德的时候，只有你在乎良心，道德才起作用。
+
+而天道不管你在不在乎、不管有没有人来执行，它无时无刻不在起作用。甚至可以说，连人道本身就在受天道支配。
+
+我们举个很简单的例子。为什么道德一直在变化、法律不断被修改？这是因为道德和法律都是受天道支配的。
+
+在封建社会，天道是建立在小农经济上的家长制家庭，所以“父母之命、媒妁之言”的包办婚姻就是符合道德的，就是人道。
+
+而到了资本主义社会，天道发生了变化，小农经济被商品经济所取代，人从土地上解放出来了，所以自由恋爱才是符合道德的，包办婚姻反而是不道德的了。
+
+如果一个法律不符合天道但强行推行，那只会变成废纸一张。比如王莽当年修改币制，把货币改得乱七八糟，然后民间根本没人用，大家都偷偷用五铢钱交易。
+
+可见，在天道面前，人道也是软弱无力。
+
+因此，要想做事成功，就必须遵循天道；如果违反天道，那不可能做成功的。
+
+我们几百年来的自然科学、社会科学就在做一件事，就是探索客观规律、探索天道。你想做一个火箭发射成功，那你就要遵循火箭的物理学规律，而不是“我觉得怎么怎么样就能发射成功”。
+
+所以如果火箭发射失败，应该思考自己哪里没有遵循物理学定律，而不是开始抱怨这个抱怨那个。
+
+这一点在自然科学上大家都知道，但到了社会科学上，很多人就不知道了。
+
+举一个最常见的例子。家长不让小孩玩游戏，但是别说小孩了，成年人都喜欢玩游戏，这就是天道，家长强行制止那就是违反天道，最后的结果就是小孩跟家长打游击、偷偷玩游戏。
+
+然后家长就开始抱怨，小孩怎么这么不听话不懂事。这位家长，请你尊重一下客观规律好吗？小孩喜欢打游戏这是老天爷的规矩，怎么着，你比老天爷还牛逼？
+
+要想不让孩子沉迷游戏，也只能顺从天道来发挥主观能动性。比如家长可以观察看看孩子还有其他的哪些兴趣，比如他喜欢观察蚂蚁，那家长就可以着重培养他在昆虫学方面的兴趣，让他觉得探索自然比打游戏更有意思，他自然就不打游戏了。
+
+但当然了，这个世界上大部分人是不懂得这个道理的，因为他们觉得自己比天道还牛逼。
+
+
+### 2、受害者与责任者
+
+那些觉得自己比天道还牛的人，一旦遇到一点挫折、一旦别人没有遵从他的意愿行事，他就开始抱怨，觉得别人都是坏人，都要来害他。
+
+这就是受害者心态，就是觉得自己是弱者，自己所遭受的苦难不是自己的问题，自己的人生应该由别人来负责，别人要来照顾他。
+
+你自己都认为你是弱者，那别人当然也会认定你是弱者。别人之所以帮助你，并不是他们从心底里认为你和他们是平等的，而是因为同情——他们在以一种居高临下的姿态在施舍你。
+
+没有人不认为乞丐很可怜，但也没有人会认为自己和乞丐是平等的。也就是说，那些人虽然施舍你，但是他们是看不起你的。
+
+当你把自己放在弱势群体的位置时，你就陷入了一种受害者思维。
+
+这种思维会暂时让你觉得很爽，因为你是受害者呀，你是不需要为此负责任的，是加害你的人需要负责任，所以这不是你的问题。这就会让你暂时摆脱自责和压力，还可以通过抱怨别人发泄情绪。
+
+但其危险之处在于，受害者思维同样也在告诉你，你没有能力保护自己，你没有办法使自己不受到伤害：如果别人要伤害你，你什么也做不了，你只能默默接受伤害，并在伤害过后去道德谴责加害者。
+
+举个例子。
+
+你在绿灯时过马路，一辆卡车闯红灯把你撞死了，这是谁的责任？
+
+你第一反应肯定是卡车司机的责任嘛，他闯红灯啊，毕竟你是好好遵守交规的。但这实际上就是你的责任。
+
+卡车司机是没遵守交规，但你被撞死了，听懂了吗？谁的损失大就是谁的责任，虽然是绿灯，但你在过马路前不应该先左右看看吗？
+
+“红灯停绿灯行”这是人道，“人被卡车撞了非死即伤”这是天道，如果我只遵守人道，我就只能希望卡车司机也遵守人道，所以我会不会被撞就完全取决于卡车司机而不取决于我，我就没法保护自己；但如果我遵守天道，看到有车即便是绿灯也不过马路，那我会不会被撞就取决于我，至于卡车司机闯不闯红灯不关我事。
+
+交通规则是可以违反的，但物理学定律不能。卡车可以闯红灯，但人可以把卡车撞飞吗？
+
+道德就像交通规则一样，你无法控制别人遵守道德；如果你试图仰赖道德来保护自己，那你就无法保护自己。
+
+你真正可以依靠的规则只有一条，那就是世界的客观规律。在现在的社会，客观规律就是一个：弱肉强食。看似伟大公正的法律，不也是要依靠警察和军队的暴力来执行吗？
+
+而这就是现代教育学的症结所在。现代教育学看似非常有道理，但本质上还是在依靠道德：因为父母爱孩子，所以父母就要这样那样；这和那些《男人如果爱你就要做到以下几点》的女频爽文有什么区别？这句话本身就说明了父母并不爱孩子，不然就不用说。
+
+既然是在用道德绑架的方式，那么就意味着父母即便平等地对待孩子，那也是不情不愿的；父母遵守现代教育学所做的一切，都是为了使自己符合道德，而不是真的认同孩子和自己是平等的。
+
+这还是好的，在大多数情况下，道德根本不起作用，真正起作用的是我在上面提到的那些东西，所以很多父母即便是看了现代教育学，也不会去做，只会在伤害孩子之后谴责自己几句罢了。
+
+弱者虽然可以得到同情，但永远得不到别人发自内心的尊重。
+
+
+### 3、遥远的救世主
+
+期待道德起作用，就像是在期待会有救世主降临。
+
+老百姓今年摊上了一个暴君、昏君，便想着等这个皇帝死了，下一个皇帝是个明君就好了。
+
+然而如果仔细观察历史，就会发现，即便是在堪称千古治世的文景之治和贞观之治期间，老百姓一样活得和牛马一样，只不过没有南北朝那样动不动就死人那么惨罢了。
+
+为什么？因为任何一个皇帝都是大地主阶级的代表，而地主阶级和农民阶级的利益矛盾不可调和。皇帝为老百姓着想，那不过是为了防止老百姓造反，或者为了自己的名声，或者为了给手下的地主阶级创收罢了。
+
+如果一个皇帝不为地主阶级牟利了，跑去给农民阶级牟利，那么他就会被手下的地主阶级推翻，因为农民得利，地主必然受损。看看历史上对既得利益者动刀子的改革者都是什么下场。
+
+这就是客观规律，这就是天道，这是不可违背的，不是说你老百姓骂两句，期望皇帝突然良心发现了，自己就能过上好日子了。
+
+要真正创造人们的幸福，只能通过暴力推翻地主阶级、铲除小农经济这一封建制度的根基，再建立起公有制经济。
+
+这不会因为你觉得“啊暴力多不好啊”或者“不要那么极端嘛”就能够改变，因为这是客观规律。数学会因为你不喜欢1+1=2它就等于3吗？
+
+> 马克思主义的道理归根到底一句话，客观规律不以人的意志为转移，什么是客观规律，归根到底也是一句话：一切以时间、地点和条件为转移。
+
+> 主体在把另一个人当成客体时，会直接忽视客体的利益；除非压榨客体的后果威胁到自己的利益，主体不会在乎客体。
+你使用一个工具，比如让驴拉磨，你会在乎驴是否喜欢拉磨吗？除非驴不干了，损害你的利益了，你才会去看看驴出什么问题了。
+
+也就是说，弱者要想让强者做出让步、让他们“良心发现”，唯一的办法就是对强者建立起威慑。
+
+而一个期待着救世主的民族、一个以皇天在上为先决条件的文化，是无法建立起平等的社会的。
+
+这种人并不少见。比如孩子觉得父母应该爱他们，所以父母应该平等尊重他们；父母觉得孩子应该孝顺自己，所以孩子应该无条件被自己控制。
+
+还有女人觉得男人爱自己，那么男人就应该满足她的一切要求和幻想。
+
+学生觉得老师既然是教书育人，那么自己被欺负了老师就该来管。
+
+老百姓觉得政客们说什么“为人民服务”或者“民主自由”，就真以为官僚应该为人民负责了。
+
+总而言之一句话，他们把人道当真了，他们不尊重客观规律。
+
+换句话说，他们在等、靠、要，他们在等待救世主来救他们，或者在等当权者良心发现，靠皇恩、靠感情、靠道德、靠别人的良心，就是不靠自己。
+
+最后的结局只会有一个，那就是没有人来救他们。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-04-15-parallel-lines-of-the-sunrise.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-15-parallel-lines-of-the-sunrise.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7563900d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-15-parallel-lines-of-the-sunrise.md
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "日出的平行線"
+author: "東加豆"
+date : 2024-04-15 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/y0mTS2K.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+今日天色很差，卻還是在路上奔跑，要上班嘛！
+
+｛子洋｝清晨五點鐘就起床，他要趕早班火車，早班車人梳稀少，這個城市實在太擠迫了。
+
+
+
+子洋按著電梯按鈕，踏出大堂門外，走過小花園，然後離開了大樓，這個價值一千一百萬的住宅單位，已經住了五年，銀行房貸三十年，子洋屈指一算，還有二十五年供款期，供款完之後，他剛剛可以申領老人金。
+
+子洋不知道自己是矛盾還是貪心，將來他會有千萬的居所，卻又渴望政府的老人金。不過，人本來就是很矛盾，而且貪心也是人之常情，許多領老人金的人都有過億身家，大家都認為理所當然的。
+
+子洋經過碼頭附近時，才發覺天氣比他想像中還要差，在家時看到天色昏暗，在路上天色漸變，灰灰黃黃，現在卻很不尋常。
+
+子洋匆匆而過，他走完一條馬路，又再走另一條，他意識到有很多晨運客拿起手機在拍照，並議論紛紛，他們都指向天空的邊，這是難得一遇的日出美景。
+
+天空中布滿了色彩斑斕的雲彩，從深藍色到粉紅色、橙色和紫色，形成了一幅美麗的畫面。在遠處，可以看到山丘和城市的天際線，而近處則是平靜的水面，反射出天空中的色彩，真讓人感到非常壯觀和浪漫的自然景色。
+
+子洋看到了赤紅色的日出，也聽到人們在讚嘆奇景，然而，他加快了步伐。
+
+要上班嘛！就在他拐過彎角踏進電梯的時候，最後的一秒讓他看到日出的全景，他想，應該就是晨運客所說的一樣，果然，非常壯觀！但當子洋拿起手機拍照時，一幅石屎牆遮擋了他的視線，因為電梯不斷下降。他有點後悔，剛才一直在碼頭，景觀一直在身邊，至少有七分鐘的時間拍照，卻等到最後一秒，拍照也來不及了。
+
+-
+
+火車的引擎聲正在啟動，三小時的車程時間，子洋本來安排了在車廂工作，可是，剛才那一秒的影像卻讓他揮之不去。子洋以為短短一秒的記憶很快就會淡忘，但相反，他似乎越來越深刻，越想越深入。
+
+今早的晨曦，仿佛看到水面上的城市，與水下的世界交織在一起，形成了一個平行世界。在這個世界中，每個人都生活在自己的世界中，從未相遇，也不知道彼此的存在。
+
+水面上是一個繁忙的現代城市，高樓林立，車水馬龍。人們忙碌地生活著，追求物質與名利的滿足。他們總是忙於工作和生活，很少有時間欣賞大自然的美好。
+
+就像子洋一樣。
+
+｛對，就像自己一樣！｝子洋喃喃自語。
+
+而在水下的世界裡，卻是一片寧靜和諧的景象，水中生物和睦相處，共同維護著海洋的生態平衡。它們享受著自然的恩賜，感受著水的滋潤和風的吹拂。
+
+然而，子洋聽說過，當夕陽下山時，一種神秘的力量會開始轉移。夕陽的餘暉穿透水面，將兩個世界緊密相連。水中的生物開始感知水面上的世界，看到人類的喧囂和繁華，而水面上的人們也感受到水下世界的平靜和美好。
+
+這種神秘的力量讓大家開始思考自己的生活和價值。人們意識到城市的繁榮並不代表一切，水下的寧靜才是最珍貴的。
+
+原來，是可以選擇的，但是怎麼一回事呢？可以有兩個世界嗎？ 還是兩者只得其一？
+
+漸漸，子洋在車廂睡著了，他今天起得很早，確實有些累了。
+
+淡入...
+
+突然，火車突然停了下來，子洋驚訝地看著窗外。一位老人站在他面前，老人告訴他可以做出選擇，可以當一個｛水下世界的守護者｝以後就會過著平靜的世界。
+
+子洋回想自己過去十年的生活，可以用四個字來形容，｛奔波勞碌！｝而且並不享受，老實說，子洋已經很疲累了，每當想到自己往後的三十年，人生相當乏味。
+
+子洋猶豫了一會兒，然後毅然決定，他要離開城市的繁榮，去尋找水下世界的寧靜，就這樣他告訴老人了。
+
+突然，火車突然煞停。
+
+...淡出
+
+原來只是一場夢，火車突然煞停，發生什麼事？
+
+原來火車發生了出軌意外，險些撞死人，非常危險！車上乘客緊張、混亂、失控，職員花了很久才能控制場面。
+
+子洋馬上發短訊給妻子和兒女報平安，這一刻，他的腦海只有家人，什麼疲累都消失了。
+
+等了一個半小時，火車繼續行駛，子洋看著窗外，心情突然輕鬆和解放。
+
+想要有兩個世界，先來學潛水，然後再看水下的世界吧！
+
+完
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-04-16-melody-carnival.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-16-melody-carnival.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e664c62b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-16-melody-carnival.md
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "旋律嘉年華"
+author: "東加豆"
+date : 2024-04-16 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aAeu1nH.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+在一個遙遠的小鎮上，住著一群忙碌而單調的居民。他們日出而作，日落而息，日復一日，年復一年。
+
+
+
+這裡是有寧靜的角落，但是大部份的環境和時間都是嘈雜的。
+
+一天，一個神秘的音樂家走進了這個小鎮，他身背一把古老豎琴，豎琴從布包裡滲透出隱隱約約的光芒。音樂家看上去不像一個音樂家，他像普通的大叔，像附近在工廠工作的大叔，所以沒有人在意他，住了三個月，樓上樓下附近的人都是叫他｛大叔｝而已。
+
+音樂家｛大叔｝看著這裡的人，每天都忙著無休無止的工作和生產線，夜以繼日地加班，重複著機器人一樣的操作，不肯停下來喘息。他很懷疑這些人的身體怎樣支撐下去？事實上，他們的臉上已經刻滿了疲憊和壓力，眼神流露出空洞和失落，沒有任何變化和驚喜。
+
+在音樂家｛大叔｝的眼裡，這種生活就像一個迷宮，無法逃脫，找不到出路，一直被生活的壓力和焦慮淹沒，沒有歡笑和歡樂，只有無盡的工作和責任等待著他們，這種心靈上的空虛和無奈是可怕和悲哀的。
+
+大叔去了一個被荒廢了的廣場，把古老豎琴放在地上，自己坐在一塊大石頭上，手腕微微彎曲，指尖輕巧地滑過豎琴的弦，如同流水般自然，優美的旋律一點一滴地在空中飄盪。
+
+對於這裡的人來說，是一件罕見的事情，他們不僅不欣賞，還感到害怕，擔心有人狡猾，擾亂他們的生活，欺騙他們的薪水。
+
+然而，大叔的音樂越飄越遠，影響著人們的心靈一個接一個，令人陶醉。一個年輕的少女，被美妙的旋律所吸引，她帶著懶洋洋的腳步，隨著音樂穿過馬路，走過草叢，聲音充滿了整個街道，她沒有半點擔憂，當她來到大廣場，看到大叔抱著豎琴彈奏。
+
+隨著音樂的節奏，廣場不僅只有一個少女，還有一個小男孩，後來又多了一個婦女，接著有一個老伯伯，他們互相不認識的。老伯伯眼有淚光，不知道他在想什麼。
+
+大叔每天也去大廣場奏樂，每天都有幾個陌生人來看，少女、男孩、婦女、老伯伯經常出現。好事傳遍千里，大叔奏出的旋律為小鎮帶來一股樸實又美好的氣息。漸漸地，居民知道了這裡有一個像大叔的音樂家，住在大叔的樓上樓下附近的人知道了，他不僅是一個｛大叔｝，他是一個｛音樂家大叔｝，然後，鄰居就改口了叫他｛音樂家｝。
+
+人們開始聚集起來，形成了一種自然的現象。音樂響起，旋律在空中飄浮，一點點的音符也走進人們心中，他們會因為音樂而改變，因為音樂而跳舞，因為音樂而唱歌，因為音樂而談情，遊戲和運動皆有可能受到音樂氛圍的影響，空氣中也瀰漫著人們的熱情。
+
+老伯伯那雙眼依然有淚光，大叔對他印象深刻，也許他是最初來到廣場的人們。老伯伯說：｛這裡幾乎六十年再沒有音樂這回事...｝這句話多麼令人難過。大叔心中唸唸。
+
+大叔越奏越忘我，不少人加入伴奏，他們隨手就找來合適的工具，大葉子、竹子、石頭、果實等。在歡樂的氛圍中，人們拍手支持，互相擁抱，高歌著，仿佛要告訴大家，美好的事快來到，這是共同創的事情，在音樂中找到了屬於自己的快樂，大廣場變得越來越像個音樂館，裡面擺放了各式各樣自製的樂器、服飾、圖畫以及林林總總的工具。
+
+這種現象非常令人感動。
+
+啦啦啦啦啦啦啦啦啦啦啦啦啦，啦啦啦啦啦啦啦啦啦啦，啦啦啦啦啦啦啦啦啦啦啦啦啦啦啦啦，在舞蹈中，氣球在天空舞動，地球也愉快地起舞。
+
+-
+
+然而，這種音樂的現象卻引起了幾位企業家的不滿。這些巨富的工廠家，他們擁有龐大的工廠，日夜不停地生產食物、衣物、動物、農作物等等，並將其輸出到全世界。
+
+本來，享受音樂是沒相干的，可是，這幾個月以來，加班的人卻大量流失，人們竟然為了這些抽象的旋律，無聊的音樂而放棄賺錢！？有什麼東西比錢還重要！？太豈有此理！
+
+幾位企業家做事從不拖泥帶水，他們決定要一把火燒毀廣場裡所有的東西。而且，斬草要除根，還有那個大叔！
+
+-
+
+月黑風高的晚上來臨，幾乎所有人也休息了，除了少數深夜加班的人。
+
+受人錢財、替人消災。
+
+火棍已經準備好了。幾個壞人瞄準大廣場，將幾十支火棍丟過去，然後匆匆離去，
+
+這一次，肯定可以把大廣場燒光了，企業家他們準備慶祝。
+
+就在這時，那些壞人告訴他們，天有不測之風暴，突然出現狂風異樣，幾十支火棍被狂風吹走了！
+
+但還不只這樣，你們的工廠也遭到這些火棍襲擊...現在非常危急！
+
+事情竟然弄成這樣，企業家差點想殺人。
+
+企業家他們匆匆趕去現場，他們發現，工廠並不是他們想像中那麼糟糕，只是一些小問題。
+
+企業家看著一個個的員工及時拯救了工廠，不然，真有可能一把火燒光工廠了！那些都是不加班的員工，因為加班的員工正在另一邊工廠工作。那些人不加班的人，原本就是企業家不喜歡的人，可是現在，可是...
+
+-
+
+企業家巨富請了音樂家大叔來他們的工廠，音樂的美妙企業家怎會不知道，然而，他們最想知道的是...
+
+有了音樂，人們可會願意加班嗎？但工作的速度呢？
+
+器材、電力費、系統的成本呢？
+
+播放優美的旋律？抑或播放沉悶的音樂？
+
+沉悶的音樂，會讓人更加專注工作嗎？.....
+
+音樂和勞工保險有著那些關係？....
+
+｛企業家真是企業家，我一生也沒想過這些問題。｝大叔心中唸唸。
+
+完
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-04-17-swimming-pool-restaurant-closed.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-17-swimming-pool-restaurant-closed.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0528e15b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-17-swimming-pool-restaurant-closed.md
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "游泳池餐廳結業"
+author: "東加豆"
+date : 2024-04-17 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/dgh2fyw.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+游泳池門外聚集了人群，都是熟悉的面孔，每天都是這樣，清晨六時半，告示板顯示｛可以進入｝，泳客就匆匆進去。
+
+
+
+不過，今天這群人在議論紛紛，他們發現了｛游泳池餐廳結業｝的消息，大家都感到非常可惜，畢竟泳池餐廳在這裡已經超過十年，有趣的是，這些泳客卻沒有人去過泳池餐廳，他們在這裡游泳也有十年八年，或者十幾二十年，都是很有泳歷的人。
+
+今天多了一個陌生人，他們看到一個未曾見過的｛四眼佬｝。
+
+｛四眼佬｝一定是｛中年初哥！｝。
+
+｛中年初哥｝在這裡的意思是，中年人開始著緊自己的身體，為健康儲糧，尋找適合自己的運動方式，游泳是其中之一。
+
+看這個四眼佬能堅持多久，大家都有這種想法。事實上有很多人匆匆來匆匆去，不到三個月就放棄了。
+
+｛四眼佬｝看著那些泳客，感覺他們介乎熟悉與陌生之間。
+
+熟悉，是因為他們的裝束和談論的話題。
+
+陌生，就是他們每一張面孔都感到陌生。
+
+｛四眼佬｝他叫阿仁。
+
+阿仁不是來游泳的，他是來把鎖匙歸還給體育館的職員。
+
+-
+
+淡入...
+
+｛阿仁｝是一名游泳愛好者，同時是一名廚師，他熱愛美食，自小就有一個夢想，他希望開設一家獨特的｛游泳池餐廳｝。
+
+他想像人們在水中暢游後，能夠品嚐他為泳客特意打造的美食，這種想法看似遙不可及，朋友告訴他這條可能是｛不歸路｝，阿仁覺得，｛不歸路｝也是｛夢想舟｝載著而行的，他決定去實現他決定了的事。
+
+在建造過程中，阿仁遇到了無數的困難和挑戰，資金短缺、設計難題、施工延期等等。每個問題都像是一塊巨石，擋在他的夢想之路上。但他從未放棄，因為阿仁的父親告訴他，最艱難的路永遠不是開始的時候！所以，他用堅定的信念，把一塊一塊的石頭搬開。
+
+阿仁絞盡腦汁想出了一份份的菜色，比如...
+
+｛浮力漢堡｝
+
+口號：一個巨大的漢堡包，搭配蓬鬆的麵包和多層肉餅。它不僅美味豐盛，還能為您提供額外的浮力，讓您在游泳時更加輕盈。
+
+｛海底撈麵｝
+
+口號：這道菜結合了海底撈和意大利麵的經典元素，讓您在游泳池中享受一碗豐盛的海鮮湯底麵條。
+
+｛浮樂園披薩｝
+
+一個特別的披薩，上面擺滿了各種浮球狀的配料，如浮球腸、浮球辣椒和浮球芝士，讓您在用餐時也能感受到游泳池的浮生力。
+
+｛跳水三明治｝
+
+這是名符其實的跳水三明治，裡面包含了彈跳魚、躍水蝦和飛翔火腿，愛跳水的您必選。
+
+｛游泳圈沙拉｝
+
+一個清爽的沙拉，裡面有各種新鮮的蔬菜和水果，並以游泳圈形狀擺放，使您更有夏日的清涼。
+
+｛翻滾魚塊｝
+
+這是一道有趣的小吃，裡面包裹著鮮嫩的魚肉，外面則是酥脆的麵包糠，讓您感受到翻滾裡的脆中之趣。
+
+｛游泳池炸雞｝
+
+這是一道經典的炸雞，但在烹飪過程中加入了一些額外的驚喜，如在雞皮上擺放小游泳池和浮球形狀的醬料。
+
+｛噴泉意粉｝
+
+精心製作而且豐富的醬汁和多種配料，每份意粉上都有一個小噴泉，您不用羨慕正在噴泉耍樂的泳客呢！
+
+｛泳池果凍｝
+
+這是一款清涼又美味的甜點，它使用各種水果和果凍製成，並以游泳池的形狀呈現。
+
+｛翻滾冰淇淋捲｝
+
+特別的冰淇淋以翻滾的方式製作，每個捲上都有小游泳池和浮球形狀的巧克力碎片，未下水已經透心涼。
+
+這些食物和廣告語經過了無數次挫敗，這是最完美配搭，拒絕和審批的是阿仁的兒女，女兒就讀小三，兒子讀小四。
+
+每年聖誕節，阿仁更會送出｛池中襪！｝給到來餐廳的泳客。
+
+｛游泳池餐廳｝終於開業了。阿仁滿心期待著每一位客人，希望他們在這裡得到滿足，美食與游泳那種雙重的享受。
+
+然而，這種快樂太短暫了...
+
+不到三年，餐廳的營業額就像跳水式直插下滑，管他付出了無數心血和努力，始終無法吸引足夠的客流。人們似乎對這個新穎的概念並不感興趣，或者只是來參觀一番，卻沒有真正走進來體驗，原來｛吃過返尋味、再吃舐舐脷｝不是理所當然的。
+
+往後那十年八年都是捱著走，他迫不得已製作一些傳統食品和飲品，甚至乎廉價食品，有人進來吃飽肚就算了。偶爾他看著空蕩蕩的餐廳，聽著泳池裡傳來的孤獨水聲，心中充滿了無奈與失落。
+
+日子一天天過去，阿仁的熱情逐漸被消磨殆盡。他開始懷疑自己的選擇，甚至懷疑人生的意義。
+
+一晚，當阿仁準備關門的時候，一個陌生的年輕人走了進來。他看起來有些疲憊，但眼神中閃爍著堅定的光芒。他告訴阿仁，他是從遠方趕來的，一直聽說過這裡有一家獨特的游泳池餐廳，今天終於有機會來品嚐。
+
+那一刻，阿仁的心中湧起了一股暖流，他有說不出的難過和感動，他意識到，即使只有一個人懂得欣賞他的努力，他的堅持也是值得的。他重新燃起了鬥志，決定繼續經營這家餐廳，直到最後一刻。事實，又怎會只得一個人欣賞他的努力？阿仁看著貼在雪櫃門的家庭照片。
+
+然而，游泳餐廳始終結業了，他心中充滿了感慨。
+
+｛謝謝你們來過。｝阿仁輕聲說。然後，他轉身走進了餐廳，關上了門，也意味著他放下過去和對未來的無畏。
+
+-
+
+...淡出
+
+六時三十分，告示板顯示｛可以進入｝，泳客們一一進去泳池更衣了。
+
+阿仁進入大堂轉去了另一邊。
+
+｛原來四眼佬不是來游泳｝有泳客說。
+
+｛白撞！｝另一個泳客說。
+
+完
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-04-18-pig-eyebrows-raising.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-18-pig-eyebrows-raising.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..49e9b8fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-18-pig-eyebrows-raising.md
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "戚豬眉"
+author: "東加豆"
+date : 2024-04-18 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/Xz9XTCK.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+一個名為｛豬仔學校｝的地方，有兩隻小豬，小樂和小貝。牠們不像其它小豬那樣，滿足於在泥潭裡打滾或在飼料自助餐廳裡大吃特吃。兩隻豬最渴望在天空中飛翔，自由自在，多麼的美！
+
+
+
+一天，小樂和小貝從巨大的｛滑梯式入口｝滑入校園，牠們最喜歡這種方式進入校門，刺激又愉快。然後兩豬偷偷溜進了｛呼嚕圖書館｝，找到了一本關於｛肥豬飛行秘技｝。牠們非常興奮，｛肥豬都可以飛！？小豬更不是問題啦！｝。兩豬覺得距離飛翔的想法又走近了一步，立刻就開始練習起來，結果卻不小心把圖書館弄得一團糟，校長是一隻嚴肅的老母豬，牠決定給這兩隻調皮鬼一個教訓，於是，小樂和小貝被罰面壁思過，還要抄寫｛豬蹄歷史｝。兩豬沒有沮喪，還在牠們的豬眉戚了一下嘿嘿一笑，覺得這正是青春該有的色彩。
+
+牠們趁著校長不注意偷偷溜出了圖書館，跑到｛豬園游泳池｝裡練習｛豬式呼吸｝、｛豬流體力｝、｛浮豬｝、｛推力豬｝，這一系列的動作對豬非常有益。總之，在水中做得越好，在天空中飛得越高。練習完，小樂和小貝就來到了豬操場。兩豬深吸一口氣，然後用力...一吹！
+
+奇蹟發生了！它們真的飛了起來！
+
+雖然只是短短的幾秒鐘，但對兩隻小豬來說，這已經是前所未有的體驗，兩豬忍不住叫起來！豬眉戚了戚下！旁邊的豬也嚇得叫起來。
+
+不幸的是，小樂和小貝的飛行表演被校長發現了。校長生氣地咆哮，命令牠們立刻回到教室去。小樂和小貝很樂意地向校長道歉，兩豬相視一笑，異口同聲地說：｛不跳皮，才是最可悲！｝然後，牠們又一起吹了一口氣，再次飛上了天空！這次飛得很高，比一棵大樹更高，大家也在嘩啦啦。
+
+校長看著這兩隻頑皮的小豬在空中飛舞，突然忍不住笑了出來。老母豬校長意識到，也許這就是青春的意義，盡情享受每一個瘋狂的瞬間，不留遺憾。因為將來誰不會變了嚴肅的姑姐婆婆？老母豬曾經也是一隻會發熱發亮的豬，不怕挑戰，不怕失敗。
+
+不過，現在始終還是一隻老母豬校長，小樂和小貝似乎犯規了，不懲罰牠是說不過去的，何況，豬生命只有一次，豬們可以大膽追求理想，同時也要珍惜這唯一的旅程。
+
+現在，豬仔學校多了一項｛飛行豬｝的科目，上空中充滿了歡笑，每當夕陽下山時，就能看到一群小豬在空中飛翔的身影。
+
+小樂和小貝戚著眉！
+
+完
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-04-21-social-mentality-in-post-epidemic-china.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-21-social-mentality-in-post-epidemic-china.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a05ecef3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-21-social-mentality-in-post-epidemic-china.md
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "后疫情中国的社会心态"
+author: "鹿馬"
+date : 2024-04-21 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/5YFk7MN.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "一个离岸观察者的臆想？"
+---
+
+我来聊聊作为离岸观察者对现如今中国社会的一点点观察。
+
+
+
+### 赞美的声音少了，批评的声音也少了
+
+疫情放开后的一年里，从等待到彷徨，再到对未来失去盼头，现在大多数国人都已经有了比较稳定的预期——我的国好像没有那么厉害了。从清零前期大国抗疫叙事下对集体主义的自豪，到清零后期和无预警放开之后的愤怒，现在的人们少了清零前期的自豪，却也不会像清零后期一样有那么多的批评。
+
+或许是大家希望赶快恢复正常的个人生活吧，对于和自己无关的有的没的，变得越来越无所谓。只要不把我封在家里，只要恢复了对自己生活的掌控感，过去的事情就让它过去吧，也不再去奢求大环境是好是坏。至于当下发生的事，只要自己不是受害者，血别溅到我身上就行。大环境不好，这个情况几乎谁都知道，心照不宣罢了。
+
+
+### 报复社会的行为多了，关心社会的声音少了
+
+作为在墙外的离岸观察者，在墙外经常能看到真真假假的国内恶性事件，包括但不限于当街砍人，开车冲撞类事件，同时各种仇杀暴力案件和自杀也层出不穷。不论是无差别的报复社会还是有针对性的暴力作案，在过去的一年里好像变得多了起来。但这些事件往往并没有得到社会应有的关注度。或许信息审查让这些事不能再墙内网络上广泛传播，但是这并不意味着普通人没有感受到日渐高涨的社会戾气，这些事情或许已经不需要大范围媒体报道，通过身边的人口耳相传也能略知一二。
+
+这些恶性事件政府当然知道，老百姓也不是一无所知，但谁也不把这个这一系列事件总结为一种现象摆到台面上说。官媒党媒肯定不报道这些消息来破坏安定祥和的局面，地方政府也不希望给自己找麻烦，民间自媒体也不可能大范围传播这些事情——一是怕自己账户报销，二是老百姓也并不希望看到这些新闻，负面情绪已经够多了，还是娱乐新闻和搞笑视频更受人民群众喜闻乐见。
+
+看看网红一杯猫“造谣”事件吧，一个编段子的网红先是在全网掀起了寻找虚构小学生“秦朗”的热潮，甚至连官媒都开始跟风报道，后来谎言败露，还惊动了警方立案调查，并对其行政处罚。就这么个屁大点的事，受到了官民的集体关注。网红编的故事是真是假，跟公共安全有个毛关系？媒体和网民是吃饱了撑的没事干了吗？至于对这种事情那么关注吗？
+
+就在一年多以前，我还对唐山打人事件的饱和式讨论现象颇有微词，认为对一般社会治安事件的挤兑试关注，正是由于允许讨论的自由空间不断缩小造成的，最终会让人对房间里真正的大象（当时是清零政策）视而不见。然而，我还是高估了下限——现如今整个社会却对网红编段子这样的连花边新闻都算不上的事大动干戈，而那些明明就波及到每个人人身财产安全事情却好像事不关己。社会从上到下的心态是病态的，病到连醉生梦死都降级成了更廉价的混吃等死。
+
+
+### 积极向上的少了，穷开心的多了
+
+与十年前的创业大潮不同的是，经历大国崛起和三年疫情的年轻人，仿佛越来越奉行识时务者为俊杰：要么靠近权力，进入国家扶植的重点行业（比如电动汽车，锂电池），要么干脆进入权力体系，挤破脑袋地考公务员。至于国企，并不是不想进——看看一家三代“铁路人”，一家三代“电力人”，再看看那个爷爷和爸爸都是银行行长自己长大也要当银行行长的那个小朋友，你会发现所谓国有企业已经严重板结为一个基层家族把持的小社会，针插不进水泼不进，越来越“县城婆罗门”化。那么距离权力相对较远的广大打工人呢？下班后让短视频占据自己的注意力，放假特种兵国内旅行，而曾经出国旅行的盛况不再。经济上追求安稳，思想上趋于保守，文化消费趋于廉价和低俗。看似又回到了疫情前的岁月静好，实则在没有盼头的心态下趋于萎靡。
+
+
+### 反思的声音少了，不想回忆的人多了
+
+虽然在前几年就出现了”反思婊“这种诋毁性的网络词汇，但是至少这个词汇出现意味着当时社会上有不少呼吁反思的声音，对爱国群众来说这种声量是如此刺耳，以至于他们发明出这么一个侮辱性地词汇，隔着屏幕都能感受到粉红们暴跳如雷呲牙咧嘴的气势。然而现在，呼吁反思的声音变得极其微弱，不要说什么几十年前的事情，就是几年前的疫情期间的事，大多数人好像也抱持者不想思考，不愿记起，得过且过的的心态。是啊，为什么要记起？不愿记起又何谈忘记？
+
+
+### 不关心，不去想，因为想了也没用
+
+站在墙外，看到维权事件变得越来越多，特别是烂尾楼业主，变相减薪裁员导致的维权，以及养老金等维权等等，这些事情实实在在地正在发生。像烂尾楼这样关系着千千万万普通人家庭的，得到全社会足够的关注了吗？难道是墙内信息封杀导致大家对此一无所知？事实好像并非如此，像恒大和碧桂园暴雷，多家房企烂尾，理财产品养老金暴雷，这些事情就算没有媒体报道，但是以其波及面之广，就算从身边的人那里也能听说到了。那么为什么好像社会整体看起来还那么淡定呢？我认为还是和大众的心态有关。
+
+经过三年疫情的洗礼，再到解封后的希望落空，处于彷徨状态的中国人，已经变得越来越不想看那些糟心事。人们更倾向于把所有糟心事都归结为“别人的事”，不论这件事离自己有多近。过去人们忙着赚钱，忙着改善自己的生活，因而不少人主动选择了漠视社会事件，而现在的情况是，每个人都想尽力保住自己所拥有的东西而没有闲心去关注别人，就算最后落到自己头上，那也可以安慰自己：大家都不好，到了那一步谁也没办法。
+
+疫情后一年多到现在，大众表现出来的社会心态已经让我感到并不乐观。我知道个人感觉这个东西是不怎么靠谱的，仅凭这些更是无法预料今后会如何。只是不知道，这到底是创伤后恢复期的平静呢？还是自我麻醉下可怕的平静呢？
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-04-22-construct-your-own-way-to-grow.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-22-construct-your-own-way-to-grow.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d92bff09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-22-construct-your-own-way-to-grow.md
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "构建自己的成长方式"
+author: "李BOBO"
+date : 2024-04-22 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/toIQUjG.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "关于终生成长的五个问题"
+---
+
+大多数人的“成长”是在“教育系统”里面完成的，比如学校，公司，单位，组织。因为系统会有自己的运行机制，所以在系统的人可以相对被动地处在一种“成长”的状态里面，尽管这些系统的成长方式和目标，并不一定完全符合所有个体的实际需求。
+
+
+
+另一方面，因为过于依赖现成的“教育系统”，很多人并没有去建设出一套属于自己的成长方式的意识，以至于一旦脱离了“教育系统”，他们就陷入了成长的停滞。
+
+这篇文章是我个人梳理的和“成长”相关的几个问题，回答它们也许可以帮助你思考如何建设出一个属于自己的“成长系统”，毕竟“成长”是一件让自己愉悦的事情，同时也是一个在外部视角看来，让自己变得更有价值的过程。
+
+
+### 问题一：你看见了什么？
+
+我觉得成长的第一步是“看见”，看见的核心目标是增加更多的信息量（知识量）。
+
+没有见过的东西，对于我们而言天然就更具有信息量，所以也会更吸引我们的注意。
+
+如果大家有看一些古代电视剧的话，我们可能会有这样的印象就是古代的一些皇帝会接见一些外国人，听他们介绍从外国带来的一些“珍奇异宝”。同样的，现代人去国外旅行也是同样的道理，大家都会觉得更新奇：跨文化的体验，最容易让我们在短时间内看到不同的东西，可以让信息量有一个更大幅度的增加。
+
+对于我自己而言，时不时地去接触不同的地方，不同的文化，不同的行业，就是去看见更多没见过的东西，如果一直生活在信息茧房里，每天接触类似的东西，能够给我们处理的信息都是有限的，成长，就更谈不上了。
+
+所以，在我看来，我们要成长的话，首先要先“看见”，多去看看那些之前没见过的东西。
+
+
+### 问题二：你是怎么看的？
+
+虽然都是“看见”，但是不同人看同一个“对象”会看出不同的东西。
+
+随便举一个例子，如果是看一个“杯子”，艺术家看的可能是杯子给到人的“感受”，化学家看的可能是杯子的“成分”，商人看的可能是杯子的“成本”，人类学家看的可能是杯子和使用者的“关系”.......不同人存在不同的视角，不同的视角会看到不同的内容，关心不同的问题。
+
+所以，除了去看更多的东西之外，如何获得更多的视角也是非常重要的事情，而视角的获取就需要和更多人去做交流，或者是阅读书籍。我们只有知道更多人不同的看法，才能对看到的东西了解得更加立体。
+
+从成长的角度出发，我喜欢和不同专业背景的人做交流，就是希望了解更多不同的“视角”，确切说是希望听到不同的人去提问，去了解不同身份背后的“问题意识”。
+
+
+### 问题三：你认为什么是好的？
+
+当有不同的视角出现的时候，对于同一个对象就有了不同的叙述，所以，“价值判断”也就开始出现了，简单讲就是：你认为什么是好的。
+
+同样一辆汽车，有人从速度的角度做叙述，有人从耐久的角度做叙述，有人从能耗的角度做叙述，有人从价格的角度做叙述，所以同样一辆汽车在不同的叙述视角下，有了好坏之分。
+
+同样一个社会，有人从社会主义的角度做叙述，有人从资本主义的角度做叙述；上帝有上帝的说法，佛陀也有佛陀的说法；中国有中国视角，美国有美国视角，日本有日本视角....
+
+在那么多不同的视角之下，选出、甚至创造出一个自己更认可的视角，然后用这个视角去理解世界，你就有了自己的世界观。事实上，这个过程也是一个建设自己身份认同的过程：你开始知道自己是谁，然后，以此为基点，建设出自己的世界。
+
+
+### 问题四：如何落地行动？
+
+当我们有了更多的看见，有了更多的视角，并且有了关于“什么是好的”的价值判断的能力，那么，就会有人开始想要去产生行动，去搞事情，把自己认为好的，或者对的事情去实践出来...
+
+然后，他们就会遇到很多具体的技术问题。
+
+解决技术问题需要很多实际的经验，一种方式是从理论入手，因为所有的实践经验都需要符合物理世界的运行规律，所以，在我看来，去学习类似于数学，物理等理工科的基础学科，以及一些具体领域的专业知识，可以建立一些整体性的认知。
+
+但是，直接从抽象的知识入手去学习，对很多学习者并不是很友善，直接上手操作，反而是更有效的学习方式，现在网络上有很多现成的教学视频，跟着一个专业的博主，按照对方的路径先实践出一个成果，再从这个实操的过程中理解抽象的理论知识，可能更具备普遍意义。
+
+
+### 问题五：经济如何持续？
+
+任何东西的可持续都是建立在经济可持续的基础上，如果个人的“成长”也需要变成一件可持续的事情，那么，“成长”也需要经济的可持续，这也意味着你的“成长”需要持续帮助更多人解决他们的问题。
+
+如果前面的那四个问题更多地是从自己的角度出发来思考自己的“成长”，那么第五个问题的思考角度就把自己的成长和他人产生了关联。
+
+-
+
+以上就是我理解的关于成长的五个重要的问题，为了更好地回答上述几个问题，我把自己的个人成长转变成了更具体的长期行动，包括：
+
+1. 建立一个社群，去聚集一些可以提供独立视角的伙伴，定期或者不定期地开展交流活动；
+
+2. 自己个人或者组织这些伙伴去到陌生的地方和领域去体验探访；
+
+3. 把自己产生的想法快速地投入实践，然后梳理总结成实践经验；
+
+另外一方面，基于这五个问题，我观察到中国的教育环境更引导人们去向后面几个更“务实”的问题，但是却没有给人提供接纳不同视角的空间，同时也不鼓励引发更多视角的存在，这也无形中影响到了人们做价值判断的精准度：
+
+你没见过更多的东西，没听过更多的说法，就缺乏足够的理由说自己已知的东西是更好的。
+
+当然，上述提到的这五个问题，以及为了解决这五个问题所产生的三个行动，也都是我非常个人化的经验，不一定正确。
+
+但是如果这些经验，也可以给你提供另外一种不一样的视角，那么这个“视角”本身似乎也成了构成你个人成长的其中一个参考元素了。
+
+以上。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-04-22-what-laws-did-chongqing-gas-company-violate.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-22-what-laws-did-chongqing-gas-company-violate.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..727c35a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-22-what-laws-did-chongqing-gas-company-violate.md
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "重庆燃气公司犯了哪些法律？"
+author: "江上小堂"
+date : 2024-04-22 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/jCSIgBf.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+重庆燃气公司燃气表多收费事件有了处理结果。公司总经理被免职，退回了多收用户的燃气费，远程校准了燃气表。
+
+
+
+
+
+燃气公司让燃气表多计量的做法让我想起以前教科书上控诉黑心地主“小斗出，大斗进”的伎俩：地主用小斗出借给农民粮食，而在农民归还粮食时用大斗计量。两者如出一撤，都是在计量器具上做文章，达到多收多占的目的。光天化日之下，无异于赤裸裸的抢劫。
+
+严格说来，重庆燃气公司不仅应当受到行政处罚，还应受到法律的处罚。在我看来，重庆燃气公司至少触犯了三项国家现行法律规定。
+
+首先，违反了《中华人民共和国计量法》。《计量法》第二十七条规定，“制造、销售、使用以欺骗消费者为目的的计量器具的，没收计量器具和违法所得，处以罚款；情节严重的，并对个人或者单位直接责任人员依照刑法有关规定追究刑事责任”。
+
+其次，涉嫌商业欺诈。燃气公司与用户之间是合同关系。而燃气公司以欺瞒的手法多收费，可以按合同诈骗罪处理。
+
+第三，主要负责人犯有滥用职权罪。《刑法》第三百九十七条规定，“国家机关工作人员滥用职权或者玩忽职守，致使公共财产、国家和人民利益遭受重大损失的，处三年以下有期徒刑或者拘役；情节特别严重的，处三年以上七年以下有期徒刑。”重庆燃气公司是国有企业，履行政府授予的提供公共服务职能。国企高管也属于滥用职权罪的主体。
+
+但主要负责人多半不会移交司法机关立案调查。这个就不细说了。
+
+有些不可思议的是，重庆燃气公司为何会干下如此下作和愚蠢的事情呢？这样明目张胆地侵害广大用户的利益，明显会被发现，会引起公愤，引起强烈的舆论反弹。上头肯定顶不住舆论压力，会出手整治嘛！最终吃进去的东西还会吐出来，吃不到狐狸还惹身骚，所为何来？稍为有点政治头脑都会预料到这样的结果，不会犯这样愚蠢的错误。
+
+可能是逼急了，亏损严重。一则成本减不下来；二则现在各地财政都非常困难，没有什么补贴了。自己的孩子自己抱，自己想办法弥补亏损。各部门各想各的招。比如说城管可以加大力度查违章，增加罚款收入。燃气公司呢，还有供水和供电，调价不可能，价格由发改委管着的，只剩下偷量这一招了。形势比人强，顾不了那么多，先把眼前的窟窿堵上再说。事情败露了，那也引起了上级主管部门的注意，总得给些补贴吧！俗话说，“会闹的孩子有奶吃”，捅个娄子出来，虽然会挨打，但可能也会得到糖吃。
+
+但这娄子捅得太大，严重激发社会矛盾。虽说有难处，难以完成既要不亏损，又要不能减成本，还要不能提价的不可能任务，那也不能不顾全大局，“摆烂”和“破罐破摔”，做给人看。纯粹是给政府出难题，加深民众的信任危机。政府要解决这个难题，要么给补贴，要么提高水电气价格。前者财政吃紧，后者加重广大居民的负担，都是很难办的事情。
+
+
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diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-04-23-the-essence-of-tanking-is-learned-helplessness.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-23-the-essence-of-tanking-is-learned-helplessness.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2920ff1f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-23-the-essence-of-tanking-is-learned-helplessness.md
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "摆烂的本质是习得性无助"
+author: "番茄米线"
+date : 2024-04-23 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/SgND5Xg.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+有个变态科学家把三组狗放进三个笼子里。A组狗面前是控制电的操控杆，B组啥也没，C组是逃过一劫的对照组。然后科学家给AB通电，A组狗很快发现只要推动操控杆就可以停电，而B组狗什么也做不了，只能默默忍着。然后科学家又把狗换到另一个被一个板子隔开、一边通电另一边不通的笼子，狗事先放在通电的一边。再次通电后，A、C组狗本能地就跳过隔板润了，而B组狗则是什么也不做默默忍着。
+
+
+
+那我们换成人，人摆烂的原因很简单，就是发现努力没有毛用。但是我们又发现，要达成一个我们大部分时间想要的目标，比如数学学霸，比如财务自由，比如脱单，比如练成施瓦辛格，都需要长时间的努力和自律，所以努力一下发现没达到目标是很正常的事，经常达不到目标那就习得性无助，就摆烂了。当然还有另一种情况，那就是开始自我谴责不能吃苦，每天都怀着吃了苍蝇屎心情用羞耻感逼迫自己去自律，最后往往情绪崩溃，遂摆烂。
+
+但是我们又发现，为什么有的人就可以一件事坚持很久很久，然后你就想卧槽这个人太牛逼了太自律了，太能吃苦了，然后开始谴责自己怎么做不到。但有没有一种可能，你和那个自律的人本质目标就不一样。你的目标是数学考到100分，所以你只要考不到100分那就是没达成目标，就陷入习得性无助；但另一个人的目标就是研究数学，他喜欢的是学习本身，他只要在研究数学就很快乐，只要学到了一点数学知识就很爽，即便可能他只能考80分。你俩现在都只能考80分，你每天吃苍蝇屎逼自己学数学，每次开始学习前都要进行大量心理建设；他每天学数学爽的一批，对他来说学数学那就和打游戏一样爽。然后一年过去了，他考到了100分，你考了85，然后你觉得哇他简直太自律太能吃苦了，其实他真没你能吃苦。再举个例子，为什么老实人只能当舔狗，而渣男的泡妞技术炉火纯青？因为老实人的目标是脱单，而渣男则享受泡妞本身的这个过程。结果老实人只要一次出击被拒绝就陷入习得性无助；而渣男则是只要出击他就快乐，不管结果如何。结果就是，老实人想脱单却没法脱单，渣男目标不是脱单却轻易脱单。
+
+我一个初中同学喜欢画漫画，后来都画了两三本漫画了，但他的目标并不是画一本漫画出来，而是他享受画漫画本身的过程；另一个同学动不动就写小说，现在应该写了十万多字了，他一开始的目标也不是要写十万字的小说，而是享受写小说本身的过程。以我自己为例，我所有技能树里最牛逼的是历史社会学哲学这类，而奇怪的是我从没去刻意学习这些，我一般是吃饭的时候看看，就当娱乐一样；反而是我很努力学的东西比如数学、物理、化学——这些东西说实话难度比哲学低，数学难度应该和哲学一样——我却怎么学都学不会。我的哲学水平三年前比数理化差远了，但现在远远超过，而数理化还是三年前的水平。
+
+也就是说，你特别看重目标，反而会失败；你不看重目标，反而才能达到目标。这就是人类行为与学习模式的客观规律，虽然听着离谱，但是却不可违背。辩证法说，量变到质变，要先有量变才会有质变，你都没有量变就想一步登天，那你和黑格尔马克思的哲学体系至少要崩溃一个。
+
+
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diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-04-23-three-major-ruptures-in-modern-chinese-history.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-23-three-major-ruptures-in-modern-chinese-history.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f091c12d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-23-three-major-ruptures-in-modern-chinese-history.md
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "中国近现代历史上的三次大断裂"
+author: "江上小堂"
+date : 2024-04-23 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/Eg8synZ.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+一个国家处于巨大的外部压力和内部冲突时，其政治与社会结构必然会出现重大调整以消除内部矛盾和应对外部压力，重新建立一个稳定的结构。这个调整期或长或短，主要取决于国家的规模与组织结构的复杂度及对外部世界的态度。
+
+
+
+中国的近现代历史，从“鸦片战争”始，到“中华人民共和国”的建立，就是一个长达100多年的调整期。历经多次内外部冲突，才最终建立起的一个稳定的政治与社会结构。
+
+单从内部冲突来看，有三次比较显著的“大断裂”。一次是“辛亥革命”，继之以“北伐战争”，归结于“国共大决战”。愈往后，社会的断裂面一次比一次大，政治动员一次比一次下移，民众对政治的卷入一次比一次广泛，矛盾冲突越来越剧烈与残酷。
+
+为何如此？主要取决于两个因素。一个是经历过内部冲突后，是否达到了预设的政治目标；其次在于整个社会最薄弱的层面位于何处。
+
+中国近现代历史的根本命题是如何成为“强国”，这成为当时国民的共同诉求与社会共识，无论政治领袖、社会精英或者一些普通民众都有这种强烈的愿望。虽然他们可能在如何“强国”上有重大分歧，但要“强国”却是共同。无论是“戊戌变法”也好，“洋务运动”也好，还是“辛亥革命”也好，“五四新文化运动”也好，“爱国”也好，“卖国”也好，都是为了“强国”这一最终的政治目标。
+
+但是，所谓的“强国”是个什么内容呢？在当时的中国人，甚至现在的许多中国人看来，所谓“强国”就是自己的事情自己的政府说了算，不容许其它国家干涉，也不受外部世界价值的影响。就是要独立于世界体系与西方国家建立的规则之外。所以，“强国”实际是就是要恢复与建立一个强大的国家政权，摒弃清政权那样对外软弱的政权。
+
+所以，我们来看，第一次重大分裂，“辛亥革命”发生在统治集团内部，是不奇怪的。因为清政权是“家天下”加“族天下”，在统治集团内部有着重大的利益冲突。在整个金字塔结构中，塔尖的某一横断面是最薄弱处，就是汉人官僚与满清皇族之间的衔接处。原因在于满清是少数民族统治，汉人官僚与底层的联系比与清廷的联系更强。
+
+但是推翻清廷之后，北洋政府对外仍然非常软弱，没有满足大部分人的政治期望。北洋政权是一非常脆弱政治平衡，是一个非稳定平衡系统，小的扰动就会让它失去平衡，不可能长时间保持平衡。它的内耗非常大，比清廷更难整合国家的政治力量，对外形成合力。北洋时期虽然可以是走向宪政民主的起点，但因为缺乏坚实的宪政政治基础，又缺乏外部力量强有力的规制，更主要的是建立强大的政权是中国预期的政治目标，所以，会更容易滑入集中与加强政权权力的轨道。袁世凯想称帝，孙中山要建党国，都是为了要集中和加强权力。
+
+那么，第二次大分裂“北伐战争”，就发生在社会的中层，发生在以“革命党”为核心的国民政府与以旧官僚为核心的“北洋政府”之间，发生在两个事实上不相隶属的政权之间。冲突层面下移，更多的中下层民众卷入进来，冲突也主要集中在城镇。但国民党夺取全国政权后，还是对外软弱。它同样对外要依赖美国、在它统治期间日本对中国的侵略还进一步扩张。还是无法满足大部分人的政治期望。所以，社会结构就还需要调整。
+
+相比而言，国民党政权比北洋政权和清廷对外要强硬些，收回了不少的主权。但因为它仍然没有完全满足人们的政治预期，所以，它仍然是一个非稳定平衡，只是稳定性要比北洋政权和清廷高一些。那么，第三次分裂就发生在社会底层，发生在统治集团与被统治者之间。广大的底层民众，主要是农民卷入进来了。共产党通过“发行群众闹革命”将冲突由城镇扩大到了农村。这一次冲突更接近于中国过去历史上的“农民起义”。但也有许多重大的区别，在此不论。
+
+最终，通过这次天翻地覆的冲突，中国社会进行了自下而上，全方位的整合，消除了分散的权力，重新建立起一个比历史上任何时期都更加强大的国家政权。借助于外部世界的组织与技术手段，中国终于又实现了独立于世界与世界规则之外的愿望，以一种自虐的方式，付出了极为惨痛的代价，将外部势力从中国彻底赶了出去，将外部世界在国家政权软弱时对中国施加的影响也彻底清除了出去。这才完全实现了先前预设的政治目标，而收敛于一个稳定平衡状态。它具有相当高的抗扰动能力，至少在一定阶段是如此。
+
+殷鉴不远，我们可以问一问，当今中国是否具有比较一致的政治目标，如果有，是什么？对不对？以及当今中国社会最薄弱的横断面位于哪个层面？
+
+2011年12月20日
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-04-24-spider-web-knots.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-24-spider-web-knots.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3b6bc2bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-24-spider-web-knots.md
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "蜘蛛網的結"
+author: "東加豆"
+date : 2024-04-24 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/QXA5M93.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+在灰色夜幕的小城中，孤獨和失落是｛子進｝唯一的朋友，他靜靜地走在空蕩蕩的街上，直到一隻黑色蜘蛛進入了他的視線，它正在吐著柔軟的絲線，編織一張飄渺而神秘的網。
+
+
+
+子進從未見過真正的蜘蛛在織網，它輕易地踏過每一根絲線，而所有絲線都被精心安排在特定的目標，給人一種無形的壓迫感，彷彿被織網的力量所束縛。
+
+子進看著那張網，有點似曾相識，就像他曾經穿過的舞衣，輕盈而飄渺，彷彿隨時都會被風吹走，子進的心被深深觸動，回憶如同海浪湧進來，他想起了一個人，那個曾經讓他心動的一個人，雖然那個人已經離他而去。
+
+子進從來沒有聽過有人用｛蜘蛛精｝來形容一個男人，而且是他很愛的人。
+
+｛柯旭｝他看起來一表人才、溫文爾雅、純真，這個年代很少有這種男子的。
+
+一表人才、溫文爾雅、純真，從來只有別人這樣形容子進自己，如今讓他遇見一個這樣的人，子進無法控制自己對他心動。
+
+身邊不斷有人告訴他，柯旭的確是一表人才，可是溫文爾雅和純真卻無法認同，講不出口。
+
+子進的父親怒罵地說：｛你要愛男人即管愛飽他！但無論怎樣看，這個人都是心術不正！｝
+
+子進感到很苦惱，周遭的反對聲浪如同蜘蛛網般困住了他。親朋好友將柯旭比作有毒的蜘蛛精，警告子進遠離。子進滿腦子疑問，子進看著柯旭都是一片彩虹，怎樣人們看他都是昏暗？子進感到難過，也替柯旭不值，他心中的愛意變得越來越堅韌，如同蜘蛛絲，無法輕易割斷。
+
+意外的是，子進發現柯旭對他的愛並不普通，是情深的。兩人的感情在眾人的質疑和壓力下綻放，子進如同黑夜中的蜘蛛網，雖然微弱，卻堅定地閃爍著光芒。
+
+他們在月光下纏綿，那些溫柔的時光彷彿就在眼前，可是現實卻殘酷地告訴他，一切都已成為過去。儘管他一直在掙扎過去的思念，無法抗拒過去的渴望，子進就像那隻被困在蜘蛛網中的蚱蜢，明知危險卻又無法自拔。
+
+當他明白為什麼別人看到昏暗，而只有他看到彩虹時，一切都已經太遲了。子進並不知道，另一邊有一個蜘蛛的世界正在運行中，大蜘蛛操控著一切。
+
+大蜘蛛手中有八隻小蜘蛛棋子，柯旭只是其中的一隻小蜘蛛。
+
+小蜘蛛手中也有八隻棋子，子進只是小蜘蛛其中的一隻棋子。
+
+蜘蛛的世界是很可怕，它們不會被金錢和物質所引誘，它們要的是身份和愛情，它們會精心地策劃，一步步的誘惑，使愛情變得殘酷無情的欺騙。
+
+深夜，子進走進那間充滿回憶的房間，再次看到那件黑色的舊舞衣，輕盈而飄渺，彷彿隨時都會被風吹走，這一刻，他意識到，應該讓風把它吹走，只要接受現實，一切都會重新開始，儘管心中仍留有遺憾和悲傷。
+
+子進看著前面兩行路，他會選擇他想要的...
+
+完
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-04-26-glowing-disco.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-26-glowing-disco.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2aa6eb3c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-26-glowing-disco.md
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "發光發熱的士高"
+author: "東加豆"
+date : 2024-04-26 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/hLbItLM.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+在現實世界裡，人總覺得很沉悶，所以他們會尋找各種方法來填塞滿自己，比如是娛樂，或者似是而非充實的生活。
+
+
+
+｛高士的｝正是看中了這種現象，他研究了一種叫｛的士高｝的玩樂，在未來的科技世界一直醞釀中，現在，是時候發光發熱了。
+
+有音樂、雷射、情感和技術的元素，還有神秘的歌舞廳，很寬闊、無限大的空間，他不相信會有人抗拒的。｛的士高｝的音樂不僅能夠震撼人心，而且透過雷射直接就會影響人的大腦感官，讓他們體驗到前所未有的感受。
+
+｛高士的｝有一種特殊的能力，他是吟遊詩人，不僅吟詩妙絕，更會創造他的音樂，他的歌聲能夠引領激光的舞動，可以控制激光的軌跡和強度。高士的日以繼夜徘徊在的士高。｛光加熱就等於火、火加歌就等於我。｝這是高士的經常說的話。
+
+一切也是｛高士的｝的想像。
+
+踏入此門，人群瞬間被一股無形的力量所吞噬。空氣中瀰漫著一種獨特的香薰，據說能激發最深處的欲望，讓人每呼吸一次都會變得貪婪。
+
+強烈的音樂撲面而來，像海浪一樣把人吸進這瘋狂的氣氛中。舞池裡，音樂和影子交錯，人群隨著節奏搖擺，仿佛被一種魔法在操控，迷失了自我。
+
+酒吧台旁，五光十色的酒液在燈光下流轉，像是液態的蠱惑。人們舉杯痛飲，甘心被液體的魔力洗去內心的疲倦和困惑。
+
+空氣中瀰漫著暧昧和欲望的氣味，每個人都似乎沉浸在一種狂歡中，忽略了時間，忽略了自我，他們並不介意狂歡背後將會是什麼。
+
+｛光加熱就等於火、火加歌就等於我！｝
+
+這就是｛高士的｝想要｛的士高｝的效果，在這裡他可以操控任何事，他喜歡看著人們的脆弱和迷失、愚笨和沉溺。高士的想要人們像他一樣孤獨，或者他要像人們一樣瘋狂。
+
+然而，高士的認為一切都是等於他的時候，一個名叫｛休止符｝的人出現了在的士高，休止符是另一個組織的人。休止符的任務就是消滅高士的，因為該組織認為，激光和聲音技術應該是他們控制的，光加熱和火加歌更加就是等於他們，怎可能落在一個叫高士的那個人身上？而且，他所有元素都充斥著毒素，怎可以讓他加害這裡的人？
+
+當｛休止符｝出現在高士的眼前，他愣住了，動也不動。高士的看著眼前的女人，美麗得讓人無法形容，美麗得不能再美麗！
+
+在昏暗的燈光下，休止符緩步逼近，仿佛將高士的繞其中。她眼中閃爍出深沉光芒，每一步都透著堅決。高士的被這氣勢所攔，動彈不得。當他開始懷疑時，心頭湧起一股莫名的緊張感，仿佛被她的氣息牢牢鎖定，可是，已經太遲了。
+
+這裡的音樂開始被扭曲、音跑掉、歪歪斜斜。雷射激光失常，無法對目標進行精確打擊，它可以影響人的大腦，同時也會造成嚴重傷害。高士的突然清醒過來，他不再相信眼前的休止符，世間上不可能有這樣的美人！
+
+他決定要離開這裡，高士的決定要離開的士高！因為再逗留在這裡，會令人窒息、神經失常、百病纏身、一無所有。保住性命最關鍵，的士高可以再創造，至於那些人...由它罷！
+
+高士的馬上逃亡，他脫離了休止符，脫離了那個組織。休止符並沒對他狂追猛打，只要沒有人踩過界，只要不影響他們的地盤。不然，他們就會攞他的命。
+
+高士的逃走了，他跑得很遠很遠，頭也不回。然而，當他停下來的時後，身後竟然有一大群人。高士的看著這班人，全是陌生的面孔，這些人看高士的卻是一張熟悉的臉。
+
+最後，高士的發現，他們都是的士高裡的人。
+
+這時這刻，這些人竟然還要做他的追隨者。
+
+完
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2024-04-28-three-times-passing-by-the-house-without-entering.md b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-28-three-times-passing-by-the-house-without-entering.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b09c1d47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2024-04-28-three-times-passing-by-the-house-without-entering.md
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "“三过家门而不入”"
+author: "江上小堂"
+date : 2024-04-28 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/NCA1c07.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "儒家忽视亲情的家庭价值观"
+---
+
+大禹“三过家门而不入”是人们耳熟能详的故事，传递了一种价值理念，对中国人的认知和行为有实质的影响。传说中，大禹是夏朝的第一位君王，大禹是后人对他的尊称。因治理洪水有功，受舜禅让帝位。他则将帝位传给了儿子，将传贤的禅让制改为传子的家天下。
+
+
+
+这则故事最早见于《孟子·滕文公上》，“禹八年于外，三过其门而不入”。司马迁在《史记·夏本纪》中则说，“禹伤先人父鲧功之不成受诛，乃劳身焦思，居外十三年，过家门不敢入”。一个说是在外八年，一个说是在外十三年。孟子明确说三次过其家门而不入，司马迁则没有说有多少次，但解释了禹不入家门的原因，是对父亲鲧（gǔn）治水失败被杀而感到难过，一则想将己之功补父之过，二则担心自己也落得父亲一样的下场。因此劳身伤神，一心扑在治水上，不想因回家探望而耽误了治水。
+
+后人综合孟子和司马迁之言，演绎出“三过家门而不入”的故事。摒弃了司马迁对大禹的动机解释，而将大禹不入家门解释为自觉自自愿，“舍小家顾大家”，并丰富了故事细节。《百度百科》上说，“大禹第一次经过家门时，听到他的妻子因分娩而在呻吟，还有婴儿的哇哇哭声。助手劝他进去看看，他怕耽误治水，没有进去；第二次经过家门时，他的儿子正在他妻子的怀中向他招着手，这正是工程紧张的时候，他只是挥手打了下招呼，就走过去了。第三次经过家门时，儿子已长到10多岁了，跑过来使劲把他往家里拉。大禹深情地抚摸着儿子的头，告诉他，水未治平，没空回家，又匆忙离开，没进家门。”这就纯粹是文学想象了。
+
+我理解“三过家门而不入”，这个门不是具体指他家居所的门，而是泛指他家居所所在地。好比说大禹家在北京，他去天津公干要路过北京。如果回家探望妻儿的话，要耽误不少时间，影响公事。于是没有在北京停留，直接去了天津。不能解释为他都到家门口了，听到了他老婆在家里哭，却不进家门。这太不合逻辑和情理了。一则大禹的家不太可能在交通要道上，是大禹公干的必经之路。二则都到家门口了，用几分钟见个面问候一下，或者花个把时辰聊聊各自的情况，增进一下与妻子和孩子的感情，又能有多大影响呢？进一下家门就会耽误国家大事？这种小作文拿今天的话来说，就是“高级黑”。不合逻辑和不合情理地极端吹捧。
+
+儒家当然对大禹“三过家门而不入”赞赏有加。儒家的最高价值就是“忠”和“孝”。“三过家门而不入”符合“忠”的价值，也不违背“孝”的价值。孔子说道：“禹，吾无间然矣。菲饮食而致孝乎鬼神，恶衣服而致美乎黻冕，卑宫室而尽力乎沟洫；禹，吾无间然矣。”（《论语》泰伯第八）；意思是说对于大禹我鸡蛋里挑骨头都挑不出什么来。显然，儒家对禹的这种行为至少是不介意的，儒家既没有指责禹这种行为，也没有对禹的这种行为感到不安，但按现在的法律，大禹长年在外不回家，如果也不为孩子的成长提供经济来源，则可能犯有“遗弃罪”。
+
+虽然儒家也重视家庭，但却有严重的缺陷，内容单一，就是一个“孝”，而没有“爱”。儒家的家庭价值忽视、轻视和剥夺父母对子女天然的爱心；儒家的家庭价值忽视、轻视和剥夺配偶之间的情爱，它只关心只要求子女对父母的孝顺。在禹这一案例中，禹的父母已亡，只有妻子儿女，所以儒家不在乎他不回家。如果禹的父母还在，他也不回家探望的话，儒家对他的评价会发生变化吗？我想，会有一些变化。我以为，儒家虽然仍然会肯定他为民治水的功德，同时也会对他不回家看望父母而感到不妥，感到不安，就不会那么对他大加赞赏了。
+
+儒家的家庭价值忽视、轻视和剥夺父母对子女天然的爱心，轻视和剥夺配偶之间的情爱，有太多的支持事例。什么程婴“搜孤救孤”呀，易牙“蒸子献食”、吴起“杀妻求将”、刘安“杀妻为食”、“刘备撇妻弃子”，等等，多得不胜枚举。但儒家对这些行为大多赞赏，至少没有进行过批评。儒家只在乎孝，所以编出“二十四孝”那么变态的东西来宣扬“孝”。儒家有过褒扬对子女的爱心吗？没有！儒家有过褒扬配偶之间的情爱吗？没有！儒家只宣扬过为了君王为了自己牺牲子女；从来没有宣扬过父母为了保护子女、丈夫为了保护妻子而牺牲自己。虽然这种事例由于人的天性而大量发生，但我们没看见儒家宣扬这种行为。
+
+在这样的价值导向下，传统中国人没有把小孩与妻子当作一个独立的生命个体，而只是当作他的财产，看成可以投入可以牺牲而换来自己荣华富贵的资产。中国人轻视生命的价值由此可见。所以，过去溺死女婴和现在强制堕胎都是有文化基础的。在传统社会中，父母和子女的关系，特别是父子关系其实是很紧张的。无论帝王官宦之家，还是平民百姓之家，小孩在成长过程中及至成人后，都需要时时刻刻听从父亲的耳提面命。但同时，却得不到父亲的关爱。母爱的本能倒不受孝的太大抑制。《红楼梦》中的贾宝玉，能得到奶奶和母亲的百般宠爱，但却得不到他父亲的关爱。他与他父亲的关系非常疏远，可以说是敬而远之，惧而远之。
+
+因而，儒家的家庭价值观确实是有重大缺陷的。第一，它只重视家庭关系的一个维度，就是子女对父母的服从，对父母的责任与义务，而忽视父母对子女的情感与责任，忽视配偶之间，主要是丈夫对妻子的情感。民间所谓一日夫妻百日恩这种说法，我以为是来源于佛家的姻缘说，而不是来自于儒家。第二，“孝”也并不是子女对父母亲情的适度反映。在儒家那里，“孝”超越了亲情，而转化为一种权力结构，一种对权威的服从。权力结构表现在宗法家族层面，具有强制力；权威表现在家庭层面，受强大的社会舆情支持。归根结底，儒家的“孝”体现的不是父母与子女的对等权利关系，而是一种权力关系。
+
+那么，如果要建立起现代文明社会，“三过家门而不入”的这种君权至上、“国家至上”的价值观念就应当被抛弃，重视家庭价值是建立现代文明社会非常重要的一个方面。家庭关系必须建立在家人具有平等权利的基础之上。在平等的基础之上，子女对父母的尊重与回馈，父母对未成年子女的保护与爱心、配偶之间相濡以沫的情感，才会得到自然而健康的展现。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/1899-09-30-PeterKropotkin-a1_r-memoirs-of-a-revolutionist-8-exile-in-western-europe.md b/_collections/_heros/1899-09-30-PeterKropotkin-a1_r-memoirs-of-a-revolutionist-8-exile-in-western-europe.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..74e7822d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_heros/1899-09-30-PeterKropotkin-a1_r-memoirs-of-a-revolutionist-8-exile-in-western-europe.md
@@ -0,0 +1,660 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title: "革命家忆・西欧亡命"
+author: "彼得·克鲁泡特金"
+date: 1899-09-30 12:00:00 +0800
+image: https://i.imgur.com/jLRShN0.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+position: right
+---
+
+`我在西欧活动之目的——在爱丁堡及伦敦小住——向《自然》杂志及《泰晤士报》投稿——离英赴瑞士——国际工人协会与德国社会民主党——国际工人协会在法国、西班牙、意大利的发展`
+
+
+
+我们驶近英国海岸的时候，北海里起了大风暴。可是遇上这个风暴，我并不觉得苦，反而非常高兴。看着我们的轮船与汹涌起伏着的波涛互相冲击，我觉得是种享受。我坐在甲板上，浪花打着我的脸，有好几个钟头。在一个阴暗的暗炮台里住了两年以后，我身体内部的每根纤维，这时似乎全都在作生命的颤动，全都急于要去享受一种十分充实的生活。
+
+我本来只打算在国外停留不超过几个星期或几个月：只要等因我的越狱而引起的喧嚣惊扰平静下去，同时我的健康恢复一点，我就回俄国去。我上岸时，用的名字是拉瓦旭夫，这就是我离开俄国时用的假名；为了不去立刻会受俄国大使馆的密探跟踪的伦敦，我先到了爱丁堡。
+
+然而事与愿违，到西欧以后，我竟然永远没有再回俄国去。当时西欧安那其主义的运动，正是方兴未艾，我不久就加入进去了；我当时觉得，如果我留在西欧帮助大家去阐明发扬安那其主义，一定比回俄国去工作的好处大。在俄国，知道我的人太多了，我决不能去作公开的宣传，尤其是在工人农民中间；而且到了后来，俄国革命运动变成了秘密谋叛及反抗专制政体代表的武装斗争，自然一切企图组织民众运动的念头会被抛弃；我的性情则更倾向于劳动群众，使我愿意与他们共命运。在他们中间传播可以有助于指导他们去努力使劳动者全体获得最大的利益的思想，使那些作为将来社会革命的基础的理想及原则深化扩大；在劳动者面前，把这些理想和原则详解申说使之成为劳动者自身理性的结果，而不是领袖下的命令；还有，启发他们自己的首创精神，使他们知道他们现在正被要求作为一个社会组织的公道模式的建造者而出现在历史舞台上——这些事在我看来，对于人类的发展都是必要的，我如回到俄国，所能做的事，不会比这些更重要。因此我便参加了在西欧向这个方向努力的少数人的行列，接替那些因为多年艰苦斗争而趋于崩溃的人。
+
+我在赫尔上岸，到了爱丁堡，把我平安到英的消息只告诉几个俄国和汝拉同盟的朋友。一个社会主义者无论在什么时候都要靠自己的劳力去维持生活，所以我到苏格兰的首府以后，在市外租了一间小房，立刻就去找工作。
+
+在我们船上的旅客中，有一位挪威教授，我和他谈话，想把我以前学过的一点瑞典文温习一下。他会说德文，但是他向我说：“你既然会说一点挪威文，而且你还想学它，我们就用挪威语谈话好了。”
+
+我大胆问他：“你是指瑞典话吗？——我说的是瑞典话，对不？”
+
+“呵，我想这大概是挪威文，无论如何决不是瑞典文。”他这样回答我。
+
+J.凡尔纳的小说里，有一位主人公本来想学西班牙话，但是弄错了，学了葡萄牙话，我正和这人一样。不管怎么说，我和这位教授谈得很多（就说是挪威文罢）。他给我一份在挪威京城克利斯蒂安尼遏出版的报纸，里面载着新近返国的挪威北大西洋深海探险队的报告。我到了爱丁堡，立刻用英文写了一篇关于这次探险的文章，寄给《自然》杂志，我在圣彼得堡时常与我的哥哥合看这杂志，从第一期起，就没有间断过。副编辑接到了我的文章，写信来表示感谢，并且用极其宽容的态度说我的英文“很好”，只是需要更“符合英语习惯一点”。以后，我在英国常常遇着人向我说这样的话。我在俄国时本已学过英文，而且还和我的哥哥合译过佩奇的《地质学之哲学》及斯宾塞的《生物学原理》。但是我的英文是从书本上学来的，而且发音很糟，所以我和我的苏格兰女房东说话时，要使她了解我的英语，困难极了。她的女儿和我时常把我们要说的话写在纸上；因为我不懂得普通习用的英语，当然要弄出许多非常可笑的错误来。我还记得有一次和她在纸上笔谈时，我向她抗议道：在喝茶时我所要的并不是“一杯茶”，而是好几杯。我的本意是说我多要几个杯子。我担心我的房东以为我是馋嘴。但是我要为我自己辩护说，在我读过的英文地质学以及斯宾塞的《生物学原理》里，对于喝茶这样的大事，连个提示也没有。
+
+我接到俄国《地理学会学报》以后，就开始写一点关于俄国地理探险的消息向《泰晤士报》投稿。蒲利叶瓦尔斯基当时正在中亚细亚，他的旅行在英国引起许多人的注意。
+
+可是我身边带来的钱用得非常之快，而凡是我寄到俄国去的信件全被扣留，没有办法可以使我的通信地址为我的家属和亲戚们知道。因此几个星期以后，我就去伦敦，希望在那里能找到一份比较正规的工作。俄国老亡命者P.L.拉甫罗夫继续在伦敦出版他的《前进》；但是我当时打算不久就动身回俄国，而这俄国报纸的编辑部一定受到密探的严密监视，所以我没有去找他。
+
+我自然到过《自然》杂志的编辑部，它的副编辑司各脱·克尔提君十分诚意地接待我。他们这时正要把“论著札记”栏扩充，觉得我写的文章正合他们的意思。于是他在编辑部里给我指定一张桌子，上面堆着能够搜集到的各国文字的科学杂志。副编辑向我说：“拉瓦旭夫先生，每星期一请你来把这些杂志大略看一遍，如果有你觉得有值得介绍的论文，就请你把它的大意写出，或是在那篇论文上作个记号，我们就送给一个专家去审定。”克尔提君自然不知道我每写一篇介绍文，常常抄改三四遍，才敢把我的英文拿给他看；不过我可以把这些科学杂志带回家去，不久我便一面替《自然》杂志写“论著札记”，一面向《泰晤士报》投短文，我就这样维持生活。《泰晤士报》按星期给报酬，每星期四将稿费付给投稿人，我觉得这个办法极好。不用说，有几个星期关于蒲利叶瓦尔斯基的探险没有什么重要消息，俄国别处的新闻他们又不感兴趣；在这种时候，我除了面包与茶以外，便没有别的东西可吃了。
+
+然而有一天，克尔提在书架上拿出好几本俄文书，请我写一篇评论在《自然》上发表。我一看那些书就感到为难，——那都是我自己的关于冰河时代和亚洲山志的著作。我的哥哥没有忘记把这些书寄给我们爱读的《自然》。我当时简直不知所措，只好将这些书放在我的书包里带回家去，把这件事细细想一下。
+
+我问自己：“对这几本书，我怎么办呢？这是我自己著的书，当然不能称赞它们；然而我的意见与书中的完全一致，对作者也不能严词批驳。”我只好决定第二天把这几本书带回去，向克尔提声明我以前用的拉瓦旭夫这个姓不是真的，这几本书是我的著作，我不便加以评论。
+
+克尔提在报纸上本已知道克鲁泡特金越狱的消息，这时发现这个亡命者平安地到了英国，非常高兴。对于我的为难，他想出了一个聪明的办法：我无须申斥也不必表扬作者，只把书的内容告诉读者就行了。从那天起，我们就成了朋友，一直到现在。
+
+1876年11月或12月，在P.L拉甫罗夫的报纸“通信栏”里，我看见一个启事：请“K”到该报编辑部去，领一封从俄国来的信。我想这大概指的是我，我便到该报编辑部去，不久，我就与拉甫罗夫和印刷这报纸的年轻人结成朋友。
+
+我第一次到《前进》编辑部去的时候，胡须全剃了，戴着一顶高帽，尽力用我的最好的英语，向那位替我开门的太太说：“拉甫罗夫先生在办公室吗？”我当时以为如果我不说出我的姓名，不会有人知道我是谁。但是好像这位太太立刻就把我认出来了，她跑上楼去告诉人：这位客人是谁——其实她从来没有和我会过面，不过我的哥哥在苏黎世的时候，这位太太和他很熟。她后来对我说：“我一看见你，立刻就认了出来，因为你的眼睛让我想起你哥哥的。”
+
+那一次，我在英国没有停留多久。我当时与汝拉同盟里的朋友J.吉约姆频繁通信，我一旦找到较长期的地理工作，在瑞士也可以做，与在伦敦没有什么不同，我就搬到了瑞士。后来终于接到从俄国来的信，说在俄国当时并没有什么重要事可做，劝我还是留在国外。
+
+在那时候，斯拉沃尼亚人正在反抗土耳其的年长月久的压迫，俄国全国有许多人很热烈地支持他们；我的最好的朋友塞尔该（即斯捷普尼亚克）、克尔尼支和另外几位，都到巴尔干半岛去加入革命军。我的朋友写信给我说：“我们在《每日新闻》的通信里读到在保加利亚的恐怖行为，我们读的时候总是流泪，于是就去加入巴尔干的起义者，充当志愿兵或是去做看护。”
+
+我到了瑞士，加入国际工人协会的汝拉同盟，听从瑞士朋友的劝告，定居在拉·绍得封。
+
+汝拉同盟在近代社会主义发展史中占有一个重要的位置。
+
+无论什么政党，在成立的时候，总要规定它的目的，而且当众宣布：不完全达到这个目的决不满足，但是到了后来，它就会分成两派。一派仍然致力于已定的方针；另一派虽然宣称对当初的目标一点也没有改变，但是接受某种妥协，一次又一次，渐渐的妥协惯了，离开最初的党纲愈来愈远，终于变成一个头痛医头、脚痛医脚的改良党。
+
+在国际工人协会里也发生了一次这样的分裂。国际工人协会最初公布的目的乃是剥夺现在地主和资本家的财产，把生产财富的一切资料交给生产者自己。协会要求各国劳动者组成他们自己的组织来直接与资本主义斗争；而且要他们找出使财富之生产及其消费社会化的方法；一旦时机成熟，劳动者准备这样做时，就占有生产的必需资料，并且由他们自己管理生产，而不管本身需要进行彻底重建的现有的政治组织。因此协会必须成为在人的头脑中，随后在人的生活方式中准备发动一次巨大革命的工具。——这一革命会替人类打开一个以所有人的团结为基础的进步的新纪元。就是这个理想唤醒了几百万酣睡着的欧洲劳动者，把其中最聪敏最有识见的分子吸收到协会里来。
+
+但是不久，国际工人协会也渐渐分成了两派。这时是在普法战争以后，法国完全战败，巴黎公社的起义又被武力镇压了，法国政府还制定了严厉的法律，禁止法国工人加入国际工人协会；而在另一方面，议会政体已经被“统一的德意志”所采用（这是1848年以来激进派的目的）。这时候，德国人作出努力要修改整个社会主义运动的目的与方法。这一派自称为“社会民主党”，他们的口号是“在现存的各个国家内部夺取权政”。德国议会选举时，社会民主党的最初几次胜利引起了很大的希望。社会民主党议员的数目，由两个增加到七个，不久又增加到九个，于是就有些本来颇为理智的人自信地估计，不到十九世纪终了，社会民主党就要在德国议会中占大多数，他们就可以用适当的立法手段来实现那个社会主义的“平民国家”了。社会民主党的这一社会主义理想渐渐地失去了它本来的性质，不再主张由劳工组织自己动手，而主张由国家经营各种工业——事实上即是国家社会主义；而国家社会主义实即国家资本主义。现在瑞士的社会民主党在政治上努力实现中央集权制反对联合主义，在经济上提倡铁道由国家经营，银行业务由国家垄断，酒类由国家专卖。下一步便是在较远的将来由国家经营管理土地、主要工业、甚至财富的消费。
+
+德国社会民主党的生命与活动被渐渐地完全置于选举考虑之下。他们蔑视工会，反对罢工，因为这两件事都分了劳动者的心，使之不能集中在选举斗争上。在那几年中间，欧洲任何国家的每一次民众暴动和革命鼓动，都会受到社会民主党领袖们的仇视，甚至仇视得比资本家的报纸还要厉害。
+
+但是在拉丁各国，这个新趋势所得到的追随者并不很多。国际工人协会的各部门、各联合会依旧忠于协会成立时多数公认的原则。拉丁民族的劳动者历史上自来主张联合主义，厌恶中央集权国家这种主张，而且有着革命的传统，当然不能追随德国人的演变。
+
+社会主义运动里这两派的分裂在普法战争以后立刻就明显起来。我在前面已经说过，协会当时设立了一个总管机构，名为总委员会，驻在伦敦，总委员会的中心人物是两个德国人：恩格斯和马克思；这个机构成了社会民主党方向的据点；而在拉丁各国，劳动同盟的鼓舞者及精神上的领导人则是巴枯宁和他的朋友们。
+
+马克思派和巴枯宁派之间的冲突并不是他们的个人的事情。这是联合主义与中央集权主义之间、自由的公社和国家的父权统治之间、人民大众的自由行动与用立法手段以改善现存资本主义状况之间必然的冲突——这是拉丁精神与德意志精神之间的冲突；德国在战场上战败了法兰西以后，这德意志精神还要在科学、政治、哲学上，甚至于在社会主义上争霸，把自己的社会主义的概念称作“科学的”，而把所有其他方式的理解称为“空想的”。
+
+1872年，国际工人协会在海牙举行的大会上，伦敦总委员会用了虚构多数这个办法把巴枯宁和他的友人吉约姆开除，甚至于把汝拉同盟也从协会里排斥出去。但是因为协会中未被除名的分子大多数（即意大利、西班牙与比利时的各同盟）一定会与汝拉同盟取一致行动，这次大会便想把国际工人协会解散。他们提名的几个社会民主党人在纽约成立了一个新委员会，当时在那里并没有一个劳工团体是加入国际工人协会的，所以没有人监察他们，后来就再也没有听见人谈起这回事了。同时，协会里的西班牙、意大利、比利时与汝拉各同盟继续存在，并且此后五、六年间还和以前一样，每年举行一次国际大会。
+
+我到瑞士的时候，汝拉同盟在当时要算是国际工人协会的各联合主义的同盟的中心和发言人。巴枯宁刚死去（1876年7月1日），但是汝拉同盟依然保持着它在巴枯宁的推动之下所取得的地位。
+
+当时在法国、西班牙和意大利情形恶化，要不是国际工人协会的工人保持着普法战争前的革命精神，那么这三国政府便会采取决定性的步骤来摧垮劳工运动实行白色恐怖。现在大家知道，当时的法国波旁王朝的复辟差不多就要成为事实。麦克马洪元帅能够留着做共和国的总统，只是为着准备皇室复辟；连亨利五世庄严地进入巴黎的日期都已决定了，甚至于马具（镶以那个篡夺王位者的王冠与姓名的第一个字母）也都已齐备。这个复辟计划之所以没有实现，全是因为甘必大和克雷孟梭（机会主义者与激进派）在法国许多地方成立了许多武装了的委员会，如果有人敢实行这个政变，他们马上就起来反抗。但是这些委员会的真正的力量还是在工人；他们中间许多是以前国际工人协会的会员，没有失掉那原有的革命精神。据我个人所知道的，我敢说中产阶级激进的领袖们在危急的时候也许会踌躇不进，然而工人会抓住机会实行起义，首先去保卫共和国，然后也许会向着社会主义方向前进的。
+
+在西班牙情形也是一样。只要国王左右的教会和贵族的分子包围着国王，使他加紧实行反动，共和党人立刻就会以发动一个运动去威吓他。他们知道，在这个运动中真正能够战斗的分子是工人。在加泰鲁尼亚一省，坚强组织起来的工会会员在十万人以上，国际工人协会的西班牙会员在八万人以上，他们以真正的西班牙人的责任感定时举行大会，按期缴纳协会会费。我到过西班牙，我说的关于这些劳工组织的话都是我自己所深知的，我知道当时他们已经准备成立西班牙合众国，放弃殖民地的统治，并且在一些最先进的地区，在实现集体化方面作了认真的努力。正是这种始终存在的威胁使西班牙王朝不敢镇压所有的工农组织，不敢公然实行教会的反动。
+
+意大利的情形也类似。意大利北部的工会的势力，虽然还没有像现在这样强大；但是有些地区，国际工人协会的支部和共和党的团体已如星罗棋布。意大利君主政府天天在那里担心中产阶级的共和党人如果真与工人中的革命分子携手，它的末日便要到了。
+
+总之，回想起距今已有二十五年的那些年代，我坚决相信1871年后欧洲之所以没有经历一个严酷的反动时期，原因大半在于这种革命精神——这精神在普法战争以前勃兴于西欧，以后又被国际工人协会的安那其主义者、布朗基派、玛志尼派与西班牙的主张地方自治的共和党所保持。
+
+马克思主义者当时专心从事他们的各地选举竞争，对于这些情况所知甚少。他们害怕俾斯麦的雷霆会打在他们的头上，尤其害怕一种革命精神在德国出现会使政府采用高压手段，而他们的力量不足以去对付它，于是他们不但为了策略起见拒绝给予西欧革命者以任何同情，而且渐渐地对于革命精神也憎恶起来。无论哪一个地方只要有革命精神出现，他们就恶狠狠谴责它——甚至在看到俄国出现了革命精神的最初苗头时也是如此。
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+在麦克马洪元帅的总统任内，没有一份革命的报纸可以在法国印行，甚至于唱《马赛曲》都被当做犯罪行为；1878年5月我在法国旅行，火车到了一个车站，有几个新兵在唱这支革命歌曲，同车有好几个乘客听见后害怕起来，彼此焦虑地相问：“难道又许唱《马赛曲》啦？”我看见这情形非常惊异。在法国，这时自然没有社会主义的报纸了。当时西班牙社会主义的报纸编得却很精彩，有几次，他们的大会宣言便是安那其社会主义的极好的阐释；但是在西班牙境外，有什么人知道西班牙人的主张呢？至于意大利社会主义的报纸，它们都是短命的，出版了不久就停版，后来换一个名字换一个地方再出；其中虽然有一些很好的报纸，但总不能够销到意大利境外。在这种情形之下，汝拉同盟以及它的那些用法文出版的报纸，当然就成为拉丁各国维持和表现那革命精神的中心了——这种精神拯救了欧洲，使它免于一个非常黑暗的反动时期。巴枯宁和他的追随者们用一种全欧洲大陆所了解的语言阐明安那其主义理论的概念时，也是以这个汝拉同盟为基地。
+
+-
+
+`汝拉同盟及其重要分子——定居绍得封——瑞士禁止红旗——一个新社会组织`
+
+当时汝拉同盟里面有不少各国的杰出人材，他们差不多全是巴枯宁的私人朋友。同盟的主要刊物《会报》的主笔J.吉约姆是一位教员，出身于纽夏德尔的贵族家庭。他的身材瘦小，颇有罗伯斯庇尔的刚毅果断，又有着一颗真正的黄金的心，但是只有最亲密的朋友才能感觉到：他的工作精力是那样异乎常人，他的活动是那样一丝不苟，真是一位天生的领袖。八年来他和种种阻力作斗争，以维持这个刊物，对于同盟中一切事情，无论大小，全都极其积极地参与，但是到了后来，在瑞士什么工作都找不到，他不得不移居法国，从事教育的改革。有一天法国教育史上会非常尊敬地提到他的姓名的。
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+另一个瑞士人席威次加伯尔属于乐天、活泼、眼光敏锐的这种类型，在伯尔尼的汝拉山中，说法语的钟表匠里这种类型的人是很多的。他的职业是钟表雕刻匠，他从来没有想抛弃他的手艺工人的地位，哪怕是在本业不旺，挣钱有限的最困苦时期，他也很快活很勤勉地工作，以养活他的那一个大家庭。他会提出一个经济的或政治的难题，经过细细思索以后，从工人的视角去考察这问题，而不失其最深刻的含义，这种才能令人叹服。在“山中”无论远近的各国工人中，他是个人人敬重喜爱的人物。
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+另外有一个瑞士人与他恰恰相反，那是斯皮席革耳，也是一个钟表匠。他是个哲学家，行动思想都很迟缓，外貌像一个英国人；对于每一事实他总想把它的意义弄得清清楚楚，他一面雕刻表盖，一面默想着种种问题，他所得的结论总是非常公正，使我们大家感受很深。
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+在这三人的周围，聚集了不少忠实诚恳的中年和老年工人，他们都爱自由，非常高兴来参加这个大有前途的运动，还有一百名左右聪明活泼的青年，大半也是钟表匠——他们个个不依不靠，相亲相爱，非常活跃，随时准备着不顾一切地去牺牲自己。
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+巴黎公社的亡命者中，也有好几个加入了汝拉同盟。如大地理学家爱利塞·邵可侣便是其中之一。他在生活方式上是一个真正的清教徒，其头脑又像一个十八世纪法国百科全书派哲学家；这个人能鼓舞别人，但从没有支配过也决不想支配别人。他是一个安那其主义者，他对于在一切气候下在一切文明阶段的人类生活方式之知识异常渊博，他的安那其主义不过是这种知识的一个概括；他的著作应列入十九世纪名著之林；他的文体有一种惊人的美，读了使人的心智良心为之感动。这个人走进一个安那其主义的杂志社时，便会开口对编者（即使这个编者比起他来只能算是个孩子）说：“请告诉我让我干什么？”于是他坐下来，像报馆里的助手，去把本期刊物里若干行的空白填满。在巴黎公社时期，他拿着一支枪站在队伍里。如果他请一个人和他一起编纂他的世界闻名的《地理》中的某一卷时，对方胆怯地问他：“我要做些什么？”他的回答是：“书在这里，桌子在这里，你愿意做什么就做什么。”
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+除了邵可侣外，还有上了年纪的勒弗郎塞，以前是一个教员，他已经三次亡命外国：第一次是在1848年6月革命以后，第二次是在拿破仑三世政变以后，第三次是1871年巴黎公社失败以后。他是前公社委员之一，当时大家都说，所有公社委员离开巴黎时，每个人口袋里都装有好几百万。但是他却在洛桑做铁路搬运夫，这种只有壮年人干得了的工作几乎送了他的命：有一天，他和另外三个工人一起从货车里卸下一块铁板，铁板太重，差点儿把他压死。他的那本关于巴黎公社的著作，是一本把那个运动的真正历史意义予以恰当的阐明的书。他会说：“请注意，我是一个公社派，不是一个安那其主义者。我是不能和你们这些蠢人在一起工作的。”但是，他除了我们以外，不愿和别人一起工作。他自己说过：“因为你们虽然都是蠢人，但是我最爱的人。和你们在一起，一个人可以工作而保持他自己的一切。”
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+另外还有一个前巴黎公社委员与我们在一起，那是潘狄。他是来自法国北部的木匠，后来成了巴黎人。他在一次受国际工人协会援助的罢工里，由于精力和聪明出众在巴黎得到很大的名声，并被举为公社委员，公社又提名他为土伊勒里宫的司令。凡尔赛军队进巴黎时大批地枪杀他们的俘虏，巴黎城内各区里，至少有三人是因为被人误认作潘狄而被枪杀的。但是在战斗以后，幸而有一个勇敢的姑娘，一个女裁缝，把他藏匿起来，军队来搜查的时候，她的镇静救了他的生命，后来这位姑娘便做了他的夫人。十二个月以后，他们才得以安然离开巴黎，没有被人认出。他们来到瑞士，在瑞士他学会了金属化验，成了个技艺高强的化验员。他白天在他的那个赤热的炉边度日，夜间便热心地从事宣传工作，他进行宣传的时候能够把一个革命者的激情与巴黎工人所特有的见识与组织能力巧妙地结合在一起。
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+保罗·布鲁斯当时还是一个年轻的医生，头脑灵活机动，性好热闹，锐敏、活泼，对于任何思想都要用几何般精确的逻辑推究到它的最终结论；他的对于国家及国家组织之批评十分有力。他居然有时间同时编辑两个刊物：一个法文的，一个德文的，还写了许多长篇大论的信。他又是工人晚会的灵魂；经常以一个真正的“南方人”的细致的头脑去积极组织人们。
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+在瑞士与我们合作的意大利人中间有两个人的姓名总是连在一起，而且在意大利不止一代人会记着他们。这两个人都是巴枯宁的好友，一个是加费罗，一个是马拉铁斯达。加费罗是一个极高尚极纯洁的理想主义者，他把他的很大的家产献给了革命事业，而且从此也不问自己他明天将如何生活。他是一个善于哲学思辨的思想家，一个从不肯伤害任何人的人，然而有一次，他和他的朋友们以为可以作一次带有社会主义性质的暴动的尝试，纵使不成功，也可以使民众明白他们的暴动不仅是对税收官员的反抗，还应该有更深的意义。这样决定以后他便拿起一支枪到贝内文托山里去了。
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+马拉铁斯达是一个医科学生；他为了革命抛弃了他的医生专业和他的财产。他充满着火一样的热情与智慧，是一个纯洁的理想主义者，现在他已经快到五十岁了，可是他一辈子从没有想过：今晚能不能有一块面包充饥，夜间能不能有一个宿处。他连一间可以说是他自己的房间也没有。他日里在伦敦街头卖冰冻果汁水维持生活，夜间替意大利的报纸写出色的文章。
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+他在法国入狱，期满释放后被驱逐出境，在意大利被捕定罪，流放到一个岛上；他逃出来，化装回到意大利；无论是在意大利，或是在别国，他总是在斗争进行得最激烈的地方——他坚持过这种生活，已经连续有三十年了。无论是在他由狱中释放或从岛上逃出以后，我们再见着他，他总是依然如故；总是重新投入战斗，总是那样爱人。对于他的敌人和狱卒，总是毫无仇恨之心；对朋友，总是那样恳切地微笑；对于小孩，总是那样抚摩爱护。
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+在我们中间，俄国人并不多；他们大多跟着德国社会民主党去了。但是我们有茹科夫斯基。他是赫尔岑的朋友，1863年离开俄国。他是一个才华出众，英俊而极其聪明的贵族，工人们都喜欢他——他有法国人所说的“平民的耳朵”，在这一点上，我们其余的人都不及他，因为他知道怎样指点给工人看：在这个社会改造的工作里他们要起多么大的作用，使他们振作起来；他会向工人陈述那高瞻远瞩的历史眼光去提高他们的精神境界，他会把最复杂的经济问题给他们解释得非常明白。他的热心与诚恳又能使听众心情振奋。还有索科罗夫，以前是俄国参谋总部的一位军官，他崇拜路易·库里埃的气魄与蒲鲁东的哲学思想。他在杂志上发表的文章使许多俄国人相信了社会主义。这个人也和我暂时在一起。
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+我在这里仅仅举出那些因为是著作家、大会代表，或者其他原因而出名的人。但是我要自问，我是否应该提那些姓名从来不曾见之于文字的人，他们在维持汝拉同盟一事上所尽的力并不下于任何著作家；我是否更应该提出那些在队伍里战斗的人，他们以普通一兵的身份战斗，随时准备参加任何行动，不计工作之大小，是出众还是平常，其后果是否伟大还是将给自己和家人造成无穷的苦恼。
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+我本来还该提及德国人威尔纳和林克以及西班牙人阿尔巴拉青以及其他许多人；但是我的文笔太无力了，恐怕不能把这小团体里的每一个人所引起的那些熟识他们的人的敬爱之心充分传达出来，使读者也同样地感觉到。
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+在我所知道的瑞士城市中，最不吸引人的恐怕就是拉·绍得封了。它在一个寸草不生的高原上，冬天暴露在侵骨的寒风之下，那时积雪之深与莫斯科相同，雪融了又落，落了又融，次数之多，又像在圣彼得堡。但是把这个城市当做一个宣传我们的主义的中心，使地方的宣传更有生气，这却是很重要的。潘狄、斯皮奇革耳、阿尔巴拉青以及布朗基派的斐勒与查罗两人当时都在那里，我还可以不时去纽夏德尔去看吉约姆，到圣·伊美去看席威次加伯尔。
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+我所喜欢的一种充满了工作的生活现在开始了。我们时常开会，亲自到咖啡店和工场里去散发我们的通告。我们的支部会议每星期开会一次，开会时讨论极其生动热烈，我们也到各政党所召集的会上去宣传安那其主义，我还时常旅行，去参观别地方的支部，帮助它们。
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+在那一个冬天，我们赢得很多人的同情，但是我们的正规工作，却因钟表业的危机大受阻碍。有一半的工人，或是完全失业，或是只作半天的工，结果市政厅不得不设立公共食堂，将只收成本的价廉的伙食供给工人。安那其主义者在拉·绍得封设立的将挣来的钱平均分配给每个成员的合作工场，虽是信誉卓著，这时候也很难接到活儿。斯皮奇革耳好几次为了维持生活不得不去替一个室内装饰商做梳羊毛的工作。
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+那一年，我们全体都参加在伯尔尼举行的红旗示威运动。当时反动浪潮蔓延到了瑞士，伯尔尼警察竟敢违背宪法禁止手执工人的旗帜。因此我们必须有所表示，使人知道至少还有一些地方的工人不能容忍别人践踏他们的权利，他们要出来反抗。在巴黎公社纪念日，我们全体到伯尔尼去，不顾警察的禁令，高举红旗在街上游行。这自然免不了要和警察发生冲突，两个同志受了刀伤而两个警官伤得颇重。但是这面红旗却平安地到了会场，在那里开了一个热烈异常的会。不用说，那些所谓的领导人也都在队伍里和其余的人共同战斗，将近三十个瑞士人被牵连在这个案件里受审判，他们全体要求对他们提出公诉，打伤警官的人也自动地出来承认。这使我们的运动得到很多同情；人们明白一切自由必须拼命保卫，不被人夺走。因而法庭的判决非常轻，至多也不过是三个月的监禁。
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+然而伯尔尼政府依然禁止在本市任何地方手执红旗；汝拉同盟为了反抗这个禁令，决定在圣·伊美（我们那一年正在那里举行大会）手执红旗游行。这一次，我们中间大多数都带了武器，准备即使流血也要保卫我们的旗帜。一个广场里驻扎着一队警察预备阻止我们的队伍前进；还有一队民团以打靶为名在附近一个空地里等候——我们在街上游行的时候，清楚听得他们的枪声。但是我们到了那个广场的时候，根据形势可以判定：如果向我们进攻，一定会发生大流血，市长只好让我们继续前进，一直走到准备在那里开会的会场，路上没有人敢捣乱。我们中间没有一个人希望与军警发生冲突，但是在军乐声中做着战斗准备的进军，使我们是那样地斗志昂扬，我简直说不上来，我们刚到会场的时候我们中大多数是一种什么样心情——是因为免于一场我们并不愿意进行的战斗而自慰呢，还是由于战斗没有发生而觉得惋惜。人这东西是非常复杂的。
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+不过我们主要的努力却是在使安那其社会主义在理论及实践两方面，都完备起来。在这一方面，汝拉同盟无疑有一些难以磨灭的成绩。
+
+我们看到在文明国家里有一种新的社会形式在萌芽，它一定会代替现在这个旧的。在新社会里，人人平等，没有一个人会被强迫去把他的体力或脑力卖给那些随意雇用他们的人，大家都能在这样一个机体中把他们自己的知识和能力应用在生产上；这个机体的构成使所有的努力都可以联合起来，以求为所有的人获得最大可能的福利，同时为每一个人的主动精神的发挥提供了充分的自由的天地。这个社会由许多团体联合组成；这些团体的联合是为了达到一切必需联合起来才能达到的目的：工会联合是为了从事各种农业、工业、智力方面的以及艺术方面的生产；合作社联合起来是为了消费，提供住房、煤气、食物、卫生设施等等；然后是合作社彼此之间的联合，合作社与工会之间的联合；最后是包括一个或好几个国家的更为广大的组织，它们由合力以求满足不限于某一特定区域的经济、智力、艺术和道德方面的需要的人所组成。所有这些团体，都用自由协议的方法，直接联合起来，恰与现在各国铁路公司和邮政局一样，用不着一个中央铁路政府，或一个中央邮务政府，也能一起合作——纵然铁路公司仅以自私的营利为目的，而邮政局属于许多不同的而且时常彼此敌对的国家，但仍无碍于他们的合作。又如现在的阿尔卑斯山各登山、滑雪俱乐部，大英帝国的各救生艇站以及气象学者、自行车运动员、教员等等为了各自共同的事业联合起来，或是为了求知的目的，或仅仅是为了娱乐。对于新的生产形式、新发明、新组织之发展将有完全的自由；这个社会鼓励个人的主动精神，而对于一切倾向于一致与集中的趋势，则加以劝阻。
+
+而且这个社会还会继续不断地修改它的形式，而不会集中成为某种固定不变的模式，因为它将是一个活生生的、进化的机体；不会感到需要有个政府，一则因为现在各国政府所认为是它们的种种职能那时全都用自由协议和自由联合去执行；二则因为冲突的根由在数量上将会减少；即使还有冲突发生，也可以提交仲裁解决。
+
+我们里面没有一个人不知道，我们所希求的变革是非常重大，非常深远的。我们明白现在流行的意见总以为土地、工厂、矿山、住宅等等必须归个人私有，才能求得工业的进步；而且为了强迫人们去作工，工资制度也是不可缺少的。我们很知道这些意见一时不会为社会化的所有制和社会化生产这些更高的观念所代替。我们都很知道要经过很久的时间，要有不断的宣传和一长串的斗争，对于现在私有财产制度的个人和集体的反抗，个人的牺牲，要为了重建社会的部分的努力和部分的革命，才能改变现在流行的财产私有的观念。我们也明白现在的文明人类决不会而且不能摒弃“强权是必要的”这个思想（我们大家也都是在这思想里培养出来的）。一定要经过多年的宣传，一长串对强权之部分的反抗行为，而且还要把从历史演绎出来的教训加以彻底修改，才能使人们认识到：把事实上从他们自己的社会感情和习惯所引申出来的东西看作统治者及其法律的成就，那是大错特错了。这一切我们都知道。不过我们也知道：在这两方面宣传改革，我们应该顺应人类进步的潮流。
+
+我和工人阶级以及同情他们的知识分子更为接近以后，不久就明白他们珍惜他们的个人自由更甚于他们的个人幸福。五十年前，工人情愿把他的个人自由卖给形形色色的统治者（甚至于卖给一个专制暴君）以换得一个个人丰衣足食的许诺；然而现在情况不再如此。我看出在拉丁各国工人中间，那种对于当选的统治者盲目的信仰已经在消失了——纵使这当选人是从劳工运动的最好的领袖中挑出来的，他们也不肯再盲目地信任他了。“我们必须首先知道我们要什么，然后我们自己去干，能干得最好。”这个思想在工人中间是非常普遍的——远过于大家平常所相信的。写进国际工人协会的章程里那句话“工人的解放是工人们自身来完成”，大家对此都有同感，而且在工人的心中生根。巴黎公社的悲惨的经验只是证实了它。
+
+巴黎公社起义爆发的时候，许多属于中产阶级的人也准备在社会化方向作一新的开始——至少是接受这一新的开始。爱利塞·邵可侣有一次对我说：“当我的哥哥和我两人走出我们的那个小房间到街上去的时候，四面八方都有许多中产阶级的人走过来问我们：‘请告诉我们，现在应该怎么办？我们愿意试试来一个新的开始。’但是我们当时还没有准备好来提出方案。”
+
+从来没有一个政府能够像1871年3月25日所选举的公社委员会那样公平地代表所有的进步党派。在这个委员会里一切革命党派，如布朗基派、雅各宾派、国际工人协会派等等各派的代表人数的比例是符合实际的。但是因为工人们自己对于社会改革没有明确的想法要求他们的代表去付诸实施，所以公社政府在这方面一点事情也没有做。而且，政府人员把自己关在市政厅里与民众分离；结果是使政府趋于瘫痪。因此如果要使社会主义成功，一定要在宣传社会化所有制和社会化生产以外，同时还要宣传废除政府，自力更生，个人的自由主动精神的思想——一言以蔽之，安那其主义的思想。
+
+我们的确预料到如果个人被赋予了思想和行动的自由，我将面对我们的原理的某种过度的夸张。我在俄国虚无主义的运动中便见过这样的事。但是我们相信（而且经验证明我们是对的），社会生活本身，在对思想和行为之坦白开明的批评的支持之下，便是一个弄清楚各种意见并去除其中夸张的成份的最有效的方法。实际上，我们是按照一句老话行事：医治自由的一时的弊害，最明智的方法还是自由。人类中有一个社会习惯的核心（这是过去遗留下来的，大家还不十分了解它们），这些习惯不是靠强制来维持的，它们超乎强制之上。人类的进步正是以这个核心为基础的。只要人类在肉体与精神两方面不开始堕落，那么不管这个核心受到何等的批评与偶尔的反抗，它们也不会被毁掉。我的对人对事的经验愈增，我对这个意见也愈加肯定。
+
+同时我们也明白，这样的一个变化决不能是一个伟大的天才的臆测的产物，这也不是一个人的发现。这一变化必须是民众的建设性工作的结果，恰和中世纪初期制定的诉讼程序形式、乡村公社、同业工会、中世纪都市以及国际法的基础一样，都是由民众自己创造出来的。
+
+在我们以前已经有许多人致力于描画理想的联合体了，有的以权威的原则为基础，有的（在一些少见的场合）是根据自由的原则。欧文和傅立叶发表了他们关于有机地发展的自由社会这一理想，以与那些抄袭罗马帝国和罗马教会而来的金字塔式的理想对抗。蒲鲁东继续了他们的工作，巴枯宁把他的渊博明晰的历史哲学见解用来批判现有制度，“在破坏中建设”。但是所有这一切都不过是准备工作而已。
+
+国际工人协会对于解决各种实际的社会学问题创出一个新方法：便是请工人自己去解决。那些加入协会的知识分子仅仅告诉工人：世界各国在发生些什么以便分析现有的结果，并随后帮助工人形成他们的结论。我们并不妄想，根据我们的关于社会应该是怎样的理论见解造出一个理想的联合体来，我们不过请工人自己去探讨现社会弊病的原因，请他们在讨论时以及开大会时，把那个比现社会好一点的社会组织的实际面貌加以研究。一次国际大会上提出的一个问题应当成为所有的劳工团体研究的题目。在这一年中，在全欧洲各支部的小集会上，大家本着对于各业各地方的当时的需要的充分了解，来讨论这个问题；然后各支部讨论的结果在各联合会的下一次会议上再提出来讨论；这个问题渐渐有了更精密、更完满的形式，最后提交给下次国际大会。那个我们所渴望的未来社会的结构就这样由下而上，在理论和实践两方面创造出来；这个安那其主义的理想之趋于精密的过程，汝拉同盟的功劳实在不小。
+
+至于我自己，我处在那样好的环境里，也就渐渐明白安那其主义所包含的不仅是一个行动方式，也不仅是一个自由社会的概念，它还是一个自然哲学与社会哲学之一部分——这个哲学的发展，应该采取与以前研究关于人的科学所用的形而上的以及辩证的方法大不相同的一种方法。我认为研究这个哲学所用的方法，应该与研究自然科学所用的完全一样；而不像斯宾塞那样站在仅仅类推法的一个容易失足的基础上，而是站在一个牢固的适用于人类制度的归纳基础上。我全力以求在这方面最好地完成我能完成的一切。
+
+-
+
+`安那其主义与社会民主主义间的斗争——我被比利时政府驱逐出境——巴黎居留——法国社会主义之复兴——屠格涅夫和他对俄国青年的影响——屠格涅夫与虚无主义——《父与子》里的巴扎洛夫`
+
+1877年秋天，有两个大会在比利时举行；一个在韦尔维耶，是国际工人协会的大会，另一个在根特，是国际社会党大会。两者中间国际社会党大会尤为重要，因为大家知道在这次大会上，德国的社会民主党企图使所有欧洲的劳工运动隶属于一个组织之下，受一个中央委员会的指挥——这个中央委员会将是以前国际工人协会的总委员会，只是换了个新名称。因此保全拉丁各国劳工组织的自治权实属必要，我们于是尽力设法在这个大会上能多有几个代表。我用了拉瓦旭夫这个假姓赴会，还有两个德国人是排字工威尔纳和工程师林克，他们从瑞士的巴塞尔到比利时，几乎完全步行；在根特的大会上，虽然我们只是九个安那其主义者，但是我们成功地阻遏了中央集权的计划。
+
+至今二十二年已经过去了；其间国际社会党大会也开了不少次，每次大会上，这个斗争没有不发生的——社会民主党总想把全欧洲的劳工运动完全放在他的旗帜之下，受他们的控制，安那其主义者则反对他们，便阻止这个计划。多少精力因此白费，多少恶语彼此相加，多少努力因此分散，只是因为那些采取“在现存国家内夺取政权”的政策的人不明白这方面的活动永远不能代表社会主义运动！社会主义在最初的时期中，就形成了三条发展路线，体现在圣西门、傅立叶和欧文三人身上。圣西门主义发展成社会民主主义，傅立叶主义则变成安那其主义；欧文主义在英国和美洲便进化成工会主义，合作以及所谓地方社会主义，这一派反对社会民主党的国家社会主义，而与安那其主义有许多汇合点。但是社会民主党不明白这三派的道路虽然不同，但是共同的目的则是一个；而且不明白后两派对于人类进步也有非常宝贵的贡献，他们竟然花费了四分之一世纪想去实现那个永远不会实现的乌托邦——要造出一个社会民主主义型的独一无二的劳工运动。
+
+对我来说，根特大会结束得出人意料。开会后三四天，比利时警察就知道了拉瓦旭夫是谁，奉命来逮捕我，因为我在旅馆里用了假名，违犯警章。我的比利时朋友们警告过我。他们认为当时的旧教徒内阁有把我引渡给俄国的可能，他们极力要我立刻离会。他们不让我回到旅馆去。吉约姆挡着路，说如果我一定要回旅馆，那么他非和我动武不可。我只好和几个根特的同志一起走了，但是我一到了他们中间，立刻从一个黑暗的广场的各个角落里发出低声的呼叫和口哨的声音——广场上散布着几伙工人，当时的情形简直神秘莫测。最后，在许多次低语声和口哨声以后，便有一群同志把我护送到一个社会民主党工人家里，我和他一起过了这一夜。虽然我是一个安那其主义者，但他竟然把我当作兄弟似的，非常令人感动。第二天早晨，我搭船再一次去英国。上岸时，英国海关职员要检查我的行李，但是他们见我除了一个小手提包外再也没有别的东西，便露出善意的微笑。
+
+我在伦敦没有停留多久。我在大英博物馆很丰富的藏书中研究法国革命的开端——革命是如何爆发的；但是我需要生活得更活跃，于是不久到了巴黎。在巴黎公社被惨酷地镇压下去以后，法国劳工运动又开始复活了。我和意大利人科斯达、巴黎工人中间几个安那其主义的朋友，还有盖斯德和他的同伴（他们当时还不是严格的社会民主党人），一起组织了几个最初的社会主义团体。
+
+我们最初的规模，小得令人好笑。我们六七个人常在咖啡店里聚会，如果在我们召集的会上能有一百个听众，我们就很高兴。那时谁也不会猜想到两年以后社会主义运动会热火朝天的发展。但是法国有它自己的发展道路。当反动势力占了上风时，一个运动的所有看得见的痕迹都告消失。逆潮流进行斗争的人是很少的，但是简直有点令人莫名其妙地，通过一种看不见摸不着的思想的渗透，反动会遭到削弱；一个新的潮流于是出现，到了那时，大家一下子看到那个大家以为已经死了的思想始终活着，而且不断地在传播，在扩大。一旦公开鼓动成为可能，立刻就有成千的追随者走上前来——他们的存在，谁也没有猜想到。老布朗基常说：“在巴黎有五万人，他们从来不到会场里来，也从来不参加一次示威游行，但是时机一到，他们觉得民众能够到街上去表示他们的意见，他们就会到场去夺取阵地。”当时的情形就是这样。当时坚持这个运动的人不到二十个，公然支持这个运动的人也不到二百。1878年3月，我们开第一次巴黎公社纪念会时，到场的人不到二百。但是两年以后，对于参加公社运动的人的大赦令已经通过，巴黎工人便在街上欢迎那些归来的公社同志；开会的时候，成千的工人鼓掌喝彩欢迎他们，这时社会主义运动突然勃兴了，连激进党人也被卷到这运动里来了。
+
+但是我们在巴黎的时候，这个社会主义复兴时期还没有到。1878年4月某天晚上，科斯达和一个法国同志同时被捕，在警察法庭受审，因为他们是国际工人协会会员，被判了十八个月的监禁。我之所以没有被捕，仅仅因为误会。警察来逮捕拉瓦旭夫，竟捕去了一个俄国学生，他的姓与我的假姓读音很相像。这一次，我用了我的真姓名，并且用这个姓名在巴黎继续住了一个月。然后我应召赴瑞士。
+
+这一次在巴黎，我初次认识屠格涅夫。他先向我们的共同朋友P.L.拉甫罗夫表示要见我，并且还要照俄国人的习惯，请几个朋友吃饭来庆祝我的越狱。我带了近乎崇拜的感情跨过门槛进了他的房间。他的《猎人笔记》使大家憎恨农奴制度，单是这一本书，他对俄国的贡献就非常巨大（我在当时还不知道他是赫尔岑的强有力的《钟》杂志里，他是一个首要的角色），而他以后的小说对于俄国的贡献也不小。他给我们指出了俄罗斯妇女是怎么样的人，她们有着何等的头脑和心灵的宝藏，她们是怎样鼓舞着男子。他又教导我们真正高尚的男子是怎样看待女子的，他们怎样爱女子。对于我，对于成千上万的同时代人，他的这种教导所给与我们的不可磨灭的印象，比最好的关于女权的论文给予我们的印象还要有力得多。
+
+他的相貌是大家都知道的。高大、强健，满头浓密柔软的灰发，他的确是一个美男子，两眼充满了智慧，还带点幽默的味道。他的全部举止显得纯朴和毫不矫揉造作，这是所有俄国第一流作家的特点。他的美丽的头显得他的脑力非常发达。他死的时候，保罗·伯特和保罗·邵可侣（爱利塞的侄子，一个外科医生）量他的脑，竟有两千克以上的重量，比当时知道的最重的居维叶的脑还重许多，使他们不敢相信他们的秤，便换了新的秤重新量过，结果仍是一样。
+
+他的谈吐尤其令人惊异。他说话的时候也与写作的时候一样，爱通过形象。虽然他非常长于哲学讨论，但是他常用一个设计得很优美的场面来说明他的思想，那场面美得有如从一本他的小说里摘出来似的。
+
+他有一天对我说：“你常常和法国人、德国人或其他国家的人来往，一定有很多的经验。你有没有注意到：对于同样的问题，他们的许多概念与我们俄国人的意见之间，也有一个深不可测的鸿沟吗？在这些问题上我们俄国人是和他们永远不能一致的吗？”
+
+我回答说，我还没有注意到这些地方。
+
+“的确有一些。我举一个例子。有一天晚上，我和福楼拜、都德、左拉同在一个包厢里看一出新戏的首演。他们都是有进步思想的人。剧本的情节是这样：有一个女人和她的丈夫离了婚。她后来又有一次新的恋爱，和另一个男子同居。在剧本里这个男子是个出色的人。多年来，他们过得很幸福。她以前生的两个孩子（一男一女）在她与前夫离婚的时候都只是婴儿；现在他们都长大了，女的有十八岁，男的也有十七岁。这许多年里，他们都把这男子当做他们真正的父亲。这男子待他们像待亲生的儿女一样，他们爱他，他也爱他们。这一场戏中，这个家庭在进早餐。姑娘走进来，走近她的后父身边——当他正要去亲她的时候，男孩不知从哪里得知了真相，冲上去叫道：‘你敢！’
+
+“这句话使全场震动，疯狂似地鼓掌喝彩。福楼拜他们也随着大家鼓掌。我感到厌恶。
+
+“我当时就说：‘为什么鼓掌呢？这个家庭既然幸福；这个男子对待这两个孩子比他们的亲生父亲还要好……他们的母亲既然爱这个男子，和他过得很幸福……这个顽皮变态的孩子应该为了说那两个字挨一顿打才是。’……我的话不起作用。我后来还花费了好几个钟头和他们讨论这个问题；他们中间谁也不能了解我！”
+
+我自然完全同意屠格涅夫的观点；但是我对他说，他所来往的人大半都是中产阶级。在中产阶级里，民族间的差别的确是很大的。然而我所来往的纯粹是工人，各国工人之间，尤其是在农民之间，相似的地方很多。
+
+然而我这么说是错误的。我后来有机会和法国工人来往得更亲密了，我便时常想到屠格涅夫的话的确不错。对于婚姻关系，俄国人的想法与法国人的想法的确有一道鸿沟——无论是在工人中间，或是在中产阶级中间。还有许多别的问题，俄国人的意见也与别国人的意见同样大不相同。
+
+屠格涅夫死后，有人说过他曾有意就这个问题写一本小说。他如果已经开始写它，上面所说的那个场面一定会留在他的稿本里。他竟然没有把这本小说写出来，这是多么可惜的事！以他的思想方法而论，屠格涅夫是一个彻头彻尾的“西欧派”，关于这个在他一生中曾深深地打动他的问题，他一定能发表一些很深刻的见解。
+
+十九世纪小说家中，屠格涅夫在艺术方面的确达到最高的完美的境界；他的散文在俄国人听来简直是音乐——而且和贝多芬的音乐同样感人至深。他的主要的小说是《罗亭》、《贵族之家》、《前夜》、《父与子》、《烟》与《处女地》，都能勾划出1848年后急速而连续地演变的俄国知识阶层中主要的“创造历史”型的人物。这些人物都描写得充满着哲学的思想和人道主义的理解，以及一种在任何别的文学里难以找到的艺术上的美。但是《父与子》（作者正当地认为是他的最深刻的作品）出版的时候，却遭到当时俄国青年的大声反对。俄国青年以为《父与子》里面的主人公虚无主义者巴扎洛夫不是他的阶级的真正的代表，许多人甚至以为巴扎洛夫只是一幅虚无主义的讽刺画。这个误解使屠格涅夫十分难过，虽然后来在《处女地》出版以后，在圣彼得堡的青年一代又与他重归于好，那些抨击给他留下的伤痕却始终不曾医好。
+
+屠格涅夫听到拉甫罗夫说过我热烈赞赏他的作品。有一天，我们同去看雕刻家安托科尔斯基的工作室坐车回来的时候，他问我对巴扎洛夫的意见怎样。我老老实实地回答说：“巴扎洛夫是虚无主义者的一幅出色的画像，但是我们读的时候总觉得你爱他不及你爱你的其他主人公。”
+
+“恰恰相反，我爱他，深深地爱他”，他用了意想不到的着重语气回答我。“我们到家的时候，我把我的日记给你看，其中我记到我用巴扎洛夫的死来结束那本小说的时候，我曾怎样地哭过。”
+
+屠格涅夫对于巴扎洛夫的知识分子一面的确是很爱的。他使自己如此认同于他的小说主人公的虚无主义哲学，以至于用巴扎洛夫的名字记了一本日记，用巴扎洛夫的观点来评价时事。但在我看来，与其说他爱巴扎洛夫，不如说是仰慕他。他在一次关于哈姆雷特与唐·吉诃德的出色演讲里，把人类的创造历史的人物分成两类，就以哈姆雷特与唐·吉诃德为两类的代表。他以为哈姆雷特的特点是：“首先是分析，然后是利己主义，所以没有信仰——一个利己主义者连他自己也不能相信，所以他是一个怀疑派，永远不会做成一件事；唐·吉诃德与风车战斗，把一个剃头匠用的盘子当做是曼布林的魔盔（其实我们中间谁不曾犯过这种错误呢？）他是一个群众的领袖，因为群众永远跟随着那种不理会大多数人的冷嘲热讽，甚至迫害，勇往直前，目光永远盯着一个也许只有他一个人看得见的目标的人。他们寻觅；他们倒下；但是他们会再站起来，终于找到目标——这是理所应当。不过哈姆雷特虽然是一个怀疑者，虽然不相信善，但是他对恶却并不不相信，他恨恶；恶与欺骗是他的仇敌；而且他的怀疑，并非事事都漠不关心，只是否定与怀疑，这最终将使他的意志消磨净尽。”
+
+在我看来，要了解屠格涅夫与他的书中主人公的关系，他的这些思想是一把真正的钥匙。他自己以及他的几个最好的朋友是多少属于哈姆雷特型的。他爱哈姆雷特，他仰慕唐·吉诃德，所以他也仰慕巴扎洛夫。他把巴扎洛夫的优越之处描写得很好。他也了解巴扎洛夫的孤立处境之可悲，但是他对别的近似哈姆雷特型的主人公，有如对待一个病友似的，给他们以那种温柔的、诗意的爱，而他却不能把这种爱用在巴扎洛夫身上。那本是不相宜的。
+
+1878年，他有一次曾问我：“你认识麦希金吗？”在审讯我们的团体时，麦希金表现出来是我们里面最强有力的人物。他又说：“我真想知道他的一切。这才真是个人！他一丝一毫的哈姆雷特气味也没有。”他说这些话的时候，显然是在默想着俄国革命运动里这一新的典型——这种典型在屠格涅夫的《处女地》中所描写的时代里还不存在，而是在两年以后出现的。
+
+我最后一次看见屠格涅夫是在1881年秋天。他当时病势沉重，而且时时以为他应该写一封信给亚历山大三世，这个念头使他苦恼。这时亚历山大三世刚即位，拿不定主意他应取的政策。屠格涅夫想劝他给俄国一个宪法，并且用确实不移的论据，使他明白这一步骤是必要的。他带了显然的悲哀对我说：“我觉得我应该写这封信，但我又觉得我已经没有力量这么做了！”事实上，他因为脊髓里生了癌，痛苦万分，连坐起来谈几分钟话也已困难到了极点。他终究没有写这封信，几星期以后，这已无用了。亚历山大三世在一篇宣言里声称他仍然要做俄国的专制统治者。
+
+-
+
+`俄土战争后人民对于政府之不满——一九三人案——暗杀特列颇夫事件——四次谋杀国王——汝拉同盟遭迫害——我们创刊《反抗者》——社会主义报纸的使命——经济的和印刷上的困难`
+
+1878年俄国事态有了一次新的转折。1877年俄国对土耳其发动的战争引起了人民普遍的失望。战争未爆发以前，俄国人民对于在土耳其压迫之下的斯拉沃尼亚民族曾经表示过非常热烈的同情。许多人并且相信一场巴尔干的解放战争，结果会使俄国本国也向着进步的方面前进。但是斯拉沃尼亚民族的解放只部分地实现了。俄国人作出的巨大牺牲因高级军事当局的大错终归无效。在战场上送命的人以十万计，所得的结果，不过是些部分的胜利，而土耳其被迫作出的让步在柏林会议中又被取消。大家还知道，在这次战争期间，公款被私吞盗用，其规模之大竟与克里米亚战争时差不多。
+
+就在1877年终，这种普遍的不满笼罩俄国全国的时候，在1873年后陆续被捕的一百九十三个和我们的运动有关的人的审判开始在一个高级法庭举行。这些被告有一些很有辩才的律师为他们辩护，立刻得到了公众的同情。他们给圣彼得堡社会的印象对他们有利。后来大家知道，他们中间大部分都已经被监禁了三四年等候审判，而且有二十一个人已经自杀或发了狂，于是大家对他们的好感更加强烈——便是审判他们的法官中也有对他们表同情的。法庭对于少数人处以极重的刑罚，对于其余的人则处罚较宽，理由是：候审拘留期太长，这本身已是很重的刑罚了，如果再处重刑，未免有失公道。当时大家还有把握地以为沙皇会进一步减刑。但是使大家极其惊异的是沙皇竟把刑罚加重。法庭已经判决无罪释放的人竟被流放到西伯利亚和俄国的僻远地方；法庭只判短期监禁的人，现在却要服五年到十二年的苦役。这是第三科的头子麦孙佐夫将军所做的事。
+
+就在这时候，圣彼得堡警察总监特列颇夫将军有一次视察拘留所，看见一个政治犯波哥留波夫没有向这个万能的恶官僚脱帽致敬，他立刻跑到波哥留波夫面前，亲自揍了他一下，波哥留波夫表示反抗，他便下令处波哥留波夫以鞭刑。其他的囚犯在他们的监房里听见这事，都高声大叫表示他们的愤怒，因此都受了狱卒和警察的惨酷的鞭打。
+
+俄国的政治犯在西伯利亚流放期间或苦役期内忍受一切困苦艰辛不作一声，但是他们决定对体刑绝不容忍。一位年轻姑娘，薇拉·沙苏丽奇，尽管自己并不认识波哥留波夫，却拿了一支手枪跑到圣彼得堡来，找到这个警察总监对他开枪。特列颇夫不过受了伤。亚历山大二世来亲自看一看这个英勇的少女。她的十分可爱的面貌和谦逊的神态给了他深刻的印象。特列颇夫在圣彼得堡的仇人太多了，他们居然能设法使这一案件按习惯法审理。沙苏丽奇在法庭当众宣言，她用手枪是出于不得已，因为一切别的可以使社会知道这事而得到某种伸雪机会的方法都已用尽而无效果。甚至有人请伦敦《泰晤士报》驻圣彼得堡的记者把这个消息在他的报上发表，他也许以为这件事是不确实的而没有照办。她不得已才去枪击特列颇夫，事先并没有把她的打算告诉任何人。现在事情既已公之于众，她听说特列颇夫不过受了一点轻伤，她觉得很高兴。陪审员全体一致决定判她无罪；当她走出法庭的时候，警察要再逮捕她，门外的群众援救她脱了魔掌。她便离开俄国，不久就来瑞士，到我们中间来了。
+
+这事轰动了全欧。沙苏丽奇被释放的消息传到西欧时，我正在巴黎，那天我刚刚有事到几家报馆的编辑部去。我发现编辑们对此都很热心，并且写出非常有力的评论赞美这位俄国少女。甚至《两世界评论》也在它的1878年大事述评里说：本年使欧洲舆论印象最深的两个人乃是柏林大会上的戈尔恰科夫亲王和沙苏丽奇。好几本年鉴都把他们两人的照片并排刊印出来。对于西欧工人，沙苏丽奇的这一献身行为也给了他们以极深的印象。
+
+就在这1878年里，一连发生了四起谋刺君王的事，都未发现有事先的谋划。工人荷得尔和诺比令博士先后枪击德国皇帝，几个星期以后，又有一个西班牙工人奥立瓦·蒙卡西枪击西班牙国王，一个厨子帕萨南特拿了一把刀要杀意大利国王。欧洲各国政府不能相信，这种对三位君主的谋刺连续发生，而背后却没有一个国际阴谋！它们匆匆断定安那其主义者的汝拉同盟便是这个阴谋的中心。
+
+从那时候到现在，已经有二十多年了，因此我可以确定不移地断言：各国政府的这种假定是毫无根据的。但在当时，欧洲各国政府全都攻击瑞士，责备它不该庇护组织这种暗杀阴谋的革命党人。我们的汝拉报纸《前锋》的编辑保罗·布鲁斯遂被捕受审。但是瑞士法官也明白要把布鲁斯或汝拉同盟牵连进那几次的暗杀事件是一点根据也没有的，于是仅仅判了布鲁斯两个月监禁，说是为了他的文章的缘故；但是这家报纸却被禁止发行，而且联邦政府要瑞士全国的印刷局都拒印这张以及其他相似的报纸。汝拉同盟因此被剥夺了发表意见的权利。
+
+此外，瑞士的政治家不满于安那其主义者在该国（瑞士）的鼓动工作，私下使汝拉同盟里最重要的瑞士会员不得不退出公众生活，否则只能挨饿。布鲁斯被瑞士政府驱逐出境。不顾一切障碍把汝拉同盟的机关报维持了八年之久的J.吉约姆，他的生活费大半是从授课得来的，如今也找不到事做，只得离开瑞士到法国去了。A.席威次加伯尔在钟表业里找不到事，他又要担负一大家子的生活费，因此只好退出了运动。斯皮奇革耳的情形也是一样，他只得移居别国。我虽是一个外国人，但是为当时的情势所迫，汝拉同盟机关报的编辑责任却不得不落到我的肩上。我当然为此踌躇，但是别无他法，我便和两个朋友屠美德莱及海尔奇一起，于1879年2月在日内瓦创办了一个半月刊，定名《反抗者》（Le Révolté）。大部分的稿件都要我一个人写。发起这刊物的时候，我们只有二十三个法郎（约合四美元），但是我们大家尽力去征求订户。第一期居然出版了。刊物的论调虽然温和，但是实质上是革命的。我尽力写得使一般聪明的工人都能了解那些历史的和经济的复杂问题。我们以前出的刊物从来没有销到六百份以上。这次，第一期的《反抗者》我们印了两千份，不到几天，竟一份也没有剩下。这个刊物成功了，现在它还继续在巴黎出版，不过改用了《新时代》这名称。
+
+社会主义的报纸容易有成为记载对现状的抱怨诉苦的倾向。矿山、工厂与田庄的劳动者所受的压迫在这里都有交代，罢工时，工人的贫困与痛苦被活灵活现地描写下来；工人们和雇主抗争时的那种孤立无援的状况也被再三提出。每一个星期都要提出的这些无望的努力会给读者们以极不良的影响，使他们意气消沉。为了防止这个流弊，编辑人只有用那些激烈热情的字句去提高读者的活力，加强他们的信心。我的意见恰与这个相反，我以为一张革命的报纸首先必须指出那些见于各处的，报告新时代来临、人类社会生活的新形式萌生，以及日益有力地反抗陈旧制度的征兆。我们应该找出这些征兆，发现它们之间的密切关系，并且把它们归在一起，使那大多数犹豫不决的人也能明白：在一个社会里，发生了思想复兴的时候，进步的思潮到处可以找到看不见的意识不到的支持。
+
+我以为，一张革命的报纸的主要任务在于使读者觉得他的心是和全世界人的心是跳动在一起的，使他同情人心对于年长月久的不义的反抗和创造新生活形式的努力。使革命成功的不是绝望而是希望。
+
+历史家常常告诉我们，这一或那一哲学体系曾如何完成了在人类思想上，因而在社会制度上的某一变革。但这不是历史。最伟大的社会哲学家只要抓住了即将到来的变革的迹象，便能懂得这些迹象彼此的内在关系，凭归纳法和直觉，可以预言将会发生什么。社会学家们拟定了许多社会组织的规划，由几条原则出发，演绎出必然的结果，恰如根据几条定理，得出一个几何学的结论来一样；但这不是社会学。要得出正确的社会预测，唯一的办法是留心那个新生活的成千个迹象，把一时偶然发生的事实和有机的、本质的事实区别开来，在这个基础上建立普遍法则。
+
+我尽力使读者熟悉这个思考方法，我用浅显易懂的字句，务使读者中间最谦逊胆小的人也习惯于自己去判断现在社会究竟向何处去；如果这个思想家得到了错误的结论，他们也能自己去纠正他。至于对现存制度的批判，我只将罪恶的根源分解说明，指出一切罪恶的主要来源一是对于人类发展的过去阶段的陈旧残余的根深蒂固而且精心培育的偶像崇拜；其次是广泛存在的思想和意志上的怯懦。
+
+屠美德莱与海尔奇在这方面全力支持我。屠美德莱生在萨甫瓦的一个最贫苦的农家。他不过在小学里得到一点极粗浅的知识。但是他是我所遇见的最聪明的人之一。他对时事和对人的评估异乎寻常地合情合理，往往简直等于预言。他对于新刊的社会主义的书报是一个极优秀的批判家，从来不为那些漂亮字句所迷惑，也不受那冒牌科学的欺骗。
+
+海尔奇生在日内瓦，是一个年轻的商店职员；他为人拘谨腼腆。当他表示他的一项独创的见解时，会脸红得像一个姑娘。我被捕以后就由他负责继续编辑我们的刊物，靠了他的坚强的意志他居然写出了很好的文章。日内瓦的店主后来议定都不再雇用他，使他的全家陷于绝境，但是他还努力维持这个刊物，直到刊物可以移往巴黎出版时为止。
+
+对这两个朋友的见识我不言自明地信任。如果海尔奇皱起眉头迟疑地低声说：“对——嗯——也许行”，我立刻明白定有什么地方不行。屠美德莱每逢要读一篇写得不很通顺的原稿时，总是抱怨他的眼镜太糟，所以通常他只读校样。他读的时候，有时忽然中断，大声叫起来：“不，这不行！”我立刻明白那地方写得不对头，于是尽力去猜想是什么思想，或什么文句使他不满意。我知道不必去问他，为什么那地方不对头？如果问他，他会回答：“呵！那不是我的事，是你的。我只能说那不行。”但是我总觉得他是对的，于是坐下来，把这一段重新写过，或者拿了排字盘，自己另外排出一段。
+
+我应该承认，我们维持这个刊物，有时候也很艰难。刊物才出到第五期，印刷人就来要我另找印刷所。宪法上规定的出版自由，对于工人和他们的出版物，在法律本文以外还有许多限制。承印我们刊物的人对刊物并无异议：他爱好这个刊物；但是瑞士的印刷所无论哪一家都依靠政府为生，每一家都多少承印一些政府的统计报表等文件。我们刊物的印刷人得到明白的通知，如果他再印我们的刊物，那么他就不要再想承印日内瓦政府的任何东西了。我走遍了瑞士说法语的地方，拜访了所有印刷所的经理，但是无论在什么地方，即使遇着那些并不讨厌我们刊物的倾向的人，所得到的回答也永远是这样：“如果不承印政府的东西我们就不能维持下去；而如果我们答应印刷《反抗者》，政府那边的生意就一点也没有了。”
+
+我回到日内瓦时非常失望，但是屠美德莱却更加热心，更充满希望。他对我说：“这没有什么，我们去买一架印刷机，言明三个月以后付款，三个月内，我们一定可以付清。”我当时反对说：“但是我们没有钱，手头只有几百法郎。”“钱？傻瓜！我们一定会有的。我们只要马上买了铅字，把下一期印出来——钱自然会来的！”他的判断又一次证明是对的。当下期《反抗者》在我们自己的汝拉印刷所里印出以后，我们又在刊物上把我们的困难告诉了读者，另外还印出两本小册子（我们大家都帮着印），钱居然来了；大部分是铜板和小银角，但是钱毕竟来了。我一生不知道有多少次听到进步的党派抱怨说没有钱；但是我的年纪愈大，我愈相信我们的最大困难并不在于没有钱，而在于没有人坚定不移、继续不断地朝着正确的方向，向着一个确定的目标走去，而且鼓舞别人也努力前进。二十一年来，我们的刊物始终是经济拮据——差不多每期的封面上都有求人捐钱的启事；但是只要有人坚持，用全力维持刊物，如海尔奇与屠美德莱在日内瓦，格拉佛在巴黎十六年来所做的那样，钱总是会陆续来的：大部分是工人的铜板和银角，印刷费用就多少可以支付了。办一个刊物和做其他一切事情一样，人的价值比钱不知要大多少倍。
+
+我们的印刷所设在一个狭小的房间里，排字的是一个小俄罗斯人（即乌克兰人），他为我们的刊物排字，每月只要六十法郎。他只要每天有饭吃，有时候能听一次歌剧，他就满足了。有一次，我在日内瓦街上遇见他，他挟了一个褐色的纸包，我问他：“约翰，你去洗澡吗？”“不！我搬家，”他用了他惯有的悦耳的声调，带着他的常有的微笑回答。
+
+可惜他不懂法文。我总是把我的稿子尽力写得非常工整——我时常后悔从前在学校里上我们的好老师爱尔伯特的习字课时浪费掉的时间——但是约翰读法文原稿时，读得怪极了，排字时也会排出许多异常古怪的别字，完全是他自己发明的；不过他却不曾加字或减字，所以改的时候每行的长短可以不变，只把每行换十二个左右字母，就行了。我们和他的感情非常好，我在他的指导之下，不久就学会了一点排字术。每期的报纸总是按时排好，照例先把清样送到报纸的负责发行人（一个瑞士同志）那里，请他完全看过之后才付印；然后我们中间一个人便把排好的版用车子送到印刷所去印。我们的汝拉印刷所因了它的出版物，尤其是它的小册子，不久就很出名了。小册子的售价不超过一个铜板，这是屠美德莱的规定。要写这些小册子不得不创造一种新文体。我承认我有一种劣迹，就是去嫉妒那些可以把他们的思想随意发挥，无须计较写作页数，而且可以用塔列朗的有名的借口：“我没有时间写得简短”来为自己辩解的著作家。
+
+当我要把几个月的研究结果（比如法律的起源之类）在一本售价不过一个铜板的小册子里扼要写出来时，不得不另花时间使文字写得简短。我们的刊物是给工人看的，对于一个普通工人，一本二十生丁（即四枚法国小铜板）的小册子太贵了。结果是这些价值不过一两个小铜板的小册子，可以成千上万地卖出去，而且译成了各国文字出版。我在那个时期中写的社论，后来在我入狱以后，被爱利塞·邵可侣编印成书，题名为《一个反抗者的话》。
+
+法国从来是我们运动的主要目的地；但是法国政府严禁《反抗者》，而且走私商人可以由瑞士运到法国的好东西太多了，不愿意过问我们的刊物而使他们的行当遭到危险。有一次，我曾和他们一起偷过法国国境，我觉得他们都是十分勇敢可靠的人，但是我不能使他们答应私运我们的杂志。没有别的办法，我们只好把杂志放在封口的信封里寄往法国，给一百左右的人看。我们并不因邮费而加价，只请订阅者自愿捐款，弥补这种额外的费用（他们总是照办的）。但是我们常常想，法国警察错过了一个可以使我们的刊物破产的大好机会。他们只要订阅一百份，而不自愿捐款，就很足以使《反抗者》不能维持下去了。
+
+第一年全靠我们这几个人来维持这个刊物；不过爱利塞·邵可侣对于我们的事业之兴趣渐渐浓厚起来，到了后来，在我被捕以后，他便参加进来赋予刊物以未曾有过的生气。邵可侣请我帮助编纂他的不朽的《大地理》中关于亚洲的俄国领土的一卷，他自己懂得俄文，但是他以为我既然熟悉西伯利亚，可以在这一特殊方面给他帮一点忙；而且我妻子的身体当时很不好，医生因为日内瓦的寒风于她的病体有碍，劝她马上离开，我们夫妇于是在1880年初春搬到克拉龙，爱利塞·邵可侣当时住在那里。我们定居在克拉龙上面一个小村的一个农家，下临日内瓦湖的碧波，后靠南齿山的积雪的山峰。在我们的窗下流着一道小溪，在大雨之后像一道激流似的发出很大的响声，挟着巨大的山石冲到狭窄的溪床里。对面的山坡上，可以看到那沙特拉的古城堡，城堡主人直到1799年文书烧毁团革命以前，凡有邻近农奴生子、婚嫁、死亡的事，都要征收封建税。在那里，在我妻子的帮助下——（我做每一件事，每写一篇文章，都要先和她讨论过，她是我的文章的一个严格的文学批评家）。这样我写出了我为《反抗者》写的一些最好的文章，其中如《告青年书》一篇被译成各国文字，散布达数十万份。事实上，我以后的几乎所有著述的基础都是在这里建立的。我们安那其主义的著作家因为受着放逐排斥而散布在世界各地；我们最最缺少的也许就是不能接触到与我们的思想方法近似的有教养的人。在克拉龙，我却有机会常与爱利塞·邵可侣、勒弗郎塞两人接触，同时我还继续不断地和工人来往；虽然我的地理工作已经很忙，但是我为安那其主义的宣传所做的事甚至于比平时还要多。
+
+-
+
+`俄国革命运动之形势更为严重——执行委员会指挥下的暗杀沙皇计划——亚历山大二世之死——专为攻击革命者的保皇同盟之创立——我被判死刑——我被瑞士政府驱逐出境`
+
+在俄国国内，争自由的斗争愈演愈烈。好几次政治犯审判由高等法庭进行，如“一九三人案”、“五十人案”、“达尔古欣团案”等等——每次使人看到的都是同一现象。
+
+青年们到农民和工人中间去，向他们宣传社会主义，散布在外国印出的社会主义小册子，也有一些含混不清的呼吁大家反抗经济压迫的传单。总而言之，他们所做的，都不过是世界上其他国家的社会主义运动所常见的事情。警察丝毫不曾查出反对沙皇的阴谋，甚至没有任何准备革命行动的迹象。而且事实上也没有。当时的青年的大多数反对这样的行动。我现在回顾1870年至1878年间的运动，我敢自信地说：只要允许当时青年的大多数与工农阶级在一起生活，教育他们，或以个人或地方自治政府一类的资格来和民众携手共事（本来有知识又正直的青年男女是有成千种方法来为民众服务的），他们就会感到满意。我充分了解那时代的青年，我的话自信是不错的。
+
+但是他们所得的惩罚，却是残酷的——残酷到了愚蠢的地步，因为这个运动是俄罗斯当时国情的产物，已经根深蒂固，不是残暴所能镇压得了的。六年，十年，十二年矿山中的苦役，期满后永远流放在西伯利亚，这是很普通的刑罚。比如有一位姑娘被判处了九年的苦役并终身流放西伯利亚，只为了把一本社会主义的小册子交给一个工人。
+
+还有一个十四岁的姑娘，顾可夫斯加亚，在科瓦尔斯基和他的友人们将受绞刑的时候，她好像歌德的克莱杏那样，想煽动袖手旁观的人群去救出他们（这件事在俄国便是从当局的立场上看，也是极自然的，因为在俄国法律里，对于普通刑事犯是不处死刑的，而对于政治犯执行死刑，当时还是一件新鲜事，一个恢复已被遗忘的传统之举。）—只为了这件事，她竟然被终身流放在西伯利亚的一个僻远的小村。被投身在这一大片荒原之中，这位姑娘不久就投叶尼塞河死了。
+
+便是那些被法庭释放的人，也被宪兵流放到西伯利亚或俄国东北部的小村落去，政府每月只给他们三个卢布，使他们忍饥待死。这种小村落没有什么工业，而教书对于流放的人是严禁的。
+
+官厅似乎故意使青年更加愤激，它把这些已经定罪的人不直接送往西伯利亚，却先把他们囚禁在中央监狱里好几年，使他们备受苦楚，因而羡慕起被送到西伯利亚矿山中作苦工的罪犯来。这些中央监狱也的确可怕。某一中央监狱（该狱牧师在一次布道中竟称之为“伤寒病之窟”）的囚犯的死亡率在十二个月中高达百分之二十。在中央监狱里，在西伯利亚的苦役监内，在要塞中，囚人时常不得不使用“同盟绝食”这个办法以抗议狱卒的暴行，或者要求改善待遇，如干某种活儿或在监房里读书之类，使他们不致于在几个月以内发狂。实行“同盟绝食”的男女囚人连续七八天不进食物，躺在地上不动，神志游离，甚至这也似乎不能使宪兵动心。在哈尔科夫的监狱里，他们把那些卧地待死的囚人用绳索捆缚起来，强迫喂进食物。
+
+这种可怕的消息从监狱里漏出来，越过广大的西伯利亚，在青年中间传播很广。有一个时候，没有一个星期不发现一件这类新的暴行，有的还更惨酷。
+
+俄国青年当时实在是愤怒到了极点。他们开始说：“别国的人遇着这样的事是有勇气反抗的。一个英国人、一个法国人是决不会忍受这种摧残的。我们又怎能忍受呢？让我们手执武器，抵抗宪兵的深夜搜查罢；既然被捕以后便是慢慢地、可耻地死在他们手里，至少让他们知道他们只有和我们决一死战的一条路。”
+
+在敖德萨，科瓦尔斯基和他的友人们在夜间宪兵来逮捕他们的时候，便开枪拒捕。
+
+亚历山大二世对付这一新动向的回答便是下令全国戒严。把俄国分成了若干区，每区设一个总督，奉有命令可以无情地绞死违犯戒严令的人。科瓦尔斯基和他的朋友们并没有打死一个宪兵，但是全体被绞死了。绞刑成了平常事情。两年中间，被绞死的人一共二十三个，包括一个十九岁的青年，他在火车站贴一张革命传单时被捕，他的罪名只有这一点。他还是个孩子，但像成人一样被处死。
+
+于是“自卫”两字便成了革命党人的口号。对付有些密探冒充为同志混进团体里任意告发人，只因为如果不告发很多人，他们就得不到赏金；对付那些虐待囚人的人以及权力无限的政治警察首脑是应该用自卫手段的。
+
+死在这个新阶段的战斗里的人，有三个大官和两三个小密探。麦孙佐夫将军因为使沙皇把“一九三人案”的判罪加重一倍，便在圣彼得堡大街上光天化日之下被人杀死。一个宪兵上校也在基辅被杀；他做下的事，比上面所说的还更凶残。任哈尔科夫总督的我的堂兄狄米特里·克鲁泡特金在一个晚上从戏院回家的路上也被人枪击身死，因为那第一次的同盟绝食和强迫进食之事是在他治下的中央监狱里发生的。他其实并不是一个坏人——我知道他本人对政治犯多少还有点表同情。但是他这个人没有魄力，又是一个廷臣，所以没有毅然去干涉。实际上他只要说一句话，囚人所受的虐待就可以立刻停止。亚历山大二世是那么喜欢他，他在宫廷里的地位是那么稳固，因此他的干预很可能会得到赞许。两年前，他到圣彼得堡去报告沙皇说，他对于哈尔科夫那次的贫民暴动采取了平和的态度，处置暴动者也很宽厚，亚历山大二世回答说：“谢谢你，你的行为正合我的意思。”但是这一次，他批准了狱卒的暴行，哈尔科夫的青年看到他们的同志受着这种虐待非常愤激，有一个就枪杀了他。
+
+但是沙皇本人还处于斗争之外；直到1879年，还没有企图刺杀沙皇的行为。那个农奴解放者是有一道灵光护卫着的，这比大批军警的保护强多了。如果亚历山大二世在这危急的时候，稍微表示一点改善俄国政治状况的意思，如果他仅仅召回一两个从前改革时期中辅佐过他的人，叫他们去调查全国情况或至少调查一下农民状况；如果他表示一点限制秘密警察的权力的意图；那么他的步骤一定会得到人民的热烈欢迎。他只要说一句话，就可以再一次变为“解放者”，而俄国青年又会背诵赫尔岑的名句：“加利利人，你战胜了！”但是正如在波兰暴动时，他已经表示过他是一个暴君，曾经听从过加特科夫的主意滥用绞刑；如今他又听了加特科夫这个邪恶的天才的主意，不干别的，专设一些特别军事总督来执行绞刑。
+
+到了那时候，而且只有在那时候，才有几个革命党人（执行委员会）起来向专制政体宣战。我应该老实说，当时的知识阶层，甚至沙皇身边的人，也有对现状越来越不满的。这对于执行委员会是一种支持。这一斗争经过了好几次失败，终于以1881年刺死亚历山大二世而告结束。
+
+我在前面已经说过，在亚历山大二世身上，有两个人同时存在，在他一生中，这两个人的冲突愈来愈猛烈，此时已到了真正悲剧性的地步。索罗维约夫枪击的时候，第一枪没有打中他，当时他居然还能镇静地不走直线，而曲折地向最近的门跑去，尽管索罗维约夫还在继续放枪。他因此得以身免，只是他的大衣撕破了一点。便是在临死那一天，他还证明：他无疑是有胆量的。在真正的危险关头，他是勇敢的，但是他却对自己想象中的幽灵不断地颤抖。
+
+有一天，他枪击了一个侍从武官，因为那个人做了一个突如其来的动作，亚历山大二世便以为这人要刺杀他。仅仅是因为他怕遭暗杀，他竟把一切沙皇的权力交给了那些只求升官发财毫不忠心于他的人。
+
+亚历山大二世对于皇后玛丽的感情无疑没有完全消失，虽然当时他已经和多尔戈露奇公主发生了关系。皇后一死他马上就娶了她。他不只一次对L.米利科夫说：“请不要向我提起皇后，这使我太痛苦了。”然而他到底把他身为“解放者”时忠实地和他在一起的皇后玛丽完全抛弃了；任她无人照顾地死在宫里。只有两个真正对她忠心的侍女留在她的身边，而他却住在另一座宫里，来看她时也只是坐一刻就走。一位现已谢世的俄国名医曾告诉他的友人说，他虽是一个外人，但他看见皇后在最后的病中那样无人照顾也感到震惊。自然，宫中的侍女们都不管她，她们要去奉承多尔戈露奇公主。
+
+当执行委员会作出了炸毁冬宫的大胆计划时，亚历山大二世竟做了一件史无前例的事。他制造了一种独裁制，给L.米利科夫以无限的权柄。这位将军是亚美尼亚人，以前有一次，伏尔加下游发生黑死病疫时，德国威吓俄国，如果不将瘟疫扑灭，就要下动员令对俄国进行检疫封锁。当时亚历山大二世已经给了他一次同样的独裁权力。现在亚历山大二世看到连宫廷警察的护卫也不可靠，于是又把独裁的权力给了米利科夫。因为米利科夫有着“自由主义者”的名声，大家便以为这个任命表示不久就会召集一个国民议会。但是在炸毁冬宫事件以后短时间内，并没有危害沙皇的性命的事发生，他又恢复了信心。几个月以后，米利科夫又由独裁者而降为内务大臣，什么事也没有办成。
+
+我在前面已经说到过亚历山大二世的伤感，在伤感突然袭来的时候，他常常责备自己在位期间的统治的反动性质。如今，这伤感愈来愈厉害，发作起来竟使他会嚎啕大哭。他会坐着哭好几个钟头，使米利科夫束手无策。他会问米利科夫：“你的宪法草案要到什么时候才会完成呢？”但是如果两天以后，米利科夫来向他说，宪法草案已经完成，沙皇却似乎已忘得一干二净！他竟然会问：“我曾经说过它吗？有什么用处呢？不如让我的继位人来办，就算是他即位后赐给俄国的礼物罢。”
+
+当一个新的阴谋的风声传到亚历山大二世耳边时，他为了讨好执行委员会起见，又打算去做一点事。但是在革命党人中间似乎没有什么动静的时候，他又听从反动派的意见，什么事情都不管了。米利科夫随时都准备着丢官。
+
+1881年2月，米利科夫报告沙皇说，执行委员会已经策划好一个新的阴谋。但是无论怎样搜查，总不能发现这个阴谋的计划。
+
+亚历山大二世于是决定召集一个由各省选出的代表组成的协商会议。他时时担心会遭到路易十六的命运，便把这个会议说成是“名流会议”，与路易十六在1789年的国民议会以前所召集的一样。这一计划，需要在枢密院提出，但是他这时又犹豫不决了。直到1881年3月1日（即旧历13日）的早晨，得到L.米利科夫的新的警告以后，他才下令在下星期四将这计划提交枢密院。
+
+那是在星期日，米利科夫要求他那天不要出去阅兵；否则他有遇刺的危险。但是他去了。他要去看加塞林公主（这是他的姑母海伦·帕夫洛夫娜的女儿，海伦是1861年的改革派的领袖之一），告诉她这个好消息，也许是他想向故皇后玛丽赎罪的一个表示。据说他曾用法语告诉公主说：“我已经决定召集名流会议。”但是这个迟来的、半心半意的让步还没有宣布出来，他在回到冬宫去的途中就被刺杀了。
+
+沙皇被刺时的情形是大家都知道的。一个炸弹投在他的铁甲马车下面，马车停了，几个护卫他的塞加西亚人受了伤。扔炸弹的雷沙科夫当场被捕。这时他的马车夫非常恳切地劝他坐在车里不要出来，说马车虽然有点损坏，他还可以驱车回宫，但是沙皇无论如何一定要下车。他觉得他的统帅的尊严使他一定要去看望负伤的塞加西亚人，慰问他们，像他慰问俄土战争中的伤兵那样。那一次是在他的生辰，猛攻普列夫那城之后，他的军队损失惨重。这一次，他走近雷沙科夫，问了他几句话。当他走过另一个青年格林涅维次基身边时，这个青年抱着同归于尽的决心扔了一个炸弹在他自己和亚历山大二世中间。
+
+两个人都受了重伤，几个钟点以后都死去了。
+
+亚历山大二世这时躺在雪上，他的侍从中竟无一人理他，所有的人都不见了。还是阅兵以后回来的军官学校学生把这个垂死的沙皇抬起来，把他的还在抖动的身体放在雪橇上，盖上一件军校学生的外套。一个恐怖主义者伊米连洛夫臂下挟了一个用纸包着的炸弹，不顾自己有当场被捕处绞刑的危险，跑去帮助军校学生救护那个受伤的沙皇。人的天性每每是这样矛盾的！
+
+亚历山大二世一生的悲剧就这样完结了。人们不明白一个为俄国做了这样多事情的沙皇，怎么会死在革命党人手里。但是我有机会亲眼看见亚历山大二世的最初的反动施政和他的渐次的堕落，我又知道他是一个性格复杂的人（他是一个天生的专制君主，只是因为教育把他的暴虐性减轻了些，他只有武士的勇猛，但缺乏政治家的魄力，他的情感很强烈，但他的意志又很薄弱），在我看来，这个悲剧的发展好像有着一出莎士比亚戏剧中在劫难逃的天意。在1862年6月13日，他下令在波兰第一次大肆屠杀以后对我们这班新任军官演说的时候，这悲剧的最后一幕就已经为我写好了。
+
+圣彼得堡宫廷里起了一阵很大的恐慌。亚历山大三世虽然身高体壮，却不是一个很有魄力的人。他不肯移住到冬宫而搬到加奇那，住在他祖父保罗一世的宫内。我是知道这座老建筑的，它被设计成一个沃邦式的要塞，四周围以壕沟，护以望楼，又有暗梯，由望楼顶上直通沙皇的书斋。我见过这书斋里特设的陷阱，可以出其不意地把一个敌人抛掷在下面水底尖利的岩石之上，我也曾见过通地牢的暗梯，这暗梯还通到对着一个湖泊的地道。保罗一世的所有的宫殿建筑差不多是一个模式。同时在亚历山大三世做皇太子时代所住的阿尼奇科夫宫的四周也掘了一条地道，并有自动电气装置，防止革命党人来埋炸药炸毁它。
+
+一个专为保护沙皇的秘密团体成立了。用了三倍的薪水去引诱各级军官加入这一团体，到社会各阶级中做志愿的密探。不用说，常常发生许多可笑的事。有两个军官彼此都不知道对方是这个秘密团体的成员，在火车上互相引诱对方说些犯上不忠的话，然后你要捕捉我，我要逮捕你；直到最后才知道他们的苦心努力，纯属白费力气。这个团体现今还存在着，不过形式较为公开，改名为奥赫拉纳（保护会）；为了维持自身的存在，它时时编造各种虚构的危险，去恐吓现今的沙皇。
+
+还有一个更秘密的团体“神圣同盟”，也在这时成立。首领是皇弟弗拉季米尔。目的是用种种手段与革命党人作对。其中之一是要暗杀国外亡命者中被他们认为是最近阴谋之主谋者的人。我也被列入其中。弗拉季米尔大公大骂同盟里的军官太怯懦，竟没有一个人胆敢去暗杀这些亡命者；于是有一个军官（当我还在侍从学校时他也是一个侍从）便被同盟派去实行暗杀计划。
+
+事实上，居留国外的亡命者与圣彼得堡执行委员会的工作无干。自己远在瑞士，竟想指导阴谋，而叫那些在圣彼得堡的人冒着无时不在的生命危险去行动，——绝无这样的道理。斯捷普尼亚克和我曾经声明过好几次，说我们自己如不在场，决不去替人制定行动计划。但是圣彼得堡的警察当然要说，他们无法保护沙皇的生命，全是因为一切暗杀阴谋都是在外国制订的——而且我很清楚，他们派出的密探则按着他们的意旨提供许多所需的报告。
+
+俄土战争中的英雄，斯科别列夫也曾被邀加入这个同盟，但是他断然拒绝了。L.米利科夫的遗书曾由他的一个友人在伦敦刊行了一部分。在这些遗书里，我们才知道当亚历山大三世即位后迟疑不肯召集“名流会议”时，斯科别列夫竟向L.米利科夫及伊格纳节夫伯爵（即“说谎的帕沙”，这是君士坦丁堡的外交官们送给他的绰号）提议把沙皇拘禁起来，强迫他在一张立宪的宣言上签字。但是据说伊格纳节夫向沙皇告了密，因此被任为首相，他在首相任内，按照前巴黎警察总监昂得里欧的主意，用了种种计策去麻痹革命党人。
+
+如果俄国的自由主义者在当时多少表现一点勇气和组织力量，那么一个国民议会早已召集了。根据L.米利科夫的遗书，亚历山大三世在好几个星期内愿意召集一个国民议会。他已经决意这样做，而且还告诉过他的兄弟。老威廉一世也支持他这样做。
+
+只因为他看见自由主义者毫无动作，同时加特科夫派则十分积极从事相反的活动——昂得里欧也劝他镇压虚无主义者，还教他用种种手段去达到这个目的（这个前巴黎警察总监的关于此事的信函，也发表在米利科夫的遗书里），——亚历山大第三终于打定主意，宣称他要继续做俄罗斯帝国的专制君主。
+
+亚历山大二世死后不到几个月，瑞士联邦政府就下令把我逐出瑞士国境。对于这件事，我并不愤慨。瑞士政府因为容许各国政治亡命者居留，受各君主国家的攻击，俄国政府机关报又恐吓它说要把当时在俄国的很多做家庭女教师和侍女的瑞士女子全体驱逐出境。瑞士政府将我驱逐，便可以使俄国警察多少感到满意。但是我代瑞士设想，它做这件事，乃是它的失策。因为这样一来，就无异于自己承认“瑞士是一个酝酿阴谋的地方”，而且也承认了自己的弱点，果然各国政府不久就利用这个机会。两年以后，J.费里向意大利和德国提议瓜分瑞士的时候，他的理由必定是：瑞士政府自己已经承认瑞士是“国际阴谋的策源地”。这第一次让步招来了更无理的要求，如果瑞士当初不作那次让步，瑞士的独立地位一定会更加稳固得多。
+
+1881年7月，我到伦敦，出席一次安那其主义者大会。从伦敦回来，我马上就接到驱逐出境的命令。大会闭幕后，我在英国住了几个星期，写了从我们的立场论述俄国事务的最初几篇文章，登在《纽喀斯尔纪事报》上。当时英国报界完全是诺维科夫夫人的（换句话说，就是加特科夫与俄国政治警察的）应声虫。约瑟夫·考温先生答应在他的报上腾出篇幅给我发表我们的观点，我当然高兴之至。
+
+我刚刚见过在高山中的妻子（她当时住在山中离爱利塞·邵可侣的家不远的地方）以后，我就被要求离开瑞士。我们先把我们的简单的行李送到邻近的火车站，步行到亚格尔，最后一次欣赏我们十分喜爱的山景。我们越过几座小山抄近路，但后来发觉近路却使我们走了一些弯路，便大笑起来；我们到了谷底，便走入满地灰尘的大道。每每在这种情景中，会遇上可笑的事。这一次是一个英国太太惹出来的。一个穿得十分华丽的太太斜倚在一部租来的马车里面，旁边坐着一个绅士，车子经过我们这两个穿得寒伧的流浪人时，她扔给我们几本小册子。我从灰土里拾起小册子。这位太太显然是那种自以为是基督教徒，而以向“放荡的外国人”分送宗教小册子为己任的人。我想我们在火车站上一定可以追上这位太太，便把《圣经》里大家都知道的那一句，关于富人进天国的话，以及其他适用于此的类似的说法利赛人的话，写在一本小册子上。
+
+我们到了亚格尔，那位太太正在她的马车里吃点心。她显然觉得坐在马车中沿着这风景如画的山谷前进，比闷在窄小的火车里舒服得多。我彬彬有礼地把那几本小册子还给她，并且说，我在上面加了几句话，对于她本人也许不无补益。这位太太当时不知道应该跳起来打我，还是拿基督教徒的耐心接受这个教训好。这两个冲动都在她的两只眼睛里先后飞快地表现出来。
+
+我的妻子正在准备受日内瓦大学理科学士的考试，所以我们就定居在托农，这是莱蒙湖岸旁的法国高萨甫瓦的一个小城，我们在那里住了两个月左右。
+
+至于那神圣同盟给我的死刑判决，我接到了来自一个俄国最高级官员的警告。我连那个从圣彼得堡派到日内瓦来主持这阴谋的太太的姓名都已知道了。我不过将这件事告诉了《泰晤士报》的日内瓦记者，如果发生了什么事，便请他将这个消息发表。同时关于这事，我也写了几行登在《反抗者》上面。以后我就不把这事放在心上了。但是我的妻子却并不小看这事。我们在托农时，住在那位心地善良的农妇散索夫人的家里，并在她那里包饭。她也从别方面知道了这个阴谋（她的在一个俄国密探家里当保姆的妹妹告诉她的），她便尽力照顾我，令我十分感动。
+
+她的家是在托农城外，每逢我晚上到托农城里去时（有时是到火车站去接我的妻子），她总能找到一个借口，叫她的丈夫提了一个灯笼陪我去。“克鲁泡特金先生，请你稍等，”她总是这样对我说：“我的丈夫也要进城去买点东西，你知道他总是带灯笼的。”有时候，她请她的兄弟远远地跟着我，不让我知道。
+
+-
+
+`居住伦敦一年——英国社会主义精神复兴之最初的征兆——去托农——密探——伊格纳节夫与恐怖主义者议和——1881年与1882年的法国——里昂织工的贫苦生活——里昂某咖啡店被炸——我的被捕与判罪`
+
+1881年10月或11月，我的妻子考试完毕，我们马上从托农去伦敦，在那里住了将近十二个月。从那时到现在没有几个年头，但是我可以说，当时伦敦和英国全国思想文化生活与较后时期大不相同。大家知道，在四十年代，英国差不多是欧洲社会主义运动的先导。这个伟大运动当时深深地影响了工人阶级，现在大家称为科学社会主义或安那其社会主义的理论在当时都已提出来了，不过在以后多年的反动时期中，这个大运动停顿了下来。在英国也和在欧洲大陆一样，大家都忘记了这个运动。而法国著作家们笔下的“无产阶级的第三次觉醒”，在英国还没有开始。1871年的农业委员会的工作，在农业劳动者里面所做的宣传，基督教社会主义者的以前的努力，当然都为开辟未来的道路做了一些工作。但是亨利·乔治的《进步与贫困》出版后所引起的社会主义情绪在英国的勃兴，在当时（1881年）也还没有发生。
+
+我当时在英国过的一年生活真正是流放人的生活。对于一个抱有先进的社会主义思想的人，这里是没有自由空气可以呼吸的。我在1886年回英时所看到的那个发展得生气蓬勃的社会主义运动，在这时连一点预兆也没有。彭斯、钱毕昂、哈弟等工人运动领袖当时都还没有出现；费边派也不存在；莫理思还没有自称是一个社会主义者；至于工会，它们仅限于伦敦少数几个特权行业，对于社会主义是敌视的。社会主义运动之唯一的积极活动的、公然的代表就是海因德曼夫妇以及在他们周围聚集的少数工人。1881年秋天，他们举行了一个小小的会议，我们常常开玩笑地说（其实这句话也差不多是实情），海因德曼夫人在她的家里接待了大会全体人员。至于那多少带一点社会主义色彩的激进派的运动，虽然在人心里已经产生，但是还没有公开明白地表现出来。四年以后出现于公众生活中的那一大群知识阶层男女，他们虽不公开相信社会主义，却也参加了种种和民众的幸福与教育有关的运动，而使英吉利和苏格兰的每个城市后来都有一种改革的新空气，都有一群新的改革家。然而在1882年看不到有这样一群人。自然，这些人当时已经存在了；他们在思想，他们在发言；一个广泛的运动所必需的要素都已经有了。但是因为他们找不到一个可以吸引人的中心，如像后来成立的社会主义团体那样；因此，他们都消失在群众中间；他们当时彼此都不认识，而且对他们自己也没有明确的认识。
+
+柴可夫斯基当时也在伦敦，我们于是像从前那样地开始在工人中间传布社会主义。我们得着几个英国工人的帮助（他们中间有的是我们在1881年的大会上认识的，有的是因为对于控告约翰·莫斯特感着不平而接近社会主义者的），便到激进派俱乐部中去演说俄国问题，俄国青年“到民间去”的运动以及一般的社会主义。听讲的人数少得可笑，很少有超过十二个人的时候。偶尔有一位胡须灰白的老宪章运动者在听众中站起来，向我们说，我们现在所说的在四十年前就有人说过了，当时大受劳动群众的热烈欢迎，但是现在全都完了，而且没有希望再使死灰复燃了。
+
+海因德曼刚刚出版了他的《大家的英国》，这是一本阐释马克思主义社会主义的出色的书。我还记得在1882年夏天，有一次，我很诚恳地劝他创办一份社会主义的报纸。我告诉他说，我们当时创办《反抗者》的时候，经费是多么的少；还对他说，如果他愿意尝试，他一定会成功。但是当时前景是如此不令人乐观，甚至海因德曼本人也认为尝试一定会失败，除非他有钱来支付一切费用。当时他也许是对的，但是不到三年以后，当他创刊《正义》时，工人却热心支持他；到了1886年，就有了三份社会主义的报纸，而社会民主联盟也已经是一个很有势力的团体了。
+
+1882年夏天，达勒姆矿工举行一年一度的大会时，我用嗑嗑巴巴的英语向他们演说。我又在纽喀斯尔、格拉斯哥和爱丁堡等地演讲俄国的革命运动，大受欢迎。散会以后，成群结队归家的工人在街上齐声向虚无主义者欢呼。但是我的妻子和我两个人却在伦敦感觉到非常寂寞，我们想在英国唤起一个社会主义运动的努力看来又是那样没有希望，我们便决定在1882年秋天动身再回到法国去。我们本也知道到了法国我不久一定会被逮捕，但是我们彼此向对方说：“法国监狱总比这座坟墓好。”
+
+那些爱说进化迟缓的人应该研究一下英国社会主义的发展史。进化是慢的，但是它的速度并不是永远一致。它有酣睡的时候，也有突然猛进的时候。
+
+我们又定居在托农，住在我们的旧房东散索夫人的家里。我的妻子有一个兄弟，患肺病垂危，已经到了瑞士，这时便来与我们同住。
+
+我从来没有像我住在托农的两个月中看到过那样多俄国密探。我们刚刚租好房子，就有一个自称是英国人的可疑人物来租房子的另一部分。毫不夸张地说，一伙伙的俄国密探包围了我的住宅，用种种借口想进门来，否则就是两人、三人、四人一队在门前走来走去。我可以想象他们会写出多么有趣的报告，一个密探总得报告。如果他老实说他在街上站了一个星期，什么诡秘的事也没有见到，那么他很快会被扣去一半薪水甚至被解职。
+
+这时正是俄国秘密警察的黄金时代。伊格纳节夫的政策已经有了功效。有两三个警察机构彼此竞争，每个都有很多的钱可以随意花用，从事最放肆的阴谋。举一个例子：一个警察机构的首领苏台金上校和一个名叫德加叶夫的人（苏台金上校后来就死在他的手里）合谋，向日内瓦的革命者告发伊格纳节夫手下的密探，而且给恐怖主义者以种种必要的便利去暗杀内务大臣托尔斯泰伯爵和弗拉季米尔大公。苏台金说如果托尔斯泰被杀，他就会被任为内务大臣，有独裁的权柄，沙皇本人就完全在他的掌握之中。俄国秘密警察的这种活动肆无忌惮，后来竟敢把巴腾堡亲王从保加利亚绑架到俄国，可谓达到了顶点。
+
+法国警察也提高了警戒。“他在托农干些什么？”这个问题使他们很不放心。我还继续在编《反抗者》，并且给《大英百科全书》和《纽喀斯尔纪事报》写稿。但是根据这种事编造些什么呢？
+
+有一天，一个本地的宪兵来看我的女房东。他在路上听见一架机器的声音，就大惊小怪，以为我家里有一架秘密印刷机。他便趁着我不在家的时候来请我的女房东带他去看印刷机。她回答说没有什么印刷机，宪兵听到的也许是她的缝衣机的声音。对这样平淡的解答宪兵当然不会满意，竟强迫女房东使用她的缝衣机，好使他在房里、房外听这声音是否就是他所听到的。
+
+“他一天到晚干些什么呢？”他问我的女房东。
+
+“他写东西。”
+
+“他不能一天写到晚。”
+
+“中午他在园里锯木头，每天下午四点到五点，到外面去散步一次。”——那时是11月。
+
+“呵！对了！天色已晚的时候，对不对？”他就在他的记事册里写道：“每出必在晚间。”
+
+俄国密探为什么这样特别监视我，我当时不十分明白。不过这一定与下面的事多少有点关系。伊格纳节夫被任为首相时听从了前巴黎警察总监昂得里欧的劝告编造了一个新计划。他派了许多他的手下人到瑞士去，其中有一个创办了一份杂志，表面上主张略为扩大俄国的地方自治制，但是实际上，主要的目的在于攻击革命党人并把亡命者中反对恐怖活动的人联合在这一旗帜之下。这当然是挑拨离间的一种方法。后来，执行委员会的委员们差不多都在俄国被捕，只有两个亡命到巴黎来，伊格纳节夫便派了一个人到巴黎来提议讲和。他答应对亚历山大二世时代暗杀沙皇一案的犯人，此后不再判处死刑，即使对那些以前没有抓到，后来落在政府手里的人也不处死刑。他答应把车尔尼雪夫斯基从西伯利亚召回；他答应指定一个调查委员会把那些未经审判而流放到西伯利亚去的人的案件一一改判。同时，他要求执行委员会答应在皇上举行加冕礼以前不企图暗杀他。也许还提到过亚历山大三世打算实施的有利于农民的改革。协议是在巴黎达成的，双方都遵守。恐怖主义者停止了敌对活动。也没有一个人因为参与以前的阴谋而被处死刑，后来为这一罪名被捕的人都被囚禁在席鲁塞尔要塞这个俄国的巴士底监狱里，十五年来从来没有他们的消息。其中一部分至今还囚禁在那里。车尔尼雪夫斯基从西伯利亚召回以后只许他住在阿斯特拉罕，与俄国思想界完全隔绝，不久便死了。调查委员会巡行西伯利亚，释放了一些流放人，又给其余的人定了一个流放的年限。我的哥哥亚历山大的流放期限就被这个委员会延长了五年。
+
+1882年我在伦敦的时候，有一天，有人告诉我，一个自称是俄国政府派来的真正代理人（他有证据可以证明这一点），想来和我开始谈判。“请告诉他，如果他敢进我的门，我一定把他推下楼去。”这就是我的回答。伊格纳节夫大约由此便以为执行委员会虽然答应不暗杀沙皇，但是安那其主义者也许会有此企图，所以想把我除掉。
+
+1881年和1882年中，法国安那其主义运动有很大的发展。大家通常以为法国人思想中是反对共产主义的。国际劳工协会因此在宣传时便以集体主义这个名词代替。那时集体主义的意义是“生产资料公有，至于消费方面，或根据个人主义，或根据共产主义，每一个集体各有自由决定之权”。实际上，法国人思想中所反对的，不过是旧派“共同居住论者”（Phlanstére）的寺院式共产主义。当汝拉同盟在1880年大会上大胆宣称它信奉安那其共产主义也就是自由共产主义时，安那其主义在法国得到了极大的同情。我们的报纸开始在法国流传，与法国工人来往的信件也非常之多，在巴黎以及某几省，尤其是里昂一带，一个重要的安那其主义运动很快发展起来。我在1881年从托农到伦敦的路上，曾在里昂、圣·艾蒂安、维埃纳各地停留、演讲。我在这些城市里发现许多工人都准备接受我们的思想。
+
+在1882年年尾，里昂一带发生了一个可怕的危机；丝织业已告瘫痪。织工们一贫如洗，以致成群结队的小孩每天早晨站在军营门口，等士兵们省下的一点面包和汤水给他们吃。布朗热将军就是从这时出名的，因为他允准士兵们分给小孩食物。里昂地区的矿工也处于朝不保夕的境地。
+
+我知道当时人们情绪处于极大的骚动中，但是我在伦敦住了十一个月，已失去和法国的运动的密切接触。我到托农以后不到几个星期，就在报上看到关于蒙素·勒·明勒的矿工的消息：他们受着“极端天主教徒”的矿山主人的种种盘剥，愤而开始了一个运动。他们秘密开会商议总同盟罢工的事。矿山附近所有的道路本来都竖有石十字架，他们把这些十字架或是推倒，或是用炸药炸毁。这些炸药是他们在地下干活时经常使用的，有时就存在他们手里。同时里昂的骚动也愈演愈烈。在里昂，安那其主义者的数目不算少。每逢投机的政客开会，他们总要去加入演说，如果被拒绝，他们就强占讲台。他们一上讲台便提议把矿山、一切生产资料以及住宅等等马上完全充公。他们提出的议案大受听众欢迎，很热烈地被通过了，使中产阶级大为恐慌。
+
+工人的愤激日甚一日，他们反对投机派的市政府委员和政党领袖；他们还反对报界，因为报界把极其尖锐的危机不当回事，不去设法缓解那广泛的贫困。在这种情形之下，穷人们总是特别憎恨那些声色犬马、纸醉金迷的场所。在穷困与惨苦的时刻，这种地方更令人刺目，因为在工人看来，这些地方就代表着富人阶级的自私与堕落。工人们尤其憎恨的一个地方，是柏尔库戏院的地下咖啡馆。这个咖啡馆通宵营业，从外面可以看到一批新闻记者和政客们拥抱着娼妓大吃大喝，一直到天明。工人们每次开会的时候，对这个咖啡馆总要恶狠狠地说些指桑骂槐的话。有一夜，不知道什么人拿一管炸药放在那个咖啡馆里面，点燃了引线。一个工人（他是一个社会主义者）偶然看到了，便跑过去想把引线弄灭，却被炸死。此外还有几个正在那里饮酒作乐的政客也受了轻伤。
+
+第二天，又有一管炸药在招兵局门口爆炸，有传说是安那其主义者想把里昂山上那座极大的圣母像炸毁。只有在里昂或里昂附近住过的人才能明白那地方的居民和学校直到现在还受着天主教牧师多大的控制；而且那里的男子憎恨神职人员到了怎样的地步。
+
+里昂的资产阶级大起恐慌。六十个左右安那其主义者被捕。他们都是工人，只有爱米尔·戈蒂耶一人是属于中产阶级的，他当时正在里昂旅行演讲。里昂各报催促政府把我也逮捕起来，说我是这次骚乱的首领，特为从伦敦赶来指挥这个运动的。于是俄国密探又在我住的那个小城里出现，人数令人瞩目。我几乎每天都接到一些信，显然是国际警察的密探寄来的，信里不是说什么炸药阴谋，就是莫名其妙地告诉我：有一批交给我的炸药已经运出。我在每封信上面都写明“警察国际”字样，集在一起，为数很可观；后来法国警察到我家来搜查的时候，就把这些信拿去了，但是他们从不敢在法庭上发表出来，也永没有交还给我。
+
+在12月里，我住的房子被他们进行一次俄国式的搜查。而且我的正要去日内瓦的妻子在托农车站被捕，还被人搜了身。但是他们当然搜不出一点不利于我或可以牵连到别人的东西来。
+
+十天过去了，在这时间内如果我想走，很可以自由地离开。我接到好几封信都劝我走。其中有一封是一个未具名的俄国友人寄来的，也许是外交团的一个成员，好像认识我；他在信里说，如果我不愿意做正在缔结的法俄罪犯引渡条约的第一个牺牲者的话，最好立刻走开。我没有走，而且我看到伦敦《泰晤士报》登载一条电文说我已经离开托农，我便写了一封信给这家报馆，把我的住址告诉他们，并且宣称我的同志中间被捕的人是这样多，我无意离去。
+
+12月21日夜间，我的内弟死在我的怀里。我们早已知道他的病是不治之症，但是看着一个年轻的生命在很勇敢地和死搏斗了许久以后，在你的眼前渐渐消失，真是可怕。我的妻子和我悲痛之极。三四个钟头以后，那阴暗的冬季的早晨刚刚发白，宪兵就走进我的屋里来逮捕我。鉴于我妻子的心情，我要求他们允许我暂时陪伴她到她的弟弟入土后为止，以我的人格担保，到了时候一定自己到监狱门口来。这个要求也被拒绝了，第二天夜里，我就被押解到里昂。爱利塞·邵可侣接到电报，知道我被捕，马上就来以他的伟大仁爱的胸怀，竭力安慰我的妻子，别的朋友从日内瓦来。虽然葬仪完全不用宗教仪式（在小城里这还是一件新鲜事），但是全城的人有一半来送殡，他们来是向我的妻子表示：贫苦阶级和诚朴的萨甫瓦农民同情我们，而是和他们的统治者对立的。在我受审期中，农民们同情地关注着审判，常常从他们山间的村里到城内来买报纸。
+
+另外还有一件事也使我深为感动：一个英国朋友特地跑到里昂来。他是代表一个在英国政界很出名而且很受人尊敬的先生来的（1882年在伦敦时，我和他和他的家人度过许多幸福的时光）。他带来一笔巨款，要运动保释我出狱，同时我的伦敦友人又请他对我说，我完全用不着顾虑这一笔保释金，要紧的是立刻离开法国。不知怎么，他竟能自由见我，不受人监视（并不像我会见我的妻子时那样，在一个有两道栅栏的铁笼里）。他看到我拒绝这个提议，十分感动，正和我一样，我对这个伦敦朋友的友谊的表示也非常感动，——我对这位朋友和他的无限善良的夫人，早已深怀敬意。
+
+法国政府当时希望有一桩使人民产生很深的印象的大案，但是政府无法把爆炸事件扣在被捕的安那其主义者的头上。因为要这样办，非把我们交给一个陪审团不可，而陪审团大概会无罪释放我们。政府于是用了一个非常阴险的办法，以国际工人协会会员的罪名判我们的罪。巴黎公社失败后，法国议会曾通过一项法律，凡是做过国际工人协会会员的人都可以被带到普通警察法庭里审判。最重的刑罚是五年监禁。而一个警察法庭当然不敢不迎合政府的意旨判罪的。
+
+审判于1883年1月初在里昂开始，审了两星期左右。控诉的罪名简直是一个笑话，大家都知道里昂工人中没有一个加入过国际工人协会的。这个罪名完全不能成立，只要看下面的一件事就可知道。原告方面的证人只有一个，这就是里昂秘密警察的头目，他年事已高，法官们十分尊敬他。我应该承认他的报告里凡是事实都是正确的。他说：“安那其主义者已经掌握了居民，他们使机会主义者的集会开不成，因为每有这样的会，他们总来登台演说，宣传共产主义，宣传安那其主义，听众就跟着他们走。”鉴于迄今为止他的证词都是实在的，我便大胆地问他一句：“你在里昂听到过有人说起国际工人协会这一名称吗？”
+
+“从来不曾听到过，”他不大高兴地回答道。
+
+“1881年我从伦敦大会回来，尽力想在法国把国际工人协会恢复起来，我成功了没有？”
+
+“你没有成功。法国工人认为国际工人协会不够革命。”
+
+“谢谢你！”我对他说，于是面向检察官继续说道：“你看！你的控诉的罪名被你自己的证人完完全全推翻了！”
+
+虽是如此，但我们依然以国际工人协会会员的罪名全数被判了罪：其中四个人被判最重的刑罚：监禁五年，罚金二千法郎；其余的人都被判一年至四年的监禁。事实上，控告人对于和国际工人协会有关的事从未企图加以证实。这件事他们似乎全然忘记了。他们只是请我们将安那其主义加以解释，我们照办了。至于那件炸药案他们提也没提。有一两个里昂同志提出它，请他们澄清，他们直截了当地回答：“你们并未为此受到控告，我们判你们罪，因为你们都是国际工人协会会员”——其实除了我一人以外，其余都不是。
+
+这类审判总有一些笑料，这一次的笑话是我的一封信引起的。控诉毫无根据。许多法国安那其主义者的家里都被搜查过，但是他们仅仅搜出两封我的信。检察官想尽可能利用这两封信。一封信是给一个法国工人的，他感到失望消沉，我在信里对他说，我们现在生活在一个伟大的时代，大的改革不久就会到来，新思潮已经发生，而且在各处流传等等。这封信并不长，检察官在里面找不到什么。另外一封信共有十二页，是我写给另一个法国朋友的——他是一个年轻的鞋匠。他的生计是在他的房间里替一家商店做鞋。他左手边有一个小铁炉，在炉上天天自己烧东西吃；右手边有一小凳，在这上面他写出许多长信给同志们，用不着离开他的鞋匠的矮凳。只要他做了几双皮鞋，够他自己的费用（他生活过得极其简朴），还能寄点钱给他的乡下的老母，他就放下活儿花上好几点钟去写信，在信中他以了不起的智力和见识，演绎安那其主义理论的原理。现在这个人已经是一位著作家了，在法国很出名，为人大义凛然，无人不尊敬他。可惜，他会一口气写上八页或一打信纸，还没有一个句点；竟然连一个逗点也没有。有一天，我便写了一封长信给他解释：我们的思想写在纸上的时候，应该分成一组组句子，句子后面要加句号。每一句子又分成子句，子句后面要加逗点。这样读起来很清楚。我告诉他，事情很简单，只须稍加注意，他的文章一定会有所进步。
+
+检察官在法庭上把这封信高声朗诵，还加上了可怜亦复可笑的评论。他在法庭上说：“诸位先生！你们都已经听到了，乍看起来，信里并没有什么。他不过给一个工人上一堂文法课……但是啊（说到这里他的声音因感情激动而颤抖）！这封信的目的，并不是要教育一个可怜的工人——这个工人大概是因为懒惰，没有在学校里受到教育。这封信的目的并不是要帮助这个工人获得正当生计……不！诸位先生！这封信是要使这个工人憎恨我们的伟大而完备的制度，好使安那其主义的毒素更容易灌输到他的心里，而使这个工人变成社会的一个格外可怕的仇敌啊……唉！克鲁泡特金的脚踏上法兰西国土的那一天，我们的法国就该倒霉啦！”他以妙极了的感情结束了他的演说。
+
+在他演说的时候，我们忍不住像小孩子一样地笑；法官们也都大张着眼睛呆望着他，好像在对他说：“够了，够了！你太过火了！”但他仿佛什么也没有看见，只管装腔作势，悲壮激昂，越来越起劲，他真是用尽了气力来博得俄国政府的奖赏。
+
+我们判罪以后，庭长不久就升官，被任为巡回法庭庭长。至于检察官和另外一个法官呢，说起来简直难以相信，俄国政府居然授予他们圣安娜十字章，而且法兰西共和国允许他们去接受。那有名的法俄同盟原来出自这里昂审判中。
+
+这次审判为时两个星期，在审判期中，那些第一流的演说家，如工人伯纳尔和戈蒂耶等人极其出色地阐明安那其主义，他们的演说辞都登在各报上。所有被告的态度都十分坚决，自始至终宣讲我们的信条，在法国传播安那其主义思想上有很大的影响，而且肯定无疑对其他各国中社会主义的复兴起了一定的作用。
+
+这次判罪极其无理，所以法国报界除了政府御用报纸以外，全都公开责备那些法官。便是那十分温和的《经济学家新闻》也公然反对，说“在法庭审判过程中，没有任何事实可以使人预见这样的判决。”原告方面与我们之间的争论，在舆论界看来是我们得胜了。立刻就有人在众议院里提议特赦，表决时居然有一百票左右投票赞成。以后这动议每年都提出来，投票赞成的人数也逐年增加，直到我们全被释放为止。
+
+-
+
+`监狱制度在社会方面之恶果——在克来服中央监狱中——囚人的劳动——老囚人的悲惨境遇——囚人彼此间密切的来往——监狱之使人堕落的影响`
+
+审判终结以后，我在里昂监狱里又过了两个月光景。被判罪的同志大多数对警察法庭的判决提出了上诉，我们得静候上诉的结果。我与四个同志不肯在上诉状上签名，继续在我的“优待室”里劳动。我的好友马旦（一个维埃纳的织工）住在我隔壁的一间“优待室”。我们既已定罪，便可以一同散步。在两次散步之间，如果有什么要谈时，就用叩壁的方法通话，和在俄国一样。
+
+我住在里昂时，已经开始明白监狱对于囚人有使他们堕落之可怕的影响，这使我无条件地谴责这整个制度。
+
+里昂监狱是一座“现代化”监狱，按一人一房建筑的，形状像一颗星。每一道监房与另一道监房之间有一个沥青铺地的小院。天晴的时候，囚人就出来在露天里干活。大多数囚人的工作是打蚕茧取丝，成群结队的小孩在白天某一个时候也被带到这些小院里来。我时常从我的窗口观察他们，他们瘦小、衰弱，吃不饱饭——只能说是一些孩子的影子。他们的小脸上写着，他们的瘦弱发抖的身体很明白无误表露着：他们害着贫血症。非但在宿舍里，便是在小院里，在太阳下面，他们的贫血症也在日渐加重。这些孩子将来从这样的学校里出去，身体是毁了，意志消沉了，精力削弱了——他们会变成怎样的人呢？贫血症削弱人的精力，使人厌恶工作，使人的意志薄弱，智力衰退，想象力被引向邪路，它促成犯罪，不知要比多血质症高多少倍。这个人类的大敌是在监狱里造成的。而且，这些孩子们在这样的环境里所受的又是什么样的教育啊！单靠隔离，即使能够严格做到，也没有多大效力——何况根本做不到。一切监狱里的空气都在夸耀那“孤注一掷、铤而走险的身手”——这就是盗窃、欺诈以及其他同类反社会行为的实质。一代代的未来的囚犯，就在这些“幼儿园”里养成了。这些“幼儿园”，国家出钱维持，社会也默许它存在。为什么呢？不过是因为它不愿让人谈起它自身的病患并加以解剖罢了。“一个人年轻时候进过监狱，就会在监狱里过完一辈子。”这句话我后来时常听到，凡是关心刑罚制度的人都这样说。我眼看着这些孩子们，想到他们将来的苦命，我不能自已地问我自己：“究竟谁是真的有罪呢？是这些孩子呢？还是那些年年判决成百上千的孩子，使他们一生受罪的法官呢？”我很愿意承认法官的罪行是无意识的。但是所有被囚禁在监牢里的人，他们所犯的罪难道就像一般人以为的那样是有意识的吗？
+
+我入狱以后不到几个星期，就有了另一点活生生的感受，然而这感受却没有引起过法官和刑法学者的注意。这就是，监狱制度（除了那有意无意的法律上的错误不用说外）有无数案件，使许许多多完全无辜的人所受的罪，比那个被判罪的囚犯本人所受的还更严酷。
+
+我的几乎每一个同志的经济情况很可以代表工人阶级的中等境况。他们差不多都有家庭负担，或者有妻儿要养活，或有姊妹、老母依靠他的工钱过活。现在呢，这些女人都没有了依靠，只好尽力设法去找工做，有几个居然找到了，但是没有一个能够每天赚到一个半法郎。他们所挣的工资，每星期不过九个法郎，往往只有七个法郎，她们和她们的儿女就靠着这一点工资过日子。这样生活的结果就是：食不果腹，各方面的匮乏，女人和小孩的健康日益恶化，智力消损，精力减退，意志变弱。我因此明白，法庭宣布的判决在事实上使完全无辜的人受到种种的苦楚，而且在大多数的案件里，这些无辜的人所受到的痛苦，比被判罪的本人所受到的还更厉害。据说法律拿种种物质的和使精神堕落的困苦来惩罚犯罪的人。但是人生来就是这样：无论你把怎样的困苦加之于他，他渐渐都能习惯不以为意。他既然无法减轻这些痛苦，便只好忍受，过不了多久也就习惯了，好像对一项痼疾一样，久了成为习惯，也就没有感觉了。但是当他被关在牢里的时候，他的妻儿（即是那些平时靠他作工来养活的无辜的人）怎么办呢？他们所受的惩罚比罪犯本人所受到的还要残酷！我们习以为常地不去想这么一件极不公道的事。便是我自己也在是有了实际经历后才明白的。
+
+1883年3月中旬，我们二十二个判决一年以上监禁的人被极其秘密地押到克来服中央监狱里。这在以前本是圣伯尔拿寺院，法国大革命时被改为济贫院，后来又改为“拘留兼感化院”。但是囚犯们甚至狱吏们自己也给它起了一个更适当的绰号“拘留兼腐化院”。
+
+我们在里昂监狱里所受的待遇，与法国一般候审人所受的待遇一样，可以穿自己的衣服，可以从饭店里叫饭食进来吃，可以每月出几个法郎租一间较大的监房。我便趁这个机会努力替《不列颠百科全书》和《十九世纪杂志》写文章。不过到了克来服，我们应该受什么样的待遇，就成问题了。在法国，大家都承认，剥夺政治犯的自由，强迫他不能活动，已经是很重的刑罚了，不必再加别的惩处。所以狱中当局告诉我们，我们还是受候审人的待遇。我们可以有各自的房间，穿自己的衣服，不从事强迫劳动，而且不禁止我们抽烟。典狱还向我们说：“你们里面如果有人想做一点手工挣几个钱，便可以缝紧身褡，或是雕刻珍珠母的小东西。这些活儿挣钱很少；但是你们不能到牢内工场的制造铁床、画框之类商品的工厂里去作工，因为那样就要你们和普通刑事犯住在一起了。”和别的囚犯一样，我们也可以在狱中饮食店里买一些外加的食物和一品脱葡萄酒。这些东西都是价廉物美的。
+
+克来服监狱给我的最初的印象是极好的。我们在早晨两三点钟坐在通常用来押解囚犯的火车上，关在那个窄小的箱子里面，这样走了一整天。到了中央监狱，我们被临时收容在惩戒监里，那里是一些通常的监房，不过它们极其清洁。虽然已经夜深，狱里居然特为我们预备好一顿热饭，很简单，但是质量很好，我们每人还能喝一大杯当地出产的好葡萄酒，这酒是狱中饮食店卖给囚人的，价钱很便宜，每瓶只要二十四生丁。典狱和狱卒对我们也都十分客气。
+
+第二天，典狱把他打算给我们居住的房间指给我看。我告诉他，这些房间都很不错，不过我们有二十二人，这些房间未免太小一点，许多人挤在一起，容易生病。他于是从那所当年寺院院长的住宅，现在改为医院的房屋里，选出几个房间给我们。我们的窗前有一个小花园，再往前便可以饱览四围的田野美景。老布朗基在出狱前的三、四年内，就关在靠近这房屋的另一个房间里。在此以前，他是关在单身牢房内的。
+
+我们一共得到三个很大的房间，另有一间较小的留给爱米尔·戈蒂耶和我两人在里面继续我们的文字工作。我们所以得到这样的优待，大概是因为一大批英国科学家的干预，他们在我被定罪以后立刻呈递了一份请愿书给法国总统，要求将我释放。许多《不列颠百科全书》的撰稿人，以及H.斯宾塞和斯温伯恩都签了名；维克多·雨果不但签了名，还加上几句热情的话。法国的舆论对于我们的判罪十分不满。当我的妻子在巴黎向人说我需要书籍，科学院就将它的藏书供我借用，E.勒南也写了一封动人的信给我的妻子，表示愿意把他的私人藏书听她使用。
+
+我们还有一个小花园，可以在里面玩球。此外我们又在沿墙一带开了一条菜畦，种了一些蔬菜，在这块不过八十平方码的面积上，我们所得到的莴苣和红萝卜的数量之多，简直叫人难以相信；我们另外还种了一些花。不用说，我们马上就组织班次上课，在克来服的三年中间，我给我的同志讲授了宇宙志、几何与物理，还帮助他们学习外国语。他们几乎每人都学了一种外国语——英语、德语、意大利语或西班牙语，有几个还学了两种。我们有时还装订书报，这是在出色的《洛列百科全书》出版的一本小册子里学来的。
+
+不过到了第一年年尾，我的身体又变坏了。克来服监狱是建筑在一块低湿的土地上，在这种地方疟疾是很容易发生的，我同时患了疟疾和坏血病。我的妻子当时正在巴黎求学，在伍尔茨的实验室里工作，准备参加理科博士的考试。她抛弃一切，跑来住在克来服的小村里。这个小村只有十几所房屋，聚在那监狱的极高的围墙脚下。这种生活当然没有丝毫的乐趣。但是她却一直住在那里，直到我出狱。第一年，她只被允许每两个月见我一次，而且每次见面，总有一个狱卒坐在我们中间，但是她搬到克来服以后，声明她坚决要留在那里，不久她便得到每天见我的许可。
+
+我们在一间狱卒住的小屋里会面，我的饮食就由她住的旅馆送进狱里来。后来，我们甚至得到许可，一起在典狱的花园里散步，通常总有一个同志陪伴着我们——当然是在严密监视之下。
+
+我惊奇地发现克来服中央监狱在各方面都像一个小的工业城市，四面围以果园和麦田，全都圈在一道外墙里面。虽然法国中央监狱里面的囚人过得如何，似乎比英国监狱里的囚人更随典狱和狱卒的一时高兴而定；但是法国囚人所得的待遇，比英国囚人所受的要人道得多。中世纪遗留下来的报复之道在英国监狱里还很普通，但在法国却早已没有了。法国囚人并不被强迫睡硬板床，也不是要每隔一天才有软垫睡。人一进监狱，就有人给他一张正常的床，从此床就是他的。没有人强迫他做难堪的活儿，如爬一个轮子，或理清乱麻之类。相反，他做的是有用的工作，所以克来服监狱简直像一个工业发达的小城，差不多有一千六百个囚人在里面制造铁制家具、画框、镜子、米达尺、绒布、麻布、紧身褡、珍珠母制的小东西以及木鞋等等。
+
+虽然不服管教要受十分严厉的惩罚（这事我在那本讲监狱的书里已经详述过，有关法国监狱的那一章，巴黎《时报》曾经转载），但是在英国监狱里还未废除的笞刑，在法国已经不用了。这样的刑罚在法国是绝对不可能有的。总之，克来服中央监狱可算是欧洲最好的监狱之一。虽然如此，但是在克来服监狱所得到的结果，也与其他一切旧式监狱一样坏，有一次，一名监狱管理当局的官员亲自对我说：“如今大家都在说，在我们的监狱里面囚犯得到改造。这是瞎说，我无论如何决不会受人指使说出这样的谎言来。”
+
+克来服监狱的药房就在我们住的房间的下面。所以我们有时和在那里做事的囚人有点来往。其中一个年纪有五十多岁，头发已经斑白；我们在狱时，他的刑期满了。听了他出狱的情形，人人不免为之动容。他知道不到几个月甚至于不到几个星期，他会回来，便请求医生把他的药房里的位置留着给他。他来克来服，这已不是初次了，而且他知道这也不是最后一次。他出狱以后，在世界上没有一个亲人伴他度他的晚年。他说：“有谁肯雇用我呢？我有一行手艺吗？没有！出狱以后，我不得不到我的老伙计们那里去，他们至少会接待我，把我当做一个老朋友看待。”和他们在一起时他会多喝一杯，大家谈到某一次的好手气，谈到再露一次“好身手”，说的自然是偷盗，于是一半是因为意志薄弱，一半是因为不愿意使他那些仅有的朋友失望，他入了伙，于是又被关起来。他一生中已经有过好几次这样的事。但是这次他出狱已经两个月，还不曾回克来服。囚人们，甚至于狱卒们都想他，大家开始焦虑起来。“他到现在还没有回来，难道他有功夫搬到别一个司法区里去犯法吗？但愿他没有陷到什么坏事里面，”他们会这样说，希望他不会干比偷盗更坏的事。“要是真陷了进去可就糟了，他是多么善良安份的人！”不久，从另一座监狱里来了一封信，大家才知道这老人已被关在那里，正在争取移到克来服来。
+
+那班年老的囚人的境遇是最可怜不过的。他们里面很多人自小或者少年时，就开始尝到铁窗风味，其余的是成人后才入狱的。反正“一入监狱，就会在里面过一辈子。”这句话是出自经验。如今年纪已经到了或者过了六十，他们明白他们得在牢里过一辈子。监狱当局通常把他们派在毡袜工场里作工（这些毡鞋都是用种种废弃的羊毛做的），好让他们早点离开这个世界。
+
+这工场里的灰尘不久会使他们害上肺病死去。于是四个同狱的囚人就把死者抬到公共坟场里，唯一的送殡人便是守墓人和他的那条黑狗。监狱牧师走在前面，机械地背诵他的祷文，两眼看着路旁的栗树和枞树，那四个抬棺材的囚人也正忙着享受他们暂时脱离监狱的自由，能被葬仪的肃穆所打动的，恐怕就只有这条黑狗了！
+
+法国当初设立改良中央监狱的时候，人们相信可以在里面实行“绝对肃静”的原则，但是这原则与人性截然相反，所以它的实行就不得不放松了，事实上，单身囚禁也不足以防止囚人彼此通问。
+
+从外面观察，监狱似乎是完全肃静的，但是实际上住在里面的人也是一样忙碌，好像在一个小城市里一般。悄声耳语，照面时匆忙地说上一两句，或者仓卒地写在纸片上，用了这些方法，凡是稍有一点趣味的消息立刻会传遍整个监狱。随便什么事情，无论是在囚人中间发生的，或是在狱吏住宅中发生的，或是在工厂雇主们居住的克来服村庄里发生的，或是在巴黎政界发生的，无不立刻传遍各宿舍、各工场、各单身牢房。法国人生性太喜欢来往沟通，要完全禁止他们的地下通讯是不可能的。我们和普通刑事犯之间没有来往。但是每天的消息我们都知道：
+
+“园丁约翰又回来啦，刑期是两年。”
+
+“某督察的妻子与某人的妻子大闹了一场。”
+
+“牢房里的詹姆斯递给画框工场里的约翰一张问候字条，被人逮住了。”
+
+“某某那老畜生已经不是司法部长啦，这个部已经垮啦。”诸如此类。当有消息说：“约翰刚刚拿了两件绒背心，换得两包五十生丁一包的烟草”，这消息也会马上传遍全狱。
+
+问我们要烟草的人是很多的。有一次，一个不出名的律师也被囚在监狱里，想给我一张字条，请当时住在村里的我的妻子不时去看望一下他的太太（她也住在村里），不少囚人十分关心于传递这张字条，不知经过了多少只手，这张字条才到了我手里。如果一张报上有一点和我们特别有关的消息，这张报会被人以最奇妙莫测的方法传到我们手里来，报纸里面会包着一个小石子，从我们园里的高墙外扔过来。
+
+单身牢房也不能成为传播的障碍。我们到克来服时，先住在单身牢房里，这些小房间真是冷得可怕，连我的手也冻僵了。我写给当时在巴黎的妻子的信到了她手里，她竟然认不出是我的笔迹。后来上面下了命令叫把这些牢房尽量烧得热一些，但是随你怎么烧，还是一样冷。后来才知道所有这些热气管全被塞住了，里面尽是好几代囚人隐藏的碎纸、撕成小块的字条、小刀和别的种种小玩意。
+
+我在前面已经说过的朋友马旦，现在得到许可将他的刑期一部分在单身牢房里度过。他不愿和十几个难友挤在一间房里，情愿与世隔绝，于是他到了一个单身牢房的一间房里。他一到那里，就大吃一惊，在他的牢房里，决不是只有他一个人。四周墙壁，钥匙孔，都在向他说话。不过一两天，所有关在单身牢房里的囚人都知道了他是谁，他也认识了大家。这种表面上各房隔绝的单身牢房，实际上像一个蜂窠一般忙碌。不过这种忙碌时常带了一种可以完全归之为精神变态的性质。恐怕连克拉夫特·埃宾也闹不清有些关在单身牢房的囚人、精神错乱到了何等地步。
+
+我在1886年从克来服监狱出来以后不久在英国出版了一本题作《俄法狱中记》的书，说明监狱对于囚人的精神上的影响。在那本书里说过的，我在这里用不着再说了。不过有一件事必须说一说。监狱里面的囚人的成份很复杂，但是单就那些通常称为正规的“罪犯”来说，关于这种人，龙布罗梭和他的追随者近来说了许多，使我印象深刻的乃是下面一件事：通常大家总以为监狱是一种防止反社会行为的工具，其实它正是一个滋生这种行为的机构；囚人受了“监狱教育”以后，犯起罪来会变本加厉。谁都知道，这类人犯法受审的原因是缺乏教育、从小就厌恶正规劳动、身体缺乏锻炼，不能长时间用力气、爱好不正当的冒险、爱好赌博、精力萎靡、意志未经锻炼以及对于他人的幸福之漠不关心等等。而我在克来服时却注意到监狱在囚人身上所培养的正是这些人性的缺点一个也不少——这就是我在狱期间的深刻印象。监狱使这些缺点发展，这是必然的，因为监狱总是监狱。监狱不废除，这些人性的缺点也永远在那里滋长。
+
+事实上，监狱里的长期幽禁，注定要毁灭一个人的精力，而且更加确定无疑地会杀死他的意志。对于一个人，监狱生活没有供他应用他的意志的余地。一个囚人如果还有自己的意志，那就肯定会给自己惹上麻烦。囚人的意志是必须消灭的，事实上，它也是被消灭了。而应用一个人的天然的同情之机会更是没有；监狱方面，千方百计地使囚人与那些他可以同情的人——狱外的也好，狱中的也好——毫无自由接触的机会。无论肉体还是精神，他愈来愈难以作持续不断的努力。如果他以前对于正规的劳动已经有点厌恶，在监狱里关上几年以后，这种厌恶只有格外增加。如果他在第一次入狱以前，因为不十分知道一门手艺，不能好好地干活，对于那种单调的劳动不久便感到厌烦，对于那种工钱太少的过度劳动已经有怨言；那么到了现在，他的厌恶会变成憎恨。如果他以前对于现今的道德训条的社会作用已经有所怀疑；那么到了现在，他看清了卫护这些训条的官吏是些什么样的人，听了他的同狱囚人对于这些人的意见，他自然会抛弃这些训条。如果他的性格、情感、肉欲各方面以前就有病态的发展，因而犯罪入狱，那么现在在监狱里关了好几年以后，这种病态的性格会格外发展——在许多情况下简直会发展到可怕的地步。在最后这一点上（这是最危险的一点），监狱教育起的作用是最灵验不过的了。
+
+我在西伯利亚时亲眼看见那龌龊不堪、挤满了囚犯的俄国“未经改良”的监狱简直是一个垃圾堆，是使人身心堕落的地方。我在十九岁时心里就想，如果不把囚犯那样挤在一堆，如果把他们分门别类，如果给他们合乎身心健康的工作，监狱制度就可以大大改善。现在我不得不和这些幻想分手了。我有理由相信：就对囚犯起的效果，对社会全体造成的后果说，最好的“改良”监狱（无论是单身牢房与否）比起从前的龌龊的牢房来是一样糟，甚至更糟。
+
+这些新式监狱决不会使囚犯得到改造的。恰恰相反，在绝大多数情况下，这些新式监狱给囚犯以最大的腐蚀。盗贼、骗子、地痞、恶棍等等，在监狱里住过几年以后出来会比以前更容易去干他们的老勾当。现在他更有准备，更懂得怎样去干那些老勾当，干得比以前更干净利落。他现在对社会更加仇视。他发现了更有力的理由去反抗现社会的法律和习惯。他因为干了一些反社会的行为而犯罪受审，现在他必然不可避免地沿着这条反社会的道路走下去，愈走愈远。他出狱后所犯的罪一定会比以前犯过的更为严重。他注定了要在一个监狱或苦役地结束他的一生。在前面提过的我的那本书里，我曾说过：监狱是国家出钱办的犯罪大学，这是我在十五年前说的话，现在加上这十五年的经验，我对这句话只有更加确信无疑。
+
+就我个人来说，我对在法国监狱里那几年生活并没有抱怨的理由。对于一个活跃的独立的人，自由和活动受到限制是最大的匮乏；和它比，其余的一切，如监狱生活的小苦恼，便不值一提。当我们听到人说起当时法国政界的活跃情况，我们对于受强制不能活动一事，当然感到痛恨。在第一年的年终，尤其是那阴暗的冬天，囚人总是感到难堪。春天来了，一个人感觉到比任何时候都更需要自由。当我倚窗远望，看见一片青绿的牧场，春雾弥漫群山，或者看见一列火车驰入一个山谷，我确实感到一个非常强烈的愿望，要跟着火车走去，要去呼吸林间的新鲜空气，要追随着人流流到一个忙碌活动的城市里去。不过一个人既然投身在一个进步的革命党里，就应该准备在监狱中住几年，不要抱怨。他觉得即使是在狱中，他仍然是人类进步潮流中远非不起作用的一分子；这潮流在扩大、在加强对他来说是最宝贵的思想。
+
+里昂监狱里的狱卒全是些横暴的人。我的同志们、我的妻子和我自己都受过他们的无礼待遇。但是打过两三次交道以后，情形也就好了。再说，狱中当局也知道巴黎报界同情我们，他们当然不愿意招罗什福尔的怒骂或克雷孟梭的尖刻的讥评。克来服监狱不需要报界的干预。我们到这里时，监狱管理人员刚刚全部换过。有几个狱卒把一个囚犯杀死在他的牢房里，然后把尸首吊起来装作囚人自缢。但是这一次，狱医却把这个秘密泄漏了出去。典狱受了免职处分，狱里的气氛此后就好得多了。至于我自己，我离开克来服时还带着典狱所给我的极好的印象。即使是在监狱里时，我也不止一次地想，人总要比他们所属的制度好一点。但是我既无个人的私怨，我更可以自由地、无条件地反对这个监狱制度，它是黑暗的过去的遗迹，其原则是错误的；对社会来说是深远难测的邪恶根源。
+
+我应该还提到一件事，这件事给我印象之深比监狱的使人堕落的效果还更甚。每个监狱（甚至于每个法庭）对于它的邻里，对于那些住在它的附近的人，总是一个传染源！龙布罗梭就他在监中囚犯里面发现的“罪犯标本”作了很多发挥。如果他能下一番同样的功夫来观察那些围着法庭转（侦探、密探、讼师、告密者、欺诈老实人的坏蛋等等），他大概会得到这个结论：他所说的“罪犯标本”，并不都在监狱的高墙里面，他们的地理范围要广得多。我在里昂审判厅内外看到过数以十计的人。我从没有见过比这伙人的脸更卑劣、更下流的，远远低于常人。我在克来服监狱的围墙里面的确没有见过这样的一些人。狄更斯和克鲁克香克在他们的作品里，曾把这些标本中的几个描了下来，使他们长此留存。但是他们代表着环绕法庭活动的一个世界，它将疫病传播得又广又远。每一个像克来服这样的中央监狱都是如此，处处都是小偷、小骗、暗访密探，引人腐化堕落，形形色色，不一而足，每个监狱四周都有这样一片油污，无孔不入。
+
+以上所说都是我亲眼看见的。我在未入狱前本已知道现社会设置目前的刑罚制度是错误的；待到走出克来服以后，我更明白这个制度非但是错误的，非但是不公道的，而且社会幻想这个制度对于遏止犯罪本能确有必要，便一半不自觉地，一半有意无视现实地，来自己掏钱办这些犯罪大学，——这些引人堕落的场所，这简直是一大蠢举。
+
+-
+
+`我和密探开玩笑——一个密探的可笑的报告——被人发觉了的密探——一个假男爵——密探行为的结果`
+
+每一个革命者在他的一生中多少总要遇上几个警探和假充革命党的密探，我也遇见过不少。各国政府每年总要耗费大量金钱去养活这些恶棍。不过他们主要对年轻人造成危险。对生活、对人多少有点经验的人不久就会看出这帮家伙身上总有一些令人警惕的地方。他们都是从社会渣滓中募集而来的，在那些下流到极点的人中间选来的。只要一个人对他所遇见的人的道德品质加以注意，他不久就会在这些“社会栋梁”的行为举止间看出一些令人震惊的地方。于是他会自问道：“这个人来会我是为了什么？他身上有什么可以使我引为同道的呢？”在绝大多数情况下，这个简单的疑问就很足以使人小心警惕了。
+
+我第一次到日内瓦时，俄国政府派来侦察流亡者的那个密探，我们都熟识他。他自称是一个伯爵；但是他既没有听差，又没有马车可以把他的爵冕和爵徽（纹章）绘在车上，他便把它们绣在他的小狗的外套上。我们有时在咖啡馆里见到他，并不和他攀谈。实际上这是一个“无害的”家伙，他不过到报摊上把亡命者所有的刊物买来，多半添上一些迎合上司心理的评语。
+
+后来，亡命到日内瓦的俄国青年越来越多，各种不同的人也成群结队地跑来了。然而我们总有法子认出他们。
+
+如果有一个外人到我们中间来，我们就以虚无主义者的惯有的坦率盘问他的过去历史和他的眼下光景；并不要多久，我们就可以知道他是个怎样的人。人们彼此来往时，如果希望建立很好的关系，最好的方法便是坦白。在辨别友敌这一点上，坦白的好处更是无穷的。许许多多到日内瓦来的人，我们不认识他们，连他们的姓名也没有听说过，他们和一切革命团体完全没有关系，但是其中不少人在到后不过几天功夫，甚至不过几个钟头，竟会和所有的亡命者变得异常友好。可是不知为什么，那班密探从不曾能跨越和我们熟悉的门槛。一个密探可以成为我们的一般相识，可以说出他以前在俄国的最好经历（有时甚至是正确的），他可以把虚无主义者的俗话和举止完全学会，但是俄国青年中间生长起来的那种特别的虚无主义者的伦理观念，他是永远学不会的。——这一点就足以使他无法接近我们的聚居地了。密探能模仿任何事情，却不能模仿虚无主义者的伦理观念。
+
+当我和邵可侣在克拉龙一起工作的时候，在那里有一个这样的家伙，我们都不理他。我们并不知道不利于这个人的任何事情，但是我们总觉得他不是“我们中间的一个”。因为他愈是想方设法要钻到我们里面来，我们愈是对他起了疑心。我从来没有和他谈过一句话，他因此特别要来找我。他发现不能够用平常的方法和我接近，便开始写信给我，神秘莫测地约我在树林里或这一类地方相会，为了神秘莫测的目的。有一次，我想开个玩笑，便答应了他的约会，到指定的地点去，远远地有一个好朋友跟随着。这家伙（大概他有一个同伙）准是注意到了我不是一个人；便没有出现。因此不幸失去和他说话的机会。再说我当时很忙碌，一面帮助邵可侣编纂他的《大地理》，一面又要替《反抗者》写文章，连一分钟的空闲都没有，更没有功夫参加任何阴谋。虽然如此，我们后来知道这家伙时常给第三科寄递详细的报告，当然都是他捏造的，说我和他谈了些什么话，告诉他什么心腹之言，说我在策划什么可怕的阴谋，要暗杀在圣彼得堡的沙皇！所有这些报告一到圣彼得堡，马上就有钱来，是现款交易。在意大利也是如此。有一天，加费罗在瑞士被捕，当局把一些案情重大的报告给他看，递这些报告的意大利密探警告政府说加费罗和我带了许多炸弹，就要进入意大利。事实上，我从来没有到过意大利，也从来不曾想过要到意大利去。
+
+话说回来，密探的报告也不全是凭空捏造的。他们所说的事往往是真的；一切取决于事情是怎样讲的。1881年，我的妻子和我从巴黎到伦敦，有一个法国密探跟踪我们。他给法国政府上的报告使我们开心了好一会。这个密探干的大概是两方面的买卖（这在他们是常有的事），所以又把这个报告卖给罗什福尔，后者在他的报上发表了那报告。这个报告里面所说的话都正确无误。且看他是怎样讲的。
+
+举一个例，他写道：“我坐的那节车厢是在克鲁泡特金和他的夫人所坐的车厢的隔壁。”一点也不错。他是在那里，我们注意到他，因为他的那张阴沉的讨厌的面孔引起了我们的注意。“他们总是讲俄国话，为了使别的旅客不懂他们说些什么。”也很对，那天我们讲俄国话；我们两人之间说话，照例用俄语。“到了加莱，他们两位每人喝了一碗汤。”一点不错，我们喝了一碗汤。但是那次旅行的神秘莫测的部分就此开始。“喝了汤以后，他们忽然一起不见了。我在月台上、在别的地方找他们，都不见踪影。后来他们再出现时，克鲁泡特金变了装，后面有一个俄国牧师，寸步不离地陪他一直到伦敦。到了伦敦以后，我就看不见牧师了。”我的妻子有点牙痛，我于是请饭店主人让我们用一下他的私人房间，治我的妻子的牙。我们就这样地“一起不见了”。因为我们要过海峡，我便将我的毡制的软礼帽放在衣袋里，戴了一顶皮便帽。这样我就“变了装”。至于那位神出鬼没的牧师，他也真在那儿。他不是俄国人，但这无关紧要。他至少穿了一身希腊教会牧师的服装。我看见他站在柜台前面问什么话。但是没有人懂得。他急得直说：“阿加！阿加！”我便向侍者说，“给这位先生一杯水喝”。这个牧师于是用一种真正东方人的感情流露出感谢我的好意。我的妻子很可怜他，便用不同语言和他说话，但是他除了现代希腊语外，什么也不懂。后来知道他会说几句南斯拉沃尼亚话，我们才听明白：“我是希腊人。伦敦。土耳其大使馆。”我们便对他说（大部分是用手势）我们也是到伦敦去，他可以和我们同行。
+
+这个故事的最有趣的地方是我居然在到彻灵十字县车站以前，替这位牧师把土耳其大使馆的地址找到了。火车在路上一个车站停下时，有两位漂亮的贵妇人偏要到我们的已经挤满了的三等车厢里来。两人手里都拿了报纸。一个是英国人；另外一个面貌俊俏、高身材的太太说得一口流利的法国话，自称也是英国人。她和我谈了两三句话以后，出其不意地突然问我：“你认为伊格纳节夫伯爵是怎样的人？”接着又问：“你就要去暗杀新即位的沙皇吗？”听了这两个问题，我立刻知道她的职业是什么了。但是我想着那位牧师，我便问她道：“你知道土耳其大使馆的地址吗？”—“某街某号”，她毫不迟疑，好像一个女学生背诵功课似地回答我。我又问她：“我想你大概也可以告诉我，俄国大使馆的地址罢？”她也和刚才一样，马上告诉我，我便把这两个地址交给牧师。我们到了彻灵十字县车站，那个贵妇人对我的行李照顾得十分周到，甚至要用她的戴了手套的手来提那只沉重的箱子，我实在忍不住，向她说（她当然大惊不已）：“够啦！太太们哪有替男人提箱子的道理！走开！”
+
+现在还是来说那位诚实不欺的法国密探的报告罢。他写道：“他在彻灵十字县下车，但是在火车到站以后，他在站上等了大半个钟点，直到他看见所有人都离站以后才走，那时我也暂时离开，躲在一根柱子背后。他们看见所有旅客都已离站，便猛地跳上一辆马车。但是我仍旧跟着他们，而且还听见车夫把地址告诉守城门的警察——某巷，门牌十二号——当时附近一辆车子也没有，我只好在他们的马车后面奔跑，一直到特拉法加广场，才找到了一辆车。我便坐车跟踪他，看见他们在上面说的那个地址下了车。”
+
+这段报告里的事实、街名、号数以及其他都是一点不错的。但是从这位密探的口里说出来，这一切听起来是多么神秘莫测。我把到伦敦的日期事先告诉过一位俄国朋友，但是那天早晨起了大雾，我的朋友睡过了头。我们等了他半个钟点，然后把行李寄放在衣帽间，先坐车到他的家里去。
+
+“他们把窗帘放下，在屋里直到午后两点钟，才有一个身材高大的男子从屋里走出来，一个钟点以后他带了他们的行李回来。”连那句关于窗帘的话都是事实。因为雾太大，我们不得不点起煤气灯，又为了不愿看那条埋在雾里的窄小的依斯令顿街的难看相，便把窗帘放了下来。
+
+我在克拉龙和邵可侣一起工作时，每隔半月到日内瓦去一次，办理《反抗者》出版事务。一天，我到了印刷所，有人告诉我说，有一位俄国绅士要见我。他已经和我的朋友们见过面，说他是来请我创办一个和《反抗者》同类的俄文报。办报需用的经费，他愿意独力负担。我到一个咖啡店里去见他，他见了我，用的是一个德国姓，似乎是：Tohnlehm，又告诉我他生长在波罗的海省份。他自夸拥有田产和工厂等一大笔财产，对于俄国政府使波罗的海各省俄国化的政策十分愤怒。大体说来，他给我的印象是难以确定的，因此朋友们都坚持要我答应；但是我和他初次见面就不大喜欢他。
+
+我们走出咖啡店，他又请我到他住的旅馆里去。一到了自己房里，他就不像先前那样谨慎小心，露出一些他的真面目，更使人不快。他对我说道：“请你不要怀疑我的财产。我曾有一项很来钱的发明，我就要去申请专利，可以得一大笔款子，我要把这些钱都用在俄国革命事业上。”他便把他的发明拿出来给我看，使我大吃一惊的是那是一只难看之极的烛台，它的独特之处在于它是极端丑陋，其次是它有三根铜丝，可以放蜡烛。最穷苦人家的女人也不会要这样一只烛台；便是他得到了专利权，也不会有一个五金商肯出十来块钱向这位发明家购买的。“一个有钱的人居然把他的希望放在一只这样的烛台上！这个人一定没有见过比它强的烛台罢。”我这样想。我对这个人的看法就此定了。我断定他不是个有钱人，他要给我的决不是他自己的。我于是不客气地对他说：“好，你既然这样想办一个俄文的革命刊物，既然又这样抬举我，你得用我的姓名把钱存在一家银行里，由我个人随意处置。但是我预先告诉你，你以后和这个刊物将没有丝毫关系。”他回答道：“当然！当然！我不过来看一看，有时候提供一点意见，还帮忙你将刊物偷运到俄国去。”“不，不！这些事你都不要管！你也用不着再来见我！”朋友们都以为我太令这个人难堪了。但是过了不久，我们就接到一封从圣彼得堡来的信，警告我们说第三科派了一个密探来见我们，他的姓就是Tohnlehm。这样看来，那只烛台对我们算是立了一功。
+
+不管是因为一只烛台，或是别的什么东西，这种人几乎总会自己露出马脚来的。1881年，我们住在伦敦的时候，在一个大雾的早晨，我们接见了两个俄国人。其中一个的姓名我早知道；另一个是我不认识的年轻人，前一个给我介绍说这是他的朋友，他自愿陪他到英国来访问几天。这个年轻人既然是朋友介绍的，我对他也就一点不起疑心，但是那天我有事，非常忙碌，便请一个住在邻近的同志代他们找一间房，带他们到伦敦去游览。我的妻子当时没有逛过伦敦，便和他们同去。下午她回家，就对我说：“你知道，我很不喜欢这个人。你要当心。”我问她：“那是为什么？出了什么事？”“没有，什么事也没有，但是他一定不是‘我们一伙的人’。看他对待咖啡馆侍者的样子，看他用钱的样子，我立刻就知道他不是一个‘我们一伙的人’。既然不是，那么到我们这里来做什么呢？”她确信她的疑心是一点不错的，所以她一面虽然尽她的主人待客的义务，但是居然做到了连一分钟也不让这个年轻人一个人在我的书斋里。我们有一次闲谈，这个客人越谈越露出他的道德品质之低下，连他的朋友都为之脸红。后来我细问他的生平，他的回答更加令人不能满意。我们两人于是都对他有了戒心。两三天以后，他们两人都离开了伦敦。过了半个月，那个俄国朋友写了一封道歉信来，说不该介绍这个年轻人给我，现在巴黎已经有人发觉他是俄国大使馆派出来的密探。我便去查执行委员会（在圣彼得堡到处都有委员会里的人）新近寄给我们亡命者的在法国和瑞士的俄国暗探的名单，发见了其中果然有这个年轻人的姓名，只改了一个字母。
+
+警察出钱办刊物，由一个暗探主持，这个办法已经是很陈旧的了。1881年，巴黎警察总监昂德里欧早已用过。我和邵可侣一起住在瑞士山中时，我们接到一封信，是一个法国人（也许是比利时人）写来的，他要在巴黎创刊一份安那其主义的刊物，请我们协助。这封信里充满了恭维话，给我们一个很不快的印象，而且邵可侣仿佛记得他听见过写信人的姓名和一件不好的事情有关。我们便决定不与他合作，我还写了一封信给我的一个巴黎朋友，说我们首先一定要弄清楚这个刊物的经费是从什么地方来的。“这些钱也许会是奥尔良派拿出来的（这个家族惯要这把戏），所以我们一定要知道钱的来源……”我的巴黎的朋友以他那种劳动者的直爽，在一次会上将我的信宣读了，那个刊物的暂定的出版人也在座。他假装生了气，我不得不为这件事写了好几封信；但是我坚持说：“如果这个人是认真的，他必须告诉我们钱是从什么地方来的。”
+
+到了最后，他说了。被人问得紧了，他便告诉我们说，这些钱是他的伯母给他的，——那是一位有钱而思想极旧的太太，但为了满足她的侄儿的办报的想法，答应把钱给他。这位太太当时不在法国；她住在伦敦。但是我们坚持要知道她的姓名，她的伦敦住址。我们的朋友马拉铁斯达愿意去见她。他和一个意大利友人（是贩卖旧家俱的）一起到她的家里去。他们看到了这位太太住在一套小公寓里。马拉铁斯达和她谈话，越谈越相信她不过是在这出喜剧里扮演伯母的角色。同时他的贩卖旧家具的朋友打量着房里的桌椅等等，立刻看出所有这些家具都是前一天从他隔壁那家旧家具店里运来的——大概是租来的。桌椅上的店号还在上面。这本来算不上是重要的证据，但自然使我们的疑心加重了。我于是坚决拒绝和这个刊物发生关系。
+
+这刊物出版后，其论调之激烈闻所未闻。里面没有别的，尽是放火、杀人、炸弹等等字眼。我在伦敦大会上遇见这刊物的编辑。我一看见他那张阴森森的面孔，听他说上一两句话，看一眼那个到处跟随着他的女人的模样，我对这个人的意见就定下了。大会上，他提出种种可怕的议案，代表们都不理他。当他坚持索取全世界安那其主义者的地址的时候，我们不客气地严辞拒绝了。
+
+现在长话短说，几个月后，他的面目终于被人揭露了，刊物第二天就永久停刊了。过了两年，巴黎警察总监昂德里欧出版他的《回忆录》，把他创办这个刊物的前前后后和盘托出。他还说到他自己的暗探怎样组织了巴黎的炸弹案——他们把沙丁鱼盒子“里面放了一点东西”放在梯也尔的铜像下面。
+
+可以想象，这些事要耗费法国和别的国家多少钱财。
+
+关于这题目我可以写上好几章，但是我只想再讲两个到克来服来的冒险家的故事。
+
+在监狱围墙脚边发展起来的那个小村里，只有一个小旅馆，我的妻子就住在那里。有一天，旅馆的女主人走进我妻子的房间，拿了一封两个男子写给她的信，他们到旅馆里来见她。这个女主人用尽她的口才为那两个人说好话：“嗯，我见过世面，”她说。“太太，我可向您保证：这两位先生都是规矩人。再也不会有比他们更规矩的啦。一个自称是德国军官。他一定是一位男爵，不然，就是一位大富翁。另外一个是他的译员。他们都熟识您。男爵就要到非洲去，也许永不回来啦，所以在动身之前，他想见你一面。”
+
+我的妻子看那信封，上面写着：“呈克鲁泡特金王妃夫人”，但是王妃这个称呼就被他写成了“王犯”。因此她用不着别的证据，就已经可以决定这两位先生是否“规规矩矩”的了。至于信的内容，比信封还更坏。“男爵”写信不顾一切文法规则，也违背常识，他说有一件秘密的信息要向她报告。她直截了当地拒绝接见这个“男爵”和他的译员。
+
+这个男爵于是一封又一封地写信给我的妻子，她不拆就把原信退还。
+
+全村的人不久就分成了两派：一派，由旅馆的女主人带头站在男爵一边；另外一派的首领竟是她的丈夫，他反对男爵。于是传出了一些谣言。据说这个男爵是在我的妻子未结婚前认识她的。在维也纳俄国大使馆里，他曾和她跳过许多次舞。现在他还爱她。但是她呢，这个狠心的女人，在他就要动身去作危险的远征的时候，竟然不肯和他见一面……
+
+接着又是一个莫名其妙的故事，说我们有一个儿子，被我们藏了起来。那个男爵问人道：“他们的孩子在哪里？他们有一个儿子，现在应该有六岁了——他到哪里去了呢？”——有一派人说：“如果她有一个儿子，她一定不会丢下他的。”另一派人一口咬定：“不错，他们的确有一个儿子，但是他们把他藏了起来。”
+
+这场争论对于我们两人是一个很有趣味的启示。这证明我们来往的信，经监狱当局看过以后，还把各信内容通知俄国大使馆。我在里昂时，我的妻子到瑞士去看爱利塞·邵可侣，有一次她写信给我说，“我们的孩子”情形不坏；非常健康；大家为了庆贺他的五岁诞辰，一起度过了一个快乐的晚上。
+
+我知道她是指《反抗者》，我们在谈话时提到这个刊物，往往称它为“我们的顽皮孩子”。
+
+现在这些先生们既然问到“我们的顽皮孩子”，而且这样正确地指出了他的年龄，那么那封信除了典狱以外还有别的人看过，这是很明显的了。这个警告对于我们是很有用的。
+
+在乡下一个小村里，无论什么事都逃不过村里人的注意。那个男爵不久就引起了别人的疑心。他又写了一封信给我的妻子，比以前的信更加唠叨。现在他请她原谅，不应该自称早先认识她。他承认她以前并不认识他，不过虽然如此，他却是一番好意。他有一个异常重要的信息要报告。他要警告她：我有生命危险。男爵和他的秘书走到老远的地里，一起研究这封信，商量这信的要点——有一个森林警察远远地跟着他们。但是两人竟然争吵起来，把这信撕碎，抛在田里。警察看到他们走远了，就把这撕碎的信拾起，拼起来读了。一个钟点以后，全村的人都知道这个男爵并不真的认识我的妻子。男爵那一派所传布的动情的故事顷刻烟消云散了。
+
+那个宪兵队长终于得出了结论：“哼！他们自称是男爵，是译员，其实全是假的。这么看，他们一定是德国密探了。”他便把他们逮捕了。
+
+这却不能怪那个队长，事实上，不多久以前，有过一个德国密探到克来服来。在战争期间，监狱的那些大建筑物很可以作储藏军需品、驻扎军队之用，德国总参谋部当然很想知道监狱里各建筑物的内部究竟有多大。果然有一天，一个嘻嘻哈哈的旅行照相师来到这村里，不要一文钱，替全村的人照相，以博取他们的好感。他由此得到许可，非但照了监狱大院的内部，而且还照了各监房。他照完以后，又到东部边境一个城市去，在那里因为被查出身上带有可疑的军事文件，被法国当局捉住。在宪兵队长的脑里照相师的印象还很鲜明，他马上断定这个男爵和他的秘书也是德国暗探，把他们押解到巴绪奥布小城。第二天上午，他们被释放出来，本地报纸刊载消息说，他们是“某友邦的特派人员”，并非德国密探。
+
+这时，舆论完全转而反对男爵和他的秘书了。但是他们的冒险行为还没有完结。他们被释放以后，到村里一个小咖啡馆里去，一面喝一瓶葡萄酒，一面用德国话发泄他们的气恼。那个假译员竟向假男爵说道：“你是个蠢货，是个胆小鬼。我要是你，我会给那个审讯中的检察官一枪。他要敢对我这样做，他一定会吃我一枪……”如此等等。
+
+在那间屋子里的一角，有一个商人安安分分地坐在那里，他听到了这些话，立刻跑到宪兵队长那里去报告。队长马上写好一份官方报告书，又把那个秘书逮捕了——其实他是斯特拉斯堡的一个药剂师。他被解到巴绪奥布警察法庭里受审，为了在公共场所威胁一位法官，被判了一个月监禁。最后，这两个冒险家总算离开了克来服。
+
+上面这些关于暗探的故事，结局都是滑稽可笑的。但是这些恶棍给我们造成了多少悲剧，多少可怕的悲剧！为了使这种诈骗犯过舒服日子，多少宝贵的生命因此丧失，多少完整的家庭被摧残。当你想到那成千上万的暗探，受雇于各国政府，散布在全世界；想到他们所布置的为了陷害老实人用的种种陷阱；想到那多少人命因为他们而落得的悲惨下场；想到他们播下的种种悲苦；想到为了养活这些从社会的渣滓里面挑出的人而花费的巨额金钱；想到他们灌输于社会，甚至于流毒到家庭里的种种腐恶，不由得对他们造成的邪恶之巨大感到震惊。但是侦探行为并不限于侦查革命党，也不限于军事间谍制度。在英国，特别在沿海城市里，有些报纸满载着“私人侦探事务所”的广告，它们专门搜集一切离婚诉讼所需的各种情报，替妻子监视丈夫，替丈夫监视妻子，钻进家庭内部去陷害头脑简单的人，只要人家付相当的钱，要他们做什么他们就做什么。对于最近在法国揭露的最高军界内部的侦察丑闻，人们为之汗颜；但是他们不知道在他们四周，也许在他们的屋顶下便有官厅的或私家的密探在干同样甚至更坏的事。
+
+-
+
+`米歇尔的“抢劫”——爱理·邵可侣——我定居哈洛——亚历山大哥哥的科学工作——我的哥哥的死`
+
+在报纸上，在议会里，都有人不断地要求释放我们。尤其是因为差不多在同时露易丝·米歇尔也被判了罪——罪名是抢劫！米歇尔如果看见一个女人受冻，她的的确确会把她的最后一条披肩或最后一件外衣给她；在她坐牢的时候，别人永远无法迫使她吃得好一点，因为她总是把别人送给她的东西分给她的那些同囚者；现在她竟然和另外一个同志布惹一起被判九年监禁，罪名是拦路抢劫！便是在中产阶级的机会主义者看来，这也未免太难堪了。原来有一天，她领着一队失业工人游行，路上经过一家面包店，便进去拿了几条面包分给那些挨饿的人：这就是她的抢劫。释放安那其主义者的呼声因此变成了反对政府的口号。1885年秋天，我们的被捕同志除了三个外，所有其余的完全由格勒维总统下令释放了。要求释放米歇尔和我的呼声于是更加高涨。但是亚历山大三世反对将我释放，有一天，法国总理弗累辛内在答复议员质问时，竟在议会里明说：“因为外交上的困难，不能释放克鲁泡特金。”一个独立的国家的总理居然说出这样的话，真是怪事。但是我们还听到了比这更奇怪的有关法国与俄罗斯帝国所订的那不祥的同盟条约的话！
+
+终于在1886年1月中旬，米歇尔，布惹和我以及三个和我一起关在克来服的同志被放出狱了。
+
+〔我被释放，同时我的妻子也恢复了自由。因为她自愿关闭在那个小村里，住在监狱门口陪我，使她的身体渐渐地受了影响。〕我们到了巴黎，与爱理·邵可侣同住了几个星期。他是一个卓越的人类学家，在外国大家时常把他和他的弟弟地理学家爱利塞误以为一人。这两兄弟从小就异常亲密。他们到了应该进大学的年龄，便从吉隆特省山谷中一个小镇，徒步到斯特拉斯堡，像地道的流浪汉一样，只有一条狗作伴。当他们到了一个村庄，只有那条狗有碗汤喝，他们两兄弟的晚饭时常只有一块面包和几个苹果。弟弟从斯特拉斯堡到了柏林，在那里为大地理学家利特尔的讲课所吸引。后来在1840年代，他们两人都在巴黎。爱理·邵可侣变成了坚定的傅立叶主义者。他们两人都把1848年的共和视作一个社会进化的新纪元的开始。所以在拿破仑三世的政变后，他们两人都不得不离开法国，移居英国，大赦令通过以后才回到巴黎来。爱理在巴黎办一个傅立叶派合作主义的刊物，在工人中间销行很广。有一件事很少有人知道，在此也许值得说一说：拿破仑三世想做一个“恺撒”，他关心着工人阶级的情形（一个“恺撒”应该如此）。在这个刊物每一期快出版的时候，他总要派一个侍从到印刷所去，把第一份印好的报，给他拿进土伊勒里宫。后来，他甚至打算去赞助国际工人协会，只要协会在它的会报里写几句话，对于这个“恺撒”的社会改造大计划表示信任。协会直截了当地拒绝和他发生任何关系，他便下令迫害协会。
+
+巴黎公社成立时，这两兄弟高兴地加入。爱理在瓦扬手下就了国家图书馆馆长及卢浮宫博物院院长之职。我们今天还能够有这两处收藏着人文知识与艺术的宝藏，在很大程度上得力于他的先见和他的努力。在梯也尔军队炮轰巴黎时，城内大火四起，要是没有他，这两处宝藏也许早已毁灭了。他本人热烈爱好希腊美术，他使人把最宝贵的雕像和花瓶包扎起来藏在地窖里。他又小心翼翼地将国家图书馆里最宝贵的书籍藏在安全的地方，将图书馆的建筑保护好，使四周大火不致延及。他的夫人是一个有胆识的女人，而且是他的当之无愧的伴侣。在第二次围城时，市民饥饿到了极点，她带着她的两个小孩在街上奔跑，尽力在她的本区里办理供给市民的粮食。公社到了最后几个星期才明白它首先应该做的事乃是供给市民食物（市民在这危急时期里无法自谋生计），便有一些人自动出来办理这件事。
+
+爱理·邵可侣服务到最后一刻，他没有被凡尔赛军枪毙，那只是侥幸；后来因为他胆敢在公社时期就任一个那样重要的职务，得到了放逐的判决，只得带着妻儿亡命到外国去。如今他回到巴黎，再开始他的毕生事业：人种学的研究。他的研究的价值，我们根据他的印成单行本的一小部分（可惜太少了），《原始人》和《澳洲人》以及他在他的弟弟爱利塞创办的布鲁塞尔高等研究学校中所讲授的《宗教起源史》便可以判断出来。所有关于人种学的著作里，很少有几本能像他的那样，表示出来对于原始人的真正本性有那么透彻，那么富于同情心的理解。
+
+至于他的《宗教之起源》（在《新社会杂志》及其后身《新人类》中连载），我敢说，在所有关于这个问题的书里这一本要算是最好的。无论如何，比H.斯宾塞在这方面的论文好些。H.斯宾塞虽然才智超群，但是他并不能了解原始人的朴实单纯的天性，而爱理·邵可侣对于这个却了解得十分透彻。再加上他对于民俗心理学，换言之，就是对于信仰的进化和变化（对于这一部门的学问，大家太不重视了）又有极广博的知识。我用不着说到他的无限的敦厚与谦逊，也用不着说到他的优越的智力，并且凡是关于人文科学的所有学科他都有渊博的知识；这一切都可以从他的文章风格中体会到。以他的十分的谦逊，以他的沉静的举止以及他的深刻的哲学见解，他完全像一个古希腊哲学家。如果在一个社会里不是像现在这样地爱好官厅特许的教授法，不是这样地爱好那种鸡零狗碎的授课，如果对于广大的人文概念的发展更尊重一点，那么他会和古希腊像他那样的人一样，周围会聚集起一大群弟子。
+
+我们从克来服来到巴黎的时候，巴黎的社会主义与安那其主义运动正十分活跃。路易斯·米歇尔每天晚上都出去演讲，激起了她的听众（无论是工人还是中产阶级）的热情。她的名声本来已经很大，这时更大了，甚至传到了大学生中间。那些大学生也许讨厌进步思想，但是他们把她当作一个理想的女人，崇拜她到那样的地步，有一天，在一个咖啡馆里发生了斗殴——因为有一个人在大学生们面前谈起米歇尔，说了一些不好听的话。这些青年于是替她辩护，终于大打出手，咖啡馆里的所有桌子、杯子全被砸了。我也在巴黎演讲过一次安那其主义，听众有好几千人，我演讲后立刻离开巴黎，使政府没有时间听从反动的和亲俄派的报纸的要求把我驱逐出法国国境。
+
+我离开巴黎，我们到了伦敦，在那里遇见了两位旧友，斯捷普尼亚克和柴可夫斯基。社会主义运动正是风起云涌，四年前，我在伦敦的生活是枯燥苦闷，虚度时光，这时已经不再是那样了。
+
+我们定居在哈洛，住的是一所小屋。我们对于屋里的家具不大关心，其中一大部分是我自己做的——有柴可夫斯基给我帮忙。他到过美国，在那里学到了一点木匠的手艺。我的妻子和我大为高兴的是我们园里有一小块米德尔塞克斯沃土的土地。我们于是开始热心于种植。我们读了杜波的著作，认识了几个巴黎园艺家以后，我们开始得到了喜人的收获。我们自己在克来服狱中的园艺经验对于我们也有一些帮助；至于我的妻子，她到哈洛不久就得了伤寒症，病愈后，菜园里的活儿对于她的健康的恢复，比一个最完善的疗养院更有功效。
+
+但是在夏季的末尾，我受到一个非常沉重的打击。我们得到了我的哥哥亚历山大去世的消息。
+
+在我亡命到外国以后未入法国监狱之前的那几年里面，我们弟兄间未曾通过一封信。在俄国政府看来，对一个因为政治见解而受迫害的兄弟表示友爱是一种罪孽。如果他亡命国外，还不与他断绝关系，那是犯罪行为。一个沙皇的臣民应该憎恨所有反抗这个最高统治者的威权的人。何况亚历山大当时是在俄国警察的掌握中。所以我坚决不肯写信给我的哥哥以及所有别的亲戚。自从沙皇在海伦姊姊的请愿书上批了“让他待在那里”以后，哥哥就完全失掉了早日恢复自由的希望。两年以后，在俄国成立了一个委员会，专为把那些未经审判、未定年限而被流放到西伯利亚去的人定一个流刑的年限。
+
+哥哥被判还要留在西伯利亚五年。加上他已经度过的两年，一共是七年。L.米利科夫内阁时代另外又指定了一个新委员会，把哥哥的流刑再加五年，所以他要到1886年10月才能恢复自由。他一共要受十二年流刑。起初是在东西伯利亚的一个小城里，后来在托姆斯克——这是西西伯利亚的一块低地，更不如在西伯利亚东部的高原，那里还有干燥卫生的空气。
+
+我被囚禁在克来服的时候，他写信给我，我们才通了几次信。他的信里说，既然我们的信在西伯利亚要受俄国警察检查，到了法国又有狱吏查看，我们通信当然就须意识到这双重的检查。他告诉我他的家庭生活，他说起他的三个孩子，他把他们描写得极好，他还说起他的工作。他特别劝我注意考察意大利的科学的发展，那里有出色而独创的研究，但是经过了德国人的复制，才为科学界所知；关于俄国政界的可能出现的进展，他也有意见告诉我。他不相信在最近的将来俄国能有仿效西欧议会的立宪政体出现。但是他希望会召集一种议事的国民议会（他对此认为目前已经够了）。这个议会并不制定法律，不过制订出一些法律草案，让沙皇和枢密院加以修正，最后核准。
+
+他在信里特别说起他的科学研究。他对天文学从来就有一种明确无误的偏爱。
+
+我们在圣彼得堡时，他在俄国出版了一本书，出色地概述了所有关于流星的知识。以他的精细的批判头脑，他对于各种假设的优劣马上就可以看出。他的数学的知识虽然不够，但是因为他有非常丰富的想象力，他能够把握最复杂的数学研究的结果。他靠想象生活在不停运动着的天体间，他对于它们的复杂运动，常常比较某一些数学家（特别是纯粹代数学家）更要清楚。这些数学家时常只看见公式和它们的逻辑的关联，而忽视了物质世界的现实。圣彼得堡的天文学家向我说起哥哥的那本著作，表示十分欣赏。现在他已经开始研究宇宙的结构：分析所有关于那无穷的空间中那些太阳、星群及星云的材料和假设；剖析它们彼此间的大概集结方式、它们的生命和它们的进化与衰减之定律。普尔科沃天文台的天文学家季尔登说起亚历山大的这本新著作，予以甚高评价。他写信介绍他与美国的霍尔登先生相识。后来我到华盛顿，有幸听到后者赞扬哥哥的研究。科学非常需要能不时听到精细的，勤勉的，有批判精神，又有想象力的人所作的高水平的探讨。
+
+但是在西伯利亚的一个小城里，远离所有的图书馆，无法做到随科学的进步同步，所以在他的著作里，他只能体现在他未被流放以前的研究成果。后来有一些重要的著作出版，他并不是不知道，但是如果他不离开西伯利亚，他怎么能得到这些必要的书籍呢？
+
+自由期的临近并不给他以希望。他知道他不会得到许可住在俄国或西欧的一个大学城里，他知道他离开西伯利亚以后，将会再判流刑，也许这第二次还要更坏，说不定他会被流放到俄国东部的一个小村里去。
+
+绝望压倒了他。“一种浮士德式的绝望，不时占有着我”，他给我的信里有一次这样说。当他的自由期快到时，他趁着航路还未被冰冻断绝的时候，要他的妻儿搭轮船先回俄国。在一个阴暗的夜里，那浮士德式的绝望结束了他的生命……
+
+有好几个月，一片阴云罩着我们的小屋——直到一线光明冲破了它。第二年春天，一个小东西，一个小女孩出世了，她继承了哥哥的名字。她的无助的哭声使新的弦在我的心里颤动起来。
+
+-
+
+`1886年英国社会主义运动——我参加这个运动——生存竞争的公式得到“互助”这个自然定律的补正——社会主义思想的大发展`
+
+1886年，社会主义运动在英国正是如日中天。在所有的重要都市里，许多大的工人团体都公然加入这个运动。还有不少中产阶级的人士（大多数是青年）也用种种方法帮助社会主义运动的发展。
+
+那一年，许多行业里都有着严重的经济恐慌，每天早晨甚至整整一天，我都听见成群的工人在街上一面走，一面唱“我们没有工作”等歌或圣诗，讨面包吃。到了晚上，成群的人都跑到特拉法加广场去，不避风雨，垫和盖着两张报纸就在露天睡觉。2月的某一天，群众听了彭斯、海因德曼及钱毕昂的演说以后，冲到匹卡狄力街，打破各大商店的少数玻璃窗。但是比这次的民愤爆发重要得多的，乃是伦敦四郊工人区中最为贫苦的人的精神状态。这种状态到了如此地步，如果那几个因这次骚乱而被起诉的运动的领袖被重判，那么憎恨与复仇的情绪（这是英国近代劳动运动史上至今未见过的，但是它的预兆在1886年已是非常显著）一定还会增加，会使此后的运动长久受其影响。但是中产阶级似乎明白了这个危险。他们在西区捐了大笔的钱去救济东区的贫困——这当然不足以解救那蔓延极广的大穷困，但是至少足以表示有钱人的一番好意了。
+
+至于法庭对于被控的运动领袖的判罪，只限于两三个月的监禁。
+
+各个社会阶层对于社会主义以及社会改良与社会革新的种种计划都非常注意。从秋天一直到冬末，全国各地都有人请我去演讲，一部分是请讲监狱制度，但大半是请讲安那其社会主义的。我就这样地把英吉利和苏格兰的各大城市差不多走遍了。我照例是答应那些首先邀请我在演讲以后到他家里过夜的人，所以有时候今夜睡在一个富翁的公馆里，明晚又睡在一个工人家庭狭小的居室内。每天晚上我都看见许许多多各阶级的人。无论是在工人的小客堂里，或是在富翁的大客厅里，关于社会主义和安那其主义之十分热烈的讨论总是要继续到深夜——在工人家里则是希望，在富翁公馆里则是恐惧，但是到处都同样的热切。
+
+在富翁的公馆里，主要的问题是要知道“社会主义者到底要的是什么？他们打算做些什么？”其次，“到时候为了避免严重的冲突起见，那些绝对必须作出的让步是什么？”在这些谈话里，我很少听到有人把社会主义者的要求说成是不公道的，或者说成是异想天开，但是我也发现他们坚决相信在英国革命是不可能的事，工人群众的要求还没有达到社会主义者的要求那样地精确，也没有达到那种程度，工人们所获改善远比社会主义者要求的低得多，他们便会感到满意，因此只要有一些次要的让步如稍微增加一点福利，一点闲暇时间之类，这在英国工人阶级看来，已经可以作为在将来作更大的改善的保证而接受了。一个对于英国生活广有经验的老国会议员有一天对我说：“我们是一个‘中间偏左’的国家，靠着妥协过日子的。”
+
+在工人家里也是一样，我注意到在英国向我提出的问题与在欧洲大陆向我提出的问题之间有一个区别。拉丁民族的工人非常看重一般的原则，有了这些原则，就可以决定其部分的应用。如果某一个市政会通过拨款支持罢工，或供给小学学生免费饭食，大家对于这些事并不在意。他们把这些事认为是理所当然的。
+
+一个法国工人说：“一个挨饿的小孩子当然不能求学。应该给他吃。”他会说：“厂主逼得工人们罢工，这是错误的。”——这样说过以后就不管了。个人主义的现社会对于共产主义原则的微小的让步，在他看来，无须赞扬。工人的所想的已经超越这类让步的时代了。他问：将来负责组织生产的，是公社，还是工会，还是国家；单靠自由协议是否就足以维持社会秩序；如果现社会废除了压迫的工具以后，用什么道德的强制措施才可以代替。他又问，一个选出的民主政府是否能够完成倾向于社会主义的重大改革，既成的事实是否不应该先于立法，以及诸如此类的问题。
+
+在英国，主要的着重点在于一系列治标的让步，让步的重要程度逐步增加。但是，在另一方面，英国工人似乎早已明白叫国家去管理工业是不可能的。他们最关心的是建设性地实现以及使这种实现成为可能的条件如何达到。“克鲁泡特金！假使明天我们把本城的码头占领了，依你的意见，我们应该怎样去管理呢？”或是：“我们不喜欢国营铁路的这种主意，而现在由私家公司去管理铁路，简直是有组织的抢劫。但是假使所有的铁路都归工人所有了，该怎样来组织铁路的经营呢？”每当我们在一个工人家中小客堂里就座以后，我首先被问的就是这一些问题。他们虽然缺乏一般的观念，但是他们却有一个欲望要去深入探究现实的细节，这也可以算是一种补充罢。
+
+英国社会主义运动另外一个特点就是有许多中产阶级人士用不同形式来支持这个运动，他们有的公然加入，有的在运动之外予以帮助。在法国和瑞士，工人和中产阶级不但彼此对立，而且阵线分明。至少在1876年至1885年十年间是如此。我住在瑞士的三、四年中间，所认识的几乎全是工人。中产阶级人士不过两三个。这在英国是不会有的。我们可以看到不少中产阶级男女，无论是在伦敦，或是在各省，毫不迟疑地公开出面帮助组织社会主义的集会，或者拿了募捐箱到公园里去求人捐钱援助罢工者。我们还可以看到一个与七十年代初期俄国青年“到民间去”的运动相似的运动，不过不像那样激烈，那样充满自我牺牲精神，也不像那样丝毫不带一点“慈善”的想法。在英国，也有不少的人以各种各样身份去接近工人，走进贫民窟、平民馆、托因比服务所等等地方去。我可以说，当时大家都有很大的热诚。许多人大概以为一个社会革命已经开始，这正如莫里斯的一本喜剧《转败为胜》的主人公所想的一样，他说那个革命岂止就要开始，它已经开始了。但是这类热心人等到发现英国也与别处一样，需要做长期的烦难的艰苦的准备工作，他们中间，很多人退出了积极的宣传工作，如今站在运动的外面，仅仅是一个同情的旁观者而已。这类人往往如此。
+
+我积极参加了这个运动，和几个英国同志一起，在三种已经在出版的社会主义刊物以外，我们创办了一个安那其共产主义的月刊：《自由》，它至今依然存在。我在被监禁时被迫中断的关于安那其主义的工作，也在这时重新开始。此书的批判的部分，已于我在克来服狱中时由爱利塞·邵可侣编辑出版，题名《一个反抗者的话》。现在我开始写安那其共产主义社会的建设的方面（就能够预测的而言）的一些论文，登载在巴黎的《反抗》上面。“我们的孩子”（《反抗者》）因反军国主义的宣传而受压迫，不得不改换一下名称，现在用一个阴性的名字出版。后来，这些论文经我大加充实之后印成单行本，就是《面包与自由》。
+
+这项工作使我不得不去把现在文明国家的经济生活的某些方面加以更深的研究。大多数的社会主义者都说，现代文明社会中所生产的其实已经远远超过了保证所有人的安乐所需要，毛病仅仅出在分配方面；一旦社会革命发生，各人只要回到工厂或工场去工作就行了——社会将把现在资本家所拿去的“剩余价值”或得益拿到手。
+
+在我看来，刚刚相反，在现有的私有条件之下，生产本身走向一个错误方向，忽视而且往往阻止生产充足数量的生活的绝对必需品。没有一件这类必需品是生产到了超过保证所有人的绝对安乐所需的数量的。至于大家谈得那样起劲的生产过剩，其真实意义不过是民众太穷了，连那一般认为维持常规的生存的必需品都买不起。但是在所有一切文明国家里，无论在农业或工业生产都应该，而且很容易便能大大增加，使人人都有充裕的生活。这使我去研究现代农业的可能性究竟有多大，还有通过怎样的教育使每人都有可能同时从事脑力工作和可以作为享受的体力劳动。
+
+我把这些思想发挥在一系列论文里，陆续刊载于《十九世纪》，现在已在《田园、工厂、手工场》这题名下刊印成书了。
+
+另一个大问题也使我非常注意。大家都知道达尔文的“生存竞争”公式被他的追随者的大多数（甚至其中最聪明的人如赫胥黎也不能免）演化出一些什么样的结论来，无论是在文明社会里，或是在白人对待所谓劣等民族的关系中，或是在“强者”对待“弱者”的关系中，没有一桩罪恶不是从这个公式中找到借口的。
+
+对于动物世界中“生存竞争”这个公式本身，以及它在人类社会中的应用，实有加以根本修正之必要，这是我在克来服狱中时就已明白。少数几个社会主义者在这方面所作的尝试都不能使我满意。后来在一个俄国动物学家凯斯勒教授的讲演里，我终于找到了生存竞争这一法则的真正的表述。他在他的讲演中说：“如果相互斗争是自然界的一个法则，那么相互扶助在同等程度上也是一个。但是对于物种的一步步的进化来说，互助比互斗更为重要得多。”
+
+这几句话——可惜他只引了少数几个实例（以前有一章里，我提到过的动物学家谢威尔左夫又增补了一两个），——他的讲演包含了解答整个问题的钥匙。当1888年赫胥黎发表他的大谬不然的论文《生存竞争：一个纲领》时，我便决定利用我两年来搜集的材料，写成明白易读的文章，反驳他对动物界以及人类中的生存竞争的看法。我把这个意思告诉过我的朋友。
+
+但是我发现把“生存竞争”解释为“弱肉强食”的战斗口号已经提到科学所启示的自然界的戒律的高度，在英国已经是根深蒂固，（几乎已经成为一个宗教信条了。）支持我来反驳这个对自然事实之错误解释的人只有两个。《十九世纪》编辑J.诺尔斯以其令人叹服的慧眼立刻看出这个问题的要旨，以一个真正青年的精力鼓励我开始着手这个工作。另外一个就是H.W.贝茨。达尔文在他的自传里说过，在他遇见的最聪明的人中间，贝茨算是一个。他当时是地理学会的书记，我认识他。我把我的打算告诉他，他非常高兴，对我说：“对，你务必把它写出来，这才是真正的达尔文主义。想到他们把达尔文的思想解释成那种样子，真叫人难过。你动手写罢。你的书出版时，我将这意思写一封信给你，你可以将它发表。”这番鼓励使我十分感激，我便开始写作，这是系列论文，先后刊载于《十九世纪》，就是《动物界中的互助》《蒙昧人中间的互助》《野蛮人中间的互助》《中世纪都市中的互助》与《现代人中间的互助》。我发表头两篇关于动物界的论文时，贝茨还活着；可惜我没有寄给他看。当时我希望不久就可以完成这书的第二部，关于人类中间的互助的。但是我花费了好几年的功夫才把它写完，那时贝茨已经去世了。
+
+我研究这些问题时，因为要去探究野蛮时代和中世纪自由都市的制度，使我开始了另一项重要的研究，就是，最近在欧洲发生的“国家”在三百年来的历史上起着怎样的作用。在另一方面，研究各文明阶段的互相扶持的组织，又使我去研究人的正义观念与道德观念之进化论的基础。
+
+最近十年来，社会主义的成长在英国出现了一个新的面貌。那些只知道根据全国所开社会主义的和安那其主义的集会次数，与这些集会所吸引的听众的数目下判断的人一定会说，社会主义的宣传现在已经衰落了。也有人把那些自称在议会里代表社会主义的人所得的票数之多寡来断定社会主义之盛衰，他们会说，英国社会主义的宣传现在快要销声匿迹了。但是社会主义的思想传播得深浅广狭，是不能以那些在他们的选举纲领上多少写进一点社会主义的要求的人所得的票数而定的。在英国更是不能。事实上，傅立叶、圣西门和欧文三人所创始的三派社会主义中在英吉利和苏格兰最占势力的乃是欧文一派。所以要去判断社会主义运动之强弱，必须要看在工会运动、在合作运动里，以及在所谓城市社会主义运动里，社会主义的观点渗透得怎样，在全国各地社会主义的思想一般渗透得怎样，而不是依据开会次数以及投社会主义的票数的多寡。从这方面看，现在英国社会主义观点穿透的程度比起1886年来要大得多，而我可以毫不迟疑地说，比起1876年到1882年的光景来更有巨大的发展。我还可以说，那少数安那其主义者团体的坚持不懈的努力，对于废除政府、主张个人权利、地方行动、自由协议的思想之传播也很有贡献。—这些思想之传播已经使二十年前流行的国家万能、中央集权、严明纪律的思想受了打击，因此现在我们可以说，我们并没有白费时间。
+
+全欧洲这时正在经历一个军国主义盛行的极坏的时期。这是1871年德意志军事帝国凭藉它的普遍兵役制战胜法国以后不可避免的后果。在当时就有人预料到，许多人并且预言过这一后果——而以巴枯宁讲话的方式特别的动人。但是在近代生活里，一个相反的潮流已经开始出现了。
+
+丢掉了经院形式的共产主义思想已经侵入了欧美两洲。在我积极参加社会主义运动的这二十七年中间，我可以观察这些思想的进展，它们的传播极广。我想到国际工人协会的起初几次大会时工人所表达的模糊的、混乱的、胆怯的思想，想到在巴黎公社时期流行的那种思想（便是领袖中间最有思想的人也不能免），把它们拿来和现在为数巨大的工人的思想比起来，我必须说，在我看来，它们简直像是代表两个绝对不同的世界似的。
+
+历史上没有一个时代（也许十二世纪和十三世纪的暴动时期除外，当时产生了中世纪的公社）曾发生过在流行的社会概念上与当今相类似的深刻变化。现在，在我五十七岁的时候，我比二十五年前还更深信：如果发生了由一些偶然事变巧合而成的条件下，就可能在欧洲发生如1848年的革命蔓延极广，但是重要得多的革命；这不是在各政党之间的斗争的意义上，而是在一次深刻的、急速的社会改造的意义上说的。我深信，不管这样的运动在不同国家里性质如何不同，它们都会表现出比过去六个世纪中所表现出远为深刻得多的对必需的变革的理解；而这样的运动在特权阶级那里所遭到的抵抗不大可能顽固到冥顽不灵的程度，因而也不大可能使革命带有暴力的性质。
+
+为获得这一巨大成果是非常值得各国各阶级成千上万的男女在最近三十年中为之所付出的努力的。
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/1922-01-01-DraftingCommittee-a1_l-the-constitution-of-hunan-province.md b/_collections/_heros/1922-01-01-DraftingCommittee-a1_l-the-constitution-of-hunan-province.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5b68b81f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_heros/1922-01-01-DraftingCommittee-a1_l-the-constitution-of-hunan-province.md
@@ -0,0 +1,648 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title: "《湖南省憲法》"
+author: "起草委員會"
+date: 1922-01-01 12:00:00 +0800
+image: https://i.imgur.com/sCmzE1J.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+position: left
+---
+
+### 序言
+
+湖南全省人民，爲增進幸福，鞏固國基，制定憲法如左：
+
+
+
+### 第一章 總綱
+
+第一條 湖南，爲中華民國之自治省。
+
+第二條 湖南省，以現有之土地爲區域。
+
+第三條 凡有中華民國國籍，繼續住居本省滿二年以上者，皆爲本省人民。
+
+第四條 省自治權，屬於省民全體。
+
+
+### 第二章 人民之權利義務
+
+第五條 人民在法律上，一律平等，無男女、種族、宗教、階級之區別。
+
+無論何人，不得以人身爲買賣之目的物。
+
+第六條 人民有保護其身體、生命之權。
+
+身體之自由權，非依法律，不受何種限制或被剝奪。
+
+依法而受限制或被剝奪時，不得虐待或刑訊。
+
+除現役軍人外，凡人身自由被剝奪時，施行剝奪令之機關至遲須於二十四小時以內，以剝奪之理由通知本人，令其得有卽時提出申辯之機會；被剝奪人或他人皆得向法庭請求出庭狀，法庭不得拒絕之。
+
+人民有要求受適當法庭迅速審判之權；除依戒嚴法規定外，不受軍法機關之審判。
+
+凡行爲，必於其實行以前，已經法律規定爲犯罪行爲，審判時方得以犯罪目之。
+
+人民受法庭審判時，非正式宣吿判決有罪確定後，不受何種刑罰之執行。
+
+人民不受身體上之刑罰。
+
+第七條 人民有保護其私有財產之權。
+
+人民之私有財產，依法律認爲必要時，非給以相當之價値，不得收爲公用。
+
+人民之私有財產，非依法律，不得查封，沒收，及其他處分。
+
+人民之私有財產，不受非法之科罰，捐輸，或借貸。
+
+第八條 人民有保護其居宅之權。
+
+人民居宅不得駐屯軍隊。但戰時依合法之程序，得駐屯之。
+
+第九條 人民之身體、住宅、郵電、文書及各種財物，除經本人允許或依合法之程序外，不受搜索、檢查。
+
+第十條 人民限於不妨害社會秩序、善良風俗，有信仰宗教之自由。政府不得對於何種宗教，與以不平之限制或特享之利益。
+
+第十一條 人民在不抵觸刑事法典之範圍內，有用語言、文字、圖書、印刷及其他方法自由發表意思之權，不受何種特別法令之限制或檢查機關之侵害。
+
+第十二條 人民在不抵觸刑事法典之範圍內，有自由結社及不攜武器平和集會之權，不受何種特別法令之限制。
+
+第十三條 人民或人民之自治團體有購置槍枝、子彈以謀自衞之權；但須經官廳之許可登記。
+
+前項之槍枝子彈，無論何種機關，不得強制借用，或提取。
+
+第十四條 人民有營業之自由權；但爲保障重大之公共利益時，須受法律上之限制。
+
+第十五條 人民有居住遷徙之自由。
+
+除省法律別有規定外，在本省內無論移住何縣、何市、何鄕，有與該地人民同等之權利義務。
+
+第十六條 人民有請願於議會之權。
+
+第十七條 人民有陳訴於行政官署之權。
+
+第十八條 人民有訴訟於法院之權。
+
+法院如違背訴訟法規、延不審判，人民得提起懲戒之訴。
+
+第十九條 人民有請求救恤災難之權。
+
+第二十條 人民依法律有選舉、被選舉、提案、總投票及任受公職之權。
+
+公職員之任免、保護及懲戒，以省法律定之。
+
+第二十一條 人民有受教育之義務。
+
+義務教育以上之各級教育，無分男女，皆有享受其同等利益之權。
+
+第二十二條 人民依法律有左列各種義務：
+
+（1）納租稅之義務。
+
+（2）服兵役之義務。
+
+（3）擔任名譽公職之義務。
+
+第二十三條 人民之一切公私權利及義務，不得以宗教信仰之故而生變動。
+
+第二十四條 外省人之居住營業於本省者，與本省人受同等之保護。
+
+
+### 第三章 省之事權
+
+第二十五條 關於左列各事項，省有議決執行權：
+
+（1）省以下之地方制度及各級地方自治之監督。
+
+（2）省官制、官規、官俸及官吏之考試。
+
+（3）省法院之編制、監獄及感化院之設立及司法行政之監督。
+
+（4）各種職業團體之組織及關於勞動之法規。
+
+（5）制定本省稅則、募集省公債及訂結省政府有負擔之契約。
+
+（6）制定戶籍法及登記法。
+
+（7）省公產及營造物之處分。
+
+（8）各級學校學制及與教育相聯屬之事項。
+
+（9）鑛業、農林之保護及發展。
+
+（10）各種公共實業及關於實業之法規。
+
+（11）省以內之河川道路、土地整理及其他土木工程事項。
+
+（12）省以內之鐵道、電話、電報支線之建設；但爲謀交通行政之統一、聯絡省際商業之發達及應國防上之急需，國政府之命令，得容受之。
+
+（13）省內之軍政、軍令事項。
+
+（14）省警察行政事項。
+
+（15）衞生及各種公益慈善事項。
+
+第二十六條 其他關於省以內之事項，在與國憲不相抵觸之範圍內，省得制定法規並執行之。
+
+第二十七條 省政府受國政府之委託，得執行國家行政事務。但因執行國家行政所生之費用，須由國政府負擔。
+
+
+### 第四章 省議會
+
+第二十八條 省議會，以全省公民直接選出之議員組織之。
+
+凡有選舉權之人民，稱公民。
+
+第二十九條 省議員之名額，以人口爲比例。每人口二十萬，選出議員一名。但不滿二十萬之縣，亦得選出議員一名。
+
+第三十條 有中華民國國籍之男女，年滿二十一歲以上，於調查選舉人資格以前，在湖南繼續住居滿二年以上，有法定住址，無左列情事之一者，皆有選舉省議員之權：
+
+（1）患精神病者。
+
+（2）被剝奪或停止公權，尙未復權者。
+
+（3）受破產宣吿，尙未撤消者。
+
+（4）吸食鴉片者。
+
+（5）營不正當業者。
+
+（6）未受義務教育者。但義務教育未普及以前，以不識文字者爲限。
+
+第三十一條 公民年滿二十五歲以上，無左列情事之一者，皆有被選爲省議員之權：
+
+（1）現役軍人。
+
+（2）現任官吏。
+
+（3）現任宗教師。
+
+（4）在校未畢業之學生。
+
+第三十二條 省議員之選舉及省議會之組織，以省法律定之。
+
+第三十三條 省議員任期三年。從當選之日起算，至滿三年之日爲止。
+
+第三十四條 省議會設議長一人、副議長二人，由議員互選之。
+
+第三十五條 省議會自行集會，開會，閉會。
+
+第三十六條 省議會每年開常會二次，於每年三月一日、九月一日開會。
+
+常會會期爲兩個月；但遇有必要時，得延長一個月。
+
+第三十七條 省議會閉會時，設常駐委員會。
+
+第三十八條 省議會遇有省議員三分之一以上動議或省長認爲必要時，得召集臨時會；但會期不得過一個月。
+
+第三十九條 省議會之職權如左：
+
+（1）議決第二十五條及第二十六條之事項。
+
+（2）議決預算及決算案。
+
+（3）依本法所規定選舉官吏。
+
+（4）受理人民之請願。
+
+（5）提出質問書於省務院或請求省務員出席質問之。
+
+（6）對於省務員之全體或一員，得爲不信任之投票。
+
+（7）省長有謀叛、賄賂或其他重大犯罪行爲時，得以議員總額四分三以上之出席，出席員三分二以上之可決彈劾之；省長被彈劾時，須卽退職；退職後，由檢察廳提起公訴。
+
+（8）高等審判廳長及高等檢察廳長，有賄賂、或其他違法行爲時，得以議員三分二以上之出席，出席員三分二以上之可決彈劾之；被彈劾之廳長，須卽退職；退職後，由檢察廳提起公訴。
+
+（9）省務員及審計院長，有賄賂或其他違法行爲時，得以議員總額三分二以上之出席，出席員三分二以上之可決彈劾之；被彈劾之省務員或審計院長，須卽退職；退職後，由檢察廳提起公訴。
+
+（10）對於其他各種官吏，有賄賂或其他違法行爲時，得組織查辦委員會，查明咨請該主管官廳懲辦之。
+
+第四十條 省議員在會內所發之言論，對於會外不負責任。
+
+第四十一條 省議員在開會期內，除現行犯外，非經省議會之許可，不受逮捕、審問及監禁。
+
+省議員在開會期內，被逮捕監禁時，逮捕監禁之機關，須於二十四小時以內，將逮捕監禁之理由通吿省議會。
+
+第四十二條 省議員在任期內，不得爲官吏及兼任有給之公職。
+
+第四十三條 各選舉區對於該區所選出之議員不信任時，得以左列方法撤回之：
+
+（1）由原選舉區公民百分之一以上連署提議，經該區公民總投票過半數可決者。
+
+（2）由原選舉區內之縣議會、市議會、鄕議會議員總額過半數連署提議，經該區公民總投票過半數可決者。
+
+第四十四條 省議會，得以左列方法解散之：
+
+（1）由全省公民百分之一以上連署提議，經全省公民總投票過半數可決者。
+
+（2）全省縣議會過半數連署提議，呈由省長交全省公民總投票之過半數可決者。
+
+（3）省長以省務院全體之副署，提出理由書，付全省公民總投票過半數可決者。
+
+第四十五條 依前條及第五十二條第二項解散省議會後，須於三個月內召集新省議會；但一年內不得解散議會兩次。
+
+
+### 第五章 省長及省務院
+
+#### 一 省長
+
+第四十六條 省行政權，由省長及省務院行使之。
+
+第四十七條 省長由省議會選出四人，交由全省公民總投票決選，以得票最多數者爲當選。
+
+第四十八條 依本法規定之本省公民年滿三十五歲以上，在湖南繼續住居滿五年以上者，得被選爲省長。
+
+第四十九條 省長就任時，須於省議會爲左列之宣誓：
+
+某某誓以至誠遵守憲法，執行省長之職權，謹誓。
+
+第五十條 現職軍人被選爲省長時，須解除本職，方得就任。
+
+第五十一條 省長任期四年，不得連任。但解職四年後，得再被選。省長滿任前三個月，須舉行次任省長之選舉。
+
+第五十二條 省長未滿任以前，得由省議會提議，交公民總投票表決，令其退職；省議會提出此項議案時，須有議員總額三分二之出席，出席員三分二之可決，方得成立。
+
+前項議案成立後，省長卽須停止其職權之行使，公民總投票對於前項議案多數可決時，省長卽須退職；多數否決時，則省長回復其職權，省議會卽須解散。
+
+第五十三條 省長缺位或因事故不能執行其職務時，由省務院長代行其職權，至新省長就職之日或省長再行視事時爲止。
+
+省長缺位時，卽依本法第四十七條所定之方法選舉新省長。
+
+第五十四條 省長應於滿任日解職；如屆期新省長尙未選出或選出後尙未就職時，省務院長代行職務。
+
+第五十五條 省長之職權如左：
+
+（1）公布法律及發布執行法律之命令。
+
+（2）統率全省軍隊、管理全省軍政。
+
+（3）任免全省文武官吏；但本法及法律有特別規定者，依其規定。
+
+（4）遇內亂外患時，經省議會之同意，得宣吿戒嚴；如在省議會閉會期內，須得常駐委員同意，由省議會於下屆開會時追認之。
+
+戒嚴期內，本法第九條、第十一條、第十二條之效力得暫受限制；但經省議會認爲無戒嚴之必要時，應卽宣吿解嚴。
+
+（5）遇必要時，得召集省議會臨時會。
+
+第五十六條 省長執行前條各款之職權，皆須由省務院長及主管之省務員副署負責。
+
+#### 二 省務院
+
+第五十七條 省設省務院，及左列各司：
+
+（1）內務司。
+
+（2）財政司。
+
+（3）教育司。
+
+（4）實業司。
+
+（5）司法司。
+
+（6）交涉司。
+
+（7）軍務司。
+
+省務院，以各司之司長組織之；各司司長皆爲省務員。
+
+第五十八條 各司之組織及司長之選舉與任期，以省法律定之。
+
+第五十九條 各司司長，由省議會選舉二人，咨請省長擇一任命之。
+
+省務院長，由省務員互選一人，呈請省長任命。
+
+省務員去職時，省議會須於省務員去職之日起十日內選出；如
+
+省議會在閉會期內，須於開會後十日內選出之。
+
+省務員如有溺職及其他違法行爲時，省長得罷免之。
+
+省務員於省議會閉會期內去職時，得由省長暫行任命代理。
+
+第六十條 省務院設政務會議，以省務院長爲議長；各省務員皆列席，議決施政方針及關涉各司權限爭議之事件，對於省議會負連帶責任。
+
+第六十一條 政務會議議決之結果，須由省務院長報吿省長。
+
+遇有特別重大事件，得由省長主席於省務院開特別聯席會議；但此種聯席會議，省長不得以省務員不能負責之議案，強制其議決執行。
+
+第六十二條 省長所發之命令及其他關於政務之文書，非經省務院長及各主管司長之副署，不生效力。
+
+第六十三條 省務員全體或一員受省議會之不信任投票時，卽須辭職。
+
+
+### 第六章 立法
+
+第六十四條 法律案，由省議會議員或省務院以省長之名義提出之。
+
+第六十五條 法定之省教育會、農會、工會、商會、律師公會及其他依法律組織之各職業團體，得提出關於各該團體範圍內之法律案，省議會必須以之付議。
+
+前項議案開議時，提案者得派員出席省議會說明之；但不得參加表決。
+
+第六十六條 全省公民百分之一以上連署動議，或全省縣議會及一等市議會三分之一以上連署動議，得提出法律案，呈請省長咨省議會議決。省議會對於此項議案，如擱置不議或議而否決時，省長應將該案及否決之理由，付全省公民總投票表決；可決時，卽成爲法律。
+
+第六十七條 省議會議決之法律案，省長須於送達後二十日內公布之。
+
+省議會議決之法律案，省長如否認時，須於送達後十日內，將否認之理由咨省議會覆議；如有出席議員三分之二以上，仍執前議時，應卽公布之。
+
+未咨省議會覆議之法律案，逾公布期限，卽成爲法律。
+
+法律案於將近閉會期咨送省長者，省長如否認時，得聲明理由，咨省議會，於下屆開會時覆議之。
+
+法律案咨送省長後，於省長否認而省議會被解散時，得咨新省議會覆議之。
+
+全省縣議會及一等市議會三分之一以上連署動議，或全省公民百分之一以上連署動議，皆得於公布期內，要求將已議決之法律案，展緩兩月公布，兩月內卽提交全省公民總投票表決。
+
+第六十八條 凡本法所規定得由公民提案及須公民總投票表決之事項，其提案及投票之方法，以省法律定之。
+
+
+### 第七章 行政
+
+#### 一 財政
+
+第六十九條 省之租稅，依省法律之規定徵收之。
+
+第七十條 省之收入支出，由省庫或代理省庫之銀行執掌之。
+
+發款書據須有審計院長之簽印，省庫方得支付。
+
+省庫之組織，以省法律定之。
+
+第七十一條 省會計年度，以每年七月一日爲始，至次年六月三十日爲止。
+
+第七十二條 省長須於省議會開會後之五日內，將次年度之預算案提交省議會議決。
+
+省長得提出追加預算案，交省議會議決。
+
+以省款經營之事項非一年所能完竣，或其費用非一年所能籌備，或因契約之關係其負擔不止於一年者；得經省議會之議決，預定年限設繼續費。
+
+省議會對於預算案，得修正之；但不得增加歲出或增加新款項。預算案內之款項，經省議會議決後，不得濫用。
+
+第七十三條 省長須於會計年度終了後，將前年度之決算案提交省議會議決。
+
+第七十四條 省之財務行政狀況及省議會議決之預算、決算案，省長須詳細公布之。
+
+#### 二 教育
+
+第七十五條 全省人民，自滿六歲起，皆有繼續受四年教育之義務。
+
+爲達前項之目的，得強制各地方自治團體就地籌集義務教育經費，開辦應有之國民學校。
+
+第七十六條 每年教育經費，至少須佔全省預算案歲出百分之三十；每年提出之教育基金，至少須佔全省預算案歲出百分之二；其保管方法及用途，以省法律定之。
+
+第七十七條 成績優良之國民學校，得酌量獎勵之。
+
+第七十八條 成績優良之職業學校，經省議會議決，得爲添置設備之補助。
+
+第七十九條 省須設立大學一所。
+
+第八十條 爲達本法第二十一條第二項之目的，省政府及各自治團體須設備特別基金，資助貧戶男女學童之適於受中等以上教育者，其資助之方法，須以省法律定之。
+
+第八十一條 學校不得駐紮軍隊或據爲軍人住宅。
+
+#### 三 實業
+
+第八十二條 省有產業，非經省議會議決，不得抵押或變賣之。
+
+省內之天然富源，無論公有私有，不得變賣與無中華民國國籍者。
+
+第八十三條 省政府經省議會議決，經營各種實業時，須依私人營業之組織。
+
+第八十四條 省政府對於省內之私人營業，認爲於公益上有必要時，經省議會議決，得以相當之代價收歸省有。
+
+第八十五條 省政府對於私有營業之勞工保護、勞工賠償、勞工衞生等，得依法律之規定監督之。
+
+第八十六條 省政府對於私有營業之不正當競爭或不公允價率，得依法律之規定製裁之。
+
+#### 四 軍事
+
+第八十七條 全省軍務，爲省行政之一部。無論平時戰時，其管理統率，依本法第五十五條及第五十六條之規定，屬於省長。
+
+第八十八條 全省之健全男子，自滿二十歲至滿四十歲，依義務民兵制，平時合計須有十二個月在軍中服務。
+
+義務民兵之兵役法及編制，以省法律定之；但得設一萬人以內之常備部隊。
+
+中華民國對外國宣戰時，本省軍隊之一部得受國政府之指揮。
+
+第八十九條 省內治安，省民共保之；省外軍隊，非經省議會議決及省政府允許，永遠不得駐紮或通過本省境內。
+
+
+### 第八章 司法
+
+第九十條 省設高等審判廳，爲一省之最高審判機關，對於本省之民事、刑事、行政及其他一切訴訟之判決，爲最終之判決。
+
+高等審判廳之下，設地方審判廳、初級審判廳。
+
+第九十一條 省設高等檢察廳，爲一省最高之檢察機關。
+
+高等檢察廳之下，設地方檢察廳、初級檢察廳。
+
+第九十二條 高等審判廳長及高等檢察廳長，由省議會依法定資格選舉之。
+
+選舉方法，以省法律定之。
+
+高等審判廳長及高等檢察廳長以下之各法官，均由省務院呈請任命之。
+
+第九十三條 法官獨立審判，不受何方之干涉。
+
+第九十四條 高等審判廳長及高等檢察廳長任期八年；在任期內，非依本法第三十九條第八款之規定，不得免職。
+
+高等審判廳長及高等檢察廳長以下各法官，非依法律，不得免職、降職、停職、減職或轉職；法官之懲戒處分，以省法律定之。
+
+第九十五條 司法區域之劃分、法院之編制及法官之俸給，以省法律定之。
+
+
+### 第九章 審計院
+
+第九十六條 省設審計院；審計院長，由省議會選舉之。
+
+審計院之組織及審計院長之選舉，以省法律定之。
+
+第九十七條 審計院長任期八年，在任期內，非依本法第三十九條第九款之規定，不得免職。
+
+第九十八條 省經費之收入，各徵收機關須於繳納省庫時，報吿審計院。
+
+省經費之支出，須經審計院長，按照預算案或臨時支出之法案，核準籤印支出；與原案不符時，得拒絕之。
+
+第九十九條 審計院得隨時調查各機關之收支簿據。
+
+第一百條 審計院對於全省各機關收支簿據之登記法及報吿程式，有釐訂劃一之權；此項釐訂劃一辦法，由審計院長咨請省長行之。
+
+
+### 第十章 縣制大綱
+
+第一百零一條 縣爲省之地方行政區域，幷爲自治團體。
+
+第一百零二條 縣置縣長，受省長之指揮監督，執行省之地方行政及縣之自治行政，並同時監督縣以下之各自治機關。
+
+第一百零三條 縣長由縣議會選舉六人，交由全縣公民決選二人，呈請省長擇一任命。
+
+第一百零四條 縣長任期四年；但在任期內，如有溺職或違法行爲時，由省長免職，或縣議會彈劾，呈請省長免職；免職後，卽依前條舉行新選舉。
+
+第一百零五條 縣長之資格、選舉及縣行政機關之組織，以省法律定之。
+
+第一百零六條 縣置縣議會；議員人數，依縣之大小酌定之；但不得少於十六人，至多亦不得過五十人。
+
+縣議會之議員，由全縣公民直接投票選出之。
+
+縣議會之組織解散及縣議員之選舉撤回，以省法律定之。
+
+第一百零七條 在不抵觸省法令之範圍內，縣有左列各事項之自治權：
+
+（1）縣以內之教育及與教育相聯屬之事項。
+
+（2）縣以內之道路、水利及其他土木工程事項。
+
+（3）縣以內之實業及公共營業。
+
+（4）縣以內之警察、衞生及各種公益慈善事項。
+
+（5）縣公產及營造物之處分。
+
+（6）其他依省法令賦與縣自治處理之事項。
+
+前列各事有涉及兩縣以上者，得協議處理之。
+
+第一百零八條 在不抵觸省法令之範圍內，縣得制定縣稅及附於省稅之附加稅，並他種公共收入，以充縣自治事項之經費；但須受省政府之監督。
+
+第一百零九條 縣之收入支出，每年由縣長詳細公布之。
+
+
+### 第十一章 市鄕自治大綱
+
+第一百十條 市鄕皆爲自治團體。
+
+第一百十一條 省以內之都會、商埠，人口滿二十萬以上者，爲一等市；人口滿五萬以上、不及二十萬者，爲二等市；人口滿五千以上、不及五萬人者，爲三等市；不及五千人者，屬於鄕。
+
+第一百十二條 一等市，直接受省政府之監督。
+
+第一百十三條 一等市設市長一人，由全市公民直接選出，任期二年。
+
+第一百十四條 一等市設市議會，由全市公民直接選出之議員組織之；其選舉及組織，以省法律定之。
+
+市議會之議員爲無給職。
+
+第一百十五條 一等市設市委員會，以市長爲委員會長。凡市之行政方針，由委員會議決施行。
+
+委員會之半數，由市議會選出。其他之半數，由市長從各職業團體中擇任之；委員會之委員爲無給職。
+
+第一百十六條 一等市市政公所之專務職員，由市長經委員會之同意任用之。
+
+第一百十七條 一等市之公民對於市之重要立法，有直接提案及總投票之覆決權；其方法以省法律定之。
+
+第一百十八條 自治權：
+
+（1）市以內之教育及與教育相聯屬之事項。
+
+（2）市以內之街道、水溝及其他土木工程事項。
+
+（3）市以內之電燈、電車、煤氣、自來水及其他關於公益之營業。
+
+（4）市以內之警察、衞生及各種公益慈善事項。
+
+（5）其他依省法令賦與或由省政府委託市執行處理之事項。
+
+第一百十九條 一等市受省政府之監督，得制定左列各種市稅：
+
+（1）房屋稅。
+
+（2）車馬稅。
+
+（3）戲院及其他各種游戲場稅。
+
+（4）屠宰稅。
+
+（5）酒館稅。
+
+（6）附於省稅之附加稅。
+
+（7）其他稅則得政府之許可者。
+
+第一百二十條 一等市受省政府之監督，得募集市債。
+
+第一百二十一條 二等市之組織，得適用本法自第一百十三條至第一百十七條之規定；但受縣政府監督。
+
+第一百二十二條 二等市之自治權，得適用本法第一百十八條及第一百十九條之規定；但以不抵觸省及縣法令爲範圍。
+
+第一百二十三條 一二等市之制度，以省法律定之；但在不背本法之範圍內，一二等市得自定其制度，經省議會認可施行。
+
+第一百二十四條 三等市及鄕之組織，以省法律定之；但得斟酌各地方情形，自定其組織，經省議會認可施行。
+
+第一百二十五條 凡市鄕之收入支出，每年須詳細公布之。
+
+
+### 第十二章 本法之修正及解釋
+
+第一百二十六條 本法公布後，每十年須召集憲法會議一次，議決應行修正案，交由公民總投票決定之。
+
+經省議會議員四分之三及全省縣議會及一等市議會團體三分之二，提出修正案，得召集憲法會議議決，交公民總投票決定之。
+
+憲法會議之組織，以省法律定之。
+
+第一百二十七條 因本法所發生之爭議，由高等審判廳解釋之。
+
+
+### 第十三章 附則
+
+第一百二十八條 省法律未公布以前，中華民國現行法律及基於法律之命令，與本法不相抵觸者，仍得適用於本省。
+
+第一百二十九條 國憲未成立以前，應歸於國之事權，得由本省議決執行之。
+
+第一百三十條 戶口調查未完竣以前，本法第二十九條之規定暫緩施行；省議員之名額，暫以各縣田賦爲標準。凡田賦未滿壹萬元者，選出一名；壹萬元以上六萬元未滿者，選出二名；六萬元以上十二萬元未滿者，選出三名；十二萬元以上十八萬元未滿者，選出四名；十八萬元以上者，選出五名。
+
+其各縣應選出省議員之名額，列表於後：
+
+長沙四名 湘陰三名 瀏陽四名 醴陵三名 湘潭四名
+
+寧鄕三名 益陽三名 湘鄕四名 攸縣三名 安化二名
+
+茶陵三名 寶慶三名 新化二名 武岡三名 新寧二名
+
+城步一名 衡陽五名 衡山三名 安仁二名 耒陽三名
+
+常寧二名 酃縣二名 零陵三名 祁陽二名 東安二名
+
+道縣二名 寧遠二名 永明二名 江華二名 新田二名
+
+郴縣二名 永興二名 資興二名 宜章二名 桂陽二名
+
+桂東二名 汝城二名 臨武二名 藍山二名 嘉禾二名
+
+岳陽三名 平江三名 臨湘二名 華容二名 常德三名
+
+桃源三名 漢壽二名 沅江一名 澧縣三名 石門二名
+
+慈利二名 安鄕二名 臨澧二名 大庸一名 南縣二名
+
+沅陵二名 瀘溪二名 辰谿二名 漵浦三名 芷江二名
+
+黔陽二名 麻陽二名 永順二名 古丈一名 保靖一名
+
+龍山一名 桑植一名 靖縣二名 綏寧二名 會同二名
+
+通道一名 亁城一名 鳳凰一名 永綏一名 晃縣一名
+
+第一百三十一條 戶口調查未完竣以前，本法第四十七條之規定暫緩施行；省長之選舉，由省議會選出七人，交由前全省縣議員決選之。
+
+第一百三十二條 戶口調查未完竣以前，本法第十一章所定一等市之組織暫緩施行；但非遇意外事變，至遲須於本法公布後之一年內，將省內各重要都會、商埠人口調查完竣；依本法制定一等市制度施行之。
+
+第一百三十三條 全省戶口之調查，非遇意外事變，至遲須於本法公布後二年完竣。
+
+第一百三十四條 在國憲未成立以前，省政府得徵收國稅；但徵收額數與其用途，仍須編入省預算案內，經省議會議決。
+
+第一百三十五條 依本法所定之初級審判廳及檢察廳，至遲須於本法公布後一年內完全成立。
+
+第一百三十六條 本法公布後，須卽由現省政府設立法制編纂會，擬定施行本法所必須之法案，於第一次省議會開會時提出議決。
+
+第一百三十七條 依本法成立之第一屆省議會第一次開會期，不限於三十六條第一項之規定。
+
+第一百三十八條 本法公布後，至遲須於三個月內，依本法辦理省議會及各縣議會，選舉省議會及各縣議會；選舉完竣後，至遲須於三個月內，依本法選舉省長；省長選出後，臨時省長應卽解職；由正式省長依法組織省行政機關，本法第八十七條之規定應卽施行。
+
+第一百三十九條 現有軍隊未收束以前，本法第八十七條之規定暫緩施行；但至依本法所定正式政府成立之日止，須將軍費減至省預算案歲出二分之一；至鄰近各省自治政府成立後之半年止，軍費須減至省預算案歲出三分之一；至國憲成立後之半年止，軍費須減至省預算案歲出四分之一；並須於國憲成立後，卽爲實施本法第八十八條之預備進行。
+
+第一百四十條 立法、司法、行政各機關依本法成立時，原設之機關應卽廢止。
+
+第一百四十一條 本法由全省公民總投票可決後，公布之日施行。
+
+
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2024-05-15-AnnaHerr_QuentinHerr-a1_c-superconducting-supercomputer.md b/_collections/_heros/2024-05-15-AnnaHerr_QuentinHerr-a1_c-superconducting-supercomputer.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e720e583
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_heros/2024-05-15-AnnaHerr_QuentinHerr-a1_c-superconducting-supercomputer.md
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title: "Superconducting Supercomputer"
+author: "Anna Herr and Quentin Herr"
+date: 2024-05-15 12:00:00 +0800
+image: https://i.imgur.com/nTmt0Vp.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+position: center
+---
+
+Before the explosion of generative AI, scientists had predicted that by 2040, almost 50 percent of the world’s electric power will be used in computing. The amount of computing resources used to train the AI models has been doubling every 6 months for the past decade. At this rate, by 2030 training a single artificial-intelligence model would take one hundred times as much computing resources as the combined annual resources of the current top ten supercomputers. Simply put, computing will require colossal amounts of power, soon exceeding what our planet can provide.
+
+One way to manage the unsustainable energy requirements of the computing sector is to fundamentally change the way we compute. Superconductors could let us do just that.
+
+Superconductors offer the possibility of drastically lowering energy consumption because they do not dissipate energy when passing current. True, superconductors work only at cryogenic temperatures, requiring some cooling overhead. But in exchange, they offer virtually zero-resistance interconnects, digital logic built on ultrashort pulses that require minimal energy, and the capacity for incredible computing density due to easy 3D chip stacking.
+
+Are the advantages enough to overcome the cost of cryogenic cooling? Our work suggests they most certainly are. As the scale of computing resources gets larger, the marginal cost of the cooling overhead gets smaller. Our research shows that starting at around 10^16 floating-point operations per second (tens of petaflops) the superconducting computer handily becomes more power efficient than its classical cousin. This is exactly the scale of typical high-performance computers today, so the time for a superconducting supercomputer is now.
+
+
+
+At Imec, we have spent the past two years developing superconducting processing units that can be manufactured using standard CMOS tools. A processor based on this work would be one hundred times as energy efficient as the most efficient chips today, and it would lead to a computer that fits a data-center’s worth of computing resources into a system the size of a shoebox.
+
+
+### The Physics of Energy-Efficient Computation
+
+Superconductivity — that superpower that allows certain materials to transmit electricity without resistance at low enough temperatures — was discovered back in 1911, and the idea of using it for computing has been around since the mid-1950s. But despite the promise of lower power usage and higher compute density, the technology couldn’t compete with the astounding advance of CMOS scaling under Moore’s Law. Research has continued through the decades, with a superconducting CPU demonstrated by a group at Yokohama National University as recently as 2020. However, as an aid to computing, superconductivity has stayed largely confined to the laboratory.
+
+To bring this technology out of the lab and toward a scalable design that stands a chance of being competitive in the real world, we had to change our approach here at Imec. Instead of inventing a system from the bottom up — that is, starting with what works in a physics lab and hoping it is useful — we designed it from the top down — starting with the necessary functionality, and working directly with CMOS engineers and a full-stack development team to ensure manufacturability. The team worked not only on a fabrication process, but also software architectures, logic gates, and standard-cell libraries of logic and memory elements to build a complete technology.
+
+The foundational ideas behind energy-efficient computation, however, have been developed as far back as 1991. In conventional processors, much of the power consumed and heat dissipated comes from moving information among logic units, or between logic and memory elements rather than from actual operations. Interconnects made of superconducting material, however, do not dissipate any energy. The wires have zero electrical resistance, and therefore, little energy is required to move bits within the processor. This property of having extremely low energy losses holds true even at very high communication frequencies, where losses would skyrocket ordinary interconnects.
+
+Further energy savings come from the way logic is done inside the superconducting computer. Instead of the transistor, the basic element in superconducting logic is the Josephson-junction.
+
+A Josephson junction is a sandwich — a thin slice of insulating material squeezed between two superconductors. Connect the two superconductors, and you have yourself a Josephson-junction loop.
+
+Under normal conditions, the insulating “meat” in the sandwich is so thin that it does not deter a supercurrent — the whole sandwich just acts as a superconductor. However, if you ramp up the current past a threshold known as a critical current, the superconducting “bread slices” around the insulator get briefly knocked out of their superconducting state. In this transition period, the junction emits a tiny voltage pulse, lasting just a picosecond and dissipating just 2 x 10^(-20) joules, a hundred-billionth of what it takes to write a single bit of information into conventional flash memory.
+
+
+_▲ A single flux quantum develops in a Josephson-junction loop via a three-step process. First, a current just above the critical value is passed through the junction. The junction then emits a single-flux-quantum voltage pulse. The voltage pulse passes through the inductor, creating a persistent current in the loop. A Josephson junction is indicated by an x on circuit diagrams. Chris Philpot_
+
+The key is that, due to a phenomenon called magnetic flux quantization in the superconducting loop, this pulse is always exactly the same. It is known as a “single flux quantum” (SFQ) of magnetic flux, and it is fixed to have a value of 2.07 millivolt-picoseconds. Put an inductor inside the Josephson-junction loop, and the voltage pulse drives a current. Since the loop is superconducting, this current will continue going around the loop indefinitely, without using any further energy.
+
+Logical operations inside the superconducting computer are made by manipulating these tiny, quantized voltage pulses. A Josephson-junction loop with an SFQ’s worth of persistent current acts as a logical 1, while a current-free loop is a logical 0.
+
+To store information, the Josephson-junction-based version of SRAM in CPU cache, also uses single flux quanta. To store one bit, two Josephson-junction loops need to be placed next to each other. An SFQ with a persistent current in the left-hand loop is a memory element storing a logical 0, whereas no current in the left but a current in the right loop is a logical 1.
+
+
+_▲ Designing a superconductor-based data center required full-stack innovation. Imec’s board design contains three main elements: the input and output, leading data to the room temperature world, the conventional DRAM, stacked high and cooled to 77 kelvins, and the superconducting processing units, also stacked, and cooled to 4 K. Inside the superconducting processing unit, basic logic and memory elements are laid out to perform computations. A magnification of the chip shows the basic building blocks: For logic, a Josephson-junction loop without a persistent current indicates a logical 0, while a loop with one single flux quantum’s worth of current represents a logical 1. For memory, two Josephson junction loops are connected together. An SFQ’s worth of persistent current in the left loop is a memory 0, and a current in the right loop is a memory 1. Chris Philpot_
+
+
+### Progress Through Full-Stack Development
+
+To go from a lab curiosity to a chip prototype ready for fabrication, we had to innovate the full stack of hardware. This came in three main layers: engineering the basic materials used, circuit development, and architectural design. The three layers had to go together — a new set of materials requires new circuit designs, and new circuit designs require novel architectures to incorporate them. Codevelopment across all three stages, with a strict adherence to CMOS manufacturing capabilities, was the key to success.
+
+At the materials level, we had to step away from the previous lab-favorite superconducting material: niobium. While niobium is easy to model and behaves very well under predictable lab conditions, it is very difficult to scale down. Niobium is sensitive to both process temperature and its surrounding materials, so it is not compatible with standard CMOS processing. Therefore, we switched to the related compound niobium titanium nitride for our basic superconducting material. Niobium titanium nitride can withstand temperatures used in CMOS fabrication without losing its superconducting capabilities, and it reacts much less with its surrounding layers, making it a much more practical choice.
+
+
+_▲ The basic building block of superconducting logic and memory is the Josephson junction. At Imec, these junctions have been manufactured using a new set of materials, allowing the team to scale down the technology without losing functionality. Here, a tunneling electron microscope image shows a Josephson junction made with alpha-silicon insulator sandwiched between niobium titanium nitride superconductors, achieving a critical dimension of 210 nanometers. Imec_
+
+Additionally, we employed a new material for the meat layer of the Josephson-junction sandwich — amorphous, or alpha, silicon. Conventional Josephson-junction materials, most notably aluminum oxide, didn’t scale down well. Aluminum was used because it “wets” the niobium, smoothing the surface, and the oxide was grown in a well-controlled manner. However, to get to the ultrahigh densities that we are targeting, we would have to make the oxide too thin to be practically manufacturable. Alpha silicon, in contrast, allowed us to use a much thicker barrier for the same critical current.
+
+We also had to devise a new way to power the Josephson junctions that would scale down to the size of a chip. Previously, lab-based superconducting computers used transformers to deliver current to their circuit elements. However, having a bulky transformer near each circuit element is unworkable. Instead, we designed a way to deliver power to all the elements on the chip at once by creating a resonant circuit, with specialized capacitors interspersed throughout the chip.
+
+At the circuit level, we had to redesign the entire logic and memory structure to take advantage of the new materials’ capabilities. We designed a novel logic architecture that we call pulse-conserving logic. The key requirement for pulse-conserving logic is that the elements have as many inputs as outputs and that the total number of single flux quanta is conserved. The logic is performed by routing the SFQs through a combination of Josephson-junction loops and inductors to the appropriate outputs, resulting in logical ORs and ANDs. To complement the logic architecture, we also redesigned a compatible Josephson-junction-based SRAM.
+
+Lastly, we had to make architectural innovations to take full advantage of the novel materials and circuit designs. Among these was cooling conventional silicon DRAM down to 77 kelvins and designing a glass bridge between the 77-K section and the main superconducting section. The bridge houses thin wires that allow communication without thermal mixing. We also came up with a way of stacking chips on top of each other and are developing vertical superconducting interconnects to link between circuit boards.
+
+
+### A Data Center the Size of a Shoebox
+
+The result is a superconductor-based chip design that’s optimized for AI processing. A zoom in on one of its boards reveals many similarities with a typical 3D CMOS system-on-chip. The board is populated by computational chips: We call it a superconductor processing unit (SPU), with embedded superconducting SRAM, DRAM memory stacks, and switches, all interconnected on silicon interposer or on glass-bridge advanced packaging technologies.
+
+But there are also some striking differences. First, most of the chip is to be submerged in liquid helium for cooling to a mere 4 K. This includes the SPUs and SRAM, which depend on superconducting logic rather than CMOS, and are housed on an interposer board. Next, there is a glass bridge to a warmer area, a balmy 77 K that hosts the DRAM. The DRAM technology is not superconducting, but conventional silicon cooled down from room temperature, making it more efficient. From there, bespoke connectors lead data to and from the room-temperature world.
+
+
+_▲ Davide Comai_
+
+Moore’s law relies on fitting progressively more computing resources into the same space. As scaling down transistors gets more and more difficult, the semiconductor industry is turning toward 3D stacking of chips to keep up the density gains. In classical CMOS-based technology, it is very challenging to stack computational chips on top of each other because of the large amount of power, and therefore heat, that is dissipated within the chips. In superconducting technology, the little power that is dissipated is easily removed by the liquid helium. Logic chips can be directly stacked using advanced 3D integration technologies resulting in shorter and faster connections between the chips, and a smaller footprint.
+
+It is also straightforward to stack multiple boards of 3D superconducting chips on top of each other, leaving only a small space between them. We modeled a stack of 100 such boards, all operating within the same cooling environment and contained in a 20- by 20- by 12-centimeter volume, roughly the size of a shoebox. We calculated that this stack can perform 20 exaflops (in BF16 number format), 20 times the capacity of the largest supercomputer today. What’s more, the system promises to consume only 500 kilowatts of total power. This translates to energy efficiency one hundred times as high as the most efficient supercomputer today.
+
+So far, we’ve scaled down Josephson junctions and interconnect dimensions over three succeeding generations. Going forward, Imec’s road map includes tackling 3D superconducting chip-integration and cooling technologies. For the first generation, the road map envisions the stacking of about 100 boards to obtain the target performance of 20 exaflops. Gradually, more and more logic chips will be stacked, and the number of boards will be reduced. This will further increase performance while reducing complexity and cost.
+
+
+### The Superconducting Vision
+
+We don’t envision that superconducting digital technology will replace conventional CMOS computing, but we do expect it to complement CMOS for specific applications and fuel innovations in new ones. For one, this technology would integrate seamlessly with quantum computers that are also built upon superconducting technology. Perhaps more significantly, we believe it will support the growth in AI and machine learning processing and help provide cloud-based training of big AI models in a much more sustainable way than is currently possible.
+
+In addition, with this technology we can engineer data centers with much smaller footprints. Drastically smaller data centers can be placed close to their target applications, rather than being in some far-off football-stadium-size facility.
+
+Such transformative server technology is a dream for scientists. It opens doors to online training of AI models on real data that are part of an actively changing environment. Take potential robotic farms as an example. Today, training these would be a challenging task, where the required processing capabilities are available only in far-away, power-hungry data centers. With compact, nearby data centers, the data could be processed at once, allowing an AI to learn from current conditions on the farm.
+
+Similarly, these miniature data centers can be interspersed in energy grids, learning right away at each node and distributing electricity more efficiently throughout the world. Imagine smart cities, mobile health care systems, manufacturing, farming, and more, all benefiting from instant feedback from adjacent AI learners, optimizing and improving decision making in real time.
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diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2024-04-03-BethanMcKernan_HarryDavies-a1_l-israel-used-ai-to-identify-hamas-targets.md b/_collections/_heros/_0x29/2024-04-03-BethanMcKernan_HarryDavies-a1_l-israel-used-ai-to-identify-hamas-targets.md
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diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-24-face-off-in-arctic.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-24-face-off-in-arctic.md
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-24-face-off-in-arctic.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Face-off In Arctic
+author: Mathieu Boulegue and Duncan Depledge
+date : 2024-05-24 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/dDMQg5n.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The Face-off in a Fragmented Arctic: Who Will Blink First?"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_As uncertainty grows over the future of cooperation in the Arctic, the risk is that creeping alternatives will harden the dividing lines between Russia and the West._
+
+
+
+With Russia’s war against Ukraine well into its third year, fears of a potential “spillover” into the Arctic remain high. With Sweden and Finland having recently joined NATO, three things become clear. First, there is now de facto “more NATO” in the Arctic. Second, Russia’s fears of strategic encirclement are not going away any time soon. Third, the dividing line between Russia and the West in the Arctic has never been starker – there is now what can be argued to be a “NATO 7 vs Russia” in the region.
+
+The implications for Arctic cooperation are significant. “Arctic exceptionalism” – the idea that the challenges facing the region encouraged cooperation and not geostrategic competition – which for so long was regarded as the guiding light for relations between the eight Arctic states (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the US), has all but dissipated. The principle of “circumpolarity” (the idea that the Arctic 8 should collectively determine the region’s future) has also been eroded. The impact on the Permanent Participants (representing Arctic indigenous peoples) has been largely overlooked.
+
+The challenges faced by the Arctic Council (the premier forum for regional cooperation) over the past two years are emblematic of the current state of circumpolar affairs. Within weeks of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, seven of the eight member states (Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden and the US) jointly “paused” their involvement in the Council and its affiliated bodies. Around a third of the Council’s 130 projects were reportedly put on hold, with new projects blocked and existing projects unable to be renewed.
+
+Gradually, the “Arctic 7” have found ways to resume activities with minimal participation from Russia. The handover of the chairship from Russia to Norway in 2023 proceeded smoothly. In February 2024, Norway announced that the Council’s Working Groups, where the organisation’s main work takes place, would be resumed with the participation of all states, including Russia – but only in a virtual format.
+
+Yet despite these steps to restore critical functions, there is still good reason to be concerned by the Arctic Council’s future prospects. Even as plans for the Working Groups to meet virtually were being drawn up, Moscow announced that it would suspend its annual payments to the Arctic Council until the organisation resumes its work in full. Since 2022, Russia has restricted access to scientific data that is crucial to monitoring climate change, and especially to assessing the potential impact of carbon dioxide and methane “bombs” being released by Russia’s melting permafrost as part of a feedback loop. Such a situation will negatively impact climate change prediction models at large.
+
+Signs of increasing collaboration in the Arctic between Russia and other members of the so-called BRICS+ (Brazil, India, China, South Africa, Iran, Saudia Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Ethiopia) have prompted further concern that Moscow may be preparing to pursue the commercial exploitation of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF) independently of the Arctic 7. With Chinese interests in mind, such a situation could be to Moscow’s long-term detriment, as Beijing might be tempted to impose its own views on Arctic governance.
+
+___`The fragmentation of circumpolar cooperation is closing doors on diplomatic activity that could help to diffuse tensions and promote confidence-building measure`___
+
+Meanwhile, Russia has shown little appetite for addressing circumpolar challenges relating to climate change, the rights of indigenous communities, the management of biodiversity and living resources, environmental pollution, and the threat of radioactive contamination from Soviet-era and current nuclear activities.
+
+Amid all this uncertainty over the future of Arctic cooperation and whether the Arctic Council can survive (without betraying the West’s commitment to Ukraine), military activity in the region has continued to increase. The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO necessarily requires a re-evaluation of the Alliance’s defence planning across the Wider North (comprising the North Atlantic, Arctic and Baltic). This is likely to become a significant point of contention with Moscow, particularly as it begins to drive the restructuring of commands in the European and Northern theatres, the reconfiguration of forces and deployments, and new patterns of training and exercising.
+
+Viewed from Moscow, the “enlargement” of NATO closer to Russian borders is feeding a sense of not only vindication but also increased conventional vulnerability. Furthermore, melting ice in the AZRF is no longer a reliable source of protection along Russia’s northern border, which is further strengthening the Kremlin’s Arctic insecurities. Russia’s own Arctic ground forces in the European High North have been largely decimated by war operations in Ukraine, which will continue to divert attention and resources away from the Arctic theatre.
+
+However, Moscow’s military posture in the Arctic has not changed in the context of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and it remains bent on obsessive control over the AZRF and countering NATO activity. Russia’s vast multi-layered network of Arctic-capable air and coastal defence systems has stayed in place along the AZRF and has not been tremendously impacted by the war against Ukraine.
+
+In this context – and judging by the sense of conventional vulnerability fuelling Russia’s Arctic insecurities – there is a risk that Moscow could engage in more overt nuclear sabre-rattling and escalatory behaviour. There remains an outside chance that Russia could resume nuclear weapons testing on the islands of Novaya Zemlya. This situation is compounded by the inherent risk of miscalculation provoked by accidents, incidents and tactical errors, left unchecked by the current absence of lines of communication.
+
+Meanwhile, the fragmentation of circumpolar cooperation is closing doors on diplomatic activity that could help to diffuse tensions and promote confidence-building measures. Prior to 2022, there was some discussion of re-establishing joint military forums or some form of “code of conduct”, but this dissipated quickly as Moscow’s designs on Ukraine became clear. The chances of a predictable Arctic in military security terms are growing slimmer.
+
+The risk of an armed conflict in the Arctic is clearly higher than it was. However, this does not mean that either NATO or Moscow is any more likely to seek a conflict in the Arctic than they were prior to Russia’s assault on Ukraine. Considering the complexity of the operating environment, there is little incentive for Moscow – or NATO – to escalate in the Arctic per se, let alone conduct high-intensity warfare operations there.
+
+___`For now, the most likely scenario is that we will continue to see a balancing and counterbalancing of NATO and Russian forces in the High North as both sides adjust to the realities of Swedish and Finnish membership of NATO`___
+
+There is no sign yet (publicly at least) that either side is seeking to change the “facts on the ground” regarding critical international agreements, or even press claims in areas of disagreement – for instance, over how to interpret the Svalbard Treaty on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as it applies to the Northeast Passage (including the Northern Sea Route, or NSR) and the delimitation of extended continental shelves.
+
+Nevertheless, Russia remains determined to control “its” Arctic and the NSR. Over the past few years, successive waves of regulations have increasingly restricted passage through the NSR, placing it under Moscow’s tight control. If, even as the effects of climate change are felt, Russia maintains its dubious interpretation of the status of the NSR, or if the Kremlin seeks to further restrict passage along the route (especially for foreign military vessels), there could be more serious consideration of a US- or NATO-led Freedom of Navigation operation, even if it increases the risk of an armed clash.
+
+These issues are all the more critical in the context of the renewed US interest in Arctic affairs as part of the 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region (NSAR) and its 2023 Implementation Plan. Indeed, the NSAR is quite clear regarding protecting freedom of navigation across the Arctic region in accordance with UNCLOS.
+
+For now, the most likely scenario is that we will continue to see a balancing and counterbalancing of NATO and Russian forces in the High North as both sides adjust to the realities of Swedish and Finnish membership of NATO. The danger is that this could increase the risk of a miscalculation provoked by an accident escalating into something worse. More presence and platforms in a changing Arctic will undoubtedly bring about more incidents, including environmental catastrophes and human-made disasters, with indigenous peoples and other local communities bearing the brunt of the impact.
+
+Beyond that, we anticipate that the Arctic will remain in limbo until one side or the other makes a move to either restore or abandon the Arctic Council, or attempts to press a claim that undermines the commitment that all the Arctic states made in Ilulissat in 2008 (and again in 2018) to resolve their disputes in accordance with international law. The wider risk is that in the absence of a circumpolar approach, creeping alternatives will harden the dividing lines between Russia and the West.
+
+Neither side currently looks ready to blink first. China, meanwhile, may seek to exploit the fragmentation of Arctic governance to push for its own “free for all” approach. All the while, human insecurity and climate breakdown in the Arctic look set to worsen.
+
+---
+
+__Mathieu Boulegue__ is a Global Fellow at the Wilson Center’s Polar Institute, a Consulting Fellow at Chatham House and a Non-resident Senior Fellow at CEPA.
+
+__Duncan Depledge__ is a Senior Lecturer in Geopolitics and Security at Loughborough University. He is an Associate Fellow of RUSI, where he previously worked on the Climate Change and Security Programme. In this role, he focused primarily on analysing how climate change is impacting global and regional dynamics of security and geopolitics, especially in the Arctic.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-29-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-before-verdict.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-29-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-before-verdict.md
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-29-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-before-verdict.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊明日裁決】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-05-29 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 16人不認罪 明日裁決
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名組織及參與初選的民主派，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，經歷118日審訊，將於明日（30日）在西九龍裁判法院（暫代高院）裁決。距離61萬人投票的民主派初選近4年，法庭明將就控方指控被告串謀取得立會過半後，無差別否決預算案，迫使特首解散立法會及辭職，意圖顛覆國家政權，作出裁定。
+
+根據《國安法》第22條，一旦顛覆國家政權罪成，「首要分子或罪行重大」可判監10年以上至終身監禁；「積極參加者」可判監3至10年；「其他參加者」則判監3年以下，故法官就被告參與程度及角色的裁定，將會影響判刑。值得留意的是，政府去年修例，就沒有陪審團的高院國安案，若有被告罪脫，律政司可緊接提出擬上訴，法庭可應申請，命令無罪被告還柙或准予保釋。
+
+本案目前共34人還柙，其中32人已還柙至今逾3年2個月，料裁決後罪成被告將與認罪被告另外擇日一併求情及判刑。
+
+#### 正庭、延伸庭共設410公眾席
+
+案件明天早上10時於西九龍法院3號法庭進行聆訊，司法機構表示，將於明天早上9時15分派發合共410張公眾席入庭籌，其中正庭有43席，另外4個設有聆訊直播的法庭及延伸區域，則有367席，另設約100張後備籌。
+
+#### 6人不准保釋 4人還柙逾1,180日
+
+本案16名不認罪被告為：鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、何桂藍、陳志全、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄、柯耀林、李予信、余慧明及吳政亨。
+
+
+▲ 鄭達鴻
+
+
+▲ 楊雪盈
+
+
+▲ 彭卓棋
+
+
+▲ 劉偉聰
+
+
+▲ 黃碧雲
+
+
+▲ 施德來（左）
+
+
+▲ 陳志全
+
+
+▲ 柯耀林
+
+
+▲ 李予信
+
+其中6人正在還柙，當中何桂藍、林卓廷、梁國雄和吳政亨4人，至裁決日已還柙逾3年2個月、逾1,180日；至於鄒家成和余慧明一度獲准保釋，但因違反保釋條件而遭撤銷擔保，已分別還柙逾2年9個月及2年7個月，逾970日及950日。
+
+#### 爭議無差別否決是否「非法手段」、被告有否達協議
+
+本案由指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理，是《國安法》後最大規模的案件，亦是「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪首案。
+
+本案指控被告串謀取得立會過半後，無差別否決預算案，迫使特首解散立法會及辭職，意圖顛覆國家政權。控辯雙方爭議無差別否決預算案是否構成控罪中的「非法手段」，及被告有否達成協議無差別否決、是否串謀一分子、及是否有意圖顛覆國家政權等。
+
+#### 刑期三級制 最高可囚終身
+
+16名不認罪被告中，僅發起「三投三不投」的吳政亨被視為組織者，其餘則為參與者。根據《國安法》第22條，一旦罪成，「首要分子或罪行重大」可判處10年以上至終身監禁；「積極參加者」可判監3至10年；「其他參加者」則判監3年以下、拘役或者管制。因此法官就被告參與程度及角色的裁決，將會影響判刑。
+
+
+▲ 吳政亨
+
+#### 律政司可緊接提擬上訴、申罪脫被告還柙
+
+值得留意的是，被告即使獲裁定無罪，律政司亦可緊接提出擬上訴，法庭可應申請將無罪被告羈押。政府去年修訂《刑事訴訟程序條例》，針對高等法院原訟庭沒有陪審團、由3名指定法官審理的國安案件，法例列明如法官就被告作出無罪裁決，律政司司長可「緊接」通知法庭擬提出上訴，法庭則可應律政司司長的申請，命令將該被告羈留扣押，以待上訴庭作出裁定，或准予該被告保釋。
+
+法例亦列明，法庭處理保釋申請時，受限於《國安法》第42條的保釋門檻，意味除非法官有充足理由相信，被告不會繼續實施危害國安的行為，否則不得准予保釋。
+
+#### 首提堂至開審歷時近兩年 審訊118天
+
+民主派初選於2020年7月舉行，其後立法會選舉延期一年，47人於2021年1月6日被以「顛覆國家政權」罪拘捕，同年2月28日被要求提早報到，被落案起訴「串謀顛覆國家政權」。47人於3月1日首度提堂，經歷6次提訊日及多次提堂後於2022年7月正式交付高院，當中共31人認罪，包括組織者戴耀廷和區諾軒，另16人不認罪受審。
+
+案件今年2月6日於西九龍法院開審，原定審期90天，最終歷時近10個月、審訊118天，於同年12月4日完成結案陳詞。當中控方案情花了共58日，被指為組織者的區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟以控方證人身分作供44天，認罪的林景楠亦應辯方要求被傳召作盤問。此外，控方傳召在新西協調會議拍片的匿名證人X先生作供，及應辯方要求傳召6名警員及1名選舉主任作盤問。
+
+其後以6日處理「共謀者原則」爭議及被告申請毋須答辯的中段陳詞，法官裁定該原則不適用於《國安法》前的言行，及所有被告表證成立。
+
+辯方案情則用了51日，不認罪的16人，除吳政亨、楊雪盈、黃碧雲、林卓廷、梁國雄和柯耀林6人外，其餘10人：鄭達鴻、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、施德來、何桂藍、陳志全、鄒家成、李予信、余慧明均有出庭作供，至於吳政亨及柯耀林則傳召辯方證人。案件最後以3天完成結案陳詞。
+
+#### 31人認罪
+
+至於認罪的31人，包括：戴耀廷、區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟、袁嘉蔚、梁晃維、徐子見、岑子杰、毛孟靜、馮達浚、劉澤鋒、黃之鋒、譚文豪、李嘉達、譚得志、胡志偉、朱凱廸、張可森、黃子悅、尹兆堅、郭家麒、吳敏兒、譚凱邦、劉頴匡、楊岳橋、范國威、呂智恆、岑敖暉、王百羽、伍健偉及林景楠。
+
+認罪被告中，僅呂智恆、林景楠和黃子悅獲保釋，惟黃另涉理大衝突案，承認暴動判囚37個月。其餘被告均還柙至今逾3年2個月。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-30-beyond-deadlock.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-30-beyond-deadlock.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Beyond Deadlock
+author: Sultan Barakat and Antonio Giustozzi
+date : 2024-05-30 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/YNAyAfc.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Opportunities for Western Engagement with the Taliban"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_This paper highlights the Taliban’s perceptions, agendas and modes of operation to aid understanding of how to move forward with the question of future engagement with the Taliban._
+
+
+
+While international media attention is currently diverted to the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, the question of whether to engage with the Taliban’s de facto government remains a contentious topic actively deliberated in Western diplomatic circles. Rather than examining the merits of engaging (or not) with the Taliban, this Emerging Insights paper highlights the Taliban’s perceptions, agendas and modes of operation in order to gain a better understanding of how to move forward with the question of future engagement with the Taliban. The paper is specifically aimed at informing Western policymakers and is not intended to cover the wider spectrum of the Taliban’s perceptions of the external world, nor does it aim to analyse the group’s foreign policymaking. Thus, notwithstanding their undoubted importance, the paper does not cover the Taliban’s relations with Afghanistan’s neighbours.
+
+
+### INTRODUCTION
+
+This paper is informed by recent research on the Taliban’s more than two years in government, supported by tens of meetings and interviews with Taliban officials and leaders, dating from well before August 2021 and up to the present day. Identities and all data emerging from these exchanges are either anonymised or unattributed, as specific sources cannot be identified.
+
+The paper has two main sections. The first section discusses the Taliban’s perception of Western countries and the second outlines the Taliban agenda towards Western countries. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the implications for Western powers of engaging with the Taliban.
+
+
+### UNDERSTANDING THE TALIBAN PERCEPTION OF THE WEST
+
+#### RESENTMENT AND SUSPICION
+
+After more than two years of diplomatic negotiations and exchanges, the Taliban are sceptical about the value of engaging with the West. “We have had open discussion with many political figures over the past two years, diplomats and UN officials, but we see little progress as a result”, says one senior Taliban member. Still, this does not mean that the Taliban have given up on building bridges with the West – not yet. The Taliban recognises the Doha agreement of February 2020 as the main document regulating their relations with the US and by extension all Western countries, as the agreement refers to “the United States, its allies, and the Coalition”. Disagreements over the implementation of that agreement fuel Taliban distrust of the US and its allies – as well as US distrust of the Taliban. The US has repeatedly accused the Taliban of not having fully implemented the terms of the agreement, in particular with regard to their handling of groups linked to Al-Qaeda.
+
+The Doha agreement was rather imprecisely worded, asking the Taliban not to allow “any of its members, other individuals or groups, including al-Qa’ida, to use the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its allies”, to “prevent them from recruiting, training, and fundraising” and not to “host them” (note that the term “ally” lends itself to conflicting interpretations). It also asked the Taliban to “send a clear message that those who pose a threat to the security of the United States and its allies have no place in Afghanistan” and to “instruct members of the … Taliban not to cooperate with groups or individuals threatening the security of the United States and its allies”.
+
+Perhaps more importantly, the US State Department is silent on whether the agreement still stands. The State Department has been vocal about the Taliban’s treatment of women and other rights issues, while gradually becoming more positive about the Taliban’s handling of foreign jihadists.
+
+The Taliban responded that, according to the Doha agreement:
+
+- The US was supposed to “initiate an administrative review of current U.S. sanctions and the rewards list against members of the … Taliban with the goal of removing these sanctions by August 27, 2020”, and that this did not happen.
+
+- The US was further supposed to “start diplomatic engagement with other members of the United Nations Security Council and Afghanistan to remove members of the … Taliban from the sanctions list with the aim of achieving this objective by May 29, 2020”, and that this did not happen either.
+
+- The US also committed to “refrain from the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Afghanistan or intervening in its domestic affairs”. The Taliban claim is that the US is continually putting pressure on them on these matters.
+
+The Taliban also argue that the freezing of National Bank funds violates the spirit of the Doha agreement, as does the fact that the US continues to fly drones over Afghanistan. Sources were keen to stress this point, and claimed that leaders in the Taliban felt intimidated by the continuous drone surveillance, which some of them took as a sign of US bad faith. Some leaders argue that this unfriendly behaviour plays into the hands of hardliners opposed to engaging with the West, pushing pragmatists to prioritise internal Taliban unity over efforts to marginalise the hardliners.
+
+While there is a degree of defensiveness in evidence here, and there are other, perhaps more important, reasons why the hardliners gradually gained influence from September 2021, it is at least plausible that the more threatened the Taliban feel, and the more distrust towards Western countries there is within their ranks, the easier it will be for Taliban hostile to engaging with Western countries to impose their line.
+
+After more than 20 years of war, the Taliban’s distrust of Western countries (and vice versa) comes as no surprise. But it is, nonetheless, one factor contributing to why Afghanistan’s de facto government has so far shown little to no interest in responding to calls by foreign governments and institutions for policy change – with the assumption being that such governments and institutions cannot be trusted to reward Taliban concessions in any substantial way. The Taliban maintain that the centrality of Sharia Law to their system of governance is non-negotiable, and they also have their own ways of determining which interpretation of Sharia Law applies in a given case, with the prime authority in the field resting with the Taliban’s Amir, Haibatullah Akhundzada (who is the leader of the Taliban movement but does not have a formal role in the Taliban government).
+
+One noteworthy example of how Taliban distrust can have the effect of harming the Taliban themselves is the recent failure of the so-called “Doha II” meeting of 18 February 2024, when special envoys for Afghanistan gathered to discuss the report prepared by UN Special Coordinator Feridun Sinirlioğlu. Although the intention was to map a path towards the normalisation of relations, the Taliban interpreted the recommendation to appoint a UN special envoy for Afghanistan as an attempt to humiliate them. They also took exception to civil society representatives seemingly being accorded the same status as the Taliban at the meeting. Then, when it emerged that the UN Secretary-General would not chair the meeting with the Taliban, they took it as a snub (notwithstanding that Antonio Guterres could not meet the unrecognised de facto government in any case). Attempts to find an approach acceptable to the Taliban failed after the UN’s final proposal arrived too late for the Taliban’s slow policymaking arrangements, which required it to make the rounds between Kabul and Kandahar, gaining the acceptance of all the Taliban’s heavyweights. The end result was that the Taliban did not attend the meeting.
+
+#### SENSITIVITIES ABOUT CRITICISM
+
+The Taliban are especially proud of what they view as having achieved stability in Afghanistan and ending the very long war that began in 1978. State collapse, feared by many, has been averted and the Taliban have undoubtedly proven able to provide basic security. They consider this the main source of legitimacy of the new regime. Ordinary Afghans, they say, now enjoy the freedom to move around the country without risking their lives. “Many people have been able to visit their home villages for the first time in decades”, said one member. The Taliban also express irritation that among foreign diplomats there has either been no acknowledgement of their achievement of what they describe as the “neutralisation of the IS-K [Islamic State in Khorasan] threat” without external help, or, if the achievement is acknowledged, it is immediately undermined by what they see as a litany of complaints about the Taliban’s lack of respect for the rights of minorities and women. It seems clear that in the expectations of many Taliban, the group’s role in containing IS-K and averting state collapse should offset the other concerns of Western countries.
+
+Taliban leaders and officials say that they appreciate receiving advice, but remark that “there is a big difference between advice given by your enemy and advice given by a friend”, implying that Western countries are not “friends”. These words from another senior member of the Taliban show how the distrust for Western countries is apparent:
+
+> What we don’t appreciate is when the West and in particular the US occupies the moral higher ground and start[s] issuing advice to the IEA [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] on issues of human rights and freedoms – as if we don’t see and hear about their practices in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world – look what is going on in Gaza as we speak.
+
+The Taliban also harbour resentment about public criticism in the diplomatic arena:
+
+> When you advise someone with good faith, the advice and the way it is delivered must be peaceful and preferably confidential. One does it to receive reward from Allah and not to score goals or humiliate the other side. However, if the advice is public and confrontational, then the Taliban movement considers it offensive.
+
+The Taliban’s extreme sensitivity to public criticism is hardly unique – most governments would be sensitive – but theirs is likely reinforced by the sense of insecurity derived from their lack of diplomatic training and relative lack of experience in navigating the diplomatic arena. An additional factor, perhaps even more important, is that in the constant intra-Taliban tussle over competing foreign policy lines, Taliban interlocutors with Western countries feel humiliated by external criticism, which they believe undermines them in the eyes of their more sceptical colleagues.
+
+Conversely, the Taliban are often thirsty for Western appreciation. The July to October 2023 World Bank reports, for example, were greatly appreciated by some Taliban for their positive assessment of the financial and economic trends in Afghanistan. This illustrates how the Taliban – particularly the pragmatists among them – value acknowledgement and commendations. They interpreted the reports as a sign of political appreciation and as a rare piece of evidence of external appreciation that they can show to their more isolationist colleagues.
+
+Diverging foreign policy views among the Taliban could explain why, at a surface level, the Taliban have appeared resistant to taking advice from any source, Western or otherwise, public or private. Individual Taliban leaders and groups within the Taliban are reported by their colleagues to be willing to listen to advice from different sources – Qatar, the UAE, China or even in some cases the CIA – but contradictory pieces of advice tend to offset each another, resulting in little movement in policy terms.
+
+#### WHY THE TALIBAN THINK THEY NEED TO ENGAGE WITH THE WEST
+
+The Taliban tend to deny courting external support, while at the same time seeking it in certain circumstances. For example, senior Taliban contacted for this paper say that the main reason for the April 2022 ban on the cultivation, production and trade of drugs was awareness of the devastation that hard drugs were bringing to Afghanistan itself, as well as the fact that Sharia Law bans the consumption of narcotics. However, the desire for external support is evident when they suggest, to one of the authors but also to foreign diplomats, that help in dealing with the large quantity of drug addicts in the country and providing alternative livelihoods to opium farmers would be welcomed.
+
+The Taliban also argue that consolidating an improved security situation depends on “improving people’s livelihoods and in particular new employment opportunities for young men from rural areas”, as a senior figure put it to one of the authors. The need for economic progress in Afghanistan is one of the main rationales for external engagement in the eyes of the Taliban. However, there is little readiness to accept trade-offs that might include what many Taliban consider external interference in their internal decision-making. The Taliban are, nevertheless, beginning to implement plans to open Afghanistan’s mining sector to investment, not least to encourage Western investment to counterbalance the expected heavy Chinese investment in the Afghan economy.
+
+
+### THE TALIBAN’S AGENDA
+
+#### TALIBAN RIGIDITIES AND SOME EVOLUTION
+
+There is no question that the Taliban suffer from multiple rigidities in their policymaking. Some of these may be “ideological rigidities”, either genuine ones embedded in the Taliban’s origins, or ones rooted in the fear of being overtaken by more extreme groups. Others may have more to do with power struggles and internal competition among groups and leaders. Others still may be understood simply as a demonstration of sovereignty, a result of the Taliban’s desire to show that they are in charge.
+
+For example, Taliban pragmatists and modernists claim that the suspension of women’s and girls’ education, in high schools in September 2021 and in universities in December 2022, is the result of pressures from a minority group of ultra-conservative leaders, mostly concentrated in Kandahar, who genuinely believe that previous arrangements were not compliant with Sharia Law, and who have the support of the Amir. This is despite the fact that the policy is rather unpopular, even among Taliban themselves. Many Taliban officials say they do not take very seriously the view of figures such as Justice Minister Abdul Hakim Haqqani, who believe that jihad (intended as “mobilisation for struggle”) should continue until the establishment of a fully Islamic order – that is, a system of government very rigidly based on an institutionalised version of the Taliban’s understanding of Islam. For them, the jihad ended the moment Kabul fell in August 2021. However, even these Taliban justify the implementation of such policies with another ideological statement: that revolt against the “legitimate Amir” without “legitimate justification” (which can only be the Amir’s disbelief in Allah) is not permissible under Sharia Law. The Amir must, therefore, be obeyed even when he is “unjust”. Importantly, obedience to the Amir is also seen as key to the Taliban’s unity and, as one member explains, “our success rests on staying united”.
+
+In other areas, Taliban have claimed that some policy decisions were dictated less by their own convictions than by the desire to counter propaganda claims from IS-K that the Taliban have sold out to the West. This could of course be an excuse to justify policy shifts that many Taliban officials might find it difficult to justify otherwise, such as the suspension of women’s rights to education. There are, nonetheless, cases where this perceived vulnerability might have genuinely contributed to reshaping policy. In interviews with low-level officials of the Taliban Emirate in 2021–23, the Taliban clearly appeared to be concerned about some of their disgruntled members being attracted to IS-K. One example of this potentially having influenced policy is the decision to fully apply Sharia Law in criminal matters and the growing rigidity shown towards the Shia community from summer 2023 onwards, as Taliban failure to implement Sharia Law and the group’s courteous relations with the Shia community had been two key points of IS-K propaganda.
+
+Assessing the role of ideology in Taliban policymaking also requires consideration of the issue of intra-Taliban competition. While there are certainly many ultra-conservative ulema (senior clerics) within the Taliban, it is far from clear that the Amir is ideologically aligned with them. His record in 2016–21 was eminently pragmatic – see, for example, his willingness to accept Russian support for the Taliban in 2016, at the peak of the Russian intervention in Syria, despite widespread opposition within the leadership. This raises the issue of to what extent the Amir may be using the fatwas of his ulema to undermine those Taliban leaders who try to bypass his authority, including by reaching out to Western diplomats without his consent (as happened repeatedly in 2021–22). It is worth noting that, typically, suspensions of girls’ education rights came within days of meetings between Taliban officials and Western diplomats.
+
+Whatever is driving these rigidities, they are primarily endogenous factors that have had a major impact on how the Taliban interact with the rest of the world, even though they primarily concern the Emirate’s internal affairs. Evolution, or softening, is not impossible, however. The Taliban’s cautious approach towards foreign jihadists based in Afghanistan is an example. In the face of obvious IS-K attempts to attract foreign jihadists away from the Taliban, the Emirate was unwilling to put more than moderate pressure on the Pakistanis of the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), despite very strong demands from Islamabad. The reason appears clear: the TTP’s thousands of fighters could destabilise eastern Afghanistan if they allied with IS-K. However, the Emirate placed the much smaller Uighur and Uzbek jihadist contingents under strict surveillance and then forced them to relocate, estimating that the damage caused by defections to IS-K would be limited, and aiming to win praise from Beijing and Tashkent.
+
+There are other examples. In September 2023, the Taliban responded to an incident in Sweden in which the Qur’an was burned by freezing all Swedish aid activities. One Taliban member commented:
+
+> It may not have been sanctioned by the government, [but] the only option for us is to sanction all Swedish activities. Having done that, we have done our very best to protect the property and personnel of Swedish aid organisations in the country, but we cannot go against the will of the Afghan people who feel badly hurt as a result of [this incident].
+
+More recently, however, the Taliban have taken care not to be seen as promoting mobilisation in favour of Hamas in Gaza, for example, despite the issue being strongly felt by many within their ranks. This can probably be read as a signal to the West. Overall, the impression is of a Taliban leadership that is juggling its political capital, combining a rigid approach on some ideological issues related to internal affairs with considerable pragmatism on other issues, especially those related to the prospects of economic growth. They appear to have judged that dropping any kind of support for jihadist movements abroad will not hurt or impact them much, except in the case of the TTP in Pakistan.
+
+It is important to note, moreover, that despite their rigidities the Taliban do have a track record of sometimes responding positively to lobbying from NGOs, tribal and local elders, and even neighbouring countries – although at the centre, the rigidities appear harder to negotiate. Low-profile, discreet messaging appears to be more effective in influencing Taliban policymaking, while public statements, threats and ultimatums are generally rejected.
+
+#### TALIBAN UNDERSTANDINGS OF INCLUSION
+
+Greater inclusion of a variety of ethnic, religious and political groups in the Taliban government is a key demand not only of Western countries, but also of most neighbouring countries. When the Taliban are asked about inclusion today, they defend themselves by noting that their critics did not seem concerned with inclusion when the Taliban were entirely purged from the state apparatus in 2001. In comparison, they argue, the Taliban’s de facto government has at least retained most officials from the previous regime, such that the ministerial machinery mostly continues to function in the same way as before. In fact, junior officials were largely retained, while senior-level managers have been replaced, which leaves the issue of inclusiveness to a large extent unaddressed. The Taliban say that they are even retaining officials once linked to parties opposed to the Taliban, and that they make every effort to pay the salaries of officials on time (albeit at a considerably reduced rate), while many members of the Taliban themselves experience major delays. There is evidence that civilian officials do get paid, while, according to interviews, salaries to Taliban in the armed forces are often paid irregularly.
+
+With regard to specific communities, Taliban perceptions often represent an obstacle to a more inclusive government. The Taliban are dismissive about the possibility of ethnic tensions, both within Afghanistan and among the Taliban themselves. Sources quoted Interior Minister Serajuddin Haqqani’s assessment that “there are no racial and linguistic prejudices in the nation and the Islamic Emirate will not allow anyone to do this. People should be assured that there is full unity between the ethnic groups of Afghanistan”. Taliban with whom the authors met claimed to have recently defused conflict between Kuchi nomads and Hazara settlers in Behsud in Wardak province, and noted that they had recently invited Shia leaders, such as two of the most prominent leaders of Shia parties, Karim Khalili and Haji Mohaqeq, to return to Afghanistan. They seemed oblivious to the worsening of relations with the Shia community following clashes during Ashura observances in summer 2023, and to deteriorating relations between Pashtuns on one side and Uzbeks and Tajiks on the other, including among the Taliban themselves.
+
+Ultimately, the Taliban consider any debate about the system of government to be settled. In their view, the Islamic Emirate – an authoritarian system with the Taliban movement at its centre – is the solution, and the so-called “hybrid system”, bringing together elements of the 1990s Emirate and the Islamic Republic or even the monarchy (which was abolished in 1973) – which was still being discussed in the weeks following the Taliban takeover – is no longer under consideration. In reality, however, the Emirate system remains poorly defined, especially with regard to the distribution of powers and governance. Nevertheless, the firmly held belief is that the Islamic Emirate system “served the Taliban well during two decades of war” and, in the words of one contact, the pragmatists find it “difficult to convince leaders that something else might be more suitable for peacetime”.
+
+External demands to revisit this issue are considered interference in the internal affairs of the de facto government and are rejected. The Taliban acknowledge that lack of inclusiveness is still a problem, both in private and – more obliquely – in public. But they deny that there is any wish or intent on the part of the Taliban to discriminate against any particular ethnic group. Further, they intend to resolve this lack of inclusiveness in their own way: by incorporating individuals from different communities and rejecting the inclusion of organised groups. Actors such as former president Hamid Karzai and former CEO Dr Abdullah, who have been lobbying for greater political inclusiveness in Kabul, appear marginalised today. Political parties that were promised government positions immediately following the Taliban takeover, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i Islami, had all but lost hope by October 2022. As of January 2024, there was only a handful of non-Taliban individuals at the top levels of government. An exact head count is difficult, as some avowedly non-Taliban individuals may have entertained discreet relations with the Taliban in the past, as is alleged in relation to Minister of Commerce Nooruddin Azizi and the minister of health, Qalandar Ibad. There are also five deputy ministers with no confirmed links to the Taliban: Sheikh Madar Ali Karimi Bamyani (urban development and land), Abdul Latif Nazari (economy), Hassan Ghiasi (health), Mohammad Azim Sultanzada and Mohammad Bashir (commerce).
+
+#### SEEKING ACCEPTANCE AS AN AUTHORITARIAN “PROBLEM SOLVER”
+
+The Taliban are aware that much of the wider region is ruled by authoritarian governments. Hence it is likely that they feel there is no particular reason for their own authoritarian regime not to be accepted too.
+
+Indeed, Taliban sources argue that their success in stabilising the Afghan economy derives from their “power to assert sovereignty” against local, factional, sectarian and tribal/ethnic interests. One example of this assertion of sovereignty, a senior figure explained, is the ban on the use of other currencies for trade within Afghanistan. The Taliban also point to their success in banning the production of drugs, including methamphetamine, as a sign of their ability to act as a result of their “assertion of sovereignty”. In other words, the Taliban believe they have demonstrated that their strong-handed approach works in their operating environment.
+
+The difference between the conservatives and the pragmatists is that in the latter’s view, the Taliban will in practice need to tackle particular issues, such as gender discrimination and inclusiveness – at least to some degree – before achieving full international acceptance, gaining diplomatic recognition and obtaining external aid. The conservatives, on the other hand, believe that to gain international acceptance, the Taliban simply need to demonstrate staying power and the ability to keep Afghanistan together.
+
+
+### CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ENGAGEMENT
+
+The attitudes of Western countries towards engaging with the Taliban’s de facto government of Afghanistan vary, although a majority of governments now appear to favour some level of engagement, while staying away from formal recognition. Those governments favouring engagement must contend with:
+
+- The Taliban’s notions about the West, and the context of mutual distrust and mutual flawed perceptions.
+
+- The Taliban’s determination to retain the Emirate model of government.
+
+- Diverging strategic views among Taliban leaders.
+
+Distrust and misperceptions are inevitable after 20 years of war. One such misperception is about the degree to which the Taliban are being “ideological”. Some of what is usually viewed as ideological rigidity are in fact political tactics, which derive from the Taliban’s insecurity or from their internal power struggles.
+
+A more substantial and probably more long-term issue is the fact that the Taliban have seemingly given up altogether on political inclusion, which remains a key demand of most Western and neighbouring countries. Similarly, the Taliban do not even try to portray themselves as anything other than authoritarian, and they make it clear that this is not going to change. Therefore, even if in future engagement is unlocked by progress on female education, this engagement will remain limited – especially compared to the billions of dollars of development aid Afghanistan received before 2021 – and so any impact will only be seen in the medium and long term, and will be diluted over time. Another hard reality, however, is that any collapse of the state in Afghanistan, or a deepening economic crisis, would drive hundreds of thousands more Afghans to migrate or seek asylum westwards. This raises the question of how wise it is for European countries to delay engagement.
+
+Some positive signalling could be useful to keep doors open and to strengthen the position of those Taliban pragmatists who believe that good relations with Western countries are important for the de facto government. Without such positive signalling, the pragmatists would be left empty handed and condemned to gradual marginalisation. Even small steps could begin a virtuous cycle. For example, helping to address issues such as the refusal of international banks to process payments to and from Afghanistan would involve very little engagement and have disproportionate positive impact, enabling investment into the country. Projects aimed at encouraging or facilitating private investment could similarly improve the diplomatic environment, without necessarily undermining Western demands concerning rights.
+
+An interesting test is the recent decision of the World Bank to unlock development funds for Afghanistan. The Taliban see this as a potential confidence-building measure. The question is whether Taliban policymakers in Kabul would then be able and willing to reciprocate, at least with some small, symbolic gesture, once funds began gradually translating into projects on the ground.
+
+It is worth adding that at the Doha II meeting in February 2024, China, Russia and Iran all supported the Taliban’s rejection of the proposal for a special envoy to Afghanistan, clearly expecting to gain from the failed take-off of Taliban–West relations. It is not clear to what extent Western countries are concerned about the possibility of Afghanistan falling into the orbit of these neighbours, but if they are, this would be one more reason not to delay engagement.
+
+---
+
+__Sultan Barakat__ is a Professor in Public Policy at Qatar Foundation’s Hamad Bin Khalifa University and an Honorary Professor at the University of York. He is also the Founding Director of the newly established Global Institute for Strategic Research (GISR).
+
+__Antonio Giustozzi__ is a Senior Research Fellow in the Terrorism and Conflict team at RUSI. He has been working in and on Afghanistan since the 1990s, and has published extensively on the conflict there, and especially on the Taliban and the Islamic State.
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+---
+layout: post
+title : The UK As An AI Superpower
+author: Pia Hüsch and Noah Sylvia
+date : 2024-05-30 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/l61XUAh.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The Government’s Challenge Begins at Home"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The UK has ambitions to be a global AI superpower. But even with the best intentions, fast-paced adoption and implementation of AI in the public sector will involve significant challenges._
+
+
+
+The widespread adoption of AI technologies comes with much promise. In the public sector in particular, AI integration has the potential to bring greater efficiency, for example by speeding up administrative services, thereby saving taxpayer money and offering better services to citizens. On a more macro level, AI integration in the public sector – civilian and military alike – is also supposed to secure an economic and military advantage to the UK.
+
+The government already envisages widespread adoption of AI, and is encouraging civil servants to familiarise themselves with generative AI at work, for instance. The Cabinet Office is currently running a trial for an AI-powered chatbot, intended to make an interactive document analysis tool accessible to all civil servants. However, while the aim is for all government departments to use AI and support the wider goal of becoming a “global AI superpower”, in practice, many hurdles arise for the adoption of AI by the public sector. These range from the lack of skills and training in day-to-day engagement with AI technologies to a lack of flexible procurement and technical leadership.
+
+
+### Knowledge and Skills in the Private Sector
+
+A key challenge the public sector faces is that much of the knowledge and experience around AI development, research and application currently lies in the private sector, whose deep pockets drive R&D and attract much sought-after talent. No public spending commitments come close to the budgets of the private sector – compare the UK’s £900 million commitment to build a supercomputer to the $35 billion committed by AWS to data centres in Virginia. Of course, many consultancies offer well paid advice to public sector entities on how to navigate this challenge. But it takes more and especially different kinds of partnerships with the private sector to enable greater information and knowledge exchange between public and private organisations. Such partnerships are needed not only to enable the public sector to reap the benefits of AI but also to design effective regulation and governance to mitigate any risks that arise. The National Cyber Security Centre’s Industry 100 scheme, through which public institutions host cyber security experts from the private sector for one day a week or month, is a laudable model that could be replicated in an AI context. This would allow the public sector to benefit from private-sector expertise while the private sector can access a greater network and gain insights into the government’s work.
+
+
+### Learning from Defence Procurement
+
+Challenges also arise given the public sector’s slow procurement of AI technologies. The Ministry of Defence (MoD), for example, spent £25 billion with UK industry in 2022/23. Yet industry has long complained about the MoD as a customer, and these complaints extend to its procurement of AI. The MoD published its strategy for exploiting AI (the “Defence Artificial Intelligence Strategy”) in 2022, but has since faced criticism for failing to sufficiently detail how it will become “the world’s most effective, efficient, trusted and influential Defence organisation for our size [in terms of AI]”.
+
+___`A greater range of partnerships are needed not only to enable the public sector to reap the benefits of AI but also to design effective regulation and governance to mitigate any risks that arise`___
+
+Companies, both large and small, have not received clear demand signals on the MoD’s operational objectives, hindering the deployment of successful AI in defence. Besides a lack of clarity on priorities and requirements (which, granted, the Defence AI Centre hopes to rectify), uncertainty persists over how to integrate AI with existing systems. The MoD contains a myriad of “architectural standards, patterns and interfaces”, thereby limiting data accessibility (the lifeblood of AI functionality) and AI integration into decision-making, analysis and training processes. Similarly, the rather disparate efforts at AI procurement across a host of defence entities – from front-line commands to the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory – inhibit AI’s efficiency benefits. The Integration Design Authority (IDA) will alleviate some of these frictions by incorporating a level of AI oversight into its efforts; however, it cannot bear sole responsibility for this task, as the IDA was created to facilitate integration across the whole of Defence.
+
+Furthermore, most of the AI innovation occurs in smaller firms and start-ups, especially small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), while many of the MoD’s procurement processes are overwhelmingly oriented towards the largest defence contractors – the so-called “defence primes”. The regulatory framework requires experience of navigating the complex MoD bureaucracy as well as sufficient capital to sustain one’s firm through the long process. SMEs often have neither the £25,000 monthly revenue stream to stay afloat, nor the decades of organisational knowledge about the MoD’s security and classification protocols: their choice is either to fail or to pivot away from the MoD to easier customers. Ongoing efforts to shorten innovation cycles include the new “Integrated Procurement Model” with a focus on software-oriented procurement, which requires maintaining a stronger relationship with companies in order to ensure constant, iterative updates. To secure the best technological advantage, MoD and wider public procurement need to become more agile to include smaller companies that provide cutting-edge technology, even if not at scale yet.
+
+
+### Changing the Public Sector Career Mindset
+
+The MoD at least has an AI strategy; 76% of government departments don’t, even though over a third of surveyed government departments questioned on the use of AI by the public sector are already deploying AI. Declaring the aim to become a global AI superpower is perhaps an ambitious target, but it is by no means sufficient in terms of setting useful guidance and vision for government departments. The UK’s public sector needs more tangible goals to work towards. This means identifying in more concrete terms what being an “AI superpower” looks like in the next 3, 5, 10 and 20 years.
+
+___`Only when its people support the government’s aim of being an AI superpower will the UK be able to turn ambition into reality`___
+
+Setting out and implementing such a vision needs credible leadership at all levels and in all government departments. Yet the career civil servants and generalists who often fill these positions can easily lack the technological understanding and vision that a technician from the private sector, or even a specialist within the public sector, might offer. Thus, external hiring needs to become more agile to offer private-sector tech visionaries and specialists the opportunity to come into the public sector on a senior level and for a shorter timeframe than is currently the case, while still benefitting from full integration and trust from public sector colleagues. Similarly, technology experts already working within the public sector must be able to be promoted to leadership positions, not only to offer their expertise on new levels but also to show that a long-lasting technology career within the public service is possible. Only by hiring and retaining adequate technology leadership will the public sector be able to successfully roll out AI technologies.
+
+
+### Navigating the Talent Terrain
+
+Technically focused leaders are crucial for planning and envisioning strategies, but are entirely reliant upon the skills held within government departments to enact their policies. Unfortunately, the National Audit Office’s autumn 2023 survey of government bodies found that 70% of respondents described a lack of skills as a barrier to AI adoption. Difficulties in hiring and retaining individuals with the necessary skills to develop and deploy AI have intensified in recent years, exacerbated by uncompetitive salaries relative to the private sector (which faces its own skills shortage). Every entity of the UK government needs greater expertise in machine learning, data management and cloud computing, along with a broader spectrum of software skills and lawyers trained in AI ethics and the corresponding legal compliance. Yet the demand for skills must extend beyond experts. Non-technical employees must familiarise themselves with simple data processes while understanding the function of their organisation’s models in order to trust the outputs.
+
+The government is demonstrating its commitment to equipping younger generations with the skills for a data-driven world. But this investment is geared towards the long-term upskilling of the UK economy and does not mitigate the current shortcomings of an under-skilled civil service. Currently, the government is filling this gap with “contractors, agency workers, and temporary staff”, who comprise a third of “digital and data professionals”. Despite the government commitment to reduce reliance upon temporary workers in order to cut costs, the lead time on large-scale upskilling indicates that the government will need to continue to buy in skills before developed skills have matured. This transition must be accelerated by including data skills as part of on-the-job learning for all civil service roles, providing a boost in digital literacy without more major expenditure in formal training. Similarly, personnel management must become more porous to permit expertise to flow out of and back into government with ease. Flexible career paths between the public and private sectors are needed to ensure that private-sector knowledge, ideas and skills can be brought into government at no additional cost to the taxpayer.
+
+
+### A People Challenge as Much as a Technology One
+
+Much can be debated about what the right aim is for a grand AI strategy, how the public sector can procure AI technologies and who has the vision and leadership to work towards AI implementation in the public sector. Most importantly, however, the UK cannot become an AI superpower unless the ambition is reflected in wider society. This includes early access to learning opportunities and safe engagement to try out human-machine teaming, as well as a clear signal of job opportunities rather than threats to the labour market. Critically, it also requires strong engagement with ethical concerns and other risks that need to be addressed to meaningfully assure the responsible use of AI. Only when its people support the government’s aim of being an AI superpower will the UK be able to turn ambition into reality.
+
+---
+
+__Pia Hüsch__ is a Research Fellow in cyber, technology and national security. Her research focusses on the impact, societal risks and lawfulness of cyber operations and the geopolitical and national security implications of disruptive technologies, such as AI.
+
+__Noah Sylvia__ is a Research Analyst for C4ISR, especially its intersection with Emerging Technology, on the Military Sciences team at RUSI.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-30-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-verdict.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-30-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-verdict.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊裁決】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-05-30 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 庭外逾35人通宵排隊 有被告好友稱前來一齊承受共業
+- 涉煽動罪被捕 李盈姿保釋後即到庭外排隊聽審
+- 獲保釋被告先後到庭 社民連欲開庭前示威被阻
+- 16名不認罪被告 14人罪成 劉偉聰、李予信罪脫 律政司擬提上訴 劉偉聰、李予信續須遵守保釋條件 罪成被告暫定6.25求情
+- 劉偉聰罪脫 官指無主張否決財案、不肯定是否親自簽「墨落無悔」
+- 李予信罪脫 官：李後期才參選、對公民黨簽「墨落無悔」不知情
+- 吳政亨罪成 官：即使「三投三不投」或自發 亦與戴耀廷有協議實行謀劃
+- 黃碧雲、林卓廷、梁國雄罪成 官：資深議員必然知道政府永遠不會同意「五大訴求」
+- 抗爭派何桂藍、鄒家成、余慧明罪成 官指政見激進、參選為推翻政府
+- 何啟明、施德來、陳志全罪成 辯稱「墨落」無綑綁否決 官拒納 稱難以置信、荒謬
+- 楊雪盈、柯耀林罪成 官無相反證據下推論楊知悉「墨落」 柯認為政制腐敗簽「墨落」不出奇
+- 鄭達鴻、彭卓棋罪成 官拒信鄭不跟黨立場 指彭「投機取巧」、拒納說「選舉語言」
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】初選47人案將於今（5月30日）早裁決，有市民在西九龍裁判法院外通宵排隊。據《獨媒》現場觀察，晚上11時半已有逾35人在庭外排隊。排在隊伍較前位置有被告劉偉聰的朋友，不久前出獄的他認為有需要到場旁聽，又表示「呢啲共業嚟，一齊承受」。「女長毛」雷玉蓮則帶同平安包到場，希望各被告能「平安大吉，大步檻過」。
+
+另外，由隊伍中段開始，近30名排隊人士均戴上口罩及帽，部分人背向街道而坐。記者上前逐一詢問有關排隊目的、聽審內容、是否「有錢收」等，惟他們均拒絕回答記者提問。
+
+#### 兩人與劉偉聰相識 望為47人打氣
+
+陳先生（化名）昨晚約8時半已到達現場，是被告劉偉聰的朋友，稱放工後便到場排隊。他表示有傳訊息給劉表達關心，考慮到今日可能是最後機會看到被告，希望到場為他們打氣，並拍下被告的照片，「始終在公在私都想送佢一程，可能真係聽日 bye bye。」
+
+陳先生上月剛出獄，坦言擔心會被警員監視，但認為裁決需要到場旁聽。他表示在獄中一直有留意47人案的消息，「咁嘅時勢冇擔心，呢啲共業嚟，一齊承受。」
+
+
+▲ 陳先生（化名）
+
+陳先生在現場偶遇同樣剛出獄的朋友加入隊伍。該名朋友表示知道有關案件內容，關注3名指定法官理解案件的邏輯，以及他們如何回應辯方的論點。
+
+同樣是劉偉聰朋友的 Mark 同樣排在隊伍較前。Mark 指，看到審訊過程覺得生氣、無奈，「因為嬲，心唔舒服，傷心」，所以來支持被告，希望最好「聽日一齊走呀」。
+
+
+▲ 劉偉聰的另一位朋友 Mark 帶同書本到場閱讀。
+
+#### 蓮姐帶平安包到場 望各被告大步檻過
+
+「女長毛」雷玉蓮因擔心排隊黨再度出現，所以昨晚約9時帶同平安包和平安飾物到場。她笑言，希望能過法庭安檢，令庭上讓被告看到，祝願「平安大吉，大步檻過」。蓮姐稱之前因工作而無法旁聽，但認為判決很重要，所以今次請假兩天到場。
+
+雷玉蓮亦表示，對每一位被告都十分留意，包括戰友「長毛」梁國雄。她認為今次案件很大規模，如何判決都會引起社會很多關注。
+
+
+▲ 雷玉蓮
+
+#### 排頭位旁聽師昨晚6時到場
+
+外號「姨婆」的69歲旁聽師昨日下午6時許已擺放折凳在隊頭。她表示常常旁聽47人案審訊，形容被告何桂藍供詞「非常銳利」。她又指，最近的英國《國安法》案件容許所有被告保釋，相比之下香港令人感覺「肉酸」。
+
+
+▲ 「姨婆」
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】初選47人案今早迎來裁決，日前被指涉嫌利用「某個將至的敏感日子」前持續發布煽動帖文，違反《維護國家安全條例》，於本周二被捕的牙醫李盈姿，在昨晚約11時獲准保釋後，梳洗過後，今早約4時到庭外排隊等候聽審，「橫掂都無瞓，就不如出嚟啦，同埋都想報吓平安、見吓大家。」
+
+李盈姿認為，初選47人案無實質證據指控，「好唔公平、好離譜。」她預計能入正庭聽審，但如若有親友需要輪候籌，會不介意讓出。她坦言對裁決不感樂觀，寄語各人「我們喺外面等你哋」。
+
+《獨媒》通宵在庭外守候，日出之後排隊人數明顯增加，而且多是身穿「街坊裝」，有身穿黑「莊tee」的排隊校媒成員被警員查身份證。截至早上7時半，已有約70人在排隊等候聽審。
+
+#### 李予信好友：作為朋友盡一份力，有得陪就陪
+
+其中一名被告李予信的朋友 Stanley，今早6時便到場排隊。他提及李在被檢控後，仍有不時曝光，「佢從一而終咁實踐自由意志，呢點我係 respect 嘅。」他自言已做好心理準備，「無理由我哋喺出面仲預備得差過佢」，希望能陪對方一同面對，「作為朋友都盡一份力，有得陪就陪。」
+
+
+
+#### 有曾排隊聽審學生今早自發到場派糧食
+
+家在法院附近的港大法律系二年級生 Keith（化名），坦言「做到嘅真係無乜」，但因在去年2月亦曾排隊聽審。他指排隊人士會感肚餓，故今早清晨帶同食水及餅乾等食糧到場，派發予通宵等候的排隊人士。他稱一直有了解案情，認為辯方「拗嘅有point」，惟最終判決仍取決於法院，估計辯方勝算機會較微。
+
+
+
+#### 有學生身穿黑「莊tee」被警查證
+
+科大編委成員 Richard 今早亦有到場排隊，坦言對裁決不感樂觀。他打算報道案件，以引起學生關注。身穿科大編委的「莊tee」的 Richard，在接受訪問期間一度有警員上前打斷，被要求查其身份證。
+
+李予信的朋友 Wendy 昨凌晨3時半已到場排隊，打算進入正庭親身鼓勵李，「起碼可以真人望到佢」，但未知能否拿飛進入正庭。Wendy 表示以泰然及平穩的態度面對裁決，並會與李共同面對結果，因兩人相信堅持理念是最重要。Wendy 表示，裁決前兩人分別撰寫信件給對方，以表達內心說話。
+
+Wendy 認為，李的信念堅定，即使面對制肘仍然在不同方面追求進步，並對李的所有決定有信心及會支持。她認為最重要的是清楚自己所追求的。Wendy 指，在審訊期間面對着更多挑戰，她一早已經預計結果，會為不同情況作好準備。
+
+「獵人書店」店長黃文萱於約早上8時到場排隊，表示想親身見證裁決，亦想「陪下大家」。她指審訊過程漫長，現時心情複雜，對於結果不太樂觀，只希望能還被告公義。
+
+
+▲ 「獵人書店」店長 黃文萱
+
+前立法會議員邵家臻亦到場，他表示對結果「唔敢樂觀」，不停提醒自己要沉着面對結果、控罪、判刑、或往後日子。被問到有什麼想跟47人說，邵僅表示：「唔使怕，我哋有彼此。」
+
+
+▲ 前立法會議員 邵家臻
+
+
+▲ 今日續有疑似排隊黨出現，他們拒絕回應記者提問。（[按此觀看影片](https://youtu.be/pQQoq2UGdEs)）
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】初選47人案今早裁決，一眾獲准保釋的被告今早先後到達法西九龍法院。被告之一、本身是大律師的劉偉聰，他在進入法庭前接受傳媒訪問，他對記者表示：「多謝大家關心，希望大家繼續關注，後會有期。」社民連定今早在法院外示威，但主席陳寶瑩及成員曾健成等人，卻在請願前遭警方帶至遠離法院的行人路調查。陳寶瑩認為警方做法不能接受，稱今早原定只有四名成員簡單表達意見，卻遭剝奪權利。
+
+聆訊今早10時開始，李予信最早到達，他在8時58分便到達法庭，他穿上老虎圖案的藍色恤衫，並配戴了金鏈，特地在法院門外停下讓記者拍照。另一被告柯耀林則在9時01分到達。
+
+其他被告及後陸續進入法院，鄭達鴻與女友手拖手進入法庭，劉偉聰在進入法庭前對記者表示：「多謝大家關心，希望大家繼續關注，後會有期。」曾因旺角騷亂案入獄的盧建民亦有到場，他更特地為劉偉聰拍照，後者曾擔任盧建民的代表律師。施德來亦與妻子拖手抵達，何啟明則向記者揮手。
+
+
+▲ 李予信
+
+
+▲ 鄭達鴻
+
+
+▲ 施德來
+
+
+▲ 何啟明
+
+
+▲ 劉偉聰
+
+在多名獲保釋的被告中，彭卓棋成為傳媒焦點，他剃了光頭，在向記者鞠躬後進入法庭，有記者問彭卓棋，剃光頭是否已準備好坐監，他沒有回應。楊雪盈則在前東區區議員韋少力陪同下進入法庭，她向記者點頭示意。
+
+
+▲ 彭卓棋
+
+
+▲ 楊雪盈
+
+黃碧雲在丈夫佘雲楚陪同下進入法庭，有記者問她心情如何、是否緊張，她未有回應，只向記者合十及揮手。最後一名到達法院的被告是陳志全，他在9時39分到達，及身穿粉紅色上衣。「慢必」在進入法庭的時候，亦未有回應記者提問。
+
+
+▲ 黃碧雲
+
+
+▲ 陳志全
+
+民主黨前主席兼前立法會議員劉慧卿亦有到場，她自言感到非常傷感，希望告訴國家主席習近平，本港在頒布《香港國安法》及在《基本法》第23條立法後已非常安全，盼港人仍可享有集會、宗教及新聞等自由。
+
+早上約8時30分，一名身穿深藍風衣、黑色衫褲、攜黑色袋的女士在西九龍法院大樓地下，被約5至6名警員截查，搜查其隨身物品。她向記者表示，昨晚到場時排在隊伍頭10人以內，惟在步入法庭時便手勢後，隨即被警員帶到法院大樓地下近升降機位置截查。
+
+她指警員向她稱「你都知而家敏感日子，無謂要上頭做嘢，呢啲嘢唔好講喇」，另有國安警員口頭警誡她剛才行為已涉意圖煽動，如有相同情況會立即拘捕。警員其後要求她直接離開法院重新排隊。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名組織及參與初選的民主派，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16人不認罪，今（30日）於西九龍裁判法院（暫代高院）裁決。3名國安法指定法官今早裁定，16名不認罪被告中，劉偉聰、李予信2人罪名不成立，其餘14人，包括鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、黃碧雲、施德來、何桂藍、陳志全、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄、柯耀林、余慧明及吳政亨，均罪名成立。
+
+控方表示，擬按《刑事訴訟程序條例》第81DB，提出上訴，並要求法庭維持二人保釋狀態直至下午2時半再開庭。其餘罪成被告則須即時還柙。該條例為政府去年修訂，就沒有陪審團的高院國安案，若有被告罪脫，律政司可「緊接」提出擬上訴，法庭可應申請，命令無罪被告還柙或准予保釋。
+
+李予信聞判後表現平靜，微微戚眉和搖頭望向女友。劉偉聰獲悉結果後與律師相擁痛哭。柯耀林聞結果後「O嘴」驚訝，鄒家成則平靜望向旁聽人士。鄭達鴻一直望向旁聽親友。彭卓棋向李予信舉拇指，李點頭回應。梁國雄用手摸頭。
+
+李予信步出被告欄時右手撫胸向其他被告點頭，劉偉聰步出庭時，獲旁聽人士握手祝願，並著他保重。劉的親友與他擁抱時不禁落淚，但劉未就結果發表感受。他只是說：「多謝大家關心，繼續關心其他人。」
+
+罪成被告均須還柙，離開時林卓廷向親友微笑，彭卓棋飛吻和揮手，鄒家成揮手，柯耀林舉交叉手勢。有旁聽親友見被告被押走時拭淚。黃碧雲透過玻璃向親友微笑揮手。楊雪盈步入囚室時向父親說：「睇住啲貓呀爸爸，你同貓都要平安呀！」
+
+各被告於9時45分起陸續進入被告欄，欄內氣氛頗為輕鬆，黃碧雲與柯耀林交談一會，楊雪盈則向親友微笑後步入，又在欄內雙手放頭做兔仔手勢。李予信一度向女友揮手及舉出拳頭手勢。
+
+至於還柙中的被告，何桂藍束起頭髮、手持文件出庭。林卓廷穿西裝出庭，鄒家成向公眾揮手。旁聽人士站起揮手時，法庭職員大喊：「麻煩公眾人士唔好揮手！」
+
+開庭前，各被告在庭外與親友道別，劉偉聰搭着陳志全肩膊，有朋友上前與劉握手說：「我哋晏啲去飲嘢」，劉微笑不語；鄭達鴻與其代表大律師潘熙握手，又與彭卓棋交談。楊雪盈則與親友相擁。
+
+#### 劉偉聰表示自己並非焦點 冀公眾關注其他人
+
+劉偉聰步出庭時，獲旁聽人士握手祝願，並著他保重。劉的親友與他擁抱時不禁落淚，但劉未就結果發表感受。他只是說：「多謝大家關心，繼續關心其他人。」
+
+劉步出法院時被記者包圍，警方隨即阻止記者，並由數名警員「護送」劉過馬路。劉向記者指，自己並非是日裁決的焦點，他冀公眾繼續關注其他人，以及詳細閱讀判詞。
+
+
+▲ 劉偉聰罪名不成立、法官宣布暫時休庭後離開法院。
+
+
+
+#### 李予信：心情無特別、只想見家人
+
+李予信離開法庭時表示「多謝大家關心」，他指因現時律政司表示可能會上訴，所以現階段「唔可以 comment 任何嘢」，心情「都係一樣，冇乜特別」，被問得悉其他被告罪成的感受，他神情凝重指：「大家明白，我都好難講太多。」
+
+李予信向記者豎起拇指，又右手輕拍胸口。多名記者上前包圍拍攝，警方隨即陪同李離開，逾20名警員一度築起人鏈阻隔記者，又拉着記者背包要求移開。李向記者表示，「我講嘅嘢唔多，多謝大家咁多年嘅關心，我哋係睇到同感受到大家嘅愛。」
+
+被問到會否擔心律政司上訴需即時還押，李僅回應現階段不能評論或表達意見，他指現時心情平和，只想與家人見面：「我宜家只係想同屋企人飲下茶，因為我仲未見到屋企人。」
+
+
+▲ 李予信罪名不成立、法官宣布暫時休庭後離開法院。
+
+
+
+多名認罪被告到庭旁聽，其中一號延伸庭有朱凱廸、黃子悅、譚凱邦、袁嘉蔚、吳敏兒、劉頴匡；二號延伸庭有胡志偉、梁晃維、伍健偉、馮達浚、李嘉達、黃之鋒、岑敖暉、徐子見。
+
+胡志偉聞畢裁決後，神色凝重；梁晃維、伍健偉、李嘉達、馮達浚四人則低頭交談；黃之鋒不時望向觀眾席。除了徐子見外，其餘七人離開時均有向觀眾席揮手。
+
+法官今早宣布裁決結果後，押後至下午再開庭。
+
+下午開庭前，罪脫的李予信坐在被告欄外，劉偉聰則繼續坐在律師席。至於罪成的14被告，各人精神不俗，林卓廷向公眾席微笑點頭，並向親友做手勢，示意「我OK」；黃碧雲、何啟明均微笑揮手；楊雪盈束了低馬尾，向親友點頭和展露燦爛微笑，又做心形手勢；施德來穿上風衣，雙手合十抱拳。陳志全戴上了眼鏡。
+
+#### 控方就兩無罪被告提上訴
+
+甫開庭，刑事檢控專員楊美琪表示，擬根據《刑事訴訟程序條例》第81DB條，就兩名無罪被告以「案件呈述」方式上訴，並望維持二人原有的保釋條件，以待上訴。劉偉聰沒有反對，代表李予信的大律師關文渭則表示反對。
+
+
+▲ 代表李予信的大律師 關文渭
+
+關文渭陳詞後，法庭押後考慮，終下令二人續准以原有條件繼續保釋，包括不得離港，不得直接或間接以任何方式發放或作出任何可能被視為危害國安的言論和行為等，但警署報到次數則由每周一次減為一個月一次，李予信亦獲撤銷人事擔保10萬元。
+
+#### 暫定6.25求情
+
+法官陳慶偉續宣布，就本案求情暫定於6月25日開始進行，求情陳詞不可多於20頁，需於求情前14天呈交。代表彭卓棋的大律師盧敏儀其後為彭申請保釋候判遭拒。
+
+
+▲ 彭卓棋
+
+散庭時，楊雪盈向親友飛吻，陳志全做心心手勢，梁國雄一直揮手，直接走入囚室一刻，黃碧雲、施德來等亦揮手。
+
+李予信和劉偉聰早前獲准保釋的條件，包括：
+
+1. 不得直接或間接以任何方式（包括傳統實體／電子媒體／任何公眾平台），作出、發放或轉載任何可能有合理理由被視為根據其性質可構成違反國安法或香港法例中維護國家安全中的罪行的言論
+
+2. 不得直接或間接以任何方式（包括傳統實體／電子媒體／任何公眾平台），作出任何可能有合理理由被視為危害國家安全的行為
+
+3. 不得組織、安排或參與任何級別的選舉（投票除外），不論政府或非政府舉辦的公開或非公開形式的選舉
+
+4. 不得以任何方式聯絡外國官員、議員或或任何各級議會成員及其他服務於以上人員的人士
+
+5. 不准離開香港，須交出旅遊證件，居於報稱住址
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】初選案16名不認罪被告當中，只有劉偉聰及李予信罪脫。就劉偉聰，法官指他並沒有在競選活動中，主張否決預算案及迫使政府回應五大訴求。而就劉早前稱無簽署「墨落無悔」聲明，法官認為，即使劉的名字出現在聲明中，但不能確定是他親自簽署，或是授權他人簽署；亦接受劉稱，他發現自己名字出現在聲明時，處於進退兩難的局面，若然他將名字刪除或作出澄清，在當時的政治氣氛而言，等同於「政治自殺」。法官認為，無法從證據獲得唯一合理的推論，來指出劉同意涉案謀劃，亦不肯定他在任何階段有顛覆國家政權的意圖，因此裁定他罪脫。
+
+#### 官：劉沒有在政綱提及否決財案
+
+法官於判詞指，實際上劉並沒有在選舉政綱或競選活動中，主張否決預算案及迫使政府回應五大訴求，因此有理由懷疑劉是否同意無差別否決預算案。
+
+#### 官：不能確定劉親自簽聲明或授權他人
+
+劉早前稱並非他親自簽署「墨落無悔」聲明。法官認為，即使劉的名字出現在聲明中，但不能確定是他親自簽署，或是授權他人簽署。雖然控方認為，劉未能就為何名字會在聲明出現作出令人相信的解釋，但法官肯定，若然劉的員工因知道他將會參選故將其名字貼在聲明裏，而員工卻表示不知誰負責，那劉就只能作出上述解釋。
+
+法官接受劉所稱，他發現自己名字出現在聲明時，處於進退兩難（catch-22）的局面。若然他將名字刪除或作出澄清，在當時的政治氣氛而言，就等同於「政治自殺」。劉並沒有將聲明張貼在自己 Facebook，亦無在選舉工程中運用聲明。
+
+在選舉論壇上，劉問何啟明為何首先簽署聲明，但法官同意他這樣問，是希望對方能夠在論壇上顯示大放異彩；而這個提問確實沒有透露出劉對聲明的立場。
+
+
+▲ 何啟明
+
+#### 官接受劉稱沒有使用FB 員工負責專頁及初選群組
+
+法官接受劉所指，他並非 Facebook 用戶，而關於區議會工作的專頁是由其員工操作。對於劉表示只會在工作時使用 Facebook，法官看不出有何不合理。
+
+法官亦接受劉所指，他並非 WhatsApp 使用者，他只會用 iMessage，但法官指，這不代表他沒有留意到其義工屬於九西 WhatsApp 群組一員。法官續指，能夠確定劉有透過義工等人收到初選的協調文件，並已閱讀內容，但該義工並沒有在群組直接提及「五大訴求」或否決預算案，只是問及初選安排。
+
+法官接受劉參與首次九西協調會議後，並沒有再留意大部分與初選有關的後勤更新。法官亦接受劉所指，他沒有閱讀《蘋果日報》、戴耀廷的文章或 Facebook 帖文、或其他泛民參選人的最新發展。劉在參與初選前，並沒有充分理由去留意相關資訊。
+
+法官指，無法從證據獲得唯一合理的推論，劉同意涉案謀劃，亦不肯定他在任何階段有顛覆國家政權的意圖，因此裁定他罪脫。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】初選案16名不認罪被告當中，只有劉偉聰及李予信罪脫。就李予信，法官接納他是黨內新人和低級成員，直至2020年5月底仍無意參與初選，也沒有參與超區協調會議，是在6月13日才被公民黨徵召出選；而公民黨於6月11日簽署「墨落無悔」聲明，但李當時尚未參選，法官接納他對公民黨內部討論應否簽署不知情，控方未能證明他同意作為聲明的聯署人。法官又指，李在論壇或 Facebook 均沒有提及利用否決權迫政府回應「五大訴求」，無法確定李是謀劃的一份子，亦不能肯定他有意圖顛覆國家政權，因此裁定他罪脫。
+
+#### 官接納李中途才獲公民黨「徵召」參與初選
+
+李予信一方爭議，即使他曾經參與涉案協議，但在《國安法》生效前已經退出。就李予信參與初選的時間，法官接納，李沒有參加公民黨記招前的籌備會議，對此一無所知，亦沒有人將細節告知他。法官亦接納，直至2020年5月底，李亦無意參與初選，也沒有參與戴耀廷等人舉辦的協調會議。而李是在2020年6月初公民黨開始「徵召機制」後，才表示對出選有興趣。直至2020年6月13日，他因6.12一周年示威案獲保釋後，在公民黨副主席賴仁彪要求下才參與初選。
+
+#### 官：公民黨簽署「墨落無悔」聲明時 李尚未參選
+
+法官認為，區諾軒稱李曾出席5月協調會的說法並不可靠，因當時李尚未成為候選人，他亦不會收到戴耀廷發送的協調文件。法官又指，公民黨於2020年6月11日簽署「墨落無悔」聲明，但李尚未參選，接納他與公民黨簽聲明一事無關，對公民黨就聲明的內部討論不知情。
+
+#### 控方指李作為黨員必然同意聲明 官：論點沒有說服力
+
+而就控方強調，李必然知道公民黨認同聲明，因此他作為黨的一份子，必然也會同意。惟法官反駁，上述論點沒有說服力，相反，法官認為控方未能證明李同意作為聲明的聯署人。
+
+#### 官：李沒有提及「否決」或「五大訴求」
+
+法官認為，雖然李在提名表格上簽署，當中同意並支持謀劃，但他沒有出席唯一一次的協調會議。另外，即使李於3月在 Facebook 上轉發公民黨關於「議會過半 反制政府」的帖文，但他當時尚未成為候選人。法官又指，沒有足夠證據證明，李事先知道公民黨其他代表將在記者會上發表甚麼言論，李就否決權方面亦沒有發言。
+
+控方強調，另一成員鄭達鴻在6月23日在 Facebook 表示，將與其他成員使用否決財案等手段，以實現五大訴求。而李是鄭專頁的追蹤者之一，因此他會同意其言論。然而，法官不認為上述推論是強而有力，因為選擇追蹤 Facebook 可出於多種原因。法官留意到，李即使與鄭參與同一街站活動，但他卻沒有在 Facebook 帖文提及「否決」或「五大訴求」的相關字眼。
+
+
+▲ 鄭達鴻（右）
+
+#### 官：李明顯採用公民黨所有候選人的範本
+
+法官認為，李的政綱明顯是基於公民黨所有候選人使用的範本，而李較遲才參與初選的競選活動。對於李是否有選擇，還是只可採用其他人的範本，法官抱有保留態度。另外，當李看過《國安法》後，他立即通知黨員停止派發舊單張，並設計一款沒有提及「五大訴求」的新單張。
+
+法官也留意到，李在選舉論壇中並沒有提及利用否決權迫使政府回應「五大訴求」。法官指，由於李是黨內新人，在公民黨的地位較低；若他無法獲得黨的支持，就別無選擇，只能退出選舉。
+
+法官最後指，無法確定李是謀劃的一份子，亦不能肯定他有意圖顛覆國家政權，因此裁定他罪脫。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】初選案16名不認罪被告當中，自行發起「三投三不投」、並非初選候選人的吳政亨，被判罪成。法官指，吳與戴耀廷就初選事宜頻繁交流，即使「三投三不投」可能是吳自行發起，但他並非單獨行事，肯定吳在《國安法》前，已與戴同意推行涉案謀劃並有意實施。法官又指，雖然其他參加者不知道吳的參與，但吳知道有其他候選人，亦知道他做的事情已超出與戴的往來範圍，他自願並有意確保只有初選勝出者才能參與立法會選舉，協助民主派取得大多數議席，否決預算案迫特首回應五大訴求，令特首下台。法官認為，吳與戴之間的協議，跟戴和其他人之間的協議是相同；而吳擁抱「攬炒」概念，《國安法》生效後仍繼續懷有顛覆政權的意圖，因此裁定他罪成。
+
+
+
+#### 官：吳無出席會議 但知道及同意運用否決權
+
+審訊期間透露，吳政亨曾發起「三投三不投」，他並非初選的候選人，並選擇不作供。法官指，吳清楚知道35+計劃的目標，是要運用否決權，迫使特首回應「五大訴求」，雖然他沒有出席任何協調會議、也不是候選人，但證據顯示他清楚知道五個地方選區的協議中，包含「會運用」或「會積極運用」否決權，因他曾在 Facebook 發布相關帖文。此外，吳在訪問中明確表示知道民主黨沒有簽署「墨落無悔」聲明，顯示他知道聲明內容。
+
+法官認為吳是同意涉案謀劃，並逐一列出原因，包括吳並不反對否決所有議案這個想法；雖然他提及在初選與「墨落無悔」聲明之間，會選擇前者，但不代表他不同意涉案謀劃，這只顯示他認為取得35+是可行策略的基礎。此外，吳得悉選區協調會議有共識「會運用」或「會積極運用」否決權後，形容這是「好消息」；他又對於有人願意簽署「墨落無悔」聲明表示高興。法官認為，若然吳不同意聲明，就不會覺得高興。
+
+#### 吳發文同意「攬炒」官：不能詮釋為「選舉言論」
+
+另外，警方在吳政亨的電腦上發現他用筆名「李伯盧」撰寫的文章，當中提及「在中共這強大敵人面前，我們不單要做『攬炒行動者』......要議會攬炒，首要條件是人數過半，35+」。法官認為由此可見，吳同意那些擁抱「攬炒」概念的人，即若政府拒絕回應訴求，就會破壞其職能。而吳和其他擁抱「攬炒」的人，兩者分別只在於優先順序及策略。
+
+法官又指，吳在網上將中共形容為「不擇手段的對手」，並呼籲選民抵抗及戰鬥；他亦強調初選目的是「踢走共產黨」。另外，吳轉發文章並同意戴耀廷所說，取得立法會多數議席後，需運用否決權。
+
+法官指，考慮上述證據後，發現吳在網上的言論，不能單單以「選舉言論」來解釋。唯一合理推論是吳實際上同意民主派一旦進入立法會，就會履行謀劃並採取行動對抗政府及共產黨。至於吳在訪問中聲稱對否決預算案等保持中立的說法，僅是未經盤問的開脫性言論。
+
+
+▲ 初選案第一被告戴耀廷（資料圖片）
+
+#### 官：吳向戴耀廷傳送宣傳初選等文件、曾獲對方使用
+
+法官指，只要吳同意戴耀廷懷有必要意圖進行謀劃，控方即可證明對吳的指控。若上述能夠被證明，那麼其他共謀者是否知道吳的參與，則不重要。
+
+法官續指，吳與戴除了在案發期間使用 WhatsApp 頻繁溝通初選事宜外，還有電話交流及親身會面。吳對於戴為香港的付出表示感謝，並提出會盡力幫忙，又表達希望初選能夠成功。其後，吳向戴發出宣傳初選的文件，戴回應指兩人想法很接近。直至5月，雖然吳沒有參與任何協調會議，但戴仍然向吳匯報會上內容。吳又告知戴自己將會撰寫公開信件，呼籲選民不要投票予未能遵守協議的候選人，最後吳將草稿傳給戴，並獲其同意及使用。直至《國安法》頒佈後，吳告知戴他已放置頭版廣告。
+
+
+▲ 吳政亨曾設街站宣傳「三投三不投」（資料圖片）
+
+#### 官：吳在《國安法》生效前後均屬協議一份子、其後續執行謀劃
+
+法官指，吳一直了解並同意謀劃，唯一合理推論是他並非單獨行事。即使「三投三不投」的計劃可能是吳自行發起，但能夠確定的是，吳在2020年7月1日即《國安法》實施前，已經與戴有協議實行涉案謀劃，其後繼續提供積極幫助。而儘管35+計劃其他參加者並不知道吳的參與，但吳知道還有其他候選人參與，亦知道他做的事情已超出與戴的往來範圍。
+
+法官認為，吳自願並有意圖，繼續採取行動確保只有初選勝出者才能參與立法會選舉，協助民主派取得大多數議席；又指毫無疑問，吳知道謀劃目標是否決財政預算案，迫使特首回應「五大訴求」。法官肯定吳有意實施謀劃，並充分意識到謀劃結果是兩次解散立法會、令特首下台。
+
+基於上述，法官認為吳與戴之間的協議，跟戴和其他人之間的協議是相同；而吳擁抱「攬炒」概念，懷有顛覆意圖。法官並指，不論是《國安法》生效前後，吳亦屬協議一份子；即使在《國安法》生效後，吳仍對與戴執行謀劃的協議知情，繼續懷有顛覆政權的意圖，並執行謀劃中屬於他自己的部分。法官考慮上述因素後，裁定他罪成。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】初選案16名不認罪被告當中，共有14人罪成，部分被告任立法會議員多年，包括民主黨的黃碧雲及林卓廷、社民連的梁國雄。法官指，以他們任立法會議員及政治人物的豐富經驗，其中黃碧雲一定知道政府永遠不會同意落實「五大訴求」，而上述被告亦會知道否決財政預算案將帶來嚴重後果，令政府運作癱瘓。而雖然黃碧雲及梁國雄在初選中落敗，並沒有參選，但兩人仍表明支持獲勝團隊爭取35+。
+
+#### 官：黃碧雲必知計劃目的是無差別否決財案
+
+案發時屬民主黨的黃碧雲，為九龍西參選人，但她在初選中落敗，因此沒有參選立法會。黃在審訊中選擇不作供。
+
+
+▲ 黃碧雲（資料圖片）
+
+黃曾派代表出席兩次協調會議，當中戴耀廷提及〈真攬炒十步〉一文。警方在黃的電腦內，找到九西的最終協調文件，因此法官確信黃當時收到並曾閱讀文件，文件內列明當選者將否決財政預算案。另外，電腦內亦有民主黨的帖文截圖，內容表示民主黨會尊重及遵守協調機制。法官相信，黃提交提名表格的時候，必定注意到民主黨會遵守協議。此外，黃屬於九西訊息發佈區的成員之一，因此可以肯定黃知道計劃目的包括無差別否決預算案。
+
+#### 官：黃任議員經驗豐富、必然知道政府不會同意「五大訴求」
+
+法官指，黃與組織者同意推行相關謀劃，根據她的行為言論，以及提交報名表格時，她已經成為謀劃的參與者。
+
+法官認為，以黃擔任立法會議員的經驗，以及作為經驗豐富（seasoned）的政治人物，她一定知道政府永遠不會同意「五大訴求」；故如果取得35+，勝選者必然會因政府堅拒屈服於威脅（never yield to their threat），而無差別否決預算案，因此肯定立法解散和特首下台，是黃意圖導致的結果。
+
+法官又指，黃必然知道，預期政府無法或拒絕回應五大訴求，只是用作否決預算案的藉口。以黃的議會經驗，她亦必定知道無差別否決預算案會引發憲制危機，令政府運作陷入癱瘓。
+
+#### 黃在選舉論壇表明採納民主黨立場 官：非受壓之言
+
+黃曾在選舉論壇上表示，如戴耀廷認為需簽協議，民主黨願意簽；又指時任民主黨主席胡志偉和所有議員，會用盡憲制裡所有權力，包括否決預算案，以爭取五大訴求。法官肯定，黃的言論反映其真實立場，而非受其他參選者壓力之下所說的話；亦認為其立場與胡的提倡呼應，顯示她採納了民主黨的立場，即過半後無差別否決預算案。而且黃的言論與組織者在《國安法》後的說法是吻合的。
+
+
+▲ 左起：黃碧雲、胡志偉、涂謹申（資料圖片）
+
+在《國安法》生效後，胡志偉曾在論壇表明所有參選人均會運用否決權，迫使政府回應五大訴求。雖然黃不在場，但法官認為在「共謀者原則」下，相關言論可用來指證黃。而法官肯定於案發期間，在運用否決權的議題上，黃跟胡持相同立場，即會無差別否決預算案，迫使政府回應五大訴求。即使在《國安法》後，黃亦繼續在 Facebook 發布相關帖文。法官確信黃有意推行謀劃。
+
+#### 官：黃落敗後仍支持獲選團隊、立場保持團結一致
+
+黃最終在初選中落敗，她與林卓廷、胡志偉、尹兆堅及其他黨友一同召記招，表明不會參選，但仍會支持獲勝團隊爭取35+。黃並呼籲進入議會的民主派團結，以落實「五大訴求」。法官指，她在落敗後仍然與其他黨員保持團結一致立場，黃在《國安法》生效後仍然是謀劃的一份子。考慮到黃有顛覆政權意圖，並藉參加初選意圖執行謀劃，故裁定她罪成。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+#### 官：林卓廷選舉論壇筆記稱如戴耀廷要求 願簽聲明
+
+至於另一民主黨成員林卓廷，他亦選擇不作供。證據顯示，林沒有出席其參選的新界東選區任何協調會議，只是由莊榮輝代表出席，但林仍可透過群組接收協調文件。法官裁定，林已經了解35+計劃的目標。
+
+林曾經參與選舉論壇，在其辯論筆記可見，他提到民主黨前主席李柱銘反對「攬炒」，而林認為其意見不正確，法官認為顯示林與主席胡志偉同樣認為政權需要付出代價。筆記又提及「胡志偉一再公開回應話會積極運用。況且，其實我立法會四年沒有贊成過財政預算案」；又指不簽署聲明是基於對戴耀廷的尊重，「在會上都有講過如果戴教授真係有份嘢，我哋承諾咗會簽。」不過筆記沒有提及否決財案，因當時預算案還未出台，但法官指無可抗拒推論是林打算無差別否決預算案。
+
+
+▲ 林卓廷（資料圖片）
+
+辯方力陳，沒有證據顯示筆記由林作出。但法官不同意，因筆記是在林的住所被發現，而且林在論壇中的回答，與筆記內容大致相同。法官指筆記是林為出席論壇而準備的，內容代表了他的信念、認知及立場。
+
+#### 官：林必定知道否決財案負面後果
+
+綜合上述原因，法官認為林充分了解計劃的目的是否決財案，他亦知道和同意民主黨就否決預算案上的立場，而林指願意簽署由戴耀廷發起的聲明，這顯示他對於否決預算案沒有問題。
+
+林最終在初選中獲勝，並提交了立法會選舉的表格。而在初選後林和黃碧雲也在場的記者會上，胡志偉表明過半目的是迫使政府回應「五大訴求」，這進一步支持林在《國安法》後繼續參與計劃。
+
+法官並提到，以林作為立法會議員的經驗，他必然知道否決預算案會對政府履行職能造成嚴重負面後果。而林雖在論壇筆記提及過往4年從未支持預算案，但「他過往提出任何原因，並非本案審訊的重點」，法官肯定林將無差別否決預算案，因此裁定罪成。
+
+#### 官：梁國雄轉發FB帖文提否決財案 肯定知悉目標
+
+社民連的梁國雄選擇不作供。證據顯示，梁沒有出席新界東任何協調會議，而是由社民連副秘書長陳寶瑩代為出席。在第二次協調會議前，社民連主席黃浩銘致電區諾軒，要求他不要向任何人承諾否決財案。會上鄒家成提出要運用否決權，但陳寶瑩對此表達不同意，戴耀廷最後提議「積極運用」。由於這個議題引起激烈討論，因此法官相信社民連包括梁會關注。
+
+法官留意到，社民連的立場發生變化，他們在5月〈爭奪全面否決權持續不斷抗暴政 — 社會民主連線回應當前香港政治形勢變化的決議文〉提及，有人主張爭取過半議席，以取得全面否決權，而社民連必須審時度勢，檢討過往的立場，共同對抗中共暴政。
+
+而梁國雄曾於 Facebook 轉發社民連帖文，提到無論35+或35-，泛民主派都應否決預算案以令政府回應五大訴求，法官肯定，梁收到協調文件，亦完全知道謀劃的目標，是取得立會過半後運用否決權。
+
+#### 官：過去否決原因非重點
+
+法官指，梁在提交提名表格時，同時附上「五大訴求，缺一不可，抵抗惡法，您我同行」的競選政綱。梁提到，人大常委會以政治逼害為目的，篩走涉危害國家安全的候選人，並強調35+和否決權的重要性。
+
+
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+梁在論壇表示自己沒有簽署「墨落無悔」聲明，只是因為聲明重複了35+計劃的目標，又指他過往曾否決財案，對於再次實行並沒有問題。法官認為，梁作為資深政治人物，肯定會知道過半數議員持續否決對政府運作帶來的嚴重後果。他過去或有很多原因、或沒有原因否決，但不是本案的重點，法庭關注2020年的情況。
+
+梁最終在初選中落敗，他轉發社民連發表的聲明，表示自己不會參選，但會繼續支持35+。法官考慮上述因素，裁定他有顛覆政權的意圖而罪成。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】初選案16名不認罪被告之中，3名「抗爭派」何桂藍、鄒家成和余慧明均被裁定罪成。法官形容，何桂藍是「擁有最激進政見的參與者之一」，何參選是望將香港現行制度「連根拔起」、反對「一國兩制」，無疑意圖令特區陷入完全停頓並「破局」。至於發起「墨落無悔」的鄒家成，法官指他較激進、不接受中央對港主權，而他作為本土抗爭派，無疑入立法會是要以任何方法對抗政府或建制派，推翻現有政府。至於余慧明，法官指她參選目的是透過「破局」為政治制度帶來巨變，拒信她稱願意與政府談判；又指無疑若政府拒絕答應其訴求，余會連同其他民主派無差別否決預算案，破壞政府權力和合法性。
+
+此外，就鄒家成發起「墨落無悔」，當中提及否決預算案，法官認為是填補戴耀廷稱毋須簽署協議的空白，反映各區均達成的共識，拒納鄒稱聲明與協議文件相似是「純粹巧合」。而就岑敖暉等在抗爭派記者會提否決預算案，法官指何桂藍無提出反對，正因他們說出她心中所想。
+
+
+▲ 2020年7月15日 抗爭派記者會（資料圖片）
+
+#### 官拒納何桂藍無向組織者追問協議下落 指庭上亦會提反對
+
+何桂藍是新東參選人，她選擇作供。何曾出席所有新東協調會議，法官指戴耀廷有何的電話號碼，無疑會向她發出新東協調文件，認為何有收到，亦完全知悉文件提及「會運用」否決權。
+
+何供稱，曾期望就參與者達成的協議簽署並公開，但最終該文件無出現，因此認為就運用否決權無達成共識。法官接納沒有任何簽署的共識，但認為以何對協議的態度，若組織者未能提供任何書面文件，例如新東協議，難以相信她無向組織者跟進；又留意到何在法庭上，曾數次因某些說話或事情明顯不符她理解或指示，而提出反對，認為何在法庭的證供不可信也不可靠。
+
+法官認為，何當時沒有投訴，實因她滿意所收到的協議文件內容；何聲稱是單一議題候選人，望將反修例運動精神帶入選舉，文件上「會運用」否決權條款正好反映此點。法官認為，何清楚知道謀劃目標及協議存在。
+
+
+▲ 何桂藍（資料圖片）
+
+#### 官拒納參選僅為鼓勵投票 實望入議會「破局」
+
+何供稱參選只想鼓勵人投票以得到最大票數，令外界不會忽視，法官不接納是她參選的唯一理由。法官指，何不曾在競選集會、論壇、訪問、競選單張提及相關看法，亦從未聽過何向公眾提及，立法會取得35+、迫使政府答應五大訴求是不實際或不可能。相反，她曾稱要爭取立會過半，逼出北京不能接受的局面，又指議會不再是議事殿堂、是抗爭陣地，要文攻武鬥等，共同主題是運用權力否決預算案、反對政府及進行抗爭，認為她在法庭的證供與其帖文不一致。
+
+法官認為，何實希望實現行政長官及立法會雙普選，正如她反覆表示現行制度失能、無法為港人服務，她真正想要的是一個全新的政治制度及架構，而為了達成此點，她想獲得高票數進入立會抗爭、「破局」，令外界注意。法官認為，何最終提交提名表格參與初選，可證她是謀劃的一分子。
+
+何桂藍最終勝出初選，並發文稱最重要是利用立會選舉製造政治張力及觸發憲政危機。法官指，無疑何所指的與戴耀廷提倡的一樣，並與她庭上稱35+不可能完全相反。法官指，若她向選民稱參選目標是取得多票數，認真懷疑她會否仍首位勝出；又指取得高票數但無立會過半，並不會直接觸發憲制危機。
+
+#### 官：抗爭派記者會無反對岑敖暉談否決 因正說出所想
+
+何桂藍於7月15日出席抗爭派記者會，法官指岑敖暉會上提倡運用否決權癱瘓議會、會拒絕通過預算案，但何沒有提出反對；又指從片段可見，岑在回答應否否決預算案時，曾轉向何的方向，二人亦曾於競選活動一同出現，又共用選舉單張。同樣地，王百羽會上稱「其實我哋嗰個最大公因數就一定係堅決反對《財政預算案》，如果五大訴求冇落實的話」，但何事後無提出反對，供稱認為無需要，惟法官認為，何沒有投訴是因他們正正說出何心中所想。
+
+
+▲ 岑敖暉（資料圖片）
+
+#### 官：何為最激進政見者之一 望將現行制度連根拔起
+
+何在8月4日於《洛杉磯時報》發文，表示反對派過半便會對北京造成惡夢，因可否決政府所有議案。法官認為，何在整個計劃的立場非常一致，無疑何不僅想破壞政府機能，亦想破壞政府的合法性。法官重申，雖然何供稱35+不可能、參選是望鼓勵投票，但她所做和所說的並不這樣反映。
+
+法官最後指，從何桂藍的言行可見，她是擁有最激進政見的參與者之一，希望能將香港現行政治架構及制度「連根拔起」（uproot），並反對「一國兩制」原則，可能她是那些會形容戴耀廷為不激進和不進步的人。法官認為，毫無疑問她參與謀劃的意圖，就是要嚴重干擾、阻撓、破壞特區政權機關依法履行職能，旨在顛覆國家政權，令特區陷入完全停頓（complete halt），望其「破局」主張會發生，因此裁定她罪成。
+
+#### 官：鄒家成與社民連爭論後 戴才以「積極運用」迎合
+
+鄒家成案發時是新東參選人，他選擇作供。鄒曾出席所有新東協調會議，但就第二次會議情況，法官不接納鄒稱是戴耀廷先提議「會積極運用」否決權，鄒才建議改用「會運用」；而是接納區諾軒說法，會前社民連副主席黃浩銘曾着區不要答應否決預算案，認為是鄒與社民連的爭論後，戴才提議以「積極運用」迎合不同意見。而「會運用」這個較確定的立場，最終在協調文件採納。
+
+法官又指，鄒會後曾就不禮貌向戴道歉，戴向他索取電話號碼，戴沒理由不會向他發送協調文件，故肯定鄒有收到。而文件提及會運用否決權、其後亦可見於「墨落無悔」，故鄒清楚知道謀劃存在、其目標是否決預算案。
+
+
+▲ 左起：張可森、鄒家成、梁晃維（資料圖片）
+
+#### 官：拒納「墨落無悔」與協議相似純粹巧合、鄒是填補戴的空白
+
+鄒家成與梁晃維、張可森3人，在戴耀廷表示為免增DQ風險而毋須簽聲明後，發起「墨落無悔」聲明。法官認為，3人來自3個選區，但聲明提及「已取得共識的共同綱領」、「最大公因數」，認為合乎邏輯的推論，是當中運用否決權兩點聲明，是五區協調會議均達成的共識。
+
+法官又指，就辦初選、論壇、目標議席、替補機制4項共識，不具爭議性、亦非政治性，如真屬共同綱領，沒什麼阻止戴要求參選人簽署。法官拒納鄒指「共同綱領」僅指會上討論過的事項，指「墨落無悔」若非代表已達成的共識，3人無需花一個下午準備。
+
+法官又指，隨着更多人簽署「墨落」，鄒甚至製作 Google 文件讓他人簽署，認為鄒不僅發起聯署，更是聲明的監護人（custodian and guardian）。法官不接納鄒稱，「墨落」與最終協議文件字眼相似，是「純粹巧合」，考慮到製作日期、字眼相似，「墨落」明顯是用來填補戴耀廷留下的空白，裁定鄒不可信也不可靠。而3人其後要求組織者回應，訊息亦清楚提及否決預算案的目標。
+
+#### 官：鄒不接受中央對港主權
+
+法官指，鄒的競選口號為「拒絕殖民，民族抗暴」，亦曾於參選宣言形容香港被中國「殖民」，「說這個帖文的內容為激進，是說得保守了。」鄒又曾發文提到「同殖民者設計嘅議會制度攬炒到底」，雖然鄒稱要守護本土價值，但法官認為他實際上是不接受中央政府對香港的主權。法官亦認為，鄒庭上稱會以「五大訴求」作為唯一優先標準審視預算案、從無想過癱瘓政府，與其FB帖文非常不同，法庭拒絕接納。
+
+法官認為，從鄒的言行，他提交提名表格參選時，已是謀劃一分子。而鄒稱一直認為35+不可能，卻選擇繼續參選，明顯他一直都是和戴耀廷一樣，對「35+計劃」樂觀和有信心。
+
+#### 官：鄒較激進 參選為推翻現行政治制度
+
+法官指，明顯鄒抱有較為激進的理念或立場，他認為五大訴求有壓倒性民意支持、合法合理，自視為本土派、願景是確立香港民族地位。法官相信他會用盡所有方法迫使政府回應五大訴求，亦因此拒納他稱入議會後不會用武力、只會自衛。
+
+法官指，作為本土抗爭派，毫無疑問鄒家成入立法會的目的，是以任何方法對抗建制派或政府，他參加初選的意圖清晰，就是作為推翻現有政府和政治架構的第一步。
+
+鄒最終勝出初選並出席抗爭派記者會，岑敖暉會上稱會否決預算案，法官拒納鄒稱不同意岑的說法，並認為毫無疑問鄒參選目的與戴耀廷一致，就是要破壞和推翻現行政治制度，無疑鄒有意圖顛覆香港政府，因此裁定他罪成。
+
+#### 官：余慧明知悉及同意謀劃、參選目的為政治制度帶來巨變
+
+至於參選衞生服務界、時任醫管局員工陣線主席余慧明，法官認為有充份證據顯示她知悉及同意涉案謀劃，包括她簽署「墨落無悔」聲明，以及競選材料。法官指，毫無疑問，余參加「35+計劃」的目的，是要透過「破局」，為政治制度帶來「巨變（sea change）」，例如余3月曾發表〈踏上這攬炒旅途〉，提到「要破局，必須由制度上的變革開始，甚至把制度推倒重來也在所不惜」；同年8月又受訪稱若真要作出改變，「攬炒」是手段，望「破局而立新」。
+
+#### 官：余有意圖顛覆國家政權 不信願與政府談判
+
+法官亦指，毫無疑問地，余有意圖嚴重干擾及阻礙政府職能，以達致新的政治制度，即是她所提及的「破局」，裁定她有意圖顛覆國家政權。其中余4月〈攬炒的時代革新意義〉曾稱，「全面否決所有政府提出的議案，藉此觸法基本法第五十條，令特首宣布解散立法會，製造憲政危機」；又曾受訪稱：「一定要用任何方法去推翻而家呢個政權、呢個政府，先可以做到一個改變。」而余盤問時沒有否認她有說過上述的話，僅稱訪問不夠仔細。
+
+法官認為，基於余在不同場合的公開說法、及其選舉材料，不接受余庭上稱願意與政府談判和作出讓步；相反，毫無疑問地，若政府拒絕答應余的政治訴求，她有意圖連同他人運用否決權，嚴重干擾、阻撓、破壞政權機關，意圖顛覆國家政權。
+
+
+▲ 余慧明（左）、岑敖暉（右）（資料圖片）
+
+對於余稱她不認為自己意圖所做的事是違法，法官不接納她當時真誠地相信透過無差別否決財案、故意導致「憲政危機」是合法的。無論如何，即使她真的如此相信，也不能構成合理辯解。
+
+#### 官：余視政府為「極權」、無意與之談判
+
+《國安法》生效後，余曾受訪稱議會是「抗爭戰場」、要將抗爭意志帶入議會、不會為了當選而選擇暫時隱藏「攬炒」、「抗爭」等信念，又形容政府是「極權」；余亦曾於FB發文，指：「抗爭派參與選舉，早就下定決心無論議會內外都要用盡一切手段令暴政付出沈重代價⋯⋯極權面前，我地要團結一致，我地休戚與共。一息尚存，抗爭到底！」
+
+法官認為，上述並非純綷余所稱的「談判策略」；相反，余視政府為「極權」，並無意與之談判。法官肯定余會將她所說的付諸實行，即在立法會連同其他民主派，無差別否決預算案，以圖破壞政府的權力和合法性；並深信《國安法》生效之後，余的想法也沒有改變。雖然余無參加過任何協調會議，但法庭信納《國安法》前被告已達成協議推行謀劃，而余是一分子，遂裁定罪成。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】初選案16名不認罪被告當中，共有14人罪成。罪成的民協施德來、何啟明及人民力量陳志全均稱，理解「墨落無悔」聲明沒有綑綁候選人須運用否決權，他們可自行選擇是否運用；但法官認為該解讀難以置信、荒謬，認為聲明字眼簡單直接，被告簽署是意圖無差別否決預算案。就施德來和何啟明稱認為否決權是《基本法》賦予，是與政府談判落實五大訴求的籌碼，法官亦指以二人從政經驗，肯定知道政府永遠不會接受「五大訴求」。
+
+法官又指，施德來於論壇多次提否決預算案，與其證供相反，其言行亦違背他稱認同民協的「維護中國主權」原則。而同為民協的何啟明指與施德來沒有統一立場，法官不接納，反指若兩人立場不一並發表不同言論，只會引起「政治災難」。至於陳志全街站提到否決預算案，解釋語氣較重，惟法官認為他是淡化自己參與。
+
+#### 施德來稱聲明無綑綁用否決權 官指解釋難以置信
+
+案發時為民協主席的施德來，在初選中落敗，因此沒有參選。施作供時強調，理解「35+計劃」及「墨落無悔」聲明均沒有綑綁參選人使用否決權，他們可自行決定是否使用。法官認為其解釋令人難以置信，故不接納，認為聲明清晰表達簽署目的是展示抗爭意志，如果就運用否決權一點無約束力，毫不合理。法官又舉例反駁，指施在 Facebook 帖文表示已簽聲明，並承諾會運用立法會權力，包括否決預算案。這顯示他明顯知道聲明具約束力，因此才承諾簽署。
+
+#### 施視否決權為籌碼 官指必知政府不會接受五大訴求
+
+施亦供稱，認為否決權是《基本法》賦予的權力，視否決財案只屬「籌碼」，是迫特首回應「五大訴求」並解決社會矛盾的策略。惟法官指，施作為民協主席，及以其任區議員及從政的經驗，必然知道政府永遠不會接受「五大訴求」。
+
+#### 施強調認同民協原則維護中國主權 官：言行已違背
+
+就施強調無意否決財政預算案，會考慮及討論預算案的優劣才決定，又指自己認同民協堅持的原則，包括維護中國主權及「一國兩制」、改善民生及服務基層等，他認為與政府維持工作關係非常重要，一旦當選將會和政府談判及溝通。
+
+不過法官指，施曾在選舉論壇上表明會兩次否決預算案、與政府沒有談判的餘地，又在FB帖文、選舉單張等多個場合表示會否決預算案，與其庭上證供相反，法官拒納他稱無意否決，亦不接納只是「選舉策略」。法官認為，施的言行，顯示他已違背民協秉持的價值觀，包括維護中國主權。
+
+
+▲ 施德來（資料圖片）
+
+#### 官拒納施稱會談判 指若收回承諾屬「政治自殺」
+
+法官亦拒納施稱會與政府談判，指施望透過稱否決預算案而爭取選民支持，亦會繼續保持民協進步的立場和新形象，若他收回承諾，就與「政治自殺」無異。
+
+法官指，《國安法》後，施仍在選舉論壇稱要「全面攬炒」、仍無撤回「墨落無悔」帖文，而他初選落敗後無參選，但仍發文要求獲勝的候選人達到35+。法官肯定，施與組織者一致同意，將會無差別否決財案，並相信他會實行，而施在《國安法》後仍然參與，具意圖顛覆，因此罪成。
+
+#### 何啟明理解「墨落」可選擇用什麼權 官批解讀荒謬
+
+案發時為民協副主席的何啟明，最終在初選中獲勝，並有參選。法官認為，何了解「35+計劃」的目標，是要否決財政預算案。何供稱以其理解，否決權是《基本法》所賦予，又認為「墨落無悔」聲明沒有綑綁否決，參選人可自行選擇運用哪一項《基本法》權力。法官認為其解讀「荒謬（absurd）」，又認為如聲明只是陳述明顯的事（state the obvious），即議員可運用《基本法》賦予的權力，是多餘（otiose）。
+
+法官又反駁指，若參選人能自行選擇運用什麼權力，將會很難達致大多數，集體向政府討價還價。而何稱會用任何《基本法》權力迫使政府回應五大訴求，但不會運用否決權，是與聲明的字面意思和脈絡相反。
+
+#### 官指何啟明證供不合理、認為民協就否決有統一立場
+
+法官批評何是不可靠證人，其證供不合理。法官不接納何所指，他與民協主席施德來在初選事宜上沒有溝通，而且沒有統一立場。雖然兩人的選區不同，但不會導致兩人缺乏溝通；而且運用否決權是大家都關心的話題，法官認為兩個競選團隊之間無溝通是不合理，相反他們更需要互相協調。
+
+
+▲ 何啟明（資料圖片）
+
+法官又指，根據施所稱當時民協是一個小政黨，亦逐漸被邊緣化，因此對兩人來說，最重要是需在選舉中至少得到一議席，亦即至少其中一人在初選中獲勝。法官認為兩個團隊採取不同競選策略是有違常理，因為若兩人在否決權上立場不統一，並發表不同言論，對民協而言只會是政治災難。
+
+法官確信兩人就選舉策略曾進行協調，並需確保在公開場合發表的言論是一致，包括否決財案，兩人必需有一致防線以抵禦預期中候選人會作出的攻擊。對於何表示他與施採取不同的選舉策略，法官認為這與何曾表明支持「墨落無悔」聲明的說法不相符，何不單止簽署聲明，更在轉發聲明時提及施的名字，這顯示兩人之間存在協調，在運用否決權上有統一立場，即會無差別否決財案。法官拒絕接納何所稱，民協核心小組沒有討論過否決權，同時不接納他稱成員可以自行決定有關立場。
+
+#### 官：以何政治經驗 會知道政府不會接受「五大訴求」
+
+法官亦拒絕接納何表示不知道「35+計劃」的目標，因協調會議上張崑陽和戴耀廷曾討論否決權，但何沒有提出反對。何供稱覺得「35+」可在立法會產生制衡，與政府談判以實現「五大訴求」，但法官不接納其說法，因憑着何在政治領域上的經驗，肯定他知道政府永遠不會接受「五大訴求」，這只是用作否決預算案的藉口；而若真的否決也會令政府運作癱瘓。法官進一步指，何曾在選舉小冊子中表示獲得否決權才可以實現訴求。
+
+#### 官：何簽「墨落」是完全同意無差別否決
+
+法官又指，若何理解共同綱領只是區諾軒所指的4點，而不包括否決權，那他在論壇上被問到為何首先簽署聲明時，就不會回答指香港人希望見證民主派達致35+。何之所以簽署，是完全同意無差別否決財案。在《國安法》生效後，何並沒有在 Facebook 上收回對聲明的支持，他仍堅持初選目標之一是展現民主派團結對抗政權的決心。何在初選獲勝後，即宣布參選並表明自己會站在立法會前線對抗政權。法官相信何知道無差別否決財案是不合法，這構成濫用權力。最後裁定他罪成。
+
+#### 官指人民力量同意民主派之間有共同政治理念
+
+案發時為人民力量主席的陳志全選擇作供。他沒有出席任何新界東協調會議，只是派代表出席，事後對方向陳匯報。陳得知會上談及否決權，他們將字眼由「運用」改為「積極運用」，但陳認為兩者沒有太大分別。法官認為，即使陳沒有出席會議，但他仍充分了解計劃會運用否決權。雖然陳不同意自己會無差別使用否決權，但他承認有閱讀戴關於〈真攬炒十步〉的文章，因此他必然了解計劃目的。
+
+陳提及人民力量過往拒絕參與民主派任何初選，但今次他們同意參與，是基於一個條件，即民主派候選人之間必須有共同政治行動綱領。人民力量在 Facebook 重申，如各方要舉行初選的話，他們應該制定共同的政治行動，以對政府作出制衡。法官確信人民力量同意民主陣營的政治理念，即運用否決權。另外，人民力量曾在 Facebook 轉發「墨落無悔」聲明。
+
+#### 官：陳淡化對計劃了解和參與
+
+陳強調，雖然他簽署聲明，但內文沒有提及將所有候選人綑綁為同一立場，即運用否決權。法官並不接納此說法，因內文簡單直接，亦正是共同政治行動綱領，即陳參選的原因。
+
+就陳於街站曾提否決預算案，陳庭上稱語氣較重，是「隨口噏」，法官拒絕接納，認為陳採用的字眼和語氣與他此前一致，認為陳只是在庭上淡化自己對計劃的了解和參與。
+
+
+▲ 陳志全（資料圖片）
+
+法官又指，人民力量副主席譚得志曾在論壇上表明會否決預算案，法官認為二人以相同政綱參選；而初選前一天，兩人亦在宣傳片提及否決預算案、解散立法會及迫特首下台。
+
+陳在初選中獲勝，並提交提名表，同時附上「抗爭到底」的宣傳單張。陳其後收到選舉主任提問，但法官指其回答迴避問題、遠非誠實（evasive and far from frank），只是避免被DQ。法官確信陳知道計劃目的，繼續參加是顛覆政權，故裁定罪成。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】初選案16名不認罪被告之中，時任灣仔區議會主席楊雪盈被裁定罪成。沒有作供的楊，無在FB發布「墨落無悔」聲明，但名字出現在其他人帖文，法官認為在無相反證據下，唯一合理推論是她知悉聲明內容，亦是強烈證據她同意及有意推動涉案謀劃；又指她雖無將否決預算案與五大訴求綑綁，但考慮到她不同場合提及爭取過半落實五大訴求的決心、對謀劃的認知和作為區議員的經驗，無可抗拒推論是她意圖聯同其他民主派，無差別否決預算案，並知道會嚴重破壞政府職能。
+
+同被裁定罪成的區政聯盟柯耀林，法官拒信其選舉助理證供，認為柯對涉案謀劃完全知情，而他曾發文表示立法會不再是討論政治事務的場所，無可抗拒推論是他不會審核任何預算案；加上柯認為政治制度腐敗，簽署「墨落無悔」不足為奇。
+
+#### 官：楊雪盈FB無發布「墨落」 惟無相反證據下推論知悉內容
+
+楊雪盈是港島參選人，沒有作供。3次港島協調會議中，楊派代表出席首次，並親身出席之後兩次，其辦公室電腦被搜到「35+立會過半計劃 民主派港島協調機制（初稿）」，提及「會積極運用立法會的權力，包括否決財政預算案」，迫使特首回應「五大訴求」。法官指，在沒有其他相反的證據下，唯一合理推論是楊知道「運用」或「積極運用」否決權，是「35+計劃」的重要元素。
+
+雖然楊雪盈無在FB發布「墨落無悔」帖文，但其名字出現在其他聯署人的帖文上，法官再次指，在沒有其他相反證據下，唯一合理推論是她知悉「墨落無悔」的內容，及知悉其他參選人支持該聲明，而她對「墨落」的贊同，是強烈證據她同意及有意推動涉案謀劃。
+
+法官又指，《國安法》後，楊與戴耀廷等出席7月9日記者會，戴會上稱35+目標是爭取立法會控制權，行使憲制權力要求政府問責。法官認為，楊當時必然知悉，「35+計劃」目標是取得立會過半，迫政府回應五大訴求。
+
+#### 官：電腦文件指政府不公 「一定會」否決財案
+
+法官續引述楊的參選宣言，提及「五大訴求、議會過半是我們共同呼喚的將來……」；而從其電腦搜獲的文件，問及是否一定會否決預算案時，提及「是。政府多年來提出的財政預算案，都是由上而下，幫唔到真正有需要既人……提出預算案既政府亦唔係直選，整個過程本身就唔公義。看不到非民選的政府，會提出符合香港人利益的財政預算案」。
+
+法官認為，相關文件是為楊初選準備的「統一口徑（lines to take）」或論壇筆記，楊知悉並同意。雖然楊沒有政治聯繫，亦沒有將否決預算案與五大訴求綑綁，但上述文件提及她「一定會否決」預算案，因政府不公，不會提出符合港人利益的預算案。
+
+法官指，「知悉」不等於「同意」或「協議」，但考慮到楊在不同場合及文件提及協助民主派立會過半，以落實五大訴求的決心，以及她對謀劃目標的認知、作為區議員的經驗，無可抗拒推論是她意圖聯同其他民主派，在立法會無差別否決預算案，亦知道如預算案否決，會造成嚴重干擾、阻撓和破壞政府職能。
+
+#### 官：落選後FB帖文 證意圖按協議及「墨落」行事
+
+法官續引楊雪盈在初選落選後的帖文，提及得票不足，「我一定會尊重選民的決定，遵守初選協定，跟從民主派協調的安排」，又指「希望大家一定要在未來的正式選舉中，給各位初選勝出的代表，投下支持的一票！民主派能團結地在議會發揮最大的抗爭力量，難道不是我們共同的願望嗎？」法官認為，帖文不單與港島區協調協議一致，亦證明楊意圖按協議及「墨落無悔」行事；楊亦知道她支持的其他候選人，同樣意圖無差別否決預算案。
+
+控方證人趙家賢曾稱，就戴耀廷提否決預算案，楊曾向他稱「咪由佢講吓囉」，認為議員入立會後也是自主行事。惟法官不給予任何比重，認為相關陳述是「混合式陳述」，亦沒有楊的證供支持，無可抗拒推論是她意圖顛覆國家政權。
+
+法官指，在沒有楊的解釋下，肯定她是謀劃的一分子，意圖顛覆國家政權。法庭無忘記楊於2020年7月底報名參選立法會正式選舉，明顯違反協調協議及「墨落無悔」，惟法官指，那是在區諾軒和趙家賢宣布退出初選後發生。法庭不會揣測楊是否「靈童」，但無論如何，楊報名參選的行為，並無影響法官裁定她案發時知道並同意參與謀劃，因此裁定她罪成。
+
+#### 官指柯耀林選舉經理陳展浚非誠實可靠 認為柯有關注初選動態
+
+至於參選新東的區政聯盟柯耀林選擇不作供，只是傳召其選舉經理陳展浚作供。法官裁定陳並非誠實可靠證人，其證供與真相有差距。陳表示柯工作繁忙，故沒有密切關注政治動態的習慣，但法官不接納，指柯活躍於政壇多年。法官亦對陳稱柯閱報時只會留意其物業管理工作方面的廣告感懷疑，認為陳證供嘗試令柯與初選保持距離，但實際上柯非常留意最近的政治動態，亦密切關注戴耀廷說的話。
+
+法官亦指，由於初選涉及大量資金，約30至50萬，因此柯肯定會密切關注組織者的一言一行，因一旦組織者作出政治方向或後勤安排的改變，都會影響其選舉策略、財政資源及成功機會。
+
+#### 陳表示無收到組織者的文件 官批評不合邏輯
+
+陳展浚表示自己沒有出席協調會議，但法官認為他也是嘗試讓自己與初選保持距離。對於陳表示沒有收到協調文件，法官批評是不合邏輯及令人難以置信，因戴耀廷有柯的聯絡電話。法官肯定柯有收到文件，知道當中提及運用否決權。
+
+對陳指組織者有責任通知協調會議內容，法官批評說法荒謬，指陳只是嘗試描述柯對謀劃的認知有限；就陳稱留意到柯沒有將戴儲存為聯絡人，法官亦質疑他並非一個如此注意細節的人。法官亦不相信陳聲稱沒有看過戴的文章、及戴在初選記者會上說的話，因若屬實，陳作為選舉經理的任務便是失敗。法官因此裁定柯對謀劃完全知情，清楚知道案發時有協議取得立會過半。
+
+#### 官：柯認為政治制度腐敗 簽署「墨落無悔」不足為奇
+
+法官留意到，柯曾發文指立法會不再是討論政治事務的場所，無可抗拒的推論是他不會審核任何預算案和政府議案。柯亦提及民主派取得35+後，會獲得主導權，又表明會團結抗爭力量，支持抗爭陣營對抗敵人，並肯定自己會參與協調。法官指，柯覺得當時的政治制度已經腐敗，柯因此簽署「墨落無悔」聲明也不足為奇，而他支持聲明，是因聲明反映了他對協調會議上達成共識的理解。
+
+此外，柯發文向選民表明自己堅決抵抗的立場，又表示即使可能入獄亦不會退縮。法官確信他參與謀劃，意圖嚴重干擾、阻撓及破壞政府履行職能。柯亦在選舉政綱中表示，香港人不能再以被動態度對抗極權。法官認為，在他提交提名表時，他已經是謀劃一份子。
+
+#### 辯方指柯政綱提出項目需用財案撥款 官拒接納
+
+辯方力陳，柯在政綱中提及的項目需用到財政預算案的撥款，因此他不會無差別否決。法官不同意說法，因他在選舉單張中表明暴政鎮壓越趨加劇，高壓殖民統治會令香港人抗爭更加激烈；而香港人需要勇於抵抗的立法會議員。法官認為他對「殖民統治」的看法與鄒家成相近。
+
+另外，柯列出的政治議程沒有細節，法官指很難判斷屬於過往工作還是當選後的追求，即使是後者，這些項目也可以在當時政治體制被取代之後繼續執行。法官認為，柯參與初選及立法會選舉的意圖顯而易見。
+
+#### 官：柯無表示不支持「攬炒」 任議員必知否決財案後果
+
+辯方亦強調，柯與不支持「攬炒」的參選人劉凱文聯合宣傳，因此他並無顛覆意圖。法官不同意，因柯沒有在選舉單張中表示不支持「攬炒」，而劉受訪時亦曾表示以香港的政治局勢而言，「攬炒」是必然的結果。
+
+法官相信，柯作為經驗豐富的區議員，深知持續否決財案會對政府履行職能上造成嚴重負面後果。而他初選落敗後呼籲選民繼續支持其他勝出者，法官認為他是呼籲他人繼續支持謀劃，具意圖顛覆政府，因此裁定他罪成。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】初選案16名不認罪被告之中，公民黨鄭達鴻被裁定罪成，其黨友李予信則罪脫。鄭曾供稱反對黨否決預算案，惟法官指，他在公民黨記者會上無提反對、而是舉牌，可強烈推論他決定遵循黨魁楊岳橋表達的黨立場；而他不同場合的公開發言亦顯示他忠於黨立場，為獲黨支持參選，打算跟隨更激進的路線，當選後無差別否決預算案。法官不同意鄭僅盲目背誦黨路線，認為他不會拿自己政治前途冒險，採取與黨魁相違的立場。
+
+同被裁定罪成的彭卓棋，法官指其政網表明必須運用否決權，否決所有不公義議案。法官不接納彭在論壇表示不惜癱瘓政府等，只是發表「選舉語言」，認為他是「投機取巧」及不可信的證人，作出對自己有利的說法。
+
+#### 官：鄭達鴻必知公民黨同意戴謀劃、很多候選人同意用否決權
+
+公民黨鄭達鴻是港島參選人，審訊時有作供。法官接納控方證人區諾軒稱，2020年2月戴耀廷與包括梁家傑的公民黨成員見面，鄭曾參與公民黨記者會前的籌備會議，譚文豪提議該黨帶頭以否決權為籌碼爭取五大訴求。而在3月25日記者會上，梁家傑表示支持民主派協調，達致議會過半，楊岳橋及譚文豪亦承諾公民黨會否決財政預算案，要求落實五大訴求，相關說法與戴耀廷文章吻合，無疑他們所指的是戴提出的「35+計劃」。法官又指，鄭電腦內有戴文章〈齊上齊落 目標35+〉截圖，提倡取得足夠議席否決預算案，認為不可抗拒的推論是鄭在3月底必定留意到，至少上述的公民黨成員，同意公民黨應該參與戴的計劃，更重要的是，他們同意推行該謀劃。
+
+法官又指，鄭參與了港島協調會議，並留意到有人提出使用否決權的議題，接納區諾軒指只有司馬文表達反對。至於6月的「墨落無悔」聲明，鄭表示有與黨員商討是否簽署，而鄭電腦內亦有相關文件，顯示聲明獲公民黨及其他人贊同，鄭在6月初必然留意到很多候選人已表達同意使用否決權。
+
+#### 官：若公民黨無共同訊息召記招是違背常識
+
+鄭達鴻供稱，曾在籌備會議和公民黨討論是否簽署「墨落無悔」聲明時，表達不同意，不過其意見不獲接納；又指記者會上楊岳橋等3人表達的意見，並非所有出席記者會人士的統一立場，至少郭家麒和郭榮鏗有不同意見，他同意後兩者說法。惟法官指，如公民黨沒有共同訊息傳達而召記者會，是違背常識。
+
+法官又引郭榮鏗會上提及，提倡運用包括否決預算案的權力；郭家麒則指市民要求五大訴求很清楚，無論任何人當選都要要求政府回應，又指如撥款胡亂增加警察開支，有責任反映，直至政府交出合理的預算案。法官認為，郭家麒判斷預算案是否合理的標準，是政府會否正面回應五大訴求，而發言者說法的差異，只是重點不同，但實質內容一樣，不接納鄭達鴻稱會上各人表達的訊息不一致，亦不接納鄭如此相信。
+
+#### 官不同意鄭僅盲目背誦公民黨路線
+
+鄭又供稱，若然當選會申請公民黨豁免機制，不跟從黨就預算案的立場投票，並會審視預算案的優劣，不會無差別投反對票。惟法官認為，鄭記者會上沒有對楊岳橋等人的意見表達不同意，反而站在他們身後，高舉「35+議會過半實現五大訴求」標語牌。法官認為，無論鄭在籌備會議說過什麼，強烈推論他在3月25日已決定遵循梁家傑和楊岳橋表達的黨立場。
+
+法官指，鄭之後的言行進一步強化了上述推論，包括電台節目表示「共同目標就係撼動個政權去用35 plus」，而戴耀廷要求不簽聲明是想有「走棧位」，但有人想繼續有共同願望，因此有聯署，而公民黨已簽署。法官不接納鄭的言論只是盲目背誦公民黨的路線，指明顯他承認候選人有共同目標撼動政權，亦同意公民黨簽署「墨落無悔」。法官亦拒絕接納鄭指公民黨以黨名義簽署能提供彈性，認為說法不合邏輯。
+
+法官又指，鄭曾在公民黨街站稱民主派要團結力爭35+，可以在立法會否決預算案，為香港人爭取落實五大訴求，認為其說法不僅是「選舉修辭」；而鄭提交初選提名表格時，政綱提及「以關鍵否決權促使政府落實『五大訴求』」，雖然是基於公民黨統一範本，但認為鄭作出的承諾令他日後難以獲黨豁免。
+
+#### 官：公開發言顯示忠於公民黨否決立場
+
+此外，鄭FB帖文曾稱會否決預算案逼特首下台，從而爭取五大訴求，法官認為不論帖文是否由鄭本人撰寫，他不可能對帖文不知情；而鄭選舉論壇上也提及要否決預算案。就鄭有份參與拍攝的公民黨初選宣傳短片中，楊岳橋曾稱會否決預算案，法官亦不接納鄭稱別無選擇拍攝，指他明顯可以選擇，而他選擇遵從黨的路線，以得到支持參選，實現成為立法會議員的夢想，不接納他會採取與黨魁「莊嚴承諾」相違的立場，拿自己的政治前途冒險。
+
+法官指，鄭公開發言顯示他忠於（committed to）公民黨否決預算案的立場，裁定鄭於3月已同意謀劃，並為獲黨支持參選，打算跟隨更激進的路線，即當選後無差別否決預算案。而就區諾軒還柙時曾寫信予鄭指他被公民黨「連累」，法官不給予任何比重，認為區諾軒不能代表鄭的想法說話。
+
+#### 官：拒納公民黨《國安法》後改變立場
+
+就鄭供稱，《國安法》後公民黨曾修改政綱，法官認為當中仍提及「否決財政預算案，迫使政府落實五大訴求」，與《國安法》前單張無分別。而公民黨用「以言入罪 無字政綱」代替初選政綱，惟法官認為，一個合理的人會解讀口號為對《國安法》的抗議，無從顯示公民黨改變否決預算案，迫政府回應五大訴求的立場，又認為公民黨的修改只為減少候選人被DQ的風險。
+
+法官不接納鄭達鴻認為35+不可能，認為他被DQ後退黨，只因對黨的不滿及夢想破碎；他清楚知道「35+計劃」目標，並意圖跟隨黨的否決路線。法官又指，以鄭作為區議員及其政治經驗，必然知道政府不會接受「五大訴求，缺一不可」；加上其法律背景，他肯定知道推行謀劃意味解散立法會兩次，最終特首下台。考慮到他在《國安法》後持續參與初選，唯一合理推論是他意圖顛覆國家政權，因此裁定他罪成。
+
+#### 官：彭卓棋選舉單張印戴「攬炒十步」 清楚知道計劃目標
+
+彭卓棋是港島參選人，他不屬任何政黨，於審訊時選擇作供。法官接納區諾軒提及，他和戴耀廷曾於2020年2至3月與彭會面，但彭不關心立會過半或否決權，只關心選票方式，因會影響其勝算。而彭有出席首次港島區協調會議，會上有人提出使用否決權的議題，不過各方尚未就「運用」或「積極運用」字眼達成協議。
+
+彭的電腦內有選舉單張草稿，標題為「共同協調人民奪權 齊上齊落對抗極權」，首頁提到民主派35+願景是提倡否決財案，迫當權者回應五大訴求，單張背面印有戴耀廷的「攬炒十步」時間表。法官因此確信，彭清楚知道戴耀廷提倡利用「35+計劃」取得立會過半，否決預算案，迫政府答應五大訴求。
+
+#### 官：彭政綱表明會否決所有「不公義」議案
+
+法官續指，彭在政綱表明必須運用否決權，「否決所有不公義議案（包括財政預算案）......迫使當權回應『五大訴求』......阻撓不公議會進行」；又提到「『35+』是選舉主軸，以『議會抗爭攬炒』迫使政府回應『五大訴求』，這是沒有妥協的空間」、「不論是純政治表態的議案還是具約束力的議案，我們也不應該放過任何一個機會去展示抗爭意志」。
+
+法官認為，彭是表達對抗政府的堅定決心，他將「35+計劃」、「立法會抗爭」、「攬炒」及「五大訴求」連結一起，又指立法會「腐爛」現象持續已久，與他指預算案及立法會程序「不公」的說法相呼應。
+
+#### 彭稱有意大灣區創業 官指與反政府無矛盾
+
+法官指，雖然彭稱有興趣探索大灣區商機，並協助年輕企業家利用政府資助作相關事情，但不接納辯方所指，基於上述利益，彭不大可能有意圖與他人否決財案。
+
+法官舉例反駁，彭在政綱中就經濟改革表明要「推倒既有經濟結構」，主張「先拆除，後重建」，因此彭一方面推動創業，一方面持反對政府的政治理念，兩者並無必然衝突。法官認為，考慮到選舉單張及彭的教育程度，他必然意識到常人會理解其政綱的意思，是當選後會否決財案迫使政府回應五大訴求，這亦是他想傳達的訊息。
+
+再者，彭曾經簽署「墨落無悔」聲明，並且在選舉論壇上表明：「我哋嘅敵人就係共產黨，我哋入到議會不惜以肢體抗爭、癱瘓政府、否決財政預算案，亦會用議員身位支援街頭抗爭」。
+
+#### 官：彭作供「投機取巧」、不可信
+
+法官認為，觀察彭在庭上作供，認為他是個「投機取巧」及不可信的證人，作出對自己有利的說法。法官亦不接納他聲稱自己僅發表「選舉語言」，實際上無意執行。法官又指，彭明顯將政府及共產黨刻劃成「敵人」，表明不公義的預算案必須被否決，亦無意與他一再形容為「暴政」的政府談判，唯一合理推論是他完全贊同「35+計劃」的目標，意圖嚴重破壞政府和政權的合法性。
+
+就彭卓棋稱《國安法》後曾撕爛單張，以示放棄政綱，法官也不接納，指彭從未公開宣布放棄政綱，單張仍可見反抗政府的訊息，認為彭稱沒有政綱下參選不是講真話。相反，法官認為彭派發撕爛單張的行為，是含蓄地向公眾傳達反抗政府的決心。考慮上述因素後，法官裁定他罪成。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
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+---
+layout: post
+title : An Uncertain Future
+author: Ryan C. Berg and Leonardo Moraveg
+date : 2024-05-31 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/GpkFOd6.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Democratic Backsliding through Executive Aggrandizement under AMLO"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_This report examines indicators of democratic backsliding that took place during the presidency of Andrés Manuel López Obrador and warn against a deteriorating democracy in Mexico._
+
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+While the most dramatic types of democratic backsliding, such as coups d’etat, have been on the decline in Latin America, democratic backsliding, in a more insidious way, has taken its place in the form of executive aggrandizement. Executive aggrandizement, according to scholar Nancy Bermeo, is when the executive branch weakens checks and balances by enacting institutional changes that hamper the ability of the opposition to challenge executive preferences. Heads of state who partake in executive aggrandizement are typically electorally popular and therefore justify these changes as carrying out the people’s mandate. Such aggrandizement aims to secure one’s political position and enable the implementation of a political agenda with minimal pushback.
+
+Case studies of executive aggrandizement in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) include Ecuador’s Rafael Correa from 2007 to 2017, but more recently Mexico has many wondering whether the United States’ neighbor to the south will be effective in insulating its democratic institutions from this trend. The research in this report relies on Bermeo’s definition of executive aggrandizement and creates 16 indicators based on actions that the executive can take to suppress legislative and judicial bodies while simultaneously targeting other institutional sources of accountability, such as a free and independent press, civil society groups, and civilian oversight over defense and security bodies. Of the 16 indicators the authors lay out, Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador (colloquially known as AMLO) has exhibited 14.
+
+
+### The Case of Mexico
+
+Mexico has had a tumultuous and complicated history in terms of the abuse of power. The 1917 constitution, crafted to benefit the political elite at the time, provided presidents with “meta-constitutional” and “anti-constitutional” privileges granting them the ability to select and remove elected politicians from office, maintain tight control over financial resources, and directly intervene in the administrative and financial affairs of local and state governments. This led to the exertion of unitary party control by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which heavily concentrated power in the executive branch. To correct this abuse of power, reforms in the 1980s decentralized power by expanding Mexico’s Chamber of Deputies and implementing proportional representation. Additionally, the reforms mandated the creation of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) — the precursor to the National Electoral Institute (INE) created in 2014 — which was in charge of overseeing and regulating the electoral process. These changes ensured competition in congressional seats and empowered the supreme court to challenge unconstitutional abuses of power. The reforms are credited with Mexico’s multiparty democracy and the historic win of the National Action Party (PAN) in the 2000 general election, followed by a second victory in 2006 and the unprecedented victory of AMLO, the first presidential candidate of the National Regeneration Movement (Morena), in 2018.
+
+#### AMLO’s Historic Presidency
+
+Throughout his 2018 campaign, then candidate AMLO promised to bring Mexico into its “Fourth Transformation,” aimed at ending corruption, growing the economy, reducing violence, building infrastructure, and expanding social programs designed to reduce poverty and inequality. This follows three historic transformations: Mexico’s War of Independence, the Reform War, and the Mexican Revolution. AMLO’s historic election stood out as the most recent demonstration of the people’s discontent with the status quo of the economy and high levels of corruption, as he became the latest leftist leader in Latin America to be elected on a platform of social reforms seeking to eradicate poverty and inequality, similar to Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and later Colombia’s Gustavo Petro.
+
+Close to the end of his six-year term, an assessment of AMLO’s policies — measuring their impacts not only on the political, economic, and security situations in Mexico but also on its democratic institutions — suggests that Mexico “appears far more battered and bruised than the Mexico AMLO took the reins of in 2018.” AMLO politicized the office of the attorney general, attempted to curtail the INE’s budget, and has continued to militarize Mexico’s security forces, following in the steps of his predecessors. AMLO sees himself, not Mexico’s congress, as the direct and sole manifestation of the will of the people, and his disregard for checks and balances is troubling. The following sections seek to quantify AMLO’s efforts to centralize power and assess the impacts of these efforts on Mexico’s democracy.
+
+
+### Evaluating AMLO’s Administration and Democratic Backsliding in Mexico
+
+Using Bermeo’s work as a guide, the authors have examined four dimensions of democratic backsliding to assess the situation in Mexico: (1) executive influence over the electoral system, (2) executive influence over the judicial branch, (3) executive encroachment on national and civilian security, and (4) executive undermining of established political liberties. Each dimension contains four indicators that illustrate the different ways in which the executive branch can influence other branches, alter institutions, and centralize power. All dimensions and indicators are highlighted in Table 1, where a checkmark (✓) indicates that AMLO has exhibited this behavior and an x (X) means he has not.
+
+
+_▲ Table 1: Dimensions and Indicators of Democratic Backsliding in Mexico_
+
+
+### Executive Influence over the Electoral System
+
+AMLO has consistently voiced his opposition to the INE, an entity which he blames for losing the 2006 and 2012 presidential elections, and he has sought, through budgetary reforms, to significantly reduce the INE’s presence throughout the country. The president has also violated electoral laws by using his platform to campaign for other party members. Of the four indicators in this dimension, AMLO exhibited executive aggrandizement in three: manipulating budget allocations for the electoral system, restricting voter access, and hampering electoral procedures. AMLO has not attempted to place political appointees in positions responsible for electoral oversight, making it the only indicator in this dimension for which there is no evidence of democratic backsliding.
+
+#### Budget Manipulation Related to Electoral Oversight
+
+AMLO has weakened the electoral system by reducing the INE’s budget by 3.5 billion pesos ($209.6 million). This has affected not only the INE’s staff but also its ability to set up, monitor, protect, and regulate federal, state, and local elections. AMLO declined to provide additional funding to the INE during the 2021 Mexican midterm elections, which significantly delayed results; he has spoken about removing the institute altogether; and he has called for the INE’s director, Lorenzo Córdova, to resign.
+
+#### Restriction of Voter Access
+
+In 2021, a national referendum asking Mexicans whether to investigate former presidents for corruption had a 7 percent voter turnout. Some observers credit such low voter turnout to a reduction in polling stations, which went from the 104,667 originally planned to 56,465, due to budgetary constraints. The referendum, pushed in part by AMLO himself, was estimated to cost around 500 million pesos (around $29 million), equivalent to a third of the INE’s budget that year. Similarly, a referendum seeking to put AMLO’s recall on the ballot in 2022 cost the INE 1.5 billion pesos (around $89 million) and yielded a mere 17 percent voter turnout, potentially due to a reduced number of polling stations. NGOs and domestic organizations criticized both referenda as political exercises by AMLO to increase his popularity.
+
+#### Hampering of Electoral Procedures
+
+AMLO has also frequently used the presidential platform and podium to publicly and openly campaign for fellow Morena party members while also verbally attacking candidates from other political parties, which is in direct contradiction to the principles stated in the Mexican constitution. Overall, AMLO has not been supportive of the country’s electoral infrastructure, and he has failed to provide additional security and support for poll workers amid Covid-19 and the high rates of violence in many states.
+
+
+### Executive Influence over the Judicial Branch
+
+Despite his campaign promises of accountability and transparency, AMLO has hampered the judicial system for his political benefit and weakened Mexico’s checks and balances in the process. Throughout his term, AMLO has politicized and weaponized the federal judicial system with politically driven investigations and prosecutions. He has made politicized appointments to the supreme court, harassed judges, and threatened political figures with incarceration. AMLO’s actions to advance his personal and political interests have weakened the rule of law and tainted the judicial system with allegations of impunity and widespread corruption. In this dimension, AMLO has exhibited executive aggrandizement in all four indicators.
+
+#### Appointment of Ideologically Aligned or Loyal Judges
+
+AMLO has appointed 4 of the 11 current supreme court justices during his presidency: Loretta Ortiz Ahlf, Juan Luis González Alcántara Carrancá, Yasmín Esquivel Mossa, and Ana Margarita Ríos Farjat. Ortiz Ahlf, before becoming a minister of the supreme court, was a congresswoman for the Labour Party (PT), Morena’s ally in the Mexican legislature. Although she was appointed by López Obrador, Ortiz Ahlf did recuse herself from the hearing on Mexico’s Electricity Industry Law and was prevented from sitting in the corruption case against AMLO’s brother due to concerns over conflicts of interest. In contrast, Esquivel Mossa, a supreme court justice since 2019, granted AMLO’s attorney general a suspension through which she prevented the delivery of the investigation file on his brother to the electoral authorities due to concerns related to human rights violations of his data (AMLO himself would later infringe on these same laws by doxing a New York Times journalist, and when questioned, he argued the law doesn’t apply to the president).
+
+#### Use of Executive Decrees to Restrict Judicial Oversight of the Presidency
+
+Of Mexico’s most recent presidents, AMLO has used executive decrees on the widest range of topics. AMLO has recently proposed constitutional reforms that, if passed, would give the executive branch control of the wages, evaluations, and promotion tracks of all judges — even those in the supreme court. The Mexican Bar Association, the Stanford Law School Rule of Law Impact Lab, and the Inter-American Dialogue’s Rule of Law Program strongly condemned the proposed reforms as a threat to judicial independence in a report released this year.
+
+#### Blockage of Investigations
+
+On the campaign trail, AMLO promised to bring to justice public officials who have relations with drug cartels. However, during his administration, he refused to open an investigation into the former secretary of national defense under Enrique Peña Nieto, Salvador Cienfuegos, who is known to have received bribes from the H-2 Cartel. Additionally, AMLO, who was initially eager to investigate the truth of the Iguala mass kidnapping in 2014, has instead allowed multiple investigations under the “truth commission” he created to stall. AMLO has therefore shielded key military officers from being held accountable and has been criticized by the Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts for hampering domestic and international efforts to uncover connections between government officials, cartels, and the military.
+
+#### Harassment or Removal of Judges
+
+The United States and the international community have harshly criticized AMLO for using the attorney general’s office to harass and prosecute political opponents. For example, the López Obrador administration’s Financial Intelligence Unit allegedly harassed former supreme court justice Eduardo Medina Mora, leading to his subsequent resignation. After Mora’s resignation, AMLO filled the vacancy with his desired appointee, Margarita Ríos Farjat.
+
+
+### Executive Encroachment on National and Civilian Security
+
+AMLO has rhetorically adopted a policy of nonviolence toward Mexico’s diversified criminal groups, a policy he dubbed abrazos no balazos (“hugs not bullets”). In actuality, however, he has continued to militarize the security forces and has vested them with expanded powers. A 2021 report by the Center for Investigations and Economics (CIDE) found that between 2006 and 2021 more than 245 governmental functions had been transferred from civilian authorities to the Mexican armed forces. Furthermore, the creation of the national guard, accompanied by a refusal to transfer the body to civilian control, heralds what experts have called “new militarism,” that is, the normalization of expanded roles of the military and of the handover of civil matters to the military. Lastly, while a 2023 investigation revealed that Mexico was the first country to use Pegasus spyware during the Peña Nieto administration, there is little evidence to suggest that AMLO has significantly expanded the surveillance capabilities of the state. Based on this assessment, AMLO has exhibited executive aggrandizement in three out of four indicators in this dimension.
+
+#### Transfer of Resources to the Military
+
+While an increase in the national security budgets is a common policy decision, especially amid security crises, the López Obrador administration has transferred functions that typically fall under the purview of other government departments to the military and, in particular, to the newly minted national guard. According to reports, AMLO has transferred 15 state companies, and arguably their proceeds, to military management, including Mexico City’s two airports, a new airline, and the new Tren Maya. Throughout his presidency, López Obrador has approved the expansion of the military’s budget by 150 percent, primarily to absorb the costs of such projects.
+
+#### Expansion of Institutional Impunity
+
+AMLO has sought to expand the role of the military in Mexico without providing safeguards to prevent the abuse of power. In 2020, Attorney General Alejandro Gertz Manero, with the president’s backing, proposed a judicial reform plan that would allow suspects to be detained without charges for up to 40 days and would decrease the number of judges needed to monitor defendants’ rights. While AMLO later withdrew his support for the plan, his administration has failed to implement crucial accountability mechanisms under the Organic Law of the Attorney General of the Republic. Manero has allowed the expedited appointment of legal officials and experts without the approval of congress and civilian committees.
+
+#### Militarization of Civilian Security Forces
+
+Even though AMLO initially claimed he would not use the military under his administration, he has deployed the military to drug-related operations and civilian security tasks since 2019, including for supporting the construction of certain projects, securing ports of entry, building banks to disperse social programs to the elderly and the poor, stopping illegal immigrants, policing large public areas, guiding traffic, and dispersing demonstrations. Furthermore, AMLO has resisted calls to hand over control of the national guard to a civilian. It is currently under the jurisdiction of the Secretariat of Security and Civil Protection despite earlier attempts to transfer it to the Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA).
+
+The national guard has been widely condemned for its use of tear gas on innocent protesters and asylum seekers from Guatemala. To make matters worse, between January 1 and August 17, 2022, the National Human Rights Commission (CDNH) registered around 32 complaints of torture and 94 complaints of arbitrary detention, 43 of which were against the national guard. Moreover, over the same time period, the CDNH received an additional 120 complaints of inhumane treatment that were committed by the national guard and other related government entities, including the Secretariat of Security, the attorney general’s office, SEDENA, and the National Migration Institute. In 2020, the CDNH also received complaints about forced disappearances, inhumane treatment, and arbitrary detention. In April 2020, photos circulated on social media of members of the national guard eating with cartel members, and a video surfaced in early May that year of the national guard extorting citizens in Sonora, further augmenting concerns about the force’s abuses.
+
+
+### Executive Undermining of Established Political Liberties
+
+AMLO not only has failed to protect journalists but also has attacked the press and independent organizations and defunded independent agencies that seek to protect civil liberties. AMLO has also sponsored and promoted laws that harshly repress demonstrations and has routinely used the national guard to repress civilian protests. Overall, AMLO has contradicted himself in declaring himself a champion of the people while simultaneously being punitive toward citizens and civil society. In this dimension, AMLO has exhibited executive aggrandizement in all four indicators.
+
+#### Attacks on the Media
+
+AMLO’s presidency has been characterized by the establishment of a daily press briefing, also known as the “Mañanera,” an hours-long daily briefing that the president has instituted in the name of transparency. However, AMLO most often uses this platform to respond to negative coverage of his administration, oftentimes by attacking or doxing journalists who publish negative stories about him. During his six-year term, he disclosed the income of journalist Carlos Loret de Mola and the phone number of New York Times reporter Natalie Kitroeff, and has referred to journalists as “thugs,” putting journalists in acute danger. Mexico has been one of the most dangerous countries for journalists, including active warzones, with around 37 journalists killed during AMLO’s term alone. With little political appetite for extended protections, journalists continue to suffer not only verbal attacks by the president but also physical violence with no end in sight.
+
+#### Encroachment on Civilian Privacy through Surveillance
+
+According to a report by the New York Times, Mexico was the first country to deploy Pegasus, during the Calderón administration. While AMLO has also openly criticized the use of spyware by the Calderón administration, there is no evidence that he is has stopped its use. In fact, during his six-year term, the armed forces deployed the software on human rights defender, Raymundo Ramos, accusing him of seeking to “discredit the armed forces.” Raymundo was in fact, investigating an unlawful killing by the military that took place in Nuevo Laredo when his phone was infected. Two other cases, both undertaken by the armed forces, are salient during AMLO’s presidency: the surveillance of Alejandro Encinas, Mexico’s undersecretary for human rights, and constant monitoring of over 15 feminist groups.
+
+#### Interference with Political Actors and Others in Opposition
+
+In the run-up to the Mexican presidential election, AMLO has continuously attacked candidate Xóchitl Gálvez, thus breaking with long-standing tradition of Mexican presidents not commenting on candidates in the presidential race. AMLO has also used his attorney general’s office to threaten to incarcerate more than two dozen professors and scientists for alleged money laundering and organized crime charges, which were quickly shot down in court due to a lack of evidence. AMLO has also used lower federal courts and tax authorities as well as financial crime units to harass political opponents.
+
+#### Repression of Protests and Demonstrations
+
+AMLO, ironically, became popular for protesting Pemex operations in the early years of his political career. Now, AMLO is supportive of punitive laws that increase pretrial detention and tougher penalties for those who are arrested during protests and demonstrations. In July 2019, AMLO and Morena Party members proposed legislation that would permit prison sentences of up to 20 years for obstructing access to business and 13 years for blocking progress on public works projects. AMLO has also used the national guard to disperse crowds and protests, an institution that in its young tenure has already faced complaints of excessive use of force, abuse, and even torture.
+
+
+### An Uncertain Future for Mexico
+
+On February 5, 2024, Mexico’s Constitution Day, AMLO proposed 20 new political changes, 18 of which require changes to the constitution, with the remaining two seen as legal reforms. Key changes include a reduction in the number of seats in Mexico’s national legislature, and a reform to elect judges by popular vote. While the proposed reforms are currently being reviewed in the lower house of congress, it is important to note that AMLO’s party, Morena, does not have the necessary two-thirds majority in both chambers to pass them. Many fear that, should Morena win a supermajority in both houses and the presidency, AMLO’s legacy of executive aggrandizement and democratic backsliding will continue even after he leaves office. Considering Latin America’s history of democratic backsliding through executive aggrandizement, the question of how countries can best safeguard institutions and maintain checks and balances is one Mexico must grapple with should it wish to continue to be considered a robust democracy in the hemisphere.
+
+---
+
+__Ryan C. Berg__ is the director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
+
+__Leonardo Moraveg__ is a fellow with the American Political Science Association’s Diversity Fellowship Program.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-31-how-wagner-lost-syria.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-31-how-wagner-lost-syria.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4d732c89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-31-how-wagner-lost-syria.md
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : How Wagner Lost Syria
+author: Antonio Giustozzi
+date : 2024-05-31 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/DN3KjGv.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Despite the death of its former leader, the Wagner Group continues to operate in some parts of the world. In Syria, however, its presence has long since evaporated. What went wrong?_
+
+
+
+The Wagner Group, a private military company (PMC) funded by the Russian state, deployed to Syria in 2015 and spent six years there. Its role in the country’s conflict was most clearly highlighted by the Battle of Khasham in February 2018, during which a mixed force of Wagnerite mercenaries and Syrian militiamen tried to seize control of an oil field from the US army and its allied militias. The Wagnerites and their allies were badly bruised by a thorough US air and artillery bombardment, and the incident was seen as very puzzling at a time when US-Russian deconflicting arrangements were still fully operational. In fact, the key question about the incident is whether the Russian command in Syria was aware of the Wagnerite plan or not. Wagner’s boss Yevgeny Prigozhin alleged that the Russian command knew, while the latter denied knowledge – hence claims by Prigozhin and his supporters that already at that time a jealous Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) was trying to undermine Wagner.
+
+Prigozhin’s claims can be interpreted as evidence of friction with the MoD, dating back to the early years of the Wagner Group. The narrative that emerges from both Syrian government and Russian government sources indicates, however, that until 2023, things were not so bad. Even after Prigozhin’s mutiny and subsequent death, Russian diplomatic and military sources rated Russia’s experience with mercenaries in Syria as quite positive. Syrian diplomatic, military and oil and gas industry sources were also adamant that the Russian authorities always defended Wagner against Syrian criticism and blocked Syrian attempts to take existing contracts, especially in the oil and gas sector, away from the group. It was only after the mutiny that the Russian authorities lifted their protection of Wagner and converged with the Syrians in terms of getting Wagnerites to leave the company or indeed the country.
+
+Having said this, Syrian sources all agree that they never had the impression that the Russian authorities were involved in Wagner’s expansion beyond the private military business and into oil and gas and related industries. The sources might, of course, have been unaware of Wagner’s arrangements with the Russian authorities, but it seems clear that Prigozhin was not sharing the bulk of his profits with the Kremlin authorities, other than paying some taxes in Russia. Given the shadowy nature of the business, one suspects that the taxes paid were a relatively small amount.
+
+Syrian views of Wagner and its operations in their country are not entirely negative. Wagner’s operations as a commando or shock force were seen as useful, given the shortage of aggressive, combat capable units in the Syrian armed forces and the unwillingness of the Russian MoD to commit regular Russian forces. Syrian businessmen who worked with Prigozhin were also generally happy about the collaboration: the extraordinary profits made by not paying taxes or customs were shared with Syrian business partners, who today describe that time as a bonanza.
+
+___`Wagner’s role in reclaiming control over Syrian oil and gas fields legitimised the exceptionally favourable conditions under which it was able to operate them afterwards`___
+
+For a period, Prigozhin also took care of keeping the political elites happy. The Assad family was rewarded by contracting companies it controls, for example. Over time, however, the jealousy of the Syrian economic and political elite grew, not least because the oil and gas sector is one of only a few ways to make any money in Syria. Prigozhin, perhaps reassured by the protection he enjoyed from the Russian authorities, did not feel he had to distribute Wagner’s profits beyond a narrow number of Syrian business partners and the minister of oil and gas.
+
+The initial justification for Wagner’s entry into the oil and gas sector was of course that it played a key role in reclaiming control over the fields. This legitimised the exceptionally favourable conditions under which Wagner was able to operate them afterwards. By June 2020, however, with the war effectively over, both Syrian powerbrokers, who were not receiving their share, and Syrian officials, who were not seeing any gains for a Syrian state struggling to raise enough revenue to sustain itself, grew critical of Wagner and its privileges.
+
+There is a stark contrast here with the situation that emerged in Mali after Wagner’s 2023 mutiny. In Mali, the Russian government tried to take the contract with the Malian government away from Wagner, but Bamako objected and insisted on keeping Wagner in the country. In the end, a compromise was worked out where 80% of the old contract stayed with Wagner. The Malian government did not want Russian PMC Redut, which is in fact a branch of the MoD, to take over from Wagner. It assessed that Wagner would be a more pliable tool in its hands than Redut.
+
+In Syria, not only did the government not object to the Russian government’s plans to expel Wagner from the country, but it actively endorsed them. As in Mali, however, the government showed little interest in an expansion of the role of Redut (which already operated in the country in parallel with Wagner). The Russian authorities are still trying to “sell” an expanded Redut role to the Syrians, but the lengthy negotiations demonstrate a distinct lack of enthusiasm on the Syrian side, which would rather do without any Russian private military or security involvement in the oil and gas sector.
+
+___`It is clear that by and large Russia was never in a position to offer full, pervasive and long-term protection for Wagner across the geographic range of its operations`___
+
+This seems to suggest that Wagner might only be replaceable by the likes of Redut to a limited extent, because customers do not want the Russian government to have too much say over how mercenaries are used. There are other reasons, too, as to why Wagner is hard to replace. According to senior staff of both Russian and Syrian companies previously operating under Wagner, once the Russian MoD took control of Wagner’s operations in the oil and gas sector, the profitability collapsed. This is not a matter of technical or managerial competence, because the staff have changed little, but of the shadowy business skills that were Prigozhin’s own turf. The Syrian authorities are now demanding that Russian companies in Syria pay taxes and customs.
+
+The paradox of the Wagner modus operandi in Syria was that it worked because of Prigozhin’s ability to break every rule, but it failed for the same reason. Prigozhin’s “wild capitalist” model was always bound to generate resistance, jealousies and criticism. Only by relying on the protection of the Russian state, which had huge leverage over the Syrian elite in 2015–20, could Prigozhin’s system work. Now the question is whether that model – assuming his son Pavel intends to continue with it – can operate autonomously and still turn out a profit.
+
+In Syria, the Prigozhin model was acceptable as long as the situation of extreme crisis allowed for little or no alternatives. Such a situation cannot last forever – it must evolve in one direction or another. Even if the model appears to be still viable for now in Mali and Central Africa, it is clear that by and large Russia was never in a position to offer full, pervasive and long-term protection for Wagner across the geographic range of its operations. Indeed, beyond Syria, the presence of the Russian state alongside Wagner deployments was always much thinner, and typically limited to diplomatic and technical support. This is a key difference between Prigozhin’s business model and that of, say, the British East India Company. Both models are/were driven by extreme rapaciousness, but the East India Company relied on a comparatively much greater ability of the British state to back up the Company’s “investments”.
+
+As a result, Prigozhin’s model was only really viable for relatively short burst of very intensive profit making. It might well have been designed with that in mind: in Syria, according to sources within Wagner’s financial operation, the organisation earned a war chest that continues to fund Wagner adventures elsewhere. As a venture capitalist, Prigozhin appears to have assumed that several of his operations would result in losses, but expected a few immensely successful ones to cover that and still leave a hefty profit, which might well have been the case.
+
+---
+
+__Antonio Giustozzi__ is a Senior Research Fellow in the Terrorism and Conflict team at RUSI. He has been working in and on Afghanistan since the 1990s, and has published extensively on the conflict there, and especially on the Taliban and the Islamic State.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-31-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-dictum.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-31-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-dictum.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..cbf949b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-31-trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-dictum.md
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【初選47人案・審訊判詞】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-05-31 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/cu04ZjQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "#墨落無悔 #民主派初選 #初選47人案 #港區國安法"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 官指無差別否決財案迫政府回應五大訴求 屬違《基本法》及濫權
+- 官：戴耀廷終極目標推翻現行制度 游說參與者 運用否決權成絕大部分人共識
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名組織及參與初選的民主派，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16名不認罪被告中，劉偉聰、李予信2人罪名不成立，其餘14人則罪名成立。本案指控被告串謀以「非法手段」，取得立法會過半議席後無差別否決財政預算案，迫使特首解散立法會及辭職。辯方提出多項法律爭議，包括控罪中的「非法手段」應僅限於武力相關及刑事罪行，又認為被告否決預算案不構成濫權。
+
+法官於長達337頁的判詞一一反駁，指《國安法》目的是防範及制止危害國安罪行，而立法會運作可被武力以外的手段癱瘓，例如網絡攻擊立會系統、生化或放射性物質攻擊議員，批評辯方狹窄詮釋會造成法律漏洞，是「荒謬、不合邏輯且有違《國安法》的目的」。法官亦認為，「非法手段」不限於刑事罪行，亦可涵蓋「違憲」行為。
+
+法官續指，立法會議員集體肩負憲制責任，需據預算案利弊作審核和通過，雖然立法會不應「自動及機械式地」通過政府議案，但大多數議員蓄意無差別否決預算案，明顯是違反《基本法》下的議員職權；而議員藉此迫政府回應五大訴求，亦違反擁護《基本法》的規定，構成濫權。法官又指，控方指控被告無差別否決預算案造成的「憲制危機」，令政府不能推出新政策等，必然構成「嚴重干擾、阻撓、破壞香港特別行政區政權機關依法履行職能」，足以構成「顛覆國家政權」。
+
+此外，辯方曾爭議被告案發時相信「35+」不可能，惟法庭認為只屬「事實上不可能」，而非「法律上不可能」，該罪行客觀上不可能成功，不構成辯護理由。
+
+
+
+#### 被指以「非法手段」犯案
+
+由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、陳仲衡、李運騰頒下的337判詞，主要處理法律爭議、整體案情、及各被告案情，本文處理法律爭議一部分。
+
+控方於本案指稱各被告達成協議參與一項謀劃，即串謀取得立會過半後，無差別否決預算案，迫使特首解散立法會及辭職。控方指控，被告違反《國安法》第22條，任何人組織、策劃、實施或參與實施「以武力、威脅使用武力或者其他非法手段」旨在顛覆國家政權行為，即屬犯罪，當中第3項「嚴重干擾、阻撓或破壞香港特區政權機關依法履行職能」。
+
+#### 官拒納「非法手段」僅限武力 稱非武力可癱立會、詮釋致法律漏洞
+
+就「非法手段」的定義，辯方爭議，根據「同類原則（Ejusdem Generis）」，控罪中的「非法手段」，應限於「使用武力或威脅使用武力」的非法手段，惟法庭不接納。法庭指，《國安法》首要目的是維護國家安全，而根據全國人大常委2020年5月22日作出的「說明」，鼓吹港獨自決、侮辱國旗國徽、煽動公衆仇恨、及癱瘓政府管治和立法會運作等「非暴力」行為，均可令國家安全受到破壞，《國安法》正是在此背景下制定；而全國人大5月28日通過制定《國安法》的「決定」，也指出要防範、制止及懲治「任何」分裂國家、顛覆國家政權等嚴重危害國安的行為和活動。
+
+法庭認為，5.22說明和5.28決定提及「任何」活動，非單指武力相關的活動，因此辯方將「非法手段」狹義詮釋為限制於武力相關，是「荒謬、不合邏輯且有違《國安法》的目的」。法庭指，不難預計，立法會運作可被「武力或威脅使用武力」以外不同方式、形式或方法癱瘓，例如針對資訊科技、通訊和能源系統的網絡攻擊，能令立法會完全停止運作；立法會議員和職員，也可受到生化或放射性物質的攻擊。
+
+法庭又指，若就「非法手段」採用狹義詮釋，則以非暴力手段如放火、放毒氣及散播病原體等攻擊政府設施，即使與武力手段造成同等後果，甚至更為嚴重，在《國安法》下也不會被懲治。辯方曾稱可以恐怖活動罪處理，惟法庭指兩者目的非常不同，除非將「非法手段」的意思擴至「極限」（breaking point），否則辯方詮釋會造成法律漏洞（lacuna）及荒謬，會過份地限制《國安法》的範圍，亦因此減低其用作維護國安的有效性，有違立法目的。
+
+
+▲ 立法會（資料圖片）
+
+#### 官拒納「非法手段」僅限刑事罪行 稱可涵蓋違憲行為
+
+辯方亦爭議，「非法手段」應限於刑事罪行，否則會令《國安法》22條範圍過於廣泛和有欠肯定。法庭同樣不接納，認為此詮釋同樣有違《國安法》立法目的。法庭指，立法會運作能被不屬刑事罪行的手段癱瘓，亦「不能想像任何旨在顛覆國家政權的行為或活動，不論其形式及方法，可被視為可接受和可容忍」。
+
+法庭又指，如條文僅限於指刑事罪行，全國人大立法時可列明「刑事手段（criminal means）」，惟最終使用較一般（generic）的字眼，明顯與辯方陳詞相反，指辯方解讀不僅令第22條過份複雜、甚至多餘，亦是要求控方在罪行中證明罪行（prove a crime with a crime），嚴重減低第22條防範和制止危害國安罪行的有效性。
+
+法庭續指，《國安法》中出現了5次「非法」字眼，認為「非法」一詞足夠廣闊，可涵蓋違反憲法（unconstitutional）、違反法律的行為，或其他不跟隨正當程序（not following the proper procedure）而屬一般意義上「非法」的行為；但若採用辯方解讀，則會導致「非法」在《國安法》條文內有不同意思，令條文內部不一致。考慮到《國安法》目的是建立健全維護國安的法律制度和執行機制，及防範顛覆國家政權，因此「非法手段」不限於刑事行為及刑事罪行。
+
+至於民事過失是否足以構成非法手段，法庭認為無需就此事表達肯定意見，指在本案中，法庭只須指出違反《基本法》是否足以構成非法手段。
+
+
+▲ 初選案第一被告戴耀廷（資料圖片）
+
+#### 官：毋須證被告知手段屬「非法」
+
+至於辯方爭議，被告或真誠誤信戴耀廷提倡的手段屬合法，控方須證明被告知悉行為屬非法。法庭也不接納，認為條文中的「非法」只是形容罪行中的犯罪行為（actus reus），而非犯罪意圖（mens rea），就如與13歲以下女童發生性行為罪行，亦無須證明被告案發時知道其行為是非法，否則被告可基於對法律的無知提出辯解。法庭認為，控方無須證明被告知道有關手段屬「非法手段」，但須證明被告作出行為時具意圖「顛覆國家政權」。
+
+#### 官：嚴重干擾破壞政權機關履行職能 足構成「顛覆國家政權」
+
+針對控罪提及「旨在顛覆國家政權」，辯方爭議，「顛覆國家政權」沒有清晰定義。法庭認為應按立法目的詮釋，將《辭海》中「政權」的定義，以及《釋義及通則條例》和《基本法》中就「國家」和「權、權力」的定義，應用在《國安法》，認為「國家政權」意指特區政府的各種權力，及政府不同組織例如政府部門所履行的職能。
+
+至於「顛覆」，法庭援引《辭海》及《牛津英語辭典》，當中「顛覆」指「顛倒，倒翻，傾敗」、「干擾（disturb）或推翻（overthrow）」、「弱化或破壞（weakening or destruction）」國家或政府等。法庭又引5.22說明，提到各樣針對政府的敵對行為，令香港國安風險「日益突顯」。
+
+法庭認為，考慮到「顛覆」的通常及字面涵義、導致《國安法》制定的社會背景，以及法庭對「國家政權」的理解，認為《國安法》第22條所指「嚴重干擾、阻撓、破壞香港特別行政區政權機關依法履行職能」的行為，足以構成「顛覆國家政權」的行為；而意圖作出相關行為的人，亦必然意圖顛覆國家政權，形容《國安法》第22條是一條「自我定義（self-defining）」的條文，意味意圖干犯條文下行為的人，便會構成顛覆。
+
+
+▲ 2019年12月8日，國際人權日遊行。（資料圖片）
+
+#### 官：無差別否決迫政府回應五大訴求 明顯違《基本法》、構成濫權
+
+法庭就「非法手段」及「顛覆國家政權」的定義作出了其詮釋，那到底被告本案被指無差別否決預算案、濫用《基本法》第73條下的議員職權，是否構成「非法手段」、「顛覆國家政權」？
+
+根據《基本法》第73條，立法會職權為「根據政府的提案，審核、通過財政預算」。法庭指根據《基本法》第48條、62條及73條，是由政府編制財政預算案，立法會審核，再由行政長官簽署後報中央人民政府備案。法庭認為，立法會議員「顯然集體肩負憲制責任，在需要時依據財政預算案的利弊，對之審核和通過」。
+
+法庭續指，雖然立法會不被期望亦不應「自動及機械式地」通過政府提出的議案，但大多數議員蓄意拒絕按預算案的內容與利弊作審核，明顯是違反《基本法》第73條及《國安法》第3條；而如大多數議員計劃無差別否決預算案，以迫使政府答應他們的政治議程，那便會構成濫權。
+
+就辯方爭議被告擁有議會特權，法庭不認為適用於本案，指控方是指控被告在當選立法會議員前已達成協議，他們並未享有任何特權；而被告行為違反《基本法》，議會特權明顯不會涵蓋這些公開表明意圖違反憲制責任的立法會議員。法庭又強調，無論如何，議會特權並非絕對特權，又指《國安法》第3條賦予行政、立法及司法機關責任防範、制止和懲治危害國安行為，「有見及此，法庭看不出審訊一宗如本案，即涉及顛覆國家政權指控的案件時，為何不能審視背後的動機或意圖」。
+
+#### 官：2021年《釋義》修訂助本案詮釋何謂「濫權」
+
+法庭又指，《基本法》第104條要求立法會議員必須宣誓擁護《基本法》，以及宣誓效忠香港特區。雖然政府在2021年5月才於《釋義及通則條例》新增第3AA條，列明「不屬」擁護《基本法》及效忠香港特區的行為，包括「無差別地反對特區政府提出的議案」，意圖要脅或推翻政府等，但法庭認為修例並非新增法例，只是令現行條文更加清晰、鞏固和更清楚解釋以往原則，法庭認為該條文對於本案詮釋什麼構成「濫權」提供了支持。
+
+法庭續指，因此無差別否決政府提出的預算案或公共開支，以迫使政府回應五大訴求，一直（all along）都違反《基本法》第73條和104條內擁護《基本法》的規定，「若此等行為具有嚴重破壞政府或行政長官權力和權威的意圖，更不在話下」。
+
+
+▲ 2020年7月15日，抗爭派記者會。（資料圖片）
+
+#### 官：無差別否決必嚴重破壞政權機關履行職能
+
+就被告被控的串謀罪，法官指，控方須證明被告同意與至少一名共謀者，串謀作出一連串行為，並干犯《國安法》第22條的罪行；而本案所指的行為，就是在2020年立法會選舉取得立會過半，無差別否決預算案，以迫使特首回應五大訴求，特首若拒絕就須解散立法會，並須按《基本法》的機制辭職。
+
+而法庭認為，被告懷涉案犯罪意圖，無差別否決預算案，造成控方指控的「憲制危機」，以迫使特首回應五大訴求，是必然導致「嚴重干擾、阻撓、破壞香港特別行政區政權機關依法履行職能」。
+
+法官續解釋，就辯方根據《基本法》第50至52條，爭議立法會否決預算案後，特首仍可申請臨時撥款、政府亦可再提出另一個預算案；法官認為若被告協議不按預算案優劣否決，迫使政府回應五大訴求，則不可能批准臨時撥款申請，亦會不顧議案優劣否決第二份預算案。至於特首在立法會被解散時，可按上一財政年度的開支標準批准臨時短期撥款，法官指這代表政府不能推出任何新政策或為改善人民生活增加開支，會嚴重破壞或阻撓特區政權機關履行職能。
+
+#### 官：35+不可能非辯護理由
+
+法庭續指，辯方曾爭議被告案發時相信「35+」不可能，因政府或DQ民主派，或未能在功能組別取得足夠議席，惟法庭認為，此議題只是「事實上不可能」（factual impossibility），而非「法律上不可能」（legal impossibility），考慮到控罪的所有元素，該罪行客觀上不可能成功，不會構成辯護理由，該串謀仍可被納入罪行。不過法庭補充，控方除了須證明被告有意無差別否決，亦要證明他們有意顛覆國家政權。
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】47名組織及參與初選的民主派，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，16名不認罪被告中，劉偉聰、李予信2人罪名不成立，其餘14人則罪名成立。就本案事實爭議，法官裁定，戴耀廷是「35+計劃」大腦及主要推手，首先提出立會過半的構想，並提倡運用否決權作手段，迫使特首對五大訴求讓步，若不回應就須辭職；惟法官指，五大訴求實際上不可能，戴終極目標是推翻現行政治制度。
+
+法官指，公民黨最初未有決定，但其後改變立場，於3月召記招表明否決所有政府議案，涉案串謀協議最早於2020年3月已存在；其後戴繼續游說協調會議參與者跟隨其理念和目標，並向所有人發協議文件，聲明運用否決權。法官指，所有協調會議參與者均清楚知道計劃目標，而曾對否決權有保留的社民連、民主黨其後也改變立場，在初選提名期結束前，運用否決權已成絕大部分參選人達成的共識。至戴耀廷稱毋須簽協議後，鄒家成等人發起的「墨落無悔」聲明，進一步證明各區已就運用否決權達成協議，並加強參選人基本決心，以宣揚戴的目標。
+
+
+▲ 2020年3月25日，公民黨召開記者會。（資料圖片）
+
+#### 被指以「非法手段」犯案
+
+由3名國安法指定法官陳慶偉、陳仲衡、李運騰頒下的337頁判詞，主要處理法律爭議、整體案情、及各被告案情，本文處理整體案情一部分。
+
+控方於本案指稱各被告達成協議參與一項謀劃，即串謀取得立會過半後，無差別否決預算案，迫使特首解散立法會及辭職，違反《國安法》第22條顛覆國家政權。
+
+判詞指，就本案的事實裁定，關乎案發時是否有控方指稱的串謀協議存在；以及如有，被告對謀劃是否知情、是否謀劃一分子，及有否意圖顛覆國家政權，並以該意圖參與謀劃。
+
+#### 官：戴耀廷首先構想爭立會過半
+
+就串謀的起始，法官指無爭議在立法會贏取過半數議席的構想，是源於戴耀廷。他2019年12月在《蘋果日報》發表〈立會奪半、走向真普選重要一步〉一文，其想法引起泛民主派的注意；而2019年區選大勝後，民主派開始探討2020年立會選舉取得過半數議席的方法。
+
+判詞指，2020年1月數名民主派人物的飯局，探討設立協調機制以免浪費選票，戴較堅持舉行初選，構想出「35+計劃」，戴會上亦提及否決預算案和製造「大殺傷力憲制武器」。戴耀廷與區諾軒其後一同籌備計劃，會見不同政黨和人士，判詞形容計劃有兩名組織者，戴作為大腦，區負責協調聯絡。
+
+
+▲ 戴耀廷、區諾軒（資料圖片）
+
+#### 官：協議最早於2020年3月存在
+
+判詞指，二人先與公民黨會面，該黨當時尚有猶豫，但於3月25日的記者會完全改變取態，時任黨魁楊岳橋稱若特首不回應五大訴求，「以後每一個法案、財政撥款申請、財委會撥款申請，我哋都會否決，呢個亦都係一個莊嚴嘅承諾」，又指望達成35+，一同否決預算案。法官認為毫無疑問，至少楊岳橋、或譚文豪、郭家麒當天已成為協議一分子，涉案協議最早於2020年3月已存在，否則就是同年6月9日的初選記者會開始。
+
+#### 官：「35+計劃」終極目標推翻現行政治制度
+
+法官續指，戴發表多篇文章宣傳「35+計劃」、及行使否決權作為手段迫使特首對五大訴求讓步，包括〈立會過半是大殺傷力憲制武器〉及〈真攬炒十步 這是香港宿命〉。2020年3及4月時，「35+計劃」的終極目標和用意已非常清晰，戴亦已向公眾表明，就是要利用涉案謀劃破壞、摧毀或推翻香港特區根據《基本法》和「一國兩制」原則，所建立的現行政治制度及體制。
+
+#### 官：爭立會過半只是手段非目標
+
+法官續指，控方證人區諾軒強調辦初選初心只是爭取立會過半，而「攬炒」則是否決預算案致政府停擺，惟法官不接納，認為基於戴耀廷清楚表明的終極目標，區會知道「35+計劃」就是第一步（starting point），會引起連鎖反應。法官又指，爭取立會過半「只是手段，不是目標」，而區一直知道戴「35+計劃」的目標，不單是取得立會過半。
+
+#### 官：運用否決權成絕大部分人共識
+
+就涉案協議是否存在，控方於本案依賴協調會議及不同文件舉證。法官指，戴出席了所有協調會議，「的確是『35+計劃』的大腦和主要推手」，並信納戴耀廷曾向所有協調會議參與者發放有關「35+計劃」文件，當中列明只有認同五大訴求的人能參與。
+
+法官又指，無爭議各區協調會議後，共有4個項目達成共識，包括辦初選、辦選舉論壇、目標議席數目及替補機制；而它們全屬正式選舉前的實際流程安排、「非政治性」，與如何達成「五大訴求，缺一不可」無甚關係，純粹是盡量增加民主派立會議員數目的機制、與上述「手段」相關。雖然當中不包括「運用否決權」，但法官認為協調過程絕非止於協調會議；又肯定「目標」應是戴耀廷和參與者關心的更重要議題。
+
+法官續指，戴耀廷當然知道不是所有人認同否決預算案，但他繼續努力推廣對他至為重要的理念，毫無疑問，在所有協調會議結束直至提名期完結前，除少數仍有保留及無參與初選的人士外，「運用否決權」已成為絕大部分（vast majority）參選人達成的共識。雖然部分政黨如社民連和民主黨曾表達保留或反對，但他們不知何故（somehow）決定改變立場，戴耀廷亦繼續游說參與者跟隨他的理念和目標。根據所有 WhatsApp 訊息，沒有被告曾明確反對運用否決權。
+
+#### 官：信戴曾向所有人發協議、聲明運用否決權
+
+就協調機制文件，雖然除施德來外的作供被告均稱無收過，但法官指，考慮到戴耀廷曾索取所有協調會議參與者的電話號碼，無理由該文件不會被派發，信納戴在每次會議後均準備摘要並向所有參與者發放。法官又指，在所有由戴製備的協調機制文件中，均清楚說明初選的作用及目的，參與者聲明一旦當選，會「積極運用」或會「運用」《基本法》賦予立法會的權力否決預算案。
+
+#### 官：「墨落無悔」顯示已達協議否決、加強參選人決心
+
+法官續指，6月9日初選記者會前，戴耀廷曾向所有組織者發訊息，指經過3個月的協調，泛民主派終於達成協議；而戴在當天記者會宣布不要求參選人簽署協議，因不想製造更多人被DQ的風險。法官認為，若協調會議只就上述4項達成共識，看不出有任何理由足以成為DQ的風險。
+
+
+▲ 2020年6月9日，立會35+初選記者會。（資料圖片）
+
+法官續指，當戴聲明不要求簽署協議時，鄒家成、梁晃維及張可森決定製作「非官方」協議，肯定組織者的決定令較進取的參與人，即使不至於不滿和憤怒，也難免失望。誠如鄒家成所稱，其財政資源緊絀，沒有主流政黨支援，對他來說，抗爭意志及初選敗選者承諾不參選正式選舉，至為重要，法庭肯定上述3人發起「墨落無悔」聲明起源於此。
+
+法官又指，聲明內容與各區最終協議相似，無疑是對戴稱毋須簽聲明的回應；而3人曾受訪稱對戴決定失望，若協調會議無就運用否決權達成共識，懷疑3人不會有如此大反應。法官又指，其他被告其後簽署聲明，更進一步支持所有選區已就運用否決權達成協議，而「墨落無悔」與協調協議互相補足，前者是附加機制（additional mechanism），進一步加強參選人宣揚戴耀廷目標的基本決心。
+
+
+▲ 張可森、鄒家成、梁晃維（資料圖片）
+
+#### 官：所有參與者均清楚知道計劃目標
+
+就所有參選被告均提交的提名表格，法官指，戴耀廷非常小心，提名表格僅列出「我確認支持和認同由戴耀廷及區諾軒主導之協調會議共識，包括『民主派35+公民投票計劃』及其目標」。區諾軒曾稱如有人問及「目標」是什麼，會答是共同綱領，但無人問及，法官認為，所有協調會議參與者均清楚知道（knew perfectly well）計劃目標是什麼。按金收據同樣列明，如違反共識將不發還按金，法官指，可見組織者強調除非該人同意他們的意圖和理念，否則不應前來。
+
+法官續指，透過參與協調會議、聽戴耀廷說話、收到協調文件、簽署「墨落無悔」和提名表格，所有參與者均知道運用否決權及其目標，所有參與者均成為謀劃的一分子。
+
+#### 官：戴《國安法》後稱參選人達協議否決、「共謀者原則」適用
+
+法官續指，《國安法》生效後，戴在2020年7月的記者會上提到，「35+計劃」其中一個目標是取得立會過半，運用權力否決預算案，亦提到解散立法會。而在初選後的7月13日記招，戴指參選人將遵守已達成的協議，及承諾運用權力否決預算案；翌日再發帖稱參選人已在協調會議達成否決預算案的協議。法庭認為，「共謀者原則」適用，戴所說的話可用來指證所有被告。
+
+
+▲ 2020年7月13日記者招待會（資料圖片）
+
+抗爭派其後於7月15日舉行記者會，岑敖暉表明會無差別否決預算案，在場的何桂藍、鄒家成及余慧明均無表示反對。
+
+#### 官：五大訴求實際上不可能
+
+立法會正式選舉最終因疫情延期，法官指若「35+計劃」得以進行，被告意圖造成的後果，是迫使特首對五大訴求讓步，若不回應就得辭職。法官認為不應忽視的是，口號不只是「五大訴求」，而是「五大訴求，缺一不可」，即五項訴求必須俱全；而要求特首下台一直都是訴求之一。
+
+法官續指，五大訴求實際上是不可能的追求，正如區諾軒所指，即使最容易達成的訴求，即成立獨立調查委員會，亦於2019年被時任特首拒絕；而直至現在，除撤回逃犯條例修訂草案外，其他訴求皆不獲回應。
+
+#### 官：戴推想特首下台並非如辯方稱空洞
+
+法官續指，否決預算案一次本身，並不能達到戴耀廷計劃的終極目標，亦難以形容為「大殺傷力武器」；因此當戴提及否決預算案概念時，毫無疑問他指的是《基本法》第50至52條中整體否決權力及其後果，即解散立法會及特首辭職。
+
+法官續指，運用否決權僅為手段，特首因預算案否決兩次後別無他選須辭職，因此戴推想的「攬炒十步」，引申至特首下台的第七步，當中想法「或許並非如辯方所說般空洞（hollow）」。
+
+#### 官：無差別否決造成憲制危機
+
+法官又指，即使特首選擇不解散立法會，但過半民主派仍會否決任何臨時撥款；而即使《基本法》容許特首在立法會被解散時，按上一財政年度開支標準批准臨時短期撥款，這亦代表政府執行任何新政策都必遭嚴重阻礙、基本上都要煞停，「政府及特首的權力和權威會被大大破壞」。法庭套用區諾軒的說法，指這會造成香港的「憲制危機」。
+
+法庭終指，若各方懷有如控罪所指的意圖來進行涉案謀劃，必然構成「嚴重干擾、阻撓、破壞香港特別行政區政權機關依法履行職能的行為」，或令成功的候選人參與。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC69/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-03-no-silver-bullets.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-03-no-silver-bullets.md
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--- /dev/null
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+---
+layout: post
+title : No Silver Bullets
+author: Matthew Savill
+date : 2024-06-03 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/MSdbJSv.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Removing Constraints on Support to Ukraine"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Removing restrictions on the use of weapons supplied to Ukraine by international partners will help Ukraine’s defence against Russia, but it is not a war-winning move on its own._
+
+
+
+Overnight on 30 May, media reporting claimed that US President Joe Biden had apparently relaxed restrictions on the use of US weapons against targets in Russia. This followed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky voicing his frustration at the continued existence of such limitations. The issue has been given extra relevance by Russian forces based in Belgorod launching a new operation around Kharkiv, and has been taken up by the NATO Secretary-General and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Journalists and analysts have been left to parse the meaning and phrasing of every (ambiguous) sentence uttered by Western politicians on the subject.
+
+
+### Current Ukrainian Operations and Existing Constraints
+
+The start point, on which everyone seems to be in agreement, is that it is both legitimate and legal for Ukraine to attack military targets on Russian territory. It is defending itself against a Russian attack and can respond under Article 51 of the UN Charter, having been engaged in an International Armed Conflict since 2014. Provided it acts in accordance with International Humanitarian Law, it has a wide range of targets from which to choose, including oil and fuel production facilities which, while they may have a civilian function, are also contributing to the Russian war machine – so-called “dual use facilities”. Added to this would be the airbases for long-range Russian bombers that have been launching strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure and other civilian targets; military production facilities; ammunition dumps and storage facilities for other materiel; and a variety of military bases including the Russian ports for the Black Sea Fleet.
+
+The suggestion of caveats first appeared with the provision of sophisticated and mostly longer-range weapons that arrived in mid-2022 and early 2023, from multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) like the US HIMARS and UK M270, to cruise missiles like the UK Storm Shadow and French SCALP. Biden stated at the time that HIMARS would not be used against targets in Russia, and it later emerged that technical alterations had been made to ensure this was not possible. Meanwhile, UK statements on the use of Storm Shadow heavily emphasised its use inside Ukraine (including areas illegally annexed by Russia, like Crimea), mirroring apparent restrictions on the use of UK M270. The overriding concern in these early debates was the risk of escalation involved in any Russian response to the provision of more sophisticated and more threatening weapons.
+
+___`Removing restrictions on HIMARS and other MLRS systems, as well as Ukrainian artillery firing Western-supplied ammunition, would allow Ukraine to strike massing Russian forces and conduct counter-battery fire against artillery situated just over the border`___
+
+That debate continues to rage, with the benefit of two years’ observations on Russian rhetoric and actions, including strikes against Ukrainian civilian targets and growing suggestions of a Russian sabotage campaign inside Europe. But alongside the serious consideration of managing this escalation (or calling Russia’s bluff) should be a discussion on the military utility of – and possible targets for – such weapons. Ukraine is already running a deep strike campaign using drones against a range of targets, occasionally hitting Moscow itself, but more frequently striking refineries and production facilities. These attacks reduce supplies going directly to Russian forces, and also cut revenue used to fund the war. In addition, a campaign against bomber airfields has destroyed both long-range bombers and smaller fighter-bombers. Some of these attacks have used drones and have taken place at extreme ranges of over 1,000 miles, but there also appears to be an element of infiltration and ground sabotage against bases and rail links, including some over 3,000 miles from Ukraine. Finally, Ukraine’s use of both air and maritime drones against the Black Sea Fleet has sunk a number of ships and even threatened the port at Novorossiysk. What, then, would other weapons add?
+
+
+### The Value of Deep Strike
+
+The answer is that the types of targets and the defences around them work against the drone programme. First, the drones used by Ukraine tend to be slow and have limited payloads. They use sheer numbers to get through to targets, and although they have very long ranges – it can be hard, especially in the face of Russian air defences – to get sufficient numbers through to cause major and long-lasting damage, especially against hardened targets or those under cover. Flight time can vary, but for long-distance targets is sufficient to give the Russians early warning, which necessitates Ukrainian mass or much closer (and riskier) infiltration operations. For the long-distance and relatively predictable targets, this may be enough, but Ukraine needs firepower that it can bring to bear rapidly and with little warning. This is where ATACMS – with multiple variants – comes into play, and it could provide a valuable weapon for striking airbases hosting both fighter-bombers and attack helicopters, as well as rear-area logistics and ammunition dumps. Depending on which variants have been provided, both cluster and unitary warheads have ranges of up to 190 miles, providing a threat to static locations, such as in Belgorod, Voronezh, Kursk and maybe even Lipetsk oblasts.
+
+Longer-range air defence systems could also play a role, albeit with some significant risks involved. Russian bombers mostly launch their cruise missiles within Russian airspace, so the launching aircraft are outside the ranges of systems like IRIS-T (15 miles) or point defence like Starstreak (5 miles). The same is true of some aircraft launching glide bombs, which are currently being used to devastating effect both on civilian areas and Ukrainian forces on the front line. Some can be released from 25 miles away; in the north this can be done from Russia. They are almost impossible to intercept, and this can only be achieved at great cost with expensive missiles used for multiple incoming bombs. Ideally, launch aircraft would be caught on the ground, but as a fallback, a surface-to-air missile (SAM) system like Patriot – with a range of around 100 miles (depending on the target) – could be pushed closer to the front line to shoot down Russian aircraft before release. So-called “SAMbushes” involve removing launchers from around infrastructure and putting them at greater risk of attack, but pose a challenge to Russian aircraft which currently fire from airspace where they believe themselves to be safe. There is some doubt over the extent to which this represents a “strike” on Russian “territory”, but media reporting suggests there has been disquiet over the use of German systems, which at least indicates the expectation of some kind of existing constraint.
+
+The new development which raises the question of a potentially unintended constraint being rendered nonsensical by changes on the ground is the Russian assault towards Kharkiv and the massing of forces over the border from Sumy. Up until now, the “close” fight has largely been conducted unambiguously on Ukrainian territory. In the case of Kharkiv, the proximity to the border means that Russian assault forces have been able to mass and assemble inside Belgorod, and artillery fire from within Russia can reach Ukrainian forces along the front. Removing restrictions on “standard” HIMARS and other MLRS systems, as well as standard Ukrainian tube artillery firing Western-supplied 152mm and 155mm ammunition, would allow the Ukrainians to at least strike massing Russian forces and conduct counter-battery fire against artillery situated just over the border. In the case of HIMARS it would allow the Ukrainians to out-range the equivalent Russian guns (although reporting has indicated there is effective Russian interference with guided projectiles).
+
+___`The lesson of the past 18 months is that the deep battle complements fighting close-in and along the front line, but is not a substitute for it`___
+
+Perhaps surprising by their absence from this priority list are the Storm Shadow and SCALP missiles. While these would be useful for arms dumps, command locations and logistics targets with protection against drones, their (publicly-acknowledged) range of around 160 miles means that the launch point for the Ukrainian aircraft carrying them comes uncomfortably close to Russian air defences if the target is deep within Russia. For this reason, both have been used on targets much closer to the front line, including in and around Crimea. The provision of German Taurus, with a slightly larger warhead and a range up around 300 miles, could make striking deeper targets in Russia much more feasible, or bring additional firepower to bear on targets further south around Crimea, including the Kerch Bridge, where Russian air defences have already been degraded.
+
+
+### Keeping the Russians Guessing
+
+It is worth concluding with an acknowledgement of the military benefits of ambiguity and what a change in policy would not achieve. The public Western position around the use of such weapons has been hugely variable; UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron, for example, did not explicitly say UK-supplied weapons could be used in Russia, and many of the recent statements of support have been generic. Beyond the question of escalation management, it would be prudent to keep Russia guessing about what sophisticated weapons may or may not be used against its forces, because this poses dilemmas about what mix of air defence systems to deploy and what level of dispersal or early-warning systems may be necessary. We can assume that Storm Shadow (for example) has not yet been fired against a Russian target as no components have emerged from debris, but the potential exists if the right tone is struck. It may also be the case that, behind the scenes, some constraints have already been lifted. At sea, the UK has retrospectively claimed credit for the use of maritime drones against the Black Sea Fleet. Given the UK’s role, alongside others, in providing support to Ukrainian drone programmes, it is possible that a number of countries have already provided components for weapons that have struck Russian targets. The ambiguity over this support not only evades questions of escalation, but also provides few clues for Russia that would allow it to prepare countermeasures until after such weapons can be used.
+
+
+### Larger Challenges Remain
+
+At the same time, caution should be taken not to see a change in policy as a panacea for Ukraine’s current challenges. The successful campaign against Russian energy infrastructure has not forced Russia to reassess its campaign overall. The long-range bomber force has had to disperse and has reduced its strike capabilities, but has not ended attacks on civilian infrastructure. The decimation of the Black Sea Fleet has reopened exports from Odesa, but made little contribution to the ability of 2023’s counteroffensive to retake lost territory. And strikes on arms dumps behind the front lines and sabotage within Russia have reduced the flow of materiel going to the Russian army, but not to the extent that it has had to fall back. The lesson of the past 18 months is that the deep battle complements fighting close-in and along the front line, but is not a substitute for it. Striking forces across the border from Kharkiv will provide some immediate relief to Ukrainian forces and be of significant tactical benefit; in doctrinal terms, this is a “close battle” that happens to straddle the border with Russia. Overall, the challenges for Ukraine in 2024 and potential answers remain the same as before this decision: resupply of equipment and ammunition, recruitment and training of personnel, and effective defences to prevent or slow down Russian ground advances. Deep strike is not a silver bullet.
+
+---
+
+__Matthew Savill__ is the Director of Military Sciences at RUSI, focussing on developments and trends in modern conflict, and the use of force in the 21st Century.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-03-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-87.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-03-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-87.md
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-03-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-87.md
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【黎智英案・審訊第 87 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-06-03 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 辯方指黎智英身體不適、打冷顫 官提議送院檢查 押後至明日續審
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（3日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第87日審訊。控方打算繼續播放黎智英在《國安法》生效之前的受訪片段，惟辯方指黎身體不適，明顯可見正在「打冷顫」，又指昨晚黎見了醫生，惟只獲處方止痛藥。法官杜麗冰提議安排黎送院接受檢查，並且今天不應在黎缺席下續審，遂押後至明日續審。
+
+甫開庭，代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻表示不幸地有一個壞消息要報告法庭，因黎智英身體不適，現時明顯地可見被告欄內的他正在「打冷顫」，又指昨晚黎見了醫生，惟只獲處方止痛藥（Panadol）。庭上所見，黎能夠自行步入及步出被告欄，他今天身穿啡色大褸上庭，而非平日所穿的普通外套。
+
+法官杜麗冰聽罷指，黎需要送院接受進一步身體檢查，不認為今天的審訊要在黎不在場下繼續，又表示理解黎有相當年紀及最近天氣不佳。杜官指示辯方律師在今日下午4時再了解情況及醫生意見，並且通知法庭。控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行則表示會與懲教人員和警方溝通以作出安排。
+
+黎一度在被告欄內與律師團隊溝通，其後彭耀鴻向法官轉述黎智英擔心自己浪費在座所有人的時間。法官杜麗冰則稱沒有問題，最重要是黎在感到舒服的情況下才能繼續審訊，最終押後案件至明日不早於上午11時續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC51/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-04-framing-sanctions.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-04-framing-sanctions.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..730fd3e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-04-framing-sanctions.md
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Framing Sanctions
+author: Balázs Gyimesi
+date : 2024-06-04 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/c6T4Uth.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "EU Strategic Communications to Support Sanctions Against Russia"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_This paper examines the question: How does the EU use strategic communications to persuade third countries to cooperate on sanctions? The paper analyses how the EU is using arguments linked to upholding values and appealing to the interests of third countries._
+
+
+
+Diplomacy and strategic communications are key to making sanctions effective. Tackling the challenge of sanctions circumvention requires the cooperation of non-sanctioning (or third) countries, and sanctions diplomacy plays an important role in persuading them to cooperate. This paper offers a data-driven analysis of the EU’s strategic communications on sanctions against Russia, showing that the EU relies mostly on addressing interests (such as EU accession and economic interests) and framing support for sanctions as economically or politically desirable for third countries. To a lesser degree, values also play a role in the EU’s outreach, mostly in relation to protecting the principles of international law. This is in line with EU foreign policy’s broader shift to focusing more on interests.
+
+On the issue of sanctions circumvention, EU sanctions diplomacy applies a “stick and carrot” approach to both warn third countries of the potential negative impact on their economies if they allow such activities, and praise the efforts of countries that pledge to tackle circumvention. This communication implies that becoming a platform for circumvention can lead to reputational damage, resulting in fewer investments.
+
+However, the EU takes a different communication approach towards EU candidates than towards other third countries. Regarding the wider set of third countries, the EU generally accepts their wish not to align on sanctions, and only aims to compel them to tackle circumvention. On the other hand, EU candidate countries are reminded of their commitment to align with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy as part of the accession process, including alignment on sanctions.
+
+On values, the EU links cooperation on sanctions to defending the values of international law, offering third countries an opportunity to frame their support for sanctions as a way to help uphold the principles of international law, rather than framing them as explicit measures against Russia.
+
+The EU should focus on tracking policy developments in third countries, following their pledges to tackle circumvention, and adjust EU sanctions diplomacy accordingly. The EU should also resort more strongly to highlighting the requirement for EU candidate countries to align with sanctions. For other third countries, the EU should offer framings that highlight international norms and explore different options, such as environmental concerns surrounding Russia’s shadow fleet.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+Since February 2022, the EU and its allies have adopted a series of sanctions to respond to Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. A key challenge of making these restrictive measures effective is the tackling of circumvention, as redirecting trade of sanctioned goods through third countries can diminish the impact of sanctions. However, beyond stricter enforcement within the EU, this also requires the cooperation of non-sanctioning countries, as taking action to hinder circumvention through their territory is their sovereign choice.
+
+The paper examines the following question: How does the EU use strategic communications to persuade third countries to cooperate on sanctions? The paper analyses how the EU is using arguments linked to upholding values (supporting sanctions to protect the values of international law) and appealing to third countries’ interests (such as EU accession and economic interests) in its strategic communications on sanctions.
+
+The EU has taken several steps to close loopholes and strengthen the role of sanctions diplomacy – in other words, diplomatic efforts “to persuade [third] countries to follow suit”. As the paper demonstrates, however, in the case of the EU, sanctions diplomacy has been used not only to persuade countries to follow suit, but also to incentivise third countries to address circumvention.
+
+The 12th sanctions package of the EU, adopted in December 2023, has strengthened its anti-circumvention measures, which were already put at the top of the agenda in the 11th sanctions package in June 2023. Furthermore, the 13th package, adopted in February 2024, listed several companies in third countries that have been involved in sanctions circumvention. The EU’s diplomatic efforts to tackle sanctions evasion have also been supported by the appointment of the International Special Envoy for the Implementation of EU Sanctions (EU sanctions envoy) at the end of 2022.
+
+At the same time, several third countries have been expressing their reservations about and even opposition to sanctions. Latin American countries reportedly advocated for omitting mentions of support for Ukraine from the July 2023 EU-CELAC summit declaration. South Africa claimed sanctions against Russia were causing collateral damage to “bystander countries”. India has been denying criticisms that the country would be facilitating sanctions circumvention by reselling refined Russian oil.
+
+These developments underline the need for constructive dialogue between the sanctions senders and third countries. They also highlight the importance of the public element of the EU’s sanctions diplomacy, namely the EU’s strategic communications as a “goal-directed communication activity”.
+
+Research on the perceived challenges of the EU’s strategic communications on sanctions has been relatively sparse. Nevertheless, existing literature contends that the EU’s strategic communications on sanctions have been driven by values rather than interests. This also led to the suggestion that the EU should reformulate its sanctions diplomacy “with more focus on the interests of states in joining the collective sanctions against Russia”. This paper argues that the EU’s strategic communications on sanctions have been focusing on interest-based arguments, in line with a shift towards highlighting interests in the EU’s foreign policy, as discussed in Chapter I.
+
+The paper is comprised of three chapters. Chapter I examines the role of sanctions diplomacy, the factors influencing third countries’ approaches to sanctions, and the EU’s shifting foreign policy, which form the context of the EU’s strategic communications on sanctions. Chapter II breaks down the communications strategies of EU officials in relation to Russia sanctions using a data-driven approach including an expert survey and word frequency analysis. Chapter III interprets the results and examines how the EU’s strategic communications on sanctions have balanced values- and interest-based communications in relation to the countries visited by the EU sanctions envoy. The paper concludes with a set of recommendations on how the EU can optimise its strategic communications on sanctions.
+
+#### Methodology
+
+The paper is based on a review of speeches, press conferences and interviews: strategic communications that create expectations ahead of meetings between the EU and third countries, and frame outcomes after such meetings. The paper analyses the communications outputs of two key EU representatives: the EU sanctions envoy, David O’Sullivan; and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission (EU HR/VP) Josep Borrell. The analysis looked at EU communications issued between February and September 2023.
+
+The definitions of strategic communications and public diplomacy are not universally accepted. For Philip M Taylor, public diplomacy is one of the four pillars of strategic communications, while for Michael Vlahos, “public diplomacy” and “strategic communications” are synonymous. According to Guy J Golan and Sung-Un Yang, public diplomacy is the “management of communication” among diplomatic actors which have an objective of reaching foreign publics to promote national interest. However, for Nicholas J Cull, strategic communications is just one of many terms that describe what is essentially “conducting foreign policy by engaging foreign publics”. For Ali Fisher, strategic communications is the “telling” end of the spectrum of public diplomacy, messaging directly to foreign audiences. As this paper examines the EU’s direct messaging to foreign audiences through press releases, blogs and media interviews, it relies on Fisher’s definition, and employs the term “strategic communications”.
+
+Within the wider category of third countries targeted by strategic communications, the paper focuses on countries where the EU sanctions envoy has led negotiations. Within this group of countries, the paper examines six countries (out of nine) in which the EU sanctions envoy and third country officials communicated publicly around the negotiations: Armenia; Georgia; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Serbia; and Uzbekistan. Three of the nine countries had to be omitted from the analysis as no public statements could be identified on the EU sanctions envoy’s visits to the following jurisdictions: Türkiye; Pakistan; and the UAE.
+
+The review relied on desk-based research to retrieve the relevant communications materials and compile an analysis of academic literature. In its analysis of communications of relevant EU officials, the paper relies as much as is feasible on direct quotes, and not on reporters’ interpretations or descriptions. This ensures that only the language directly attributable to the EU officials is analysed, with the exception of Armenia and Serbia, for which the analysis sources did not reveal direct quotes by the EU sanctions envoy; the paper therefore uses secondary sources.
+
+The paper introduces the typology of “values-based” and “interest-based” communications, building on international relations and public diplomacy literature. For the purposes of this paper, “interest-based” communications focus on appealing to strategic interests, including political, military, economic and trade. “Values-based” communications focus on culture, values and ideals (political, economic and social systems), which can create an enabling environment for national interests.
+
+The methodology is inspired by Gry Espedal and colleagues’ book on researching values, with a special focus on Arild Wæraas’s chapter on making values emerge from texts and Benedicte Maria Tveter Kivle and Gry Espedal’s chapter on identifying values through discourse analysis. Furthermore, Paul Baker provides valuable insights on employing frequency analysis and using occurrences in discourse analysis. The paper’s methodology builds on two key approaches: the term “frequency analysis” as used by Steven Louis Pike; and Francis A Beer, Barry J Balleck and Ricardo Real P Sousa’s classification of idealist and realist vocabulary.
+
+On the use of frequency analysis, Kathleen Ahrens found that “narrowly focused corpora are suitable for identifying different viewpoints through an examination of lexical frequency patterns”. Pike used frequency analysis to research the narrative-driven shifts in US public diplomacy messaging and strategy. According to Baker, discourse analysis can point to “patterns in language (both frequent and rare) which must then be interpreted in order to suggest the existence of discourses”. To identify the main framings used by the EU to compel third countries to cooperate on sanctions, the paper builds on a frequency analysis of terms (collocations) used in EU sanctions communications.
+
+For the main analysis, the author worked with 23 texts (10,921 words) published between February and September 2023 (see Annex). The texts were published online, on EU institutional websites, on governmental websites in Armenia and Serbia, and through media outlets in Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
+
+To mine the most often-used terms, the statistical programme “r” was used, which can be used to measure term and document frequency and the co-occurrence of words, among other things. This allows for the calculation of possible collocations, which, according to Andreas Niekler and Gregor Wiedemann, “comprise two (or more) semantically related [words] … which form a distinct new sense”. Two terms, if they occur “significantly more often as direct neighbours as expected by chance”, can be treated as collocations.
+
+The most-often used collocations were listed in a survey which asked respondents to assign each collocation a score from 1 (values-based) to 7 (interest-based), based on their perception. This Likert scale allowed respondents to express the nuances of the level to which they perceived that collocations were falling towards a more values-based approach (scores 1–3), or a more interest-based approach (scores 5–7), or whether the collocations were neither explicitly values- nor interest-based (score 4).
+
+The survey was completed during January 2024 by 15 members of the European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet), experts who have worked on sanctions within the framework of the network and focus on international relations studies. They represent think tanks from the UK and eight EU member states: Czechia; France; Germany; Hungary; Latvia; Lithuania; Poland; and Sweden. This covers perceptions from across different regions of the EU and the UK, thereby attempting to reflect geographic diversity.
+
+The survey presented the respondents with the topic of the paper, a description of the corpus and the definition of values- and interest-based communications as described above.
+
+#### Challenges and Limitations
+
+Key challenges for the research included the sample size of texts that could be analysed, as the sample is limited by the number of countries that the EU sanctions envoy has visited and where public communications were part of the envoy’s visit. Furthermore, sources being in the third countries’ languages posed a challenge, which was surmountable through the use of online translation tools, cross-checking against dictionaries and translation applications.
+
+Another challenge was developing a list of concepts to be used in the analysis to better understand the mode of communication (values-based or interest-based) employed by the EU in its sanctions diplomacy. The “coding” or classification through experts in the field of international relations from across the EU and the UK allowed for minimal cultural bias and an independent assessment of the terms employed in EU strategic communications.
+
+
+### I. EU Sanctions Communications Towards Third Countries
+
+The EU has consistently used strategic communications as part of its sanctions diplomacy towards third countries, aimed at reinforcing its sanctions policy. This is critical, as “active non-cooperation by [third] countries can sabotage the effort by providing offsetting assistance to the targeted regime”. This shows that third countries’ positioning in the dispute between the sanctions sender (EU) and the target (Russia) is highly relevant for the efficacy of sanctions, with “multilateral” sanctions deemed more successful than “unilateral” sanctions.
+
+Strengthening sanctions diplomacy efforts, the EU appointed David O’Sullivan as sanctions envoy in December 2022. The role of sanctions diplomacy was further reinforced by the 11th package of sanctions, adopted on 23 June 2023, which set out a multi-step approach to tackling sanctions circumvention, starting with the strengthening of “bilateral and multilateral cooperation through diplomatic engagement with, and the provision of increased technical assistance to, the third countries in question”.
+
+If the first round of diplomatic efforts yields no results, the EU can employ targeted proportionate measures aimed solely at depriving Russia of strategic resources. If this approach still fails to deliver results, the EU pursues re-engagement with the relevant third country. However, if these diplomatic efforts to tackle circumvention still fall short, the EU can adopt exceptional last-resort measures, including the restriction of sale, supply, transfer or export of sensitive dual-use goods and technology to the third country. At the time of writing, the EU has not yet resorted to the use of such last-resort measures for a third country.
+
+#### EU Strategic Communications to Third Countries
+
+Going beyond tackling circumvention, the EU has also been attempting to incentivise certain third countries to align with its sanctions policies. Alignment has no legal definition, but in diplomacy, it is used to signal a third country’s public willingness to adopt sanctions similar to those of the EU. Between February and September 2023, the EU offered the opportunity for 14 non-EU countries to align with EU sanctions, and those which did were listed in declarations and statements issued by the EU HR/VP. While these declarations and statements are not legally binding, they offer a way for the EU to communicate the international support for its sanctions regime.
+
+_EU Candidate Countries, EEA Member Countries and Eastern Partnership Countries_
+
+As sanctions form part of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), candidate countries are formally required to progressively align with those sanctions, reaching full alignment prior to accession. This expectation of candidate countries was also expressed in the European Council conclusions of 24 June 2022. However, as the evidence shows, not all candidate countries have been aligning themselves with the EU sanctions regime.
+
+The EU’s attempts to see countries join its sanctions efforts are most successful in its immediate neighbourhood, specifically among certain EU candidate countries and European Economic Area (EEA) countries. The declarations and statements by the EU HR/VP on the “alignment of certain countries” show that from February 2022 to September 2023, EU candidate countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Ukraine, and EEA members Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway have been consistently aligning themselves with EU sanctions. The candidate countries Georgia (potential candidate country until December 2023), Moldova (candidate country since June 2023) and Serbia were listed in certain declarations, while candidate country Türkiye and Eastern Partnership countries Armenia and Azerbaijan were not listed in any declarations regarding the alignment on sanctions against Russia between February 2022 and September 2023.
+
+_EU Partner Countries_
+
+While certain regional partners of the EU are not invited to join the declarations on alignment, they still communicate their adherence to the sanctions policy on Russia. Switzerland, for example, has issued its own announcements on its alignment with EU sanctions packages, without joining the EU HR/VP’s declarations. In the case of the 10th sanctions package, this “room for manoeuvre” was used in the Swiss Federal Council’s announcement to highlight that while the country was implementing the package, it also “introduce[d] a new means of safeguarding Swiss economic interests in specific cases”.
+
+For third countries, the alignment with EU sanctions depends both on a political evaluation of adopting the sanctions as a national foreign policy measure and on the political consequences of expressing public support for the EU’s sanctions regime.
+
+#### Factors Influencing Third Countries’ Approaches to EU Sanctions
+
+This section examines the factors that third countries take into consideration when deciding whether to support sanctions regimes. This can offer valuable insights into the factors that can also determine the success of the EU’s sanctions communications towards third countries.
+
+Research for this paper demonstrates that the economic links between the third country and the sanctioned country play a key role. For countries with close economic ties to Russia, sanctions present high costs and incentives to bust sanctions and provide indirect access to the sanctioned economy. Countries that are more economically dependent on Russia could therefore have limited means to implement sanctions, especially where social and economic groups have vested financial interests in continuing trade with the sanctioned country and lobby against sanctions implementation. Similarly, countries close to Russia in a vulnerable financial situation may fear economic disruption from the implementation of sanctions. Furthermore, the geopolitical orientation of third countries can also influence their decision on whether to support sanctions regimes. Another approach has been to look at the role of commercial and other actors in third countries, as “sanctions imposed against a target can make trade more profitable for a third party, presenting commercial opportunities”.
+
+The case of Georgia showcases the interplay of several elements of the factors described above. The country did not decide to adhere to the sanctions against Russia, but introduced certain restrictive measures, particularly in the financial sphere. For Georgia, Russia is the third-largest trade partner, and the EU’s share, while it is still the main trade partner, is decreasing. The circumvention challenge in Georgia is further complicated due to its trade with the Eurasian Economic Union, which is used by Russia to conceal the destination of trade flows. Furthermore, Georgia is economically benefiting from the inflow of Russian citizens and capital to the country. These factors, among others, contribute to Georgia’s complex approach to sanctions.
+
+Given the efforts of the EU to incentivise third countries to join its sanctions policies and the considerations influencing third countries’ choice of whether to support sanctions, it is important to analyse the type of goals EU sanctions diplomacy can attempt to achieve. Returning to the challenge of tackling circumvention, another avenue is for the EU to incentivise third countries to commit to tackling evasion through their territory, without asking them to align themselves with the EU’s sanctions regime.
+
+#### The EU’s Shifting Foreign Policy and Strategic Communications
+
+Understanding the EU’s approach to foreign policy and strategic communications is fundamental for a more comprehensive study of the EU’s sanctions policy. The EU’s foreign policy has been analysed, to a limited extent, through the prism of discourse analysis, finding that its foreign policy and identity are articulated by referencing liberal values. Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union presents these as the values that the Union is meant to defend and further internationally.
+
+On the role of the EU’s public diplomacy and strategic communications, it has been noted that while the European External Action Service (EEAS) should be key to helping “ethical Europe” grow, it should also provide a keen sense of strategic direction and interests. The EU has been described in the literature as a “normative power”, as it “was constructed on a normative basis, [which] predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics”. However, the 2016 EU Global Strategy set out the “principled pragmatism” approach, which considers the combination of interests and values as a guiding principle of the EU’s external action. The focus on interests was reinforced in the 2022 EU Strategic Compass, in which Borrell stated that the EU has to learn lessons from recent crises, including “finally getting serious about threats to our strategic interests that we have been aware of but not always acted upon”. The shift in the EU’s strategic communications to interests is also in line with the view of Allan Rosas, who highlighted that “sanctions should not be seen as value imperialism … as the Union is taking them to pursue not only its values but also its interests”.
+
+
+### II. Expert Perception of EU Sanctions Communications on the Values-Interest Spectrum
+
+To better understand the role of the EU’s sanctions communications as a foreign policy tool, the paper assesses them along the values-interests spectrum. To this purpose, the paper examined the speeches, interviews and other communications outputs of the EU sanctions envoy and the EU HR/VP from February to September 2023.
+
+Analysis of the communications led to identifying the most frequently used pairings of two words in communications outputs, or “collocations”. Using the statistical programme “r”, the analysis computed 395 collocations using the “quanteda.textstats” package.
+
+The programme identifies collocation candidates based on the co-occurrence of patterns of words. The programme takes out the most frequently used word fillers or “stop words”, including “of”, “to” and “but”, which therefore do not appear in the 395 collocations that were computed. Of those, 116 collocations occurred three or more times and 279 collocations occurred two times across the 23 texts analysed. To focus only on collocations that occur a significant number of times across the 23 texts, the paper does not consider the 279 collocations that occurred only twice in EU communications. This process led to the reduction of the number of collocations to 25 and four synonyms.
+
+Next in the analysis, the collocations were to be categorised on the values-interest spectrum. Respondents completed the survey asking them to assign each collocation a score from 1 (values-based) to 7 (interest-based) based on their perception, reflecting the subjective judgement of each anonymous respondent. The responses were recorded anonymously and exported to Excel. The analysis used the rounded median of the responses to avoid the result being skewed by outliers. Table 1 shows the rounded median of the survey’s ratings and the number of times the collocation occurred in the 23 texts analysed.
+
+
+_▲ Table 1: Most-Often Used Collocations in EU Sanctions Communications_
+
+For a better understanding of where the collocations lie on the values-interest spectrum, the results are summarised in Figure 1.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 1: Collocations on the Values-Interest Spectrum_
+
+Figure 1 plots both the number and the occurrence of collocations in each of the seven categories along the values-interest spectrum, ranging from strongly values-based to strongly interest-based. The number of collocations (dots) shows how many of the terms were perceived to fall into each of the seven categories by the expert respondents to the survey. The occurrence of collocations falling into each category (bars) shows how many times the terms appeared across the analysed texts.
+
+Figure 1 demonstrates that interest-based collocations occurred significantly more often (91 times in total, including both weakly and moderately interest-based collocations) than values-based terms (17 times in total, including both weakly and moderately values-based collocations) or terms that were perceived as neither values- nor interest-based (16 times). The 11 moderately interest-based collocations occurred 60 times across the 23 texts analysed, making them the most commonly occurring terms.
+
+The results of analysis demonstrate that the EU’s strategic communications on sanctions strongly rely on interest-based terms. However, values and particularly the norms of international law also play a role in its communications – this is examined in more detail in Chapter III. Furthermore, the EU also employs terms that are neither values- not interest-based among the most-occurred terms in the analysed communications.
+
+
+### III. The Balance Between Values- and Interest-Based EU Communications on Sanctions
+
+The results of the survey demonstrate the complexity of the EU’s sanctions diplomacy. While collocations that are perceived as interest-based by experts occur more often in quotes by O’Sullivan and Borrell, the use of values-based communication adds a nuance to the picture and raises the following questions. How are the collocations used in EU communications? How can they be interpreted in the context of the EU officials’ declarations? What do they divulge about the EU’s sanctions diplomacy?
+
+#### Preventing Circumvention: Targeting Third Countries’ Interests
+
+Collocations related to circumvention and evasion have a central importance in EU sanctions diplomacy, playing a particular role in conveying a message targeting the interests of third countries. The EU is warning third countries that allowing their territories to be used for circumvention could damage their economies. Conversely, third countries’ efforts to tackle circumvention are met with praise in EU communications, setting a clear expectation for third countries. The circumvention- and evasion-related collocations were perceived to be moderately interest-based by the expert respondents to the survey, further confirming the role of these expressions in appealing to the interests of both the EU and third countries.
+
+“Platform [for] circumvention” was a particularly often used expression, with 10 occurrences. It was used to point out a threat and underline how becoming a platform for circumvention would go against the interest of third countries. O’Sullivan underlined the importance of the reputational damage that ensues when a country is proven to be a platform for sanctions circumvention, noting that “it will have a chilling effect on the companies of other countries. They no longer want to work with a country that helps them circumvent sanctions”. This was a clear message to third countries, highlighting the fact that allowing for circumvention will damage their investment prospects. In Georgia, the government’s efforts were highlighted by O’Sullivan in June 2023, who noted that the “Georgian authorities are taking very seriously the issue of not allowing this country to be used as a platform for circumvention”, noting that the country has put in place export-controlling measures on the most sensitive battlefield products.
+
+Addressing the challenge of “platform [for] circumvention” was also used to describe the very focus of the mission of O’Sullivan, who declared that “cooperating and engaging in a dialogue with third countries that could be used as a platform for circumvention is vital”. The expression was also used when describing the expectation of EU sanctions diplomacy, with O’Sullivan declaring about third countries that “what they usually say is that they don’t want to align with EU sanctions, but at the same time they don’t wish to be a platform for circumvention or evasion of sanctions, and therefore they will cooperate with us in trying to prevent that”. However, there are differences between the expectations towards EU candidate countries and non-candidate countries, as demonstrated below.
+
+Similarly, the expressions “circumvent sanctions” and “circumvention [of] sanctions” occurred exceptionally often in EU sanctions communications – in total, 13 times in the texts analysed – and those expressions were perceived as moderately interest-based. They fulfilled a similar role to the expression “platform [for] circumvention” in EU communications, warning of the negative impact of allowing circumvention, and praising efforts to tackle it. O’Sullivan focused on the former when he declared that “we are particularly concerned if there’s any circumvention of the sanctions on these [battlefield] products. This has led us to visit a range of countries in the last few months”. In Uzbekistan, for example, O’Sullivan used circumvention in the context of commending the country’s assurances on being against having its territory used for sanctions circumvention, while “respect[ing] Uzbekistan’s desire to remain neutral [in Russia’s war against Ukraine]”.
+
+The two expressions linked to evasion, “sanction evasion” and “evade sanction”, occurred seven times in total, placing them among the most-often used collocations in the analysed texts. They were used in the same way as expressions mentioning circumvention, focusing on warning and praising third countries. O’Sullivan highlighted that “our legal powers now enable us to sanction an entity in a non-EU country that is aiding a European company to evade sanctions”. As a positive assessment, he underlined that, for Georgia, “there are various ways in which people can try to evade sanctions, whether that’s at customs points or false declarations. And the Georgian authorities have put in place, as I say very impressive measures of trying to monitor this and make sure that it doesn’t happen”.
+
+#### Beyond Tackling Circumvention: Addressing Implementation and Alignment
+
+EU communications addressed the options beyond tackling circumvention through third countries, including the questions of implementation, adoption and alignment on sanctions. These play an especially important role in the difference between the EU’s communications towards EU candidate countries and its communication towards other third countries. EU candidate countries are formally required to progressively align with the EU’s CFSP, which includes sanctions. A full alignment on sanctions needs to be reached prior to accession. This provides the EU with a tool to use regarding EU candidate countries to appeal to their political and economic interests in pursuing the EU accession process successfully.
+
+EU sanctions communications used three key collocations to describe how far countries potentially could go in supporting EU sanctions. On one hand, these expressions offered a way to remind EU candidate countries of their commitments. On the other, they offered a way to demonstrate that in most third countries, the EU is not asking for alignment, but only for help in tackling circumvention. These can be seen as a “compromise offer” by the EU to non-candidate countries, highlighting that while it could ask for more efforts, it is accepting tackling circumvention as a commendable policy.
+
+The terms used for communicating these interests are the weakly interest-based terms “implement sanctions”, along with its synonym “sanctions implementation” (among the most-used terms, occurred eight times) and “impose sanctions” (six times) and the moderately interest-based term “align sanctions” (four times).
+
+Speaking about his country visits, O’Sullivan highlighted that in the cases of EU candidate countries, “the context is always different of course in … Serbia and Türkiye … candidates for accession to the European Union, so there is actually potentially an obligation on them to align with our sanctions”. In the same statement, he also underlined that non-candidate countries, such as countries in central Asia or certain countries in the Caucasus, have no obligation to align with EU sanctions. This point was repeated by Borrell in September 2023, noting that “we expect our partner countries and, in particular those who aspire to become members, to align with our foreign policy decisions”.
+
+The EU’s relationship with candidate and potential candidate countries demonstrates that the issues of implementation, adoption and alignment on sanctions can be used to appeal to EU candidate countries’ interests on joining the EU. It also allows the EU to express disapproval of certain policies, including engaging with sanctioned entities. In September 2023, Borrell noted that the EU regretted the Georgian government’s decision to resume flights to and from Russia and allow sanctioned individuals to enter the country, highlighting that “these decisions go against EU’s policy and international efforts to isolate Russia internationally due to its illegal war”.
+
+#### Naming the War: Stopping Russia’s War Machine
+
+The EU has countered Moscow’s continuous refusal to call the war in Ukraine by its name, referring to it as a “special military operation”, by clearly referencing “the war” and Russia’s “war machine” in its communications. The terms “war machine” and “invasion [of] Ukraine” were perceived as neither values- nor interest-based and are therefore seen as more descriptive expressions by the expert respondents to the survey. However, the importance of these terms is signalled by the number of times they occurred (“war machine” seven times and “invasion [of] Ukraine” six). They offer a clear way for the EU to steer third countries towards using the same framing.
+
+The expression “war machine” was primarily used to describe the “Russian war machine” as a concept. It was employed to underline that most third countries do not wish to contribute to fuelling the Russian war machine, while remaining neutral in the conflict. In general, the aim of the EU’s restrictive measures is described in terms of “crippling Russia’s war machine”, targeting both the material and financial means of the Kremlin.
+
+Mentioning the “invasion [of] Ukraine” fulfilled a similar role in the EU’s sanctions diplomacy. While “war machine” was used in relation to the aim of sanctions, “invasion [of] Ukraine” was used in the context of describing the reason for the sanctions being put in place. O’Sullivan noted that the EU’s most important message is that “we oppose Russia’s invasion of Ukraine”.
+
+#### Appealing to Values: The Role of International Law
+
+While the results of the analysis show that the EU predominantly communicated by addressing interests, its sanctions diplomacy also contains an important element of values-based communications, focusing primarily on international law. Three values-based collocations, “UN Charter”, “war crime” and “international law”, were used to appeal to the values of international law. These terms were used both to remind third countries of the importance of upholding these principles and to praise third countries’ cooperation by specifically referring to international law. By linking the cooperation on sanctions to international norms, the EU offers an opportunity for third countries to frame any support for tackling circumvention as a positive effort to strengthen the norms of international law. This can be an attractive framing for third countries that have close geopolitical or economic ties to Russia and might be reluctant to communicate cooperating on these measures explicitly as steps against Moscow.
+
+Borrell noted that he “appreciated the ‘principled position of Kazakhstan based on respect for the UN Charter and the territorial integrity of all UN members, including Ukraine’”. He also highlighted that the EU is asking “all countries … to stand on the side of the principles and values of the UN charter and international law”. This demonstrates the EU’s expectation of third countries to support its sanctions efforts not only because it is in their economic interest, as the use of circumvention-related expressions shows above, but also because it is essential for upholding the norms and values of international law.
+
+Underlining this approach, O’Sullivan summarised the EU’s message as “we believe that Putin’s actions are completely contrary to the UN charter, it is a war crime” and noted that “in the case of Russia, we are dealing with a particularly egregious breach of international law”. Similarly, Borrell noted that “what is happening in Ukraine is a blatant violation of the UN Charter and the international rules-based order”.
+
+“Support Ukraine” and its synonym “Ukraine support” were perceived as the most strongly values-based terms among the 25 collocations analysed, with six occurrences in total. The term was primarily used to express that the EU is “supporting Ukraine, and we will support Ukraine for as long as it takes”, framing it as a goal of the EU’s sanctions policy, linking the support for the EU’s sanctions to supporting Ukraine. This can differ from the approach of highlighting international law, as it links the support for sanctions more explicitly to supporting Ukraine, not just international law in general.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+EU strategic communications on sanctions rely heavily on addressing economic and political interests. As the results of the data-driven analysis show, the most-often occurring terms in EU communications are perceived to target political and economic interests. Only a minority of terms appeals to values, mostly related to international law.
+
+The paper’s use of data analytics and an expert survey on perceptions offer a unique contribution to the discussion on EU sanctions communications, allowing for a more structured analysis along the values-interest spectrum. This data-driven approach provides a more informed understanding of EU communications and formulates more targeted and evidence-based recommendations on how to improve EU sanctions diplomacy.
+
+The paper presents the following findings and recommendations to EU policymakers and diplomats.
+
+> #### 1. EU sanctions communications overwhelmingly rely on appealing to interests.
+
+The EU tends to frame support for tackling sanctions circumvention as an economic interest of third countries. It employs a “stick-and-carrot” approach – the stick is a warning to third countries of the potential negative economic consequences and reputational damage of allowing circumvention, which can lead to fewer investments, while the carrot is the EU’s praise of the efforts of third countries which pledge to tackle circumvention through their territory, which can help bolster their reputation.
+
+__Recommendation: The EU should hold third countries to their promises.__
+
+The “carrot” of positive reputation through the EU’s praise can only be credible if the EU revises its communications consistently. As the EU can strengthen third countries’ reputations by praising their efforts, the EU also needs to withdraw its praise in public communications when third countries do not enact effective and enforceable policies. The EU needs to adapt this communication by expressing either continued praise if third countries indeed implement and enforce the announced anti-circumvention policies or change course and highlight shortcomings when the announced policies do not become reality or are not enforced.
+
+__Recommendation: The EU should not fear using its economic power to compel countries to tackle sanctions circumvention.__
+
+The EU needs to continue warning countries of the negative impact of allowing sanctions circumvention and use the designation of third country companies as a credible threat. The “stick” of warning third countries of the consequences of allowing circumvention only works if the negative impact is demonstrated credibly, including through the listing of third country companies that facilitate sanctions circumvention.
+
+> #### 2. The EU communicates different expectations for EU candidate countries and other third countries.
+
+Countries on the path to join the EU are formally required to progressively align with the EU’s CFSP, including sanctions, reaching full alignment prior to accession. This expectation is expressed in references to imposing, implementing and aligning with EU sanctions communications, which are among the most-often used terms. Non-candidate countries have no obligation to align with the EU’s sanctions regime, and consequently, the EU communicates their efforts to address circumvention as a sufficient policy step.
+
+__Recommendation: The EU should continue to use accession as a motivation for EU candidate countries to ensure they align with EU sanctions against Russia.__
+
+The EU should make more explicit reference to the accession process in its communications to make EU candidate countries move forward with their alignment on sanctions against Russia. The communications around accession negotiations and other meetings of EU officials with EU candidate countries should be used as a platform to remind EU candidate countries of the clear incentive to adopt EU sanctions and signal their commitment to the accession process. This needs to be highlighted in public communications in the candidate countries, informing the public of this requirement.
+
+> #### 3. The EU uses the referencing of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in EU sanctions diplomacy as a tool to counter Russia’s narrative in third countries.
+
+The EU uses the referencing of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in neither a values-based nor interest-based manner. However, it can serve as a tool to counter Russian narratives in third countries which have a high degree of political and economic ties to Russia.
+
+__Recommendation: The EU should continue to use all available forums to counter Russia’s narratives, including press conferences and other public statements from the EU sanctions envoy.__
+
+The EU sanctions envoy regularly visits countries with different degrees of ties to Russia, where the EU’s messages might not get the desired visibility. These visits can offer an opportunity to highlight the EU’s narrative and counter Russia’s disinformation. By giving interviews and being featured in the press, EU officials can create more visibility for the EU’s narratives in third countries, therefore the EU sanctions envoy and other officials should use all channels at their disposal to engage with the media during their in-country visits.
+
+> #### 4. While values play a less important role than interests in the EU’s sanctions communications, the communications employ a valuable framing tool related to international law.
+
+The EU addresses values mainly by referring to international law and linking the support for sanctions to strengthening these values. The EU HR/VP has explicitly commended the “principled position of Kazakhstan based on respect for the UN Charter” and, in this context, acknowledged Kazakhstan’s “efforts to ensure its territory is not used to circumvent European and international sanctions against Russia”, which demonstrates the impact of values in EU strategic communications.
+
+__Recommendation: The EU should continue to use the values of international law in its strategic communications, which would help third countries to frame their efforts against circumvention.__
+
+The EU should reinforce its focus on the values of the UN Charter as it can offer an opportunity to third countries to frame their anti-circumvention policies as a contribution to upholding the principles of international law. This could be especially useful in third countries that have close geopolitical or economic ties with Russia. In these countries, a framing referring to strengthening international law might be more attractive than a more explicit framing of anti-circumvention policies as measures directed against Russia.
+
+> #### 5. EU sanctions communications could explore an environmental framing.
+
+There are certain dimensions that were not addressed in EU strategic sanctions communications analysed for this paper, including Russia’s “shadow fleet”, mostly made up of uninsured old ships that transport oil to evade the oil price cap. The shadow fleet therefore presents a real environmental threat that could affect any of the littoral countries along the fleet’s routes.
+
+__Recommendation: The EU should explore referencing the environmental threat posed by Russia’s sanctions circumvention by sea in its strategic communications.__
+
+This would offer another incentive for third countries to support the EU’s sanctions efforts by tackling circumvention. Similar to the values of international law, environmental framing would allow third countries to frame their efforts to collaborate on tackling sanctions circumvention as a response to environmental concerns, rather than a measure directed more explicitly against Russia.
+
+
+### Annex: Sources Used for the Main Analysis
+
+1. [European Commission, “Statement by EU Sanctions Envoy David O’Sullivan on the First Sanctions Coordinators Forum”, 23 February 2023](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/statement-eu-sanctions-envoy-david-osullivan-first-sanctions-coordinators-forum-2023-02-23_en).
+
+2. [European Commission, “David O’Sullivan: Interview with Newly Appointed International Special Envoy for the Implementation of EU Sanctions”, 28 February 2023](https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/fisma/items/778510/en).
+
+3. [Jakob Hanke Vela and Barbara Moens, “EU’s new Sanctions Envoy Shifts Focus to Enforcement”, Politico, 1 March 2023](https://www.politico.eu/article/eus-new-sanctions-envoy-set-to-fight-sanction-cirvumvention/).
+
+4. [EU Watch, “‘Russia Sanctions will Remain in Place for a Long Time’: EU Sanctions Envoy David O’Sullivan”, 6 March 2023](https://www.euwatch.be/russia-sanctions-will-remain-in-place-for-a-long-time/).
+
+5. [Tatyana Kudryavtseva, “EU Envoy: Sanctions Should not Cause Deterioration of Relations with Kyrgyzstan”, 24 KG, 28 March 2023](https://24.kg/english/261840_EU_Envoy_Sanctions_should_not_cause_deterioration_of_relations_with_Kyrgyzstan/).
+
+6. [Tatyana Kudryavtseva, “Import of Goods from EU to Kyrgyzstan Increases by 300 Percent”, 24 KG, 28 March 2023](https://24.kg/english/261838_Import_of_goods_from_EU_to_Kyrgyzstan_increases_by_300_percent/).
+
+7. [Marianna Mkrtchyan, “Date of EU Sanctions Envoy David O’Sullivan’s Visit to Armenia not yet Known”, ArmInfo, 29 March 2023](https://arminfo.info/full_news.php?id=75406&lang=3).
+
+8. [Zhania Urankaeva, “Kazakhstan will not face Sanctions for Partnership with Russia and Putin – EU Special Representative”, 24 April 2023](https://kz.kursiv.media/2023-04-24/zhnr-putin/).
+
+9. [Ulysmedia, “ЕО өкілі қай жағдайда Қазақстанға санкциялар салынуы мүмкін екенін айтты” (“The Representative of the EU said in Which Case Sanctions may be Imposed on Kazakhstan”), 24 April 2023](https://qaz.ulysmedia.kz/news/5897-eo-okili-kai-zhagdaida-kazakstanga-sanktsiialar-salynuy-mumkin-ekenin-aitty/). Author translation.
+
+10. [Aibarshyn Akhmetkali, “EU Begin Talks with Kazakhstan to Prevent Re-Export of Sanctioned Goods to Russia”, Astana Times, 25 April 2023](https://astanatimes.com/2023/04/eu-begin-talks-with-kazakhstan-to-prevent-re-export-of-sanctioned-goods-to-russia/).
+
+11. [KazTag, “Kazakhstan will not fall Under Secondary Sanctions Due to Putin’s Visit”, 25 April 2023](https://kaztag.kz/en/news/kazakhstan-will-not-fall-under-secondary-sanctions-due-to-putin-s-visit-eu).
+
+12. [Gazeta.uz, “‘We are Grateful Uzbekistan is Against Having its Territory used to Circumvent the Sanctions’ – EU Special Envoy”, 28 April 2023](https://www.gazeta.uz/en/2023/04/28/sanctions/).
+
+13. [Delegation of the European Union to Georgia, “Transcript of Press Point of the EU Sanctions Envoy, Mr. David O’Sullivan”, 28 June 2023](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/transcript-press-point-eu-sanctions-envoy-mr-david-o’sullivan_en?s=221).
+
+14. [Mared Gwyn Jones, “Third Countries now Making it ‘More Difficult’ for Russia to Acquire Sanctioned Goods – EU Envoy”, Euronews, 4 July 2023](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/07/04/third-countries-now-making-it-more-difficult-for-russia-to-acquire-sanctioned-goods-eu-env).
+
+15. [European Commission, “EU Finance Podcast: The One About the EU Sanctions Envoy”, 26 July 2023](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-finance-podcast-future-finance/eu-finance-podcast-one-about-eu-sanctions-envoy_en).
+
+16. [Josep Borrell, “The War on Ukraine, Partnerships, Non-alignment and International Law”, EEAS, 1 February 2023](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/war-ukraine-partnerships-non-alignment-and-international-law_en).
+
+17. [JAMnews, “European Union Calls on Georgia to Join Sanctions Against Russia in Aviation Sector”, 12 May 2023](https://jam-news.net/aviation-sanctions-against-russia/).
+
+18. [EurActiv, “EU Acknowledges Kazakhstan’s Efforts to Curb Russia Sanction Circumvention”, 16 May 2023](https://www.euractiv.com/section/central-asia/news/eu-acknowledges-kazakhstans-efforts-to-curb-russia-sanction-circumvention/).
+
+19. [Josep Borrell, “Some Clarifications on the Circumvention of EU Sanctions Against Russia”, EEAS, 19 May 2023](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/some-clarifications-circumvention-eu-sanctions-against-russia_en).
+
+20. [Bojana Zimonjić Jelisavac, “Serbia not a Platform for Circumventing EU Sanctions, Says the Prime Minister”, EurActiv, 12 May 2023](https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/serbia-not-a-platform-for-circumventing-eu-sanctions-says-the-prime-minister/).
+
+21. [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, “Meeting of the Deputy Foreign Minister of Armenia Mnatsakan Safaryan with David O’Sullivan, the International Special Envoy for the Implementation of EU Sanctions”, 24 May 2023](https://www.mfa.am/en/press-releases/2023/05/24/eu_san/12023).
+
+22. [Delegation of the European Union to Georgia, “Interview with Josep Borrell, EU High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission”, 7 September 2023](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/interview-josep-borrell-eu-high-representative-european-union-foreign-affairs-and-security-policy_en).
+
+23. [EEAS, “Georgia: Press Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell After Meeting with Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili”, 8 September 2023](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/georgia-press-remarks-high-representativevice-president-josep-borrell-after-meeting-prime-minister_en).
+
+---
+
+__Balázs Gyimesi__ is the Communications Manager of RUSI Europe in Brussels.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-04-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-88.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-04-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-88.md
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+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-04-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-88.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : 【黎智英案・審訊第 88 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-06-04 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 黎智英指新冠肺炎致人命經濟損失 料美國人民會支持對中國實施制裁懲罰
+
+
+
+
+
+
+【蘋果案】黎智英指新冠肺炎致人命經濟損失 料美國人民會支持對中國實施制裁懲罰
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（4日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第88日審訊。昨日辯方指黎身體不適及發抖，至今日黎如期出庭應訊。控方繼續播放國安法生效前黎智英受訪片段，在2020年6月與美國神父 Robert Sirico 的對談中，黎指經過新冠肺炎疫情之後，西方國家不再信任中國，並以審慎的態度與中國貿易；而且中國經濟變得衰弱，對美國來說是一個好時機去改變中國，乃至拯救全世界。黎又指新冠疫情導致很多美國人喪失親友、企業倒閉和蒙受金錢損失等等，他們對於中國忿忿不平，必定會支持時任美國總統特朗普制裁中國。
+
+#### 黎智英對談節目稱初來香港感受到自由 八九民運後創辦《壹週刊》雜誌
+
+昨日辯方指黎身體不適及發抖，法官指黎需要送院作進一步檢查，遂押後至今日續審。今日黎如期出庭應訊，辯方指黎感覺比昨天好轉，因此審訊繼續。
+
+控方播放2020年6月18日美國智庫 Acton Institute 的節目影片，當中黎智英與美國神父 Robert Sirico 對談。
+
+黎憶述他年輕時初到香港，看到早餐有很多選擇，感到這個地方有自由、深受感動，雖然晚上要在工廠留宿，但他感到日子過得十分開心，因為感到這裡享有自由，獲得所有機會去證明自己、奮鬥、成就他想做的事。黎在工廠打工，期間自學英語，後來因為懂得英語而獲得機會晉升至推銷員。1969年，黎再獲得機會赴美國工作，當時正值胡士托音樂節舉行，後來演變成暴動，黎指他當時正在前往紐約，惟路途被截斷。
+
+直至27歲，黎成立自己的小型工廠，後來工廠規模變大，黎亦創立了成衣品牌「佐丹奴」。1989年北京爆發民運，黎全力支持，六四鎮壓之後他去信譴責李鵬，之後開始被中國打壓，被禁止在中國經營門市，黎因而被迫賣出「佐丹奴」，轉做傳媒生意。
+
+八九民運之後，黎創辦《壹週刊》雜誌，並打正旗號作為一個反對中共的雜誌，黎形容業務非常成功。他指當時所有人都自我審查、不敢得罪中共，而他在那時創辦雜誌，是一個很好的時機去填補市場的空白。黎其後創辦香港《蘋果日報》，成為香港最大報紙之一，後來再創辦台灣《蘋果日報》。
+
+#### 黎智英指很多主教替中國說好話 只有陳日君敢於與中國唱反調
+
+談到天主教徒身份，黎指其太太對他影響甚大，因為太太是一名虔誠的天主教徒，每逢星期日，黎與太太一同前往教堂，直至1997年黎皈依天主教。他表示從來不是以一種「為了社會或為了其他人」的心態而去爭取民主自由，而是他覺得自己應該去做，便去做，有時可能做得對，有時亦可能做錯。
+
+被問到何時認識天主教香港教區榮休主教陳日君樞機，黎指當他皈依天主教的時候，陳日君仍是一名主教，由於二人追求自由的理念一致，所以多年來是好友。黎引述陳曾說過「梵蒂岡出賣了地下教會」，使陳十分傷心。
+
+
+▲ 天主教香港教區榮休主教 陳日君樞機（資料圖片）
+
+黎又指很多主教都親中國、不時替中國說好話，甚至有的羅馬天主教會的樞機主教立場保守，希望避免得罪中國，唯一敢於與中國唱反調的樞機是陳日君。
+
+黎指，香港人的價值觀與西方一致，惟中國有著截然不同的價值觀，當中國以截然不同的價值觀與外界進行貿易來往時，世界將永無寧日。黎又指，當中國愈來愈富裕的時候，他們並不會愈來愈接近西方價值，反而會愈來愈不同，甚至想轉過來改變西方。他形容習近平是「人類史上最極端的獨裁者」，想帶領中國變回毛澤東時代，甚至懂得利用科技來監控人民。
+
+#### 黎智英指疫情令美國人蒙受損失 若特朗普推制裁會支持
+
+黎形容美國是唯一「救星」，他提到經過新冠肺炎疫情之後，西方國家不再信任中國，並以審慎的態度與中國貿易；而且中國經濟變得衰弱，對於時任美國總統特朗普來說，這是一個好時機去改變中國，乃至拯救全世界。
+
+黎指，若然特朗普推行一連串的制裁和懲罰措施，他會得到很多來自美國人民的支持，因為新冠疫情導致很多美國人喪失親友、企業倒閉和蒙受金錢損失等等，他們對於中國忿忿不平，必定會支持制裁中國。黎形容這是一個絕妙的方式去促使中國改變。
+
+#### 控方接著播放黎智英WhatsApp搜獲影片 大部份為羅傑斯發言片段、不涉黎
+
+控方其後播放多段由黎智英 WhatsApp 接收的影片，大部份為「香港監察」創辦人羅傑斯（Benedict Rogers）的受訪和公開發言片段。播片前，法官李運騰質疑影片不涉及黎智英，控方有什麼基礎播放這些影片，又指影片是在海外拍攝，可以怎樣協助控方舉證。控方代表、高級檢控官徐倩姿則指，這些影片是在黎智英的 WhatsApp 發現，能夠顯示黎對影片內容知情，而且影片內容能夠讓法庭了解案發時的背景。
+
+在2019年7月19日，羅傑斯向黎智英傳送一段《大紀元時報》節目「美國思想領袖」（American Thought Leader）片段。當時反修例運動已爆發，羅傑斯在節目中指香港在97年主權移交以後，自由逐漸被侵蝕，而政府推動《逃犯條例》修訂，該草案容許政府將所有「眼中釘」從有法治的香港，去到沒有法治、只有「以法治國」（rule by law）的中國，不少香港人視草案為「最後一根稻草」，若修訂草案通過，中港之間的「防火牆」將會消失，形容這是主權移交22年以來最差的時候。
+
+被問到近年中國情況，羅傑斯指中國對基督教教堂、法輪功和西藏進行打壓，沒有宗教自由，難以理解為何一個主張「真、善、忍」的信仰系統，會遭受中國當局如此殘酷的回應。
+
+羅傑斯又稱，不知名人士曾寄送恐嚇信給他的鄰居和家人，要求羅傑斯停止繼續發聲。在一次公開場合中，有義工遭受襲擊。
+
+羅傑斯指，中國問題不僅限於中國內的人權和自由問題，如今更已對外國構成了威脅。他形容香港站在戰線前沿，因香港作為國際金融中心，也是亞洲最開放的城市之一，如果失去香港則後果不堪設想。
+
+#### 羅傑斯：英國有責任帶頭呼籲制裁中國
+
+控方另播放羅傑斯在2019年12月9日於倫敦「國際人權日」的發言、同月呼籲劍橋大學撤銷前特首林鄭月娥榮譽院士名銜的行動發言，以及2020年3月5日的受訪片段。羅傑斯指懂得區分「反中」與「反中共」是很重要，他18歲時曾到中國居住6個月，在當地認識了不少內地朋友，他強調在文化和朋友的層面上很喜歡中國。至於前特首林鄭月娥，羅傑斯指她不願聆聽6月9日一百萬上街市民的聲音，也不願聆聽6月16日二百萬上街市民的聲音，因此不值得擁有榮譽院士名銜。另外，在2019年11月25日的影片中，羅傑斯指英國有責任帶頭呼籲制裁中國。
+
+案件明日續審，控方表示尚餘6小時影片需要播放。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC51/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-05-china-to-quarantine-taiwan.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-05-china-to-quarantine-taiwan.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-05-china-to-quarantine-taiwan.md
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : China To Quarantine Taiwan
+author: Bonny Lin, et al.
+date : 2024-06-05 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/SWXeYam.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "How China Could Quarantine Taiwan: Mapping Out Two Possible Scenarios"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_This report lays out China’s potential motivations for a quarantine and maps out two plausible scenarios of how it could conduct operations._
+
+
+
+China has significantly increased pressure on Taiwan in recent years, stoking fears that tensions could erupt into outright conflict. Much attention has been paid to the threat of an invasion, but Beijing has options besides invading to coerce, punish, or annex Taiwan. One major step China could take is a “gray zone” quarantine led not by its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) but by its coast guard and other law enforcement forces. Rather than sealing off the island, a quarantine would aim to demonstrate China’s ability to exert control over Taiwan. A quarantine is more feasible for China and more likely than an invasion or blockade in the near term; it also presents unique challenges in terms of how Taiwan and the international community can respond. This brief explores two hypothetical maritime quarantine scenarios that are informed by in-depth research, tabletop exercises, private consultations, and expert surveys conducted by the CSIS China Power Project.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+China has significantly increased pressure on Taiwan in recent years. China’s military frequently flies aircraft within the island’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) and across the Taiwan Strait median line. In August 2022 and April 2023, China escalated in response to U.S.-Taiwan political engagements by staging unprecedented large-scale military exercises around Taiwan. China has also deployed its navy and coast guard in increasing numbers around Taiwan and its outlying islands.
+
+Cross-Strait tensions further intensified in the wake of William Lai’s inauguration as Taiwan’s president on May 20, 2024. Three days after Lai delivered his inauguration address, China commenced two days of large-scale military exercises surrounding Taiwan, called “Joint Sword-2024A,” and accompanied them with “comprehensive law enforcement operations” (综合执法演练) involving China’s coast guard. Chinese officials stated that the drills were intended to “serve as a strong punishment for the separatist acts of ‘Taiwan independence’ forces and a stern warning against the interference and provocation by external forces.”
+
+These Chinese escalations against Taiwan are raising concerns that Beijing could take even more significant steps to “punish” and coerce Taiwan going forward. One major action China could take against Taiwan is a gray zone quarantine of the island. Quarantine scenarios have received far less attention than other contingencies, such as an invasion, but a quarantine is likelier in the near term and therefore warrants increased scrutiny.
+
+
+### What Is a Quarantine?
+
+The term quarantine is sometimes used interchangeably with “blockade.” However, this report differentiates between the two, defining a quarantine as a law enforcement–led operation to control maritime or air traffic within a specific area while a blockade is foremost military in nature. A quarantine would entail China’s coast guard and other forces conducting gray zone operations intended to stay below the threshold of an armed conflict. Thus, the military would play a supporting role — not a leading role — in such operations.
+
+The political and operational goals of a quarantine are not to completely seal Taiwan off from the world but to impose a system of controls over the island’s maritime and/or air commerce. In a quarantine, key necessities like food and medicine could continue to flow into Taiwan, enabling China to assert that its law enforcement operation is imposing no hardship. A quarantine could target the delivery of specific goods, such as shipments of U.S. weapons to Taiwan, but such a move would risk provoking a more direct U.S. response.
+
+A key goal of the quarantine approach is to obtain compliance from international companies and other countries to demonstrate China’s power over Taiwan. This is similar, in some respects, to China’s 2013 declaration of an ADIZ over much of the East China Sea. Many airlines, including U.S. companies, complied with Beijing’s demands then.
+
+A quarantine of Taiwan could involve a change of Chinese domestic policy to establish new rules or requirements for regulating trade or traffic into Taiwan, or it could simply involve Chinese law enforcement forces stepping up activities against Taiwan on the basis of existing laws. Thus, a quarantine would focus on forcing compliance with Chinese rules and strengthening China’s asserted sovereignty claims over Taiwan.
+
+In contrast to law enforcement–led quarantines, this brief defines a blockade as a military-led operation. China’s PLA would be leading a blockade by encircling parts or all of Taiwan, while forces such as the coast guard and maritime militia play a supporting role. More intense versions of a blockade could involve missile strikes against Taiwan as well as mining of waters around Taiwan.
+
+A blockade would, by nature, involve much more escalatory operations than a quarantine. A quarantine would not intentionally involve the use of kinetic force to attack targets, though it is possible that escalation could lead to an exchange of kinetic attacks.
+
+There are no publicly available doctrinal writings on how exactly China could execute a quarantine. However, China has conducted several maneuvers and exercises that are indicative of how it can use law enforcement operations to assert control over traffic to Taiwan and complicate Taiwan’s maritime environment.
+
+In August 2022, when then speaker of the house Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, China’s Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) deployed a large patrol vessel, the Haixun 06, to conduct operations off the coast of China’s Fujian Province and in the Taiwan Strait for the first time. In April 2023, after Taiwan’s president Tsai Ing-wen transited through the United States, the Haixun 06 deployed again. This time, it sailed farther into the Taiwan Strait, and the Fujian Province MSA announced that the vessel would carry out “on-site inspections” of vessels, though there were no reports that inspections occurred.
+
+More recently, China increased coast guard patrols near Taiwan’s outlying Kinmen Islands after an incident there. In February 2024, a Taiwan coast guard vessel chased and collided with a Chinese vessel that Taiwan asserts was illegally fishing near Kinmen. The incident resulted in the death of two crew members. China responded by increasing coast guard patrols near what Taiwan calls “restricted” and “prohibited” waters around Kinmen. At one point, Chinese coast guard personnel boarded a Taiwan-owned tourist boat to check its licenses and paperwork.
+
+Amid this uptick in activity around Kinmen, China conducted a series of combat activities in which naval and air forces from the PLA Eastern Theater Command conducted drills jointly with the China Coast Guard (CCG). Chinese official outlets described the exercises as simulating “emergency scenarios” and focusing on enhancing forces’ “interoperability and joint strike capabilities.”
+
+China again stepped up the involvement of the CCG in May 2024 during its latest round of large-scale exercises around Taiwan. Alongside the PLA exercises, the CCG conducted its own operations around two of Taiwan’s outlying islands. On the same day that the PLA exercises started, the Fujian Province Coast Guard launched a “comprehensive law enforcement exercise” in waters around Wuqiu and Dongyin “to test its joint patrol, rapid reaction and emergency response capabilities.” The CCG indicated that its patrol vessels came as close as 2.8 nautical miles from Wuqiu’s islands and as close as 3.1 nautical miles from Dongyin, marking the first time CCG vessels have entered waters there.
+
+
+
+In addition to patrolling around Taiwan’s outlying islands, four CCG vessels sailed east of Taiwan and another three sailed southwest of Taiwan near the southern entrance of the Taiwan Strait. As part of the exercises east of Taiwan, videos released by official Chinese outlets showed multiple CCG ships encircling a target vessel and spraying water cannons, though the vessel appeared to be Chinese-flagged, and the video did not show the water cannons actually hitting the vessel. This represents a marked increase in intensity compared to previous CCG activities around Taiwan, and it is the latest and clearest indication that China is preparing its law enforcement and military forces to operate together in the context of a Taiwan Strait crisis.
+
+
+### Why China Might Quarantine Taiwan
+
+A quarantine of Taiwan would represent a substantial escalation of coercion against the island, but it offers China several distinct advantages. First, a quarantine allows China to impose greater political and administrative control over Taiwan. China’s efforts to restrict air or maritime traffic to the island could allow Beijing to assert its sovereignty claims and demonstrate that Taiwan does not have control over its own claimed sovereign space. This could undermine Taipei’s ability to self-govern and erode the Taiwan public’s confidence in Taiwan’s military and coast guard.
+
+Second, China could use a quarantine to intervene in Taiwan’s domestic politics by imposing economic costs on the island. If the disruptions stemming from a quarantine are sustained for a lengthy period, elements within Taiwan’s society could leverage this to portray Taiwan’s leaders as ineffective. This could either lead to a loss of public support for Taipei or increase political pressure on Taiwan’s leaders to negotiate or improve relations with Beijing.
+
+Third, a quarantine is more limited in scope than a blockade or other large military operations. A quarantine led by China’s coast guard is not a declaration of war against Taiwan. Because a quarantine is not overtly PLA-led, there is a lower risk that escalation will lead to direct military confrontation. If the quarantine is cast as a law enforcement operation, China can easily announce the end of the operation and claim its objectives were met. Relatedly, China could choose to target only certain types of products, or the quarantine could be scaled to cover all air and maritime flows to Taiwan.
+
+If China successfully conducts a limited quarantine, it would set a political precedent and establish a new normal of Chinese activity, setting the stage for it to carry out more expansive operations in the future. The unprecedented scale and complexity of a quarantine operation would also provide a valuable opportunity for Chinese law enforcement, maritime militia, and the PLA to train and test their capabilities and identify weaknesses for subsequent operations.
+
+Fourth, a quarantine could have impact without full and sustained implementation. Although China has significant capabilities to use law enforcement and other assets to physically disrupt trade to Taiwan, it may only need to demonstrate intent and some capability for the quarantine to be effective. The announcement of a change in Chinese policy — or the beginning of law enforcement actions — is likely to have a chilling effect on the willingness of businesses to invest or operate in Taiwan. Similarly, demonstrated Chinese willingness to search and seize only a handful of commercial ships could have an outsized deterrent impact and discourage similar transgressions.
+
+Many commercial airlines and shipping companies are likely to comply with Chinese pronouncements. Even if some shipping companies do not comply with quarantine regulations, adherence by most of them would significantly strengthen China’s narrative that it has control over Taiwan.
+
+Finally, China’s use of the coast guard and civilian law enforcement complicates the ability of the United States and regional actors to respond. A quarantine does not require closing off or restricting international traffic through the Taiwan Strait — an action that other countries could use as a justification to intervene to assist Taiwan and defend international legal rights to freedom of navigation.
+
+The United States also does not have sufficient coast guard forces forward deployed to the Indo-Pacific to respond in kind. The United States could lean on other forward-deployed forces, including air and maritime assets, to help Taiwan respond, but it is likely to be cautious to avoid the optics of using “gray-hulled” U.S. Navy vessels to confront “white-hulled” CCG vessels.
+
+In a recent survey of experts from the United States and Taiwan, the China Power Project found that most are skeptical of U.S. and allied willingness to intervene in a quarantine. Only 13 percent of surveyed U.S. experts and 9 percent of Taiwan experts were “completely confident” that the United States would intervene militarily to defend Taiwan from a quarantine. An even smaller percentage had confidence that allies and partners would support a U.S.-led multinational military intervention.
+
+
+### China’s Ability to Quarantine Taiwan
+
+A quarantine would be an immense and unprecedented undertaking for China, requiring it to overcome complex logistics hurdles and jointly command law enforcement, maritime militia, and military forces. Nevertheless, China has immense capabilities at its disposal that would enable it to conduct a quarantine.
+
+With over 150 oceangoing vessels and more than 400 smaller vessels at its disposal, the CCG is the largest coast guard in the world. The CCG is a quasi-military organization that reports to China’s highest military authority, the Central Military Commission. Many CCG ships were transferred from the navy and still carry some military-grade weapons, such as 76 mm cannons.
+
+Taiwan’s coast guard would be at a major quantitative and qualitative disadvantage. It has just 10 oceangoing ships and approximately 160 smaller vessels. These vessels are responsible for protecting the over 300 harbors and ports on Taiwan’s coast and for law enforcement activity within 24 nautical miles of the island.
+
+
+
+China’s MSA, which is the primary non–coast guard civilian agency responsible for maritime security and navigation, would work alongside the CCG to lead a quarantine. The MSA’s fleet consists of at least three dozen oceangoing vessels and hundreds of smaller patrol craft.
+
+In addition to the CCG, China also possesses a large maritime militia: a force of organized, trained, and armed personnel aboard fishing vessels and other craft. These vessels operate under the official guise of commercial fishing activity, but in actuality, they work in tandem with China’s law enforcement and under the shadow of the PLA to support Chinese maritime operations. Because the maritime militia is not officially a law enforcement or military entity, it is challenging for other countries to respond to its activities.
+
+There is little information about the full size of the maritime militia, but some estimate that it consists of more than 100 large vessels and as many as 3,000 smaller vessels. The lion’s share of the maritime militia is concentrated in the South China Sea, where militia vessels often swarm by the dozens or hundreds to defend China’s territorial claims in the region.
+
+It is unclear how many Chinese maritime militia operate near the Taiwan Strait, but those that would be involved in a Taiwan contingency may be based at ports in China’s Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Shandong Provinces. Meanwhile, Taiwan does not have an equivalently large force similar to China’s maritime militia. This means Taiwan would largely need to lean on its coast guard to respond to militia activity.
+
+Finally, China’s military forces also significantly overshadow Taiwan’s. As of 2023, the PLA Navy comprises a battle force of over 370 vessels, many of which are based in areas close to the Taiwan Strait. The PLA Air Force and Navy also boast thousands of aircraft, which support China’s ability to project power and conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) around Taiwan. If the situation around Taiwan goes kinetic, Taiwan would face a much larger force than its own, limiting its ability to effectively respond to aggressive Chinese activities.
+
+
+
+
+### The Role of Geography
+
+Geography is a major factor at play in a quarantine scenario. At its narrowest point, the Taiwan Strait is only about 130 km (81 miles) wide, meaning China does not have to deploy forces at long distances from China’s own shores.
+
+Adding to Taiwan’s exposure is the fact that the island has only a handful of major international ports. Most of the busiest ports — including Kaohsiung, Taichung, Taipei, Keelung, and Mailiao — are also the closest to mainland China. There are two less-busy ports — Hualien and Su’ao — on Taiwan’s east coast, as well as additional smaller harbors.
+
+The Port of Kaohsiung stands out among these. In 2022, an estimated 57 percent of Taiwan’s maritime trade entered through the Port of Kaohsiung, making it an indispensable commercial hub for the island. It is by far Taiwan’s busiest port for containerized goods and oil, and the nearby Yung-An Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Terminal is Taiwan’s largest facility for importing LNG.
+
+
+
+All of this means it is easier for Chinese forces to reach Taiwan’s most important shipping ports. In fact, if China can effectively control traffic into just one port, Kaohsiung, it can achieve significant influence over what gets into Taiwan.
+
+
+### How China Could Implement a Quarantine
+
+The scenarios outlined below are only two examples of potential maritime quarantines. There are many other conceivable approaches China could take, but these scenarios align with activities and capabilities China has demonstrated through past operations.
+
+#### Scenario 1: Limited Maritime Quarantine
+
+In this first scenario, Beijing leverages its law enforcement forces to conduct a limited maritime quarantine of some of Taiwan’s ports. This is not aimed at choking off Taiwan’s access to trade, but a gray zone operation to achieve more limited — but still significant — objectives.
+
+
+
+Days or weeks before the start of quarantine operations, China readies maritime law enforcement forces within its coast guard and MSA. Beijing also mobilizes portions of its military and calls up maritime militia fishing vessels in the area.
+
+China begins by publicly announcing “enhanced customs inspection rules.” It avoids using terms like “quarantine” or “blockade” to describe its actions. In order to enter Taiwan, all cargo and tanker vessels must file advance customs declarations with relevant Chinese authorities.
+
+Chinese law enforcement vessels will be authorized to board vessels, conduct on-site inspections, question personnel, and undertake other measures against noncompliant ships. Chinese authorities also threaten fines and market access restrictions for companies flouting the new rules.
+
+The quarantine is set to enter into force 48 hours after announcement. This allows China time to deploy forces into position after they have been mobilized. It also allows shipping companies with vessels in transit warning time to comply, lending some credibility to China’s actions.
+
+Chinese authorities do not announce a specific location for the inspections, but they intend to target the Port of Kaohsiung, Taiwan’s busiest port. China positions more than 10 law enforcement patrol vessels off the coast of Kaohsiung. China also deploys a smaller contingent of law enforcement vessels within the Taiwan Strait off the coast of other major ports at Taichung and Taipei. About 48 hours after the initial announcement, Chinese authorities issue notices that enforcement is beginning and that its patrol ships will stop noncompliant vessels.
+
+The vessels intrude into Taiwan’s 24-nautical-mile contiguous zone and occasionally approach the 12-nautical-mile territorial seas boundary. This is symbolically important since China does not recognize Taiwan’s claims to these boundaries. During large-scale military exercises around Taiwan in April 2023, several PLA vessels intruded into Taiwan’s contiguous zone in a maneuver intended to delegitimize Taiwan’s claims.
+
+Supporting these law enforcement vessels are approximately 20 maritime militia fishing vessels extending along Taiwan’s contiguous zone. These maritime militia vessels are not authorized to conduct boarding or search operations against commercial vessels. Instead, they fill in gaps in ISR and complicate Taiwan’s maritime domain awareness by swarming in certain areas. China could deploy significantly more militia forces — as it has done in the South China Sea — but the militia forces are not as well trained as the coast guard, and Beijing may worry about their discipline and ability to face off against Taiwan’s coast guard.
+
+While this quarantine is ostensibly a law enforcement operation, the military plays a key supporting role. China’s navy deploys five surface action groups (SAGs) to encircle Taiwan from a distance. Each SAG comprises three to six ships — including destroyers, frigates, support vessels, and covertly deployed attack submarines — for a total of nearly 30 warships. They are primarily meant to deter intervention by foreign coast guard or military forces and to respond if Taiwan’s navy escalates or attempts to escort vessels into the island. They also provide ISR, extending China’s air and maritime domain awareness farther into the Pacific, helping Beijing monitor U.S., Japanese, or other movements. In addition to naval operations, the PLA constantly flies sorties of manned and unmanned aircraft around Taiwan to monitor traffic.
+
+
+
+Beijing does not need universal compliance with the customs rules in order to claim success. Compliance by around 75 percent of shipping companies would be a considerable success for China.
+
+Chinese-flagged shipping vessels — which account for a significant share of the total traffic — universally comply with Chinese authorities, and Beijing permits them to enter Taiwan’s ports. Beijing counts on most foreign shipping companies complying with the “enhanced customs rules” to avoid reprisals, but several companies headquartered in Taiwan, the United States, and certain other countries publicly oppose and disregard the rules. Over the course of one week, Chinese law enforcement vessels only stop and search one or two vessels in total and focus solely on Taiwan-owned vessels.
+
+If China meets relatively limited pushback and most companies comply with Chinese customs rules, China begins to draw down operations after about one week. However, a considerable law enforcement and military presence persists around Taiwan in the weeks that follow — an indication of the new normal China has established.
+
+#### Scenario 2: Full Maritime Quarantine
+
+This scenario is a significantly scaled-up version of the first scenario. Like the first scenario, China declares new “enhanced customs inspection rules” that will require advance notice with Chinese authorities to ship goods into Taiwan.
+
+
+
+This time, however, China publicly announces a quarantine area covering the entire island of Taiwan. The zone extends 24 nautical miles from Taiwan’s territorial baseline, matching with Taiwan’s claimed contiguous zone. This is intended to delegitimize the contiguous zone and demonstrate China’s willingness and capability to impose its will in an area ostensibly under Taipei’s jurisdiction.
+
+Chinese authorities announce that the inspection regime will go into effect 48 hours after declaration. China will require the shipper of any cargo destined for Taiwan to file advance notice with Chinese customs and law enforcement officials.
+
+China again deploys law enforcement vessels to lead the quarantine, but this time it sends a much larger overall contingent. The greatest concentration, consisting of more than 10 coast guard and maritime safety vessels, is positioned off the coast of Kaohsiung. It also deploys a dozen vessels off the west coast ports of Taipei and Taichung and sends nine near the northern Port of Keelung — Taiwan’s second-busiest import hub. Finally, it sends another six to the smaller eastern ports of Hualien and Su’ao.
+
+This deployment of more than three dozen law enforcement vessels amounts to an unprecedentedly large maritime operation for China. It would constitute approximately one-fourth of China’s oceangoing CCG and MSA fleet.
+
+Roughly 40 maritime militia vessels also swarm Taiwan’s coastal waters, along the contiguous zone, to fill in gaps between law enforcement vessels. As in the limited quarantine scenario, the maritime militia vessels do not participate in conducting boarding and inspecting activities. They focus primarily on conducting ISR for China and complicating Taiwan’s maritime domain awareness.
+
+As in the limited quarantine scenario, China’s navy deploys five SAGs to extend China’s ISR, intimidate Taiwan, and deter U.S. and other forces that may try to intervene. PLA aircraft also fly regular sorties to conduct ISR around Taiwan. This time, China supplements its naval deployment by positioning the Shandong aircraft carrier and its strike group southeast of Taiwan. It launches frequent sorties of J-15 fighters east of Taiwan, repeating operations that the PLA exercised in recent years.
+
+
+
+In this scenario, China is much more active in terms of boarding and searching vessels. Chinese forces stop at least one or two vessels per day for the period of the quarantine, focusing mostly on Taiwan-flagged ships. There also appear to be inspections of vessels belonging to some of the dozen countries that still maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
+
+Chinese forces seize several noncompliant ships and impound them at nearby ports within China. Commercial vessels that have filed the appropriate paperwork and had their requests approved are allowed into Taiwan. However, due to heightened uncertainty about the nature of China’s enforcement, many shipping companies choose to delay their shipments, causing a significant and noticeable decline of merchandise trade into Taiwan.
+
+As the operation stretches into multiple days, Chinese ships and personnel need to be rotated. After the large initial deployment, China can fluctuate the number of forces depending on factors like capacity, the level of compliance with the quarantine, Beijing’s desired intensity, and U.S. military posturing, if any.
+
+These operations continue at varying levels for over two weeks before beginning to wind down. However, a significant CCG and PLA presence continues to operate indefinitely around Taiwan at a greater level than before the quarantine.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+For both these maritime scenarios, Beijing’s goal is not to hermetically seal off Taiwan. Instead, these campaigns are designed to punish Taiwan, assert Beijing’s claimed sovereignty over the island, test the response from international shipping companies, and put significant pressure on Taiwan.
+
+While China has the capabilities to successfully execute these and other quarantine variations, these would require operations that are far more complex than anything China has demonstrated to date. Such moves would carry significant risk for China, and its success would depend to a large degree on how Taiwan, the United States, and others respond.
+
+Even if successfully implemented, there are limits to what a quarantine can achieve. If Beijing’s goal is to inflict enough pain to force Taiwan’s surrender, China would need to move beyond the gray zone into overt military action. A military blockade would be a key option for China if it seeks to forcefully unify Taiwan without launching an all-out invasion.
+
+---
+
+__Bonny Lin__ is a senior fellow for Asian security and director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
+
+__Brian Hart__ is a fellow with the China Power Project at CSIS.
+
+__Matthew P. Funaiole__ is vice president of the iDeas Lab, Andreas C. Dracopoulos Chair in Innovation, and senior fellow of the China Power Project at CSIS.
+
+__Samantha Lu__ is a research assistant with the China Power Project at CSIS.
+
+__Truly Tinsley__ is a program manager with the China Power Project at CSIS.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-05-chinese-engagement-in-argentina.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-05-chinese-engagement-in-argentina.md
new file mode 100644
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+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-05-chinese-engagement-in-argentina.md
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Chinese Engagement In AR
+author: Evan Ellis
+date : 2024-06-05 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/SqsxudY.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The Evolution of Chinese Engagement in Argentina under Javier Milei"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_In August 2023, then-Argentine presidential candidate Javier Milei declared he would not make “pacts with Communists.”_ _Months later, following his election, he declined an invitation to Argentina to join the China-dominated BRICS organization, signaling a deepening of the political distancing from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that began under his once pro-PRC predecessor Alberto Fernandez. However, the move did not necessarily signal an end to the substantial private trade and investment relationship between the two countries._
+
+As Argentina’s economic crisis deepened under President Fernandez, most of China’s high-profile infrastructure projects in Argentina became paralyzed over financing and other questions. Such projects included an $8 billion nuclear reactor at Argentina’s Atucha III complex, two dams on the Santa Cruz River, work on the Belgrano Cargas rail system, dredging of the Paraguay and Paraná Rivers to support the continued operation of the hidrovía (waterway), and problems in approving a Chinese port project near Antarctica.
+
+Even before the election of President Milei in November 2023, China had deepening difficulties in Argentina, including the cancellation of Argentina’s purchase of China’s JF17/FC-1 fighters in favor of U.S.-produced F-16 fighters. China also had replaced its dynamic Spanish-speaking ambassador and military attaché with a new ambassador, Wang Wei, who spoke mainly Italian, and a new attaché whose second language was Portuguese, not Spanish. Argentine China experts perceived that the PRC was informally downgrading the relationship.
+
+Despite Argentine foreign minister Diana Mondino’s cordial, professional approach toward the PRC and her assurances of Argentina’s continued interest in transparent commercial and diplomatic relations with China, relations continued to deteriorate. The PRC suspended a $6.5 billion bank credit that it had extended to the outgoing government, and its banks have reportedly put on hold credit for major investment projects in the country. In addition to the PRC’s reaction to President Milei’s remarks about China, the PRC was also reportedly offended by Taiwanese government representatives’ attendance at an academic event with Mondino involving Kung Guo Wei, a visiting professor from Taipei’s famous Tamkang University, before Mondino became foreign minister. Nevertheless, PRC-Argentina commercial relations are significant and, arguably, poised to deepen under President Milei’s government, driven by the likely turnaround of the Argentine economy and projects by private businesspersons and provincial and local-level politicians.
+
+
+### Trade
+
+Argentina-China bilateral trade has grown substantially since the PRC entered the World Trade Organization in 2001, though, as with many countries of the region, Argentine purchases of Chinese products and services have grown far greater than PRC purchases from Argentina. Argentine exports to the PRC grew approximately eightfold, from $1.09 billion in 2002 to $7.93 billion in 2022, while Argentine imports from China grew over 53-fold, from $330 million in 2002 to $17.5 billion in 2022. Argentina’s main exports to the PRC were agricultural goods, led by soybeans, beef, and barley, while Argentina imported an array of higher value-added manufactured goods and services from China, including telephones and computers.
+
+Argentine exports of agricultural goods, as well as lithium and other minerals, are poised to expand in the coming years as the Argentine economy recovers. Argentine consumption of Chinese electronics, cars, and other manufactured goods and services is also poised to grow, bolstered, ironically, by the relatively laissez-faire posture of President Milei toward commercial matters.
+
+Despite some reasons for optimism regarding overall trade growth, the realization of value added is likely to be lopsided in China’s favor, reflecting Argentina’s limited knowledge of the PRC as a market and the limited ability of the Argentine government to help its businesspeople consummate profitable deals there. In off-the-record interviews with an Argentine China expert, the author learned that although Argentina has diplomatic offices in Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, Canton, and Hong Kong, it has centers for commercial promotion only in Shanghai and Chengdu.
+
+___`Despite some reasons for optimism regarding overall trade growth, the realization of value added is likely to be lopsided in China’s favor, reflecting Argentina’s limited knowledge of the PRC as a market and the limited ability of the Argentine government to help its businesspeople.`___
+
+
+### Political Relations
+
+Prior to the Milei government, the PRC consistently put Argentina in the highest ranks of diplomatic partnerships it possesses. In 2004, the PRC recognized Argentina as one of three strategic partners in the region, and in 2014 it upgraded the relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” Consistent with this high level of relationship, the PRC tried to get Argentina to set up a ministerial-level committee to facilitate coordination across sectors, such as the COSBAN in Brazil and the High-Level Mixed Commission in Venezuela. But, according to an Argentine China expert, the Argentine Peronist government could not facilitate the required coordination between the Foreign and Commerce Ministries and other required government agencies, and the effort to create such a committee was ultimately set aside.
+
+In February 2022, the Fernandez government joined the PRC Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) during a state visit to Beijing tied to the Winter Olympics held there. Fernandez was one of two Latin American presidents to attend the BRI’s 10th-anniversary celebration in October 2023. The PRC reportedly is concerned that the Fernandez government could withdraw Argentina from the BRI, however, just as it turned down membership in BRICS.
+
+In 2017, Argentina also applied and was accepted to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, but the country reportedly never paid the $7.5 million membership quota and has not attended any board meetings or otherwise participated in the affairs of the bank. According to Argentine sinologists, the new Milei government appointed a respected career diplomat, Marcelo Suárez Salvia, to represent Argentina in the PRC, though he has not served in Asia and does not speak any Asian languages.
+
+
+### Petroleum
+
+China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) is the controlling partner in Bridas and, with British Petroleum, the Pan American Energy–Axion consortium. Together, the ventures give CNOOC substantial petroleum operations in Argentina. Bridas — in which the Bulgheronis, one of Argentina’s wealthiest families, also have an important stake — is the key operator of the Vaca Muerta shale gas deposits.
+
+
+### Mining Sector
+
+In the mining sector, PRC-based companies have long had a presence in traditional operations, albeit with difficulties involving relations with local communities and government licensing. The most significant Chinese conventional mining project in the country is the Veladero gold mine, in which PRC-based Shandong Gold purchased a $960 million (50 percent) stake in 2017. Other Chinese-owned mines include Campana Mahuida, owned by China Metallurgical Corporation and shut down in 2009 due to problems with the local community; Sierra Grande, shut down in 2016 over low minerals prices; and a gold mine in La Rioja owned by Chinese conglomerate Hanaq.
+
+In the lithium sector, PRC-based companies have made major advances in recent years, courting Argentine provincial governments, which make key decisions about licensing and regulation. Chinese lithium projects in Argentina include Pozuelos and Pastos Grandes, acquired by China’s Ganfeng through its $962 million purchase of Lithea Inc. in 2022. Ganfeng also owns and is developing the Mariana salt flats in Salta and Cauchari-Olaroz in Jujuy, a joint venture with Canada’s Lithium Americas.
+
+Chinese carmaker Chery and minor partner Gotion proposed a $400 million investment in an electric vehicle plant also in Jujuy, though with the country’s economic difficulties, plans have not yet moved forward. In nearby Catamarca Province, the Chinese mining giant Zijin operates the Tres Quebradas lithium field and has proposed the construction of a plant for refining lithium and manufacturing cathodes for lithium-ion batteries.
+
+
+### Agriculture
+
+Agrologistics companies Nidera and Noble, owned by China Oilseeds and Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO), have a substantial presence in Argentina, with a substantial part of their business coming from supplying agricultural goods to their parent organization COFCO. COFCO purchases for the Chinese market, giving it an advantage in competing with non-Chinese agrologistics firms such as ADM, Bunge, Dreyfuss, and Cargill. Nidera has a plant in Rosario, which suffered a high-profile explosion in 2017. It also has storage facilities in Santa Fe and Cordoba for grains, which may have some processing capabilities. There are also Chinese-owned agricultural facilities in Chaco and Tucuman, among other locations. The PRC-based company Syngenta, owned by ChemChina since 2017, has a presence in Argentina and has sought a new law for transgenic seeds to use its genetically modified organism technology in the country.
+
+Finally, during the prior government, to meet growing Chinese demand for pork, PRC-based investors had proposed $3.7 billion in investments in slaughterhouses and other pork production facilities in the country. The project became the focus of protests by environmentalists and animal rights activists, who objected to the inhumane conditions the animals were allegedly raised in. To the consternation of the Chinese, President Fernandez became involved in the dispute on the side of the protesters, including allowing himself to be photographed at one of the protests near signs that were highly derogatory toward the Chinese. The position of Fernandez effectively stopped the project from going forward.
+
+
+### Electricity Sector
+
+In Jujuy Province, a consortium led by PowerChina is currently working on the fourth phase of the Cauchari photovoltaic array, the largest solar park in Argentina and the region. The plan, according to Argentine China experts, is to leverage the project not only to power mining and other operations in the region but also to support an ecosystem of green energy facilities. PowerChina and other PRC-based firms have also been involved in the Loma Blanca wind farm and other wind projects in Neuquén and Santa Cruz.
+
+Also in Santa Cruz, PowerChina leads a consortium for the construction of two hydroelectric facilities on the Santa Cruz River — the Jorge Cepernic and Nestor Kirchner facilities — though progress on the project has been delayed over regulatory and environmental, as well as financing, issues. As noted, the construction of a nuclear pressurized water reactor by the Chinese Gezhouba Group in the Atucha complex, initially agreed to during the presidency of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, also continues to be stuck over the insistence by the fiscally imperiled prior Argentine government that the Chinese finance 100 percent of the project.
+
+PowerChina was also involved in the long-delayed Chihuido hydroelectric project, which Russia originally pursued, though neither had success in taking the project forward. PowerChina further attempted, unsuccessfully, to sell steel tubing for the construction of a gas pipeline connecting the Vaca Muerta shale gas field to Buenos Aires, but the Alberto Fernandez government chose to award the contract to the favored but much more expensive Argentine supplier Techint. According to an Argentine China expert interviewed for this project, because of the poor outcome of several PowerChina projects, CEO Tu Shuiping reportedly resigned and left for the PRC, with many of the company’s projects in Argentina remaining stagnant.
+
+
+### Transportation Infrastructure
+
+Over the past 15 years, PRC-based companies have pursued multiple train and highway infrastructure projects in Argentina, albeit with considerable delays and difficulties. The most significant of these projects are track modernization and the provision of new engines and rolling stock for the Belgrano Cargas railroad, key to moving freight within Argentina and connecting it to the ports of neighboring countries. Although work on various segments of Belgrano Cargas have been completed, work became stuck at the end of the Fernandez administration over a series of disputes, including the Chinese insisting they import their own railroad ties instead of using locally available quebracho, an Argentine hardwood. The Chinese also completed work on the Red Line (Line B) of the Buenos Aires metro (Subte), though the extension to the Buenos Aires (Ezeiza) International Airport and work on the Cordoba metro never went forward.
+
+Argentina and China explored work on tunnels through mountain passes connecting Argentina and Chile via highway, including the Agua Negra tunnel at the latitude of Buenos Aires and Santiago and a route further to the north through the Argentine province of Salta. Perhaps the most controversial Chinese infrastructure project has been the proposed construction of the $500 million multiuse Rio Grande commercial port at the tip of Antarctica in Tierra del Fuego. The area has been of interest to Chinese investors since the early 2000s when a PRC-based group explored building a petrochemical plant and maritime export terminal for urea fertilizer in the area.
+
+The potential ability of the Chinese military to surreptitiously use the port during times of war to observe and possibly inhibit transits through the Straits of Magellan or the Drake Passage has drawn attention to the project as a security concern, even obligating the governor of Ushuaia to contract a media consultant to help deal with the controversy. As of the time of this writing, the project was seen as unlikely to receive the federal approval required by the port and navigable rivers organization within the Ministry of Economy to move forward.
+
+
+### Digital Infrastructure
+
+Since 2001, PRC-based companies such as Huawei and ZTE — and today Xiaomi — have played a leading role in Argentina’s telecommunications infrastructure. By 2021, Huawei had over 500 employees in the country. Such Chinese firms are important suppliers to Argentina’s telecommunications providers, including Claro, Movistar, and Personal (which is part of Grupo Clarín). The latter relies heavily on Huawei equipment. Huawei is also a significant cloud services provider in the country.
+
+___`Since 2001, PRC-based companies such as Huawei and ZTE — and today Xiaomi — have played a leading role in Argentina’s telecommunications infrastructure.`___
+
+The outgoing Fernandez government had planned an accelerated auction of the country’s 5G bandwidth in September 2023 to raise needed funds for the government (an estimated $1 billion in royalty payments, according to Argentine China experts interviewed for this project). Companies using Huawei 5G equipment were poised to win, but the government could not conduct the bid in time, and its status with the new government remains uncertain. In Argentina, as in other countries, Huawei has a scholarship program, Seeds of the Future, to strengthen its base of tech employees in the region by bringing technically talented youth to the PRC for three months to a year.
+
+In the surveillance systems domain, ZTE is the key supplier for a $30 million smart cities project in Jujuy, where the PRC depends on local government support to access the province’s lithium. In addition, the Chinese firm Hikvision is a key provider of surveillance cameras in the country, including for corporate and home security systems, as well as for traffic cameras in towns and neighborhoods like Vicente Lopez.
+
+As in other parts of Latin America, customs scanners in Ezeiza International Airport, first purchased in 2016, are supplied by the PRC-based company Nuctec. With respect to taxi services, as in other parts of Latin America such as Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil, the Chinese taxi company DiDi is present in the country, with a particular focus on mototaxi and delivery services. However, competitors Uber and Cabify are more dominant in local markets.
+
+
+### Banking and Finance
+
+Three Chinese banks currently operate in Argentina. Hong Kong Shanghai Bank of China and International Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) are licensed to conduct branch banking operations in the country. ICBC entered the country following a 2012 approval by Argentine authorities of its controlling interest in the locally licensed Standard Bank.
+
+In addition, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), with offices in the Buenos Aires district of Puerto Madero, primarily conducts representational banking for Chinese companies tied to the currency swap and business in the PRC. According to an Argentine China expert interviewed for this project, the Agricultural Bank of China also has explored establishing a presence in the country.
+
+Through the PBOC, Argentina and China have an $18.5 billion currency swap arrangement. It was set up to facilitate the clearance of transactions for imports and exports between the two countries in order to avoid using U.S. dollars as the clearing mechanism. They also agreed to expand the agreement by $5 billion. The interest rate secured for the new portion of the swap, according to an Argentine China expert, was the 3.5 percent benchmark Hong Kong interest rate plus an additional 3.5 percent. The rate is considered high but still in the range of commercial norms. Under the Fernandez government, $5 billion of the swap was activated to support trade between the two countries. In addition, Argentina may have used its access to the renminbi to pay part of its installment payments to the International Monetary Fund.
+
+When President Milei took office, the Chinese reportedly asked the incoming government if it wished to activate part of the currency swap line to facilitate trade, but the Milei government reportedly declined, Argentine China experts say. Shortly after, the PRC also canceled the new $6.5 billion portion of its swap.
+
+
+### Pharmaceutical Sector
+
+During the early phases of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Chinese company Sinopharm conducted Phase 3 trials in Argentina, among other countries, and partnered with a local laboratory, Richmond Laboratories, for assembling and distributing its vaccine in Argentina. Because of the poor performance of the Chinese vaccine, however, the demand for the Sinopharm vaccine dried up once higher-efficacy Western messenger RNA vaccines came online. According to Argentine China experts, Sinopharm could not reach an agreement to produce its vaccine in Argentina or branch into other areas.
+
+By contrast, an Argentine laboratory, Bagó, had a production facility in the PRC for the production of aftosa vaccines for animals. In off-the-record interviews with Argentine China experts interviewed for this project, they expressed that although there was interest in leveraging the partnership to bring Chinese pharmaceutical capabilities to Argentina, as with Sinopharm, nothing came of the initiative.
+
+
+### Media Influence
+
+As in other parts of the region, the PRC has courted the Argentine media, including purchasing advertising supplements in important papers such as Clarín and La Nación. Grupo Clarín also has important business interests with the PRC, including its telecommunications firm Personal, which is the principal user of Chinese equipment in the country and the pioneer for Huawei’s entry into the Argentine market for 5G.
+
+
+### Intellectual Infrastructure
+
+Argentina, like most Latin American countries, has relatively limited China knowledge within its universities and think tanks. Nevertheless, its knowledge base and human connections have grown in recent years and are better than in many other parts of Latin America. Argentina’s most respected China studies centers include those at the Catholic University of Argentina (UCA), Universidad Nacional de la Plata (one of the country’s oldest China and Asia studies programs, with the China Center currently under Maria Francesca Staiano), Universidad Nacional de Tres de Febrero, and Universidad Nacional de Lanús, at which Argentina’s passionately Sinophile ambassador to the PRC, Sabino Vaca Narvaja, formerly taught. As in the United States, leading Argentine think tanks, such as the Argentine Council for International Relations, have China studies programs as well.
+
+Argentina currently has three Confucius Institutes in public universities, in keeping with Chinese tradition. The oldest, at Universidad Nacional de la Plata, was established in the 1980s, followed by Universidad de Buenos Aires and, most recently, Universidad Nacional de Cordoba, set up in 2020. Universidad Católica de Salta has also explored setting up a Confucius Institute.
+
+According to China-focused Argentines interviewed for this work, the number of PRC-paid trips for Argentines to study or attend forums in China has reportedly decreased from the golden age of the 2010s, with restrictions on interactions and travel for Argentines increased. Beyond PRC-sponsored education institutions and scholarships, the Sino-Argentine Chamber of Commerce is an important referent for Argentine businesses doing business in the PRC or with Chinese companies. The president of the chamber is Sergio Spadone, son of one of Argentina’s pioneers of doing business with China, and the executive director is Alejandra Conconi. In addition, former head of the chamber Ernesto Taboada now operates a small, separate organization, the Argentine-China Council, after a falling out with the chamber, which he formerly headed, according to an Argentine China expert.
+
+
+### Provincial and Local Engagement
+
+As elsewhere in the region, the PRC is particularly engaged at the provincial and local levels in Argentina, including in investment projects, the gifting of trips for local officials to the PRC, and in arrangements with local universities. These engagements include a technology and resources agreement with the National University of Jujuy, an agreement with Alibaba, agreements with PowerChina, and a $30 million contract for ZTE to install cameras and a provincial response and control system in the province, among other technologies.
+
+Beyond PRC initiatives within the Argentine provinces and with their leaders, Chinese provinces have pursued national-level representation in Argentina. According to an Argentine China expert, Hunan, Canton, and Szechuan Provinces all have representative offices in Buenos Aires but not in the Argentine provinces with which they have sister-province relations. As in Brazil under President Jair Bolsonaro, PRC engagement with Argentine local and provincial-level governments is likely to expand as a complement to a less amenable atmosphere for pursuing agreements at the national level.
+
+
+### PRC Space Sector Presence in Argentina
+
+As has been widely publicized, in 2012, the PRC signed a $300 million agreement with the Fernandez de Kirchner government, serving as the basis for the construction and operation of a deep space radar facility in a remote part of Neuquén. The facility is operated by China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control, part of the Chinese Strategic Support Force of the People’s Liberation Army. The Argentine government has only an intermittent presence at the site.
+
+In addition, since the signing of a 1989 cooperation agreement, the Chinese have operated space telescopes at the Felix Aguilar Astronomical Observatory in San Juan, constructing a satellite laser ranging station at the site in 2006. The PRC is currently constructing a 40-meter space telescope, the China Argentina Radio Telescope, at the facility.
+
+In Rio Gallegos, in the south of the country, the Chinese firm Emposat has plans to build a space tracking facility with four to six antennae. The site, if approved, would complement the Chinese polar space capabilities provided by its Antarctic research facilities at Zhongshan and Inexpressible Island, Antarctica.
+
+
+### Security
+
+The PRC has explored sales and gifts of arms and other equipment to Argentina’s police and military, though those appeared to have been decreasing at the end of the prior government and have not gone forward under the Milei administration. During the Fernandez de Kirchner administration, Argentina began exploring the purchase of Chinese 8x8 armored personnel carriers for the Cruz del Sur multinational peacekeeping brigade, which it formed with Chile, as well as P-18 offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) similar to those the PRC sold to Trinidad and Tobago and FC-1 interceptor aircraft. After purchasing four WMZ-551s for evaluation for $2.6 million, Argentina decided against the purchase of more of the vehicles.
+
+During the center-right administration of Mauricio Macri (2015–19), Argentina decided to buy French patrol boats, obviating the need for Chinese OPVs. Purchase of the Chinese FC-1 received serious consideration under the leftist Peronist government of Alberto Fernandez, including due to significant efforts by the Chinese, who saw an opportunity to introduce the fighter into the region more broadly through Argentina and who went so far as to cut the offer price by 40 percent in an attempt to win the contract, according to off-the-record interviews with Argentine security experts. The Chinese were reportedly even exploring assembly of the aircraft in Argentina in a facility of the national defense industry manufacturer FADEA for export to other parts of the region. The Chinese may have also had an additional source of leverage through Francisco Taiana, son of then minister of defense Jorge Taiana, who had received considerable access to China to write a book on the country, among other activities.
+
+In the end, however, there were serious questions about quality and maintainability, particularly because the Chinese did not use the fighter themselves. According to Argentine security experts, the Argentine evaluation team could not speak with the Pakistani pilots who had flown the FC-1s. Because the planes used a Russian-made engine, the availability of parts became uncertain in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine and associated Western sanctions. In the final months of the Fernandez government, Argentina chose to buy U.S. F-16s from Denmark rather than the Chinese fighter. Beyond these weapons purchases, Argentina also received a donation of four armored vehicles and security cameras from the PRC in conjunction with the G20 Summit in Buenos Aires, though there were no further gifts after that.
+
+In professional military interactions, the Argentine National War College (NWC) has regularly sent an officer to a six-month command and general staff course in the PRC, as well as sending officials to shorter courses. According to an Argentine security expert, the Argentine NWC, as recently as 2020, also hosted a student from the People’s Liberation Army.
+
+The Chinese National Police also maintains a presence in the PRC embassy in Argentina to support Argentine authorities in combatting Chinese-organized crime in the country. During the prior Fernandez de Kirchner government, the PRC brought in a larger presence to help the Argentine government combat the Chinese triad Pi Xue, which had grown significantly in the greater Buenos Aires area and was extorting Chinese shopkeepers. Argentine security experts note that while the reported level of extortion and other activity by Pi Xue is now much lower, the Chinese national presence in the PRC embassy in Buenos Aires continues.
+
+As in other parts of the region, the Chinese government appears to operate unofficial Chinese police stations in the country, ostensibly to assist but also to pressure Chinese nationals living in Argentina, leveraging relatives living in China. According to Argentine security experts, local authorities have identified at least two such facilities in the neighborhoods of San Martin and Tres de Febrero.
+
+In the domain of private security, China Overseas Security Group (COSG) has an office in Buenos Aires whose address, according to reports by security experts interviewed for this project, is that of the local law firm that registered it, Wilson Rae. COSG continues to advertise on its website a search for a country manager position dating to the 2019 G20 meeting in the city, though it does not have a visible presence in the city.
+
+___`As in other parts of the region, the Chinese government appears to operate unofficial Chinese police stations in the country, ostensibly to assist but also to pressure Chinese nationals living in Argentina, leveraging relatives living in China.`___
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+The Argentine-China commercial relationship is broad and substantial and will likely continue under the Milei administration, particularly in high-priority sectors such as lithium, renewable energy, and digital sectors. PRC purchases of Argentine agricultural products and other commodities and Chinese sales of a broad range of goods and services to the Argentine economy will probably continue at a significant level, though lack of political will on the Argentine side and lack of financing on the Chinese side may restrict agreements of a more political or military nature and large infrastructure projects whose business case is questionable.
+
+As in Brazil under the China-skeptical Bolsonaro regime, PRC engagements at the provincial level in Argentina may flourish compared to those at the national level, where political skepticism toward the PRC is greater. The success of the Milei government in turning around the Argentine economy will also impact its ability to engage commercially with the PRC and take new projects forward. Whatever the trajectory, the underlying economic logic between the two countries means the future of the Argentina-PRC relationship is likely to be better than some in the PRC fear and will present an opportunity for Washington to work with the Milei administration to define what a transparent, balanced relationship should look like between Argentina and a range of countries, including China, other Asian partners, the European Union, and the United States.
+
+---
+
+__Evan Ellis__ is a research professor of Latin American studies at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, with a focus on the region’s relationships with China and other non-Western Hemisphere actors as well as transnational organized crime and populism in the region.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-05-ever-the-day-after.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-05-ever-the-day-after.md
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+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-05-ever-the-day-after.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Ever The Day After
+author: H A Hellyer
+date : 2024-06-05 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/Jjj0tAW.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Egypt, Israel and Gaza"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Egypt and Israel signed the Camp David Accords in 1978, the first peace treaty between the Jewish state and any of its Arab neighbours. The accords are the bedrock of the region’s security architecture, but owing to Israel’s war on Gaza and its moves at the border between Gaza and Egypt, the relationship between Cairo and Tel Aviv has reached its lowest point in decades. What kind of state are Egyptian-Israeli relations in, and how might this impact the future?_ _Jonathan Eyal (__JE__) asked RUSI Senior Associate Fellow H A Hellyer (__HH__) about the significance of these events._
+
+__JE__: Camp David was a historic peace treaty between Cairo and Tel Aviv, and laid down the groundwork for a new regional security arrangement for the region in general, and Egypt and Israel in particular. Are we seeing that security arrangement unravel?
+
+__HH__: The Camp David Accords had a number of annexes attached to them. One of these describes several different zones; Sinai is divided into three zones (A, B and C), and then there is “Zone D” which is along the border between Gaza and Egypt, on the Gazan side. Article 2/D of Annex 1 is very clear about what type of Israeli military forces are allowed to exist in that zone, which was later described as the “Philadelphi Corridor”. There’s no question that when the Israelis moved tanks into the Corridor on 7 May and took over the Rafah border crossing, they violated that article, and they’ve done much more since then. Last week, Tel Aviv declared that it had taken over the entire corridor, again violating the terms of the Camp David Accords.
+
+We should be clear-eyed about this: Israel’s moves are seriously endangering the region’s security architecture, and many analysts – myself included – have warned over the past eight months that reckless escalatory behaviour will put all under the “law of unintended consequences”. If we’re frank, Israel’s moves over the past eight months have been incredibly reckless and have raised the likelihood of conflict breaking out across the region – between Israel and Iran, Israel and Lebanon, and now Israel and Egypt. It’s a testament to the region that we haven’t seen all-out war break out, despite these kinds of moves; it shows how little appetite there is for widespread conflict. But I think Tel Aviv is pushing the envelope hard, and it’s difficult to imagine there won’t be consequences.
+
+__JE__: Are you saying Egypt might pull out of Camp David?
+
+__HH__: No, I think Cairo continues to place great value on the treaty, and will be looking for other ways to express its rejection of Tel Aviv’s moves. As recently as 2 June, when Israel, the US and Egypt convened to discuss the issue, Cairo reiterated its demand that the Israelis withdraw from the Rafah border crossing. This is why, for example, Egypt announced it would join South Africa’s case at the International Court of Justice against Israel, and Cairo refused to coordinate with the Israelis on usage of the Rafah border crossing, clearly seeing such coordination as recognising the legitimacy of the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) presence there. Cairo may be pointing to the fact there are seven other border crossings, also completely under Israel’s control; several of them have been permanently closed by the Israelis, such as Karni and Sufa, but could be opened in order to provide aid relief to Palestinians in Gaza. Moreover, Israel’s official spokesperson, David Mencer, said to journalists that Israel had asked Egypt to open up so that Palestinians who wanted to flee to Sinai could do so, but that the request had been declined. There’s widespread concern in Cairo that Israel will take any opportunity to ethnically cleanse Palestinians from Gaza and displace them to Sinai, if it can do so; such admissions by Israel’s officials do not help.
+
+___`Israel’s moves over the past eight months have been incredibly reckless and have raised the likelihood of conflict breaking out across the region`___
+
+But there are other things to be concerned about, as Israel continues to engage in more reckless behaviour. A recent clash near the Rafah border crossing led to the death of an Egyptian soldier; Israeli media itself reported that the clash resulted from an Israeli provocation, designed to test Egypt’s reaction. Even without such moves, the risk assessment is serious; Israeli forces along the border in Rafah are seen by the Egyptians not only as violating the peace treaty, but also as part of an occupying power in occupied territory – which is also how London, the EU, the UN and most governments see Israel in Gaza. Egyptian soldiers on the border are no doubt impacted by that; they are seeing an occupying power in Gaza, right on their doorstep, where they know it’s not supposed to be, and they also know that nearby, that same army is engaged in massive hostilities against Palestinians in Rafah. Those soldiers see the same news reports that you and I see, and know that the UN and various agencies are reporting all manners of suffering as a result of the IDF operation. This time, the clash resulted in the death of one soldier; what happens next time, considering everything else that is going on?
+
+__JE__: OK, so things are rocky. But we have a normalisation of political relations between Egypt and Israel going back more than four decades. We also have a more recent set of normalisations between Israel and Arab states in terms of the Abraham Accords, and a new deal being proposed that would normalise relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. How does that impact Egypt, as it was the first to normalise, which gave it a certain leverage in terms of relations with Western powers?
+
+__HH__: There are a few things to mention here; the first is that the Biden administration has invested tremendous energy in expanding the Abraham Accords. Indeed, many analysts characterised Biden’s Middle East policy as prioritising extending those accords, and very little else. Incredibly, despite the massively destructive conflict of the past eight months, the administration has still directed a lot of its limited bandwidth towards efforts to normalise Israel’s political relationship with Saudi Arabia. There’s a lot to unpack there, but I’m not convinced it will succeed, because Tel Aviv has already said it won’t accede to the fairly minimalist demands that Saudi Arabia has, which are all about fulfilling certain UN Security Council resolutions.
+
+Be that as it may, there were also concerns expressed in 2020, when the Abraham Accords were signed, in terms of what they might do to Cairo’s geopolitical standing. The talk at the time was that they would decrease Cairo’s – and also Amman’s – importance in the region, because now there were other Arab states that had relations with Israel. But the truth is, whenever a crisis emerges involving Israel, the world still calls on Cairo and Amman, and moreso on Cairo. None of that has changed; they don’t call on Abu Dhabi, Manama or anywhere else in the same way. Cairo in particular has relationships not only with the Israelis, but with pretty much every major Palestinian faction.
+
+In any case, my assessment of the Saudi-Israeli normalisation deal remains the same – I’m not sure we’ll be seeing that anytime soon.
+
+___`Whenever a crisis emerges involving Israel, the world still calls on Cairo and Amman, and moreso on Cairo. They don’t call on Abu Dhabi, Manama or anywhere else in the same way`___
+
+__JE__: Perhaps, but the normalisation deal is all about the “day after”, and Biden’s plan put a lot of focus on trying to see beyond the current hostilities. What’s Egypt’s role in that regard?
+
+__HH__: There are a lot of scenarios being discussed for Gaza following the end of hostilities. The problem is, most of them have been vetoed by the Israelis, so it becomes rather academic and abstract to even discuss them without addressing the elephant in the room, which is Israel’s occupation of Gaza, along with its military presence therein. Even the Israelis have found themselves in rather awkward situations due to this; Netanyahu announced in early May that the Emiratis could be involved in governing Gaza following the war, only to be met with a very public denunciation of the idea by the Emirati foreign minister. The stumbling block, including for Abu Dhabi – irrespective of the Abraham Accords – was the Israeli occupation, and the absence of a Palestinian government with “integrity, competence and independence”, which would then have the capacity to invite the UAE to assist.
+
+It’s not only Arab states that reject “providing cover for the Israeli presence in the Gaza Strip”, as the Emiratis put it; I don’t think any country or multilateral organisation is interested in assisting in governing Gaza, without a clear commitment from the Israelis that they are leaving. Otherwise, such a presence would simply be interpreted as being Israel’s police force in the Gaza Strip – and thus quite likely targeted as part of the occupation. I’m not sure anyone would willingly take on that role; Cairo certainly won’t.
+
+I think if Biden is successful in getting a permanent ceasefire and an Israeli withdrawal of troops, as well as a commitment to allow a track towards a Palestinian state that includes Gaza, then yes, Egypt could probably be convinced to deploy troops as part of a broader and temporary international force, similar to KFOR in Kosovo, for example.
+
+But that’s a lot of “ifs”. The irony of all of this is that it is actually quite clear what a workable plan in Gaza entails, and it has been for decades. The question has always been: is the international community in general, and the US in particular, going to use its leverage to push such a workable plan forward? So far, the answer has been a firm “no” – and the Israelis know it.
+
+---
+
+__H A Hellyer__ is the Senior Associate Fellow of RUSI. Specialising in geopolitics, security studies, political economy, and belief, he has more than 20 years of experience in governmental, corporate advisory, and academic environments in Europe, USA, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-05-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-89.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-05-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-89.md
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-05-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-89.md
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【黎智英案・審訊第 89 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-06-05 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 料控方下周二完成案情 黎智英一方料7月作中段陳詞
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（5日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第89日審訊。控方播放餘下的影片和錄音，其中一段錄音為《蘋果》英文版會議錄音，有與會者提出集中做內地維權新聞等，並做一些《南華早報》不會做的新聞。黎認同：「啫係做番真實嘅新聞。」他亦提議多做一些較有人情味的新聞，並以講述疫情期間武漢情況的《方方日記》為例。預料控方於下周二完成控方案情；黎智英一方將有中段陳詞，要求法庭裁定3項控罪表證不成立。控辯雙方將提交書面陳詞，並暫定於7月9日續審，以在庭上作口頭陳詞。
+
+#### 黎智英手機內影片發自羅傑斯和裴倫德
+
+控方繼續播放於黎智英手機 WhatsApp 或 Twitter 發現的影片，部份影片的傳送人為「香港監察」創辦人羅傑斯（Benedict Rogers）或「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」（Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China，簡稱 IPAC）創辦人裴倫德（Luke de Pulford）。
+
+其中一段影片為2020年8月19日時任美國總統特朗普出席記者會，其後黎在 Twitter 轉發該影片。有記者問到特朗普對於港府拘捕黎智英有什麼回應。特朗普表示聽說黎是一個「勇敢的人（brave man）」和「很棒的人（wonderful gentleman）」，他指美國會投放大量資金在香港，資助和促進美國與香港之間的貿易。
+
+#### 庭上播《蘋果》英文版會議錄音 與會者主張集中內地維權新聞
+
+另一段錄音是由黎智英傳送給時任《蘋果》副社長陳沛敏，顯示黎智英與《蘋果》員工開會討論英文版方針。黎提到翻譯《方方日記》及轉載，該書講述作家方方在疫情期間身處武漢的經歷，惟另一人指有版權問題要處理，黎則提議只抽書本一小部份轉載。另有人提出集中做內地維權新聞、訪問大學教授等，做一些《南華早報》不會做的新聞。黎認同：「啫係做番真實嘅新聞。」
+
+會議談及邀請專欄作家替《蘋果》英文版撰文，黎提及邀請「沈月」，而中國組同事則提醒該作者名稱叫「呂月」而非「沈月」。
+
+有人歸納英文版新聞可以分兩個範疇，一是有關自由、民主、人權；二是有關香港企業被「染紅」、被內地企業收購的新聞。黎指其私人助手 Mark Simon 正在邀請外國政治人物訂閱英文版，中國組則負責搜尋新聞題材，主要集中內地人權對香港的影響，以及邀請作者撰寫評論。
+
+#### 張劍虹提議加入「諷刺大陸嘅漫畫」
+
+英文版主管方面，黎明言不覺得林和立勝任，因他年紀大，他需要比較年輕、有活力的人擔任統籌，例如專欄作家馮睎乾，惟不知道馮對內地新聞是否熟悉。黎亦提議多做一些較有人情味的新聞，並再次以《方方日記》為例。
+
+時任《蘋果》社長張劍虹亦是與會者之一，他提出英文版加入「諷刺大陸嘅漫畫」，除了硬新聞之外，每日連載政治漫畫也不會浪費版位。有人提議邀請政治漫畫家尊子，惟不肯定他有否留意中國內地新聞，需要先聯絡他商討。
+
+
+▲ 時任《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹（資料圖片）
+
+#### 庭上播放語音訊息 黎智英邀李兆富等人提供帖文內容 例如美國人有興趣的話題
+
+控方指，2020年5月2日黎智英向李兆富（Simon Lee，筆名「利世民」）傳送一則語音訊息，李當時回覆：「我會與他們商討。」庭上播放該段語音訊息，黎指他剛剛開設 Twitter 個人帳戶，預料會有很多人追蹤，所以希望李兆富邀請盧峯（馮偉光）和桑普等人，每日提供一些短文或寫文章時的想法，以及美國人有興趣的話題，以供黎在 Twitter 上發表。
+
+#### 料控方下周二完成案情 黎智英一方將作中段陳詞
+
+控方表示即將完成控方案情，經控辯雙方商討，案件押後至下周二（6月11日）續審，以待處理翻譯文本事宜。
+
+黎智英一方將有中段陳詞，要求法庭裁定3項控罪表證不成立；代表「蘋果日報有限公司」、「蘋果日報印刷有限公司」及「蘋果互聯網有限公司」的大律師王國豪則表示不會有中段陳詞。
+
+經控辯雙方商討，黎一方須於6月18日向法庭提交書面中段陳詞，控方則須於6月25日提交陳詞，之後黎一方須於7月2日提交回應控方的書面陳詞。至於聽取口頭陳詞的聆訊日子，法官杜麗冰提出7月9日，法官李運騰補充，因為他們還有其他工作在身。
+
+法官李運騰提到，本案是首次由3名法官組成的合議庭聽取中段陳詞，關注傳媒能否報導中段陳詞內容。控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行則指過往已出現過在3名法官席前作中段陳詞的案件。翻查報導，唐英傑案和初選案均有中段陳詞，並且控辯雙方陳詞獲傳媒報導。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC51/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-06-euro-sifmanet-copenhagen-report.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-06-euro-sifmanet-copenhagen-report.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b7db9929
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-06-euro-sifmanet-copenhagen-report.md
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Euro SIFMANet CPH Report
+author: Olivia Allison
+date : 2024-06-06 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/BvVCDB6.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network: Copenhagen Report"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Discussions held in Copenhagen in March 2024 addressed the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in Denmark._
+
+
+
+In late March 2024, the Centre for Finance and Security (CFS) at RUSI, with the support of Copenhagen-based policy centre Think Tank EUROPA, hosted a roundtable in Copenhagen. The roundtable, along with a series of one-on-one meetings, discussed the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in Denmark. None of the discussions in the event are attributable.
+
+The gatherings included representatives from national authorities with sanctions-related competences, as well as sanctions and compliance experts from financial institutions and Danish industrial groups, compliance experts from leading law firms, representatives from the industry group Danish Shipping, and other advisers. These included, among others, representatives from the Danish Ministry of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs; the Danish Customs Agency (DCA); the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (MFA); the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority; the National Special Crime Unit; and other relevant agencies. This event is part of the in-country engagements conducted by the CFS-led European Sanctions and the Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet), supported by the National Endowment for Democracy.
+
+
+### Denmark’s Decentralised Sanctions Implementation
+
+The roundtable began with a discussion of the division of authority and responsibility for sanctions in Denmark, and the significant adaptations required since 2022.
+
+The conversation considered Denmark’s preparedness for the Russia sanctions following the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) fourth round of mutual evaluations, the scope of which included implementation of targeted financial sanctions. Denmark’s mutual evaluation report was concluded in 2017 and its subsequent follow-up process ended in 2021, which a government representative at the roundtable said had helped the country to prepare for expanded sanctions. They noted that Denmark was evaluated as “partially compliant” for Recommendation 7 related to targeted financial sanctions for proliferation financing, but was upgraded to “largely compliant” in the follow-up report in 2021. Addressing these gaps had, a representative said, helped the country’s preparations, but it had not been possible to prepare fully for the sanctioning of a country with which the EU as a whole had such significant economic ties, compared to jurisdictions that are subject to sanctions regimes covered by the FATF Standards and have been for a long time.
+
+Denmark has more than 25 authorities with some role in or oversight of sanctions responsibility – relatively higher than other member states where SIFMANet has held similar roundtables. The MFA is the authority with overall responsibility for coordinating the sanctions policy of the Danish government. Since 2022, the Danish “EU-Special Committee on Sanctions” and taskforces have expanded to include additional government bodies, ranging from utilities to cultural ministries. Government representatives highlighted the enhanced coordination that had been put into practice in Denmark. Steps included the establishment of a central sanctions coordinator team, vested in a newly established economic security unit in the MFA, and new intra-governmental procedures, as well as a governmental taskforce to counter circumvention, with participation from relevant national Danish authorities.
+
+Although government representatives said that this coordination between a wider group had improved effectiveness, dividing responsibility for implementation and guidance across numerous national competent authorities may also increase the risk of fragmentation in approach. This was underscored by comments from private sector participants, who said that there had been “inter-agency problems on who’s responsible for what”. One participant said that some questions had “circled for some time” as a result.
+
+
+### Lacking National Guidance on EU Regulations
+
+One source of frustration expressed by private sector participants at the roundtable was the Danish government’s reluctance to interpret European law and regulations or provide answers to specific questions, given that the debate had taken place in Brussels. One participant said that while interpretation of Danish law would take into account written remarks about the law, no such written remarks are provided for EU law and, they said, “we can only look at what the law says”. This representative also said the Danish government’s role was to provide guidance, “not counselling”. Other government representatives said they had provided as much guidance as possible, but that the scale of requests had been unprecedented.
+
+Private sector participants were frustrated with this position. They agreed that they found the EU FAQs helpful, but insisted these should be expanded further. While they appreciated the guidance that had been shared by the Danish government, they said it was both too limited and too slow. One representative of a Danish maritime industry group said that they had sent 75 to 100 requests to Danish authorities and had not yet received a clear response. Another participant, from a law firm, said the process was time-consuming and that it “can be difficult to get answers”.
+
+In addition to this, some participants said that, over time, they had stopped seeking formal clarification on the sanctions, because of concerns about privacy in the event of freedom of information requests being made to the government. One participant said they preferred to liaise through informal discussions. A business association representative also said companies had stopped seeking clarification on other matters for fear of receiving an answer that blocked a particular transaction. Overall, some private sector participants expressed their frustration that their community continued to have more experience and expertise in sanctions implementation than the public sector.
+
+
+### Private Sector Information Sharing
+
+Despite these obstacles, a business association representative said there was an overall positive public–private dialogue, and a general perception that Danish business wants to do right thing. Participants from both public and private sectors reiterated several times the importance of trust in the business environment, and a government representative said they were highly aware of companies’ willingness to comply, as well as the public support for their doing so.
+
+Another positive aspect highlighted was sharing information within the private sector, with more experienced companies sharing tools and information with smaller businesses, in order to support their compliance with the regulations. This was seen as an important support for business, given the “huge gap in compliance readiness” that a business association representative noticed among smaller companies. One participant from a multinational company said this information-sharing practice had been much more widespread in Denmark than in other European member states, an assertion supported by SIFMANet visits to other EU member states.
+
+Government-led efforts include not only the establishment of sanctions taskforces among authorities, but also substantial outreach to the private sector. This outreach included a notification that Danish authorities sent to over 1,500 companies containing information on their sanctions obligations and encouraging them to get in touch and ask for support. In addition, the Danish Business Authority has sent out targeted letters in relation to circumvention, including compliance guidance, to approximately 200 economic operators. Danish authorities had an existing relationship with obliged entities, but the government decided to engage with all companies, given the expansive nature of the Russia sanctions regime.
+
+
+### Misalignment Between Banks and Corporates
+
+Representatives from the corporate sector, including industrial and shipping companies, expressed frustration with the banking sector, which they said had taken an overly narrow approach to allowing certain transactions – beyond what was required by the law. One participant said it was as if “every taxi driver had to ask clients what they were doing before accepting their fare”. A bank representative said the requirement to comply on the product side had fundamentally changed how financial institutions approach sanctions risk, while another participant said that they now viewed certain types of business activities as high risk, where these would not have been before 2022.
+
+Another participant, from a business association, said that several of their members had completed all compliance steps required for a certain transaction, but the banks had still refused to allow it. However, a representative from a bank said that non-US companies “need to step up”. They referred to the risks highlighted in the December 2023 amendments to US Executive Order 14024, which strengthened the US’ ability to sanction financial institutions facilitating and funding supplies to the Russian military–industrial complex.
+
+At the same time, representatives from corporates also acknowledged that there was a lack of regulation of that sector, compared to the financial industry. There is no specific “know your customer” requirement for much of Danish industry, which meant that it was challenging to convince boards to allocate resources to sanctions compliance. Meanwhile, banks now demand more compliance procedures, and have higher standards for their corporate clients.
+
+Additionally, participants from both banks and corporates cited a perception that the strictness of their compliance was harming their competitiveness compared to their European peers. They said this was a “significant” concern. Representatives of the shipping industry said that the country as a whole was now a “risk-poor environment”, with many shipping companies taking overly conservative approaches to international business, resulting in a negative impact on both that industry and the business environment overall.
+
+One area that was highlighted several times was product classification. Given the dominance of the shipping and trade sectors in Denmark, classification was a significant issue, with participants highlighting the difficulties of getting a classification on tariff codes from customs and a dual-use designation decision. Some participants agreed that there continued to be public sector resourcing issues relating to the EU sanctions over the critical goods and technologies listed under Annex VII of Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014. However, another participant mentioned that the DCA can provide Binding Tariff Information decisions.
+
+
+### Enforcement and the Shadow of the Dan-Bunkering Case
+
+The discussion then turned to the topic of enforcement, and numerous participants referred to the case of Dan-Bunkering, which was prosecuted in Denmark in 2021 for shipping $101 million in jet fuel to Syria from Kaliningrad. This case was seen by several participants as a model of enforcement. However, a representative of a business association said this represented a specific case, in which a business “wilfully turned a blind eye” to government guidance. In this way, they said, the Dan-Bunkering case was not representative of Danish business practices. Nevertheless, the experience clearly cast a shadow across public and private sector alike.
+
+Procedural questions of how investigations were initiated were also discussed, with prosecutors highlighting that many cases began with administrative infractions, escalating into cooperation between police and competent authorities. This procedure, another government representative said, had been set up after the Dan-Bunkering case, which had provided many opportunities to clarify procedures.
+
+A representative from the Ministry of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs said many investigations began with the relevant Danish authority conducting a review of the news media for negative reports or requesting documents from exporters to identify suspicious information. This information was then evaluated for potential indications of misconduct before the authority decided whether to escalate the matter to police (and potentially onwards to prosecutors). Since 2022, Danish authorities have evaluated 140 potential breaches, they said, and there were around 40 open cases. So far, six matters had been reported to police. At the same time, a customs representative said there were other steps before any potential breaches were reported, including a hearing on customs declarations, and so there was “a lot of enforcement going on behind the scenes” before any case is reported.
+
+Participants said these statistics highlighted the difficulty of comparing enforcement between different EU member states, with no centralised reporting of enforcement from the EU’s Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union. A participant from a business association said these figures were also likely to be much higher than the number of actual criminal cases, since many issues related to goods that were unintentionally misdeclared, due to the aforementioned classification difficulties, rather than deliberate evasion or circumvention.
+
+To this point from the business association, the customs representative responded that, in the majority of cases relating to possible breaches of import and export prohibitions, the DCA will go through several steps ahead of any potential filing of a police report. This includes a consultation process with the responsible party (usually the declarer), in which they are informed that the customs declaration is in possible breach of sanctions. The party will then be able to provide documentation for potential misdeclarations, so that the declaration can be corrected. Only if the responsible party is unable or unwilling to provide sufficient documentation that their goods are not in violation of sanctions will a police report be filed. Therefore, they argued, the figure is unlikely to be inflated by “unintentional misdeclarations” and similar declaration-related mistakes.
+
+Finally, participants discussed Denmark’s criminal enforcement regime for sanctions breaches, which requires proof of negligence or intent. Some participants found Denmark to have relatively high standards for criminal enforcement, and advocated for civil enforcement or other mechanisms with lower standards for deployment. Private sector representatives added that they would welcome a civil enforcement regime in Denmark, as this would allow voluntary self-disclosures and more dialogue between the public and private sectors, allowing companies to “come clean” if they have inadvertently breached sanctions.
+
+However, other participants said that widening enforcement action could damage the collaborative and cooperative nature of the public–private dialogue as well as the dialogue between private sector actors. They instead urged the government to publish findings from its investigations and reviews, even those that do not reach the standards for a criminal prosecution, as these would allow companies to learn from issues other entities have faced.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+Danish authorities and the private sector clearly reiterated their commitment to implementing and enforcing sanctions within Denmark at this roundtable. One particularly positive aspect of this was the commitment to information sharing in the private sector, both within business associations and between peers within industry. The roundtable discussions also demonstrated open and frank dialogue regarding the need for more guidance and support from the public sector, and authorities’ receptivity to these messages.
+
+The government’s ability to provide guidance and clear responses to queries appeared to be hampered by the spread of sanctions implementation responsibility across a large number of national competent authorities, to the degree that private sector actors complained of questions “circling” among various agencies.
+
+Further, the Danish authorities’ limitation on providing guidance on EU regulation, beyond what is stated in the wording and FAQs as adopted in Brussels, also poses practical difficulties and raised frustration within the private sector. Business representatives urged the government to share more information on its interpretations, including potentially on anonymised determinations by customs and other authorities in pre-enforcement investigations and analyses.
+
+Discussions also highlighted the potential gap in enforcement for sanctions breaches that occur due to conduct that falls below Denmark’s criminal standard. This may create a gap between Danish enforcement practice and that of other member states. At the same time, Danish business perceived its own practice as overly compliant, in comparison to other EU member states, raising concerns about Denmark’s competitiveness. Further alignment with other member states would address such concerns.
+
+In sum, like many EU member states, Denmark has discovered that the key to successful sanctions implementation starts with coordination across the wide range of agencies and departments that find themselves involved in the Russia sanctions regime. It has also discovered that investment in relations with the private sector – the frontline of implementation – is critical if the country is to play its part in restricting the funding, and particularly the resourcing, of Russia’s illegal war of aggression in Ukraine.
+
+---
+
+__Olivia Allison__ is an Associate Fellow at RUSI and an independent consultant. She has more than 15 years’ experience carrying out complex international investigations and supporting the development of integrity and governance for state-owned companies, international companies and international financial institutions. She has a wide range of financial crime and asset-tracing experience from leadership roles held in London, Moscow, Kyiv and Kazakhstan.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-06-friendshore-lithium-ion.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-06-friendshore-lithium-ion.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Friendshore Lithium-Ion
+author: William Alan Reinsch, et al.
+date : 2024-06-06 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/EGndAl9.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Friendshoring the Lithium-Ion Battery Supply Chain: Battery Cell Manufacturing"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_This white paper outlines the technical details behind the production of the active battery materials stage of the lithium-ion battery supply chain and how U.S. government policies are impacting friendshoring efforts in the sector._
+
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+Nearshoring the lithium-ion battery supply chain requires substantial policy efforts at every stage. Upstream inputs, such as critical minerals sourcing and processing, are concentrated in a few nations. Although many more countries engage in midstream and downstream processing of critical resources, access to this end of the supply chain is becoming less secure for U.S. manufacturers because of uncertainty in the domestic and geopolitical spheres.
+
+Commensurate to the breadth of the challenges is the importance of overcoming them. An adequate, predictable supply of lithium-ion batteries, as well as the supply chain and raw materials, is essential to reaching green transition goals in the United States. These batteries power key products that enable a sustainable, large-scale switch away from fossil fuels essential to long-term environmental goals.
+
+Calls to accelerate the shift to renewables are accompanied by other goals and legislation that have a significant impact on the direction of U.S. economic and trade policy. Recognizing China’s dominance over the supply of several goods critical to U.S. prosperity and security, policymakers say they intend to spur de-risking of these supply chains by diversifying import sources away from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as well as creating redundancies to protect against potential unforeseen shocks such as pandemics. Policymakers’ de-risking agenda goes hand in hand with government measures designed to bring production of critical goods back to the United States. They perceive renewing U.S. domestic manufacturing capabilities as a geostrategic shield as well as the pathway to creating more profitable and equitable opportunities for workers.
+
+Congress and the administration under President Joe Biden have thus undertaken several policies to simultaneously tackle three objectives that will transform the landscape of U.S. lithium-ion battery production, among other sectors. These policies aim to drastically quicken the pace of the U.S. green transition, reshore production capabilities in critical sectors, and diversify away from the PRC’s dominance in these key areas. While these three goals may all be critical to U.S. economic security in the long term, actions that enable the latter two could hamper achievement of the first. Unfortunately, measures aimed at securing the lithium-ion battery supply chain through industrial policy packages that emphasize reshoring threaten to hinder U.S. consumers’ access to this technology.
+
+This brief, the second in a series of three, builds upon the first’s findings on refining and processing and examines the production of active materials — the next step of the lithium-ion battery supply chain. The paper first outlines the technical steps necessary for active materials production — namely, mixing, coating, calendaring, and slitting, as well as production of the separator and electrolytes. It then describes current U.S. capabilities at this stage of the supply chain relative to the global market, considering the country’s nearshoring and onshoring ambitions.
+
+In addition, the brief addresses the Biden administration’s incentives, such as tax credits included in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA) and grants programs enabled by the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA). It continues with an examination of different regulations and their potential impact on the ability of lithium-ion battery input manufacturers to scale up their capabilities in the face of growing demand. Lastly, the report unpacks recent policy recommendations from Congress relevant to lithium-ion battery nearshoring considerations.
+
+
+### Manufacturing a Battery Cell
+
+#### Active Materials Production
+
+__Technical steps.__ After mining or extracting the raw minerals and materials — typically, lithium, cobalt, manganese, nickel, and graphite — processors and refiners purify them. The materials are then used to create cathode and anode active battery materials, which are commonly referred to as the midstream portion of the lithium-ion battery supply chain. Noteworthily, the active material production stage requires complex processes and advanced technologies and chemistries, meaning there are few producers and significant technical barriers to entry.
+
+As mentioned in the first paper of this series, a lithium-ion battery usually includes multiple lithium-ion cells, which function as interconnected building blocks. A lithium-ion cell is chiefly made up of an anode, a cathode, a separator, and an electrolyte. The anode is the negative electrode in a cell, whereas the positive side is the cathode. During charging, the lithium ions move from the cathode, through the separator, to the anode.
+
+The cathode component of the lithium-ion battery may comprise various formulations, chemistries, and crystalline structures. Metal oxides like cobalt, nickel, manganese, aluminum, iron, and phosphate, among others, make up the formulations and chemistries known as the cathode active materials (CAMs). Binders and cognitive additives such as polyvinylidene fluoride (PVDF) are also critical to the battery’s performance, especially for safer and longer-range applications. As mentioned in the first paper of this series, graphite is paramount to anodes, though industry is searching for ways to use alternative materials such as silicon or lithium given that they present opportunities for higher energy density and power.
+
+The process of converting a set of refined and purified critical minerals into functional components of electrodes — namely, a positively charged cathode and a negatively charged anode — may be divided into five key steps. These are mixing, coating, calendaring, slitting, and electrode making.
+
+_Mixing._ The active materials of the cathode, lithium, nickel, manganese, and cobalt, are dry blended in a planetary vacuum mixer. The active material of the anode is blended to ensure it approaches a viscous consistency. The anode and cathode materials are blended separately to ensure they do not react with one another. A solvent is added to both mixes to increase viscosity, which is critical as the viscosity, density, and solid content of the slurry affect battery longevity and performance. An additional key concern in the mixing process is air quality: controls on moisture level can limit air particles or impurities that contaminate the electrode slurry, but if moisture is not controlled, then the nickel is likely to corrode. Adding phosphoric acid or another solvent can also prevent corrosion.
+
+_Coating._ Coating broadly describes the process of applying the separate aluminum-cathode and copper-anode slurries onto metal foils. Once poured, the slurries are dried via an internal heater that operates between 70°C and 150°C. While warmer temperatures lead to lower production costs, there is a negative effect on the performance and overall longevity of the battery. Coating and drying are achieved via a slot die coater, which disperses the slurry through gaps onto moving metal foil. Once the slurry is dispersed, air flotation drying is used to evaporate any added solvents and provoke the sedimentation of particles, which is critical to battery performance. The newfound metal coating successfully protects the slurry from corrosion and damage. Both drying temperature and the speed at which drying occurs affect the distribution of slurry in each electrode. Generally, drying at room temperature, while slower, creates a more uniform dried slurry, thereby increasing the quality and longevity of the electrode.
+
+_Calendaring._ Calendaring occurs through compression of the coated electrodes onto collector metal foils. This improves the energy density of the battery and further controls for dust and humidity within the electrode. This compression to a point of even thickness and density of the dried slurry increases performance. A roller calendar is used during this stage. Generally, higher calendaring pressure increases the energy density of a given battery, thereby increasing battery life.
+
+_Slitting and electrode making._ A roller slitting machine then cuts the coated electrode into several slices. An electrode-making machine welds and cuts the electrode, and the anode, cathode, and separator are either stacked or wound into a spiral, depending on the type of battery. The machine clearly marks each side as “+ve” or “–ve,” and the electrolyte fluid (a lithium salt solution) is injected into the battery cylinder or pouch. The battery cell is then sealed and thus ready for use.
+
+_Separator production._ Separators may be manufactured via a dry or wet process. Regardless, they are made of either polypropylene or polyethylene (types of plastic). In the dry process, either plastic type is pushed through a machine to create a thin sheet. The sheet is then heated until the plastic melts. This step controls the size and alignment of the tiny crystal structures within the sheet that allow lithium ions to pass through once the battery is functional. The sheet is then stretched again to create a set of additional slit-like holes. The stretching occurs until the sheet has a porosity of roughly 40 percent. The wet process, in contrast, involves mixing softening agents that can turn polymers into plastics once heat is applied. The heated mixture is pushed out of a machine to form a sheet, which is stretched until a network of pores is present. The softening agent is then washed out, leaving a porous surface that allows lithium ions through.
+
+_Electrolyte solution production._ Electrolytes enable the conductivity of lithium-ion batteries by allowing for the movement of ions from the cathode to the anode when the battery is charging and from the anode to the cathode when the battery is in use. Electrolyte solutions are made up of soluble salts, acids, and other bases in a liquid format. When these solutions are mixed with various carbonates, such as vinylene carbonate, conductivity can increase, leading to improved battery performance.
+
+#### Current U.S. Capabilities
+
+As it stands, China dominates the active materials production portion of the lithium battery supply chain. In addition, South Korea and Japan have significant capacity. The United States finds itself a distant fourth, a position where it is likely to remain for 10 years despite significant investment. As of 2022, China produced roughly 90 percent of anodes and lithium electrolyte solutions.
+
+China also produces 70 percent of cathodes, 74 percent of separators, 82 percent of electrolytes, and 85 percent of anodes. Japan, a secondary player in the industry, produces 14 percent of cathodes, 11 percent of anodes, 31 percent of separators, and 19 percent of electrode solutions. South Korea manufactures 15 percent of the world’s cathodes and 3 percent of anodes. The United States occupies a far more modest role in the supply chain than its peers in East Asia, responsible for roughly 7 percent of battery production. It imports most components, such as cathodes and anodes, from abroad.
+
+One factor that hampers onshoring efforts in the United States is the high cost of production. Whereas the average lithium ferrophosphate cell factory in China costs $650 million to build, it costs roughly $865 million to build a similar facility in the United States or Europe due to differences in labor costs and supporting facilities. This difference in cost has created a global status quo that has favored, and will continue to favor, Chinese hegemony over the midstream. While the United States is predicted to see battery production increase to roughly 1.2 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2030, corresponding increases in Chinese production will ensure most global battery production continues to occur in China. By 2030 the United States is set to produce 0.8 million metric tons of cathodes per annum, though demand will stand at 1.3 million metric tons. Domestic anode supply will also stand at roughly 500,000 metric tons per annum, with demand hovering at 700,000 metric tons. These shortfalls will therefore drive the importation of cell components, such as cathodes and anodes, for locally produced batteries. Nonetheless, domestic demand for battery cells in the 2030s will likely outstrip the supply of battery active materials despite increases in domestic manufacturing.
+
+> #### `The PRC’s Influence over Commodity Prices`
+
+_`China’s dominance over commodities critical to the lithium-ion battery supply chain — along with the PRC’s internal demand for lithium-ion battery products, chief among them electric vehicles (EVs) — has a marked effect on the global prices of these commodities. In recent years, an annual doubling of Chinese demand for EVs has caused prices of key minerals and battery components to remain elevated. While demand is still increasing as of 2023, the rate of increase has slowed to only 30 percent. Analysts predict this leveling off of demand will continue in the coming years and that the era of annual doubling has ended.`_
+
+_`This reduction in demand has led to a 50 percent decrease in nickel futures since December 2022 and an 80 percent decrease in lithium carbonate prices. The oversupply of critical minerals resulting from the relative drop in Chinese demand is further exacerbated by the fact that nations that produce critical minerals used in EVs — such as those in the Lithium Triangle (Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia) and Indonesia, which produces nickel — have drastically increased their investment in mines in the hope that demand would continue to double annually for the coming few years. To that end, annual lithium production increased by 23 percent worldwide in 2023, while nickel output grew by 10 percent, according to U.S. Geological Survey estimates.`_
+
+_`In response to this decrease in prices, China’s government is planning to increase the size of its strategic stockpiles of cobalt by buying up 3,000 tons of privately owned cobalt from producers to add to the nation’s commodity stockpile. China added 5,000 tons of cobalt to its stockpile in July, representing another opportunity to take advantage of low cobalt prices, which have decreased by 60 percent since May 2022 due to rising supplies from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Indonesia. These stockpiles are being expanded to protect domestic producers and military manufacturers from supply and price shocks.`_
+
+_`While S&P Global projects that commodity prices will stabilize in the coming years, existing price volatility poses a challenge for new firms entering the industry. Firms that are profitable while commodity prices are low, for example, may be forced to shut down prematurely if prices of lithium carbonate spike. Both nascent and long-standing firms therefore require some protection from the ebbs and flows of the market.`_
+
+_`To that end, China acts to protect its domestic battery industry from external shocks by enforcing export license requirements on graphite, which is regarded as the most critical mineral for battery anodes. Given the market for graphite is expected to triple in the next five years and that China produces more than 90 percent of spherical graphite — the type primarily used in batteries — export licensing efforts give China leverage over the price and global supply of both graphite and anodes. Adoption of the export license requirement comes on the heels of an August 2023 rule that requires export licenses for rare earth elements gallium and germanium, which are both primarily used in semiconductors, though they have applications in EVs as well. For instance, gallium nitride can handle a lot of power without generating heat, making it ideal for onboard chargers and inverters. The new export license requirement led to a sharp increase of 25 percent in gallium prices, which has remained constant since. More critically, these curbs highlight China’s willingness to use export license requirements as a means to control the supply and price of key minerals in the supply chains of electric appliance components.`_
+
+_`This export licensing effort serves two PRC objectives. The first is a means of geopolitical leverage, especially against nations that have tense relations with China despite significant trade, such as the United States. The second is an attempt to boost the competitiveness of China’s domestic high-value industries. To that end, Beijing increased the number of restrictions on critical raw materials needed for electric cars and renewable energy, such as lithium, cobalt, and manganese, by a factor of nine between 2009 and 2020.`_
+
+#### Recycling
+
+As the demand for lithium-ion batteries continues to grow, efficient recycling methods become increasingly relevant. The minerals and raw materials involved in producing a lithium-ion battery can be scarce and costly to extract and refine. Recycling lithium-ion batteries is therefore less energy intensive than producing new batteries from raw minerals. A thriving recycling industry enables lithium-ion battery manufacturers to bypass the challenges of the upstream stages of the supply chain and closes the loop of the circular economy by enabling additional cell production.
+
+With their easily separable and durable components, traditional lead-acid batteries are relatively simple to recycle. Over 90 percent of lead-acid batteries are recycled as a result. The recycling process for lithium-ion batteries, however, is substantially more complex since lithium is highly reactive (flammable). Typically, devices that contain lithium-ion batteries are collected by the original retailers, an e-waste collector, or a business that specializes in collecting used electronics.
+
+Battery packs are sorted and shipped to collection and processing facilities. Some packs are designated for repair or reuse. Those that are not undergo a process called shredding, through which the battery is chopped into pieces, creating a “black mass” — granular material made up of the dismembered cathodes and anodes of batteries. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), there are currently no industry standards defining the exact components of black mass from which valuable metals like cobalt and nickel are extracted. The shredding and extraction processes require a relatively high amount of energy, decreasing the extracted components’ value and creating some disincentives for reprocessing. Additionally, the lack of common regulations or standards for EV battery recycling, particularly advanced chemical processes for recycling as well as restrictions on the trade of used batteries, serve as additional limiting incentives for reprocessing and recycling efforts.
+
+In response to these issues, the U.S. Department of Energy has devoted $62 million in funding set forth in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law toward efforts that entice consumers to engage in battery recycling and improve the overall economic viability of private recycling efforts. Examples of these investments include $14.4 million in student education and outreach programs that will strengthen collection efforts for end-of-life electronics and $40 million toward projects that generate “greater market demand for recycling consumer electronics batteries” through cost-savings approaches within the preprocessing and sorting sectors. Government and private sector efforts to establish battery drop-off programs also received $7.2 million in funding.
+
+
+### Promoting Active Materials Production
+
+Key to U.S. economic security is the assurance that critical goods — among which lithium-ion batteries are included given their importance to the green transition — have resilient and secure supply chains. The lithium-ion battery supply chain is currently dominated by countries of concern and a just-in-time model that can withstand neither geopolitical fragmentation nor black swan economic shocks. In particular, U.S. dependence on PRC inputs reflects a long-term risk to national security that should be addressed. U.S. economic partners and allies are currently in a better position to satisfy demand for active materials: nearshoring and friendshoring efforts therefore represent a necessary step toward countering such dependence. Another important piece of the puzzle is to promote domestic production. The Biden administration and Congress have leveraged several policy tools to spur the latter, such as tax incentives, grants, and loans.
+
+___`The lithium-ion battery supply chain is currently dominated by countries of concern and a just-in-time model that can withstand neither geopolitical fragmentation nor black swan economic shocks.`___
+
+#### Biden Administration Policies
+
+__Tax incentives.__ Current tax incentives included in recent industrial policy packages — chief among them the IRA — aim to provide a launchpad for domestic manufacturers. They are meant to spur production of multiple goods necessary to the green transition, including the active materials production stage of the lithium-ion battery supply chain.
+
+When it comes to producing electrode materials, such as anodes and cathodes, the IRA’s 45X advanced manufacturing production tax credit (PTC) is a boon for U.S. manufacturers. With eligible materials receiving a credit of 10 percent of the cost of production, the PTC is designed to support development of the active materials production stage of the supply chain. The tax credit applies to both equipment and minerals produced in the United States and sold between December 31, 2022, and December 31, 2032. Further, the produced equipment must be sold to an unrelated party as part of the taxpayer’s trade or business. There is a credit amount phaseout beginning in 2030 for only the manufactured components, but credits for critical minerals will expire without phasing out over time.
+
+However, the effectiveness of this tax credit is somewhat limited as it applies to specific production costs only. It does not cover direct or indirect material costs, nor does it include expenses related to the extraction, production, or acquisition of raw materials. These exclusions limit the overall utility of the credit in boosting domestic production of electrode active materials and instead ensure that it is only an impetus for production for firms at the margins.
+
+Another supply-side incentive the IRA provides is the 48C investment credit, awarded by the Department of Treasury in partnership with the Department of Energy. It awards credits of up to 30 percent of capital investment, provided the relevant project satisfies wage and apprenticeship requirements. This incentive has more regulatory barriers than the 45X credit, as project developers must apply to the Department of Energy and receive a decision from the Internal Revenue Service. In addition, total financing for the investment credit is capped at $10 billion.
+
+The 48C investment credit is geared toward bridging the gap between the required capital expenditures to develop factories in the United States and China. According to Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, the capital expenditure intensity in the United States averages around $90 million per gigawatt-hour (GWh), about a third higher than the $60 million per GWh capital expenditure required in the PRC. China clearly maintains the dominant position in access to raw materials, processing capabilities, and active materials production. Nevertheless, the investment credit helps enhance U.S. competitiveness. U.S. gigafactory capacity in the pipeline through 2030 has increased by roughly 70 percent, from around 700 GWh in July 2022 (before the IRA) to just over 1.2 TWh in July 2023.
+
+__Grants and loans.__ While the United States is currently not a major player in refining and active material assembly, significant amounts of onshore capacity are expected to come online in the coming years. Spurred by government-backed loans and private investments totaling $1.6 billion, firms such as Our Next Energy are set to begin producing 20 GWh of cathode materials and battery cells in a Michigan plant set to come online in late 2024. Plans for the gigafactory were announced in October 2022, giving it an ambitious timeline of roughly two years between the announcement of additional capacity and that capacity coming online.
+
+The two-to-three-year timeline also applies to gigafactory projects that Redwood Materials, Tesla, and Gotion are currently pursuing. These factories, which will focus on cathode production, anode manufacturing, and lithium refining, respectively, will collectively amount to 200 GWh in capacity once operational.
+
+However, the rollout of these gigafactories is already experiencing some setbacks. Ford announced it would pause development of a 35 GWh plant worth $3.5 billion in Michigan. Delays in battery cell factories coming online arise largely due to shortages in skilled labor, efficiency limitations, and unforeseen price increases for active materials. In recent years, pricing hurdles were driven by a surge in lithium carbonate prices from roughly $6 per kilogram in 2020 to $70 per kilogram in November of 2022. Since cathode active materials represent roughly 50 percent of total manufacturing costs for battery cells, such increases have placed barriers to entry on expanding battery cell manufacturing capacity. Yet in the last two years, these increases have largely reversed, and prices have plummeted back to $14.50 per kilogram. While this value is almost three times higher than in 2020, the effect of pricing concerns on gigafactory rollout is far more modest than it was in 2022.
+
+Additionally, U.S. workers may lack the necessary manufacturing experience, effectively ensuring that even when plants and gigafactories come online, they will not produce active materials with high efficiency. Gigafactory construction requires a set of competencies related to “equipment maintenance [and] troubleshooting production” not widely available within the U.S. workforce. Additionally, once factories have begun producing materials and finished cells, they also face assembly line staff shortages, as the U.S. workforce is largely trained in internal combustion engine manufacturing rather than in battery production. Ohio, for instance, has 58,000 open roles related to EV manufacturing. Aside from competencies, another cause of this labor shortage is the relatively low compensation levels compared to the broader automotive sector. The starting wage at a GM battery cell plant in Ohio is $16.50 an hour, while the average assembly line worker at a United Auto Workers plant makes roughly $28 an hour. While lower wages serve as a hedge against active material price increases, they also ensure labor shortages going forward.
+
+Initial production yields for battery cell lines among new entrants to the sector in the United States are often as low as 50 percent. As shown by the Center on Global Energy Policy, projections through 2032 clearly show North America will have the gigafactories to satisfy cell demand but will not have the local supply of cathodes and anodes to construct those cells.
+
+The Biden administration’s EPA sees lithium-ion battery recycling and repurposing as a means of domesticating this lithium-ion battery supply chain, particularly since U.S. lithium reserves make up just 4 percent of the world total. In the near term, the EPA seeks to take the following steps to encourage these processes:
+
+1. Foster the design of battery packs for ease of second use and recycling.
+
+2. Establish successful methods for collecting, sorting, transporting, and processing recycled lithium-ion battery materials, with a focus on reducing costs.
+
+3. Increase recovery rates of key materials such as cobalt, lithium, nickel, and graphite.
+
+4. Develop processing technologies to reintroduce these materials into the supply chain.
+
+5. Develop methodologies for proper sorting, testing, and balancing for second-use applications.
+
+6. Establish federal recycling policies to promote collection, reuse, and recycling of lithium-ion batteries.
+
+The IIJA grant disbursement notes that the focus of the funding is primarily on lithium processing, with nickel and graphite processors also receiving some grant money. The IIJA guidebook provides a comprehensive overview of all IIJA programs and grants, including several focused on active materials production and battery recycling:
+
+1. Battery Manufacturing and Recycling Grants ($3 billion total)
+
+2. Battery and Critical Mineral Recycling ($125 million total)
+
+3. Lithium-Ion Recycling Prize ($10 million total)
+
+4. Battery Recycling Best Practices ($10 million total)
+
+5. Electric Drive Vehicle Battery Recycling and Second Life Applications ($200 million total)
+
+The U.S. Department of Energy also announced $192 million in funding in June 2023 to expand battery recycling research and development, calling the investments “essential” to the advancement of a domestic supply chain of critical materials for the energy transition.
+
+However, the Biden administration’s investments in recycling capabilities may face similar roadblocks as the active materials production hubs. In October 2023, Li-Cycle Holdings Corp., which was set to receive significant backing from the Biden administration, saw its share price cut by almost 50 percent after announcing it would pause construction on a lithium-ion battery recycling plant. Li-Cycle assessed that it was facing escalating costs in attempting to operationalize its fabrication plant.
+
+While battery recycling is a relatively new market in North America, more mature firms abroad are also encountering issues. In the PRC, for instance, there are too many recyclers and not enough materials to go around, making many businesses’ operations currently untenable. It may take several years for recycling to become a viable industry in the United States: there are still relatively few EVs on the road, and other electronics that contain lithium-ion batteries are challenging to collect and too few in number to meet the needs of budding lithium-ion battery demand. Thus, the sector may encounter losses before becoming sustainable.
+
+#### Congressional Considerations
+
+A report by the House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, released in December 2023, offers some insight into the bipartisan ad hoc committee’s thinking on diversifying the lithium-ion battery supply chain. The report’s recommendations may be split into two categories: those that pertain to critical minerals and those that pertain to battery manufacturing.
+
+When it comes to critical minerals, the committee’s report recommends enacting legislation to “encourage sectoral agreements with key trading partners and allies with strong rules of origin and high standards on critical minerals,” in addition to sourcing critical minerals and materials domestically and from friendly nations. This demonstrated openness to ensuring U.S. partners and allies become a stronger part of the country’s critical minerals supply chain, instead of solely focusing on onshoring, could enable lithium-ion battery manufacturers to scale up their production capabilities.
+
+However, the report recommends incentives with domestic content requirement guardrails that partially defeat the friendshoring purpose of the overarching recommendations. Limiting the sourcing of necessary minerals and materials to U.S. production in part negates the diversification objectives in these tax credits. The enhanced recycling measures the report recommends — such as requiring the Defense Logistics Agency Strategic Material Recovery and Reuse Program to pilot a recovery program to extract strategic and critical materials from end-of-life government hard disk drives — would likely not make up, in time or amount, for the production capabilities of U.S. partners.
+
+The report’s recommendations about batteries pose a similar issue, as its proposals largely emphasize the need to “encourage a domestic battery recycling industry.” Ramping up recycling efforts could help the U.S. lithium-ion battery industry become self-sufficient as more batteries are retired, while limiting incentives to domestic efforts would curtail U.S. access to additional lithium-ion battery materials. In addition, recycling is a technically challenging, labor-intensive process. Given the difficulties, it would not wholly replace production of original active materials.
+
+Instead, coordinating the ramping up of recycling operations with economic partners and allies who are also aiming to enhance their capabilities in this sector would enable more effective diversification results. U.S. efforts are not occurring in isolation: the EU lithium-ion battery recycling market is set to increase to 130 GWh, or 700 kilotons, by 2030. In addition, the EU market is set to expand again, threefold, by 2040 to 2,100 kilotons. Japan and South Korea are also aiming to expand their battery recycling industries. For instance, key Japanese firms have collaborated with the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization, a state-owned energy research agency, to develop technology that increases their capacity to extract recyclable materials from used batteries. This initiative is set to enable a recycling ratio of 70 percent for lithium, 95 percent for nickel, and 95 percent for cobalt by 2030. South Korea is also investing some 40 trillion won ($30 billion) to facilitate recycling efforts and second-life applications for used battery components. A U.S. strategy that prioritizes working with partners who are also investing in their own capabilities would improve the likelihood of successful diversification away from China and an effective transition to renewables.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+The second stage of the lithium-ion battery supply chain examined in this paper — active materials production destined for cathodes and anodes — poses challenges to current onshoring policies. It demands physical capital and labor to accomplish technical work. Active materials production involves several steps — namely, mixing, coating, calendaring, slitting, and electrode making — in addition to producing the separator and electrolyte solution key to the functioning of a lithium-ion battery.
+
+As noted, China largely dominates this portion of the lithium battery supply chain, followed by South Korea and Japan. China’s dominance is strengthened by its sway over the production of inputs higher up the supply chain, as well as its strong influence over the global prices of key commodities. The United States is also limited by higher costs in penetrating the market, given its relative dearth of operational manufacturing capabilities and challenges in obtaining workers, which stem both from more robust labor standards and the lack of a sufficiently trained workforce.
+
+Policies that emphasize onshoring capabilities in the active materials production stage of the lithium-ion battery supply chain are already confronted with the limitations of U.S. capacity. Projects launched by grants and loans under the IIJA and IRA are facing various hurdles, such as inadequacies in the domestic labor market as well as difficulties in making a nascent recycling industry profitable. These barriers are in part self-imposed by restrictions around domestic content requirements.
+
+___`Policies that emphasize onshoring capabilities in the active materials production stage of the lithium-ion battery supply chain are already confronted with the limitations of U.S. capacity.`___
+
+Likewise, current congressional considerations and recommendations on providing the sector with additional launchpads also turn largely inward, hindering the green transition and impeding the country’s ability to successfully diversify away from Chinese manufacturing dominance. Given that other large players at this stage — namely, Japan and South Korea — are valuable partners in achieving long-term U.S. geostrategic objectives, U.S. policymakers should revisit the limitations set on incentives designed to spur active materials production. In addition, the United States should recognize that foreign direct investment from partners and allies has played an essential role in stimulating the domestic battery sector. Further efforts should be made to deepen ties with these nations and encourage additional investment. Ideally, policymakers should turn to negotiating plurilateral agreements with major players to secure this stage of the battery manufacturing supply chain. More ambitious agreements would enable partners to coordinate industrial policy efforts, enhance information sharing for research and development efforts in the field to improve manufacturing efficiency, and eliminate trade barriers in critical goods.
+
+The business community is currently engaged in reassessing the risk of doing business with the PRC given potential supply chain resiliency risks. In light of current geopolitical tensions, private entities now are striving to create redundancies in supply sources to mitigate the consequences of large-scale shocks on current choke points. The United States, along with economic partners and allies, is also moving to de-risk supply chains, but the cornerstone of the Biden administration strategy is to spur domestic production anchored by industrial policy initiatives.
+
+These efforts overlap with the push to spur a green transition, for which the lithium-ion battery is a key technology. However, if diversifying supply chains away from China occurs too soon, achieving enough domestic capabilities to effectively spur the green transition in the United States will not be possible. Likewise, a diversification strategy that does not consider the benefits of nearshoring will prove lengthy and costly. In addition, the United States should develop an effective materials management policy that incentivizes development of additional supply chains and regulatory cooperation with like-minded countries. This policy should be pursued in a manner that does not hamper domestic manufacturers from investing or commercializing products.
+
+In short, the United States is pursuing three goals: accelerating the transition to renewables; reshoring production capabilities in key sectors, which include several items necessary to the green transition; and diversifying away from China in these critical areas. Policies that prioritize one of these goals get in the way of the other two.
+
+Finally, nearshoring and friendshoring considerations lead to questions of what it means to be “near” and a “friend.” In addition, lithium-ion batteries are the current bedrock of a transition to renewables, but there are numerous research projects underway aiming to find more efficient alternatives. The final paper of this series will discuss both of these issues, in addition to describing policy challenges surrounding the final stage of the lithium-ion battery supply chain — the assembly of battery cells into modules, packed and sold to manufacturers of various end products.
+
+---
+
+__William Reinsch__ holds the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
+
+__Meredith Broadbent__ serves as a senior adviser (non-resident) with the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.
+
+__Thibault Denamiel__ is an associate fellow with the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.
+
+__Elias Shammas__ is a research intern with the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-06-new-opportunistic-aggression.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-06-new-opportunistic-aggression.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : New Opportunistic Aggression
+author: David M. Allison, et al.
+date : 2024-06-06 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/dTj9AJA.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Understanding Opportunistic Aggression in the Twenty-First Century: A Project on Nuclear Issues Mid-Career Cadre Task Force Report"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The United States faces an increasingly contested strategic environment. As policymakers grapple with the “two-near-peer” challenge, a crucial question remains: How should the United States mitigate the risk of opportunistic aggression?_
+
+
+
+### Foreword
+
+With the ongoing war in Ukraine, growing conflicts in the Middle East, and potential for war with China or North Korea, the United States and its allies are facing an enormously complex geopolitical landscape — one further complicated by the changing ways in which adversaries are leveraging nuclear weapons. As the risk of a large-scale conflict increases, particularly with China or Russia but also with North Korea, so too does the potential for nuclear weapons to be used, meaning each individual conflict carries increased risks of nuclear use. At the same time, increased cooperation among China, Russia, and North Korea makes it more likely U.S. adversaries could coordinate or take advantage of potential conflicts with the United States or its allies, increasing the likelihood U.S. forces will have to fight a two-theater or two-front war. Without sufficient conventional forces to deter conflicts from breaking out in the first place, the United States may be forced to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons to deter or respond to aggression on a second front, whether Washington intends to or not.
+
+Taken together, these dynamics increase the risk that nuclear weapons will be used in a future conflict — an outcome the United States has tried to avoid for more than 75 years. Managing these challenges requires deeper interoperability with U.S. allies, a clear prioritization of U.S. resources, and a willingness to make tough decisions about where to accept risk. It also requires a better understanding of how opportunistic aggression — or the possibility a second adversary could confront the United States and its allies while they are already engaged in a conflict elsewhere — would complicate U.S. and combined force planning in new and unexpected ways.
+
+This is why the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) convened an inaugural Mid-Career Cadre Task Force on Understanding Opportunistic Aggression in the Twenty-First Century. This effort was designed to showcase the exceptional talent and expertise of members from the Mid-Career Cadre and generate new insights on one of the central challenges associated with deterring two nuclear peers.
+
+This report should serve as a wake-up call for senior leaders. War is not inevitable, but if it occurs, the United States and its allies will face very real constraints on how they can deter and respond to aggression on a second front. Such scenarios could place significant demands on U.S. nuclear forces in a way that many policymakers today do not appear to appreciate. Understanding what decisions senior leaders might be asked to make in certain scenarios and what forces might be available — or not — could have a significant impact on future planning, resourcing, and policy decisions. Toward this end, the task force identified several recommendations that deserve serious consideration and action, from establishing a statutory nuclear policy council to developing an engagement plan for discussing opportunistic aggression scenarios with U.S. allies.
+
+We cannot underestimate the enormity of the challenges the United States is facing or the difficulty of the decisions senior leaders must make now and in the coming years. CSIS and PONI are grateful for the task force’s time and energy on this important issue.
+
+> #### Kelsey Hartigan
+> #### Deputy Director, PONI
+> #### Senior Fellow, ISP, CSIS
+> #### May 2024
+
+
+### Task Force Introduction and Overview
+
+#### Key Questions and Scope
+
+The United States faces an increasingly contested strategic environment that raises significant, unanswered questions about the role nuclear weapons will play in U.S. national security strategy going forward, and the forces that will be required to deter — and, if necessary, defeat — adversaries. For the first time in its history, the United States must contend with not one but two major nuclear powers. This poses several challenges, chief among them how the United States and its allies might confront simultaneous or sequential high-end conflicts with multiple nuclear-armed adversaries. As policymakers grapple with the “two-near-peer” challenge, a crucial question remains: How should the United States mitigate the risk of opportunistic aggression?
+
+To explore these issues and generate new thinking on a central issue affecting future nuclear strategy and posture, the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) launched the Mid-Career Cadre Task Force on Understanding Opportunistic Aggression in the Twenty-First Century. For the purposes of this report, opportunistic aggression refers to the use of force against the United States or its allies while they are already engaged in a conflict. The task force differentiates between opportunistic aggression and the broader concept of opportunism. While opportunistic states could take advantage of a distracted United States in many ways (e.g., economic actions), actions that fall short of launching an attack are not opportunistic aggression and deserve attention elsewhere.
+
+The group, comprising mid-career experts from both governmental and nongovernmental organizations, represents a diversity of views and backgrounds. Through a series of four multiday intensive workshops in the first half of 2023, the task force explored how the United States and its allies can best deter opportunistic aggression; what, if any, changes to force structure and posture are needed to address the two-near-peer problem; and how planning for opportunistic aggression scenarios in the future might affect extended deterrence commitments, strategic stability, and arms control efforts. Discussions centered on four overarching questions:
+
+- What challenges does opportunistic aggression create for the United States and its allies?
+
+- If the United States is engaged in a conventional conflict against a nuclear-armed adversary in one theater, how might that affect U.S. planning and force posture in a second theater, and what role might nuclear weapons play in each contingency?
+
+- What are the implications for U.S. allies, and how might this affect extended deterrence commitments in the future?
+
+- Does the United States need to be prepared to fight two simultaneous nuclear wars? How might this affect arms control and strategic stability efforts?
+
+This report is the culmination of the group’s effort to outline key findings and recommendations for policymakers to consider.
+
+The task force focused primarily on the implications for U.S. nuclear strategy and forces. It did not focus on what specific steps the United States and its allies might take to strengthen conventional deterrence and defense in both the European and Indo-Pacific theaters, nor did it seek to engage in the growing debate on whether and how U.S. support to Ukraine affects the military’s ability to wage a potential conflict against China — a subset of the broader challenges posed by opportunistic aggression. Strengthening conventional deterrence and nonnuclear planning and operations, as well as the broader U.S. defense industrial base, is critical, but the specific parameters for doing so are outside the scope of this report.
+
+#### Summary of Findings and Recommendations
+
+Deterring and potentially responding to two separate conflicts or contingencies presents unique challenges, depending on who initiates or takes advantage of a conflict. The task force determined that understanding the specific resource conservation and distribution challenges the United States and its allies might face, as well as the reduced response capability and insufficient resource challenges certain scenarios might bring about, will be critical to identifying and better preparing for the most consequential opportunistic aggression scenarios.
+
+___`Understanding the specific resource conservation and distribution challenges the United States and its allies might face, as well as the reduced response capability and insufficient resource challenges certain scenarios might bring about, will be critical to identifying and better preparing for the most consequential opportunistic aggression scenarios.`___
+
+Understanding when a leader might initiate aggression or use nuclear weapons — and what might deter them from doing so — is one of the most difficult intelligence requirements. Assessing how a leader’s calculations might shift if the United States and its allies are already engaged in a conflict elsewhere complicates this matter significantly. The task force identified four key factors in determining the likelihood a state will opportunistically initiate an aggressive action while the United States is already involved in a conflict. An adversary’s perception of a significant change in U.S. and allied capabilities, will, or alliance strength could lead an adversary to determine that there is an opportunity to initiate aggression to achieve its objectives. Changes or failures in signaling could also lead to this conclusion. Improving collection on and assessment of these dynamics will be essential and will allow the United States and its allies not only to better anticipate when opportunistic aggression might occur but also to provide a critical baseline for better tailoring deterrence strategies and understanding how those strategies might interact.
+
+In analyzing the wide range of possible opportunistic aggression scenarios the United States might face, the task force concluded the following:
+
+1. Policymakers appear unaware of the risks they are accepting in regard to opportunistic aggression and the demands certain scenarios could place on U.S. nuclear forces in the impending two-nuclear-peer threat environment.
+
+2. Opportunistic aggression could create unique challenges for U.S. nuclear forces.
+
+3. Current planning for opportunistic aggression scenarios is insufficient.
+
+4. There is insufficient awareness of how threats in one theater might affect U.S. allies’ security interests in a separate theater and the ability of the United States to meet its extended deterrence obligations.
+
+5. It is not clear whether the necessary processes and structures are in place to make difficult and informed prioritization decisions across the nuclear enterprise and broader defense industrial base.
+
+To address these challenges, the task force recommends the following:
+
+1. Policymakers and senior leaders should review intelligence priorities to ensure adequate intelligence collection and assessment on what factors might influence the likelihood a leader will initiate aggression if the United States is already involved in a conflict.
+
+2. Congress should work with the administration to establish a statutory Nuclear Policy Council to serve as a bridge between operational and acquisition-focused decisions and broader National Security Council–led interagency deliberations.
+
+3. The Department of Defense (DOD) should prioritize war games, tabletop exercises (TTXs), and scenario-based discussions that focus on opportunistic aggression scenarios and facilitate interagency, allied, and outside expert participation, where possible.
+
+4. The Departments of State and Defense should develop an engagement plan for allies to empower more detailed and transparent conversations on opportunistic aggression scenarios.
+
+5. The executive branch and Congress should address critical conventional shortfalls and work with allies to devise complementary investment strategies.
+
+6. Departments and agencies should prioritize nuclear deterrence education for senior leaders.
+
+7. The DOD and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) should diversify U.S. nuclear forces to ensure the president has a full range of options if deterrence fails in one or more theaters.
+
+8. Policymakers should accept calculated risks and ensure the necessary processes and structures are in place to make difficult prioritization decisions. They should also allow the advanced development communities within DOD laboratories and NNSA national laboratories to experiment more aggressively.
+
+
+### Defining the Problem
+
+#### Force Planning and the Challenges of a Two-Front War
+
+For the first time in its history, the United States must contend with not one but two major power rivals with nuclear weapons. As policymakers grapple with how to manage this two-near-peer or tripolar deterrence challenge, a key question is how the United States should approach the prospect of opportunistic aggression.
+
+As the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) points out:
+
+> Opportunistic aggression could create deterrence challenges. Should we find ourselves in a large-scale military confrontation with a major power or regional adversary, the Joint Force will need to be postured with military capabilities — including nuclear weapons — that can deter and defeat other actors who may seek to take advantage of this scenario to engage in opportunistic aggression.
+
+To address these challenges, the NPR and National Defense Strategy (NDS) outline a broad force planning construct:
+
+> To deter opportunistic aggression elsewhere, while the United States is involved in an all-domain conflict, the Department will employ a range of risk mitigation efforts rooted in integrated deterrence. These include coordination with and contributions of Allies and partners, deterrent effects of U.S. nuclear posture, and leveraging posture and capabilities not solely engaged in the primary warfight — for example, cyber and space. Additionally, the Joint Force will be shaped to ensure the ability to respond to small-scale, short-duration crises without substantially impairing high-end warfighting readiness, and to conduct campaigning activities that improve our position and reinforce deterrence while limiting or disrupting competitor activities that seriously affect U.S. interests.
+
+Unfortunately, there is little evidence the United States is prepared for such scenarios. Due to policy and strategy decisions made years ago in very different security environments, today’s Joint Force is not sized or shaped to address two simultaneous or sequential high-end conflicts borne out of opportunistic aggression scenarios. In addition, the United States already struggles to fully integrate with allies when preparing for a single crisis or conflict, let alone work through the implications for U.S. allies if large elements of U.S. conventional forces are tied up in a separate theater and the United States is forced to rely more heavily on its nuclear forces and allies to confront a second aggressor. Addressing these challenges requires policymakers to first understand what risks they are accepting today and in the future as a result of strategy and force structure decisions made years ago.
+
+The notion that the United States needs to be prepared to prosecute two simultaneous conflicts is not a novel concept. After the Cold War, the United States could fight regional wars in places like Iraq and Afghanistan while maintaining sufficient capabilities to deter military adventurism by other adversaries. In fact, multiple presidential administrations reaffirmed that the United States must be able to prevail in two simultaneous (or near simultaneous) conflicts, including President George H. W. Bush in his Base Force concept and President Barack Obama in his defense strategy. But a decade ago, experts and officials often discussed two-war force sizing in the context of two simultaneous medium-sized or regional conflicts. In 2014, then secretary of defense Chuck Hagel asserted that U.S. forces, provided they were funded at the levels called for by the administration’s pending budget request, would be “capable of simultaneously defending the homeland; conducting sustained, distributed counterterrorist operations; and in multiple regions, deterring aggression and assuring allies through forward presence and engagement.” He went on to state that if deterrence should fail, “U.S. forces could defeat a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased campaign and deny the objectives of — or impose unacceptable costs on — another aggressor in another region.” Soon, however, the growing threat from China changed this thinking.
+
+In 2018, the NDS adopted what was functionally a one-war force-sizing construct and recommended only modest increases in force capacity. This approach recognized the reality of what it would take to execute a high-end war against a large nuclear-armed adversary such as China or Russia but arguably created operational and strategic vulnerabilities. As noted by the 2018 NDS Commission,
+
+> The Department has largely abandoned the longstanding “two-war” construct for a “one major war” sizing and shaping construct. In the event of a large-scale conflict with Russia or China, the United States may not have sufficient remaining resources to deter other adversaries in one — let alone two — other theaters by denying them the ability to accomplish their objectives without relying on nuclear weapons.
+
+This warning largely went unnoticed, however, in part because it seemed unlikely the United States would be forced to confront simultaneous conflicts. Moreover, the United States intended to rely on its allies’ growing conventional capabilities and increased burden sharing to offset some of the risks a two-theater or two-front war might entail.
+
+But as this report details, the changing geopolitical environment, the presence of two powerful nuclear-armed adversaries, the growing threat from states like North Korea, and the increased cooperation among those states means that it may be infeasible to conventionally deter one adversary while committing sufficient conventional capabilities to fight and win against the other — let alone fight and win against both simultaneously. This has significant implications for U.S. nuclear forces as well as for U.S. extended deterrence guarantees.
+
+Addressing major-power opportunistic aggression in a second theater requires understanding what a large-scale conventional conflict (or conflicts) might involve and how such a conflict would constrain U.S. ability to flow forces and support logistics into a second theater or area of operations if a second adversary initiated aggression on a separate front. It also likely requires some combination of greater optimization of U.S. and allied conventional force structures, increased allied force contributions, improved industrial base efforts to reconstitute critical conventional capability deficiencies as well as the nuclear enterprise, and improved U.S. theater nuclear capabilities and integration. Deconflicting and prioritizing these efforts will be essential.
+
+#### Opportunistic Aggression in the Current Strategic Environment
+
+The next decade may be among the most strategically challenging in U.S. history. Facing the prospect of two near-peer competitors for the first time in the nuclear era, the United States continues to maintain significant global commitments. These include managing a complex network of alliances, including promises to protect these allies against aggression and potentially use U.S. nuclear weapons to defend them. While the Joint Force remains the most capable conventional military organization on the planet, this complex strategic picture entails myriad contingencies that could require the United States to commit or expend some or nearly all of its nonnuclear capabilities.
+
+If the United States were to commit a significant portion of its conventional forces to a war, it would necessarily reduce the strength of its conventional deterrent against other adversaries, who might take advantage of perceived U.S. weakness or distraction. For instance, a series of 24 war games conducted by CSIS indicated that the United States would likely flow a significant portion of its forces to the Pacific in the event of a conflict with China over Taiwan. And even if the United States, Taiwan, and Japan were successful in repelling a Chinese invasion, the United States would likely still lose “dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of servicemembers.” The United States would also likely run out of long-range precision-guided munitions in less than one week during a Taiwan contingency. Amid such hostilities, the ability to respond to aggression in another theater — by Russia, for instance — could be sharply curtailed.
+
+___`If the United States were to commit a significant portion of its conventional forces to a war, it would necessarily reduce the strength of its conventional deterrent against other adversaries, who might take advantage of perceived U.S. weakness or distraction.`___
+
+Stockpile shortages resulting from U.S. support for Ukraine have amplified concerns about the state of the U.S. industrial base. These forecasted and current shortages raise serious questions about the speed with which the U.S. defense industry can replenish depleted stockpiles, what stocks would be available to respond to a crisis or conflict in a second theater, and the ability of the United States to provide allies with indirect aid while fighting a major war.
+
+While opportunistic aggression is not a new concern — both the 2018 and 2022 NDSs identify deterring opportunistic aggression as a priority for the Joint Force — the question remains: How can the United States deter other adversaries from striking when it is already committed to a conflict, and what implications might this have for U.S. nuclear forces if deterrence fails?
+
+The two-nuclear-peer problem and the increasing partnership between China and Russia (as well as North Korea) compounds the risk of opportunistic aggression. Not only is conventional deterrence increasingly challenged, but changes in how nuclear-armed adversaries are integrating nuclear coercion and potential use into their theories of victory present unique operational dilemmas for the United States and its allies. Russia’s growing reliance on nuclear weapons amid its conventional losses in the war in Ukraine, China’s unprecedented expansion and diversification of its nuclear forces, and the continued risk of North Korean nuclear use all pose unique deterrence challenges. But the United States cannot deal with these threats in isolation.
+
+The recently released report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States took note of this problem in its findings: “The new partnership between Russian and Chinese leaders poses qualitatively new threats of potential opportunistic aggression and/or the risk of future cooperative two-theater aggression.” Indeed, cooperation on military matters between China and Russia — as well as North Korea — has expanded significantly in recent years, particularly since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Even if these adversaries do not formalize their alignment through treaties or deliberately coordinate aggression against the United States, their growing ties complicate U.S. defense planning.
+
+In one of the most overt signs of growing cooperation, Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have significantly expanded their joint military activities. Since 2018, the PRC has regularly sent forces to participate in Russia’s annual district-level exercises, which focus on high-intensity conventional war fighting, often against fictional opponents that resemble the United States and its allies. Russia and the PRC have also expanded cooperation between their air forces: the Russian and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) air forces conducted their first joint bomber patrol in 2019 and have since continued these patrols, often flying through Korean and Japanese air-defense identification zones. The Russian and PRC navies have engaged in joint exercises since 2012, including an exercise in the Baltic Sea in 2017 and, most recently, an exercise in the Sea of Japan in 2023.
+
+Beyond military exercises, Russia and the PRC are reportedly increasing ties between their nuclear industries and programs. In early 2023, Western media reported that Rosatom — Russia’s state-run nuclear energy corporation — was supplying the PRC with thousands of kilograms of highly enriched uranium to fuel fast breeder reactors. U.S. officials believe these reactors will produce weapons-grade plutonium for the PRC’s nuclear weapons program. Although the precise motivations for this cooperation are unclear, the deal is a further sign of growing military cooperation between the two countries.
+
+Russia has also strengthened its ties with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Russian and DPRK officials have made visits to Pyongyang and Moscow, and the Kremlin has reportedly purchased millions of artillery shells and rockets from the DPRK to support its war effort in Ukraine. The DPRK has also provided Russia with ballistic missiles for use in Ukraine. In return, Russia is assisting the DPRK’s efforts to develop and launch military satellites, though the precise nature and impact of this assistance is unclear.
+
+There are many ways these growing ties could complicate and stress U.S. planning. When detailing plausible conflict scenarios associated with the two-near-peer problem, a study group through the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory highlighted that an adversary taking advantage of U.S. engagement in one theater (via crisis or war) may instigate opportunistic aggression in a second region or even pose a joint aggression threat. The report notes multiple possible permutations of opportunistic aggression, with dynamics likely to be context specific. Conflicts could result from inadvertent or coincidental actions, or via actions undertaken by one of the two parties involved in the first conflict. In other words, opportunistic aggression will not play out in predictable or identical pathways but, rather, could be sequential, uncoordinated, coordinated, or even the result of an alliance between the two aggressors. Notably, an adversary may act as though it is preparing to initiate a crisis or conflict, even if it does not intend to do so, merely to complicate U.S. force planning and draw U.S. forces away from a surprise attack by the other adversary.
+
+The United States must be prepared for such scenarios. As the recent Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States makes clear:
+
+> The objectives of U.S. strategy must include effective deterrence and defeat of simultaneous Russian and Chinese aggression in Europe and Asia using conventional forces. If the United States and its Allies and partners do not field sufficient conventional forces to achieve this objective, U.S. strategy would need to be altered to increase reliance on nuclear weapons to deter or counter opportunistic aggression in the other theater.
+
+While the prospect of a two-front war against Russia and China is a worst-case scenario for opportunistic aggression, it is not the only concerning scenario. Other regional actors such as North Korea or Iran could prove difficult to deter if the United States were to find itself fighting either of its peer competitors. Conversely, if the United States found itself in a war against a minor power, even a limited conflict could impose significant resource constraints on the Joint Force that might create windows of opportunity for a peer competitor state. As a recent Atlantic Council study concluded:
+
+> US thinking about war in East Asia often neglects the possibility that the United States would have to fight the PRC and North Korea simultaneously rather than separately. Furthermore, conventional wisdom in the United States underestimates the risk that either the PRC or North Korea would resort to a limited nuclear strike in the event of a conflict in the region.
+
+Addressing these issues requires a more detailed understanding of how U.S. and allied resources might be constrained in various opportunistic aggression scenarios.
+
+#### Resource Challenges and Opportunistic Aggression
+
+The challenges that opportunistic aggression presents are myriad. However, certain configurations of adversaries are more likely to present challenges than others. Whether the first or second adversary is a nuclear peer matters for whether the United States must conserve or reallocate resources and how much it might be forced to rely on nuclear weapons in its strategy. While U.S. conventional capabilities are likely sufficient to deter most adversaries in peacetime, the prospect of opportunistic aggression is a reminder that the U.S. conventional deterrent might be significantly degraded by even a brief high-intensity conflict. This creates four primary challenges: resource conservation, resource distribution, reduced response capability, and insufficient resources.
+
+__Resource conservation challenge:__ First, in the event of a war with a non-peer state, the United States would face a resource conservation challenge. For example, the Joint Force might be called upon to reserve a significant portion of critical resources (e.g., Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles [LRASMs]) to preserve the conventional deterrent against a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan. Committing (and consuming) high-end or low-density conventional capabilities would diminish U.S. capacity to respond to additional threats. While the NDS appears to acknowledge this dynamic, in practice, combatant commanders will almost certainly push for any and all resources to respond to extant crises, which makes a decision to conserve or withhold certain assets both politically and operationally challenging. Failure to make such a decision, however, could leave the United States with fewer nonnuclear capabilities to deter or respond to aggression on a second front.
+
+__Resource distribution challenge:__ If a second non-peer adversary took advantage of a perceived weakness to engage in opportunistic aggression, the challenge would deepen. In addition to the resource conservation challenge, the United States would face a resource distribution challenge. Capabilities would need to be diverted to the new conflict while maintaining an effective deterrent against adventurism by other actors, especially peer competitors. This might require the United States to adopt riskier strategies to end the non-peer conflicts quickly, accept suboptimal conflict outcomes, rely more heavily on allies, or, if subsequent aggressors are nuclear-armed states, rely more on nuclear weapons to deter further opportunistic aggression. Such a scenario could also force the United States to revisit its policy regarding the employment of nuclear threats or operations against Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)–compliant states to provide more flexibility as threats evolve.
+
+
+_▲ Table 1. Resource Challenges and Opportunistic Aggression_
+
+__Reduced response capability challenge:__ By contrast, if the initial adversary were a nuclear peer (i.e., Russia or China), opportunistic aggression would pose a different set of challenges. The United States could not afford to reserve significant capabilities in a high-intensity conventional conflict against a peer and would therefore face a reduced response capability challenge in the event of opportunistic aggression by a non-peer adversary. The United States might be limited in its ability to fulfill commitments to allies or might be forced to adopt a more hands-off strategy against the new aggressor to help hold the line, perhaps following the model of current U.S. support for Ukraine. With its conventional forces committed to fighting one peer competitor, the United States may need to lean heavily on its nuclear arsenal to deter the other from entering the fray or taking independent action against U.S. or allied interests. It may also be forced to rely more heavily on allied capabilities and will.
+
+__Insufficient resources challenge:__ Finally, if both the initial adversary and the opportunistic aggressor are nuclear peers, the United States would confront an insufficient resources challenge. Lacking the conventional capabilities to fight and win against two near-peer adversaries simultaneously, the United States would either need to back down (in either or both conflicts) or face the prospect of fighting a conventionally superior adversary in one or both theaters, depending on resource allocation. This strategy would likely require the greatest reliance on nuclear weapons and result in the greatest likelihood of U.S. first use, as the United States might need to employ tactical nuclear weapons to offset conventional weaknesses. Table 1 outlines the four configurations of adversary types and the associated challenges.
+
+While the peer/non-peer status of the initial and opportunistic aggressors helps inform the nature of the challenge, the task force recognizes that opportunistic aggression may take many forms. Although the authors limit the definition of opportunistic aggression to military action against the United States or its allies, different types of attacks, depending on their nature and target, would require different and proportionate responses.
+
+The scope and scale of a U.S. response to opportunistic aggression would also be informed by the nature of the conflict. In accordance with the threat posed to U.S. interests and in keeping with the law of proportionality, the United States is unlikely to respond to a minor conventional incursion with a nuclear strike. Similarly, it is unlikely to defer a response to a case of nuclear use against an ally, even if the United States is already embroiled in a peer conflict. While this report primarily focuses on conventional crises that have the potential to escalate to nuclear use, the task force notes that it is possible a crisis might start with nuclear use — for example, a North Korean nuclear attack on a U.S. ally intended to swiftly achieve capitulation, or even a Chinese or Russian demonstration strike to show resolve and deter U.S. intervention. Such crises would put even greater demands on U.S. conventional and nuclear capabilities in order to successfully restore deterrence and manage (de)escalation.
+
+#### Factors That Influence Opportunistic Aggression
+
+The task force identified four key factors in determining the likelihood a state will opportunistically initiate an aggressive action while the United States is involved in a first conflict. These factors are capability, will, alliance strength, and signaling.
+
+__Capability.__ An adversary who believes that U.S. capabilities have been so compromised by an initial conflict that the United States could not meaningfully respond to new aggression will demand more, be less willing to compromise, and be more likely to resort to force if its demands are not met. The timing and scale of the initial conflict will determine the extent of this problem. Adversaries are very likely to scale the aggressiveness of their actions based on the severity and visibility of U.S. losses. However, an adversary may be emboldened even if the Joint Force is seeing success on the battlefield if that success has exhausted high-end limited resources like precision-guided munitions or long-range fires.
+
+__Will.__ Similarly, an adversary who believes the United States lacks the will to risk involvement in a secondary conflict may be emboldened to act. The appearance of war weariness in an administration or the U.S. public would send a message that the United States would rather concede than engage in additional conflict. Adversaries would also take cues from the length of the initial conflict, as wars that stalemate and drag on for years are more likely to lose public support over time. Widespread antiwar activism or a rise in populist ideas of isolationism could also signal a waning interest in continued or expanded fighting.
+
+__Alliance strength.__ Opportunistic aggression may not be targeted at the U.S. homeland. Aggressors may view a distracted United States as an opportunity to attack a U.S. ally with potentially fewer repercussions than during peacetime. This factor is exacerbated if U.S. alliance commitments appear to wane as a result of the initial conflict. This might take the form of public statements by the U.S. administration questioning the strength, necessity, or fairness of an alliance, but even the reallocation of resources could send the message, perhaps unintentionally, that the United States has deemphasized an alliance. For example, if the United States pulled capabilities from South Korea to respond to a Taiwan contingency, North Korea might perceive both a weakening of U.S. capabilities on the peninsula and, if done against the protest of the South Korean government, a weakening of the U.S.–Republic of Korea alliance.
+
+__Signaling.__ In addition to the message sent by changes in capabilities, will, and alliance strength, changes in or failures of U.S. signaling might encourage or discourage opportunistic aggression. How Washington handles strategic communications and signaling geared toward other potential aggressors could be critical in shaping perceptions of whether the United States is vulnerable to an attack on a second front. The ability to effectively communicate consequences and distinguish escalation control signals aimed at one adversary from deterrence signals aimed at a second adversary could also shape an adversary’s perceptions of whether the United States is likely to respond in a second theater or on a second front. Escalation dynamics and signals could therefore have a significant impact on an adversary’s thinking.
+
+#### When Deterring Opportunistic Aggression Fails
+
+Given the challenges of responding to opportunistic aggression, the United States should aim to deter adversaries from opening a second front whenever possible. Maintaining a high level of conventional and nuclear readiness, demonstrating the will to fight, showing strong commitment to allies, and engaging in unambiguous messaging should all contribute to effective deterrence. Should deterrence fail, however, the United States may face the difficult prospect of trying to manage escalation and keep a conventional conflict conventional in one theater while simultaneously relying on the threat (or even employment) of nuclear weapons in a second theater. If, in such a scenario, the United States were forced to employ nuclear weapons — for example, if the United States has just used tactical nuclear weapons to stop a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or respond to a crisis on the Korean peninsula — it would be extraordinarily difficult to argue that Russia should not use tactical nuclear weapons in the face of conventional defeat. The challenge of concurrently managing intra- and inter-conflict deterrence is therefore both understudied and undertheorized but increasingly relevant in a two-near-peer world.
+
+___`The challenge of concurrently managing intra- and inter-conflict deterrence is therefore both understudied and undertheorized but increasingly relevant in a two-near-peer world.`___
+
+
+### Findings and Conclusions
+
+The task force identified five broad findings over the course of its deliberations.
+
+#### Policy Findings
+
+__1. Policymakers appear unaware of the risks that they are accepting in regard to opportunistic aggression and the demands that certain scenarios could place on U.S. nuclear forces in the impending two-nuclear-peer threat environment.__
+
+Assuming current spending rates and force constructs remain relatively constant, policymakers will be accepting future risks, whether or not those risks are identified and understood. As a result, in the event of future opportunistic aggression, it is unlikely policymakers will have the number of options they assume will be available to them. Significant changes or decisions related to conventional force generation can take years to implement and, once operational, often reflect a security environment from prior years. As such, if U.S. policymakers and decisionmakers do not take action now, they may be forced to rely on nuclear weapons to compensate for shortfalls in conventional capabilities in the future.
+
+The threat of opportunistic aggression may challenge the current U.S. policy of “reducing reliance on nuclear weapons.” In fact, if changes are not made, the current force posture and structure may well require the United States to rely more on nuclear weapons in a second theater or on a second front in the event of a future opportunistic aggression scenario. This threat demands policymakers to address the disconnect between extant policy and current capabilities.
+
+#### Capability Findings
+
+__2. Opportunistic aggression could create unique challenges for U.S. nuclear forces.__
+
+As discussed, if the United States and its allies are engaged in a major conventional conflict with a nuclear-armed adversary, the United States may be forced to rely more on nuclear weapons to deter and potentially respond to aggression in a second theater or on a second front. If an adversary perceives a benefit to threatening nuclear escalation in one or both conflicts, it will present even greater challenges for the current U.S. nuclear force posture. Thus, while current capabilities may provide sufficient deterrence in the near term, the current nuclear force structure is insufficient, given current U.S. nuclear strategy, to respond to conflicts with two near peers or in two theaters simultaneously if deterrence fails.
+
+Further, the current mix of U.S. nuclear capabilities is insufficient in its versatility to proactively deter and retroactively respond to opportunistic aggression in a second theater or second area of operations. The nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) program will help fill certain gaps in nuclear capabilities that are not easily met through any other current or developing option. However, the development and fielding timelines within the nuclear enterprise today do not support closing that gap within the next 10 years. This leaves a significant challenge in the Indo-Pacific theater, where regional nuclear capabilities could play an outsize role in an opportunistic aggression scenario, especially in terms of deterring Chinese or North Korean coercion or escalation. Responding to opportunistic aggression in the Indo-Pacific region after a conflict has already broken out elsewhere — that is, dealing with a second crisis or conflict — would further exacerbate this gap given the lack of forward-deployed nuclear assets in the region and the demand that would already be placed on certain capabilities given the initial conflict. Introducing greater diversity and versatility in modernized nuclear systems, as well as additional options for the extant U.S. stockpile, would provide more credible response options for dealing with acts of opportunistic aggression.
+
+#### Planning Findings
+
+__3. Current planning for opportunistic aggression scenarios may be insufficient.__
+
+Combatant commanders must prepare for various opportunistic aggression contingencies, including scenarios that require them to coordinate forces and plans (including deterrence strategies and operations) in new and different ways across multiple geographic combatant commands, including United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). This requires a comprehensive understanding of the forces available — conventional, nonnuclear, and nuclear, including nuclear support assets — and a better process for testing plans and assumptions if the assumed or preferred level of forces is not available.
+
+But this type of planning is limited given the current planning approach. Despite the focus the 2022 NPR places on integrated deterrence, nuclear planning is often segregated rather than integrated within the DOD. Because nuclear plans are segregated by a combatant command (CCMD), geographic combatant commanders plan and execute conventional operations, while nuclear planning is largely relegated to USSTRATCOM. This separation stems from force design: most combatant commands do not have the necessary skill sets and personnel to conduct nuclear planning. Those skill sets mostly reside in USSTRATCOM, though there are some positive changes in United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) — for instance, as the Air Force attempts to bolster its deterrence posture for strategic competition with China.
+
+More detailed and realistic planning is also hindered by the reticence of the DOD — and the U.S. government as a whole — to talk about nuclear planning and operations. Policymakers may need to “think the unthinkable” when it comes to opportunistic aggression, especially for scenarios involving possible low-yield nuclear use. Geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) need to prepare for the possibility that low-yield nuclear use in one theater or situation would affect force flows and decisionmaking in another theater, especially as it pertains to deterrence operations with nuclear forces. Would more or different nuclear assets be needed in one region to maintain deterrence or reestablish it? How might nuclear use change force flows and operations for the conventional side in either theater? Reluctance to work through these difficult issues ahead of time stifles planning and could encourage adversaries to exploit perceived gaps.
+
+#### Extended Deterrence and Alliance Management Findings
+
+__4. There is insufficient awareness of how threats in one theater might affect the security interests of U.S. allies in a separate theater and the ability of the United States to meet its extended deterrence obligations.__
+
+Most U.S. allies are understandably focused on potential crises and conflicts on their territory or in their own backyard. Although the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began to consider the impact of China’s rise on the security of the alliance in 2022, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine derailed many of these discussions. The United States must lead difficult — but critical — conversations with allies regarding the threat of opportunistic aggression to better prepare for such contingencies. While existing dialogues and formats could enable such conversations, current forums are insufficient or lack the candor needed. Opportunistic aggression will likely require the United States to rely more heavily on allies to respond simultaneously in two theaters. In advance of such an extreme circumstance and in a precrisis setting, the United States can work with allies and partners now to define requirements while balancing assurance concerns. There will be different implications and asks for each ally.
+
+___`The United States must lead difficult — but critical — conversations with allies regarding the threat of opportunistic aggression to better prepare for such contingencies.`___
+
+For instance, if large elements of U.S. forces are tied up in the Indo-Pacific theater and the United States is forced to flow certain assets out of the European theater, NATO allies need to understand the potential implications. Likewise, the United Kingdom and France, in particular, may need to be prepared to respond to queries about whether there are specific, credible actions they could take to reinforce the alliance’s nuclear posture and readiness in the absence of a more visible presence of U.S. assets.
+
+__5. It is not clear the necessary processes and structures are in place to make difficult — and informed — prioritization decisions.__
+
+Prioritization of the nation’s resources to account for the possibility of opportunistic aggression is needed. Not addressing U.S. force posture to accommodate the most likely opportunistic aggression scenarios could make such scenarios more likely due to an adversary perceiving a weakness in U.S. military strength. The U.S. defense industrial base — both in terms of its production capacity and workforce — likely cannot quickly accommodate major changes in U.S. military force posture to account for the risk of opportunistic aggression. The U.S. military’s budget is stretched in many ways, and significant adjustments have proved difficult in the past and will likely be difficult in the future. These challenges point to the need for prioritization when considering how to mobilize the defense industrial base to address this problem. But it is not clear the necessary processes and decisionmaking structures are in place across services and departments for making informed resourcing decisions — not just for the nuclear enterprise but also across the broader defense industrial base. Congress and the executive branch need to address this gap.
+
+
+### Recommendations
+
+__1. Review intelligence priorities.__
+
+Understanding when a leader might choose to initiate aggression or use nuclear weapons — and what specifically might deter them from doing so — is already one of the most difficult intelligence priorities. Assessing how a leader’s calculations might shift if the United States and its allies were already engaged in a conflict elsewhere complicates this matter significantly. Policymakers should review current intelligence priorities to ensure the intelligence community is also considering what factors might influence the likelihood a state will opportunistically initiate aggression while the United States is already involved in a conflict. Improving collection on and assessment of these dynamics not only will allow the United States and its allies to better anticipate when opportunistic aggression might occur but will also provide a critical baseline for better tailoring deterrence strategies and understanding how those strategies might interact.
+
+__2. Establish a Nuclear Policy Council.__
+
+The task force recommends creating a senior interagency group with statutory authorities to more consistently and over longer periods review deterrence policy and ensure planning is congruent with nuclear policymaking in a dynamic threat environment. This group would serve as the interagency policy counterpart to the existing DOD-NNSA Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), which oversees the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile management process and ensures alignment between DOD delivery systems and NNSA warheads. The new group would serve as a bridge between the NWC and higher-level National Security Council–led policy discussions. Among the many benefits of such a standing group, continuity is the most crucial advantage. Rather than wait for the NPR process to take place every several years, a policy-focused council would ensure ongoing long-term analysis without undercutting an administration’s ability to conduct independent reviews at its discretion. The council could also more closely track operational considerations and how policy translates to planning, resourcing, and programming decisions, and vice versa.
+
+__3. Prioritize war games, TTXs, and scenario-based discussions that focus on opportunistic aggression.__
+
+While the DOD conducts numerous war games each year, the vast majority of them are limited to conventional operations. To further complicate the issue, the DOD does not maintain an annual war game in which an adversary employs limited nuclear weapons or in which a second adversary launches an attack during an existing regional conflict. Limited nuclear use and opportunistic aggression scenarios are often addressed only in localized exploratory TTXs, resulting in shortfalls across the DOD in understanding theater-level strategy and escalation management approaches for scenarios in which an adversary uses limited nuclear attacks or U.S. forces must also contend with opportunistic aggression from a nuclear adversary.
+
+War games and TTXs that focus on a range of opportunistic aggression scenarios could help senior leaders, combatant commands, and planners understand challenges and resource constraints, as well as force management limitations. However, these cannot just be games led and attended by USSTRATCOM; interagency and senior administration officials outside of the DOD should also be included. This can help senior leaders feel more comfortable making decisions in resource- constrained environments and better understand the trade-offs and potential opportunity costs of certain capability investments. Running through scenarios with allies and diversifying the participant base can also improve understanding of the potential constraints. Unclassified games outside of official channels can also help increase the overall understanding of these challenges and provide a platform for engaging key allies on these issues.
+
+__4. Develop an engagement plan for allies to empower more detailed and transparent conversations on opportunistic aggression.__
+
+The United States needs to develop an engagement plan for deepening planning and consultations with allies on opportunistic aggression scenarios. Opportunistic aggression scenarios need to be on the agenda with allies in existing dialogue structures. These could be added as an agenda item or incorporated into scenario-based discussions or TTXs.
+
+Open and honest conversations with allies could improve understanding of what might be asked of them in certain scenarios. To do this effectively, the United States must take the lead on normalizing theoretical conversations with allies while managing perceptions of assurances. Hypothetical conversations will enable allies to better understand the threat environment, limitations on U.S. capabilities, and the kind of burden sharing that will be expected or necessary. This discussion could occur via existing mechanisms and channels, or it could be a wider effort that the DOD and the State Department co-lead.
+
+__5. Prioritize nuclear deterrence education for senior leadership.__
+
+The DOD does not sufficiently educate Joint Force leaders on nuclear issues. This gap in knowledge stems from a lack of standardization and mandatory instruction on nuclear issues across professional military education (PME). Many Joint Force officers receive little to no exposure to nuclear issues, including effects, policy, deterrence theory, escalation management, and opportunistic aggression, unless taken as an elective. In fact, when a leader becomes a senior flag officer, it may be the first time they are exposed to nuclear planning and operational concepts. This needs to change. Officers need exposure to these issues much earlier in their careers.
+
+Policymakers and planners also need deeper expertise on both nuclear issues and planning for conventional conflicts. In the diplomatic realm, policymakers leading consultations and conversations with allies often lack detailed understanding of nuclear (and conventional) planning and operational concepts, making it difficult to have frank conversations about what might be needed, by whom, and when. Further, senior leaders and political appointees need better exposure to how integrated planning, including nuclear planning, is undertaken.
+
+__6. Diversify U.S. nuclear forces.__
+
+U.S. policymakers should strive to diversify U.S. nuclear forces through investments in new capabilities, possibly in smaller numbers. This would provide the president with a broader range of credible options, particularly if an adversary threatens limited nuclear attacks. Strategic deterrence is, and should remain, the primary mission of the U.S. nuclear force, and the triad is essential to the success of that mission. Nonetheless, nuclear capabilities with the following attributes will likely contribute significantly to U.S. ability to deter opportunistic aggression prior to it occurring in a second theater, or aid in restoring deterrence should it fail or if limited nuclear use occurs:
+
+- survivability (ability to penetrate enemy air defenses and maneuver)
+
+- persistent presence
+
+- lower yield
+
+- responsive and effective across a spectrum of targets
+
+These capabilities should also serve certain objectives, such as the following:
+
+- regional assurance
+
+- operational flexibility
+
+- deterrence (both prior to conflict and within it)
+
+The task force concludes that sea-launched weapons with these attributes are likely the best option to meet the opportunistic aggression threat posed by China in the Indo-Pacific and may also serve other roles in a European theater depending on the circumstances.
+
+__7. Address critical conventional shortfalls.__
+
+The risk of opportunistic aggression is increased by conventional shortfalls in key capabilities, including long-range fires, precision-guided munitions, and heavy airlift and refueling. While current stockpiles may be sufficient to achieve victory in a single brief war, the war in Ukraine demonstrates the difficult task of replacing expended munitions and destroyed platforms in sustained high-intensity conflict. The United States and its allies must acquire enough of these key capabilities to fight and win one war while maintaining a sufficient conventional deterrent to prevent a second. To do so, officials should solidify a clear division of labor and investment strategies with allies. Building the defense industrial base and workforce capacity both in the United States and within allied nations to support shifting force structure plans will be key. The United States must rely on allied nations to fill the conventional weapons gaps they are capable of filling, such as lower-end munitions to support the war in Ukraine. That is not to say that allied nations should always have the role of low-end munitions production. But this is a near-term ask, and division of labor can help fill key gaps.
+
+__8. Accept calculated risks.__
+
+A viable strategy for addressing the four resource challenges posed by opportunistic aggression, previously described in this report, is not to simply build more but to build different. The key decision here is determining how the United States is committing itself to engage in a simultaneous two-conflict scenario and where it is willing to accept risk. U.S. nuclear modernization efforts are largely focused on one-for-one replacement programs, which will put new versions of extant weapons in the triad into service. The main lines of effort of the nuclear modernization program should continue as planned, but the authors advocate for increasing diversity in the modernized triad, in terms of both of baseline and regional deterrence capabilities. This may drive hard decisions to reprioritize some modernization programs that offer the same deterrent benefit as the weapons they are replacing. The United States should be willing to accept calculated risks in limited circumstances to free up resources for the development and fielding of systems that offer greater nuclear force diversity. This requires improved processes and structures to make difficult — and informed — prioritization decisions across both the nuclear enterprise and the broader defense industrial base.
+
+Policymakers should also shift their cultural mindsets and become more risk tolerant — from both a technological perspective and a political perspective — and allow the advanced development communities at DOD laboratories and NNSA national laboratories to experiment more aggressively. This means lowering the barrier to starting and canceling new weapons programs. The national laboratories should be encouraged to experiment and explore various options for the U.S. nuclear stockpile, even when those experiments do not lead to an established weapon in the stockpile every time. Given the trajectory of the global security environment, new technologies could provide policymakers with more flexible options to meet U.S. national objectives — if U.S. scientific and technical communities are permitted to do so. Policymakers should be willing to accept calculated risks to expand opportunities, including the risk of capability failure. The ability to more easily start and cancel programs and embrace truly flexible acquisition strategies would allow U.S. nuclear posture to better adjust to military needs and be more responsive to both positive and negative changes in the security environment.
+
+---
+
+__David M. Allison__ is a political scientist with a focus on the intersection of emerging technology and strategic stability. He is a lecturer at Yale University and an associate with the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School.
+
+__Savannah Blalock__ is a foreign affairs specialist in the Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control at the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).
+
+__Micah Howard__ is an operations research analyst and the nuclear forces portfolio lead in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE).
+
+__Tim McDonnell__ is a member of the research staff at the Center for Naval Analyses. His primary area of expertise is in nuclear weapons policy, including nuclear strategy, deterrence and extended deterrence, arms control, and the relationship between nuclear posture and foreign policy.
+
+__E. Paige Price__ is an assistant professor of strategy and security studies at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS). Her research focuses on issues of international security, nuclear security and nonproliferation, and strategic deterrence.
+
+__Victoria Sanchez__ is a foreign affairs specialist at the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration. During the work of the task force, Dr. Sanchez was at the U.S. Department of State as a foreign affairs officer in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Office of Policy and Regional Affairs.
+
+__Stephan Varga__ is a lieutenant colonel in the United States Army and serves as FA52 nuclear and counterproliferation officer in the Pentagon. He has over 20 years of experience in combating weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons effects, modeling, and policy.
+
+__Angela Weaver__ currently serves as the section head for strategy and policy at Navy Strategic Systems Programs, where she is responsible for all Reentry Branch external policy coordination and Navy nuclear deterrence mission support.
+
+__Kelsey Hartigan__ is the deputy director of PONI and a senior fellow with the International Security Program (ISP) at CSIS.
+
+__Reja Younis__ is the associate fellow with PONI in ISP at CSIS, she leads research on nuclear deterrence issues, nuclear strategy, and emerging technologies.
+
+__Lachlan MacKenzie__ is a program coordinator and research assistant with PONI in the International Security Program at CSIS.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-07-russia-and-china.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-07-russia-and-china.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Russia And China
+author: Callum Fraser
+date : 2024-06-07 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/opxLH2L.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The True Nature of their Cooperation"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Strategic cooperation between Moscow and Beijing has visibly intensified in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, Russia is now firmly the weaker partner in the relationship, with China exploiting the Kremlin’s situation for its own ends._
+
+
+
+On 29 May, US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell spoke to NATO representatives in Brussels on the seriousness of Chinese-Russian relations. His words underscore the true nature of the “no-limits” arrangement between Beijing and Moscow. It is not a partnership of convenience, but a concerted effort to shift the geopolitical centre of gravity towards Asia. While the West often talks about “bleeding Russia dry” through the conflict in Ukraine, Campbell warns that it risks suffering a similar drawn-out death. China does not represent a voice of reason in Russia’s ear as has been suggested by some Western leaders, but has a vested interest in destabilising the West and distracting it from Beijing’s own objectives in the Indo-Pacific.
+
+Increasing political, economic, and social burdens stemming from the invasion of Ukraine have kneecapped Russian agency in the international arena. As the divide between Russia and the West grows, the Kremlin is increasingly focusing its attention on China, with ties between the two states growing ever stronger. In defiance of the West, Russia characterises its relationship with China as an alliance between two great civilisations. However, as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to China has highlighted, Moscow is increasingly finding itself a pawn of China’s geopolitical aspirations.
+
+Amid increasing geopolitical turbulence, the concept of multipolarity is becoming acknowledged as a global trend. Russia and China have been quick to label themselves as key players in this emerging world order, and have collectively strived towards the formation of a bloc that is set to rival Western hegemony. At a glance, the relationship appears natural: two rising authoritarian powers are joining forces to challenge the prevailing order. Yet upon delving deeper into the relationship’s dynamics, Russia’s commitment to its war on Ukraine, its stagnating economy, and its search for support extraneous to the West have led to its foreign policy objectives becoming slowly subsumed into China’s vision of the future international order.
+
+
+### The New World Order
+
+Geopolitical constraints provide Russia and China with a plethora of reasons to band together. Their distrust of Western hegemony, authoritarian governments, and similar political ambitions have nurtured relations between Moscow and Beijing for the last political generation.
+
+In their recent press conference, both states agreed that civilisational differences shape spheres of influence; that international institutions are polarised against their interests, requiring shifts in structure to accommodate “new realities”; and that there is no place for military alliances in the Asia-Pacific region. Noticeably, the conversation focused on the developing trade partnership between the two states, with comments on external affairs remaining limited in detail. In comparison to Putin’s usual damning rhetoric on the collective West, the restraint within this meeting is a sign of the true dynamics of the situation – namely, that they are shaped primarily by Chinese interests.
+
+
+### Cooperation over Competition?
+
+Despite exorbitant bilateral proclamations of partnership, dynamics between the two states remain cautious, partly as a result of historical tensions. Putin’s reference to Russia and China remaining “brothers forever” seems to skip over the Treaty of Peking (1860), the Soviet invasion of Xinjiang (1934) and nuclear posturing during the Sino-Soviet split, to name a few “breaks” in their historical relationship. These memories are still fresh in the minds of much of the Chinese population, including scholars who note an incongruence between Russian and Chinese visions of a new world order. Despite the friendly veneer, distrust remains.
+
+___`Russia’s refocused economy means it has no ability to provide incentives for greater integration within its historical sphere of influence in the face of Chinese economic competition`___
+
+With Russia’s economy concentrated on supporting the war effort in Ukraine, its exports have become focused on shipping fossil fuels and other raw materials to Eastern partners. Meanwhile, imports from China now cover a diverse field of industrial and consumer goods, providing essential resources to sustain both Russia’s economy and the conflict in Ukraine. This asymmetrical balance is forecasted to increase over the coming years as Russia struggles to survive on its war economy, and consequently, China will become an ever more important lifeline for the Russian state.
+
+
+
+_▲ __Chinese-Russian Trade Complexity.__ Variance in export complexity suggests that Russia has become a Chinese petrol station, while China provides necessities for Russia’s struggling war economy. [Source](https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/rus?depthSelector=HS2Depth)._
+
+This imbalance has precipitated unusual geopolitical concessions from Russia. The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Russia’s customs union – initially conceived in part to limit Chinese influence in Russia’s historical sphere of influence – contains several states operating a multi-vector foreign policy, including investment from China’s global development project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Putin’s comments at the 2023 Eurasian Economic Forum supporting the pairing of the EAEU and BRI demonstrate both a concession in terms of Russia’s dominance over Eurasia and an acceptance of the nature of relations with China.
+
+Development and investment have become the dominant tools for building influence in Eurasia; in this context, Russia’s economic integration with former Soviet states offers only limited influence over its neighbours. Its refocused economy means it has no ability to provide incentives for greater integration within its historical sphere of influence in the face of Chinese economic competition.
+
+Therefore, Russia finds itself increasingly reliant on a partner with historical grievances as well as ambitions in its own backyard. If Russia continues to stagnate, it must either make further concessions regarding its geopolitical position within Eurasia, or risk severing its life support mechanism.
+
+
+### Russia’s Excessive Optimism
+
+Putin’s recent visit to China, the first since his fifth inauguration as president, highlighted Russia’s strategic dependence upon its neighbour. In the opening address by the two countries’ leaders, one could see an incongruence in the rhetoric surrounding the state of Sino-Russian relations. Putin’s reference to collaboration reaching unprecedented levels was met with lukewarm compliments from Chinese President Xi Jinping about the level of cooperation, indicating a desire for improvement.
+
+These comments exemplify Russia and China’s positions. Ultimately, Russia needs China far more than China needs Russia. The relationship hardly extends beyond the transactional, with strict limitations on bilateral cooperation on projects that do not favour Chinese interests. During Putin’s visit, aspirations for a second gas pipeline linking the two states were dashed by yet another unenthusiastic response from Beijing. While Russia still has use for China, there are clear limits to how far China will cooperate with the Kremlin’s interests.
+
+
+_▲ __Average Russian Oil Exports by Country and Region, 2021-2023 (million barrels per day).__ Russia’s growing reliance on China and other Asian partners to mitigate Western sanctions on Russian exports. [Source](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/average-russian-oil-exports-by-country-and-region-2021-2023)._
+
+
+### The Ukrainian Question
+
+Victory in Ukraine has become integral to the continuation of Putin’s reign, and consequently, the progress of the Russian invasion now dictates every facet of Russian domestic and foreign policy. This opens the door to external exploitation. China, along with other Asian states, have profited from cheap Russian oil; Central Asian states have transformed into crucial transport hubs for goods to and from Russia; and the supply of goods now underproduced within Russia’s war economy is driving increased exports from the East. The longer Russia’s attention is focused on Ukraine, the longer Russia’s neighbours will profit from its increased reliance on them.
+
+___`China will happily tolerate a conflict in Ukraine, even going as far to prop up Russia’s military economy, but this does not denote an equal partnership or a friendship`___
+
+Therefore, while China continues to seek a “political solution” to the conflict in Ukraine, it seems more than happy to put up with a protracted conflict. China has typically remained neutral on external matters, but Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has presented Beijing with a narrow path through which it can prioritise its interests without suffering secondary sanctions from the West. On the surface, Beijing is fostering a growing trade relationship with Russia in a very particular manner, through the export of components with both civilian and military applications such as machine tools, satellite equipment, and drone technology – enough to turn a nice profit and maintain the status quo in the conflict, without overtly support Russia.
+
+However, Campbell’s words suggest that China is providing much greater support in terms of materiel to help reconstitute Russian forces, kept out of sight to avoid Western retaliation. Ultimately, this situation seems likely, and Russia’s aggressive revanchism in Ukraine serves as an exemplary case study of the limits of Western resolve. Meanwhile, Xi’s Taiwanese ambitions loom large; with an ever narrowing window of opportunity for military action, China will likely be analysing its Russian guinea pig while propping it up just enough to continue to drain Western military and political resources.
+
+Ultimately, China will happily tolerate a conflict in Ukraine, even going as far to prop up Russia’s military economy, but this does not denote an equal partnership or a friendship. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine suits a very particular purpose for China, distracting and draining the West. As long as this status quo continues, we can expect China to keep exploiting Russia’s position.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+Sino-Russian relations are strengthening in the political, economic, and military domains, posing a direct threat to Western security interests. The long-term dynamics of this relationship suggest a purely transactional approach, with China exploiting Russia’s economic weaknesses. However, the war in Ukraine also presents an opportunity for China to bleed Western resolve, drain NATO resources, and distract attention from Beijing’s interests in the Indo-Pacific. Ultimately, Putin, through his dreams of Russian revanchism, has transformed Russia into a tool for its ambitious and unreliable Eastern neighbour.
+
+---
+
+__Callum Fraser__ is a Research Fellow in the International Security Studies department at RUSI, specialising in the confluence between Russian foreign policy and its periphery states. Callum is particularly interested in the evolution of geopolitics within Eurasia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. He also specialises in researching the underlying motivations, justifications, and dynamics of conflict within the Eurasian space along ethnic, identity, cultural, and political dimensions.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-10-algorithmic-stability.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-10-algorithmic-stability.md
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+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-10-algorithmic-stability.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Algorithmic Stability
+author: Benjamin Jensen, et al.
+date : 2024-06-10 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/tH65t62.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "How AI Could Shape the Future of Deterrence"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_This report delves into the future of deterrence and the role of human judgment in an AI-focused crisis simulation._
+
+
+
+### In the future…
+
+- __States will integrate artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) into their national security enterprises to gain decision advantages over their rivals.__ The question will not be if a web of algorithms extends across the military, intelligence community, and foreign policy decisionmaking institutions, but how lines of code interact with the human clash of wills at the heart of strategy.
+
+- __New technology will change the character but not the nature of statecraft and strategy.__ States will still combine diplomacy, economic coercion, and influence campaigns with threats of military force to signal rivals and reassure allies. Human decisionmaking, while augmented by algorithms, remains central to strategy formation and crisis management.
+
+- __Information about AI/ML capabilities will influence how states manage escalation.__ Escalation risks will continue to emerge from how warfighting changes the balance of information available to update models and support human decisionmaking. Intelligence gaps on adversary algorithms increase the likelihood of escalation but only once states have crossed the Rubicon and fight beneath the nuclear threshold.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+How will the adoption of AI/ML across a state’s national security enterprise affect crisis decisionmaking? For example, what would the Cuban Missile Crisis look like at machine speed?
+
+Beyond current policy debates, congressional testimony, new strategies, and a drive to identify, test, and evaluate standards, there is a fundamental question of how computer algorithms will shape crisis interactions between nuclear powers. Further, will refined AI/ML models pull people back from the brink or push them over the edge during crises that are as much about fear and emotion as they are rational decisionmaking? How will humans and machines interact during a crisis between nuclear powers?
+
+_`This edition of On Future War uses a series of wargames as an experiment to analyze how players with 10 or more years of national security experience approach crisis decisionmaking given variable levels of knowledge about a rival great power’s level of AI/ML integration across its national security enterprise.`_
+
+To answer this question, the CSIS Futures Lab held a series of crisis simulations in early 2023 analyzing how AI/ML will shape the future of deterrence. The games — designed as a randomized control trial — explored human uncertainty regarding a rival great power’s level of AI/ML integration and how this factor affected strategic stability during a crisis.
+
+Two major findings emerged. First, across the simulations, varying levels of AI/ML capabilities had no observable effect on strategy and a general trend of trying to combine multiple instruments of power when responding to a crisis. While data science and the use of AI/ML to augment statecraft will almost certainly be a defining feature of the near future, there appear to be constants of strategy that will survive the emergence of such new technologies. Diplomacy, economic coercion, and influence campaigns will survive even as machines collect and process more information and help shape national security decisionmaking. AI/ML will augment but not fundamentally change strategy. That said, there is an urgent need to start training national security professionals to understand what AI/ML is and is not, as well as how it can support human decisionmaking during foreign policy crises.
+
+Second, how nations fight in the shadow of nuclear weapons will change as states selectively target the battle networks of their rivals. Even though the perceived risk of escalation is not likely to be affected by the balance of AI/ML capabilities, the criteria used to select flexible response options will change. States will need to balance countering adversary algorithms with ensuring that they do not blind an adversary and risk triggering a “dead-hand” — a fast and automated system developed by the Soviet Union to launch nuclear weapons — escalation spiral. This need to strike the right balance in military targeting will put a new premium on intelligence collection that maps how rival states employ AI/ML capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. It could also change how states approach arms control, with a new emphasis on understanding where and how AI/ML capabilities augment crisis decisionmaking.
+
+
+### Deterrence, Battle Networks, and AI/ML
+
+Modern deterrence literature focuses on how states bargain, short of war, through threats and commitments. These signals change how each side calculates the costs and benefits of going to war, implying that the less information each side has about the balance of capabilities and resolve, the harder it becomes to encourage restraint. Signaling and communication play a central role in how states seek to manipulate risk to deny an adversary an advantage, including incentives for seeking a fait accompli by military force. Even literature that stresses the psychological and cultural antecedents that shape how foreign policy leaders approach crisis diplomacy share this emphasis on the central role of information. Rational calculations break down based on past information (i.e., how beliefs shape expectations) and flawed weighting (e.g., bias and prospect theory).
+
+In modern military planning and operations, information is managed through battle networks. The ability to conduct long-range precision strikes and track adversary troop movements all rests on aggregating and analyzing data. This logic is a foundation for the Coalition Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) network, which is designed to push and pull data across distributed networks of sensors and shooters connected by faster communication, processing, and decision layers informed by AI/ML. The network is the new theory of victory at the center of the new Joint Warfighting Concept, which prioritizes synchronizing multidomain effects in time and space. For this reason, information is now a key component of military power and, by proxy, a state’s ability to bargain with a rival. The more information a state can process, assisted by algorithms, the more likely it is to identify windows of opportunity and risk as well as align ends, ways, and means to gain a relative advantage.
+
+Yet, most of the emerging literature on AI/ML and the future of war focuses more on risk and ethical considerations than bargaining advantages. First, multiple accounts claim that AI/ML will create new risks, including “flash wars,” and are likely to produce destabilizing effects along multiple vectors. The thinking goes that the new era of great power competition will be marked by an “indelicate balance of terror” as Russia, China, and the United States race to acquire technological game changers. To the extent that AI/ML alters military power, it could affect how states perceive the balance of power. As perceptions about power and influence change, it could trigger inadvertent escalation risks. Inside the bureaucracy, defense planners could rely on brittle and black-boxed AI/ML recommendations that create new forms of strategic instability. At the tactical level, the speed of autonomous weapons systems could lead to inadvertent escalation while also undermining signaling commitment during a crisis.
+
+There are two issues with these claims. First, arguments about the destabilizing role of AI/ML have yet to be explored beyond literature reviews, alternative scenarios, and illustrative wargames designed more for gaining perspective than for evaluating strategy. In other words, hypotheses about risk and escalation have not been tested. Second, accounts about emerging technology and inadvertent escalation often discount the role of increased information in reducing tensions. To the extent that algorithms applied across a battle network help reduce uncertainty, they are likely to support deterrence. You can never lift the fog of war, but you can make weather forecasts and describe what is known, unknown, and unknowable. This alternative logic sits at the foundation of the “wargame as an experiment” the CSIS Futures Lab constructed to analyze how AI/ML could affect strategic stability.
+
+
+### Would You Like to Play a Game?
+
+In 2023, the CSIS Futures Lab conducted two tabletop exercises exploring a crisis scenario involving AI/ML’s effect on strategic decisionmaking. The tabletop exercise focused on a crisis involving a third-party state between two rivals, each of which had nuclear weapons and a second-strike capability. The rival states in the exercise were abstracted to remove bias about current rivalries that define the international system, thus reducing, but not eliminating, the risk of confounding factors skewing gameplay. As a result, players made choices about how to respond to a crisis and which elements of a rival state’s battle network (i.e., CJADC2) to target. The games consisted of 29 individual players, each with over 10 years of national security experience.
+
+> #### `The Game`
+
+- _`Two tabletop exercises analyzing how players develop flexible deterrent and flexible response options during a crisis between rival nuclear states`_
+
+- _`Fake scenario to reduce bias`_
+
+- _`Players all had at least 10 years of national security experience`_
+
+- _`Players randomly assigned into different treatment groups`_
+
+- _`Three rounds of crisis interactions, moving from competition to the early stages of a military conflict`_
+
+The game design adapted an earlier tabletop exercise used to study modern competition and cyber escalation dynamics known as Corcyra. This game put players in a fictional scenario involving a crisis standoff between two nuclear rivals: Green State and Purple State over a small state, Orange State. Green State and Orange State are treaty allies. Purple State and Orange State have a maritime territorial dispute. Players, assuming the role of Green State, make decisions about the best mix of flexible deterrent (competition) and flexible response options as the crisis unfolds. The game scenario — involving a territorial dispute, enduring rivalry, and alliance networks — built in dynamics associated with escalation to focus on low-probability, high-consequence foreign policy events. The use of fake countries seeks to make players less likely to introduce bias in the results based on prior beliefs about current powers such as the United States and China.
+
+Unknown to the players, Purple State’s moves and decisions were predetermined to walk players up the escalation ladder, a technique known in the wargame community as a 1.5-sided design. This game design captures the uncertainty and interactive complexity (i.e., reaction, counteraction) of two-sided games but better supports capturing and coding observations about player preferences and assessments of risks and opportunities. Applied to Corcyra, a 1.5-sided game design enabled the CSIS Futures Lab to collect data on how players made decisions about competition and conventional conflict in the shadow of nuclear weapons.
+
+As the game proceeded, players were randomly assigned into two different treatment groups and led into different rooms with a facilitator. Each group was given an identical game packet that included an overview of the crisis and military balance between Green State and Purple State as well as the standing policy objectives for Green State to deter Purple State’s actions against its treaty allies while limiting the risk of a broader war (i.e., extended general deterrent). The only difference between the two groups was in the intelligence estimate of the extent of Purple State’s AI/ML capabilities in relation to Green State. As seen in Table 1, this difference meant that everything was constant (e.g., military balance, policy objectives, and Purple State’s actions across the game) except for the knowledge the players received about their rival’s level of AI/ML capabilities. This design reflects a factorial vignette survey, controlling for whether AI/ML capability is known or unknown.
+
+Over the course of the game, each group (i.e., Treatment A and B) responded to a set of adversary escalation vignettes. Unknown to the participants was that each subsequent move would see their rival escalate and move up the escalation ladder to ensure a more dynamic interplay between current decisionmaking and maintaining sufficient forces and options for future interactions. The design also ensured that players were forced to confront the threat of conventional strikes on the nuclear enterprise and the limited use of nuclear weapons in a counterforce role.
+
+
+_▲ Table 1: Excerpts from the Corcyra Game Packets_
+
+The first round of the game dealt with flexible deterrent options and crisis response. Afterwards, each group received a brief about a crisis — between their treaty ally (Orange State) and nuclear rival (Purple State) — and each player (Green State) was asked to craft a response using multiple instruments of power (e.g., diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) by picking three options from a menu of 24 preapproved flexible deterrent options. Each instrument of power had six response options based on the implied level of escalation. This design allowed the CSIS Futures Lab to see if varying levels of AI/ML capabilities had an effect on how players approached competition and campaigning as part of a larger deterrent posture. Specifically, it allowed the research team to test how the capability affected overall competition strategy and escalation dynamics.
+
+The second round began with a limited military strike by Purple State on Orange State. Players were briefed that Purple State conducted a series of limited strikes on an airfield and naval base in Orange State. Orange State intercepted 50 percent of the cruise missiles in the attack, but the remaining 20 — fired from a mix of Purple State aircraft and naval warships — damaged an Orange State frigate, downed two maritime patrol aircraft, and destroyed an ammunition depot. Initial reports suggested that as many as 20 Orange State military personnel were killed in action, with another 30 wounded. There were also four Green State military advisers working on the base at the time who were killed in the attack. The attacks coincided with widespread reports of global positioning system (GPS) denial, jamming, and cyber intrusions in both Orange State and Green State. Purple State said the attack was limited to the military facility Orange State had used in past provocations, but it vows broader attacks if Orange State or Green State responds. In this manner, Purple State’s conventional military response reflected core concepts in modern military theory about multidomain operations, joint firepower strikes, and sixth-generation warfare.
+
+After receiving this intelligence update, players were asked to nominate flexible response options. First, the players had to recommend which of the military responses from the menu of 24 options they recommended in response to a limited military strike by Purple State on Orange State. Players also had to specify which layer of Purple State’s battle network they wanted to affect through their recommended response: sensing, processing, communicating, decision, or effectors. This game design limited the range of options open to players to support statistical analysis and comparison between the two treatments.
+
+The third round examined if players adjusted their military response options to conventional strikes on their nuclear enterprise. Players were briefed that Purple State conducted a series of conventional strikes against Orange State and Green State. In Orange State, the strikes targeted major military facilities and even the Orange State leadership (both military and civilian) with a mix of cruise missiles, loitering munitions, and special operations forces (SOF) raids. The attacks included striking Green State intelligence satellites and major early-warning radars as well as key airfields where Green State keeps the majority of its strike and bomber aircraft squadrons. The mass precision conventional strikes — launched largely by a mix of long-range strike and bomber aircraft and submarines — also targeted key port facilities in Green State used to reload vertical launch cells and support Green State submarine forces. Orange State lost over 30 percent of its military combat power and 50 percent of its civilian critical infrastructure related to water treatment, energy, and telecommunications. Its leaders survived the decapitation strikes but are enacting continuity of government protocols. Green State has suffered 10 percent attrition in its air and naval forces. Purple State has threatened that it may be forced to expand strikes, to include using nuclear weapons, if Green State conducts additional military strikes.
+
+
+### What the Game Revealed about the Future of Deterrence
+
+#### Flexible Deterrent Options
+
+Throughout the game, each player had three options from any category (i.e., diplomatic, informational, military, or economic) to choose. Table 2 summarizes how frequently each player selected flexible response options linked to different instruments of power during the initial crisis response (i.e., Round 1). Analyzing these choices provides a window into how players with at least 10 years of national security experience approached the “ways” of crisis management toward the “end” of reestablishing deterrence. If AI/ML is inherently more escalation prone, one would expect to see a statistically significant difference between the treatments.
+
+There was no statistically significant difference between the two treatments. The balance of AI/ML capabilities did not alter how players approached their competitive strategy and crisis management. Across the treatments, players developed an integrated approach, often choosing multiple instruments of power to pressure their rival, as opposed to focusing on a strictly military response. No player in either treatment used only a singular instrument of power, such as only responding with military options. On the contrary, over 60 percent of players in each treatment selected multiple instruments of power. In other words, the level of AI/ML capabilities between rivals did not directly alter early-stage crisis response and the development of flexible deterrent options designed to stabilize the situation and reestablish deterrence. This finding runs contrary to perspectives that see AI/ML as inherently escalatory and risk prone. While AI/ML will augment multiple analytical processes from the tactical to the strategic level, national security leaders will still make critical decisions and seek ways to slow down and manage a crisis. The risk is likely more in how people interact with algorithms during a crisis than in the use of data science and machine learning to analyze information and intelligence. AI/ML does not pose risks on its own.
+
+
+_▲ Table 2: Selected Deterrent Options_
+
+During discussions in Round 1 for Treatment A (AI/ML Capabilities Known), players focused more on strategy as it relates to shaping human decisionmaking. In the first round, participants were divided over whether Purple State’s actions were hostile or not but conceded that Purple State was attempting to signal that Green State’s actions in the region were unwarranted. Of note, this focus on signaling was more about human intention than algorithmic assessments. The players generally saw the crisis as about human leaders in rival states seeking advantage through national security bureaucracies augmented by AI/ML capabilities. In their discussions, humans were in the loop and focused on finding ways to de-escalate the crisis without signaling weakness. The discussion was less about how algorithms might skew information and more about how to have direct communication and clear messages passed through diplomats to other human leaders.
+
+This logic drove the players to focus on developing the situation through diplomatic outreach while increasing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets in the region. Although participants agreed upon the utility of diplomacy as a response to the crisis, they diverged in their opinion on whether the efforts should publicly call for de-escalation or privately use third parties or influence campaigns to warn Purple State’s elites about further escalation. Group members widely supported increasing ISR assets in the region to provide early warning of future Purple State military deployments and increase protection of friendly communications and intelligence-collection assets. Additionally, group members sought to privately share intelligence with allies in the region. Again, AI/ML was less a focal point than a method to gain better situational awareness and identify the best mechanisms for crisis communication with the rival state (i.e., private, public, or third-party). People, more than machines, were central to crisis management.
+
+Where AI/ML did enter the discussion was with respect to how the rival battle networks with high degrees of automation could misperceive the deployment of additional ISR capabilities during a crisis. Although participants strongly believed that this action was essential, they recognized the possibility that Purple State’s AI/ML augmented strategic warning systems may not be able to interpret the difference between signaling resolve or deliberate escalation. At the same time, they thought the direct communication channels should augment this risk and that most algorithmic applications analyzing the deployment of ISR assets would be more probabilistic than deterministic, thinking in terms of conditional probabilities about escalation risks rather than jumping to the conclusion that war was imminent.
+
+Put differently, since all AI/ML is based on learning patterns from data or rules-based logic, the underlying patterns of past ISR deployments would likely make the system — even absent a human — unlikely to predict a low-probability event (i.e., war) when there are other more common options associated with a ubiquitous event such as increasing intelligence. If anything, the reverse would be more likely. Since wars and even militarized crises are rare events, an AI/ML algorithm — depending on the training data and parameters — would treat them as such absent human intervention. This does not mean there is a zero probability of “flash wars” and misreading the situation. Rather, the point is that given the low number of wars and militarized crises between states, there are few patterns, and there will almost certainly be a human in the loop. No senior national security leader is likely to cede all decisionmaking to an algorithm in a crisis.
+
+Treatment B saw a similar discussion between players that focused on using multiple instruments of power and identifying de-escalation opportunities. Of note, it also saw more diplomatic outreach, with players wanting to ensure they could cut through the uncertainty about Purple State’s AI/ML capabilities through direct and indirect diplomatic engagements and crisis communication. In Treatment B, concern about the strengths and limitations of an unknown AI/ML capability in Purple State had a significant impact on group decisionmaking. Group members desired a mutual understanding of Green State and Purple State’s AI/ML capabilities, believing that greater clarity over the balance and use of AI/ML capabilities between rivals would lead to stability, rather than the current instability they faced.
+
+This focus led participants to recommend deploying ISR capabilities to identify how and if Purple State was using AI-assisted ISR that might misread their intentions. Some players expressed concern about whether the use of ISR would undermine their efforts at de-escalation. Players suggested that if Purple State detected increased deployment of collection and early-warning assets, they would feel pressured to deploy military forces to prevent the appearance of a capability gap.
+
+Ultimately, players believed that deploying additional ISR was worth the potential escalation risk because it was essential to analyze adversary actions as they unfolded. These groups sought to combine diplomatic, flexible deterrent options such as third-party mediation and redeployment of naval and aviation assets away from Purple State to signal a desire to de-escalate. In other words, national security professionals wanted to ensure there was a check on algorithmic reasoning during a crisis and were willing to deploy assets to that end and even slow down operations to buy time and space for diplomacy and clear signaling.
+
+This reasoning runs counter to claims that AI triggers a security dilemma that leads to inadvertent escalation. In international relations, a security dilemma is a situation where efforts by one state to increase its security cause rival states to experience more insecurity. The concept is used to explain why states find themselves pulled into arms races, crisis escalation, and war. The security dilemma can become especially acute based, among other things, on new technologies that make it difficult to assess whether offensive or defensive military capabilities create strategic advantage. As a result, one would expect to see the emergence of AI/ML capabilities trigger a security dilemma and inadvertent escalation. Rival states would opt for more severe crisis response options in their selection of flexible deterrent options.
+
+Yet, this dynamic did not emerge in the crisis simulations based on player discussions and statistical analysis. Players could select from a menu of 24 crisis response options varying by magnitude across each of the instruments of power. Using this magnitude, the CSIS Futures Lab could analyze whether there was more or less coercive pressure applied across the treatments. As can be seen in Table 3, there was no statistically significant difference in the magnitudes across the two treatments. The balance of AI/ML capabilities did not affect how rival states approached crisis management and competitive strategy. Based on discussions, players searched for ways to escape the security dilemma through diplomatic outreach and intelligence across both treatments.
+
+While the average escalation level between the two treatments is not different, there appear to be inverse preferences for weak signaling and crisis probing that players adopted to manage crisis escalation. Table 3 below shows the levels of escalation magnitude, ranging from 1 (“low”) to 6 (“high”), that players opted for when they selected diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments of power to signal their rival and shape the crisis. Lower magnitude signals (1) — which were predominantly diplomatic and intelligence activities — were more than twice as likely in Treatment A (10) than in B (4). Players assessed that AI/ML-enabled battle networks would detect weak signals and help support a defensive posture while searching for a crisis off-ramp. Inversely, in Treatment B (AI/ML Capabilities Unknown), players adopted more of probing strategy using mid-range signaling (i.e., level 3 escalation magnitude) to test adversary capabilities and resolve. In Treatment A (AI/ML Capabilities Known), only 36 percent (14) of the responses fell in this range while Treatment B (AI/ML Capabilities Unknown) saw 60 percent (23). This finding implies that the balance of knowledge about AI/ML capabilities could alter escalation dynamics in the future.
+
+
+_▲ Table 3: Contingency Table Escalation Magnitude_
+
+
+### Battle Networks
+
+During the second round, players found themselves confronting a series of limited strikes by a rival state. In the third round, the situation escalated to theater-wide conventional strikes to evaluate how players shifted their military strategy. In these rounds, players recommended how best to attack their rival state’s battle network in terms of the optimal layer to target: sensor, communications, processing, decision, or effects. If the balance of AI/ML capabilities affects military operations, one would expect to see targeting differences across the treatments.
+
+Yet,there was no statistically significant difference across the treatments in relation to battle network targeting preferences. As seen in the contingency table below, targeting preferences varied across the treatments, but not as much as expected. In treatments where AI/ML capabilities were known and balanced, players preferred to try and target the processing and decisionmaking layers in an effort to deny the other side tempo and a decisionmaking advantage.
+
+
+_▲ Table 4: Battle Network Targeting Preferences_
+
+Player discussions drew out the logic behind the difference. When AI/ML was known, players discussed how targeting the decision layer could be a pathway to slow down a crisis and give humans a chance to respond and degrade the ability of a rival to retaliate at machine speed. At the same time, they wanted to limit targeting the processing layer. Players discussed how this layer, which consists of large data hubs, is a new form of critical infrastructure that is often co-located with energy and telecommunications infrastructure to support powering computers and distributing information. Hitting this layer could pull a rival state deeper into an escalation spiral due to concerns about civilian deaths and counter-value targeting. As a result, they discussed how best to target the decision layer, including introducing new forms of flexible deterrent and response options designed to spoof and confuse AI/ML applications that help senior leaders analyze a crisis. The goal was to gain an information advantage and use it for leverage without triggering inadvertent escalation.
+
+When AI/ML was unknown, participants opted to target effectors (e.g., conventional weapons) because it was assessed as the highest payoff target given uncertainty about adversary decisionmaking capabilities. In the absence of knowledge about the depth of AI/ML in a rival state’s battle network, players opted to change the correlation of forces in terms of neutralizing military capabilities capable of launching a retaliatory strike. Although players debated the use of cyber capabilities to degrade Purple State’s military capabilities, players wanted a kinetic strike because it was a visible signal, could be quickly executed, and could target a limited range of proportional targets to demonstrate resolve to the international community without significant escalation risk. This insight impliesaneed to rethink aspects of military targeting in an era almost certain to be defined by increasingly sophisticated AI/ML applications supporting crisis decisionmaking.
+
+
+### Escalation Risks
+
+Despite valid concerns about AI/ML and nuclear escalation, there were no statistically significant differences between the treatments in relation to how players assessed the risk. This finding is based on comparing assessments of nuclear escalation risks for Treatment A (AI/ML Capabilities Known) and B (AI/ML Capabilities Unknown). In each round, players selected how likely their flexible response option was to trigger nuclear escalation by picking a number from 1 to 6 with the following values: (1) no risk, (2) risk of limited conventional military confrontation, (3) risk of conventional strikes to degrade nuclear enterprise, (4) risk of limited nuclear attack, (5) risk of large-scale nuclear attack against nuclear enterprise, and (6) risk of large-scale nuclear attack against civilian targets.
+
+In Round 2, when players had to recommend a flexible military response option to counter a rival state, there was no statistically significant difference in their risk assessment. In both games, players assessed the risk as a rival state responding with nonnuclear, limited conventional retaliatory strikes. When AI/ML capabilities were unknown, it created a unique discussion about escalation dynamics. Some players expressed concern that targeting the communication layer in a battle network could lead bad algorithms to get even worse. Absent new information, a rival state’s AI/ML models would be more prone to provide bad or at least outdated advice.
+
+In Round 3, when players had to respond to widespread conventional military strikes, there was also no statistically significant difference in players’ risk assessment. Across both treatments, players saw an increased risk of a retaliatory conventional strike on their nuclear enterprise. When AI/ML capabilities were known, players expressed more concern about a limited nuclear strike and how to best understand the algorithms their rival integrated across the national security enterprise at the tactical, operational, and strategic level. More than technological advantage, players assessed that the key to understanding future AI/ML escalation risks during a nuclear crisis rests in mapping how algorithms inform decisionmaking at echelon. This requirement to understand the range of AI/ML systems augmenting a national security enterprise creates entirely new intelligence requirements critical to early warning and arms control.
+
+There was a statistically significant difference between the treatments with respect to conventional escalation. This finding (Table 5 below) is based on comparing which military response option players opted for in Round 3 in response to widespread conventional strikes. Treatment A (AI/ML Capabilities Known) players took a more measured response and conducted limited strikes on their rival’s military designed to manage escalation risk. During game discussions, players brought up the idea that they were signaling both the rival human leaders and their algorithms, trying to preserve the possibility of an off-ramp. Alternatively, in Treatment B (AI/ML Capabilities Unknown), players took a more aggressive, decisive response but still beneath the nuclear threshold. The findings are more nuanced than what the numbers tell. During the counteraction phase, participants were united in their belief that Green and Purple States were now in a state of war. All players assessed Purple State as “hostile” and considered “crisis escalation imminent.” Since players knew crisis escalation was imminent, they struggled to find an effective response that would signal resolve and commitment to their treaty ally Orange State that would not trigger strategic escalation. Treatment B players argued that “escalating to de-escalate” would be the most viable strategy to ensure a crisis would not lead to greater hostilities. For Treatment B, unknown AI/ML capabilities meant that Green State players were aware of the existence of Purple State’s AI/ML capabilities, yet they did not understand how these systems were being integrated into their decisionmaking process. The “escalate to de-escalate” approach of the Treatment B players was designed to offset the intelligence asymmetry gap with a stronger conventional military response. This finding suggests that a priority intelligence requirement in future crises will be the depth and extent of AI/ML systems across a rival state’s national security enterprise and operational battle networks. It also suggests a possible new form of inadvertent escalation risk associated with testing a rival’s capabilities to reduce uncertainty. This finding has significant implications for thinking about the future of arms control and how to approach national intelligence requirement generation optimized for an algorithmic future.
+
+
+_▲ Table 5: Contingency Table for Military FRO Preferences_
+
+
+### Policy Recommendations
+
+The findings from these crisis simulations point to recommendations that the United States and its network of partners and allies should consider as they build interoperable battle networks where AI/ML supports decisionmaking at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
+
+__1. Embrace experimentation and an agile mindset.__
+
+The national security community needs to stop worrying about Skynet, alongside other technology-related threat inflation, and start building applications that help people navigate the massive volume of information that is already overwhelming staff and decisionmakers during a crisis. There is a need for more experiments designed to calibrate how best to integrate AI/ML into national security decisionmaking that build on established efforts such as the Global Information Dominance Exercise (GIDE). These exercises connect combatant commands and test their ability to work along a seamless battle network moderated by AI/ML (i.e., human-on-the-loop) during a crisis and the transition to conflict. Each GIDE helps the larger Department of Defense think about how to support modern campaigning consistent with emerging doctrine, including the Joint Warfighting Concept and Joint Concept for Competing.
+
+The United States needs to expand the GIDE series and examine crisis response from an interagency and coalition perspective. These experiments should map how different executive agencies — from the Department of State to the Department of the Treasury — approach crisis management, with an eye toward enabling better decisionmaking through aggregating and analyzing data. Starting simple with a clear understanding of how each agency approaches flexible deterrent options and how these options are evaluated in the National Security Council will provide insight into where and how to best augment strategy formation and crisis response.
+
+__2. Engage in campaign analysis.__
+
+A constant in war is the fight for information and how commanders employ reconnaissance and security operations alongside collecting intelligence to gain situational awareness, anticipate change, and seek advantage. That fight for information will take place along complex battle networks managed by AI/ML applications, creating a need for new concepts of maneuver, security, and surprise. How a state protects its battle network while degrading its rivals could well become the true decisive operation for a future campaign and an entirely new form of schwerpunkt.
+
+The Department of Defense needs to expand modern campaign analysis to explore how to fight a network. These studies should combine historical campaign insights with wargames, modeling, and strategic analysis, with an eye toward balancing military advantage with escalation dynamics. The studies should evaluate existing processes such as joint planning and joint targeting methodologies to see if they are still viable in campaigns characterized by competing battle networks. It is highly likely that the net result will be new processes and methods that both accelerate tempo and keep a careful eye on escalation risks.
+
+__3. From open skies to open algorithms, start a broader dialogue about twenty-first-century arms control.__
+
+Finally, there is a need to start thinking about what arms control looks like in the AI era. Managing weapons inventory may prove less valuable to the future of deterrence than establishing norms, regimes, and treaties governing military actions that target the decision and processing layers of modern battle networks in rival nuclear states.
+
+In a crisis where software at echelon is searching for efficiencies to accelerate decisionmaking, there is a risk that senior leaders find themselves pulled into escalation traps. This pull could be accelerated by attacks on key systems associated with early warning and intelligence. The sooner states work together to map the risks and build in commonly understood guardrails, the lower the probability of inadvertent or accidental escalation between nuclear rivals. These efforts should include Track 2 and Track 3 tabletop exercises and dialogues that inform how rival states approach crisis management. For example, it would be better to have officials from the United States and China discuss how multi-domain strike networks and automation affect escalation dynamics before a crisis in the Taiwan Strait rather than after.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+Since the use of AI/ML capabilities in national security is almost certain to increase in the coming years, there needs to be a larger debate about if and how any information technology augments strategic and military decisionmaking. The stakes are too high to walk blindly into the future.
+
+As a result, the national security community needs to accelerate its experimentation with how to integrate AI/ML into modern battle networks, with an eye toward better understanding crisis decisionmaking, campaigning, and arms control. It is not enough to optimize joint targeting and how fast the military can sense, make sense, and gain an advantage. The new world will require rethinking military staff organizations little changed since Napoleon and legacy national security bureaucratic design and planning processes. It will require thinking about how best to support human decisionmaking given a flood of information still subject to uncertainty, fog, and friction.
+
+Despite the findings here that AI/ML is as likely to play a stabilizing role as it is a destabilizing role, there is a still a risk that the world’s nuclear states inadvertently code their way to Armageddon. As a result, it is important to challenge the findings and acknowledge the limitations of the study. First, the observations are still limited and could be subject to confounding effects caused by age, gender, and each player’s type of national security experience. Future efforts should increase the full range of participants. Second, the results need more observations to analyze not just the balance of known versus unknown AI/ML capabilities, but also if risk perception and escalation change based on a larger number of treatments addressing different AI/ML levels (e.g., “no AI/ML capability,” “more AI/ML capability,” etc.). Last, experts tend to get things wrong and may not see change. Future research should open the experiment up to a wider range of participants and compare how perceptions in the general public compare to those of experts. In the ideal case, these games would also involve more non-U.S. players.
+
+---
+
+__Benjamin Jensen__ is a senior fellow in the Futures Lab at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., and a professor of strategic studies at the School of Advanced Warfighting in the Marine Corps University.
+
+__Yasir Atalan__ is an associate data fellow in the Futures Lab at CSIS and a PhD candidate at American University.
+
+__Jose M. Macias III__ is a research associate in the Futures Lab at CSIS and a Pearson fellow at the Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts at the University of Chicago.
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+---
+layout: post
+title : “Go Big” On Moldova
+author: Daniel F. Runde and Thomas Bryja
+date : 2024-06-10 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/Gd7c6ja.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Moldova’s Fate Is Tied to Ukraine’s: Now Is the Time for the West to “Go Big” on Moldova"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Against the backdrop of war in Ukraine, Moldova is at a historic crossroads. Moldova is pursuing institutional reforms and alignment with the West while staring down the barrel of Russian aggression. Consolidated progress depends on five near-term factors._
+
+
+
+Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a stark manifestation of post–Cold War tensions, has had a dramatic impact on Europe’s security and political landscape. Moldova, a small country sandwiched between Ukraine and Romania, is at a historic crossroads. With a pro-Western government in power and a highly capable president at its helm, Moldova is poised for European integration but imperiled by its historic linkages with Russia and its proximity to the ongoing war in Ukraine.
+
+While Ukraine defends itself against a full-fledged Russian military invasion, Moldova is confronting a parallel Russian “hybrid war” that aims to destabilize the regime of President Maia Sandu and torpedo the country’s prospective alignment with the West. The political futures of both countries are now intertwined: Moldova’s independence will ultimately rely on Ukraine’s ability to withstand Russia’s kinetic aggression, and Ukraine’s chances of victory and post-war stability increase with the assurance of a resilient and reliable partner in Moldova.
+
+___`Moldova’s independence will ultimately rely on Ukraine’s ability to withstand Russia’s kinetic aggression, and Ukraine’s chances of victory and post-war stability increase with the assurance of a resilient and reliable partner in Moldova.`___
+
+With this context in mind, Moldova’s near-term fate will be determined by five factors: (1) whether the United States continues to provide assistance to Ukraine and Moldova, (2) whether Ukraine manages to hold off Russian forces on the battlefield, (3) whether Sandu is reelected this fall, (4) whether Moldova’s reform agenda and economic opening with the European Union continue to progress, and (5) whether Moldova is able to handle a slow-motion energy crisis coming in December 2024.
+
+Now is the time for the West to “go big” on Moldova as an extension of its support for Ukraine’s war effort and the liberal democratic principles that underpin it. U.S. policymakers should view Moldova’s current pro-Ukrainian government and path to economic resilience as critical to Ukraine’s success in the war, given that the alternative — a pro-Russian or corrupt Moldovan leader — could thwart Moldova’s aspirations of Western alignment, leave Ukraine cornered, and ultimately dim Kyiv’s prospects for survival. As an end goal, Moldova should aspire for the success of Estonia — another post-Soviet state of relatively equal size, which is nonetheless four times richer, free of any dependency on Russian energy, a member of both the European Union and NATO, and home to a thriving democracy with a developed market economy and a firm handle on corruption. A bright future for Moldova is within reach, but it cannot get there without sustained international support.
+
+
+### Background
+
+Moldova is a landlocked country of approximately 2.5 million people, bordered by Ukraine to the east and Romania to the west. As a contested region once claimed by both the Ottoman and Russian Empires, the historically Romanian-speaking territory spent more than 100 years under Russian imperial rule between the early nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. After briefly uniting with neighboring Romanian-speaking territories under Greater Romania (1920–40), it was reannexed by the Soviet Union under the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between the Soviets and Nazi Germany and spent the next 51 years as a Soviet socialist republic. When Moldova gained its independence following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, “strong gravitational pulls from Romania and Russia” opened deep social divisions that continue to define the country’s major political fault lines. Moldova’s economic ties with Russia and the presence of a significant Russian-speaking minority have worked to Moscow’s advantage, but the resurgence of nationalism among the Romanian-speaking majority — 1 million of whom now carry Romanian passports — generated a powerful Moldovan-Romanian reunification movement that has clashed with Soviet nostalgia. Languishing in geopolitical uncertainty between Russia and Europe, the country has struggled to navigate its post-Soviet transition and failed to establish robust, functioning institutions.
+
+As of 2024, Moldova is the second-poorest country in Europe after Ukraine, with a current GDP per capita of $7,490. In comparison, Estonia’s current GDP per capita is $31,850. Moldova’s economic potential has been stifled by institutional weakness, political dysfunction, endemic corruption, and Russian interference, which have long blocked its path to EU membership and pushed as many as 1 million Moldovans to emigrate in search of better opportunities abroad. Russian pressure campaigns have further boxed the country in, using Moldova’s dependencies as a lever to keep the country within the Kremlin’s sphere of influence. Internal divisions within Moldova have been an additional source of Russian influence and obstacle to reform: pro-Russian sentiments have felled all previous Western-leaning governing coalitions and remain politically salient in the autonomous Gagauzia region as well as in the breakaway region of Transnistria.
+
+___`Two watershed events have recently shifted the winds in favor of Moldova’s European integration and transformation into a free-market economy: the election of pro-Western Sandu as president in 2020 and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.`___
+
+Two watershed events have recently shifted the winds in favor of Moldova’s European integration and transformation into a free-market economy: the election of pro-Western Sandu as president in 2020 and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Sandu, a Harvard graduate and former World Bank staffer, is widely considered to be the strongest leader in Moldova’s 30-year history. Her Eurocentric vision and record of uncompromising integrity have put Moldova on a clear path toward democratic accountability and economic prosperity. Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) has launched an aggressive and ambitious reform agenda. This agenda is aimed at bringing the country’s institutions in line with those of the European Union, with a particular focus on overhauling the judiciary and rooting out corruption.
+
+The Moldovan government has also supported Ukraine without formally renouncing the country’s constitutionally enshrined neutrality. It has responded to the invasion by condemning the Kremlin’s aggression, imposing unofficial sanctions on Russia, and cracking down on Russian media manipulation. Moldova has also accepted more Ukrainian refugees per capita than any other country.
+
+Whether Moldova maintains its trajectory of rapid growth or slows significantly will depend on the next six months. Sandu’s government has achieved a degree of progress unique in the country’s history, but this momentum cannot be sustained without greater Western engagement. As the Moldovan government grapples with Russian-incited political turmoil, the slow pace of institutional reform, and the economic shocks associated with the war in Ukraine and the decoupling of Moldova’s economy and energy grid from Russia, the country’s path to EU accession may get derailed. Moldova’s future will ultimately turn on the results of the November election and upcoming referendum on EU accession, the resilience of its new energy supply, and the steadfastness of the West’s support for Ukraine.
+
+___`Sandu’s government has achieved a degree of progress unique in the country’s history, but this momentum cannot be sustained without greater Western engagement.`___
+
+
+### Will the United States Continue Aiding Ukraine and Moldova?
+
+More than nine months after U.S. president Joe Biden first requested supplemental aid for Ukraine’s armed forces, Congress passed a $95.3 billion foreign aid bill in late April that included $61 billion for Ukraine and an additional $25 million for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to support the recovery of reclaimed Ukrainian territory and assist resilience efforts in Moldova. The earmarking of aid for Moldova reflects an awareness of the two countries’ interdependence in the conflict; given Ukraine’s frosty relationship with its other neighbors, strengthening Moldova is critical not only for Ukrainian port access but also for the advantages of a friendly neighbor with shared ambitions of Western alignment. Although it was a major victory, the long-overdue passage of the bill underscored the fragility of U.S. support for Ukraine. After breezing through the Democrat-controlled Senate with a 70 percent vote in favor, the legislation faced a much chillier reception in the Republican-controlled House, leaving Ukraine and Moldova in dangerous suspense while an emboldened Russia began revving up its air assaults and testing for weak spots along the front line. The stated reasons for the delay included a growing wariness of Ukrainian corruption and increased opposition to subsidizing foreign conflicts with taxpayer dollars, with a strong contingent of hard-right Republicans being the major obstacle. Republicans insisted on a number of “important innovations” to the bill, including options to provide loans rather than grants, use frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine, and ramp up U.S. natural gas exports to squeeze Russia’s budget revenue.
+
+
+_▲ President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky (M), President of the European Council Charles Michel (L), and President of the Republic of Moldova Maia Sandu (R) during the press conference on November 21, 2023, in Kyiv, Ukraine._
+
+The concerns that held up this most recent aid package may still derail future assistance efforts. Ukraine will require steadfast U.S. backing for the remainder of the conflict and for the country’s reconstruction, but the current appetite for such support in Congress is low. Without greater efforts to mobilize a higher level of engagement and political support for Ukraine, this $61 billion aid deal will “almost certainly [be] the last package of such magnitude.” The uncertainties associated with the potential outcomes of the U.S. presidential and congressional elections this November exacerbate the challenge of building a favorable consensus on Ukraine. With both chambers of Congress expected to flip and majorities likely to remain slim, the leadership and composition of key congressional committees will shift, leaving support for Ukraine at the mercy of new partisan logjams. The implications of a possible change in administration present another hurdle. Former president Donald Trump — the presumptive Republican nominee — has said that any additional assistance to Ukraine would be made conditional on issuing aid in the form of a loan and greater burden sharing, namely the requirement that NATO members divert 2 percent of their budgets toward defense. If Western allies fail to step up, a Trump administration could attribute a future cessation of or reduction in U.S. support for Ukraine to European countries’ inability or unwillingness to meet their defense commitments. Experts have warned that there is “no substitute” for Washington’s military and financial firepower — as Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky stressed in early April, Ukraine “will lose the war” if Congress shuts off the tap.
+
+
+### Will Ukraine Manage to Hold Off Russian Forces on the Battlefield?
+
+Two years after Russia’s full-scale invasion captured nearly a quarter of the country, the stakes could not be higher for Kyiv. After a string of victories in 2022, the Ukrainian military now finds itself dug in, outgunned, and outnumbered against a larger and more powerful opponent. As the war enters its third year, Kyiv is facing critical shortages of manpower, ammunition, and money amid intense attacks on the country’s energy infrastructure. Defense experts widely predicted that the conflict was headed for a stalemate after the Ukrainian military’s much-anticipated summer counteroffensive failed to yield any breakthroughs in 2023. That projection now appears optimistic: Russian forces seized the embattled city of Avdiivka in mid-February, and the Kremlin continues to mobilize Russia’s defense industry to maintain momentum on the front lines. New reports suggest that Russian forces “may soon be able to fire 5,000 artillery rounds a day,” while their Ukrainian counterparts have been able to meet only 10 percent of their ammunition needs. Although the long-awaited approval of additional U.S. aid will help relieve pressure on the Ukrainian military, significant damage has already been done to Ukraine’s war effort. The dynamics of the war have changed dramatically in the past nine months, and growing concerns about Ukraine’s military strategy and overall chances of victory are contributing to waning support for Ukraine in Congress. Even if Kyiv embraces a more defensive long-term strategy, Ukraine’s need for help remains open-ended — and it remains uncertain whether Washington or Brussels will heed the call moving forward.
+
+The potential collapse of Ukraine’s war effort has significant implications for Moldova as one of the probable next targets of Russian military adventurism against former Soviet states. Just as the Kremlin began planting narratives to justify the 2014 invasion of Crimea during its 2008 invasion of Georgia, Russia’s criticism of Moldova’s “Western capture” represents “the telegraphing of foreign policy goals that have in the past been chased with Russian aggression.” Moldova, which ranks 144th out of 145 analyzed countries in military strength globally, is within direct missile and drone range of the Ukrainian conflict. Odessa is only an 111-mile drive from the Moldovan capital of Chisinau, closer together than Washington, D.C., and Philadelphia. Transnistria provides an obvious corridor for a Russian invasion, particularly given the presence of roughly 1,500 Russian soldiers in the region. Russian president Vladimir Putin has spoken openly about reaching Transnistria through Ukraine, meaning that a break in the Ukrainian lines would leave Moldova defenseless. Without foreign aid, Ukraine’s front line will crumble and take Moldova with it — putting Russian troops right on the border of NATO and the European Union, a development that is not in the interests of the United States or its partners and allies. In the meantime, the recent sale of French airspace monitoring systems to Moldova and Estonia’s efforts to support Moldova’s cyber defense capabilities provide examples of ways in which the West can help Moldova modernize its military.
+
+___`Without foreign aid, Ukraine’s front line will crumble and take Moldova with it — putting Russian troops right on the border of NATO and the European Union, a development that is not in the interests of the United States or its partners and allies.`___
+
+
+### Will President Sandu Win Reelection This Fall?
+
+Moldova is set to hold presidential elections on October 20, 2024. There are reasons to be cautiously optimistic about Sandu’s chances of reelection: the president’s approval rating reportedly increased from 40 percent in 2022 to 46 percent in 2023, and current polls put her ahead of the opposition candidate Igor Dodon, the leader of the pro-Russian Party of Socialists. At the same time, the electoral margins appear worryingly thin compared with 2020. A December 2023 poll shows Sandu leading the presidential race 30 percent to 24 percent over Dodon, who has gained 8 percentage points since September. Yet although she is projected to win the first round, Sandu is projected to lose the second — not only to Dodon (35 percent to 46 percent) but also to the next-highest-ranking opposition candidate, Ion Ceban (34 percent to 42 percent).
+
+The situation is especially precarious in light of Russia’s disruption of previous elections and the uncovering of a Kremlin-backed coup plot in early 2023. The stakes of this election virtually guarantee Russian destabilization efforts, either to rig the results in Dodon’s favor or, in the case of a PAS victory, to discredit the electoral outcome. Moldovan authorities and independent media investigators have exposed the extent of Russia’s interference campaign, which includes cyberattacks, weaponized disinformation, and Russian-sponsored public protests. The “unprecedented levels of Russian interference” in Moldova’s recent local elections can be considered a test run for larger-scale disruption efforts this fall. The information war within Moldova ultimately favors Russia, not Moldova. Since the country’s independence, Moldovan institutions have been weak — victims of Russian undermining, plundering by oligarchs, and the brain drain of mass emigration. These challenges have weakened the pro-reform government’s ability to counter malign narratives. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that many of Moldova’s native Russian speakers look to Russian sources for their news. Even though the Kremlin-backed news channels were banned in Moldova in mid-2022, the replacement of these networks with more balanced Russian-language programming has been slow.
+
+
+### Will Moldova’s Economic Opening with the European Union and Reform Agenda Continue to Progress?
+
+Other than the outcome of the upcoming presidential election, Moldova’s near-term future hinges on its ongoing economic opening with the European Union and its ability to execute the requisite reforms that will keep the country on track for EU accession. By all accounts, Moldova’s progress toward European integration is the one area in which Sandu and the PAS have seen “unmitigated success,” but the slow pace of institutional reforms has left the public agitated. The high hopes that followed the PAS’s initial victory have now been offset by several years of turbulence. Since 2020, Moldovan society has been rocked by the Covid-19 pandemic, an energy crisis, an influx of Ukrainian refugees, supply chain disruptions, and the loss of traditional markets. Taken together, these challenges have overshadowed the government’s comparatively subtle steps toward long-term development. Like Ukraine, Moldova’s path to EU membership is steep, requiring major administrative, political, judicial, and economic reforms, as well as the alignment of domestic laws and standards with those of the European Union. These major structural changes will take time to crystallize; as growing pains test public patience and put pressure on Sandu, the country’s visible rapprochement with the European Union has become her strongest source of political capital. Sandu’s pledge to make Moldova “a full member of the European family by 2030” appears more in reach than ever: although Moldova remains in an “early stage” of the reform process, the European Commission’s approval of the country’s liberal trajectory prompted the European Council to open formal accession negotiations with both Moldova and Ukraine on December 14, 2023.
+
+If domestic reforms and deeper economic engagement with Europe continue to move forward without further disruptions, Moldova’s entry into the European Union by 2030 might be possible. Russian subversion efforts have not managed to dim public support for the bloc: recent polls conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) found that 63 percent of Moldova’s population pins the country’s future on EU membership, and 67 percent ranks the European Union as Moldova’s most important economic partner. Forty-two percent of adults also believe that Moldova is moving in the right direction — a 14-point increase from IRI’s 2022 poll and the highest it has been in nearly a decade. Given the divisions within Moldovan society and the volatility of its political landscape, Sandu has moved to capitalize on favorable winds by announcing a referendum on EU accession this November. By focusing the government’s efforts on her most popular issue, Sandu is more likely to assuage those whose support for EU integration outweighs any current dissatisfaction with the PAS. One of the reasons that polling on EU membership is higher than PAS favorability is the fact that many Russian speakers, including some of Transnistria’s leaders and business elite, stand to benefit from European integration and are supportive of deeper EU-Moldovan relations. In light of Moldovan ambivalence toward Russia and the risks of a pro-Russian backlash, the European Union can support Moldova’s trajectory by prioritizing accession talks, extending support for ongoing reforms, and making additional efforts to strengthen EU-Moldovan trade, thereby offering the population a preview of the advantages of EU membership.
+
+
+### Will Moldova Handle a Slow-Motion Energy Crisis Coming in December 2024?
+
+Until recently, Moldova sourced 100 percent of its energy from Russian gas delivered through Ukraine to Transnistria, the site of the country’s only power plant. Although Transnistria received the gas for free, with associated revenues constituting the bulk of the region’s income, Russia billed the Moldovan government for the costs. This arrangement gave Russia an annual opportunity to strong-arm Moldova for concessions by dangling the threat of price hikes and throttled gas supplies. The unbundling of Moldova’s energy sector became a top government priority after the invasion of Ukraine, which plunged Moldova into its worst energy crisis since its independence. Last fall, the government broke Moldova’s dependence on Russian gas by drawing on a pipeline running through Romania, and it also conducted an audit that disproved the country’s debt to Russian energy giant Gazprom.
+
+These efforts have dashed Russia’s “gas blackmail” in all but one area: 70 percent of Moldova’s electricity still comes from the Russian gas-powered plant in Transnistria. While the path toward long-term energy independence — including the development of renewable energy alternatives — will take time, more immediate efforts can be made to accelerate Moldova’s integration into the European energy grid through projects such as the EU-backed construction of new electric transmission lines between Moldova and Romania. Current initiatives will need to accelerate before the year’s end: Russia’s contract with Ukraine to transport gas via pipelines in Ukrainian territory will expire on December 31, 2024, and failure to replace it could trigger a second energy crisis and mass emigration. Furthermore, because Transnistria will no longer be receiving heavily subsidized Russian gas, the potential collapse of the region’s economy risks leaving Moldova with another refugee crisis that it is ill equipped to handle, as Transnistria’s residents pour over the banks of the Nistru river in search of opportunities. The international community must make every effort to ensure the operability of new electricity networks, help Romania increase its electricity production, and support Moldova’s own domestic capacity. This planning and negotiation must include Transnistria, both in negotiation with Transnistrian leaders to continue using the region’s electrical plant with gas supplied from non-Russian sources and in ensuring that there is a plan to help support the Transnistrian economy.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+Western investments in both Ukraine and Moldova over the next several months have an enormous potential for return — a democratic and prosperous Moldova supports a free and open Eastern Europe, and Moldova’s pro-Western government offers a strategic opportunity to usher a country deprived of democracy into the European fold and create a template for good governance in the region. The end state for Moldova is a flourishing democracy with a strong GDP, resilient institutions, energy independence, full EU membership, and the protection of regional security partnerships with Romania and Ukraine.
+
+---
+
+__Daniel F. Runde__ is a senior vice president, director of the Project on Prosperity and Development (PPD), and holds the William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a leading global think tank.
+
+__Thomas Bryja__ is a program coordinator and research assistant for the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS, where he supports the program’s research agenda, business development, and administrative management. His analytical focus is on leveraging non-military power to advance the interests of the United States abroad and, in particular, to confront China’s growing global influence.
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+---
+layout: post
+title : F-16s Unleashed
+author: Christopher Koeltzow, et al.
+date : 2024-06-11 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/P2m5chu.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "How They Will Impact Ukraine’s War"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The paper explores the implications of supplying F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine._ _It examines the strategic- and tactical-level effects, outlines limitations and obstacles in their utilization by the Ukrainian Air Force and presents recommendations to leverage the platform’s capabilities to support Ukraine objectives. This document provides invaluable insights for policymakers, military strategists, and academics grappling with the intricate dynamics of European security._
+
+
+### Background
+
+Ukrainian F-16s will be challenged to independently create conditions for a much-desired breakthrough in the war with Russia. But with the right strategy, doctrinal approach, logistical support, and training, F-16s could provide a critical advance in enhancing Ukraine’s border defense and establishing localized air superiority, significantly bolstering Ukraine’s position on the ground. The underwhelming 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive, combined with finite Western materiel support, prompts the question: what role can Ukrainian F-16s play in 2024?
+
+Rather than a year marked by significant military maneuvers, 2024 may become a rebuilding period for both Ukraine and Russia. As in a rebuilding phase in sports, recently trained Ukrainian F-16 pilots will likely showcase periods of excellence while gaining vital experience that could lay the groundwork for lasting advantages over Russian forces. Consequently, the authors expect the impact of giving Ukraine F-16s in 2024 to be primarily strategic, offering long-term benefits rather than immediate tactical gains.
+
+The first section of this brief describes the strategic implications of giving F-16s to Ukraine. The next section describes the challenges expected during F-16 integration and their potential tactical influence on the battlefield in 2024. Finally, the authors offer a set of short- and long-term recommendations that policymakers can incorporate to complement the political aims of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s strategy to support Ukraine’s war effort.
+
+
+### Part I: Strategic Impacts
+
+1. __Opponents of the free world fear the airpower of the United States and its allies.__ These air forces have been purposely built to strike strategic targets, counter the power of great armies and navies, and defend sovereign territory. They have been highly successful over the past 80 years. A significant portion of the power of these air forces comes from the technological superiority they possess over their adversaries, in addition to the might of their combined size across the alliance. The F-16 is the most prolific Western fourth-generation fighter jet produced, with thousands still in active service and highly upgraded versions still in production. Furthermore, as the mainstay of NATO air forces for decades, and with its impressive combat record, giving Ukraine such an iconic jet sends a strong message of U.S. and NATO commitment to help Ukraine defend its sovereignty.
+
+2. __The capabilities of the F-16 enable Ukraine to hold more Russian targets at risk and, in turn, gain more leverage in the war and at the negotiation table.__ To create a strategic “fleet in being” that Russia must respect, the size of the F-16 fleet matters. NATO countries have committed 65 F-16s to Ukraine. However, more are needed to give the Ukrainian Air Force more power to affect the ground war. As a simple starting point, NATO should be willing to replace all of Ukraine’s Soviet-era fighters with F-16s or equivalent NATO-standard aircraft and dramatically expand the size of Ukraine’s fighter fleet beyond pre-2022 strengths. Some estimates suggest that the size of Ukraine’s fighter fleet was only 69 aircraft in March 2023. By NATO standards, that number of aircraft may make up no more than three fighter squadrons (with 18 aircraft per squadron). Ukraine needs close to 12 fighter squadrons to achieve the air support needed for the war on the ground, with four squadrons primarily responsible for each core mission set: (1) suppression of enemy air defenses, (2) air interdiction, and (3) defensive counter air. This aim would require 216 F-16s, with 18 aircraft in each squadron. Additionally, NATO should have a reserve of F-16s available for resupply on demand, proportional to historical combat loss rates.
+
+ The well-known conventional strengths of the F-16 fit neatly within the core mission sets Ukraine needs to execute. Ukraine can leverage these advantages while placing the Russian forces in its territory at a disadvantage. Additionally, F-16s can carry a significant variety of weapons in the U.S. Air Force (USAF) inventory that are supported by an active and expanding industry. Alternatively, F-16s could increase the potency of Ukraine’s interdiction campaign in the Black Sea, further degrading the effectiveness of Russia’s Black Sea fleet or threatening the flow of sanctioned trade to and from Russian ports in the Black Sea.
+
+ The quantity of targets Ukraine can hold at risk with F-16s is a function of (1) the overall quantity of F-16s Ukraine receives, (2) the type and quantity of weapons it receives, (3) U.S. and NATO employment restrictions placed on Ukraine (i.e., restricting employment beyond Ukraine’s borders), (4) the fusion of intelligence between NATO and Ukrainian sources, (5) the proficiency of the pilots and support personnel that can optimize F-16 effectiveness, and (6) the air strategy Ukraine chooses to use for its F-16s (primarily for air defense or offensive missions such as strategic attack or interdiction of fielded forces and Russian logistics).
+
+ Additionally, giving Ukraine F-16s presents NATO and the United States with a unique opportunity to gather intelligence on the potency of allied aircraft and weapons against Russian and Iranian equipment and tactics. This could be leveraged as an opportunity to gather strategic intelligence as Russia reacts to the introduction of the F-16 and follow-on security packages of logistical support for use with the aircraft. With collaboration between Ukraine and NATO, these insights can inform NATO’s leaders of the viability of the alliance’s strategy and tactics in certain domains.
+
+3. __Giving F-16s to Ukraine is a significant step forward to further integrate the country into the U.S. and European economic and defense ecosystem, which will increase Ukraine’s strength in the long term.__ Assuming the belligerent countries have equal will to fight, attritional wars are typically won by the side with the greatest economic and industrial strength and the greatest ability to manifest those strengths on the battlefield through more equipment, people, and ammunition. In The Wages of Destruction, Adam Tooze asserts that the economic and material strengths of the Allies in World War II overwhelmed Germany’s capacity to field enough equipment and people to resist the persistent assault over the long term. In 2020, the Ukrainian economy was about 9.5 times smaller than Russia’s ($155.5 billion compared to $1.5 trillion), and the Ukrainian population was 3.5 times smaller than Russia’s. For economies with equivalent levels of industrialization, industrial capacity roughly follows the measurements of gross domestic product and population.
+
+ Sustainment and reconstitution of warfighting formations, including aviation, is a challenge for Ukraine. Before the Russian invasion, Ukraine’s military used equipment mostly from the former Soviet Union, and many of the supply chains to repair or replace the equipment and its ammunition needs no longer exist or are controlled by Russia. Over time, these Soviet relics have lost their effectiveness as damage and shortages in parts and ammunition render them unfit for combat. The situation cannot support a positive outcome for Ukraine in a long attritional war. Therefore, supplying Ukraine with NATO or U.S. standard equipment is critical to sustain Ukrainian efforts because those weapon systems and Ukrainian operational needs can be integrated into U.S. and NATO supply chains. Over time, Ukraine would become more systemically integrated with NATO.
+
+4. __The U.S. resupply of Israel during the Yom Kippur War of 1973 shows how commonality of equipment becomes a strategic asset in sustaining forces during attritional wars.__ The lessons from the Yom Kippur War should inform NATO decisionmakers of the value of supplying the Ukrainian Air Force with F-16s. During the war, a coalition of Arab countries led by Egypt strategically surprised Israel, leaving it little time to prepare for the invasion. Israel’s military doctrine called for preemptive air strikes similar to those it had used during the 1967 war to offset its quantitative disadvantages in personnel and equipment vis-à-vis its adversaries. However, U.S. national security advisor Henry Kissinger made clear that U.S. support was contingent on Israel receiving the first blow. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) plan and strategy depended upon preemptive strikes. When the option for a preemptive strike disappeared, Israel lost a significant advantage. The IAF paid dearly: it lost 15 percent of its total combat aircraft (60 aircraft) in less than 24 hours and about 35 percent of its total combat aircraft by the war’s end — catastrophic losses for any air force in such a short period. By the end of the first week of the war, Israel was in bad shape and gravely needed a resupply of ammunition, tanks, and aircraft.
+
+ Luckily, the IAF had modernized most of its fleet prior to the war with U.S.-made A-4 Skyhawks and F-4 Phantoms, also flown by the USAF and U.S. Navy (USN). Israeli prime minister Golda Meir asked the United States for assistance, which kicked off a large resupply effort, including Operation Nickel Grass, in which the United States provided Israel with large numbers of 155 mm howitzers, M-60 and M-48 main battle tanks, and 100 USAF F-4s and 36 USN A-4s to reconstitute the IAF inventory. Consequently, the resupply efforts by the United States to Israel outpaced those of the Soviet Union to the Arab coalition, allowing Israel to change the balance of the war enough to secure a negotiated settlement about 10 days after the first U.S. resupply.
+
+5. __Finally, while F-16s alone will not provide air superiority, they are a vital component of this goal.__ For more than 100 years, militaries have known air superiority is essential to the success of any conventional ground campaign, but World War II was the first time the technology and capacity of mass production existed at the degree necessary to demonstrate the merits of air superiority. Examples include the Germans during the Blitz of 1939–40, the UK Royal Air Force and U.S. Army Air Forces’ air campaign in Europe in 1944–45, Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War of 1967, and the swift U.S. defeat of Iraq in Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. In each case, casualties for the ground forces operating under air superiority were relatively low compared to those of their counterparts fighting without air superiority. Additionally, the tempo of ground campaigns improved significantly compared to the ground campaigns of World War I, in which each ground force maintained relative parity with others in terms of technology and the size of its army.
+
+ Per the USAF Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-01, control of the air is among the top priorities of the joint force and is classified into three categories: (1) air parity, (2) air superiority, and (3) air supremacy. The air war in Ukraine over the past two years is best classified as one of air parity, where no force controls the air for its own ends or faces significant interference. According to U.S. Air Force doctrine, air superiority is the “degree of control of the air by one force that permits the conduct of its operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference from air and missile threats. Air superiority may be localized in space (horizontally and vertically) and in time, or it may be broad and enduring.”
+
+ Air supremacy results when one side is incapable of effective air interference in the operating area, which the United States has generally enjoyed in conflicts over the past few decades.
+
+ Today, each side of the war in Ukraine has a relatively robust air defense capability such that each can deny air superiority to the other. The missing component of air superiority for Ukraine is an offensive air capability, which the F-16s will begin to provide. Therefore, ground forces find themselves locked in relatively static battles of attrition, unable to create the conditions for a decisive maneuver campaign that could change the trajectory of the war. The robust Russian Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) makes establishing air superiority over the entire occupied territory a difficult feat. However, the Ukrainian Air Force can focus on establishing localized air superiority over limited areas for limited times. Such localized air superiority would be coordinated with Ukrainian land offensives to support a breakthrough operation and would be most effective with combined arms operations. Giving F-16s to Ukraine is an essential move toward establishing air superiority.
+
+ Gaining air superiority enables the land component to bypass or maneuver through enemy forces and obstacle belts. Trench warfare exists on both sides because neither side has air superiority. However, trenches cannot stand up to the constant bombardment and might of 500–2,000-pound bombs, as demonstrated by the U.S. coalition in Operation Desert Storm, in which an air war lasting more than 40 days pulverized the Iraqi military to such a degree that it surrendered less than 100 hours after the start of the ground invasion. Likewise, tanks, artillery, and armored vehicles will succumb to cluster bombs, Maverick missiles, and 500–2,000-pound bombs. With air superiority, Ukraine’s F-16s can bring these effects to the battlefield.
+
+
+### Part II: F-16 Integration Challenges and Tactical Influence in 2024
+
+The Ukrainian Ground Forces has showcased its adeptness in assimilating cutting-edge Western weaponry into its arsenal with remarkable efficacy. Within its artillery corps, the Ukrainian Ground Forces phased out antiquated Soviet systems, replacing them with the technologically advanced M142 High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and accompanying munitions supplied by the United States. Following a three-week training regimen for M142 operators and maintainers, Ukrainian forces learned effective tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), enabling them to proficiently target Russian ammunition and fuel depots, bases, command and control nodes, and critical resupply infrastructure. While Ukrainian troops were familiar with various rocket launchers, HIMARS represents a substantial leap forward compared to Ukraine’s previous reliance on organic BM-30 Smerch and BM-27 Uragan systems, boasting superior capabilities including extended range, improved precision, enhanced mobility, and a faster rate of fire. While Ukraine’s successful integration of HIMARS presents tactical and operational challenges for Russia, mastering the integration of F-16s into the war strategy to produce impacts of a similar magnitude will be a formidable endeavor.
+
+___`It will be years before the Ukrainian Air Force has enough experience to execute combat missions effectively. However, if supplied with the proper air-to-ground munitions, they will quickly be able to execute long-range strikes (air interdiction).`___
+
+It will be years before the Ukrainian Air Force has enough experience to execute combat missions effectively. However, if supplied with the proper air-to-ground munitions, they will quickly be able to execute long-range strikes (air interdiction). Training a proficient F-16 pilot takes a long time. For instance, the training timeline for USAF fighter pilots, from initial flight training to certification as a combat-qualified wingman, spans three to four years. Furthermore, the total training duration extends to four to five years when factoring in leadership training essential for executing formations of fighter tactics in combat. While Ukrainian fighter pilots already possess basic airmanship skills, adapting to an aircraft with a fundamentally different cockpit interface and instrument layout, designed around a different concept of human factors engineering, requires an alternative way of thinking. This reality means experienced fighter pilots will also need time to transition effectively. Furthermore, their flying experience with Soviet-era fighter aircraft will not necessarily translate to the fly-by-wire controls and design of the F-16.
+
+
+
+To fully leverage the capabilities of the F-16, Ukrainian fighter pilots must become familiar with battle-proven TTPs honed over the past four decades. To make a significant combat impact, Ukrainian F-16 pilots must excel in three mission sets: offensive counter air/air interdiction (OCA/AI), offensive counter air/air operations–suppression of enemy air defenses (OCA/AO-SEAD), and defensive counter air (DCA). These mission sets will allow the Ukrainian Air Force to maximize the combat capabilities of the F-16 while not exposing them to higher combat losses executing more complex combat missions.
+
+___`Ukraine must start flying combat sorties and build experience immediately.`___
+
+Learning and applying Western TTPs proficiently will likely take Ukrainian fighter pilots over a year. As a historical reference, the United States delivered the first F-16s to Israel in 1980. Eleven months later, the IAF flew the new platform on a daring and successful air strike against an Iraqi nuclear weapons production plant. The IAF, despite the advantages of combat and Western tactics experience, chose to wait almost a year before employing the F-16. It takes time and experience to build the proficiency needed to employ a complex fighter effectively. Ukraine must start flying combat sorties and build experience immediately. Therefore, it will be difficult to measure the significant battlefield impacts of the F-16s until 2025, and expectations should be managed accordingly.
+
+Ukraine must be able to organically maintain and repair the F-16s. One crucial lesson learned throughout U.S. military operations in Afghanistan was the vital role host-nation service members, rather than contractors, play in aircraft maintenance and repair. In Afghanistan, contractors predominantly handled maintenance support. Following the order to withdraw, their departure led to a significant decrease in mission-capable combat-ready aircraft. Similarly, the time, training, and experience required to cultivate proficient F-16 pilots are equally essential for developing competent F-16 maintainers. On average, it takes approximately five to eight years of on-the-job experience and rigorous certification (known in the USAF as “7-level” certification) to ensure the resident knowledge necessary for maintaining these aircraft. While not all maintainers are certified with “7-level” proficiency, the mid and upper levels of leadership, and their expertise, are essential to effective maintenance operations.
+
+Ukrainians must embrace a military culture in which all recommendations or voices are heard, specifically from the junior ranks. Ukraine’s impressive performance early in the war, and during the Kharkiv and Kherson counteroffensives, demonstrated its will and fighting ability. To capitalize on this fighting spirit, Ukraine must adopt NATO’s method to improve pilot performance and proficiency — specifically, a somewhat scientific and rigorous debrief of each flight. Reviewing the data recorded from each flight (“watching the tapes”) is crucial to this learning process. All aircrew are debriefed regardless of rank. Pride and ego must be sidelined to improve combat effectiveness and save lives. Furthermore, accurate battle damage assessment (BDA) should be reported back through the planning channels to maximize the efficiency of airpower by assigning strikes only to essential targets. Finally, this method of debriefing and the BDA feedback loop improve pilots’ rate of learning and the effectiveness of all air operations.
+
+___`Ukrainians must embrace a military culture in which all recommendations or voices are heard, specifically from the junior ranks.`___
+
+Poor doctrine presents a potential obstacle to maximizing the effectiveness of the F-16. Doctrine is a collection of best practices used to accomplish military objectives or effects. Ukraine should establish desired effects or objectives and then combine combat experience with Western TTPs to develop best practices. Rather than simply apply NATO or U.S. airpower doctrine, which is built around a robust command and control and resupply network, Ukrainians should own their doctrine while continuously improving it to confront the challenges from Russia on the battlefield.
+
+Once introduced on the battlefield, F-16s will increase the Ukrainian Air Force’s air-to-air capabilities. Leveraging its combat-proven radar, coupled with variants of the AIM-120 AMRAAM missile, Ukraine will extend its maximum air-to-air engagement range up to 180 km. This is an appreciable engagement range improvement compared to Ukraine’s Soviet-era MiG-29 and Su-27 fighter aircraft. Additionally, Ukrainian F-16s can more effectively disrupt Russian close air support missions across contested battlefields. During the summer of 2023, Russian helicopters impeded and delayed the Ukrainian counteroffensive. With the introduction of the F-16, these helicopters will become vulnerable and less effective in supporting Russian defensive or offensive operations. Lastly, expect Ukrainian F-16s to suppress the long-range glide bombs tactics Russian fighters have adeptly used around Kharkiv.
+
+___`The F-16 can improve Ukraine’s layered air defense, contributing to detection and elimination of incoming drones and missiles.`___
+
+Furthermore, the F-16 can improve Ukraine’s layered air defense, contributing to detection and elimination of incoming drones and missiles. The recent successful defense of Israel against the Iranian assault of over 300 drones and missiles highlights the significance of this capability, as USAF F-15Es shot down over 70 drones. However, the effectiveness of this approach hinges significantly on the interoperability of Ukrainian doctrine and technological systems. In the short term, while Russian IADSs remain intact, the battlefield conditions will make close air support too risky for Ukrainian F-16s. Instead, the Ukrainian Air Force should incorporate the F-16 as another platform capable of long-range strikes with the British Storm Shadow or French SCALP. Ukraine has already received ground-launched small-diameter bomb (SBD) launchers and should likewise be given the air-launched versions for its F-16s. Dropping SDBs from F-16s would complicate the Russian air defense, provide more opportunities for successful long-range fires, and enable targeting time-sensitive targets similar to the HIMARS — and at a far more economical rate.
+
+
+### Part III: Short- and Long-Term Recommendations to Capitalize on the F-16’s Advantages
+
+#### Short-Term Recommendations (in 2024)
+
+1. __To assist in the quality of learning, NATO should embed fighter pilots with Ukrainian Air Force units to aid with debriefing, learning, and mission planning, or set up virtual options for video footage review.__ In February 2024, French president Emmanuel Macron opened the door to Western nations sending their troops to Ukraine, stating, “Nothing should be excluded.” Should future policy allow, NATO fighter pilots should aid Ukrainian aircrew and train them to review the tapes on every training or combat sortie to find lessons learned and improve tactics, techniques, and procedures. This tape review must be incorporated into the battle rhythm of Ukrainian fighter pilots. This will reinforce a culture of learning and ensure pilots provide and receive constructive feedback from every rank. Tape reviews increase tactical effectiveness and minimize losses. During review, learning is best achieved when individuals with the most expertise or proficiency lead the debrief, even if they do not hold the highest rank. Examples of this culture of debriefing may be found in the fighter and bomber units of the USAF and USN as well as within NATO air forces.
+
+2. __The United States and NATO should authorize the use of cluster bomb munitions, GBU-39B SDBs, and Storm Shadow or SCALP missiles with the F-16s.__ Specifically, the Cluster Bomb Unit (CBU)–87/89 and smart bomb equivalents (CBU-103/105) are most relevant for military targets in this context. A specific set of guidelines or restrictions on how the munitions may be used could be attached to the authorization of the weapons to minimize the risk of collateral damage. These weapons would aid in defending Ukrainian territory if Russia gains momentum toward a breakout on the battlefield. Cluster bomb munitions degrade and destroy large concentrations of personnel or equipment with fewer aircraft or strikes, while the SDB, Storm Shadow, and SCALP munitions can strike targets at great distances, improving the survivability of the employing aircraft. In 2023, Russia used attack helicopters with success to blunt the Ukrainian counteroffensive. If Russia can muster a breakout situation, it will require a concentration of personnel and equipment that cluster munitions are well suited to counter. Additionally, it is essential to include longer-range variants of the AIM-120 AMRAAM in the ammunition package. Enhanced air-to-air capabilities will bolster Ukraine’s capacity to deter Russia’s deployment of glide bombs.
+
+3. __The United States and NATO should set up a permanent training rotation program for Ukrainian F-16 aircrew and maintainers.__ After six months of combat, aircrew and maintainers should rotate to Ramstein Air Base for debriefing and the opportunity to rest and recuperate (R&R). After R&R, they should be allowed to refine their skill sets on a high-quality training range such as the Nevada Test and Training Range before returning to Ukraine for combat. The USAF and USN put their aircrew and maintainers through predeployment flying exercises to improve combat effectiveness, and these programs could be leveraged to provide Ukrainian units with a similar experience. For example, the USN saw dramatic improvements in combat effectiveness following the stand-up of the Navy Top Gun program during the Vietnam War, as evidenced by a 600 percent improvement to its aerial kill-to-loss ratio from Rolling Thunder (1968) to Linebacker (1972). The USAF had equivalent improvements to its combat effectiveness after the creation of Red Flag in 1975, in which the Air Force kill ratio hovered around 2:1 throughout the Vietnam War. In contrast, the USAF achieved 31 kills without a single loss in direct air-to-air combat in Desert Storm. Vastly improved training and doctrine account for a significant portion of the dramatic improvement to each service’s combat effectiveness. Following this logic, dedicating a unit at Nellis Air Force Base or another NATO base to orchestrate housing and training for Ukrainian aircrew and maintainers would make this initiative more effective.
+
+4. __NATO should commit more F-16s in the next couple of months to bring its total commitment to at least 90.__ This would allow Ukraine to convert five squadrons to F-16s (18 jets per squadron) using similar operations, maintenance, and sustainment practices as NATO units. For planning purposes, each additional set of 18 like-model F-16s would equate to another unit’s worth of aircraft. Since operational planning assigns missions and tasks to tactical units, the United States could help the Ukrainian Air Force by sending appropriately sized packages that can be seamlessly integrated into operations for improved efficiency. These numbers are the minimum needed and exclude aircraft needed for pipeline training and attrition.
+
+5. __Ukraine should prioritize converting its units to F-16s based on criteria that will maximize the combat capability the F-16 brings to the Ukrainian Air Force in as little time as possible.__ The authors recommend three actions to aid in this decision. First, prioritize the units that most need fighter aircraft and that are most capable of meeting the needs of Ukraine’s air strategy with the proper amount of aircraft and equipment. With these criteria, the equipment is the limiting factor — not the number of qualified people. Second, choose the unit currently assigned a mission that is the most similar to the anticipated role of the F-16 to capitalize on the culture, experience, and expertise ingrained in the people of the unit. Finally, access to higher-quality infrastructure and logistics will minimize the time aircraft sit grounded awaiting repairs or maintenance between missions. Therefore, picking a unit that already operates in a location with these features and remains beyond the range of most Russian air attacks will also aid Ukraine in reaping the dividends of the aircraft’s capabilities sooner rather than later.
+
+#### Long-Term Recommendations (Beyond 2024)
+
+1. __To substantially increase Ukraine’s chances of victory, NATO should give Ukraine the equipment it needs to establish air superiority within its national borders.__ Providing F-16s is a step in the right direction toward this goal, but more equipment is needed. The authors estimate Ukraine needs 12 fighter squadrons of F-16s to significantly improve its position in the war. With 18 jets per squadron, this requires 216 F-16s on the front lines, and more should be placed in a reserve that can replace losses. Much has been written about the necessity of air superiority to support successful land campaigns. The remaining recommendations address helping Ukraine establish localized air superiority first, with broad and enduring air superiority as the eventual aim, to enable airpower’s subsequent use to support the land war.
+
+2. __Should U.S. and NATO political commitments allow, establish a NATO-Ukraine undergraduate pilot training (UPT) exchange program similar to programs for NATO pilots through USAF UPT bases.__ Alternatively, the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training Program could be modified to include Ukrainian pilots for a similar purpose but could also invest in building strategic relationships, with a multitude of NATO pilots going through the same program. Capturing Ukrainian talent early in their flying careers and training them with NATO methods and doctrine offers the greatest return on investment in the long term. This will result in a generational change of air doctrine that will take several years to bear fruit and, hence, a long-term strategic impact on integrating Ukraine into NATO methods.
+
+3. __For more impact on Ukraine’s strategy, the United States and NATO should consider minimal restrictions on how Ukraine uses its F-16s.__ The recent loosening of restrictions on munitions from the United States and other partners needs to continue with the inclusion of the F-16. Strikes should not be confined to Ukrainian territory. Ukraine may need to use its air force to interdict Russian logistics and forces or for strategic attack. Additionally, the Ukrainian Air Force may need other systems to strike IADSs positioned in Russian territory, beyond the operational range of Ukraine’s weaponry, to facilitate F-16 strikes. Such options may entail operations beyond Ukraine’s borders. Additionally, restricting the use of F-16s to attacks within Ukraine’s borders may result in a longer conflict such as the one the United States experienced throughout the Vietnam War until Operation Linebacker II, coupled with key diplomatic efforts led by the administration of U.S. president Richard Nixon, aggressively applied direct pressure to the leadership of North Vietnam. If Western support for Ukraine wavers, a longer conflict of attrition will favor Russia.
+
+4. __The United States should flood the Ukrainian Air Force with F-16s and other aircraft by incorporating decommissioned U.S. aircraft from the boneyard or those divested from its force structure.__ This recommendation is not novel; it echoes CSIS senior fellow Ben Jensen’s proposal in a Wall Street Journal commentary dated August 9, 2023. His insights remain pertinent and could be even more impactful today. Coupled with the ongoing manpower shortages facing Ukrainian forces, bolstering the Ukrainian Air Force’s capabilities is imperative. Introducing EA-6Bs, A-10s, C-12 Hurons, AH-1s, UH-1s, and MQ-8 Fire Scout helicopters would substantially augment Ukraine’s airpower. Leveraging existing artificial intelligence technology could transform many of these platforms into unmanned vehicles capable of complementing manned aircraft operations. This capability was demonstrated recently with the Air Force secretary riding in the front seat of a pilotless F-16 flight.
+
+5. __Do not impose U.S. doctrine or methods of warfare onto the Ukrainian Air Force.__ The United States has a lot of experience, but the Western way of war may not fit Ukraine’s methods or needs at this time. The U.S. role must be to impart hard-learned lessons, tried-and-true TTPs, and the capabilities and limitations of the F-16. Adaptation and understanding of the local realities and motivations is crucial to the success of a military strategy.
+
+6. __Ensure Ukraine can maintain and repair the F-16s.__ Effective maintenance and robust supply support are indispensable for preserving the operational readiness of military equipment. To secure the sustained operational lifespan of fixed-wing platforms, a vigorous and ongoing training pipeline must run in parallel with pilot training, alongside the modernization of maintenance personnel. Furthermore, F-16 maintenance teams should establish direct connections to experts (utilizing telemaintenance), facilitating the swift access required to support combat-ready fighters in the field.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+In 2024, Ukraine faces a critical juncture as its manpower, supplies, and ammunition reserves dwindle, providing an opportunity for Russia to seize momentum and exploit the West’s waning support. Adding the F-16 to the Ukrainian Armed Forces will assist in stalling Russia’s potential counteroffensive and further integrating Ukraine into the U.S. and European economic and defense ecosystem. This move also provides better sustainment of Ukraine’s air power, improves the security of its airspace, and increases Ukraine’s ability to hold more Russian targets at risk. It will take time to observe how Ukrainian F-16s affect combat operations. However, localized air superiority, followed by broad and enduring air superiority, should be the long-term goal, which will require more aircraft. Now is the time to ensure short- and long-term adjustments are made to partnership capacity in order for F-16s to play a critical role in 2024 and beyond. At the policy level, when addressing Ukraine’s capabilities and capacity, the United States must decide what type of Ukrainian armed force it wants to support. Is it a Ukraine that can defend, deter, or defeat Russia? Regardless of wanted outcomes, Ukraine needs more aircraft, and it needs them now.
+
+---
+
+__Christopher Koeltzow__ is a military fellow with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
+
+__Brent Peterson__ is a national security fellow at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.
+
+__Eric Williams__ is a military fellow with the International Security Program at CSIS.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-11-friendshore-lithium-ion.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-11-friendshore-lithium-ion.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Friendshore Lithium-Ion
+author: William Alan Reinsch, et al.
+date : 2024-06-11 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/KIYGMTV.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Friendshoring the Lithium-Ion Battery Supply Chain: Final Assembly and End Uses"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The last report in a series of three, this piece outlines the assembly of lithium-ion battery cells into modules as well as different battery end-uses, and addresses current U.S. policy gaps in producing and deploying the technology._
+
+
+
+Policies surrounding the lithium-ion battery (LIB) supply chain lie at the intersection of trade, climate, and national security considerations. The LIB supply chain spans the globe, and yet some critical inputs are only produced in a handful of countries — in particular China, which is dominant at several key stages of the technology’s production. The Biden administration appears to have three central, yet misaligned, objectives regarding the LIB supply chain: de-risking away from China’s dominance, reshoring manufacturing capabilities, and accelerating the green transition. To spur the technology’s production and deployment, the United States must undertake several economic and trade policy changes to address gaps in its current approach.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+Lithium-ion battery (LIB) supply chains encapsulate the profound shift in trade, economic, and climate policy underway in the United States and abroad. Policymakers are conflating national security considerations with climate and trade policies and appear determined to bolster supply chains via reshoring and nearshoring the production of critical items — including those necessary to achieve climate goals. The LIB supply chain spans the globe, but crucial inputs and processing capabilities are centralized in a handful of countries. This dual dynamic of dispersion and concentration renders the global supply chain susceptible to geopolitical disruptions and shifts in trade relationships. Exacerbating this issue is China’s dominance in lithium-ion manufacturing, including in the processing of most mineral inputs and key end uses such as electric vehicles (EVs) — as well as its position as an economic competitor and a long-term strategic threat to U.S. interests.
+
+The Biden administration appears to have three central U.S. objectives. The first is de-risking away from China’s current dominance over manufacturing key goods, such as the lithium-ion battery, given these items’ importance to economic competitiveness and security. The second is bringing manufacturing back to the United States. The country’s sector has gradually lost out to foreign competitors, costing the nation jobs and resilience in exchange for efficiency and competitive prices. The third is accelerating away from hydrocarbons to cut carbon emissions and mitigate the potentially catastrophic effects of global warming, in accordance with U.S. multilateral commitments. The policy dilemma is that the first two goals are not compatible with the third. The United States appears to have decided to pursue the first two at the expense of the third, as this paper will discuss. If the United States wants to accelerate its carbon reduction goals, then changes in policy will be required.
+
+De-risking away from China’s dominance, bringing manufacturing back to U.S. shores, and accelerating the green transition are three goals inherently at odds. Liberalizing trade with the China would enable U.S. manufacturers to significantly scale up operations by accessing lower-cost inputs and give consumers access to cheap goods critical to achieving decarbonization goals. However, it would negate de-risking efforts. Focusing on bringing manufacturing back to the United States would boost job growth and de-risk supply chains, but it would deflect attention away from building sustainable and advantageous trade relationships with prospective nearshoring partners.
+
+An effective U.S. LIB production and deployment strategy requires several policy changes. This project aims to shed light on current shortcomings in the U.S. approach and provide recommendations related to different stages of the LIB supply chain. This paper, the last in a series of three, outlines the final steps in producing a lithium-ion battery. The first brief examines the technical steps and policy challenges involved in processing and defining critical minerals and raw materials in a battery. The second brief builds upon these findings by describing the use of these minerals and materials to create cathode and anode active battery materials and other components. This final piece concludes by outlining the LIB supply chain and the assembly of battery cells into modules, which are packed and sold to manufacturers of different end products, including EVs, solar power backup storage, consumer technology products, and emergency power backup systems. This analysis then examines trade and economic policy challenges that hinder the production and deployment of lithium-ion batteries and their end products.
+
+
+### Final Battery Production
+
+Once individual components such as cathodes and anodes are turned into functioning battery cells, manufacturers combine individual battery cells into sets called battery modules. These modules are then assembled to create a battery pack, which, after testing, is fit for commercial use.
+
+#### Modules
+
+A battery module is created through the attachment and connection of multiple battery cells. The surfaces of the battery cells are cleaned, and the battery cells are checked for leaks. If no such openings are found, an adhesive is used to ensure the batteries stick to the end plates. The cells are then stacked side by side, and the end plates are connected using either a wiring harness or a metallic strip designed for high current distribution. Lastly, a cover is put in place.
+
+While individual battery cells could serve as the foundation for battery packs, a pack of battery cells immediately becomes unusable if a single cell breaks down. To negate this flaw, modules are used as an intermediate step. Modules also have greater structural integrity and vibration resistance than a set of battery cells.
+
+#### Battery Packs
+
+Once a set of modules has been assembled, they may be connected to form a battery pack. A single battery pack may require different numbers of modules or cells to function depending on its intended use, and it may require a battery management system to evaluate the charge level and service life of the pack. The system uses battery-monitoring units to assess the safety and performance of individual cells within a pack, thereby increasing battery longevity.
+
+
+### Key End Uses
+
+The lithium-ion battery is becoming a ubiquitous input for several goods critical to the U.S. economy. These end uses are set to accelerate the green transition and enhance the U.S. energy security landscape. They will transform the landscape of consumer electronics and revolutionize transportation. In short, the sectors for which lithium-ion batteries are destined hold tremendous importance. Chief among them are solar panels, emergency power backup systems, EVs, and consumer technology.
+
+___`The lithium-ion battery is becoming a ubiquitous input for several goods critical to the U.S. economy. These end uses are set to accelerate the green transition and enhance the U.S. energy security landscape.`___
+
+#### Solar Panels
+
+A solar panel in its most basic form is a collection of photovoltaic cells that absorb energy from sunlight and transform it into electricity. Over the past few years, these devices have become exponentially more prevalent. In 2023, the United States generated 238,000 gigawatt-hours (GWh) of electricity from solar power, an increase of roughly 800 percent since 2014. While these panels can generate electricity only in sunlight, they use lithium-ion batteries to store excess power accumulated during the day for use at night and on cloudy days, allowing for uninterrupted flow of electricity.
+
+These batteries must be connected to solar panels to charge and store excess electricity. This connection is achieved using charge controllers to adjust the voltage and current to ensure the battery is not damaged. The lithium battery pack is plugged into the charge controller, which is then connected to the solar panels via single-contact electrical (MC4) connectors. While lithium-ion batteries are roughly 10 times more expensive than lead-acid batteries (the main alternative battery type for solar batteries), they make up for this cost difference by being 20–30 percent more efficient and lasting roughly 10 times longer. As a result, lithium-ion technology accounted for 90 percent of the installed power and energy capacity of battery storage in the United States in 2019.
+
+#### Emergency Power Backup Systems
+
+Increasing adoption of renewable energy creates additional challenges for grid operators. Renewable energy sources, such as wind and solar power, generate electricity based on the availability of their respective resources. Consequently, grid operators must effectively manage electricity supply to ensure reliability, as these sources are inherently intermittent.
+
+As countries prioritize integrating renewable energy into their grids, adoption requires the immediate purchasing of electricity generated from renewable sources. However, renewable energy plants often generate surplus electricity beyond current demand. While traditional fossil fuel and thermal power plants can be shut down during periods of low demand to conserve fuel, the intermittent nature of wind and solar energy means that simply shutting them off is seldom a viable option. This surplus electricity has spurred the development of grid energy storage systems to store and manage excess energy efficiently.
+
+Lithium-ion batteries serve as a versatile backup power solution and are not limited to the solar energy domain. They can be connected to wind turbines and generators as well as the electric grid. In all of these cases, lithium-ion batteries store excess energy for later use that would otherwise be wasted. These systems may be divided into two subcategories: Behind-the-meter systems are generally geared toward individual consumers and small businesses and are meant to allow for emergency power storage or continuous power use from an energy source. Front-of-the-meter systems, in contrast, are larger, made up of a greater number of battery packs, and link directly to the power grid. Utilities and large firms often use them as a means to address network congestion or to alleviate demand for new power lines. These systems are then installed at the distribution substation level, where power is transformed from medium to low voltage and sent to individual households. Front-of-meter systems allow for excess power to be returned to other distribution centers, or these systems may simply serve as storage for a planned or unplanned outage.
+
+Among the existing electricity storage technologies — such as pumped hydro, compressed air, flywheels, or vanadium redox flow batteries — lithium-ion batteries have the advantages of fast response rate, high energy density, good energy efficiency, and reasonable life cycle. Substantial growth is anticipated in the United States for both types of storage systems. U.S. cumulative installed battery storage capacity, which stands at roughly 17 GWh, is expected to increase to 50 GWh by 2025. Overall, solar power alone is also predicted to see large increases in adoption and will represent roughly 7 percent of total energy generation in 2025. As a result, global demand for battery storage systems is set to increase by 30 percent annually. By 2030, these storage systems will account for roughly 700 GWh of global demand, a figure equal to the total global demand for batteries in all industries as of 2022.
+
+#### Electric Vehicles
+
+The EV sector accounted for 80 percent of global LIB demand in 2023, or roughly 800 GWh. EVs are distinguished from conventional cars by the presence of an underpan, or the area below the car where the batteries are stored. Commercial and public transport EVs may have multiple battery packs located in the front or back or even on the roof of the vehicle. The battery pack, which is generally made up of six modules, each of which has 12 cells, is connected to an inverter that converts the power supply from AC to DC. In turn, the inverter is connected to an electric motor that powers the vehicle.
+
+The recyclability, fast charging speed, and long life cycle of these batteries have spurred a boom in global demand for both EV batteries and the vehicles they power. Global demand for batteries from the EV sector has increased by 470 percent since 2020, when demand from the EV sector stood at 175 GWh. While these increases have been significant, LIB demand is forecasted to increase to 4.1 terawatt-hours (TWh) in the EV sector by 2030, and EVs are set to account for 40 percent of global auto sales by 2030 — an amount equal to 40 million EVs as well as an additional 20 million hybrids sold per annum. The average EV releases only 150 grams of greenhouse gas per mile (accounting for the power generation necessary to charge EVs), roughly 230 grams per mile less than the average conventional vehicle. This significant difference means replacing 40 million conventional vehicles with EVs will decrease greenhouse gas emissions by 395 billion pounds per annum — a critical step in achieving U.S. decarbonization goals.
+
+#### Consumer Technology
+
+The lightweight nature of lithium-ion batteries and their relatively long battery life and lifetime longevity make them ideal power sources for portable electronic devices such as laptops and digital watches. Lithium-ion batteries may also be found in cell phones, cameras, and tablets, as well as home appliances such as wireless vacuum cleaners; they are present in certain mobility products, such as scooters and hoverboards. The energy density and long lifetime of these batteries ensure that the electronics that rely on them are replaced far less often. Given their ubiquity, lithium-ion batteries will be essential to replacing internal combustion engines, not only in cars but also in boats, further reducing pollution and harm to the environment.
+
+The high energy density of these batteries renders them far superior to previous battery technologies, such as nickel cadmium (NiCd) and nickel metal hydride, especially in contexts where a smaller battery may allow for adding more hardware to a device. Rather than include modules, many devices use individual cells, ranging from three for mobile phone batteries to six in laptop batteries. The LIB market is rapidly expanding, and its total value is projected to increase by 14.5 percent per year, from $4.9 billion as of 2022 to $18.8 billion as of 2032.
+
+
+### Trade and Domestic Manufacturing Challenges
+
+Several trade and economy policy gaps are hindering LIB deployment, as well as the production of LIB-powered end uses — ultimately affecting the Biden administration’s stated goal of accelerating U.S. decarbonization. Altogether, these gaps reveal that policymakers have not adopted a unified approach to strengthen the technology’s supply chain. Instead, reshoring and de-risking policies are hindering progress, and existing permitting and infrastructure defects further exacerbate the issue.
+
+___`Policymakers have not adopted a unified approach to strengthen the technology’s supply chain. Instead, reshoring and de-risking policies are hindering progress, and existing permitting and infrastructure defects further exacerbate the issue.`___
+
+The chief issue with LIB production is not supply shortages; rather, global production capacity vastly outmatches demand. As the United States intensifies its initiatives to bring back the LIB supply chain within its borders, it is becoming apparent that demand shortages may pose significant challenges for nations aiming to develop their homegrown industry.
+
+According to BloombergNEF, demand for lithium-ion batteries in EVs and stationary storage reached approximately 950 GWh last year. However, global manufacturing capacity exceeded this by more than double, reaching close to 2,600 GWh. China’s battery production in 2023 alone matched worldwide demand. The United States is not the sole player aiming to expand its slice of the global battery market through tax incentives and domestic content requirements. Canada is keeping pace with U.S. incentives, and European countries, India, and other regions are also providing subsidies to bolster their battery sectors. This indicates that the oversupply situation is poised to worsen before any signs of improvement emerge.
+
+#### Barriers to Growing Demand
+
+The United States must overcome significant foreign trade and domestic economic challenges related to increasing demand for LIB-powered goods. In the case of EVs, there is an evident alternative — internal combustion engines, which still present several advantages. Chief among these advantages is purchase cost. EVs are still more expensive than their gasoline-powered counterparts, primarily due to expensive battery technology. The large charge required to provide a minimum range for most owners requires a costly manufacturing process.
+
+In addition, there are remaining issues with charger incompatibility that work to dampen consumer demand: the type of plug, power requirements, and app can all vary significantly, sometimes preventing EV owners from effectively using available infrastructure. Related to this problem is the relative lack of charging infrastructure. Today, most electric car and van charging relies on private chargers, mainly at the driver’s residence. Public and workplace charging stations are increasingly valuable for those living in multiple-unit habitations where charger availability could be limited. The stock of workplace chargers is expected to increase about eightfold by 2030 across the scenarios, while the number of public chargers is forecasted to increase around fivefold.
+
+_The 30D Tax Credit_
+
+The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) 30D tax credit aims to address the potential demand shortages caused, in part, by the issues mentioned. The credit, which incentivizes consumers to acquire EVs by providing a tax break of up to $7,500, and the guardrails around it have become emblematic of the anchoring of the current U.S. climate approach in nearshoring and reshoring through industrial policy. To be eligible for the credit, vehicles must undergo final assembly in North America. In addition, to receive half of the credit ($3,750), at least half of the battery components must be manufactured or assembled in North America. That requirement increased to 60 percent in 2024 and will gradually increase to 100 percent by 2029. To qualify for the other half of the credit ($3,750), the battery must contain a certain percentage of critical minerals produced in the United States or a country with which the United States has a free trade agreement. That percentage requirement likewise increased to 50 percent in 2024 and will reach 80 percent by 2029.
+
+The percentage-based content requirements required more detailed final rulemaking. After considering public feedback in response to the proposed rules, the U.S. Department of the Treasury released final guidance regarding taxpayer and vehicle eligibility for the new and previously owned clean vehicle credit, as well as critical minerals, battery components requirements, and Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) restrictions.
+
+The rules are part of a compliance review process of critical mineral and battery input requirements, along with FEOC restrictions, which started in the summer of 2024. The Internal Revenue Service conducts the up-front review, assisted by the U.S. Department of Energy. In addition, the Department of the Treasury has announced a novel “Traced Qualifying Value Test,” which requires manufacturers to perform a thorough supply chain review to assess the value-added percentage for extraction, processing, and recycling, which will be key in determining the value of the qualifying critical minerals.
+
+The FEOC restriction final rules make the accounting requirements for relevant critical minerals contained in a battery cell permanent, though they also note that some materials are untraceable. The guidance has generally remained the way it was originally proposed in late 2023: an EV containing battery components manufactured or assembled by an FEOC — defined as an entity that is “owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a government of a foreign country that is a covered nation” (China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea) — does not qualify. This definition includes entities that are “headquartered, incorporated or performing relevant activities in a covered nation, if 25 percent or more of its voting rights, board seats or equity interest are held by the government of a covered nation, or if the entity is effectively controlled by an FEOC through a license or contract with that FEOC.”
+
+The credit’s strict requirements slash the number of EV models eligible for the tax incentives. In 2023, Stanford University’s Institute for Economic Policy Research determined that only 11 EV models qualified for the credit under the IRA. Even after the law’s provisions were modified in January 2023, the total number of eligible EVs remained constant at 11.
+
+As the first report of this series notes, the leasing loophole — which presents a gap in the 30D tax credit’s friendshoring and household income requirements — has allowed consumption of EVs to continue to rise despite the IRA’s restrictive intent. Nevertheless, the guardrails around EV restrictions are undoubtedly curtailing their deployment, placing critical impediments on a key technology to achieve U.S. decarbonization goals. By curbing demand through limits around vehicle choices, guardrails around 30D prioritize de-risking from Chinese inputs and spurring domestic manufacturing over accelerating EV adoption.
+
+In addition, the guardrails around the IRA tax credits — including 30D — may well violate U.S. commitments to multilateral trade rules. World Trade Organization (WTO) rules are designed to ensure a level playing field of competition in the global marketplace. The act’s use of local content requirements — which make tax credits for EV and battery manufacturing accessible to purchasers of cars only if significant portions of the items are obtained or manufactured within the United States or its free trade agreement allies — have the potential to distort the global green technology market. China has already notified the WTO of its intent to invoke the organization’s dispute settlement procedures regarding the impact of the IRA tax incentives; despite the country’s trade rules violations, it may prevail in this dispute.
+
+#### Trade and Economic Challenges against Setting Up a Viable Domestic Landscape
+
+U.S. prioritization of reshoring over friendshoring is unlikely to be effective, as the current domestic landscape is not favorable to rapid LIB deployment; it will therefore hinder the country’s ability to lessen dependence on China. In addition, because domestic conditions in the United States are not yet capable of adequately taking on a reshoring agenda, the U.S. green transition will likely be hobbled. As the United States imposes additional trade barriers to promote domestic production, it is increasingly oversaturating a homegrown market that cannot achieve decarbonization goals or significantly scale up manufacturing.
+
+_Trade Barriers_
+
+Gaps in U.S. trade policy also drive up the costs of LIB production and deployment in the United States, as well as the manufacturing and deployment costs of key LIB-powered products — worsening issues related to demand. In addition to lowering content requirements around state-led investments, the United States can improve access to this key decarbonization technology by pursuing free trade policies. The benefits of lower barriers in a broad swath of goods would support LIB production. For instance, the levying of high and broad tariffs on imports and exports has disrupted the chemical value chain and the industries that rely on it, including green technologies.
+
+___`Gaps in U.S. trade policy also drive up the costs of LIB production and deployment in the United States, as well as the manufacturing and deployment costs of key LIB-powered products.`___
+
+Current U.S. most-favored nation (MFN) rates for lithium-ion battery products still impose barriers on the ability to procure these goods. Primary cells and primary batteries, as well as their parts, still face a 2.7 percent rate. Likewise, the rate is approximately 4 percent for critical minerals and 5 percent for magnets. Trade agreements with allies which eliminate these MFN rates would enhance the ability of U.S. companies to acquire products from markets other than China at more competitive costs.
+
+The most evident example of U.S. trade barriers negatively affecting the country’s access to LIB inputs is the imposition of tariffs on Chinese goods. In May 2024, the Biden administration announced a significant extension of tariffs on Chinese goods, including some affecting the LIB supply chain. As part of this review, tariffs will increase, particularly in industries such as clean technology, EVs, semiconductors, steel, and aluminum, which have been prioritized by President Biden’s industrial policy. For instance, Chinese EVs will now face a 100 percent tariff, while tariffs on solar cells and semiconductors will double to 50 percent. Additionally, certain steel, aluminum, battery, and medical glove products will see tariffs rise to 25 percent.
+
+
+
+When the original 301 tariffs were implemented, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative established a process that permitted private parties to seek exclusion from the tariffs for specific products. Each request underwent individual assessment. The agency outlined its criteria for decisionmaking, taking into account (1) the product’s availability from non-Chinese suppliers, (2) efforts made by importers to procure the product domestically or from other nations, (3) the potential significant economic impact on the importer or other U.S. interests due to Section 301 tariffs imposition on the specific product, and (4) the strategic significance of the product in initiatives such as Made in China 2025 or similar Chinese industrial programs. The exemption process provides a potential road map to reduce the additional costs these tariffs may impose on supporting LIB and LIB end-use development in the United States.
+
+U.S. barriers encapsulate the inherent contradiction of imposing additional restrictions on trade with China, which include several goods key to enabling the green transition, while enacting policies to accelerate decarbonization. The new tariffs broadly do not affect products currently being imported in large quantities — in part, due to previous tariffs. However, they further undercut the United States’ ability to use China’s comparative advantages in producing green technologies and reduce the chances of both nations cooperating to address climate issues. In addition, China’s inevitable retaliation to the tariffs may cause further supply chain disruptions; China may, for instance, cut off supplies of key minerals, harass Western companies operating in China, or impose retaliatory tariffs that burden U.S. exporters in critical sectors
+
+In short, such barriers hinder the effectiveness of the United States’ efforts to switch to renewables through reshoring capabilities and diversifying away from China. The latest imposition of tariffs reinforces this dynamic. The tariffs also encapsulate the misalignment of U.S. decarbonization policies: they were imposed just as the U.S. Department of the Treasury released final rules on the clean vehicle provisions of the IRA which provide additional flexibility in minerals and battery sourcing. The two developments, at odds with each other, show the Biden administration’s inability to adopt a unified in approach in spurring the green transition.
+
+> #### `Identifying Friendshoring Partners`
+
+_`Identifying friendshoring partners — instead of simply supporting onshoring policies — should be a critical part of the U.S. drive to secure the lithium-ion supply chain. These partners will help the country more efficiently acquire the inputs it needs to strengthen its domestic manufacturing capabilities while diversifying away from China’s dominance.`_
+
+- _`Japan: A handful of major battery makers exist in Japan, including Panasonic, Mitsubishi, and Toshiba. Additionally, Japanese companies such as Asahi Kasei, Toray Industries, and Sumitomo Metal Mining lead in the manufacturing of separators and positive electrode materials. In mid-2022, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry revealed an industrial strategy aiming to boost the capacity of Japanese manufacturers to 600 GWh globally by 2030, equivalent to 14.4 million units of standard EV batteries, and to achieve a domestic production capacity of EV and energy storage batteries of 150 GWh by 2030.`_
+
+- _`South Korea: South Korean battery manufacturers currently hold 37 percent of the market share, with companies such as LG Chemicals, SK, and Samsung leading the charge, placing the country in a formidable position to enhance the diversification of battery supply chains. Seoul has long been proactive in implementing targeted industrial policies for the battery sector. Under the leadership of President Yoon Suk Yeol, ambitious targets have been set for the battery industry, aiming to capture 40 percent of the global market share by 2030. To support this goal, the Yoon administration plans to expand investment tax credits — increasing them from 8 percent to 15 percent for large companies and from 16 percent to 25 percent for small and medium-sized enterprises — while also broadening the scope of credits to include mineral processing. These measures, initially set to expire in 2024, have been extended until 2025.`_
+
+- _`European Union: European LIB manufacturers are striving to localize production and adhere to EU regulations while safeguarding their supply chains against geopolitical disruptions. The region aims to establish approximately 50 gigafactories within the next decade to bolster its battery supply chain and meet production targets. Momentum is building in Europe, with several prototype and full-scale battery plants underway. The Volkswagen Group’s battery division, PowerCo, is constructing two gigafactories in Salzgitter, Germany, and near Valencia, Spain. Automotive Cells Company (ACC), backed by Stellantis, Mercedes-Benz, and TotalEnergies, has inaugurated the first of three planned European battery gigafactories in Douvrin, France. Initially, this gigafactory boasts a production line capacity of 13 gigawatt-hours (GWh), set to increase to 40 GWh by 2030. With the capability to manufacture 56,000 battery cells per day, or over 2.4 million battery modules annually, it will support the production of 200,000 to 300,000 EVs each year.`_
+
+- _`United Kingdom: In late November 2023, the UK Department for Business and Trade revealed the country’s battery strategy alongside its Advanced Manufacturing Plan. The strategy entails a governmental pledge of over $2.5 billion in capital and research and development (R&D) investment. This funding aims to bolster the manufacturing and advancement of zero-emission vehicles, batteries, and associated supply chains until 2030. To attain this goal, the UK battery strategy adopts a threefold approach. The initial component aims to enhance the nation’s R&D capabilities by creating batteries superior to current models. To achieve this, the strategy fosters innovation, provides financial support for scaling up, and establishes safety and product standards. The second aspect involves fortifying the battery supply chain, including endeavors such as accessing new markets, expediting energy grid connections, and revising planning and permitting procedures. Lastly, the strategy aims to sustain the sector by pinpointing necessary skills, minimizing trade obstacles, and channeling investments into a circular economy.`_
+
+_`These are just four examples of potential partners with which the United States could more closely collaborate to friendshore the lithium-ion supply chain. In some countries, such as the South Korea, the dominant landscape and new industrial plan make the nation a reliable partner for a significant portion of the supply chain. In other instances, the United States could identify the comparative advantages of prospective partners. For instance, the United Kingdom has a competitive R&D landscape, which recent investments will bolster. Southeast Asia is expected to be an important hub for electric two-wheeled vehicles — in addition to its significant critical minerals processing and refining capabilities. In any case, collaborating with these nations, instead of relying on the currently inadequate U.S. domestic landscape, will be critical to strengthening the LIB supply chain.`_
+
+_Inadequate Chemistry Permitting Process_
+
+Several chemistry changes could improve the energy density of lithium-ion batteries, especially with regard to anodes. For instance, silicon could be used to replace all or some of the graphite to make the battery lighter and enhance its energy density, mitigating two key issues with LIB deployment as well as U.S. exposure to China’s dominance over global graphite production, which China could leverage in an escalation of trade tensions. Furthermore, additional LIB battery chemistry choices would present several advantages. First, critical mineral prices can have an impact on the chemistry choice. Given price volatility, a greater range of battery chemistry choices would enhance the market’s competitiveness and protect it against unforeseen shocks. Issues with critical mineral supplies could stem from black swan events unrelated to geopolitics, such as a natural disaster. However, given China’s hold over minerals and materials processing and refining — as well as the willingness of the government under President Xi Jinping to leverage export curbs to serve China’s foreign policy interests — expanding battery chemistry choices would also shield U.S. manufacturers and consumers from overdependence on Chinese inputs.
+
+In short, novel chemistry technologies must be brought swiftly to the market to be competitive. In addition, given current U.S. nearshoring and onshoring goals, it would be in the United States’ interests to foster a regulatory landscape that encourages additional diverse domestic chemistry manufacturing capabilities. However, current barriers concerning the review of new chemicals for commercial uses do not allow for timely deployment. In some cases, backlogs can result in unexplained regulatory approval delays of two to three years.
+
+The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a study on permitting processes for clean technology deployment. When significant delays occurred, the GAO found the primary causes were usually insufficient funds and staff at permitting agencies. Addressing issues and delays in permitting requires retaining and expanding agency expertise and staffing in permitting and environmental review, providing clarity and guidance on necessary steps and information submissions during the permitting process, and enhancing interagency coordination and cooperation. However, setting up these additional capabilities may take time. U.S. permitting agencies may be better served by first setting up a fast-track process for permitting requests concerning green technologies.
+
+> #### `Alternative Lithium-Ion Battery Technologies`
+
+_`While the world heavily relies on lithium-ion batteries as a source of energy for EVs, consumer appliances, and emergency backup systems, alternatives to this technology exist. These alternatives, when fully developed, could help the United States diversify its green energy portfolio and deliver performance and safety advantages to lithium-ion technology.`_
+
+- _`Sodium-ion batteries: Probably the most promising of these novel battery types is sodium-ion batteries. As their name suggests, these batteries rely on sodium rather than lithium as the core ingredient for the electrolyte solution and the cathode. Extraction of the core ingredients in these batteries is very cost competitive, as sodium is roughly 1,000 times more prevalent in the Earth’s crust than lithium. In addition, these batteries use low-cost materials for cathodes, such as aluminum rather than copper foil. Advocates of a transition to sodium-ion batteries also argue that they are safer to transport, as they can be discharged to zero volts in transit, mitigating the risk of flammability.`_
+
+ _`However, critics point to the fact that sodium-ion batteries currently have an energy range of only 140–160 watt-hours per kilogram (wh/kg) — far lower than the energy range of lithium-ion batteries (150–220 wh/kg). A vehicle running on current sodium-ion battery technology would therefore have to be charged far more often than a lithium battery, limiting the marketability of this technology. Sodium-ion batteries are also limited in terms of battery life: they last only 5,000 charging cycles, while the average lithium battery can bear 8,000–10,000 charging cycles. Nevertheless, these batteries could serve as a source of power for fleets of cheap EVs that operate over short-to-medium distances. Perceiving this opportunity, Chinese firm Jiangling Motors Group (JMG) recently released the first generation of electric cars powered by sodium-ion batteries in January 2024. These vehicles cost just $8,000 and are roughly 10 percent cheaper than the lithium-powered cars JMG sells. In short, sodium-ion batteries remain a strong contender, especially in the energy storage sector.`_
+
+- _`Lithium-sulfur batteries: Lithium-sulfur batteries use sulfur in the cathode and lithium in the anode. Extraction of core material for these batteries is less resource-intensive and relatively sustainable compared to lithium-ion batteries since sulfur is a by-product of natural gas processing and oil refining. While these batteries have nine times the energy density of lithium-ion batteries, they suffer from poor chargeability and face functionality issues after only 50 charging cycles. Still, businesses are hoping to commercialize the technology. In 2020, for instance, LG Energy Solutions piloted a drone that used the battery, and the company now aims to mass produce these batteries by 2027.`_
+
+- _`Solid-state batteries: Solid-state batteries rely on solid rather than liquid or aqueous electrolytes, common in traditional batteries. Two prevalent types of solid electrolytes are inorganic solid electrolytes, which use oxides and sulfides, and solid polymers, which use polymer salts. Solid-state batteries have a lower risk of battery failure than lithium-ion batteries. They are also more energy dense and have a faster charging cycle. However, they are more expensive to produce than lithium- or sodium-ion batteries. Due to high manufacturing costs, these batteries are used only in wearable electronics and home security devices. Nonetheless, researchers at Colorado-based Solid Power have designed sulfide electrolyte batteries that have twice the energy density of lithium-ion batteries. The firm aims to power 800,000 EVs per year with this technology by 2028.`_
+
+_`A number of alternative chemistries are available to complement lithium-ion batteries in the push toward deploying renewable energy. Liquid metal and zinc-ion batteries also present attractive alternatives. As long as the shift toward electrification, the energy transition, and other battery-dependent markets continues to drive the need for energy storage, emerging technologies capable of alleviating the strains on associated material supply chains can provide invaluable benefits. This necessity becomes particularly pronounced as the spectrum of scenarios requiring energy storage expands within a swiftly electrifying energy landscape. The increasing diversity of applications presents an opportunity to investigate how novel technological solutions can effectively broaden or diminish mineral inputs to mitigate supply risks. In doing so, advancements in battery technology may also enhance performance and reduce costs compared to the dominant lithium-ion batteries currently available in the market.`_
+
+_Inadequate Grid Capacity_
+
+Since the enactment of the IRA, energy specialists have advocated for regulatory adjustments to address grid issues. These adjustments include expediting permits for transmission line installation and facilitating the connection of new power plants to the grid. A report from Princeton University in 2022 revealed that over 80 percent of the IRA’s emissions reduction goals could be jeopardized if the expansion of transmission infrastructure does not accelerate beyond the current annual rate of approximately 1 percent.
+
+For decades, the grid has suffered from underinvestment, making it challenging to authorize improvements that would place greater burdens on the grid. Concurrently, demand for electricity is escalating at a rate surpassing initial projections. A growing number of sectors and goods, such as smart appliances, data centers, and EVs, will require additional U.S. capacity.
+
+The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) assessed during a December 2023 webcast that U.S. power grids are anticipated to confront heightened vulnerability in the forthcoming years. This vulnerability arises from the dual factors of escalating peak demand and the retirement of aging generators. NERC depicted a problematic outlook for certain power markets in the United States, foreseeing capacity shortages due to the accelerated growth in demand propelled by widespread electrification, outpacing the pace of new generation capacity additions and the retirement of outdated facilities.
+
+Deployment of lithium-ion batteries will require a nationwide infrastructure that can withstand rapid electrification. Yet assessments of current U.S. grid capabilities show the grid is vastly unprepared to accommodate a broad switch to LIB-powered goods.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+The production of lithium-ion batteries and deployment of end uses face several challenges. The United States is currently prioritizing reshoring lithium-ion production capabilities over the green transition. This will slow down the country’s shift to renewables and hinder the United States’ ability to meet multilateral commitments. If the Biden administration wants to rectify this, a whole-of-government policy should be enacted. For starters, the United States should undertake the following:
+
+1. __Prioritize trade agreements to enable the green transition.__ To accelerate LIB deployment, the Biden administration should focus on taking down barriers to trade on inputs for lithium-ion batteries, as well as the batteries themselves, between the United States and its allies. Eliminating MFN tariffs on goods related to lithium-ion batteries should be a high-priority item for nations with long-term environmental ambitions. One way to achieve that would be for the Biden administration to initiate negotiations for a non-MFN plurilateral specifically focused on batteries and their inputs.
+
+2. __Reconsider barriers limiting the import of green technologies and their inputs.__ High and broad tariffs on imports and exports have disrupted the LIB supply chain and the industries that rely on it — including green technologies. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative should take green transition priorities into account when it considers exemptions to tariffs, including the Section 301 tariffs on a broad swath of Chinese goods. For instance, the items critical to LIB manufacturing could be granted exemptions to support decarbonization efforts.
+
+3. __Establish an effective fast-track process for permitting the production of key green transition technologies.__ An efficient Environemntal Protection Agency permitting process is critical to supporting the production and commercialization of green technologies. Current backlogs are hindering long-term U.S. environmental goals. Projects to produce items key to the green transition such as lithium-ion batteries — or inputs to these goods, such as developing alternative chemistries — should be placed on a fast-track permitting process.
+
+4. __Design future climate and infrastructure investments to renew funding for grid improvements.__ The grid faces capacity shortages as demand surges, outpacing the rate of new generation capacity additions and the retirement of obsolete facilities. Past underinvestment has made authorizing improvements difficult. Simultaneously, electricity demand is escalating beyond initial forecasts, primarily driven by the proliferation of data centers and the expanding electrification of various economic sectors.
+
+The Biden administration’s conflation of reshoring and de-risking objectives with the green transition has limited the country’s ability to decarbonize. The clean vehicle tax credit, for instance, hinders the act’s potential to spur demand for EVs by curbing critical minerals sourcing and final assembly options. In turn, shutting down economic partners’ opportunities to contribute to the U.S. decarbonization process harms the U.S. goal of strengthening critical supply chains through diversification. Moreover, embedding national security considerations in U.S. state-led investments further limits manufacturers of key goods such as lithium-ion batteries, given China’s dominance over green technology supply chains.
+
+These contradictions are present at every level of the LIB supply chain, as outlined by the first two papers in this project. At the upstream end, U.S. failure to negotiate additional critical minerals agreements has hindered manufacturers’ ability to source eligible minerals and has exacerbated bitterness over IRA local content requirements, as discussed in the first two papers. Further along the supply chain, U.S. efforts to reshore cathode and anode active battery materials production have already run into debilitating workforce shortages. On the downstream end, tax incentives to spur demand for EVs — a key LIB end use — are also proving too restrictive to qualify a sufficient number of existing cars.
+
+In addition, policies based on reshoring are set to encounter shortcomings in the U.S. economy’s capabilities, which is already true when it comes to LIB manufacturing. For instance, the government’s permitting process and the nation’s electric grid infrastructure are overwhelmed. A readjustment of trade policies that favors fostering robust relationships with economic allies over reshoring, gradual de-risking policies over hasty decoupling, and state-led investments without geographic requirements, which may violate multilateral trade rules, will help usher in a carbon-neutral economy.
+
+---
+
+__William Reinsch__ holds the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
+
+__Meredith Broadbent__ serves as a senior adviser (non-resident) with the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.
+
+__Thibault Denamiel__ is an associate fellow with the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.
+
+__Elias Shammas__ is a research intern with the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-11-is-nato-ready-for-war.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-11-is-nato-ready-for-war.md
new file mode 100644
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+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-11-is-nato-ready-for-war.md
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Is NATO Ready For War?
+author: Sean Monaghan, et al.
+date : 2024-06-11 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/ZfcsHZ1.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "An Assessment of Allies’ Efforts to Strengthen Defense and Deterrence since the 2022 Madrid Summit"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Two years ago, NATO adopted a “back to the future” strategy of forward defense and deterrence following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. To implement it, allies committed to take various measures to strengthen their deterrence and defense at the 2022 Madrid Summit._ _As NATO leaders gather in Washington for the alliance’s 75th anniversary summit, this paper takes stock of allied efforts to strengthen collective defense. It finds they have made substantial progress on defense spending, forward defense, high-readiness forces, command and control, collective defense exercises, and integrating Finland and Sweden — achievements which should be recognized in Washington. However, while NATO might be ready for war, the question remains whether it is ready to fight — and thereby deter — a protracted war. To meet this goal, allies still need to spend more, boost industrial capacity, address critical capability gaps, and bolster national resilience._
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+Si vis pacem, para bellum. If you want peace, prepare for war. If the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) did not already have a motto — animus in consulendo liber, “in discussion a free mind” — this Latin adage would fit the alliance’s purpose quite well. The phrase conveys a piece of timeless deterrence logic: preparing for war might be the best way of averting it.
+
+After Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, NATO adopted a new “back to the future” strategic concept which returned Russia to its Cold War status of adversary and put deterrence and defense back at the heart of alliance strategy. NATO revealed the concept at the 2022 Madrid Summit alongside a wide range of commitments which NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg described as amounting to a “fundamental shift to our deterrence and defence.”
+
+In less than a month, NATO leaders will gather in Washington for the alliance’s 75th anniversary summit. Ahead of that historic meeting, this paper takes stock of the progress NATO allies have made in implementing the commitments made two years ago in Madrid.
+
+The paper comprises three sections. The first briefly recaps NATO’s efforts to strengthen defense and deterrence since 2014 and considers Russia’s current threat to NATO. The second assesses the progress made by NATO allies in implementing their Madrid commitments to strengthen deterrence and defense across the nine issue areas described in the Madrid Summit Declaration. The final section uses this assessment to gauge whether NATO is ready for war.
+
+
+### The Road to Washington
+
+NATO’s journey toward stronger deterrence and defense began at the 2014 Wales Summit where allies responded to Russia’s annexation of Crimea by making long-term commitments to raise defense spending above 2 percent of GDP. Their near-term focus was on adapting NATO’s force posture. This started with the 2014 Readiness Action Plan, followed by establishing four Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) multinational battlegroups in the east in 2016. In 2018, the NATO Readiness Initiative improved the state of NATO’s high-readiness forces.
+
+While the 2022 Strategic Concept garnered public attention, another NATO concept agreed upon in 2020 was already quietly revolutionizing deterrence and defense: the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) concept. The DDA focuses on “force employment to deter and defend today.” Following Russia’s 2022 invasion, NATO activated its defense plans, making 40,000 troops — plus air, naval, and other assets — available to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). Four new EFP missions followed, alongside a strengthened maritime posture, air policing, air defense, and multinational exercises.
+
+NATO planning was further transformed at last year’s Vilnius summit with the unveiling of new defense plans, another product of the DDA. “The DDA family of plans,” as SACEUR, U.S. general Christopher G. Cavoli, describes them, include three regional plans (covering northern, central, and southern Europe) alongside domain-specific plans (for land, air, maritime, cyber, and space forces) as well as plans for logistics and sustainment. As one recent analysis suggests: “None of this would have been possible without the DDA.”
+
+
+### Ready for War?
+
+Russia’s actions in Ukraine confirmed the fears of many that Vladimir Putin would seek to continue the Stalinist subjugation of Russia’s near abroad. The war suggests that the worst-case thinking about Russia’s “maximum intentions” that historically guided NATO’s planning is warranted for the foreseeable future. Putin’s apparent propensity for aggression, risk taking, and strategic miscalculation makes him a dangerous adversary — and a difficult one to deter.
+
+Russia has seen staggering losses in Ukraine but has “almost completely reconstituted militarily” to pre-war levels thanks to national mobilization and a war economy supported by China, Iran, and North Korea. Beyond Ukraine, Russia is making nuclear threats against NATO and stepping up hybrid threats across Europe. Several European leaders have warned that Russia could attack NATO allies within three, four, five, or eight years. Not only is China helping Russia’s military reconstitute, but the prospect of coordinated aggression between Moscow and Beijing has many implications for NATO — the most serious being the implications for U.S. force posture in Europe.
+
+To paraphrase Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, what kind of war should NATO prepare for? Perhaps the most stressing scenario is a rapid territory seizure by Russian forces in the Baltic region. Variations of this scenario have been described, wargamed, and analyzed in recent years, almost becoming cliché, but it should not be dismissed. In military planning jargon, it is the “most likely” and “most dangerous” course of action for Russia to take.
+
+It is the likeliest scenario for any Russian conventional attack on NATO because the local force balance drastically favors Russia. This does not mean it is likely — a lot of things would have to go badly for Russia to consider this a good option — just that it might be the most likely NATO-Russia war scenario. Despite all the warnings from NATO leaders, the jury is still out on whether (and why) Russia would invade.
+
+The consequences mean NATO planners must be prepared, as this kind of invasion risks nuclear escalation and is hard to reverse. Any NATO operation to regain lost ground would require establishing air superiority and control of the Baltic Sea before massing a significant local ground force. Even with NATO assurances, this situation is sufficiently threatening under Russian doctrine for Moscow to deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons for coercive or military purposes — forcing NATO to threaten nuclear use to compel withdrawal and reestablish deterrence.
+
+This is why Baltic officials describe the best strategy as “repel, don’t expel.” It is also why NATO’s new strategic concept returned deterrence by denial and forward defense to the core of alliance strategy. As with the Cold War, deterrence by punishment — which relies primarily on the “sword” of U.S., UK, and French strategic nuclear forces — will continue to do most of the heavy lifting to deter the most serious threats to NATO allies. But just like in the Cold War, NATO allies will increasingly rely on forward-based “shield” forces to strengthen conventional deterrence and defense. This paper focuses on the commitments made by NATO allies in Madrid to do just this. The next section analyzes these commitments in detail.
+
+
+### From Madrid to Washington: Assessing Commitments by NATO Allies to Strengthen Deterrence and Defense
+
+#### Defense Spending
+
+> We reaffirm our commitment to the Defence Investment Pledge in its entirety. We will build on that pledge and decide next year on subsequent commitments beyond 2024
+> #### — Madrid Summit Declaration
+
+The 2014 Defense Investment Pledge (DIP) required allies to invest at least 2 percent of GDP on defense — and at least 20 percent of that on modernization — by 2024. Last year in Vilnius, allies agreed that 2 percent would become “a minimum.” While in Wales only three allies met the target, this year 18 are projected to do so. NATO estimates that this year will be the first where European NATO allies invest 2 percent of their combined GDP. As Figure 1 shows, European allies have increased their investment by around a third since 2014, to a total of $380 billion.
+
+
+
+Recent announcements on spending included Norway’s “historic boost” to its spending, which will double over the next 12 years. The UK government recently announced a “fully funded plan” to reach 2.5 percent by 2030 — an extra £75 billion ($96 billion). Meanwhile, despite announcing an additional funded CAD 8.1 billion ($5.9 billion) by 2030, Canada would still fall short at 1.76 percent of GDP.
+
+Despite solid progress on defense spending since Madrid, three important questions remain for NATO allies. The first is whether the “2 percent as a minimum” target agreed to in Vilnius is enough to maintain a positive trajectory and deliver the capabilities required for a strong forward defense. The second is what they are spending money on. European allies need to address their known capability gaps and remove their reliance on the United States to conduct high-end collective defense missions. The final question is how the money is being spent. European allies have been spending more but cooperating less, making defense more expensive and inefficient than it needs to be.
+
+#### Forward Defense Forces
+
+> Allies have committed to deploy additional robust in-place combat-ready forces on our eastern flank, to be scaled up from the existing battle groups to brigade-size units where and when required . . . [including] establishing division-level structures.
+> #### — Madrid Summit Declaration
+
+The main component of NATO’s revitalized forward defense is the eight EFP missions, including multinational forces from several allies led by a framework nation. The status of each mission is set out below, based on the latest available data. This analysis highlights progress against the two new Madrid commitments: to scale up each mission to “brigade-size units” (up to 5,000 personnel) and to establish “division-level structures.”
+
+
+
+NATO forward defense forces are also deployed in the air and at sea. Last year, NATO’s strengthened Air Policing mission conducted over 300 intercepts of Russian aircraft in Baltic airspace. Allied air forces also increased contributions to Air Policing and Air Shielding (air and missile defense). At sea, allied Standing Naval Forces came under SACEUR’s command for the first time in 2022, while a French navy carrier strike group operated under NATO command in the Mediterranean — another first.
+
+Significant progress has been made to enhance NATO’s forward defense. Since Madrid, allies have proven the combat readiness of all eight EFP missions with battlegroup-level certification exercises. Four of the eight missions have been exercised at the brigade level to rehearse rapid reinforcement in a crisis. Meanwhile, all eight missions are integrated into NATO’s command structure at the division level. EFP Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland have plans to integrate with new national division-level structures. Meanwhile, NATO allies have strengthened existing missions in the air and at sea. However, only two EFP missions are planning to permanently scale up to brigade size. This is because the Madrid agreement leaves the decision to scale up to the host, framework, and contributing nations. The question remains as to whether even brigade-size missions would be sufficient to deter by denial, given the local force imbalance in Russia’s favor.
+
+#### NATO Force Model
+
+> We welcome the initial offers by Allies to NATO’s new force model, which will strengthen and modernise the NATO Force Structure and will resource our new generation of military plans.
+> #### — Madrid Summit Declaration
+
+In Madrid, allies agreed to transition to a new force model by 2023. The aim of the New NATO Force Model (NFM) is to boost deterrence and defense by providing a much larger pool of forces available to deploy quickly in a crisis. The NFM replaced the 40,000 strong NATO Response Force (NRF). As Figure 2 below shows, it contains three tiers of forces held at graduated readiness, from 10 to 180 days (the NRF’s readiness time was 15 days). The NFM presaged the regional plans agreed to a year later in Vilnius, stating forces “will be pre-assigned to specific plans.” The NFM also provides the high-readiness forces required for the new Allied Reaction Force, to which NATO will transitioned in mid-2024.
+
+
+
+Detailed allied contributions to the NFM remain classified, but public announcements suggest progress. Germany agreed to contribute 30,000 troops and a combination of 85 ships and aircraft mobilizable in 30 days (Tier 2). The United Kingdom offered combat aircraft, ships, aircraft carriers, and “brigade-sized land forces.” The United States has also placed much of its 80,000 strong forces in Europe under NATO command, the most connected it has been to NATO structures in decades.
+
+Challenges remain regarding force generation and sustainment. Last year, NATO Military Committee leaders acknowledged the remaining work to meet 300,000 but emphasized the importance of knowing what is missing. Additionally, experts such as John R. Deni of the U.S. Army War College have raised concerns about readiness. Recruitment and retention challenges in Europe and the United States undermine readiness, while demand for enablers and logistics personnel is going up. Deni notes that NATO has established readiness verification processes for Tier 1 and Tier 2 forces, but these have revealed shortfalls.
+
+The authorities for SACEUR to activate and deploy NFM forces pre-crisis will be essential for delivering the DDA. As SACEUR confirmed, these authorities support “NATO’s ability to execute its plans and helps influence Allies to contribute their own forces.” Yet, allies are not always willing to grant NATO commanders the “transfer of authority” required for optimization and efficiency. This also highlights the significance of aligning NFM force composition with the regional plans, potentially different from the forces allies typically provide.
+
+#### Command Structure
+
+> Allies have committed to . . . enhanced command and control.
+> #### — Madrid Summit Declaration
+
+NATO has steadily adapted its command structure since Madrid, vital for the implementation and execution of the regional plans. The NFM’s scale also underscores the need for an updated and modernized structure. Figure 3 shows critical command and control (C2) nodes and how they relate to NATO’s regional plans.
+
+
+
+New headquarters include Headquarters Multinational Division North (MND N) in Ādaži, Latvia, which became fully operational in July 2023. In March 2024, Headquarters Multinational Division Northeast (HQ MND-NE) in Elbląg, Poland, followed suit. Both have a key role in coordinating EFP missions. In September 2023, the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Italy (NRDC-ITA) became the interim headquarters of the Allied Reaction Force (ARF).
+
+The addition of Finland and Sweden to NATO also required new C2 arrangements. JFC Norfolk (JFCNF), NATO’s newest strategic command, which oversees the northwest Europe regional plan (see Figure 3), became fully operational in July 2021 but significantly changed following Finland and Sweden’s accession, when a political consensus formed across the Nordic nations to gather under JFCNF. To meet this reconfiguration, the JFCNF is being upscaled, with full integration planned for 2025. The JFCNF demonstrated its readiness by taking command of Steadfast Defender for one month while the exercise was in its area of responsibility. A new corps-level land component command has been proposed in Mikkeli, Finland (about 140 km from the Russian border), likely vital for the JFCNF’s C2 infrastructure.
+
+If created, Mikkeli would take the number of corps-level commands to the 11 deemed necessary by NATO to deliver on regional plans. Streamlining NATO’s C2 structures is crucial for robust deterrence and defense. Agile commands such as the German DEU MARFOR, capable of rapid scalability in crises or supporting DDA activities, are essential. Prioritizing C2 adaptation and exercising should address this need.
+
+#### Integrate Finland and Sweden
+
+> We reaffirm our commitment to NATO’s Open Door Policy. Today, we have decided to invite Finland and Sweden to become members of NATO and agreed to sign the Accession Protocols.
+> #### — Madrid Summit Declaration
+
+The most notable NATO achievement since the Madrid Summit has been Finland and Sweden joining as full NATO members. Following their formal invitation and after nearly two years of political drama, Ankara and Budapest eventually dropped their objections after extracting concessions from various allies, including the United States. This sent a resounding political signal to Moscow and added serious deterrent power to NATO’s ranks, gaining two highly capable members with the ability to severely constrain Russia’s freedom of maneuver in the Baltic Sea.
+
+The process of fully integrating Finland and Sweden into NATO is ongoing, but substantial progress has been made. The integration is helped by the deep military cooperation between the two countries and NATO prior to accession. Both were Enhanced Opportunities Partners (under the Partnership Interoperability Initiative) which assessed Finland and Sweden as more interoperable with NATO than some existing allies. The integration of the “formidable” air power of the Nordic countries has been developing for decades, as the recent integration of Finnish and Swedish air forces into NATO illustrates.
+
+Several challenges remain to fully integrate Finland and Sweden. These include developing adequate command structure arrangements, adjusting the regional plans and DDA, and taking account of both nations’ requirements for defense across domains, including logistics. Analysis suggests the critical role here of the United States and United Kingdom, given that the United States recently signed Nordic defense cooperation agreements and the United Kingdom leads the Joint Expeditionary Force, which has integrated Finnish and Swedish forces on operations for several years.
+
+#### Collective Defense Exercises
+
+> We will enhance our collective defense exercises to be prepared for high intensity and multi-domain operations and ensure reinforcement of any ally on short notice.
+> #### — Madrid Summit Declaration
+
+NATO has significantly delivered since Madrid on its promise to refocus its exercise program on collective defense. The recent Steadfast Defender was the largest NATO exercise since the Cold War, featuring 90,000 personnel from all allies across all domains. It included maritime and amphibious drills in the High North and multi-domain exercises across Europe, with a focus on military mobility. Steadfast Defender has been an important tool to test and validate other major lines of effort such as the NFM and regional plans.
+
+NATO’s exercise program has focused on multi-domain operations. In the air, Germany hosted and led its largest edition of Air Defender, while Vigilant Falcon tested Baltic air policing this May. At sea, Neptune Strike 2024 included five carrier strike groups in the Mediterranean, and Dynamic Mongoose focused on anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare. The 2023 Baltops exercise was the first with Finland participating as an ally.
+
+The newest domains, cyber and space, were also tested. NATO held its dedicated space exercise Vulcan Guard in April. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia, hosted the world’s largest cyber defense exercise, Locked Shields, last year. In June, the Coalition Warrior Interoperability Exercise will test interoperability across all domains and NATO C2 systems.
+
+#### Defense Industry
+
+> To have the necessary capabilities, the Alliance requires a strong and capable defence industry, with resilient supply chains.
+> #### — Vilnius Communiqué
+
+Russia’s war in Ukraine revealed the critical state of NATO’s defense industrial base, as allies seek to supply Ukraine with munitions and replenish their stocks. At Vilnius, allies urged the removal of barriers to defense trade and investment among themselves to bolster resiliency. The Defence Production Action Plan (DPAP) was unveiled, “leveraging the Alliance’s role as a convener, standard-setter, requirement setter and aggregator, and delivery enabler.” Highlighted DPAP priority areas include aggregating demand across allies to accelerate joint procurement, increasing production capacity, and enhancing allied interoperability.
+
+Varying progress has been evident in demand aggregation, interoperability, and procurement coordination and collaboration. Since July 2023, the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) has awarded contracts for munitions, joint procurement of Patriot missiles, and artillery shells. In addition, allies have improved multinational capability cooperation, evident in NATO’s MRTT-C air fleet achieving initial operational capability. As Figure 4 shows, traditional European producers have increased trade within Europe, but Poland’s all-source importation strategy has significantly boosted arms trade for the continent.
+
+Synchronization efforts between the European Union and NATO could enhance NATO deterrence and defense, should such efforts be pursued. The European Union has allocated over €500 million ($544 million) to ramp up ammunition production and has provided aid to Ukraine through the European Peace Facility. Additionally, its first ever Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS) was released this year, with the aim to boost capacity and intra-European collaboration. While some have seen EDIS as in competition with DPAP on standard setting, officials affirm that they are not in competition with each other. The European Union and NATO share the goal of increasing readiness, making enhanced coordination between them essential to avoid duplication.
+
+
+
+Unsurprisingly, significant defense industrial production challenges remain. Despite clear demand signals, barriers inhibiting production acceleration and NATO-EU tensions persist. Orders form only one input in the production equation, and delivery delays fail to convert into weapons stocks in reliable timeframes. Figure 4 shows incremental progress but demonstrates that longstanding pathologies hobbling European production are not easily overcome. To ensure NATO readiness, the United States should prioritize multilateral munitions production with member states over bilateral efforts. The European Union’s anticipated increased role raises NATO concerns, but it could positively transform the transatlantic defense industrial base, contingent on EU funding capacity. To effectively leverage NATO collective investments and build production capacity, the alliance would benefit from greater defense industrial integration and consolidation.
+
+#### Defense Capabilities
+
+> Investing in our defence and key capabilities is essential.
+> #### — Madrid Summit Declaration
+
+NATO’s cumulative capabilities far exceed Russia’s — even excluding the United States. This is shown below in Table 2, which uses two examples of critical capabilities to make the comparison. Two years of war in Ukraine have taken their toll on Russia’s armed forces, as its fleet of active main battle tanks has diminished by 41 percent since 2022 and active personnel have fallen by nearly 20 percent despite partial national mobilization. Moreover, non-U.S. NATO can field more modern equipment than Russia. Approximately 71 percent of non-U.S. NATO’s combat aircraft fleet was produced or modernized after 1990, compared to 53 percent of Russia’s inventory.
+
+
+
+However, this advantage does not necessarily translate to the battlefield. NATO faces significant capability gaps and readiness challenges which undermine conventional deterrence. Allies may have more advanced combat aircraft, but they have struggled with magazine depth. During NATO’s 2011 air operations in Libya, non-U.S. NATO members began running out of precision munitions within a month — and this was a comparatively minor operation compared to defending the Baltics.
+
+NATO’s issues go beyond airpower. According to a study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the number of combat battalions, in-service main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored reconnaissance vehicles, and self-propelled artillery in European armies has remained static or fallen between 2014 and 2023. More broadly, European nations are carrying significant gaps in naval forces, air enablers, air defense, and “battle-decisive ammunition” (artillery munitions and missiles). Any major combat operation in Europe would rely on U.S. forces to make up for European shortfalls in the land, maritime, and air forces required to deliver a range of warfighting missions. These issues have not yet been addressed by the significant increases in defense investment by NATO allies since 2014. NATO allies clearly face an important conversion challenge in translating their wealth into combat capabilities.
+
+#### Resilience
+
+> Resilience is a national responsibility and a collective commitment.
+> #### — Madrid Summit Declaration
+
+Resilience — incorporating military capacity, civil preparedness, and emergency planning — was NATO’s first line of defense against the Soviet Union. The same is true again today. Since Madrid, allies have launched several new initiatives to enhance resilience. In October 2022, NATO established a Resilience Committee which met twice prior to Vilnius. In March 2023, the NATO-EU Task Force on the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure was established to examine four key sectors: energy, transport, digital infrastructure, and space. Its final report in June 2023 recommended 14 actions to leverage NATO-EU cooperation on critical infrastructure. This was picked up at the Vilnius Summit in July, when NATO launched a new Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Underwater Infrastructure within NATO’s Allied Maritime Command. The summit communiqué also emphasized societal resilience, health systems, supply chains, and energy security. Allies also agreed to resilience objectives and a new baseline for allied resilience planning — which remains a national responsibility, guided by NATO authorities.
+
+Resilience is a complex issue that demands persistence, investment, and cooperation, requiring a more coordinated and collective approach. Building on progress to date, NATO’s Resilience Committee should consider new ideas such as a NATO resilience fund, a resilience advisory group, and a NATO-wide Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) to identify key resilience risks. The European Union’s renewed focus on resilience and the unique levers it possesses — from financial instruments to regulatory powers — make it well placed to act boldly, in continued close cooperation with NATO. These efforts also boost allies’ responses to generational challenges in NATO’s Strategic Concept, such as green energy and the digital transition.
+
+Enhancing military resilience through NATO is not enough; each ally must confront the societal challenge of war preparedness based on its own strategic culture. New allies Finland and Sweden offer a new wave of expertise based on their advanced approaches to whole-of-society resilience and civil preparedness. Above all, NATO allies must find the “will to fight,” which — as Ukraine has shown — remains the foundation of defense.
+
+
+### Is NATO Ready for War?
+
+The detailed assessments above are summarized in Table 3 and discussed below. A simple rating of “on track” or “off track” is used because the commitments made by NATO allies in Madrid were not scheduled for completion in Washington. As one analysis put it: “the alliance’s journey toward stronger defense and deterrence has only just begun.”
+
+
+
+What does this assessment tell us about NATO’s readiness for war? The answer to this question depends on the kind of war that emerges from any crisis. It seems clear that NATO is ready to “fight tonight.” The transition to the DDA and the regional plans adopted in Vilnius have driven a step change in the scale of NATO’s forces which are combat ready, deployed forward, and under SACEUR’s direct command.
+
+Expanding to eight EFP missions and reinforcing air and maritime presence has empowered NATO to swiftly assemble a significant fighting force along the eastern front in crises, fostering a cultural shift among allies. Meanwhile, NATO’s C2 has evolved quickly and demonstrated readiness through large-scale exercises. The NFM has led to a revolution in apportioning high-readiness national forces to NATO at a scale 10 times greater than before. Above all, NATO has successfully integrated Finland and Sweden, adding significant air, naval, and land combat power and removing any uncertainty over their contribution to an Article 5 scenario.
+
+However, a closer look at the longer-term measures agreed upon in Madrid reveals a slightly different question: NATO might be ready for war, but is it ready for protracted war? Any permutation of a serious Russia-NATO conflict that does not end quickly will become a clash of not just armies, but societies. This becomes a competition in resilience and preparedness, industrial capacity and supply chains, magazine depth, logistics, mass, resources, and especially the “will to fight.” The halting progress and ongoing challenges to increase defense spending, transform defense industrial capacity, address critical capability gaps, and bolster national resilience — all required to strengthen deterrence and defense — must be acknowledged, addressed, and overcome. As SACEUR Cavoli recently clarified, the key question for NATO is not about Russian reconstitution per se, but relative to the alliance’s own deterrence and defense reconstitution. As Clausewitz reminds us in his “two wrestlers” metaphor, all strategy is dynamic and relative.
+
+In reconstituting their forces, NATO allies face the perennial challenge of balancing the “iron triangle” of trade-offs between readiness, modernization, and force structure. For NATO, this might be adjusted as shown in Figure 5. In essence, allies must balance short-term force increases (“fight tonight”) and long-term modernization efforts (“fight tomorrow”), all while preparing for protraction. For example, compare Poland’s efforts to soon field the biggest army in Europe with the United Kingdom’s focus on becoming a “Science and Tech Superpower” by 2030. This trade-off is neither new nor binary, but the nature of the Russian threat makes it critical. The answer will depend on the judgment of NATO allies as to when Russia might be able and willing to attack. The diverse range of assessments and inherent uncertainty of this task make it challenging, but NATO’s war readiness will depend on the type of conflict that arises. It seems clear that NATO is ready to “fight tonight.”
+
+
+
+A final question raised by this analysis is the paradigm within which NATO allies are planning to meet their Madrid commitments. The 2022 Strategic Concept put forward defense back on NATO’s agenda, but for all its qualities, allied forward presence is “still a tripwire.” Even if the Madrid commitments were fulfilled completely, NATO’s forward presence would likely still fall short of the denial standard required to make a Russian fait accompli untenable. The strategy would then be “expel, not repel,” when the reverse is far preferable. The alliance would be placing all of its eggs in the basket of nuclear deterrence, with all the catastrophic associated risks.
+
+As NATO leaders gather in Washington this summer, they should celebrate their significant progress in fulfilling the commitments made in Madrid to bolster allied deterrence and defense. They should also push for improvements in key areas underpinning NATO’s readiness for a protracted war: defense spending, industrial capacity, critical capability gaps, and national resilience. Furthermore, they should reconsider whether the level of ambition they set in Madrid is high enough. In the Cold War, NATO’s strategy rested just as much on a robust forward defense “shield” as it did on its “sword” of nuclear deterrence. Times have changed, but not that much. Si vis pacem, para bellum.
+
+---
+
+__Sean Monaghan__ is a visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
+
+__Eskil Jakobsen__ is the Stuart Center visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS.
+
+__Sissy Martinez__ is a program manager and research associate for the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS.
+
+__Mathieu Droin__ is a visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS.
+
+__Gregory Sanders__ is deputy director and fellow with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS.
+
+__Nicholas Velazquez__ is a research assistant with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS.
+
+__Cynthia Cook___ is director of the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group and a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS.
+
+__Anna Dowd__ is an adjunct fellow (non-resident) with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS.
+
+__Maeve Sockwell__ is an intern with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-11-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-90.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-11-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-90.md
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+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-11-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-90.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : 【黎智英案・審訊第 90 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date : 2024-06-11 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+- 控方完成案情 黎智英要求法庭裁表證不成立 案件押後至7.24續審
+
+
+
+
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（11日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第90日審訊。控方正式表示完成控方案情；黎智英一方將有中段陳詞，要求法庭裁定3項控罪表證不成立。控辯雙方將於6月提交書面陳詞，早前定於7月9日作口頭陳詞，惟法官另有工作要處理，故改於7月24及25日續審。
+
+甫開庭，法官杜麗冰表示於6月7日收到黎智英代表律師事務所羅拔臣的信件，要求法庭批准黎智英缺席今天聆訊，又指黎乃自願缺席，而在他有法律代表的情況下，他的權利不會受到影響。杜官表示，考慮到今天聆訊的性質，只是處理翻譯文本的問題，並沒有重要事項，而且黎有法律代表保障其權利，因此批准黎毋須出席今天聆訊。
+
+控方向法庭提交經修訂的翻譯文本和證物列表，其後正式表示完成控方案情。
+
+黎智英一方將有中段陳詞，要求法庭裁定3項控罪表證不成立。早前經控辯雙方商討，黎一方須於6月18日向法庭提交書面中段陳詞，控方則須於6月25日提交陳詞，之後黎一方須於7月2日提交回應控方的書面陳詞。
+
+法庭早前定於7月9日庭上聽取口頭陳詞，惟法官李運騰今表示有其他案件需要處理，故改期至7月24及25日續審。
+
+代表「蘋果日報有限公司」、「蘋果日報印刷有限公司」及「蘋果互聯網有限公司」的大律師王國豪則早前表示不會有中段陳詞。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC51/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-12-avoid-a-war-of-attrition.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-12-avoid-a-war-of-attrition.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Avoid A War Of Attrition
+author: Oleksandr V Danylyuk
+date : 2024-06-12 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/eAaV9Ic.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "How to Build Ukraine’s Military Effectiveness and Avoid a War of Attrition"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_With Russia increasingly pressing its numerical advantage, Ukraine and its partners need to devise a new strategy for strengthening Ukraine’s defence if they are to avoid playing to Russia’s strengths in an attritional conflict._
+
+
+
+Despite all the attempts of the West and especially the US to avoid further escalation in the Russo-Ukrainian war, Russia is not going to abandon its original plans to destroy Ukraine and is making all possible efforts to achieve this goal. Even colossal losses in personnel and military equipment have not forced Moscow to abandon its goal (as of May 2024, Russian losses amounted to over 500,000 servicemen, over 7,000 tanks, over 14,000 armoured combat vehicles, over 13,000 artillery systems, hundreds of aircraft and helicopters, and dozens of warships). The number of Russian troops located on the territory of Ukraine has increased from 140,000 that participated in the invasion in February 2022 to almost 650,000, with over 2,500 tanks, over 5,000 armoured combat vehicles, and over 3,500 artillery systems. This figure does not include Russian units carrying out aggression against Ukraine from the territory of Russia itself, in particular from the territory of the Bryansk and Belgorod regions.
+
+In the current operation against Kharkiv alone, which was launched by the Russians in May 2024, about 50,000 troops are involved. Fortunately, the Russian operation has not yet been very successful, and has already turned into another large battle for a small Ukrainian town, this time the town of Vovchansk, which is located on the border with Russia. Even so, an attempted new offensive against Kharkiv – Ukraine’s second-largest city with a population of over 1.4 million, located only 30 km from the Russian border – and a possible attack on Sumy, another regional centre 20 km from the border, is undoubtedly a significant escalation, and requires a rethinking of approaches to the war with Russia, both for Ukraine and its allies. Trying to win a war with Russia at the expense of only a symmetrical mass increase is a flawed strategy, given that Russia has a larger number of human reserves (about 30 million people in Russia, compared to about 8 million people in Ukraine), significant stockpiles of weapons and military equipment inherited from the USSR or built by 2022, as well as a developed defence-industrial complex and a powerful mining industry that satisfies its needs for a significant amount of strategic materials. Undoubtedly, Russian models are inferior to Western ones in quality, but Russia is clearly winning the competition with the West in the mass and cheap production of weapons and military equipment.
+
+In such a situation, when achieving a simple numerical advantage over the enemy is impossible, the main priority of the joint efforts of Ukraine and its international partners should be to increase the military effectiveness of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). Full military effectiveness in this context should be understood as the ability to achieve maximum combat power at the expense of resources that are available not only physically, but also politically, and so it is important to focus not only on tactical and operational effectiveness, but also strategic and political effectiveness. Combat power, in turn, is the ability to inflict damage on the enemy in the amount necessary to achieve the goals of the war, while at the same time limiting the damage that the enemy can inflict in response. To assess the current state of the military effectiveness of the AFU, the methodology proposed by Allan Millet, Williamson Murray and Kenneth Watman in 1986 – if adapted to today’s conditions – remains extremely helpful.
+
+___`Russia’s latest offensive against Kharkiv is undoubtedly a significant escalation, and requires a rethinking of approaches to the war both for Ukraine and its allies`___
+
+The political effectiveness of a military organisation consists of its ability to receive financial support, the provision of weapons and military equipment, and the replenishment of human forces in the volume and quality necessary to eliminate existing threats. For the AFU, this means first of all the ability to convince Ukraine’s international partners both to increase military-technical assistance and to lift restrictions on the supply of certain weapons to Ukraine, as well as restrictions on how they can be used. The political effectiveness of the AFU remains insufficient, as Ukraine’s defence needs are currently only partially met. Since decisions on increasing aid and increasing investment in the defence industry are made by the political leadership of partner countries, which mostly do not have professional military expertise, it is extremely important to involve representatives of the armed forces of these countries in the assessment of Ukraine’s needs in order to confirm the validity of such requests. At the same time, the provision of Ukraine’s defence needs cannot depend exclusively on Western aid. Increasing the political effectiveness of the AFU requires the Ukrainian military to convince the government of Ukraine of the need for unpopular decisions related to mobilisation, as well as searching for new ways of obtaining weapons that would involve direct financial obligations on Ukraine’s part, such as, for example, lend-lease.
+
+The strategic effectiveness of a military organisation comprises its ability to achieve national goals determined by the political leadership through the use of military force. The calculation of the necessary resources also depends on these goals. The AFU are in an extremely difficult situation, as the political leaderships of both Ukraine and its partner countries see these goals in different ways, which negatively affects the ability of the AFU to develop and implement a military strategy aimed at achieving them. The leadership of Ukraine aims to liberate the country’s entire territory. Such a goal is undeniably fair and rational, but it ignores the fact that the liberation of territory does not necessarily mean the end of the war. Since neither Ukraine nor its partners are aiming for the complete defeat and occupation of Russia, even after the liberation of all of Ukraine’s territories, Russia will retain the ability to continue aggression against Ukraine, to conduct military operations from its territory, and to launch missile and bomb attacks on civilian infrastructure. The political leadership of Ukraine’s partner countries, in particular the US, ideally wants to force Russia into negotiations, at which point a decision will be made to end hostilities, but the issue of the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Ukraine will not be discussed. Such a goal, despite the fact that it seems more achievable, also does not create the conditions for long-term peace, and will be viewed by Russia as a tactical respite which can be used to restore and build capabilities and plan a new phase of aggression, as was the case with the Minsk agreements.
+
+It is obvious that ending the war with Russia requires reaching such a moment when the aggressor has no ability or desire to continue it and is forced to withdraw troops from the territory of Ukraine with or without concluding a new peace agreement (as happened with the US in Vietnam in 1972 , or with the Soviet Union in Central Europe in the early 1990s). Accordingly, bringing Russia to a state of inability/unwillingness to continue the war should be the basis of a grand strategy that encompasses all means available to Ukraine and its partners, including non-military ones. The military strategy, as the most important part of the grand strategy, should in turn be aimed at inflicting unacceptable damage on Russia through the use of the AFU.
+
+The size and structure of the AFU, as well as the volumes and types of weapons and military equipment needed, must be calculated in accordance with such a military strategy. The industrial base, production capabilities, and access to strategic materials necessary for the production of weapons are an integral part of strategic effectiveness and require significant improvement. When planning a military strategy, maximum effectiveness can be achieved by identifying the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities and directing efforts towards their exploitation. Ukraine’s asymmetric naval strategy, which has already made it possible to destroy several dozen Russian ships with relatively cheap naval drones and forced the Russian Navy to significantly reduce its operations in the Black Sea, is a brilliant example of such an approach. NATO has historically had and still maintains air superiority over Russia, so increasing the aviation capabilities of the Air Force of Ukraine at the expense of a significant number of Western systems would be a completely logical and achievable step in the short term. NATO has at its disposal a large number of such systems, as well as air-to-air missiles, and could provide these systems to Ukraine, even temporarily. The number of pilots of the Air Force of Ukraine who have already been trained to pilot these systems is not an obstacle in this case, since among the foreigners (including citizens of countries that are not members of NATO) who have shown a readiness to join the International Legion of the AFU, there are many former pilots with such experience. These individuals could combine combat sorties with instructor work for a time.
+
+Operational effectiveness in the conditions of modern large-scale warfare, characterised by a high level of innovation, requires the leadership of the AFU to be able to identify and implement useful technologies extremely quickly, as well as to change operational concepts and doctrines taking into account constant technological changes, finding ways to combine old and new platforms in a combined arms battle. In modern warfare, the side that is able to adapt to these changes more quickly has a tremendous advantage. Such adaptability also requires a readiness on the part of military leaders for personal discomfort associated with the need to abandon old methods, approaches and even systems that have lost their relevance in modern conditions. Operational concepts must be developed in order to achieve the military strategy and meet its requirements. The same flexibility and willingness to quickly adapt to new challenges is also necessary for Ukraine’s partners. This concerns, first of all, their ability to quickly improve military equipment not only because Ukraine needs it, but also because the security of the partners themselves depends on its improvement. The current pace of this improvement is completely unsatisfactory, and the approaches to identifying and eliminating the shortcomings of such systems require a complete revision.
+
+___`The lack of a strategy for victory will turn this war into a war of attrition for Ukraine, which completely coincides with Russian interests`___
+
+Tactical effectiveness, the improvement of which is given the most attention, is the last in this list and should be fully subordinated to the logic of the general military strategy and operational concepts aimed at its achievement. Otherwise, the conflict between tactics and strategy usually leads to strategic rather than tactical inefficiencies. In addition, tactics must take into account the presence or absence of operational capabilities. This problem is particularly noticeable in the development and training of Ukrainian military personnel. For example, the training of Ukrainian ground units in 2023 was largely focused on practicing assault actions as part of small groups, rather than on offensive operations as part of large units during a breakthrough of the enemy’s deep defence, which did not correspond to the original plans for the counteroffensive. The training programme carried out by Ukraine’s Western partners was also overly concerned for a long time with actions in the conditions of the stabilisation phase of the war, which is an integral part of expeditionary operations but does not make any sense when liberating one’s own territories. Moreover, such training causes military personnel to develop reflexes that may even be harmful in the context of a major conventional war. In general, the tactical training of the AFU does not fully take into account the nature of the current confrontation, and is also not sufficiently aimed at exploiting the enemy’s weaknesses.
+
+In summary, the biggest obstacle to improving the effectiveness of the AFU is the lack of a clear and agreed-upon grand strategy for winning the war by Ukraine and its partners, as well as a military strategy, which is an integral component of this. This is due, first of all, to a lack of clear political goals accepted by all of Ukraine’s partners, which would ensure not only the liberation of its territory, but also long-term security in Europe. In the absence of such goals, a grand strategy and a general military strategy for victory in this war, the planning of individual operations, the assessment and provision of the needs of the AFU, the development of training programmes and preparation, and the introduction of new tactical techniques can at best support Ukraine’s ability to conduct the war, but not to win it. The lack of a strategy for victory will turn this war into a war of attrition for Ukraine, which completely coincides with Russian interests.
+
+---
+
+__Oleksandr V. Danylyuk__ is the Associate Fellow - Expert in Russian multidimensional warfare. Danylyuk closely cooperated for many years with the Ukrainian government structures in the defence, security and intelligence sectors. In 2014, he was the Chief Advisor to the Minister of Defense of Ukraine. He subsequently served as a Special Advisor to the Head of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine, Assistant to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and for many years was also a member of the Parliamentary Working Group on Countering Hybrid Threats. For the past few years, he has been the coordinator of the Ukraine-NATO platform for the early detection and countering of hybrid threats.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-12-reimagining-the-g7.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-12-reimagining-the-g7.md
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+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-12-reimagining-the-g7.md
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Reimagining The G7
+author: John J. Hamre, et al.
+date : 2024-06-12 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/aTjPttx.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "“Bending” the Architecture: Reimagining the G7"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The global governance system is in disarray. The UN Security Council is frozen by geopolitical rivalry and two wars. Other institutions such as the G20 and World Trade Organization (WTO) are underperforming._ _Time does not allow for building a new governance institution — but requires the “bending” of existing ones to meet the moment. This CSIS report speaks to the global need to elevate the Group of Seven (G7), a bloc of industrialized democracies — the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the European Union — to foster a more stable and predictable world order. The report offers recommendations on reimagining the future G7 as a critical institution of global governance, focused on agenda setting, institutionalization, and membership of the body._
+
+- Over the last half-decade, G7 leadership summits have identified nine global priorities: (1) the Indo-Pacific; (2) economic resilience and security; (3) food security; (4) digital competitiveness; (5) climate; (6) Ukraine; (7) sustainable development; (8) disarmament and non-proliferation; and (9) labor.
+
+- The G7’s scope has expanded, but its representation of the global economy and population has declined, highlighting the need for reform to enhance capabilities and legitimacy without sacrificing the G7’s trademark informality, trust, and effectiveness.
+
+- The G7 should create an informal “troika” of the previous, current, and next G7 hosts to manage a consensus-based approach to agenda setting. This ensures consistency and follow-through on issues from one host to the next.
+
+- The G7 should expand membership to include Australia and South Korea. They bring significant capabilities to the nine priorities identified by G7 leaders, are like-minded partners, and display the trust and reliability required of G7 members. These two countries perform as well, if not better than, current G7 members in the nine priority issue areas. They also address Europe’s overrepresentation and Asia’s severe underrepresentation in the group.
+
+- The G7 might recognize other high-performing actors (e.g., Spain) as dialogue partners or associate members. The G7 should also consider consolidation of the European Council and European Commission into one seat.
+
+- The G7 should establish a formal leader-level outreach mechanism to the Global South and middle-power economies to demonstrate inclusivity and confer legitimacy on the body as a global governance institution. The outreach partners should include the African Union, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China, the G20, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).
+
+While the current G7, a decade old in its practices and membership, has performed admirably, the pace of change engendered by new disruptive technologies and old geopolitical rivalries now requires innovation beyond comfort for some. Inaction precipitates a vacuum that may be filled with forms of rule that are less desirable and even dangerous. The recommendations contained in this report are necessary pre-requisites for the incarnation of tomorrow’s G7 global governance mission.
+
+
+### A WORLD IN TURMOIL
+
+At a time of global turmoil when traditional institutions of global governance are underperforming, the Group of Seven (G7), a bloc of industrialized democracies which includes the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, is needed now more than ever to foster a more stable and predictable world order.
+
+This CSIS report offers recommendations to empower a future G7 as a critical institution of global governance. The work presented here is a non-partisan and collaborative effort of CSIS expertise on Asia, Europe, sustainable development, and economics. The authors sought advice and critical input from almost three dozen former G7 point persons — so-called sherpas, sous-sherpas, and yaks — and representatives of the G7, European, and Asian diplomatic communities. This report does not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of these participants.
+
+The international system is changing at a pace not seen since the end of World War II. In the geostrategic space, wars in Europe and the Middle East, cohesion among a bloc of autocratic powers, and heightened proliferation threaten a new Cold War and pose major challenges to the peaceful status quo. At the same time, emerging and critical global issues such as artificial intelligence (AI), resilient supply chains, advances in synthetic biology, pandemic preparedness, and sustainable development demand new standards and norms, as well as cooperative and sustained action.
+
+The current architecture of global governance is ill-suited to meet these challenges and opportunities. The United Nations, particularly the UN Security Council (UNSC), has failed to address human rights abuses, anti-democratic behavior, and aggression globally. The G20, once a stabilizing force that helped address the 1997 Asian liquidity crisis and the 2007–08 global financial crisis, is now hamstrung by geopolitical rivalry. The WTO, established to uphold rules and norms for the global trading system, has expanded membership to more than 160 countries, making it difficult to make decisions or enact the reforms necessary to regulate the current trade landscape. Changes in the operative space of the international system have led large emerging and middle powers to organize a proliferation of ad hoc groupings, including the Quad, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, AUKUS, U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateralism, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Others, such as the BRICS partnerships, are also growing in membership and seeking to diminish their dependency on the U.S. dollar. Likewise, the G20 has welcomed the African Union to its ranks. Though these minilaterals allow new forums for marginalized voices, they are not yet in a position to set new rules of the road or replace institutions such as the UNSC or WTO.
+
+Dealing with these potentially existential issues will require a level of trust and capability, as well as a track record of working together. It will take real conversations among leaders, not a set of talking points or a lowest-common-denominator joint statement to produce solutions that are lacking in these larger groupings.
+
+Trying to devise a new institution would take decades, with no promise of success. The current pace of change in world affairs requires a “bending” of existing institutions to meet the challenges of global governance. As a grouping of like-minded, advanced industrialized democracies, the G7 is the only institution today that can step into this role. But this requires a reimagination of the G7 not of the past two decades but of the next two, that can find solutions to global problems, capitalize on future opportunities, and engage with critical voices from emerging and middle-power economies. This report offers recommendations focused on agenda setting, institutionalization, and membership of the body.
+
+
+### THE GLOBAL ROLE OF THE G7
+
+G7 leaders have come a long way since their initial gathering in 1975 to address the oil shock and to coordinate monetary policies. In the past few years, the G7 leaders’ statements have taken on a more urgent, expansive, and unified tone as the world has grappled with a range of existential issues, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, multiple financial crises, climate change, supply chain resilience, and wars in Ukraine and Gaza. In the past few years, it has become clear that the significant global challenges today have created demands for the G7 to actively execute across its expansive domain of responsibilities. Table 1 lists the top nine global priority issues of the G7 leaders over the past half-decade, derived from text analysis of G7 leaders’ statements between 2018 and 2023.
+
+There is no denying that G7 leaders are willing to shoulder global responsibilities to meet the demands of a new era. Yet at the same time, the G7 commands a smaller portion of the global constituency. Even as the G7’s agenda has grown global, its representation as a share of the world’s population and global economy has declined over time, raising questions about its legitimacy outside of advanced industrialized democracies. At the same time, global challenges highlight the need for other capable countries to step up and help shoulder the burden of an expanded agenda.
+
+This confluence of necessities — the need for the G7’s expanded scope, the need for effective institutions of global governance on the international stage, and the need for more inclusive representation of actors to manage the global challenges ranging from war to pandemics to the AI race — requires the G7 to “bend” and embrace a set of reforms to meet the moment. Reform and reimagination of the G7 will have to be done in a way to maintain the pieces that make it an effective and special grouping but allow it to effectuate its expanded scope and be an effective leadership organization.
+
+
+_▲ __Table 1: Top Nine Priorities of G7 Leaders, 2018 vs. 2023.__ Source: CSIS Korea Chair analysis of G7 communiqués and statements._
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1: G7 Leaders’ Priorities by Topic, 2018–2023.__ Source: CSIS Korea Chair analysis of G7 communiqués and statements._
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 2: The G7’s Declining Share of the World Economy and Global Population, 1975–2022.__ Source: Data aggregated by CSIS Korea Chair from [“GDP (current US$),” World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD); and [“Population,” World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL)._
+
+
+### RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REIMAGINING THE G7
+
+#### RECOMMENDATION 1
+#### Create a Consensus-Based Approach for G7 Agenda Setting
+
+Traditionally, the G7 has been an informal grouping. Former sherpas praise the informality as contributing to the grouping’s flexibility, nimbleness, frank consultative process, and ability to act quickly on issues.
+
+The downside, however, is that informality leads to inefficiency around agenda setting and discontinuity from presidency to presidency. For example, the 2023 Hiroshima G7 statement laid out an ambitious global agenda for member countries ranging from AI norms to cyber defenses to economic security, but the agenda for the 2024 Apulia G7 meeting, chaired by Italy, largely ignored these issues and has turned to migration from North Africa. While both sets of issues are important, the discontinuity in the agenda-setting function is suboptimal. It conveys confusing signals to the international community, precipitates a lack of follow-through, and exacerbates a lack of oversight on announced commitments.
+
+- Create an informal “troika” of past, current, and upcoming G7 hosts to complement the work of individual country secretariats.
+
+ While respecting the privilege of the host country to shape the annual agenda, the informal troika’s main focus would be to ensure the continuity of core issues, including economic security, emerging technology, China, and Ukraine. These issues may change over time as they are resolved or as new challenges arise.
+
+- Build a task force structure for key, pressing issues to ensure continuity and follow-through.
+
+ Task force-like structures, in the form of working groups, expert groups, and other such forums, already exist within the G7, but these could be repurposed in a way to ensure (1) completion of commitments from previous G7 presidencies; and (2) the tracking of agenda items for follow-on work in the next G7 presidency. Since approximately 2010, the G7 has had in place a mechanism to track accountability for G7 commitments to global development, but no such mechanism to track accountability for other political and economic commitments exists. This could be accomplished through explicit task forces, which could change focus and composition as needed. For example, G7 governments could explicitly agree to sunset task forces after a set number of years, and G7 members could also introduce new task forces to address emerging challenges.
+
+- Consider a bifurcated agenda process.
+
+ This process would include two to three items that are core interests to the greater G7 and one to two items of critical importance to the host. The agenda could be determined by the G7 “troika” — consisting of the current G7 president alongside the countries holding the most recent and the upcoming G7 presidency — with input from other G7 countries through existing consultation mechanisms.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 3: A Brief History of G7 Membership.__ Source: [“About the G7,” G7 Italia 2024](https://www.g7italy.it/en/about-g7/); [“The History of the G7,” Federal Government of Germany](https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/service/the-history-of-the-g7-397438); and [“G7/Summit of The Eight: History and Purpose,” U.S. Department of State, June 3, 1997](https://1997-2001.state.gov/issues/economic/summit/fs_summit_history.html)._
+
+#### RECOMMENDATION 2
+#### Expand the G7 to Include Australia and South Korea
+
+The current composition of the G7, now a decade old, represents a declining portion of the world’s population and global economy. Moreover, changes in the G7’s membership have been part of the organization’s identity as it has evolved over time to meet different challenges (Figure 3).
+
+Increasing membership is not without controversy. Some former sherpas see it as a potential slippery slope where the G7’s effectiveness is sacrificed for the desire for greater inclusiveness and representation.
+
+Two factors, however, weigh in favor of expansion. First, the extent to which the G7 members have enlarged the scope of their responsibilities requires new players with critical capabilities to fulfill the mission. Second, the G7’s current membership is disproportionately dominated by Europe (six out of nine seats, including the European Council and European Commission); has only one country to represent the whole of Asia; and excludes any voice representing the developing world. This composition is ill-suited for a reimagined G7 to play the role of the preeminent institution of global governance.
+
+Australia and South Korea fall in the “sweet spot” of expanded G7 membership and enhanced effectiveness. Former sherpas argued that any new members must support the G7’s mission, share its political values, be responsible stewards of the international economy, and have the capabilities, commitment, and, importantly, the trust of the other G7 members. Australia and South Korea, respectively the 12th- and 13th-largest economies in the world, easily meet this bar.
+
+- Trust and Responsibility: Both Australia and South Korea have demonstrated records as trustworthy and responsible public goods providers.
+
+ The two U.S. allies have fought on the side of democracy and a rules-based order in every major war since World War I and the Korean War, respectively. They have been exemplary leaders in contending with challenges that preoccupy the G7 leaders. Today, Australia has stood up like no other to unfair economic coercion by China, and it is instrumental to the critical mineral resiliency of the industrialized democracies. South Korea is a major provider of economic and indirect military assistance to Ukraine, and it is a critical player in protecting emerging technology supply chains. Both have demonstrated a leadership role in a host of global issues prioritized by the G7 (Figure 4). Both have been constructive members of the G20, demonstrating strong cooperation with the United States across administrations.
+
+- Performance: Australia and South Korea are outperforming some current G7 members in areas deemed critical to G7 leaders.
+
+ Former sherpas noted that any new members must enhance, not detract from, the effectiveness of the G7. At the outset of the G4/5, the original members had outsized influence and economic prowess, but that is not the case today. New members should be more representative of the type of advanced and industrialized economies of the future to be fit to deal with those challenges.
+
+ Figures 5 and 6 show how Australia and South Korea are outperforming several current members on the nine priorities identified by the G7 over the last half-decade of leaders’ statements.
+
+- Representation and Values: Australia and South Korea “balance out” the non-European composition of industrialized democracies.
+
+ A reimagined G7 should be more representative of the world as it is and will be, not as it was. The current G7 is Eurocentric and has only one Asian nation representing the entire region. As Figure 2 shows, and as suggested in the performance criteria, the G7’s share of the world economy and population is declining, calling into question how its members could speak for markets larger than them in terms of GDP or population size. Australia and South Korea would bring representation for two advanced countries in the Indo-Pacific region, with the latter demonstrating significant advancements in the economies of the future, including computing, AI, and technology.
+
+- Recognize other high-performing actors.
+
+ The metrics in Figure 6 show that other European countries, such as Spain, perform respectably in the nine priority areas identified by G7 leaders and could be considered as regular dialogue partners. The G7 should consolidate representation from the European Council and European Commission, which now occupy two seats.
+
+#### RECOMMENDATION 3
+#### Establish a Formal G7 Outreach Mechanism
+
+Any expansion of the G7, whether to a G9 or beyond, will be met with staunch criticism by some within and outside of the body. Outreach to the so-called Global South, and emerging and middle-power economies, is necessary if a reimagined G7 were to truly fulfill the role of becoming the preeminent global governance institution. The tradition of consultation with developing countries might be institutionalized as an official consultation by the annual G7 president and foreign or finance ministers, as well as both before and after the convening of the leaders’ meeting. This would ensure linkages with developing economies, demonstrate inclusivity, and confer more credibility and legitimacy on the G7. The issue areas in the near term should focus on pursuing development and climate goals, implementing new norms and standards (e.g., AI and emerging technologies), and strategic signaling and shaping, particularly with respect to China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. This outreach should be extended to the African Union, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China, the G20, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).
+
+These organizations and countries represent voices from Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Islamic world, ensuring better communication but also limiting the size of the G7 to ensure the optimal equilibrium in maintaining the G7’s effectiveness.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 4: Australia’s and South Korea’s Convening Roles in Priority G7 Issues.__ Source: CSIS Korea Chair._
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 5: Ranking of Country Performance along Identified Issue Areas.__ Source: CSIS Korea Chair._
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 6: Comparison of Country Performance across Identified Priority G7 Issue Areas.__ Source: CSIS Korea Chair._
+
+
+### CONCLUSION
+
+The scope of disruption brought on by new emerging technologies as well as old geopolitical rivalries and territorial aggression presages that the world of tomorrow will not look like the world of today. Current institutions have proven incapable of carving out a path forward that capitalizes on the opportunities created by disruption and also guards against the erosion or even usurping of the core values, norms, and ethics of the rules-based order established after World War II. A confluence of forces has made it incumbent upon a reimagined G7 to fill the leadership void. While the current G7, now a decade old in its practices and membership, has performed admirably, the pace of change now cresting requires innovation beyond what may seem comfortable to some. Inaction, moreover, precipitates a vacuum that others may seek to fill with less desirable and even dangerous forms of rule. The recommendations contained in this report are by no means comprehensive, but they are necessary prerequisites for the incarnation of tomorrow’s G7 as the preeminent institution of global governance.
+
+---
+
+__John Hamre__ was elected president and CEO of CSIS in January 2000.
+
+__Victor Cha__ is senior vice president for Asia and Korea Chair at CSIS. He is also the distinguished university professor and professor of government at Georgetown University.
+
+__Emily Benson__ is director of Project on Trade and Technology, and senior fellow of Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS, where she focuses on trade, investment, and technology issues primarily in the transatlantic context.
+
+__Max Bergmann__ is the director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and the Stuart Center in Euro-Atlantic and Northern European Studies at CSIS.
+
+__Erin Murphy__ is a senior fellow for the Asia Program at CSIS. She has spent her career in several public and private sector roles, including as an analyst on Asian political and foreign policy issues at the Central Intelligence Agency, director for the Indo-Pacific at the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, founder and principal of her boutique advisory firm focused on Myanmar, and an English teacher with the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Program in Saga, Japan.
+
+__Caitlin Welsh__ is the director of the Global Food and Water Security Program at CSIS, where she analyzes the drivers and consequences of food and water insecurity around the world, including for U.S. national security. Her specific areas of focus include the impacts of Russia’s war in Ukraine on global food security and nutrition, food insecurity in the U.S. military, and the coherence between U.S. global water security policy and U.S. global food security policy.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-13-dilemma-of-aid-to-afghanistan.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-13-dilemma-of-aid-to-afghanistan.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Dilemma Of Aid To Afghanistan
+author: Daniel F. Runde, et al.
+date : 2024-06-13 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/5KWUNeD.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The Future of Assistance for Afghanistan: A Dilemma"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Three years after the fall of Kabul, international assistance for Afghanistan is at a crossroads. As donor fatigue sets in and aid dwindles, stakeholders must grapple with how to address the country’s critical humanitarian needs without legitimizing the Taliban’s rule._
+
+
+
+Afghanistan has largely disappeared from the news, but it remains at the center of one of the world’s most persistent, severe, and complex humanitarian crises. Almost three years after the Taliban retook power in August 2021, Afghanistan has achieved a moderate degree of stability but remains in a highly precarious position. Taliban leaders inherited tremendous macroeconomic problems when they assumed control of the country. Before the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, foreign aid was equivalent to 40 percent of the nation’s GDP and financed over half of the government’s $6 billion annual budget and 75 to 80 percent of total public expenditures. The sudden regime change was followed by the abrupt withdrawal of all international aid, plunging the country into economic free fall and precipitating a catastrophic humanitarian crisis.
+
+The shock to Afghanistan’s economy was compounded by immediate diplomatic and financial isolation. Consistent with long-standing U.S. and UN sanctions against Taliban leaders, many of whom were named to key cabinet positions, the United States and Europe froze nearly $9.5 billion of Afghanistan’s external reserves, leaving the Afghan central bank, Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), deprived of assets and cut off from the global financial system. This resulted in an acute liquidity crisis, the cessation of normal financial transactions with foreign banks, and the immobilization of the country’s commercial banking sector. In order to protect some of the frozen funds from being claimed as damages by family members of September 11 victims, who had won a $7 billion default judgment against the Taliban in 2011, the Biden administration diverted $3.5 billion of these assets to establish the Swiss-based Fund for the Afghan People, or Afghan Fund, with the intention of using targeted disbursements to support Afghanistan’s macroeconomic and financial stability. As of 2024, however, the fund remains untapped.
+
+The multidimensional crises facing Afghanistan present a dilemma for the international community. An underlying assumption is that the Taliban will remain in power for at least the immediate future, which will require workarounds and tough compromises if the plight of Afghanistan’s people is to be alleviated to any degree. The large-scale influx of humanitarian aid since the end of 2021 has come largely in the form of physical shipments of U.S. dollars, delivered under the coordination of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to various UN agencies and UN-partnered international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating on the ground. The funds are used to pay staff salaries and procure food and supplies, including covering the costs of imports. As of this year, UN cash shipments remain a critical lifeline for an estimated 23.7 million people at risk in a nation of 41 million. The country’s modest degree of economic stabilization since 2021 is in large part owed to the weekly inflow of these donor funds, which have totaled more than $2.9 billion since the Taliban takeover.
+
+Although international assistance has prevented a further deterioration of conditions and helped stave off an even greater humanitarian disaster, the stability of the Afghan economy and the welfare of the Afghan people remain extremely tenuous. Afghanistan is one of the poorest and least developed nations in the world, ranked 182 out of 193 countries and territories on the Human Development Index. The initial economic collapse in 2021 has hardened into a state of chronic economic weakness: after weathering a 27 percent contraction in GDP between 2021 and 2023, the Afghan economy is now hovering in “no-growth territory,” propped up by foreign aid and highly vulnerable to shocks. According to the World Bank’s most recent Afghanistan Welfare Monitoring Survey, the unemployment rate among surveyed households was close to 20 percent as of April–June 2023, and there is “no reason to believe that more recent trends will be any better.” The loss of more than 700,000 jobs has been felt most acutely in Afghanistan’s cities, but Afghans in rural areas have been struggling to cope with floods, droughts, and earthquakes, as well as the devastating toll of the Taliban’s 2022 ban on the cultivation of opium poppy, Afghanistan’s most important agricultural product.
+
+The Afghan population is also facing economy-wide price deflation, currency shortages, weakened purchasing power, outbreaks of disease, damage to critical infrastructure, and the deterioration of basic public services. Afghans have limited access to shelter, education, healthcare, electricity, food, clean water, and sanitation systems, and roughly 6.3 million are internally displaced — the second-highest number in the world after Syria. Reports for 2024 by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) estimate that 15.8 million Afghans are experiencing acute food insecurity, 22.1 million require protection assistance, and 8.7 million children need education support. Pakistan’s decision to expel an estimated 1.3 million Afghan refugees in late 2023 added to the country’s burden, as approximately 515,000 Afghans have reentered the country between September 2023 and February 2024.
+
+The Taliban’s crackdown on individual freedoms — particularly those of women and girls — has worsened the countrywide crisis and interfered with the humanitarian response. The imposition of restrictions on female education, employment, dress, and freedom of movement and the segregation of men and women in public life have crippled humanitarian operations, obstructing access to essential services while raising the cost of their delivery. According to the 2023 annual U.S. Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Afghanistan, the Taliban regime’s restrictions extend to the exercise of free speech, the right to protest, and aspects of the Shia minority’s right to religious observance. Moreover, some former members of the Islamic Republic’s government and security forces have faced disappearance, imprisonment, and extrajudicial killings. Unmoved by sanctions or international pressure, the Taliban’s flagrant disregard for human rights poses a tremendous operational and moral challenge for donors and humanitarian actors, who struggle between providing lifesaving assistance despite the Taliban’s edicts or withholding funds and services in protest despite the impact on civilians.
+
+Compounding these challenges is the rapid decline in international support for Afghanistan in the context of growing donor fatigue. As other global crises draw the attention of the donor community, the plight of Afghanistan is fading increasingly into the background despite the country’s enormous needs. OCHA’s 2023 Humanitarian Needs Response Plan (HNRP) sought an initial budget of $4.6 billion — its highest-ever humanitarian funding appeal for a single country. This figure was later scaled down to $3.2 billion, a reduction attributable not to improved conditions but to severe shortfalls in funding. The staggering funding gap for the 2023 HNRP — which fell $2.96 billion short of the original budget and $1.59 billion short of the revised budget — does not bode well for the 2024 HNRP’s $3.1 billion funding target. As human rights violations and corruption concerns have become harder to ignore, heavyweight donors including the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and the Asian Development Bank have begun to sour on aid commitments. In 2023, the United Kingdom cut its Afghan aid budget by 76 percent, while Germany slashed its contributions by 93 percent. Even the United States — which appropriated upward of $2.5 billion for assistance to Afghanistan between October 2021 and September 2023 — has reduced its financial support, which dropped from $1.26 billion in 2022 to $377 million in 2023. As of May 9, 2024, the 2024 HNRP is only 15.9 percent funded.
+
+Relations with Afghanistan are now at an impasse. The international community continues to resist deeper engagement due to mounting concerns about rights protection, adherence to international law, and financial transparency. Meanwhile, the Taliban continue to appeal for political, diplomatic, and economic normalization without showing any intention of addressing the issues of concern to foreign donors, instead “framing calls by Western leaders to uphold international norms as the latest episode in a long history of interference and intervention.”
+
+The central challenge is finding a politically palatable middle ground between two bleak alternatives — engaging with the Taliban to assist the Afghan people or isolating Afghanistan and abandoning its vulnerable population. Given that isolation has been tried in the past to little effect, many have urged the West to avoid falling back on old strategies, which are unlikely to move a “pariah regime” that has proved defiant in the face of international condemnation. As the United States and its allies attempt to find the right balance between support for the population and pressure on the regime, they have to temper their economic punishments for the Taliban’s “increasingly flagrant human rights abuses” to mitigate the suffering of the Afghan people and prevent the country from tipping closer to collapse.
+
+___`The central challenge is finding a politically palatable middle ground between two bleak alternatives — engaging with the Taliban to assist the Afghan people or isolating Afghanistan and abandoning its vulnerable population.`___
+
+In a situation with no good options or easy decisions, the international community is struggling to find a viable path forward. There is a general consensus that ordinary Afghans should not be forgotten but that the current humanitarian-dominated assistance regime is unsustainable. If international aid is to continue and evolve as needed, there are five interrelated and overlapping issues that stakeholders will need to grapple with as they debate what form that aid should take.
+
+
+### Promoting the Rights of Women and Girls
+
+One of the most significant barriers to large-scale international donor assistance for Afghanistan — and to shifting from humanitarian aid to development aid in particular — is the deteriorating circumstances of Afghan women and girls. To the extent that Afghanistan does appear in the news, it is because of the Taliban’s draconian applications of sharia law — which include barbaric punishments for “moral crimes,” such as public stoning for adultery — and the enactment of a harsh set of measures that oppress women and girls to a degree tolerated nowhere else on earth. Since 2021, the Taliban’s repressive policies have included prohibiting female education beyond the sixth grade, barring women from civil service and NGO work, mandating the wearing of burkas, and requiring that women be accompanied by a mahram (a male relative guardian) in public. These edicts are not only egregious human rights violations but also major hindrances to the country’s long-term socioeconomic development. Estimates suggest that the de facto exclusion of women from public life will exacerbate the country’s “brain drain” — the flight of educated Afghans — and cost Afghanistan’s economy up to 5 percent of its GDP.
+
+Although the international community is in unanimous agreement that Afghanistan’s economic development hinges on the reinstatement of women’s rights, donors and stakeholders have been divided over the implications of human rights concerns for the continuation and expansion of international assistance programs in the country. Women and girls have been disproportionately affected by Afghanistan’s economic collapse and Taliban rule in virtually every dimension, making women and girls especially reliant on the continued delivery of direct humanitarian assistance and small-scale, private-sector development projects. Significant numbers of Western donors and humanitarian actors temporarily ceased, paused, or scaled down their operations as a mark of outrage, and some continue to advocate stricter conditionalities for any future or additional aid. Others have argued that the threat of further isolation is not a pragmatic or moral approach to alleviating the humanitarian crisis and reducing the burden on Afghanistan’s women. As the Taliban have doubled down on gender-based discrimination, donor strategies have sought to prioritize women and girls in the provision of essential services and development assistance.
+
+As foreign cash flows decline and assistance programs begin to emphasize the mobilization of the local private sector to meet humanitarian needs, targeted development assistance could be a more crucial lifeline for women, who experience higher rates of unemployment, face greater operational challenges as business owners, and have more difficulty accessing humanitarian relief. Ongoing World Bank and USAID programs have centered women in many project activities, rolling out educational courses, skills development programs, and targeted microfinance plans for women. Donors have also supported efforts to leverage the digital economy to provide women with alternative means of economic empowerment, the scaling up of which will depend on investments in digital public infrastructure and digital literacy programs. All these initiatives risk running afoul of the Taliban authorities, who have reportedly refused to renew business licenses for female entrepreneurs and may yet impose new policy restrictions on women’s participation in economic activities. Humanitarian actors are ultimately forced to walk a fine line between flouting the regime’s policies and attempting to work within them. Although more defiant approaches may be too out of touch with political reality to be effective, more pragmatic proposals, such as incentivizing the employment of women in the private sector by providing funds for segregated office spaces, are controversial for their perceived accommodation of the Taliban’s restrictions.
+
+There are no perfect options for protecting the rights and opportunities of women and girls in a context of humanitarian crisis and oppressive policies that UN officials have equated with “gender apartheid.” The international community must remain committed to supporting Afghan women and girls while recognizing that meaningful assistance will require a delicate balance of engagement, pressure, and humanitarian aid. Without progress on women’s rights and inclusion, the Taliban risk jeopardizing Western donors’ willingness to provide development assistance or eventual diplomatic recognition, both of which will be vital to Afghanistan’s ability to secure large-scale investment.
+
+
+_▲ People wait to receive a food donation in Kandahar on April 27, 2022._
+
+
+### Right-Sizing UN Cash Shipments and Humanitarian Aid
+
+With donor funds drying up, two particularly urgent, related concerns are (1) Afghanistan’s extreme reliance on foreign aid, which long predates the current humanitarian crisis, and (2) the issues associated with UN cash shipments, which were introduced as a temporary expedient but have persisted for well over two years. Worldwide, most humanitarian aid is intended as a temporary stopgap, allowing humanitarian actors to address the immediate needs of the population while buying time for more meaningful, long-term stabilization. Likewise, emergency cash shipments are not a lasting substitute for a functional banking sector and sustainable economic growth, and this form of aid financing is not normally allocated in ways that promote the development of effective governing institutions or the construction of the basic infrastructure needed to deliver healthcare, education, and vital human services.
+
+In the case of Afghanistan, the problems associated with long-term foreign aid dependence are particularly acute — and given the severity of the present humanitarian crisis and the country’s enormous structural problems, the risk of inertia is inordinately high. Humanitarian interventions alone cannot improve the situation for affected Afghans, leaving the population stuck in a cycle of repeated, protracted crises. The constraints related to the sanctions regime and international isolation have only exacerbated the Afghan economy’s weakness and the population’s reliance on international assistance. At the same time, large-scale humanitarian aid has allowed the Taliban to abdicate their responsibility to meet the needs of the Afghan people, effectively outsourcing the country’s social safety net to UN agencies and a handful of other international NGOs. With respect to the use of cash shipments, the weekly inflow of $40 million may have initially relieved pressure on Afghanistan’s moribund banking sector, but the money now stands in the way of the financial system’s revival. Although cash shipments have helped stabilize the local currency, an additional consequence is the Taliban regime’s accumulation of a large supply of U.S. dollars. The ban on the use of U.S. dollars in local transactions has required humanitarian agencies to exchange dollars for afghanis to fund their operations; because the local currency is in short supply, this has resulted in many private banks using UN-supplied dollars to purchase afghanis from the Taliban-controlled DAB.
+
+For donors, the risks, costs, and inefficiencies associated with regular cash shipments have become intolerable as a long-term assistance strategy — not least because the shipments can give the problematic appearance of “paying the Taliban,” undermining international statements of principles. This approach to aid financing incurs “substantial costs at every stage of the process,” including the conversion of European currencies into U.S. dollars, air shipment costs, security costs, bank fees, administrative overheads, and so on. Donors also have limited visibility over the administration and deployment of UN funds; with no reliable government structures in place, UN estimates of humanitarian needs have been issued without sufficient public accounting of the sources of data or the effectiveness, reliability, or presence of third-party monitoring and verification. Most UN assessments “grossly oversimplify” the population’s needs and the allocation of donor funds, providing an aggregate figure for the entire nation that fails to capture the enormous variations in need by area, demographic, and economic sector.
+
+Although UN agencies may be inclined to maintain the status quo for reasons of convenience, stakeholders are beginning to disfavor the use of cash shipments as the primary mode of aid financing. All donors have an interest in mitigating risks, countering waste, and avoiding the negative optics associated with the Taliban regime indirectly benefiting from foreign aid flows. However, while many are beginning to endorse the use of digital cash transfers and monitored private bank transactions, wariness of the sanctions regime and long-standing concerns about the security of the Afghan banking sector, notably the risk of money laundering and terrorism financing, may still obstruct more practical approaches to delivering aid funds. As donors become more opposed to cash shipments and less generous in their aid commitments, the failure to find alternative financing may grind humanitarian operations to a halt at great expense to the population. Despite reasonable concerns about foreign assistance relieving pressure on the state to the Taliban’s benefit, that group’s reliance on aid to avoid its duties does not mean that it would prioritize the welfare of the Afghan people if the money were withdrawn. Meanwhile, UN and NGO officials have emphasized that the population’s needs have reached a scale beyond what aid agencies alone are capable of managing.
+
+___`All donors have an interest in mitigating risks, countering waste, and avoiding the negative optics associated with the Taliban regime indirectly benefiting from foreign aid flows.`___
+
+In response to these issues, some have urged a move away from “humanitarian business as usual,” with the goal of phasing out cash shipments on a gradual and predictable basis, retooling large-scale foreign humanitarian aid, and replacing the current model of foreign support with more traditional development assistance geared to increase the Afghan economy’s self-sufficiency. Humanitarian aid funds are dwindling at an alarming rate, falling from $3.8 billion in 2022 to $1.9 billion in 2023, “with further declines expected in 2024.” Moving forward, international assistance strategies must find a way to both smooth the macroeconomic impact of declining aid and deploy increasingly limited resources in a more targeted and cost-effective way. This could include improving coordination between agencies, reducing the size of UN administrative overheads, making more use of the Afghan private sector for aid delivery, and prioritizing basic healthcare and food assistance.
+
+
+### Promoting Financial Transparency
+
+As Western donors assess how to gradually scale down cash shipments and shift to more basic development aid, a related consideration is the problem of financial transparency, which pertains to both suspected “leakages” of foreign aid funds and the black box of the Taliban budget.
+
+Considering the scope of humanitarian needs and the level of foreign aid being channeled into the country, the misappropriation of aid funds has been a consistent concern among donor governments. Humanitarian operations have not been exempt from Taliban interference, as is the case in any country receiving large amounts of such aid. According to a January 2024 report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), the Taliban have siphoned or benefited from a considerable amount of humanitarian aid. Reported tactics include infiltrating UN-partnered NGOs to access their aid budgets; imposing taxes and “security” fees on humanitarian workers; directing aid agencies to serve Taliban officials and family members; and taxing Afghan aid recipients at high rates, in some cases amounting to 60 to 100 percent of the aid received.
+
+Although the Taliban regime exaggerates the success of its anticorruption measures, its high-profile campaign claiming to eliminate the corruption that plagued the Islamic Republic government has resulted in some notable improvements. The tightening of border and customs controls has allowed for more aggressive taxation of imports and stricter regulation of the country’s vast informal economy. These measures and the dismantling of many unofficial road checkpoints — notorious sites of extortion in the Islamic Republic, used by both insurgents and state police — are “consistent with reports from Afghan traders” about the decline in corruption. Nonetheless, other reports have highlighted the persistence of illicit economies, including drug and arms trafficking, the regime’s financial linkages with al Qaeda affiliates, and the capture of state resources by Taliban leaders, who have continued previous governments’ practices of relying on patronage networks to maintain their authority. According to a February 2024 study, the Taliban regime can be termed a theocratic authoritarian “kleptocracy” due to its use of public funds, diverted humanitarian assistance, informal and illicit profits, and extensive taxation network to consolidate control over the country’s resources for the use of Taliban leaders and their cadres.
+
+Despite recent efforts to demonstrate fiscal responsibility, the Taliban regime ultimately lacks any meaningful or structural financial transparency — particularly in the area of expenditures. There is no public accounting of what the regime spends on its security forces, intelligence apparatus, and prisons vis-à-vis public services such as food, healthcare, and education. Nor are there criteria for awarding government contracts, property sales, or licenses, and the lack of external accountability mechanisms prevents transparency in procurement. The World Bank reported that the government raised $2.2 billion in revenue in 2022, 60 percent of which is estimated to have been generated through aggressive tax and customs collection, achieved in part through violence, harassment, and the threat of license suspensions and asset seizures. The World Bank’s Afghanistan Development Update reported that the government raised $2.9 billion in revenue in 2023 — a 9 percent increase from the previous year but not necessarily indicative of long-term fiscal sustainability. The primary sources of revenue growth were increases in import volume and associated border tax revenues, which may only exacerbate Afghanistan’s dependence on imports at the expense of domestic economic growth, as well as one-time nontax revenues, such as vehicle registration fees, passport issuances, and royalties, which are not reliable sources of recurring incomes.
+
+Alongside more pressing concerns about Taliban gender policies and human rights violations, reports of state kleptocracy and concerns about fiscal transparency are also threats to both the continued flow of international humanitarian aid and the prospect of future development projects. Major stakeholders need assurances against the duplication of spending and the misappropriation of funds, which depend on oversight mechanisms including audits and impact assessments. The reputational risks associated with documented aid leakages to the Taliban — particularly alongside evidence of Taliban linkages with terrorist organizations — also jeopardize foreign cash inflows. Allegations of aid diversion in various SIGAR reports prompted U.S. senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) to introduce a bill in March to withhold all U.S. funding for UNAMA pending assurances that U.S. taxpayer dollars are not funding the Taliban and — by extension — terrorism.
+
+Short of suspending aid funding for Afghanistan, the international community has few options for resolving either issue. Some current forms of aid embezzlement can be mitigated with more secure financial transfers and more robust third-party monitoring, but Western donors’ ability to pressure Kabul on its fiscal transparency is more limited. The scale of tax revenues and the regime’s evident disregard for the well-being of Afghan citizens have helped insulate the Taliban from the traditional methods by which rogue regimes are subjected to international pressure, namely sanctions and isolation. Given the shortcomings of the current approach, stakeholders must get more creative and pragmatic. A certain level of contact with governing authorities is unavoidable — rather than making aid flows contingent on total insulation from the Taliban, donors have to assess what level of “spillage” can be tolerated in exchange for economic and humanitarian progress while also tightening the delivery, allocation, and management of aid. In terms of exploring economic development strategies, donors must incentivize the Taliban authorities to be more transparent, particularly about the proportion of spending on their security apparatus versus on the social and humanitarian needs of the population. The Taliban administration’s demonstrated interest in pursuing infrastructure projects and attracting foreign investment indicates that the regime is committed to developing the Afghan economy. But ambitious development projects are unlikely to come to fruition through opaque deals that circumvent international standards and bear hidden risks.
+
+
+### Import Substitution and Private-Sector Development
+
+As direct cash transfers and humanitarian aid are scaled down, complementary engagement and investment in Afghanistan’s economy must be scaled up. Reviving Afghanistan’s private sector and enhancing local economic resilience will be critical for the country’s economic stability and long-term recovery in the absence of regular cash flows and humanitarian assistance.
+
+Afghanistan’s current economic state is the result of a lethal combination of long-term dysfunction and acute crisis. Decades of conflict and large international aid inflows have trapped the country in a state of chronic underdevelopment, leaving the economy heavily dependent on a huge basket of imports that are affordable only through external support. The Afghan financial system never fully recovered from the 2010–11 near collapse of the Kabul Bank — “at the time a critically important institution in Afghanistan’s banking system” — following revelations of massive fraud and embezzlement. Endemic corruption and persistent instability have also made for a hostile business climate and a weak private sector, made even weaker by the recent liquidity crunch. According to the World Bank’s 2023 Private Sector Rapid Survey, roughly half of Afghanistan’s businesses are struggling to operate at full capacity, and most cite disruptions in financial services as their main constraint. The country’s financial paralysis stems in part from widespread misconceptions about the scope of the sanctions regime, resulting in overcompliance and other de-risking measures at the expense of business activity, commercial financing, and cross-border trade. Barriers to economic growth have been exacerbated by the Taliban’s regressive policies and economic missteps, which include prohibitive restrictions on women in the workforce, an “unguided and mandatory shift to Islamic banking,” a burdensome taxation regime that stifles entrepreneurial incentives, and the ban on opium poppies, costing rural households over $1 billion in annual income.
+
+Circumstances are unlikely to change significantly in the short term, but there are several things that donors can do to mitigate the severity of the economic crisis while minimizing contact with the Taliban. One recommendation is for donors to promote import substitution, which would entail revving up domestic production to capture key import markets, with the ultimate objective of creating jobs, increasing economic resilience, and improving Afghanistan’s balance of trade in areas where competitive advantages exist. Afghanistan currently relies on foreign aid to import a wide range of goods — worth approximately $6 billion to $8 billion per year — that can instead be produced domestically, including food, textiles, cement, and hydrocarbons. By emphasizing local procurement, the United Nations and donor aid agencies can reduce aid costs and reorient a core aspect of the humanitarian response around the development of Afghanistan’s own resources and private sector. Significantly, the Taliban regime appears to recognize the importance of import substitution, having contracted three sizable cement projects — two with Afghan companies and one with a Qatari investor — to break Afghanistan’s costly reliance on neighboring countries for a product that may ultimately have export potential.
+
+Jump-starting private-sector development will require more concerted efforts to clarify the parameters of the sanctions regime. There are no comprehensive sanctions in place against the country of Afghanistan — instead, the United Nations and the United States have imposed targeted sanctions against a number of individuals and organizations. The UN Security Council Resolution 2615 and the U.S. General License 20, which were issued in order to facilitate normal aid-related and commercial financial transactions, explicitly state that current sanctions exempt humanitarian activities and permit most commercial and financial transactions. These include the payment of taxes and fees to government agencies, which are not sanctioned as institutions even if they are led by sanctioned individuals. Despite this, the attitudes of most U.S. and other Western banks toward financial transactions involving Afghanistan have not changed. Clearer sanctions guidance from the U.S. Treasury Department in areas in which confusion persists can help ensure that the Afghan private sector as well as Western and regional firms and banks are aware of the exemptions and safeguards that allow for continued trade and commercial activities.
+
+Supporting the revival of Afghanistan’s banking sector is equally critical for ensuring smooth payments to facilitate trade, aid, remittances, and financing. Moving away from UN cash shipments will offer an opportunity to further develop and expand alternative payment methods as well as strengthen Afghan banks and their international connections, but this shift will depend on fostering greater trust in Afghanistan’s financial system. The resumption of normal financial transactions will require increases in third-party monitoring to ensure compliance with internationally recognized Anti–Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) standards and policies. Given that DAB lacks the institutional capacity and political autonomy necessary to credibly monitor financial transactions, either the World Bank or a qualified private accounting firm commissioned by the Afghan Fund could provide AML/CFT oversight in the interim.
+
+With the help of increased engagement from the World Bank, the revival of the banking sector could also enable more direct support to vetted Afghan businesses through microfinancing plans and other innovative financing tools, which can be used to promote import substitution and increase exports. The Afghan Fund might also be mobilized to that end — a portion of its funds could be diverted to some of Afghanistan’s private commercial banks to provide liquidity for private-sector lending and financing.
+
+
+### The World Bank and Development Assistance
+
+In February 2024, the World Bank Board of Executive Directors endorsed a revision of the bank’s approach to assisting the people of Afghanistan, taking the first significant steps toward a development-based international assistance strategy since the 2022 suspension of previous projects. The bank’s “Approach 3.0” will deploy funds from the International Development Association through grants to UN agencies and NGOs to finance private-sector activities, boost employment opportunities, and facilitate private-sector participation in aid delivery. The board also gave the green light for direct engagement with senior officials at Afghan economic institutions, enhancing the bank’s ability to produce technical assessments, provide rigorous third-party monitoring, engage in knowledge sharing, and potentially open dialogues on macroeconomic policy and fiscal management. Most notable is the revival of the Central Asia-South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA-1000) after a two-year suspension. The $1.2 billion regional infrastructure project, undertaken in collaboration with the publicly owned Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherikat (DABS), will transport clean energy “between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and from Tajikistan to Pakistan and Afghanistan.” The project’s “ring-fenced” funding will ensure that payments and revenues are managed beyond the control of Taliban authorities. Although there were many reasons why this particular project was the first to be revived, CASA-1000 could be a trial balloon for future Western-backed development projects. Given the enormous gaps in Afghanistan’s critical infrastructure and the total paralysis of its financial system, the direct involvement of a credible, trusted international financial institution such as the World Bank is essential to restoring trust in the banking sector and removing barriers to development financing.
+
+The erosion of foreign aid has underscored the urgency of resuming development assistance, and there has been a growing international consensus on the necessity of increased engagement. Nonetheless, the bank’s decision to engage in development projects without attaching political conditionalities on Taliban authorities — a consequence of barring direct technical assistance or support to sanctioned individuals and entities — may raise political concerns about inadvertently legitimizing or strengthening the Taliban’s rule and reducing the international community’s leverage to push for reforms. A number of international actors and former Afghan officials supported the previous suspension of development projects as a way to hold the regime accountable for its objectionable policies. Some, including politicians in donor countries wary of the optics of “working with the Taliban,” may be similarly apprehensive that the resumption of development assistance in the context of recent Taliban policies against women could convey a message of impunity, making the regime less receptive to concessions on human rights, political reforms, and financial transparency. In light of the Taliban’s current human rights record, which has withstood immense international pressure, those in favor of increasing engagement have argued that the welfare of the population cannot be held hostage to an unlikely moderation in Taliban policies.
+
+Approach 3.0 represents a carefully calibrated strategy that reckons with the challenges of the current political reality and balances the pressing needs of the Afghan people with the long-term goal of promoting inclusive growth and social change in Afghanistan. Circumstances in Afghanistan call for greater nuance than is typically possible at the international level; navigating this difficult landscape requires the international community to leverage the flexibility of the sanctions regime to promote sustainable economic development through a policy of principled, limited engagement. This approach must prioritize initiatives that directly benefit the Afghan population while maintaining pressure on the Taliban to improve their human rights record, embrace political reforms, and enhance financial transparency. By undertaking projects such as CASA-1000, which has the potential to enhance regional connectivity and stimulate economic growth, the international community can demonstrate its commitment to the welfare of the Afghan people while avoiding actions that would signal a normalization of diplomatic and economic relations.
+
+___`This approach must prioritize initiatives that directly benefit the Afghan population while maintaining pressure on the Taliban to improve their human rights record, embrace political reforms, and enhance financial transparency.`___
+
+Against the backdrop of Approach 3.0, there is ongoing interest by China and other regional nations in investment in the country. Afghanistan possesses a wealth of largely untapped petroleum deposits and mineral reserves that have become the focus of Taliban aspirations for economic self-sufficiency. Taliban leaders have been courting foreign investors for a variety of mining, irrigation, and infrastructure projects, recently announcing their intention to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Deepening ties with China include a $540 million contract with the Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Company for oil and gas exploration, in addition to interest from other Chinese firms in mineral extraction, power generation, cement production, and digital public infrastructure projects. Although any prospective foreign investments would help address cash flow shortages, the intervention of authoritarian actors raises serious concerns about the country’s development trajectory. Given the Taliban’s pursuit of economic growth through raw mineral exports, the absence of accountability, supervision, community engagement, and independent oversight could result in asymmetric development that primarily advantages Taliban leaders, prevents the broader society from benefiting from the country’s natural resources, and further insulates the regime from human rights–related pressures.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+Foreign donors, civil society actors, Afghanistan stakeholders, UN officials, and Afghanistan’s neighbors have found themselves at odds over how to move forward in Afghanistan. Some are urging the international community to hold a firm, consistent line on human rights and refuse to engage with the Taliban on moral grounds. Others are emphasizing the severity of the humanitarian crisis and calling for a pragmatic, phased approach to engagement in order to ensure the continued delivery of essential services and remove some of the obstacles preventing progress on sustainable socioeconomic development.
+
+Afghanistan’s long-term economic development will ultimately require political and policy choices that the Taliban appear unwilling to make. No country can move up the development ladder if 50 percent of the population is categorically excluded from public life — but the Taliban’s track record and ideological zeal suggest that the regime is unlikely to moderate its policies against women in the near term. Enhancing Afghanistan’s economic self-sufficiency, then, will hinge on the question of when and how international actors can better address the needs of the population without providing an impermissible level of support — however indirectly — to the Taliban.
+
+The Afghan people need long-term sustainable solutions that include not only increased humanitarian assistance but also greater economic stability, the resumption of international development assistance, and a viable private sector–led economy. With the welfare of ordinary Afghans on the line, stakeholders will have to reckon with what imperfect options remain if both engagement and disengagement are deemed unacceptable.
+
+---
+
+__Daniel F. Runde__ is a senior vice president, director of the Project on Prosperity and Development (PPD), and holds the William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a leading global think tank.
+
+__Annie Pforzheimer__ is a non-resident senior associate with the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS.
+
+__Thomas Bryja__ is a program coordinator and research assistant with the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS.
+
+__Caroline Smutny__ is a research intern with the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS.
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+---
+layout: post
+title : AI For Unified Command Plan
+author: Benjamin Jensen, et al.
+date : 2024-06-17 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/sI4yatc.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Using Artificial Intelligence to Rethink the Unified Command Plan"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_This report explores how the U.S. military can benefit from creative artificial intelligence tools to integrate cyber, space, and electronic warfare, better organizing the national security apparatus and ensuring readiness for modern global competition._
+
+
+
+### In the Future . . .
+
+1. __Global competition will force the United States to adopt new combatant command designs optimized for gray zone competition and security cooperation.__ These new commands will better integrate gender dynamics and analyze human terrain and competing influence networks to gain access, deny benefits, impose costs, and reassure partners.
+
+2. __The integrated deterrence doctrine will drive the U.S. military to combine cyber, space, and electronic warfare and other information-related capabilities into a new multidomain strategic command.__ The command will support integrated planning, provide a larger menu of options for conventional and nuclear deterrence, and synchronize multidomain effects.
+
+3. __There will be fewer combatant commands but more combined joint interagency task forces scaled to meet emerging challenges.__ The United States will check authoritarian advances globally by better synchronizing instruments of power and creating new command and control architectures to align authorities and partners against missions globally.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+Every two years, a ritual takes over the Pentagon. A mix of service priorities, presidential prerogatives, defense ideas, and congressional intrigue combine in a cauldron called the Unified Command Plan (UCP). The classified document specifies functional and geographic responsibilities and uses this division to assign missions, planning, training, and operational responsibilities.
+
+As the ritual takes place in the “Puzzle Palace” today, the authors have decided to join the ranks of pundits new and old with ideas for revising the UCP — but with a twist. They have refined a large language model (LLM) with over 600 authoritative texts on topics ranging from military history and international relations theory to competitive strategy and deterrence into nine datasets to explore alternative blueprints for the U.S. military. Two insights have emerged.
+
+First, the tendency to create new commands may have reached its limit and potentially undermines calls for integrated deterrence and better synchronization of effects across domains, the U.S. government, and the U.S. network of partners and allies. For example, in this study, the LLM — across multiple iterations — kept generating UCP designs optimized for long-term competition with China that merged cyber, space, and electronic warfare capabilities into a unified command.
+
+Second, the current U.S. blueprint for projecting power and influence struggles in day-to-day competition and integrating development assistance, security cooperation, and economic measures in a holistic manner. The LLM consistently generated alternative UCP designs organized around this central idea.
+
+The net result is a series of options the authors hope will help the civil servants and military professionals who have the Sisyphean task of aligning the structure of the Department of Defense (DOD) with the reality of twenty-first-century great power competition.
+
+
+### What’s Wrong with the UCP?
+
+Critiques of the UCP focus either on specific issues and geographic seams or on larger bureaucratic challenges associated with the design of the national security enterprise. In fact, War on the Rocks has been a hotbed for debates about the right types of commands to address the changing character of war and evolving strategic challenges. Authors have debated U.S. Space Command, building a future warfare command, and geographic designs that are better aligned with the prevailing demand signal.
+
+A risk-averse culture and bureaucracy haunt these debates. Combatant commands appear as bloated proconsuls because they try to compensate for a misaligned national security enterprise. Organizationally, the U.S. government struggles to reconcile maps between the Department of State (DOS) and DOD because the perception of the world is shaped by theater and global campaign plans. Out of desperation, many stakeholders therefore turn to the National Security Council (NSC) to synchronize interagency activities. However, statutorily speaking, the NSC is a coordinating body to untangle the differences across the federal government rather than policymaking to align campaign plans. The net result is strategy as cacophony and an inherent dilemma where unity of effort should reside.
+
+Another issue is proponency, a fancy term that describes the advocacy of people sitting at senior decisionmaking tables and, crucially, their priorities. Proponency is a key aspect of defense politics that plays out in UCP revisions, among other places. The higher the rank of the person in charge of a particular issue set, region, or capability, the easier it will be to argue for budget shares. In 2019, concerns about insufficient advocacy for the space mission within the DOD led to a proponency overcompensation in the form of the near-simultaneous creation of the Space Force and U.S. Space Command. In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act ensured that operational commanders and service chiefs had a clear division of roles and responsibilities in order to prevent further U.S. military fiascos. Needless to say, focusing a service chief and a four-star commander on the same mission set runs counter to the organizational design of the Pentagon and could create greater risk of future military fiascos.
+
+The other problem with proponency dominating the command structure is that there are only so many senior decisionmaking tables, but the list of issues the department grapples with is enormous and grows every day. There is an inherent mismatch between what is important and who gets to decide what to do about things that are deemed important — not to mention the fact that every four-star leader is supported by a galaxy of subordinate general and flag officers. The issue has led at least one former secretary of defense to complain of “brass creep,” or an inflated number of officers with stars on their shoulders running the U.S. military without solving enduring strategic challenges.
+
+In addition to these concerns, like most bureaucratic processes, the result tends to create winners and losers while leaving both equally unhappy. With a two-year update cycle prone to parochial infighting over budgets and authorities, change tends to take the form of addition over optimization. It is easier to satisfice and add structure than it is to realign or reduce the number of combatant commands. This puts a premium on growth that may be suboptimal and reinforces a tendency for service-level interests over a unified joint or combined approach to modern operational art and campaigning. Furthermore, competing ideas, parochial interests, veto players, and the enduring quest for turf and money plague open dialogue. The net result is diminishing returns and a span of control issues that inflate the number of four-star generals and staffs running the U.S. military without solving enduring strategic challenges. As staffs become bloated, command structures grow unwieldy, and defense budgets balloon, roles and missions expand without a corresponding increase in either security or strategic advantage.
+
+
+### To Answer a Strategy Question, Tailor a Model
+
+To analyze options for UCP reform, the authors worked with the CSIS Futures Lab and Scale AI to build datasets optimized for retrieval augmented generation — a technique for refining how large models weight documents to generate text. This technique is particularly useful for overcoming the inherent limitations LLMs face when addressing specialized questions and context-dependent domains. Applied to national security, these models can help support campaign planning, wargaming, and studying escalation dynamics (Table 1).
+
+
+_▲ __Table 1: Training Datasets.__ Source: CSIS Futures Lab._
+
+First, the authors had the model summarize common criticisms of the UCP to provide a baseline leveraging 119 prior studies of UCP reform. Of note, much of the criticism matched the prevailing debate, which is not a surprise since LLMs excel at basic synthesis.
+
+Second, the authors used this baseline to explore alternative UCP reform options weighted against different combinations of datasets to, in essence, force productive hallucinations and novel insights. These datasets included 70 documents on Chinese military doctrine and competitive strategy; 205 documents on deterrence theory, military history, and operational art; and 232 document excerpts on international relations cutting across multiple theoretical schools of thought.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1: Model Threads.___
+
+Using these datasets, the authors asked the model (1) to create an illustrative scenario depicting global competition between the United States and China and (2) to recommend a new set of combatant and functional commands based on the scenario that ensures the United States is sufficiently aligned to counter the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
+
+The authors ran this sequence four times to explore where the model returns converged and where they diverged (Figure 1). In model one — “The Hunt for Asymmetries” — the authors used concepts from competitive strategy and assessments of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military strategy to analyze UCP rewrite options. In model two — “The Rational Past as Prologue” — the authors used deterrence theory, military history, and concepts from bargaining theory to analyze UCP rewrite options. In model three — “Anarchy Shapes All Decisionmaking” — the authors used texts on realism from international relations theory. Last, in model four — “Stories Guide the Art of the Possible” — the authors used a mix of social constructivism and critical perspectives to analyze UCP rewrite options. Below the authors summarize the results from each iteration.
+
+Last, to help visualize and describe the alternative strategic logics, the research team tailored prompts to produce stylized paintings using the Midjourney AI Pro art generator. To create a common reference point, the team combined international relations theory references with prompts requesting the LLM to produce a “painting in the style of Norman Rockwell.” The use of this famous American artist situates the visual logic in classic portrayals of American nostalgia, a deliberate effort to show alternatives to the Cold War history of the UCP for a new era of great power competition.
+
+#### The Hunt for Asymmetries
+
+The first thread focused on using net assessment and documents on Chinese military strategy to assess the UCP. The thread depicted an outsize role for U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) supported by existing regional commands — consistent with current approaches to global integration — and a host of new functional commands. The thread discussed the need to organize roles and missions around an evolving assessment of regional military balances relative to force posture. It also discussed the need to evaluate military balance and force posture in a search for asymmetry. In other words, net assessment should drive competitive strategy and alteration of assigned forces within the existing UCP structure and the current global integration framework, placing USINDOPACOM as the global coordinating authority for competition with China, supported by regional and functional commands.
+
+The thread sought to expand the number and type of functional commands required to support long-term competition with China. First, it expanded U.S. Cyber Command to include a larger role in technology policy and research, development, testing, and engineering. In addition to coordinating cyber offense and defense activities, the thread detailed new responsibilities for protecting U.S. technology from Chinese cyber theft and focusing investments in advanced military technology, currently overseen by the undersecretary of defense for research and engineering as well as service-level entities. Second, the model discussed the need for a new functional command focused on coordinating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities globally, with an eye toward countering Chinese battle networks and developing indicators and warnings on military capabilities and troop deployments.
+
+Interestingly, the tailored LLM suggested the United States should, through the UCP, get its act together when it comes to nonmilitary aspects of national security policy. First, the model discussed the need for a new functional command focused on economic security. The interagency command would counter Chinese economic strategies harmful to U.S. interests, counter economic coercion against partners and allies, and coordinate interagency measures addressing issues such as trade imbalances, intellectual property protection, and other economic security concerns like the labor market. Second, the model proposed new structures dedicated to human assistance and disaster relief to promote stability and enhance the reputation of the United States in regions where China is expanding its influence. These new soft power approaches are intended to appeal to the hearts and minds that China has courted in the past or is actively courting. Examples include countries in the Belt and Road Initiative or regions like Africa and Latin America.
+
+Much of the discussion is consistent with the large body of debates on interagency reform and past tendencies to expand, vice optimize, the UCP to solve evolving strategy challenges. What is interesting, however, is the model’s conclusion that integrating civilian-military effects into an operational and operational-level command structure is necessary to gain a long-term advantage against the CCP.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 2: Reimagining the UCP Using Net Assessment.__ Source: Benjamin Jensen. Midjourney Pro Prompt: “Andrew Marshall net assessment explaining Cold War strategy painting in the style of Norman Rockwell.”_
+
+#### The Rational Past as Prologue
+
+The second model combined documents on deterrence, military history, and operational art. Of note, the scenario the model returned anchored global competition around a potential crisis in the South China Sea, drawing on principles from deterrence theory more than from operational art or military history. Most of the output discussed using diplomacy alongside demonstrations of military capability with only a limited discussion of combined arms and lines of operation. In other words, escalation management loomed larger than gaining a near-term decisive military advantage.
+
+At the same time, the model envisioned competition with China as global and cutting across multiple domains in an effort to support a cost-imposition strategy. The scenario discussed using security cooperation in Africa to counter Chinese access and diplomacy to counter growing Chinese influence in Eastern Europe. The scenario discussed working with partners and the private sector to make it more difficult for China to gain an advantage in space and cyberspace. Last, the scenario focused on diplomacy and economic sanctions as the main effort, seeking to signal to China the risks of continued escalation. According to the model, these combined lines of effort created a more synchronized approach to strategy:
+
+“All these activities have a constant backdrop of political diplomacy, economic negotiations, and information campaigns to create a comprehensive response strategy. These strategies collectively work towards deterring China from aggressive action and work to maintain the balance of power in line with international rules and norms. This kind of strategizing effectively uses the UCP and its multiple combatant commands, integrating operational art and deterrence theory on a global scale.”
+
+Based on this strategy, the model recommended the following changes to the UCP. First, it advocated consolidating existing combatant command structures. U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) would be merged to form a new Eurasian Command to better link global competition with Russia and China outside of USINDOPACOM. The same logic applied to U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). The model recommended a new Americas command merging the two to better prioritize countering China’s growing influence in South America. The model also recommended merging several of the functional commands, including the U.S. Cyber Command and U.S. Space Command, to better synchronize multidomain operations.
+
+Second, the model recommended an operational command structure similar to the net assessment thread (“The Hunt for Asymmetries”) to make economic competition a central pillar of national strategy. Of note, the model saw the primary role of the functional command as coordinating interagency activities to counter the Belt and Road Initiative and Beijing’s economic priorities. The model identified the need to coordinate nonmilitary forms of power with traditional military roles and missions to manage long-term competition with China.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 3: Reimagining the UCP Using Rational Deterrence.__ Source: Benjamin Jensen. Midjourney Pro Prompt: “Thomas Schelling explaining nuclear deterrence using game theory on a chalk board painting in the style of Norman Rockwell.”_
+
+#### Anarchy Shapes All Decisionmaking
+
+When weighted with realist texts, the model focused more on how best to manage escalation regardless of the structure of combatant commands alongside the need to better integrate different agencies and instruments of power. Specifically, the model highlighted war control — a PLA concept for controlling the pace and intensity of escalation — as providing the United States an opportunity to take a measured approach to maximizing its security. Second, the model saw the future of integrated deterrence less in technology and more in how well the United States integrates multiple instruments of power and works alongside partners and allies. Last, the model saw the future as a global struggle and highlighted the need for the United States to focus on maintaining favorable regional balances of power.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 4: Reimagining the UCP Using Realism.__ Source: Benjamin Jensen. Midjourney Pro Prompt: “Machiavelli discussing political realism painting in the style of Norman Rockwell.”_
+
+#### Stories Guide the Art of the Possible
+
+When weighted with constructivist and critical theory texts, the model prioritized norms, power dynamics, and underlying narratives. This focus meant the analysis of UCP options prioritized shaping stories and how people perceive the word over regional balances of power. The model focused on a new global engagement command with elements similar to those discussed in the operational art and deterrence theory iterations, albeit based on different assumptions. Modern competition was seen as a war over ideas. In this logic, the United States needs to address not just China’s current actions but also the wider power dynamics and structural issues at play in foreign policy and how they collide in stories, propaganda, and global influence campaigns. The model assessed that these responses could involve challenging dominant narratives around sovereignty, power, and security but should avoid imposing Western-centric narratives and norms in diplomatic initiatives. Like previous threads, the insights support new, novel structures linked to coordinating nonmilitary instruments of power.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 5: Reimagining the UCP Using Constructivism.__ Source: Benjamin Jensen. Midjourney Pro Prompt: “a feminist criticizing grand strategy painting in the style of Norman Rockwell.”_
+
+
+### Policy Options to Explore
+
+While all statistical models are incomplete, some are useful, and generative artificial intelligence (AI) is no different. The ideas that emerged from this experiment suggest three options worth further deliberation for rewriting the UCP.
+
+#### Enhance Command Structure for Global Engagement and Competition
+
+Across the threads, the generative model highlighted a need to better organize the DOD — if not the entire national security enterprise — for competition short of war. These campaigns would combine traditional security cooperation activity with new efforts to protect U.S. technology and economic access. Better still, this realignment could help better connect competition and contingency planning, a perennial challenge in the Pentagon.
+
+The challenge in the current UCP design is that the authorities for these activities are divided between multiple government agencies that do not have similar regional planning frameworks (e.g., DOS and DOD). Furthermore, these activities are not strictly military, making them outside the purvey of geographic combatant commands. Getting better synchronization, therefore, would likely require deeper debate about how to design a national security system that currently contrasts DOD efforts to manage regional security challenges with the country-specific orientation of the DOS. That is a tall order and one likely to involve Congress.
+
+In the near term, military planners should consider using the UCP to task each combatant command to stand up interagency joint task forces for competition. This standing task force would enact current theater and global competition plans but serve as a focal point for better coordinating with other agency activities. In the absence of new authorities, a large amount of the task force’s time would be used to establish interagency awareness and develop a common understanding of the range of ongoing programs and activities in the region and how best to align competition planning with them. This interagency awareness over time could evolve to inform national security coordination through the NSC and augment experiments with battle networks currently ongoing through the Global Information Dominance Experiments (GIDE) managed by the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO).
+
+#### Merge Space, Cyber, and Information Effects
+
+Across the threads, an approach to military strategy emerged that stands in stark contrast to the last decade of UCP rewrites. Rather than continue to create new functional commands, the model proposed fusing them into a single command somewhat similar to the recently disbanded PLA Strategic Support Force. In some respects, such an entity could even be folded back into U.S. Strategic Command for a one-stop shop for deterrence and setting conditions for modern war fighting. The operative question is what the DOD gains from creating multiple functional commands instead of streamlining and rationalizing them into new entities.
+
+The UCP rewrite team could consider incremental options, such as focusing on global competition. For example, it could experiment with establishing a sub–unified command in each geographic command focused on integrating space, cyber, and information effects into ongoing operations. While interesting, this incremental approach would likely create duplicate structures and would not address the pull to create four-star headquarters for each new domain alongside new services. Clearly, modern competition and war fighting require the ability to integrate multiple domains. Therefore, assigning roles and missions with this unity of effort in mind should drive UCP reform.
+
+#### New Regions, Fewer Components
+
+Last, the model suggested realigning existing geographic combatant command boundaries. The model played with new seams for global competition with China, including an Americas Command merging USSOUTHCOM and USNORTHCOM and a Eurasia Command merging USEUCOM and CENTCOM. This logic is similar to that of earlier experiments during the Cold War that went as far as creating one command for overseas forces and another for those in the United States.
+
+Left unsaid by the model was that merging existing geographic combatant command boundaries could produce cost savings and provide a model for even more radical reductions. For example, are service component commands truly necessary? In both his planning guidance and subsequent comments, General Berger, the 38th commandant of the Marine Corps, expressed concerns about a lack of naval integration that inadvertently emerged as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Maybe it is time to reduce the number of service components at each combatant command, if not eliminate them outright, since service headquarters can coordinate directly to assign forces.
+
+The current team working on the UCP could explore opportunities to reduce the number of headquarters and build structures that better align with the shape of global competition with the CCP.
+
+
+### Conclusion: Back to the Ritual
+
+UCP rewrites are both an opportunity and a bureaucratic conundrum for those who oversee the ritual. Wasting that opportunity, despite the painful debates that need to occur, would abdicate professional responsibility both for those in the fight and for those watching from the outside but still dedicating themselves to national security reform.
+
+The contributions of this report are illustrative, not conclusive. The series of LLMs tailored with key documents highlight big ideas but nothing especially new. For years, national security practitioners have known the current design of the U.S. national security enterprise is broken. The UCP is just one part of that larger Cold War–era bureaucracy in need of a reboot.
+
+The models reiterate the need to rethink functional and geographic command structures alongside their roles and missions. If nothing else, there are significant cost savings to be had from merging commands as well as rethinking the current map. Staffers in the bureaucratic fight over the next UCP must at least answer the question, Why shouldn’t the United States merge the U.S. Space and Cyber Commands? More interesting is the need to imagine new ways of integrating military and nonmilitary power to manage long-term competition with the CCP. Again, ongoing dialogue inside the Pentagon should at least consider an Americas and Eurasia Command and, more importantly, what command structures would best support managing nonmilitary competition with China globally and bridging interagency divides.
+
+Outside of the models, many of these ideas need not take the form of entirely new four-star commands. Rather, new interagency joint task forces — including novel approaches like Joint Task Force Ares, used to combat the Islamic State and subordinate unified commands — offer flexible structures for managing a complex, multidomain, multi-instrument global competition. Even more radical would be using a congressional commission to explore rewriting key authorities and legal code linked to how the United States organizes for national defense and long-term competition. Regardless of what form the next UCP takes, the process of building it should ask hard questions and demand more than answers forged by bureaucratic path dependence, satisficing, and proponency. The world is too dangerous to avoid hard choices; just ask our large-language model.
+
+---
+
+__Benjamin Jensen__ is a professor in the School of Advanced Warfighting at the Marine Corps University and a senior fellow in the Futures Lab at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
+
+__Kathleen McInnis__ is a senior fellow in the International Security Program and the director of the Smart Women, Smart Power Initiative at CSIS.
+
+__Jose M. Macias III__ is a research associate in the Futures Lab at CSIS and a Pearson fellow at the Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts at the University of Chicago.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-17-chinas-human-capital.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-17-chinas-human-capital.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : China’s Human Capital
+author: Briana Boland, et al.
+date : 2024-06-17 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/PVaSq5e.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "How China’s Human Capital Impacts Its National Competitiveness"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_How will the strengths and weaknesses of China’s human capital impact national competitiveness?_ _China’s efforts to maintain economic growth, strengthen supply chains, develop strategic science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) sectors, and secure a modern military edge hinges on the ability to cultivate and utilize human capital. As the United States and other countries increasingly engage in multidomain competition with China, it is critical to start from a clear-eyed understanding of China’s human capital and Beijing’s strategy for nurturing national talent. Investments in higher education, strategic STEM sectors, and military talent demonstrate key areas in which Beijing is focusing on cultivating human capital. However, China must overcome significant obstacles to innovate as it faces substantial demographic pressures, socio-economic inequalities, and challenges to attracting and retaining top talent both domestically and internationally._
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+According to the World Bank, human capital “consists of the knowledge, skills, and health that people invest in and accumulate throughout their lives, enabling them to realize their potential as productive members of society.” Investments in human capital are a major driver of growth for modern economies and the foundation of national capacity to support key technology industries and unlock new scientific discoveries. China’s ability to cultivate, attract, and retain human capital — or as Beijing more commonly puts it, national “talent” — will shape its competitiveness vis-à-vis the United States as a global power and impact the future of innovation and talent on the world stage. As Chinese leader Xi Jinping has stated, “talent is a strategic resource to achieve national revitalization and win the initiative in international competition.”
+
+China’s massive population provides a foundational advantage in the supply of talent. The country’s rapid economic growth in recent decades can be directly linked to its mobilization of human capital, as China’s shift from an agrarian base to more productive industry and services sectors was enabled by a growing share of the population attaining higher education levels and entering the workforce. However, the government’s strict population control policies, which until 2016 restricted the majority of Chinese families to only having one child, left China with a rapidly aging population and declining workforce. China’s population shrank for the first time in over half a century in 2022 and fell by over two million in 2023. Birth rates have declined precipitously in recent years, from 13.6 per 1,000 people in 2016 to just 6.4 in 2023. One recent study published in The Lancet predicts that China’s population could decline by nearly 50 percent by 2050.
+
+
+
+China’s human capital challenges are not merely numerical. Xi Jinping sees “original” and “disruptive” technological innovation and self-reliance as critical to China’s future development and security. Yet as Beijing seeks to move national industries up the value chain in manufacturing, technology, and services, demand for high-skilled labor is outpacing supply. China thus faces an acute skills shortage. For example, according to the “Manufacturing Talent Development Planning Guide” released by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Services, China will face a talent demand gap of nearly 30 million workers by 2025 in 10 key focus areas for China’s manufacturing industry — such as robotics and semiconductors — or a 48 percent shortage of skilled workers to meet demand. Moreover, persistent inequalities in education and career opportunities for rural populations, including over two-thirds of China’s youth, limit the country’s future supply of talent.
+
+
+
+This brief aims to provide a clear-eyed overview of the Chinese government’s national strategy for cultivating talent and the challenges that China’s national planners confront in their efforts to do so. First, the brief discusses foundational constraints in China’s human capital and how the government is attempting to address them. Next, it examines efforts to create talent pipelines for strategic skill sets in higher education, science and technology industries, and the military. Finally, it explores China’s prospects for attracting and retaining talent across international borders.
+
+
+### Foundational Constraints in China’s Human Capital Environment
+
+The ability of an individual to one day enter a enter lab, research institute, or corporate boardroom is impacted by government investments and regulations, societal norms, and access to opportunities that can either promote or limit that individual’s potential. In China’s domestic context, urban-rural inequities in education and mobility, policies that restrict and repress ethnic minorities, and evolving social norms represent several key constraints on China’s ability to fully tap into national talent.
+
+#### Urban-Rural Inequality
+
+Inequality between urban and rural populations in China presents a critical challenge to the country’s economic productivity and opportunities to develop human capital. As wages rise and Beijing promotes higher-value industries that require high-skilled workers, China could face major issues of structural unemployment for low-skilled workers concentrated in rural areas. Other countries that have escaped the “middle-income trap,” such as Taiwan and South Korea, tended to have higher levels of secondary education that helped transition the workforce from manufacturing to higher-value-added work. In China, low high school graduation rates, pervasive early childhood development challenges, and urban-rural divides codified in regulations such as the hukou system could limit the country’s transition to a high-skilled workforce.
+
+
+
+#### Early Childhood Development
+
+While discussions of human capital may first conjure images of PhD graduates or high-skilled tech workers, a growing field of academic study recognizes that human capital cultivation begins in childhood. As 90 percent of a person’s brain development happens by the age of five, research shows that healthy early childhood development is linked to positive long-term outcomes in health, educational attainment, future earnings, and employment — all key aspects for a strong national human capital environment. Since the 18th Party Congress in 2012, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has considered children a strategic component of creating a national “talent foundation” and has accordingly undertaken national planning to address issues of early childhood development and primary education.
+
+However, early childhood development still presents challenges for China. In particular, urban-rural inequality in China negatively impacts early childhood development in rural areas, evident in studies of health issues and measures of cognitive development, such as the Bayley Test. In terms of children’s health, scholars estimate that 60 percent of elementary school children in rural China are affected by anemia, untreated vision problems, or intestinal worms, all of which negatively impact their ability to learn at a critical age. Studies of developmental delays among infants and toddlers in China show that around 50 percent of rural children exhibit cognitive delays, language delays, and socio-emotional delays in early childhood. For older children of elementary and junior-high age, rates of developmental delays continue to be around 40 percent. Because of the outsized importance of the first few years of life on the development of fundamental cognitive, socio-emotional, and other abilities, low levels of cognitive development at this stage have profound effects later in life and can include behavioral problems, lower academic achievement, and decreased lifetime income. To address the root of these inequalities, prominent scholars have suggested that interventions to support childhood nutrition and cognitive development in rural areas could prove highly effective. Given that over two-thirds of China’s children come from rural areas, early childhood development is a critical issue not only for ameliorating urban-rural inequality but also for the country’s overall economic future.
+
+#### Secondary Education
+
+In the last 70 years, China dramatically expanded the reach of its education system, increasing the national literacy rate from about 20 percent in 1949 to nearly 100 percent in 2021. However, the country’s education system still faces deep-seated challenges in cultivating a high-skilled workforce. Compared to other middle-income countries, China’s high school graduation rate is low. One OECD report estimates that in 2022, as little as 36.6 percent of China’s workforce aged 25–64 years old had finished high school, a graduation rate much lower than most middle-income countries, including Mexico (44 percent), South Africa (50 percent), Malaysia (50 percent), and the Indonesia (43 percent).
+
+
+
+___`“As China’s development shifts from factor-driven to innovation-driven, talents become the first resource for development. To fully stimulate and release the talent dividend, the development of Chinese talent undertakings must shift from prioritizing quantity and scale to prioritizing quality and level.” – Shang Qianming`___
+
+For students that do complete their secondary education, future career and skill development opportunities can be limited by China’s rigid national examination system. Higher education options for Chinese high schoolers are largely determined by their performance on the “gaokao,” the high-pressure national standardized college entrance exam that acts as the single primary factor in college admission. Gaokao scores are weighed much more strongly in determining whether a student is admitted to a university than U.S. college entrance exams such as the SAT, making it extremely difficult for aspiring university students to overcome a bad gaokao score through performance on other scales such as a high GPA or extracurriculars. Designed to offer equal opportunity for students across China, and with societal roots that trace back to the imperial examination system, the gaokao also puts intense social pressure on young students and greatly limits academic options for those who perform poorly. Students who score lower on the tests can only attend programs that likely lack the alumni networks or name recognition needed to give graduates a boost in China’s competitive job market. Indeed, according to a 2017 joint study by researchers from Tsinghua University and UC San Diego, students from China’s more prestigious universities earned 30 to 40 percent more on average compared with their peers who went to lower-tier institutions, a difference that can be ascribed to better career support, networks, and name recognition by potential employers. The prestige of the gaokao also limits the national development of vocational schools, which are separate from the exam system. This lowers the quality and amount of financial resources, infrastructure, and educational personnel these schools receive and thereby reduces pathways for young people to build successful careers beyond the route of doing well on a single test.
+
+#### The Hukou System and Domestic Mobility
+
+While the magnitude of urban-rural inequalities cannot be attributed to a single regulatory system, examining China’s household registration system demonstrates how urban-rural divisions are codified in regulations that limit mobility for rural workers, thus constraining China’s ability to move workers to where their skills could be most productively applied. Adopted in the 1950s, the “hukou” system broadly divides rural and urban citizens. In effect, the system limits access to public goods for rural migrants to China’s cities, causing a host of issues for China’s internal migrants, including limiting access to urban public education, limiting access to healthcare services in cities, and discriminating against rural hukou holders in the labor market. Overall, the hukou system controls the rate of rural-to-urban migration as part of a national effort to limit risk of social instability, which generates a drag on total national economic productivity and worsens rural-urban inequality. According to a 2015 survey by the Institute of Sociology, about 80 percent of China’s students attending vocational colleges came from rural backgrounds, whereas the majority of students at top “elite” universities came from urban backgrounds (65 percent). Meanwhile, rural students made up the majority of students in “ordinary” second- and third- tier universities (56 percent), relegating many rural youths to jobs with lower salaries, fewer benefits, and less stability. This inequality in access to educational resources only hardens rural-urban inequality as the disparity is passed from older generations to younger ones.
+
+The shortcomings of the hukou system are not lost on Chinese policymakers, and both the central government and local authorities are pushing forward reform. In 2014, Beijing launched the National New-type Urbanization Plan (2014–2020), which aimed to facilitate rural migrants’ transition to urban residents. In 2021, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) announced plans to relax hukou restrictions in most cities, while Hainan, Shanghai, and Hangzhou also announced relaxations on living or house-buying restrictions. Though it is too early to assess the results of the hukou reforms, the success of past efforts has been mixed. One central goal of 2014’s National New-type Urbanization Plan was to lessen the gap between social benefits enjoyed by urban versus rural hukou holders in cities, but data show that the gap has instead widened. On the other hand, research on firms exposed to hukou reform shows higher levels of labor market flexibility in cities with hukou reform. In short, though the government is taking steps to improve the hukou system, piecemeal efforts will continue to inhibit productivity and human capital development in China until there is free labor mobility.
+
+___`“Starting from the equalization of access to basic public services to implement a redistributive policy with Chinese characteristics, we can also maintain social mobility and expand the sharing of economic development in order to continuously improve the well-being of residents. The special challenge facing China is that the more ample mobility and integration of labor are hampered by the delay in the reform of the household registration system.” – Cai Feng`___
+
+#### Ethnic Inequality and Minority Policy
+
+The emphasis on social stability at the root of the hukou system also extends to government policies toward ethnic minorities. More than 91 percent of China’s population is Han Chinese, while the remainder of China’s population identifies as an ethnic minority. Significant socioeconomic inequalities between minority groups and the Han majority limit both individual opportunity for social mobility and overall national economic productivity. Studies have found that minorities are paid lower wages on average and that gaps in educational attainment play into the income gap between Han and minority groups, particularly in rural areas. As China seeks to increase the skill level of its workforce, limits on the potential of the 125 million people who identify as ethnic minorities constrain the country’s overall ability to fully utilize its human capital.
+
+However, the Chinese leadership’s ethnic minority policy emphasizes assimilation, stability, and anti-terror work as top priorities. Mass human rights abuses in Xinjiang demonstrate Beijing’s willingness to promote an increasingly repressive regime in the name of fighting terrorism and separatism, regardless of the human cost. Chinese ethnic policy varies by ethnicity and region, but by Beijing’s logic, the common thread running through all 55 of China’s ethnic minorities is their proper place as willing members in a “Chinese national family,” as defined by Xi. While official rhetoric emphasizes the benefits assimilation can bring to ethnic minority populations, it often downplays or ignores problems of cultural loss or rights abuses, as well as the social and economic costs of interethnic divisions within China.
+
+#### Limits on the Innovation Environment
+
+Alongside the policy systems and social support nets that form the basis of a strong human capital environment, social factors such as norms and popular movements can play an important role in both promoting and limiting potential. From the unique entrepreneurship culture generated in innovation hubs such as Silicon Valley to the impact of racial and economic obstacles in inhibiting innovation, sociocultural factors can both incubate innovation and create barriers for talent around the world. In China, the impacts of gender discrimination in the workplace and a new movement advocating detachment from a competitive workplace culture illustrate how social forces and trends in popular culture can limit China’s ability to fully utilize its human capital resources. Meanwhile, both the unique makeup of China’s state-centric economy and political backlash against prominent entrepreneurs indicate that the country’s environment may be trending in the direction of restricting entrepreneurial potential.
+
+An example of the impact of social movements on human capital utilization can be found in the recent popularity of the “lying flat” movement, which calls for relinquishing the stresses and ambitions of modern life. In April 2021, an online post titled “Lying Flat Is Justice” went viral in China, prompting a flurry of online discussion on the virtues of resigning from one’s job or otherwise eschewing the competitive work culture common in many tech and other high-skilled careers. While it is difficult to measure the real impact of the “lying flat” movement in prompting Chinese workers to withdraw from the workplace, survey data shows that discontent with competitive work culture is widely felt among China’s white-collar workers. In a 2019 employment trends report produced by Zhaopin, a leading career development consultancy, 80 percent of surveyed respondents said that “respect for employees” is the most important factor in corporate culture, while over 50 percent reported feeling that they needed to be on-call 24/7. Zhaopin’s 2020 employment trends report highlighted a lack of trust between employees and employers, with only 10 percent of workers surveyed reporting that they trust their employer. With an already shrinking workforce, China’s growth model can ill-afford burnout and disillusionment limiting the economic contributions of existing workers.
+
+The concrete impact of social issues on economic growth is also evident in data on gender discrimination in China’s workforce. A combination of policy and societal factors has increased barriers for women in the workforce, resulting in a rising gender gap in labor force participation rates in China. For example, while many major economies have seen the workforce gender gaps close in recent decades, China’s grew from 9.4 percent in 1994 to 14.1 percent in 2020. Policy changes such as declining numbers of state-supported childcare facilities and social factors such as bias in hiring contribute to this growing gap, resulting in underutilization of China’s female workforce.
+
+China’s entrepreneurship environment is another area in which economic and social structures may limit innovation. In an economy that stresses the central role of the government, many accomplished young Chinese graduates consider working in the state sector as their ideal job. In a sample survey conducted between 2010 and 2015 of over 30,000 college graduates from 90 colleges in China, 62.5 percent marked the government or state sector as their preferred employer. Such jobs offer safety and security that often is attractive to urban college graduates. However, the dynamism and productivity of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) tends to be lower than that of private companies. As more top talent flows to the state sector, it likely will have a dampening effect on China’s economic dynamism. While measuring lost entrepreneurial potential is difficult, research on the employment choices of accomplished college graduates does suggest a trend of top students being diverted from private sector entrepreneurship to the state sector. Along with economic incentives to enter the state sector, social pressures may also discourage would-be entrepreneurs.
+
+Particularly since Alibaba founder Jack Ma’s fall from grace in 2020, many international commentators have lamented the end of an era of relative openness for bold entrepreneurs in China amid an increasingly restrictive atmosphere for the private sector.
+
+
+### Developing Strategic Talent Pipelines
+
+The above sections discussed ways in which regulatory, demographic, and normative constraints on China’s human capital environment limit the country’s aggregate ability to develop and utilize human capital. The broad impact of these constraints can be difficult to measure, particularly at the level of specific strategic industries. A more direct line between talent cultivation and national policy priorities can be seen in government-led efforts to create domestic talent pipelines for strategic skill sets in STEM, critical technology sectors, and military expertise. Outcomes in STEM PhD growth, cultivation of artificial intelligence (AI) curricula, advances in military education, and increasing research and development (R&D) spending demonstrate areas where government policies are shaping the national human capital to increase in-demand skills and knowledge.
+
+#### Talent Pipelines in Higher Education
+
+Growing investment in the higher education system has driven research productivity at top Chinese universities and boosted their global rankings. Between 2012 and 2021, China’s Ministry of Education increased spending on higher education from $24 billion to $47 billion. Along with helping to grow the international stature of top Chinese universities (between 2010 and 2020, the number of Chinese universities listed in the top 500 on at least one global ranking more than tripled), rising investment in higher education creates pathways to promote specific in-demand skill sets, particularly in STEM. China’s growing capacity to cultivate high-level STEM expertise is evident in the increasing number of STEM doctorates produced by Chinese universities each year. By 2025, Chinese universities are projected to produce more than 77,000 STEM PhD graduates per year, more than double the 2010 level of about 34,000 STEM PhD graduates. In comparison, the United States is projected to graduate only approximately 40,000 STEM PhD students in 2025, a figure that includes over 16,000 international students.
+
+Along with increasing investment in the country’s higher education system, policymakers are instituting targeted programs to create university talent pipelines for specific skill sets such as cybersecurity, semiconductor manufacturing, and AI expertise. For example, Beijing launched a program to certify World-Class Cybersecurity Schools in 2017, which sets standards across certified schools for education in cybersecurity and allows government bodies to direct what coursework and skill development is integrated into university coursework.
+
+However, growth in STEM PhDs and Chinese university rankings may not capture the full picture of the quality of China’s higher education. One study on critical thinking and STEM skills comparing Chinese students to peers from the United States, Russia, and India found that STEM undergraduates in China actually saw critical thinking and STEM skill levels decline over four years in college, a phenomenon that scholars posit may be linked to institutional weaknesses in curricula and university program design.
+
+#### Science and Technology
+
+China aims to become a scientific and technological powerhouse by 2049. In furtherance of this goal, Beijing has directed significant resources and support for initiatives designed to attract and ensure talent cultivation in the fields of science and technology. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, $430 billion, or 2.54 percent of China’s GDP, was invested in R&D by the government in 2022, an increase of 10.1 percent from the previous year. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the United States allocated $720 billion to R&D in 2020. This makes China the second-largest spender on R&D in the world. China’s R&D input in 2020 consisted of around 6 percent in basic research, 11 percent in applied research, and 83 percent in experimental research. In comparison, the United States spent 15 percent of its R&D input on basic research, 20 percent on applied research, and 65 percent on experimental research.
+
+
+
+
+
+These investments have yielded results. In the 2023 World Intellectual Property Organization’s Global Innovation Index, China ranked twelfth overall, moving up two places since 2020. The country also ranked fourth in knowledge and technology outputs, just behind the United States. China also sourced the most peer-reviewed papers. While U.S. articles traditionally comprised most of the top 1 percent of the world’s most highly cited articles, studies have found that Chinese research ranked as high as or higher than U.S. work in the top 1 percent of scientific studies in 2019.
+
+However, a top-down approach to innovation coupled with growing R&D investments is no guarantee of success. According to Fitch Ratings, 49 percent of China’s corporate 2020 R&D spending came from SOEs. But compared to private companies, SOEs have been shown to have lower rates of efficiency per dollar in terms of patent output. Government allocations have been found to have crowding-out effects on private investments in Chinese R&D. A study by Boeing has shown a reduction of around 6.5 percent in private R&D investments in Chinese large to medium enterprises (LMEs) with each standard deviation of government R&D subsidies invested in LMEs. Government-directed R&D also has produced inefficient allocation of resources, following a pattern that has been evident in countries with state-guided scientific development models, tracing back to the former Soviet Union and Japan. Notably, an uptick in R&D subsidies has also correlated with an increase in the misallocation of funds by some of the recipients, which diminishes the return on investment of China’s R&D inputs. Furthermore, while Chinese research-intensive universities and firms have gained in international reputation, they still might not be enticing enough to attract the top talents among China’s diaspora given that China’s higher education institutions are not as well-known as other global knowledge production peers.
+
+
+
+
+
+#### Military Talent Programs
+
+___`“Xi Jinping pointed out that we need to reach deep to address prominent issues and problems constraining China’s military talent work, and press ahead in a coordinated way with reform and innovation in identifying, pooling, cultivating and appointing talent.” – Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee`___
+
+Since taking power in 2012, Chinese leader Xi Jinping has pushed sweeping reforms to modernize the country’s military, including through the enhancement of the military’s human capital expertise to ensure higher levels of competency and readiness. The Sixth Plenum Resolution of the 19th Party Congress (a plenum being the annual national meeting of the top officials in the CCP for each generation of the Party Congress) called for strengthening the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with the recruitment and training of more knowledgeable recruits and proficient talent. This had the objective of establishing a “military education policy for the New Era” (as proclaimed by Xi Jinping regarding China’s goals of modernization and development at the CCP’s 19th National Congress in October 2017).
+
+
+
+In January 2022, the Central Military Commission issued an order to enhance and modernize the country’s military talent through improving the military’s capacity and combat readiness. This statement framed the recruitment of talent as critical to the composition of the PLA by ensuring that:
+
+“. . . the barrel of the gun is always in the hands of people who are loyal and reliable to the party, will strengthen the party’s overall leadership of talent work, implement the party’s organizational line in the new era, implement the responsibility system of the chairman of the military commission, adhere to the political training and inspection of talents, and unswervingly ensure a pure selection and employment of political ecology.”
+
+Apart from requiring political adherence to CCP ideology — which some military analysts regard as hampering military effectiveness by taking time away from training to focus on the study of Marxist-Leninism and party policy lines — the government has emphasized the implementation of strong technical capabilities in the training of military personnel with the goal to, as Xi emphasizes, “make fighting and winning wars the starting point and objective of talent work.”
+
+In order to supply this expertise, China’s military has promoted incentives to recruit more educated personnel and improve human capital in the ranks, including through financial bonuses and programs to attract university graduates to enroll as officers. Indeed, one of the major weaknesses in the PLA’s human capital has been a perceived inability to attract educated recruits as wages have risen in coastal urban areas and major cities, which has made the civilian economy more appealing for young Chinese than serving in the PLA. In order to retain talented staff, the PLA offered a pay increase starting in 2017 for qualified officers which would be drawn from defense budgets that continued to grow by more than 8 percent a year. The PLA also seeks to streamline its recruitment toward a more balanced force with less emphasis on army recruitment and more focus on recruiting talent into other military branches, including the People’s Liberation Army Navy and the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, as well as training and integrating joint force operation capabilities between these branches. These efforts are being followed by new forms of training and military education. The PLA also restructured its professional military education program to increase the quality and competence of PLA personnel by updating curricular changes focusing on emerging fields such as information technology, aerospace, and computer sciences. For Beijing, these reforms in human capital recruitment and training are critical for China’s ability to field a modernized, world-class military.
+
+
+### Attracting and Retaining Talent
+
+China’s ability to retain domestic talent and attract foreign experts is another key dimension to enhancing national competitiveness. After decades of experiencing “brain-drain” of top talent leaving China to work in the United States and elsewhere, China is trying to reverse the flow to achieve “brain gain” from the rest of the world. Government efforts to incentivize foreign-educated citizens to either return to China or remain in China are well documented in “talent programs.” Immigration may seem unnecessary for a country home to nearly 20 percent of the global population, a “national condition” that opponents within China have cited in arguments against immigration. However, the ability to attract international talent can be critical for flexibility in plugging skills shortages and creating a diverse environment for innovation.
+
+#### Talent Programs
+
+The cultivation of expertise and knowledge from China’s citizens has been vital to Xi Jinping’s vision of “sharpening China’s competitive edge in human resources.” Through over 200 talent-recruitment initiatives — including the controversial Thousand Talents program and the Young Thousand Talents Program — Beijing has sought to retain Chinese tertiary education students and skilled workers through economic incentives while also making the country an attractive source for academic collaboration and professional expertise from abroad. By 2018, the Thousand Talents program had attracted nearly 7,000 experts to work in Chinese academia and institutes.
+
+Programs designed to retain homegrown expertise and incentivize overseas Chinese students, researchers, and experts to return to the country have become a key focus of Western discourse on China’s talent strategy. Western analysis of these government-sponsored programs often focuses on their roles in industrial espionage and hollowing out of industries. News stories on China’s talent programs have often focused on indictments of talent program awardees accused of making false statements about their ties to China or stealing intellectual property from Western research facilities. But overemphasizing alleged criminal cases in discourse on talent programs can have a chilling effect on scientific and academic advancement in the United States and obscure the bigger picture of talent programs as part of China’s efforts to bolster its domestic talent base.
+
+Beyond the role of acquiring expertise abroad, the success of talent programs provides insight on the elements of China’s work environment that act as either incentives or deterrents for would-be returnees. Research on efforts by Chinese government institutions, universities, and scientific organizations to attract returnee scholars underlines that beyond monetary and status incentives, non-material aspects of a research environment play an important role in attracting back returnees, such as research climate and academic relationships.
+
+Another hurdle for many foreign and returnee talents coming to China is the country’s circumscribed digital environment. In the context of the global information economy, ready access to the internet is critical to a country’s competitiveness, as open internet access allows individuals to exchange new ideas and integrate breakthroughs elsewhere to accelerate their own research. However, these restrictions have adversely impacted the ability of China’s researchers and academics to access key online resources for information, such as Google Scholar and Springer Nature, not to mention key sources of daily news about global developments, such as the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal.
+
+#### Immigration
+
+Immigration impacts a country’s ability to draw top international experts and bridge the gap in skills shortages in domestic populations, representing a key component of overall human capital competitiveness. In Xi’s own words, “China’s development needs the participation of world talents.” But with a legal framework that offers few pathways to permanent residence and with international migrants constituting only 0.1 percent of China’s total population, the country’s restrictive immigration system is a limiting factor in its access to global talent. Immigration governance reform under the Xi administration has indicated room for change in both legal frameworks and domestic perspectives on immigration. However, immigration controls since the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic point to an increasingly closed system.
+
+The 2010s saw increased momentum for reform to China’s immigration system: the State Council described the permanent resident system as an important part of the country’s human capital strategy in 2016; Xi touted the strategic wisdom of “gathering talents from all over the world” to the 19th Party Congress; and Beijing established the nation’s first national migration agency in 2018. At the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, however, momentum shifted away from economic-minded immigration reform. Instead, border authorities turned their focus to preventing coronavirus outbreaks, a move that fell in line with broader policy trends that prioritize security and centralization over economic growth in areas that involve international exchange. Though foreign travel to China has resumed since the end of the country’s zero-Covid policy, China’s foreign population today is severely diminished from 2019 levels, and many businesses are accelerating efforts to localize high-skill jobs rather than relying on international talent to fill key roles in China.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+The different aspects of China’s human capital outlined in this report all link back to China’s ambitions to become a leader across multiple categories of national competitiveness. Chinese policymakers have both sizable advantages and considerable challenges in realizing the country’s ambitions. Through the statements of senior leaders and the policies that accompany them, the Chinese government clearly recognizes that the advancement of the country’s human capital resources will be pivotal to securing China’s future economic and geopolitical potential. As with other national priorities, China’s leaders likely will act with speed to concentrate significant focus and resources on elevating the productivity and innovative capacity of its workforce.
+
+China’s growing ability to attract expertise and nurture its human capital ecosystem will have important implications for U.S. policymakers and the American public alike. The more success China achieves in improving the quality of its workforce, the faster the country will innovate and the more nationally competitive China will become on the world stage. With four times the population of the United States, China does not need to match America in per capita productivity to surpass the United States economically. It merely needs to close the gap. Since the United States cannot match China in terms of quantity, it will face an even greater premium to preserve its qualitative edge in workforce talent in the years ahead.
+
+---
+
+__Briana Boland__ is a former research associate with the Freeman Chair in China Studies at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
+
+__Kevin Dong__ is a senior research assistant with the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution.
+
+__Jude Blanchette__ holds the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS.
+
+__Ryan Hass__ is a senior fellow and director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution.
+
+__Erica Ye__ is a former intern with the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-18-crossing-thresholds.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-18-crossing-thresholds.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Crossing Thresholds
+author: Jade McGlynn
+date : 2024-06-18 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/7f8ZITS.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Ukrainian Resistance to Russian Occupation"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Russia does not have full control over the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories. It is facing an astute insurrectionist campaign. This continued resistance to occupation will play an important role in undermining the sustainability of the Russian war effort._
+
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+The most important rule: go unnoticed. You need to blend into the crowd. Dress inconspicuously; don’t swear; walk on the inside of the pavement; prepare an alibi; use public transport during rush hour; be punctual — if someone is two minutes late to meet you, they may have been captured.
+
+This is the basic code of conduct for Ukrainian underground fighters, as set out by the National Resistance Center of Ukraine — the Ukrainian government’s online resource to support the patriotic resistance under Russian occupation. This partisan movement comprises many thousands of Ukrainians and covers all manner of activities, from distributing yellow ribbons to assassinating Russian secret policemen. Their stories are as harrowing as they are heroic. For instance, in occupied Tokmak, Zaporizhzhia Region, Maksym Makhrinov’s final breath was an explosive statement of resistance. Confronted by Russian forces who had uncovered his partisan work for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Makhrinov blew himself up, taking two Russian soldiers with him. But what led Makhrinov to this situation?
+
+The following report is an effort to provide indicative answers to this question. It is based on extensive fieldwork in Ukraine since 2022, largely in the de-occupied territories. It includes 63 interviews, 50 of which are with people who had been under occupation, 17 with individuals involved in violent or nonviolent resistance, and 7 with officials in the security services responsible for handling and helping ongoing resistance. As such, the report makes no claims to be representative; it does, however, also draw from a literature review of relevant sources, such as Ukrainian Telegram channels of resistance networks and offers of support; Ukrainian reports on this topic from organizations such as OPORA, Prometheus, Eastern Variant, Eastern Human Rights Group, and the National Resistance Center; and interviews with experts specializing in this field. For the purposes of safety and anonymization, the names of most interviewees have been changed and locations are kept deliberately vague.
+
+The purpose of this report is to provide insights into the importance of the resistance, its impact on the sustainability of Russia’s war and occupation, the reality of conducting resistance, and the personal stories of some of those involved. Resistance here is defined as any act that deliberately challenges or impedes the Russian war aim as defined by Vladimir Putin: to destroy Ukrainian sovereignty and identity. Amid ongoing discussions of negotiations and dwindling resilience in the West to support Ukraine, the report will also provide information about the reality of Russia’s occupation and Ukrainians’ struggle against it. If Western policymakers intend to abandon Ukraine to its fate, they have a responsibility to acknowledge what that fate entails.
+
+Alternatively, if Western support for Ukraine does prove more resilient, this report provides recommendations and insights into how the resistance can support the Ukrainian war effort, as well as ways to aid the resistance — from boosting morale to providing material assistance. As the involvement of civilian efforts across the West to support Ukraine has been considerable, a number of recommendations are also aimed more generally at interested organizations and individuals who would like to support, morally or otherwise, the Ukrainian resistance against the Russian occupation.
+
+
+### Occupied Territories
+
+_The Situation on the Ground_
+
+To appropriately contextualize the impact, tenor, and ramifications of Ukrainian resistance against Russian occupation, a foundational understanding of the prevailing conditions is essential. Investigations into the situation within these territories highlight egregious human rights abuses perpetrated by the Russian Federation — the abduction of children, torture, extrajudicial killings, indoctrination, pervasive homelessness and poverty, and systematic resource extraction.
+
+Concurrently, the Russian Ministry of Defense has invested in building new military infrastructure in occupied regions. This militarization extends beyond the presence of military installations; it involves a comprehensive reorientation of local industries to support military logistics, the construction of essential supply networks, and educational reforms designed to instill a pro-military ethos among residents. This strategy aims to transform the occupied territories into a militarized zone, acting as a buffer and demarcation line that underscores the Russian government’s intentions toward the remaining unoccupied Ukrainian territories.
+
+The development of civilian infrastructure in the occupied Ukrainian territories is conspicuously absent, as evidenced by the lack of reconstruction efforts in devastated cities such as Popasna, Volnovakha, Bakhmut, and Soledar. Forced mobilization of locals, exploitation of natural resources, and neglect of civil infrastructure development have precipitated a humanitarian crisis. In June 2023, the Russian government’s allocation of 2.9 billion rubles — significantly less than the planned 3.7 billion rubles — for industrial development in these territories reflects Russia’s reduced commitment to reviving local industries, further exacerbating the unsustainable nature of its occupation model.
+
+Socially, interviewees report that the occupation has fractured community bonds, increased substance abuse, and fueled desires for vengeance against collaborators and Russian forces. The emergence of new social hierarchies, such as the privileged status of (some) collaborators and the disintegration of prewar moral and social orders, poses significant threats to the long-term cohesion of these communities. The demographic situation is critical. In the temporarily occupied parts of Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts, the healthcare system has deteriorated significantly due to the departure of medical professionals; occupation administration statistics indicate that 1 in every 81 newborns dies. From 2018 to 2022, the birth rate in the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic decreased by 46.8 percent.
+
+The Russian occupiers have exacerbated the current demographic decline through policies that include the shutdown of industrial enterprises and the degradation of healthcare services. In many places, the lack of workers has rendered it impossible to sustain essential services, such as water supply and infrastructure repair; this has prompted directives from the Kremlin to recruit Russian citizens and migrant workers to populate the occupied regions, an approach that is also part of a broader movement of settler colonialism and ethnic cleansing in the occupied territories.
+
+The strategies deployed in the occupied territories demonstrate a profound disregard for the wellbeing of the local population, particularly Ukrainians. This includes the conscription of locals into so-called forward detachments, effectively using them as human shields. Those captured are subsequently abandoned and relegated to second-class status — as demonstrated by a recent video appeal to Putin from POWs from the Donetsk and Luhansk Republics (DNR/LNR) who are upset they are being excluded from prisoner swaps, with only “proper” Russians being exchanged. Aside from a few lucky collaborators, the only individuals leading normal lives in the occupied territories are Russian nationals who have relocated to these “new territories.” Interviewees comprising former and current residents of the occupied territories report that any semblance of normality is largely a facade, masking ongoing human rights abuses such as disappearances and torture.
+
+The selective imposition of normality has led to a system that resembles apartheid between Russian and Ukrainian citizens, heavily enforced by the mandatory acquisition of Russian passports. The enforcement of Russian passport acquisition renders daily life and access to essential services contingent upon compliance with the occupiers’ demands, serving as an indirect punishment for those resisting the imposition of a Russian identity. For instance, emergency services and property transactions are inaccessible without a Russian passport; an interviewed individual recounted an unsuccessful attempt to reclaim her property near Donetsk due to her refusal to accept a Russian passport. Workers’ wages may also be withheld if they refuse to take a passport.
+
+___`The selective imposition of normality has led to a system that resembles apartheid between Russian and Ukrainian citizens, heavily enforced by the mandatory acquisition of Russian passports.`___
+
+Moreover, Russia’s strategy has extended to the systemic restructuring of local governance; as a rule, only Russian citizens who have not previously worked in Ukraine are appointed to senior law enforcement positions within the occupied territories. This policy underscores the Kremlin’s intent to sever any preexisting local ties to Ukrainian governance and assert control, albeit at arms’ length. The Ukrainian Cyber Resistance recently acquired the messages of the deputy director of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service, in which it was revealed that he refuses to communicate directly with subordinates in the occupied territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions. Instead, he orders the heads of the department in the Rostov region and Crimea to work as intermediaries, underscoring a hierarchical enforcement structure.
+
+Despite these measures, the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation permitted residents of the occupied territories to vote in 2023 using any form of identification, including Ukrainian passports. This policy was part of a broader strategy to compile comprehensive voter lists, indirectly serving as a population census, with data subsequently integrated into Russian federal systems. The demographic shifts in these regions are stark; in Melitopol alone, the population halved post-invasion — somewhat offset by the nearly 100,000 Russian nationals relocating to the city, further illustrating a deliberate strategy of ethnic cleansing and demographic manipulation by Russian authorities. Such strategies are coupled with severe restrictions on communication and mobility, particularly in areas near the front line, contributing to a climate of intense surveillance and suppression of dissent. This oppressive environment has eroded community bonds and trust, with residents living under constant fear of betrayal or coercion, reminiscent of Soviet-era tactics.
+
+A rigorous system for monitoring and quelling dissent has been progressively intensified. Measures include eavesdropping on communications, the widespread installation of surveillance cameras, and the establishment of an informant network within communities. Access to external information sources is significantly constrained in the temporarily occupied territories, particularly in areas close to the front line, such as Lysychansk, Sievierodonetsk, Rubizhne, and Kreminna. These cities experience substantial disruptions in internet and mobile communication services, which are restricted by occupation authorities due to concerns that local residents might transmit sensitive information to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
+
+The atmosphere of control extends to acts of intimidation and harassment, which the occupying forces perpetrate with apparent impunity. For instance, social media platforms like Telegram reveal frequent discussions among residents of occupied Mariupol and Luhansk about vehicular accidents caused by inebriated or reckless Russian soldiers. A particularly distressing incident occurred in Luhansk, where a Russian tank ran over a woman at a pedestrian crossing in broad daylight, eliciting no public reaction — a stark indicator of the societal desensitization that has occurred under prolonged Russian occupation. Such everyday harassment is particularly targeted at young and attractive women: as one interviewee noted, “All of the girls stopped taking care of themselves, the women go around in ugly clothes, it didn’t used to be like that, women had their hair, their nails (done).” When asked whether this was due to the economic situation, the interlocutor explained that it was in order to not draw the attention of occupiers, “especially the Chechens.”
+
+There have been numerous reported cases of Russian forces, including but far from limited to Chechens, sexually assaulting and raping women. A veteran soldier, actively involved in the de-occupied territories, recounted harrowing accounts of elderly women in villages who had suffered sexual assault. He told stories of wives being raped before their husbands, who were then killed after being forced to witness the crime, and of young attractive women being kidnapped as sex slaves for senior Russian officers. During interviews with villagers who had lived under occupation in the Kharkiv region, the majority of the worst cases, including the gang rape of an elderly woman in a village not far from the border with Donetsk region, happened during the initial invasion. However, rape and sexual violence — primarily toward women but also toward men in Russian custody — are a systematic part of the occupation and of the general feeling of impunity that the occupying soldiers enjoy or, as this report will show, presume they can enjoy.
+
+#### The Ukrainian Resistance at a Glance
+
+Given the escalating atrocities associated with Russia’s unpredictable and intensifying occupation, it is understandable that a considerable number of individuals might be compelled to resist, despite the profound risks associated with such actions. The context of the occupation — marked by its brutality and the existential threat it poses to Ukrainian identity and autonomy — naturally fosters various forms of resistance. Four distinct types of resistance emerge through research:
+
+__Private Resistance:__ This form involves actions that are personal and confined to a close circle of trusted individuals. Examples include reading Ukrainian literature, speaking Ukrainian within the household, sending children to the neighbors so they are seen to be leaving home for school but do not actually attend school, and refusing to take a Russian passport.
+
+__Public Nonlethal Resistance:__ These activities are overt but nonviolent, aimed at bolstering community morale and asserting Ukrainian presence. They include posting flyers, displaying Ukrainian symbols in public spaces, participating in memorial acts like placing candles in windows to commemorate the Holodomor, and engaging in symbolic resistance such as the Yellow Ribbon and Zla Mavka movements.
+
+__Internal Lethal Resistance:__ This category involves direct contributions to military efforts, such as transmitting coordinates of Russian forces to Ukrainian Special Operations Forces and monitoring the movements of Russian soldiers to facilitate targeted actions.
+
+__Public Lethal Resistance:__ The most overt and dangerous form, this type of resistance includes acts such as assassinating Russian occupation personnel and their collaborators and sabotaging occupation infrastructure, as seen in operations by groups like ATESH and SROK.
+
+The primary focus of this paper will be on the lethal forms of resistance. These actions, though less frequently discussed and more challenging to document, play a critical role in the broader resistance movement. However, the study will also address nonlethal resistance, highlighting its significance in sustaining public spirit, fostering a sense of community, and boosting the morale of those engaged in direct combat, as well as the Ukrainian Armed Forces committed to liberating their territory. This analysis aims to understand the diverse profiles of individuals who participate in both lethal and nonlethal resistance, exploring their motivations, the risks they face, and the impact of their actions on the occupation dynamics.
+
+_DEMOGRAPHICS_
+
+The resistance movement in Ukraine’s occupied territories comprises a diverse demographic, although it predominantly involves younger participants. This younger cohort’s engagement is often attributed to a combination of factors: greater physical capability, a sense of invincibility, and, importantly, a stronger national identity coupled with less nostalgia for the Soviet Union era, as indicated by opinion polls. While men are more commonly engaged in active violent resistance, women play substantial roles in both nonviolent and violent actions. For instance, in the Zla Mavka group based in Melitopol, over a hundred women participate in direct actions, though the network extends far beyond this number. The movement has seen significant growth, particularly during the winter months when new members from Luhansk and Donetsk began to emerge, despite previous isolation.
+
+A notable aspect of the resistance is the participation from Crimea, an area previously thought to be subdued after years of occupation. Reports indicate that a large number of women from Crimea have joined the resistance, demonstrating a readiness to oppose the occupation robustly. Women have also been instrumental in more covert forms of resistance — such as poisoning the food and drink offered to Russian soldiers, exploiting the occupiers’ presumptions of local hospitality. In an interview with the author, one ATESH commander explained the varied makeup of their resistance movement:
+
+> There are a lot of people and everyone is different but I will try to generalize as objectively as possible. We have men and women among our agents. Most of them are under 40. The majority of them are married but far from all of them have children. There are very few people in our movement who originally sympathized with Russia. Those few who did change their minds are not involved in sabotage operations but they do help with all sorts of information. On the other hand, we have a different situation with agents located in the Russian Federation. February 2022 changed the worldview of a lot of people. Such a large-scale war and the Putin regime’s crimes forced Russians to cooperate with the ATESH movement.
+
+The socioeconomic profile of the resistance is primarily composed of middle and lower-class individuals. Many of the wealthiest Ukrainians fled the country early in the full-scale invasion, having the resources to do so. In contrast, those from less affluent backgrounds — including some of the most marginalized groups, such as prisoners — have contributed significantly to the resistance efforts. For example, detainees in the Kherson pretrial detention center managed to transmit coordinates of enemy missiles and machinery using a covertly held phone, enabling precise Ukrainian Armed Forces strikes on Russian command centers.
+
+___`A notable aspect of the resistance is the participation from Crimea, an area previously thought to be subdued after years of occupation. Reports indicate that a large number of women from Crimea have joined the resistance, demonstrating a readiness to oppose the occupation robustly.`___
+
+This demographic diversity within the resistance highlights a widespread national commitment across different strata of society, challenging the occupation through various forms of resistance that leverage the unique capabilities and circumstances of its members.
+
+_LANGUAGE, LOCATION, AND CULTURAL IDENTITY_
+
+Many resistance movements operate in Russian-speaking areas but conduct their activities in Ukrainian, as there is a lower likelihood of occupiers understanding the language. The use of the Ukrainian language in resistance activities, especially those involving information dissemination and education, also serves as a tool of cultural resistance and identity affirmation.
+
+It is worth noting, however, that despite language differences, there is no significant division between Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking individuals in terms of their opposition to the occupiers. Linguistic preference does not correlate with political allegiance; just as speaking English does not imply that an Irishman supports British reinvasion, speaking Russian does not mean a Ukrainian desires Russian occupation. In Kharkiv, for example, predominantly Russian-speaking defenders initially confronted the Russian “liberators” with significant resistance. Notably, the Azov Assault Brigade and the Kraken Special Division, units particularly reviled by the Kremlin, consist overwhelmingly of Russian speakers.
+
+Furthermore, the assumption that residents in territories that were occupied following the 2014 invasion are less resistant than those in other cities does not always hold. For instance, Alchevsk in the Luhansk region, occupied by Russian forces in 2014, has experienced persistent hardships under occupation — including frequent water shortages, unstable mobile communications, and inadequate postal services — all of which have contributed to profound anger with the occupation. In an interview with the Eastern Variant network, a local Ukrainian partisan from Alchevsk conveyed the communal exhaustion with the ongoing deprivation and highlighted significant local resistance actions, such as the sabotage of enemy locations and ammunition depots:
+
+> Of course, the main problem in Alchevsk is water supply. It often happens that one of the areas does not have water for four to five days. Discussions arise almost weekly: either a water pipe has burst, the sewage smells across the street, or there has been no water for four days. Besides, the city often has very poor connectivity. Mobile internet was only allowed after the new year. . . . Even local Russian patriots realize that the occupiers have taken 10 years of their lives while not doing anything significant or centralized. Has life gotten better? Not at all. People have lost time, and that’s the most important thing. The occupiers closely monitor Alchevsk. Russians do not trust the local authorities entirely and always keep them under control, placing people from Russia. There are still people with a pro-Ukrainian stance in the city, especially noticeable in 2022 when almost all enemy locations and ammunition depots in Alchevsk were blown up, thanks to local partisans. Alchevsk is Ukraine. Alchevsk is waiting to return home.
+
+Occupational challenges have persisted in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions since 2014, with the situation worsening after the full-scale invasion in 2022. From the very start, there has been forced mobilization, and local LNR and DNR forces receive inferior treatment compared to Russian soldiers. Further, the dissatisfaction among the collaborator ruling class with the Kremlin’s personnel policies has led to instances of noncompliance and outright sabotage, as evidenced in Horlivka, where new mobilization rounds were refused.
+
+The author’s interviews with those living or having lived under LNR and DNR occupation often revealed conflicts between local “People’s Militia” units and Russian forces, driven by deep-seated differences. The cancellation of LPR and DPR passports, replaced with Russian passports, restricted residents’ ability to cross into Ukrainian-controlled territory, exacerbating tensions. Furthermore, the continuous arrests and detentions of pro-Ukrainian locals have intensified animosity toward Russian law enforcement representatives among the detainees’ families. To consolidate control, the Kremlin has significantly strengthened its law enforcement presence in the occupied territories, establishing an extensive network of Russian military and security forces, especially the National Guard and FSB (Russia’s domestic intelligence agency) counterintelligence.
+
+_MOTIVATIONS AND BACKGROUND_
+
+From interviews with past and current members of the resistance, as well as potential recruits, it is evident that these individuals are characterized by resourcefulness, courage, and resilience. Often creative and slightly anarchic, they tend not to adhere strictly to directives, even when associated with intelligence agencies. The challenging circumstances of ongoing resistance have further honed their ingenuity, compelling them to become highly adaptive and continuously develop new tactics to persist in their activities under intense surveillance and oppression.
+
+The resistance members who engaged with the author expressed a spectrum of political beliefs, ranging from left-wing to right-wing ideologies. However, a common thread among them was a robust commitment to sovereignty and freedom, which they interpreted in practical rather than abstract terms. Motivated by a sense of basic human dignity, they articulated sentiments such as: “I refuse to live like a serf in my own home[town/land]” and “This is my country; why should I just hand it over to [Russians]?” In this context, concepts like sovereignty and freedom are understood literally — as the right not to be dragged into a basement and tortured, or the right to not have someone take your apartment.
+
+The motivations of resistance members vary, often depending on the nature of their involvement. Those engaged in violent acts of resistance, such as sabotage and assassination, are typically the most patriotic and ideologically driven. These individuals often chose to stay behind in occupied areas to fight. For instance, one Ukrainian serviceman interviewed for this report shared how he was instructed in late 2021 to remain and coordinate resistance activities in the event of occupation. He and his colleagues replicated training schools for resistance under occupation, drawing on both local knowledge and external support — sometimes from Western intelligence agencies, though the applicability of the latter’s methods received mixed reviews from interviewees.
+
+For these “anticipatory” resisters, who are often linked formally or informally with Ukrainian Military Intelligence (HUR), their motivations are deeply entwined with a sense of historical destiny. Common sentiments among these fighters include a determination to end centuries-long struggles against Russian domination, referencing historical atrocities and genocides, such as the Holodomor, as well as Russian efforts to erase Ukrainian identity. These sentiments are prevalent across much of the Ukrainian resistance, with many viewing the conflict as a genocidal attempt to destroy the Ukrainian nation. The millennial generation, in particular, expresses frustration with their parents’ generation for not doing more to secure Ukraine’s defense post–Soviet Union. This historical perspective is also prominent in Ukrainian media coverage of the resistance, reinforcing the narrative of finality and self-defense: fighting now so future generations won’t have to. This is exemplified by initiatives like HUR’s Military TV Resistance Movement project launched on June 2, 2022, which featured a series of informational films to educate and motivate citizens to defend their lives and homeland.
+
+The resistance includes many trained professionals, such as the types of operatives who planned to stay behind — the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces, military intelligence, and certain special divisions. For example, the Kraken special division has been known to operate in Russian-controlled territories with considerable success, although it also sometimes sees losses. However, there are also many in the resistance who were not initially prepared for such roles but found themselves compelled by circumstances. For instance, the Sumy volunteer group, or “SUD,” was composed largely of local volunteers and yet they played a critical role in defending their city when official military presence was scant. This group, which grew to about 900 people, was pivotal in organizing local defense and maintaining order during the initial stages of the invasion. People continue to join the resistance, largely operating in small cells with minimal connection to other members. As one ATESH fighter explained:
+
+> People get in touch with us by contacting one of the coordinators of our Telegram channel. Or via personal contacts. The coordination of agents is generally carried out over secure messaging apps or some other different channel, depending on the situation.
+
+Among those who are not professionals or trained operatives, the motivations for joining the resistance are complex and varied. For some, it might be a response to direct impacts of the occupation, such as loss of property, restrictions on freedoms, or personal harm. The “sister regions” program implemented by Russia, which sees a Russian region invest in an occupied area and then receive rights to flood markets with local products, is one example that fueled resentment and resistance. By displacing local goods with more expensive Russian products, this program not only altered the economic landscape but also deepened the sense that this was an occupation purely in the interests of the occupiers.
+
+Sexual violence and other forms of abuse by Russian forces also serve as potent motivators for resistance. The horrific acts committed against both men and women have galvanized many to take up arms or support the resistance in any way they can. The fear and indignity experienced by victims and witnesses have in many cases been translated into a fierce determination to resist. This complex amalgam of historical grievances, personal experiences of injustice and abuse, and a profound commitment to national sovereignty and cultural preservation are fueling a resilient and adaptive movement determined to oppose Russian occupation and influence.
+
+___`This complex amalgam of historical grievances, personal experiences of injustice and abuse, and a profound commitment to national sovereignty and cultural preservation are fueling a resilient and adaptive movement determined to oppose Russian occupation and influence.`___
+
+
+### Forms of Resistance
+
+In wars like Ukraine’s fight for sovereignty, the distinctions between soldiers, civilians, and resistance fighters often become indistinct, as a broad segment of the population engages in the struggle for national survival. As previously discussed, the separation between violent and nonviolent resistance is somewhat artificial, given that each type supports and sustains the other, creating a symbiotic relationship of mutual reliance. In the words of one ATESH commander, speaking to the author:
+
+> Non-violent resistance is incredibly important too. We also conduct forms of non-violent resistance, like agitational events in Russian and occupied Ukrainian cities. Our “ATESH civilian strength” activists put up our flyers across cities and this demonstrates our presence among the population. People feel a sense of support, that people who think like them are living next door. We also take revenge on drivers who support Russia’s criminal war. We destroy or paint over cars with ZOV symbols.
+
+However, it is important to note that some members of the resistance consciously choose to avoid involvement in violent or lethal actions, driven either by personal convictions or a strategic desire to preserve their lives. To understand the full scope of the resistance, it is crucial to delineate and examine the specific acts that contribute to the broader resistance movement. Such an analysis not only highlights the varied nature of resistance activities but also helps in understanding the dynamic interplay between different forms of resistance and their collective impact on Ukraine’s struggle for autonomy.
+
+#### Nonviolent Resistance
+
+_PUBLIC ACTS OF DEFIANCE_
+
+These include acts of civil disobedience, such as refusing to comply with the occupiers’ demands or participating in organized protests and demonstrations to challenge the authority and legitimacy of the occupying forces. For example, the Zla Mavka group based in Melitopol has created and distributed fake rubles with Ukrainian symbols and messages to remind the occupiers that they are in Ukraine, not Russia. This initiative represents a creative form of psychological resistance, using humor and art to assert Ukrainian identity and sovereignty. Another prominent example is the Yellow Ribbon movement, which involves Ukrainian citizens discreetly displaying yellow ribbons as a sign of solidarity and covert defiance against Russian forces. The choice of yellow, along with blue, represents the colors of the Ukrainian national flag, signaling a quiet yet powerful affirmation of national identity and opposition to the occupiers.
+
+This form of resistance is significant because it allows for broad participation from the public, including those who may not be able to engage in more direct or violent forms of resistance. By adopting such symbols, individuals communicate their support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and their resistance to the occupation in a manner that is relatively safe yet impactful. This method is particularly effective in fostering a sense of unity and shared purpose among the population, reinforcing the resilience of the community in the face of foreign aggression.
+
+_INFORMATION AND CULTURAL INITIATIVES_
+
+To counter the occupiers’ narrative and propaganda, the resistance works hard to disseminate accurate information about the situation in the occupied territories. For instance, online bots like Resistance.Bot enable reporting on repairs to communication lines, allowing the Ukrainian underground to prevent occupiers from restricting internet access. For younger inhabitants of the occupied territories, the use of the internet and social media — especially Telegram — plays a crucial role in organizing, communicating, and raising awareness about the occupation, thus enabling the spread of information, mobilization of support, and coordination of activities without the need for direct confrontation. Telegram and increasingly Signal are also the way that violent resistance groups recruit new members.
+
+Other efforts encompass activities by journalists, activists, and ordinary citizens aimed at documenting abuses, reporting on the actual conditions under occupation, and debunking falsehoods spread by the occupiers. This includes the production and distribution of materials, such as newspapers and leaflets, with pro-Ukrainian content to combat occupier narratives and bolster public morale. The production of physical products is especially important given that the occupation forces primarily target their propaganda at older demographics, for whom the main source of information is television.
+
+_YOUTH INDOCTRINATION_
+
+Engaging in cultural and educational activities that promote Ukrainian identity and resist Russian cultural assimilation represents another facet of nonviolent resistance. This may include organizing Ukrainian language classes, cultural events, and discussions that reinforce the community’s identity and resilience against efforts to suppress it. For this report, the author spoke to several university professors in free Ukraine who provide online classes to students of high school and university age who are located in the occupied territories. These classes are discreet, with students joining anonymously using false names and with their cameras off to ensure their safety. However, the students often join group classes and are reluctant to take up the offer of separate classes, away from their fellow students, as to them maintaining their connection to a broader Ukrainian community is a much-needed “form of psychological sustenance under the oppressive conditions of occupation.”
+
+A recent BBC report highlighted a schoolteacher who left occupied Melitopol but continues to teach her former students who were left behind. In her case, she prioritizes psychological support and cultural education over traditional subjects, recognizing the significant emotional and psychological impact of the occupation on the children. In the occupied territories themselves, the author was told of numerous efforts to create safe spaces for Ukrainian education — from language to literature — for the children. Originally this was possible under the guise of religious or other forms of gatherings, but since the pseudo-referenda in autumn 2022, this has become much more difficult. The risks associated with these educational efforts are substantial, as any sign of dissent can lead to severe repercussions, including potential forced conscription of the students’ parents into the Russian military. However, these initiatives are critical in countering Russian propaganda and Russia’s extensive cultural and educational indoctrination efforts. By keeping children and older students connected to their Ukrainian roots and realities, these teachers and professors maintain a sense of identity and resilience.
+
+_LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE RESISTANCE_
+
+Other efforts involve resisting through legal and administrative means, such as refusing to recognize the legality of the occupiers’ authorities, not participating in their organized events or elections, and maintaining loyalty to the Ukrainian government. This type of resistance challenges the occupiers’ attempts to legitimize their control and governance over the occupied territories. Despite the efforts at forced passportization, a large number of Ukrainians have resisted, with the National Resistance Centre, using Russian state statistics, claiming that at least 60 percent of Ukrainians have refused passports and 80 percent have refused to put Russian license plates on their cars, as required by law. One interviewee from an area occupied since 2014 who is unable to leave due to caring responsibilities explained to the author: “I won’t take a Russian passport. [My friends in Ukraine] tell me I should, that it is safer but if I do, then who will be here to greet our boys when they liberate us? Where will all the Ukrainians be? I will greet [our boys] as a Ukrainian.”
+
+#### Violent Resistance
+
+Types of violent resistance in the occupied territories include direct attacks and sabotage operations against Russian forces and infrastructure, as well as coordinated efforts with Ukrainian Armed Forces for targeted assaults on enemy positions.
+
+_RECONNAISSANCE_
+
+In addition to educating the public on the situation, countering misinformation, and maintaining morale among the Ukrainian population, various digital platforms have been crucial for coordinating immediate resistance activities. For example, during the occupation of the Kharkiv region, local civilian defense forces, in cooperation with intelligence agencies, established a Signal chat across the region that allowed them to track the movements of the occupiers, often via hastily taken photos from the windows of basements in occupied villages. The chat was set up within the first day of the invasion. This was thanks to the Ukrainian history of self-organization and a certain level of social trust, as well as preparation. The mayor of Derhachi spoke to the author of his own involvement in clandestine networks that enabled the liberation of his home village, Ruska Lozova, strategically placed on the Kharkiv-Belgorod highway. The mayor’s broad network of friends and family provided information on the movements of Russians.
+
+On one occasion, the sharing of encrypted information over social networks and chats led to civilians informing the armed forces that a nearby factory had been taken by the Russians and was being used by them to store military equipment and tanks. Once this information had been verified, the choice was taken by intelligence forces to destroy this site. As the Russians were holding Ukrainian civilians as human shields, this was an especially fraught choice for those involved; however, the risk to the general population of Ukraine’s second-largest city meant that it was a choice the intelligence operative involved felt he had to take.
+
+The longer the occupation continued, however, the less useful such chats became. For example, by August the Kharkiv region chat was largely dead, as the risks became too high with the enhanced occupation regime. Thankfully for the residents of the Kharkiv region, their liberation came soon after. However, the challenges of disseminating information have not halted resistance efforts. Resistance groups such as ATESH continue to provide intelligence on air defenses, depots, military bases, and soldiers’ movements. Journalists have also played a crucial role; for instance, journalists from the online news source Eastern Variant established a hotline for residents of occupied and frontline territories. This provided a secure channel for information sharing, seeking assistance, and accessing a network of specialists. Eastern Variant also launched an online school of civic journalism to teach non-journalists how to safely transmit information, expanding the impact of grassroots information efforts.
+
+Support is not unidirectional; for instance, the “In the Eyes of Partisans” fundraiser, initiated by the Center for National Resistance in 2023, helped purchase drones used to adjust attacks on Russian forces. The resistance’s logistical challenges include acquiring and distributing inexpensive but effective smartphones for communication and coordination, with many such efforts described as grassroots initiatives relying on a network of trusted contacts. There are numerous organizations to support the resistance and general horizontal networking that assists, for example, in getting telephones to the occupied territories. Partisan operations burn through a lot of phones (each phone has to be destroyed after being used to send coordinates). The phones used tend to be inexpensive ($100) but still need to have basic smartphone functions. Two individuals involved in this process described their sourcing as a grassroots effort, asking trusted friends to help; they said the hardest element was the transient nature of support, which poses strategic challenges for resistance operations, highlighting the need for continuous, reliable assistance to the occupied territories.
+
+_SABOTAGE_
+
+There have been a significant number of sabotage activities in the occupied territories, many of them psychological as well as physical. For instance, in Melitopol, the resistance movement SROK has engaged in marking the residences of Russian occupiers in the city. Specifically, apartments that Russian military and police personnel have commandeered are marked with “200,” a reference to Cargo 200, the Russian military slang term for dead soldiers. This marking tactic is intended to disrupt the occupiers’ sense of security and destabilize their operations.
+
+The resistance also targets key infrastructure to disrupt Russian logistical and administrative control in the occupied territories. Notably, the railway system in these regions has been declared autonomous and named the “Railways of Novorossiya,” ostensibly to evade international sanctions aimed at Russian Railways. This entity is not integrated into the broader Russian railway network and is overseen by the Federal Agency for Railway Transport (Roszheldor). Strategic efforts by Ukrainian partisans have focused on sabotaging these rail lines, which are critical for transporting military supplies and looted goods, such as grain and metal, from Crimea to mainland Ukraine. On October 13, 2023, and again on December 15, Melitopol partisans successfully detonated devices on trains that were transporting ammunition, fuel, and stolen resources between Crimea and Dniprorudne. These acts resulted in substantial damage to the railway infrastructure and severely disrupted Russian logistical operations. Following these incidents, Russian forces and administrative personnel intensified security measures and launched extensive searches for the partisans, who have, in this case, evaded capture and remained active.
+
+_DIRECT ACTION_
+
+During the initial full-scale invasion, in many soon-to-be-occupied cities, territorial defense units swiftly transitioned into partisans operating behind enemy lines. An example of this proactive resistance occurred at the battles for the Antonivskyi Bridge near Kherson, where partisans impeded the occupiers’ movements by barricading roads with concrete blocks and trees. Under intense conditions — lacking ammunition and close mortar fire — the partisan leader orchestrated a strategic retreat, ensuring the safety of his unit. Russian forces possessed comprehensive lists of all members of the territorial defense, including personal details such as names and addresses, meaning they had to flee once they could. In an interview with the author, one soldier who fought in the territorial defense of Melitopol recounted his harrowing experience of escaping surrounded cities, navigating through potentially mined fields, leaving behind injured comrades, and enduring severe frostbite.
+
+In a published story on Kherson, another soldier remembers disguising himself as a homeless person to avoid suspicion. Many of the soldier’s comrades stayed behind until the last minute in order to coordinate with commanders to identify and transmit the locations of enemy equipment and personnel. This intelligence gathering was crucial for directing accurate strikes against Russian military assets, but in many cases cost the soldiers their lives.
+
+As in the cases above, there is often a combination of reconnaissance and direct action. For example, while the ATESH movement mainly appears to provide logistical information, partisan activists also claim to have carried out violent attacks, including killing 30 Russian soldiers in a military hospital and setting off a car-bomb attack in Russian-occupied Kherson. In another blurring of roles, there are also crossovers into occupied territory by Ukrainian special divisions. The Bratstvo Ukrainian special division, for example, has conducted operations in Crimea, while others work in different parts of the occupied territories or provide support. For example, Kraken has provided support to Russian units fighting on the side of the Ukrainian Armed Forces — like Legion Svobody, the RDK, and Vostok battalion — in raids into Russia, as well as to Ichkerian units; these units fight on the side of the Ukrainian Armed Forces “for the liberation of their countries from Vladimir Putin’s regime,” in the words of Legion Svobody’s leader.
+
+However, there are also raids into occupied Ukrainian territory, much of which remain secret and classified but a few of which have been made public. One HUR special unit conducted a night raid in the area of Nova Kakhovka on January 23, 2023. The raid was possible thanks to cooperation with local partisans and satellite imagery that identified the exact location of the Russian forward command post, which the reconnaissance forces destroyed with grenade launcher fire. The raid also gave the Ukrainian special forces comprehensive data on the number, composition, and locations of enemy reserves. While the so-called Surovikin line of reinforced defensive lines has made such raids very difficult now, they were very common during the initial months of the invasion; for example, in the village of Shestakove, there was a crossing point where people could come and go between the occupied territories and the gray zone, then pass through into the free territories (e.g., Chuhuiv). This was a space, albeit a very dangerous one, for saboteurs to cross into the occupied territories and collect information from villagers or set traps.
+
+Perhaps the most astonishing of all actions are those direct attacks that involve self-sacrifice — as in the example of Maksym Makhrinov, mentioned at the beginning of this report, who blew himself up and took two Russian soldiers with him. In a similar vein, in December 2023, members of a Ukrainian partisan group called the Crimean Combat Seagulls poisoned and killed 24 Russian soldiers after lacing their vodka with arsenic and strychnine, despite knowing that there was a high risk they would be caught, tortured, and even executed. Similarly, there have been reports from Bakhchysarai, Crimea, of Ukrainian partisans killing Russian soldiers by lacing pies and alcohol with arsenic and rat poison. There have also been reports and claims of mass poisonings of Russian troops elsewhere, from Melitopol to Mariupol. Often, attractive young women are involved in these types of actions, and, in the words of one Ukrainian intelligence operative interviewed by the author: “They are very brave but they don’t live very long afterwards. They disappear into the basements, or if they are lucky some general takes them for a bit [for forced sex].”
+
+As in the cases above, partisans’ direct action is overwhelmingly targeted at Russian military or security forces. The author’s own monitoring of Russian and Ukrainian Telegram channels covering the occupied territories identified over 73 reported deaths of Russian soldiers, police officers, and occupation officials at the hands of partisan movements between December 2023 and January 2024 alone. The true number is likely much higher. Moreover, this figure does not include the vastly more numerous deaths of Russian occupying forces from targeted strikes carried out on the basis of intelligence provided by the underground resistance. For example, in February 2024, a Ukrainian strike on a bakery in the occupied eastern Ukrainian city of Lysychansk killed three Russian occupation officials; in April, Ukraine used Storm Shadow cruise missiles supplied by Britain to target the Luhansk military command base for the Russian army — a severe blow to Russia’s efforts to take more of the region, given the micromanagement of the armed operations there, and something that would not have been possible without the involvement of partisans on the ground.
+
+In addition to Russian occupiers, the resistance also targets those collaborators who actively implement and facilitate the occupation. For example, on April 1, 2024, partisans likely assassinated Valeriy Chaika, who went over to the enemy in 2022 and took on the position of deputy head of the “Center for the Maintenance of Educational Organizations,” in which role he implemented Russia’s indoctrination system for Ukrainian children. On February 10, 2024, partisans appear to have assassinated Oleksandr Hallii in Berdyansk. Before the full-scale war, Hallii was involved in waste processing and selling tobacco products, but afterwards he helped the Russians to expropriate the homes and businesses of Ukrainian residents. Hallii fits a rather typical portrait of collaborators in the occupied territories — but Ukrainian partisans have more egregious traitors in their sights, as with the assassination of Ilya Kiva, a former Ukrainian MP and Russian agent, in Moscow.
+
+
+### Implications and Recommendations
+
+#### The Risk of Being Caught
+
+“Everyone knew that the police station had become the torture chamber, they wanted you to know. I would cross the street not to walk too close to it.” The performative terror so characteristic of the Putin regime in Russia has acquired an even grislier turn in the occupied territories, as reflected in the words of this former resident of the occupied territories. Across all Russian-occupied towns and cities in Ukraine, torture chambers run by the FSB function in plain sight, as a demonstrative form of intimidation. There are legion reports of sexualized torture (e.g., electric shocks attached to genitalia), the removal of fingernails, rape, and mutilation. Any Ukrainian caught helping the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces or undertaking violent resistance is unlikely to live for very long — although, given the conditions in the torture chambers, they may not want to live for very long. There are detailed lists of torture chambers across the occupied territories, the happenings in which deserve far greater media attention but are sadly predictable; they were described in detail in Stanislav Aseyev’s recounting of his time in a DNR torture camp.
+
+___`The performative terror so characteristic of the Putin regime in Russia has acquired an even grislier turn in the occupied territories, as reflected in the words of this former resident. Across all Russian-occupied towns and cities in Ukraine, torture chambers function in plain sight, as a demonstrative form of intimidation.`___
+
+In anticipation of resistance activities, the occupying forces frequently deploy disinformation campaigns to distract from their inability to prevent such actions. Often, they attempt to link resistance efforts to Western influences, as seen in fabricated news claiming that the “British Council” was attempting to recruit residents on the western bank of Kherson. According to Russian allegations, British intelligence was using cultural engagements as a cover for espionage activities, collecting data on Russian military deployments and occupier equipment. These accusations escalated following a series of successful strikes by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the region, leading to propaganda that painted all cultural exchanges as intelligence operations.
+
+Russian efforts to dismantle the resistance also include crudely executed schemes aimed at ensnaring partisans. For instance, a Telegram channel named “Volya” threatened to destroy schools in Mariupol, purporting to represent an anarcho-Ukrainian underground movement. This was a calculated provocation designed to identify active and potential members of the resistance, framing them as criminals and miscreants within the Russian-controlled narrative. Speaking to the author, one ATESH commander explained how the FSB try to infiltrate their network:
+
+> The Russians constantly try to penetrate our network. The FSB are especially interested in us. We maintain our security by verifying potential agents and putting them through a screening process. We give them a number of tasks to complete and then once the potential agent has completed the tasks we give them something a bit trickier. From the results of the tasks we can evaluate their work and their trustworthiness, which trained people help us to do. We can also evaluate how the agent communicates, whether they are suspicious. Normally FSB agents who want to infiltrate us try to find out about our locations, how exactly our network works, and they try to get into physical contact with representatives of the ATESH movement. This system helps us to screen [them] out.
+
+Some areas are experiencing a spate of resistance activity, such as Luhansk, where the resistance is trying to pick up the slack from exhausted forces in the 31st Brigade attempting to resist Russia’s efforts to “fulfill its strategic aims of reaching the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.” In the words of the commander of the 31st Brigade, responsible for this area, his troops “will keep on fighting, they have no other choice but they are tired of course and the lack of support can be felt on the ground and in their heads.” As the resistance try to help as they can, the occupiers have sought to significantly limit their internet access in order to limit communication between partisans and the Ukrainian Armed Forces, such as by installing wired internet which can only be accessed after identification.
+
+#### The Importance of Resistance
+
+On D-Day, the allies knew the location of the Nazi defenses thanks to the French resistance. This is just one of the many factors — from the weather to technological advances — that contributed to Operation Overlord’s success. Ukrainian resistance groups have played pivotal roles in similar, albeit smaller, operations, significantly aiding the Ukrainian Armed Forces in liberating villages near Kharkiv and throughout the region. Should Ukraine acquire sufficient weaponry to launch further counteroffensives, the Ukrainian resistance will undoubtedly have its own D-Day.
+
+To date, partisans have been instrumental in collecting and transmitting intelligence about the locations of enemy equipment and personnel, enabling the Ukrainian Armed Forces to execute precise strikes against Russian military assets. They support military operations by providing essential intelligence, engaging in sabotage to disrupt enemy logistics and command structures, and creating favorable conditions for Ukrainian military initiatives. This not only impacts the operational capabilities of the occupiers but also exposes critical weaknesses, such as the inadequacy of Russian air defenses in occupied territories. The attacks on Crimea, in particular, have carried substantial geopolitical weight and have bolstered Ukrainian morale, countering Putin’s narratives of Russian might.
+
+Moreover, the actions of the Ukrainian resistance debunk Russian propaganda claims of a welcoming occupied populace and pose challenging questions for the liberal Russian opposition in exile. While some Russians are supporting the Crimean resistance movements, the stark contrast between the vigorous resistance within Ukraine and the lack of any large-scale significant opposition within Russia itself raises critical questions about the authenticity and effectiveness of anti-war sentiments in Russia. The repressive regime in the occupied territories far exceeds that within Russia’s borders — and it is only getting worse. On the other hand, the need to constantly increase the numbers of Russian national guard, FSB, and other security personnel points to the challenges occupiers face in policing resistance activities in the occupied territories. This ongoing resistance stretches Russian resources thin, diverts attention from frontline engagements to internal security, and exacerbates the challenges of sustaining the occupation, further demoralizing the Russian mobilization effort as the local population remains overtly hostile.
+
+Despite the suffocating weight of the Russian occupation, Ukrainian men and women continue to identify, intimidate, and assassinate Russian occupiers on a daily basis. As a result, Russia does not have full control over the temporarily occupied territories. It is facing a sustained, well-trained, and astute insurrectionist campaign. This continued resilience and resistance to occupation will play an ever more important role in undermining the sustainability of the Russian war effort. The integration of civilians into the resistance efforts, forming underground networks that provide logistical and intelligence support, underscores the comprehensive nature of the Ukrainian fight. It is imperative that the international community recognizes these regions not as lost causes but as active participants in Ukraine’s ongoing war of liberation. The heroic feats of the Ukrainian resistance deserve to be covered — and Western audiences deserve to read about them. Otherwise, they will develop a flawed understanding of the war and what might be an acceptable, or practical, way to resolve it. It is easier to justify giving up hundreds of thousands of innocent men, women, and children to the arbitrary rule of torturers and executioners if you can pretend that there is no alternative, nobody there is fighting back, and the residents have come around to Russian rule, perhaps even welcomed it. As this report shows, that justification is not true.
+
+___`The heroic feats of the Ukrainian resistance deserve to be covered — and Western audiences deserve to read about them.`___
+
+#### Civil and Policy Recommendations
+
+Supporting the Ukrainian resistance is crucial for those committed to thwarting Russian ambitions in the region. The resistance has demonstrated remarkable resilience and effectiveness under extremely challenging conditions. However, these groups require continued moral and financial support to sustain their efforts. Recognizing and amplifying their struggle in media, government discussions, and public discourse is vital.
+
+In thinking of ways the West can support the Ukrainian resistance, the author asked resistance fighters past and present to offer their own recommendations. It goes without saying that they all asked first and foremost for more military support to the Ukrainian Armed Forces to help liberate their territories. As such, what follows is selection of their answers that specifically related to the resistance movement. The following recommendations outline realistic actions that can be supported by policymakers and the general public to enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of Ukrainian resistance efforts.
+
+__1. Information and Perception__
+
+- Enhancing the visibility of the resistance’s activities is crucial. There needs to be a significant increase in English-language coverage, possibly through translations of comprehensive reports by Ukrainian media and greater sharing of English-language Ukrainian sources such as the National Resistance Centre. Russian opposition publications like Verstka and Important Stories also produce important reports on the resistance.
+
+- One Ukrainian research organization heavily involved in the occupied territories expressed a desire for more support from Russian colleagues in the form of data. For both security and political reasons, such cooperation with Russian anti-war organizations should be mediated through a Western, or neutral, intermediary organization.
+
+- In the words of one ATESH fighter: “We need informational support, so that as many people as possible find out about our struggle. That helps us to recruit new potential agents.”
+
+__2. Technological Support__
+
+- Ensuring the operational continuity of trusted local media outlets in exile is vital. For instance, during its occupation, the local news site Obrii 1909 in Izyum was able, with the help of Western technical support, to unblock its website and then to disseminate crucial information from journalists within and outside the area, bolstering community spirit during critical times.
+
+- Facilitating reconnaissance activities that lighten the load on partisans is essential. Civilian and open-source intelligence (OSINT) communities play a pivotal role in gathering and disseminating actionable intelligence, and the Ukrainian communities involved in this space would be grateful for more assistance from Western colleagues.
+
+- Innovative technological solutions can aid nonviolent resistance. For example, language learning apps could create mirror sites for the Ukrainian language, serving as a tool for cultural preservation and resistance.
+
+__3. General Fundraising__
+
+- Public fundraising initiatives like “In the Eyes of Partisans” deserve broad support. Individuals can contribute financially to organizations that supply the resistance with essential equipment like drones and communication devices. Nongovernmental organizations can form partnerships with entities like the National Resistance Centre and the Ukraine Security and Cooperation Centre’s Free Ukraine Fund, which supports the resistance with nonlethal equipment and delivers funding to Ukrainian domestic arms producers.
+
+- In addition to U.S. support already provided, European countries should provide dedicated funding for special divisions, such as Kraken, and the Special Operations Forces, as well as military intelligence, who form and/or support the resistance. This is especially important given that while special divisions carry out targeted and difficult work, they receive less priority in resource allocation from the Ukrainian Armed Forces, impacting their operational capabilities.
+
+__4. Intelligence Sharing__
+
+- Ukraine’s allies should increase the sharing of satellite imagery to identify coordinates to destroy occupation infrastructure. For example, this could include undermining critical infrastructure used by the occupiers, such as the railway line from Rostov to Dzhankoi, which is crucial for Russian military logistics.
+
+- A number of collaborators are reported to be currently living in the European Union, having escaped the Ukrainian liberation via Russia. Ukraine is currently preparing Interpol requests for their extradition, but European countries should proactively identify these individuals and, if there is legally a case to do so, return them to Ukraine to face justice.
+
+Even small measures, like donating telephones for the resistance or helping to increase public awareness of the resilience of the Ukrainian underground, make a real difference in the desperate conditions of the occupied territories. In the words of one active resistance fighter: “We are grateful to any international and Ukrainian media that bring attention to our activities. It is a great help from their side and an honor for us.” It is important to stress that small acts can have large consequences in these circumstances and that individuals supportive of Ukraine do not feel overwhelmed by the scale of the Russian occupation. After all, Ukrainian partisans continue to believe in their own agency:
+
+> Our faith in liberation is the cornerstone of our struggle. Our actions, every single successful act of sabotage brings victory closer and we understand that perfectly. Every one of us imagines victory day in their own way. For some of us, it will be a massive party, for others a huge demonstration with Ukrainian symbols everywhere, for others still an unbelievable sense of relief. And for the rest, we will just quietly remember all our dead comrades.
+
+---
+
+__Jade McGlynn__ is a research fellow in the War Studies Department at King’s College London.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-18-investing-in-science-and-technology.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-18-investing-in-science-and-technology.md
new file mode 100644
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+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-18-investing-in-science-and-technology.md
@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Investing In S&T
+author: Sujai Shivakumar, et al.
+date : 2024-06-18 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LPsEt0V.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The United States Needs to Up Its Game"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_This report highlights the serious challenge posed by China’s rapid advancements in AI, QIS, and semiconductors, emphasizing the need for policymakers to act decisively to secure the United States’ future in the global technology race._
+
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+The United States is facing a challenge to its global leadership in science and technology that is more serious than any it has confronted since gaining that position after World War II.
+
+Within the relatively short span of two decades, China has emerged as a formidable rival, mounting a concerted drive to dominate key technology-intensive sectors and increasingly matching or exceeding the United States in resources committed. At the same time, the U.S. Congress is bogged down in protracted struggles over public spending and the role of government that have engulfed needed investments in science, research, development, and education — the foundation of U.S. economic strength.
+
+The U.S. private sector remains more innovative than its Chinese competitors, but its efforts are focused on developing consumer-oriented products. Meanwhile, the centralized Chinese system concentrates sustained, long-term government support in technology areas that have direct security-related implications — namely, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum information science, and semiconductors.
+
+The U.S.-China technology rivalry, with its inherent asymmetries, has manifest strategic implications that can ultimately determine the outcome of a potential military confrontation, should one come about. Moreover, as U.S. technology leadership declines, the risks of economic and military challenges will rise.
+
+The limited appreciation of the nature of this rivalry with China was recently underscored by the failure of the U.S. Congress to appropriate the funds previously authorized for the largest part of the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, while simultaneously cutting the budgets of key federal science and technology agencies for fiscal year 2024. This is all the more disappointing, not to say alarming, given that the same week, China announced a 10 percent increase in its already significant levels of public spending on research and development (R&D).
+
+
+### Foundational Funding for CHIPS and Science on Hold
+
+In a major shift in U.S. policy, in August 2022 Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act (“CHIPS Act”), which authorized and appropriated nearly $52 billion in federal investments to promote the creation and expansion of semiconductor manufacturing capacity and microelectronics R&D on U.S. soil. The act also authorized tax credits initially valued (pre-passage) by the Congressional Budget Office at $46 billion through 2031 for investments in domestic semiconductor manufacturing facilities.
+
+Welcoming this legislation, the White House said it “will boost American semiconductor research, development and production,” ensuring U.S. leadership in this foundational technology.
+
+In a concrete manifestation of the program, in March 2024 the Commerce Department announced $8.5 billion in federal grants for U.S. chipmaker Intel Corporation, to be augmented by $11 billion in concessional loans to support the company’s creation of new chipmaking capacity in the United States. That came one month after the administration announced a $1.5 billion grant for foundational chips to GlobalFoundries. Since March, the process has accelerated, with awards of $6.4 billion to Samsung, $6.6 billion to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), and $6.14 billion to Micron Technology for advanced DRAM (memory chip) production in the United States. These grants have unquestionably contributed to a massive surge in U.S.-based investments in semiconductor production.
+
+In addition to the $39 billion to support chip manufacturing, the CHIPS Act authorized a far larger expenditure of $174 billion for investment in the science, engineering, R&D, education, and workforce development that will underpin future advances in chip design and manufacturing, with the goal of assuring future U.S. leadership in this critical enabling industry. The principal federal recipients of these funds are to be the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the Economic Development Administration (EDA).
+
+In contrast to the funds allocated to chip manufacturing, however, these funds were authorized but not appropriated by Congress.
+
+The FY 2024 congressional appropriation did not deliver on the CHIPS Act authorizations for science. Under the CHIPS Act, the NSF was to receive $81 billion over five years, doubling its budget by FY 2027, starting with $15.6 billion in FY 2024. Instead, in the FY 2024 budget, the NSF will receive just $9 billion, 42 percent of the CHIPS Act target, compounded by an 8 percent cut in its current budget. Commenting on these reductions, an NSF spokesperson observed that “it is difficult to place this in the context of the rapid, large-scale science investments by our competitors such as China with the express purpose of outcompeting the United States.”
+
+The FY 2024 budget also features additional funding cuts funding to NIST and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). And looking forward, President Joe Biden’s proposed budget for FY 2025 calls for programmatic increases for NSF and NIST, but not at the levels envisioned by the CHIPS Act, in a retreat from the goals set out in the act.
+
+There is very little in the CHIPS Act benefiting the U.S. semiconductor design industry, which has recently lost major markets in China as a result of tightened U.S. export controls on chip technology to that country. U.S. design firms are not eligible for direct federal funding or investment tax credits under the act, yet they are a major source of competitive strength for the United States.
+
+Sadly, the failure to follow through on the promises of the CHIPS Act is not new. Much of the America COMPETES Act of 2007, which also authorized funding for the NSF and other federal science agencies, was never implemented.
+
+Amid the current climate of geopolitical competition with China, a similar failure to fund the CHIPS Act provisions would represent a serious miscalculation. In the words of Matt Hourihan, a science specialist at the Federation of American Scientists, cuts “to agencies like NSF and NIST are frankly unconscionable in an era when we should be enhancing support for U.S. scientists and engineers.”
+
+
+### China’s Innovation Drive
+
+At a time when science and innovation underpin both competitiveness and national strength, the comparisons with Chinese efforts are disturbing.
+
+During the past two decades, wavering and erratic U.S. public support for science and technology stand in stark contrast with the massive and sustained Chinese effort to boost its innovation capabilities. In the 2010s, funding for R&D in the United States fell in real terms as federal spending was reduced across most categories. While these cuts satisfied short-term domestic political concerns, losses in R&D funding are not easily made up, and the effects endure. Emerging indicators suggest that China is closing the innovation gap with the United States, a development that should command the attention of U.S. policymakers and the public.
+
+In March 2024, the NSF released a report showing that while the United States still leads the world in R&D spending, with $806 billion in gross expenditures in 2021, China was close behind, at $668 billion. As recently as 2009, U.S. R&D outlays were more than double those of China (Figure 1).
+
+The NSF noted that with respect to indicators of global science, technology, and innovation (STI) capabilities, such as science and engineering (S&E) research publications, patents, and knowledge and technology intensive (KTI) industry output, “China has significantly increased its share of global STI capabilities.”
+
+China is now the top producer of S&E publications and international patents and has the largest value-added KTI manufacturing output, at $2.4 trillion in 2021, versus the United States’ $1.4 trillion.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1: Gross Domestic Expenditures on R&D by Selected Country or Economy, 2000–2021.__ Source: [Steven Deitz and Christina Freyman, The State of U.S. Science and Engineering 2024 (Alexandria, VA: National Science Foundation, March 13, 2024)](https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsb20243/discovery-u-s-and-global-r-d#global-r-d)._
+
+The United States has long led the world in doctorate degrees awarded each year in the S&E field (Figure 2). However, in 2020 China, with nearly 43,400 degrees, surpassed the United States, with around 41,700. While China’s larger population clearly impacts comparisons, China nonetheless far surpasses the United States in first university degrees — which are essentially equivalent U.S. bachelor’s degrees — in S&E fields, graduating two million in 2020, more than double the 900,000 in the United States. In the case of degrees, patents, and publications, qualitative differences may be significant, but the scale of China’s aggregated indicators are worth noting.
+
+The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) national security think tank, in a 2023 analysis of research trends in 23 strategic knowledge-intensive sectors related to Australian national defense, found that China led advanced technological research in 80 percent of the sectors. ASPI found that state-led investment allowed China to surpass the United States, Europe, and Japan in areas including hypersonic, sonar, advanced underwater communications, post-quantum cryptography, and underwater drones.
+
+A January 2023 study by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), a U.S.-based think tank, found that “based on key indicators of innovation and advanced-industry performance, China has surpassed the United States in total innovation output.” Among the study’s key findings were that China is threatening U.S. and allied market share in advanced, high-value-added, and national security-critical industries. China is evolving “from an imitator to an innovator,” it said, and has demonstrated the capacity for world leadership in several advanced technologies, including supercomputers and high-speed rail.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 2: S&E Doctoral Degrees Awarded by Selected Country, 2011–2020.__ Source: Deitz and Freyman, The State of U.S. Science and Engineering 2024._
+
+A study on Chinese innovation published by Cambridge University Press in 2023 characterized China as an emerging “juggernaut in science, technology and innovation,” citing a number of factors. According to the study, by 2021 China was spending double its 2015 R&D expenditure and 56 times the amount it spent in 1995, the year the government proposed a development strategy of “rejuvenating the nation with science, technology and education” (Figure 3).
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 3: China Gross Domestic R&D, 1995–2021.__ Source: Deitz and Freyman, The State of U.S. Science and Engineering 2024._
+
+The study also found that China has the largest talent pool in the world: in 2020, the number of total undergraduate degrees awarded in China was 7.97 million, with graduate degrees totaling some 662,450 and doctorates 66,175.
+
+A 2022 study of China’s innovation policies published by Oxford University Press observed that “in absolute values, such as R&D expenditure and the number of researchers, patents, and publications, China is now ranked first or second in the world.” The study added, “Examples of its scientific and technological prowess include the development of the world’s fastest supercomputer, China’s first single-aisle jet aircraft, high speed rail networks, fifth-generation (5G) communications networks, and a demonstrated ability to land a spaceship on Mars, along with a plethora of world-leading innovations in the digital economy.”
+
+As mentioned previously, the United States continues to outspend China in gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD), although by a narrowing margin. The United States also outspends China in GERD as a percentage of GDP, spending 3.5 percent in 2021 compared to China’s 2.4 percent. However, these differences should not be grounds for complacency. It is notable that China’s R&D allocation differs from that of the United States, with a greater proportion of spending focused on applied research and development and more limited efforts on basic research which, through legitimate and illegitimate means, can be acquired from U.S. sources (Figure 4).
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 4: Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D as a Percentage of GDP, United States and China, 2015–21.__ Source: [“Main Science and Technology Indicators,” OECD Data Explorer](https://data-viewer.oecd.org?chartId=80feaac0-9eac-4307-a324-921e8e1b9f70)._
+
+Importantly, U.S. R&D spending is spread out over a vast array of commercially oriented themes and industries, while Chinese investments are concentrated in several dozen strategically important high-tech sectors. Most of these sectors have defense-related implications and are focused not on the pursuit of breakthrough innovations but on the dominance of those sectors through more efficient manufacturing and commercialization of recent innovations, most commonly drawn from R&D initially conducted outside of China.
+
+
+### China
+
+_An Unprecedented Degree of Government Engagement_
+
+While government policy measures have played a key role in the development of high-tech industries in the United States, Europe, and East Asia, “the Chinese case offers a rare and unprecedented opportunity to examine state-led innovation as few other countries have intervened so systematically and invasively in their national innovation systems,” the Cambridge University Press study noted. In the United States, perennial internecine battles over the federal budget have led to continuing uncertainty over the scale and scope of the government’s innovation policies. In contrast, China’s government has pursued a consistent, long-range technology development effort for nearly two decades, albeit with adaptive adjustments for shocks such as the 2008 financial crisis, the Covid-19 pandemic, and the imposition of stringent technology export controls by the United States and its allies in and after 2022.
+
+#### The Medium and Long-Term Plan
+
+In June 2006, the Chinese government promulgated its “Medium and Long-Term Plan (MLP) for the Development of Science and Technology (2006–2020),” which the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative described in 2018 as “the seminal document articulating China’s long-term technology development strategy.” The MLP featured a panoply of government measures to promote the development of “key fields and priority subjects,” including fiscal and tax measures, preferential government procurement, and “absorption” of imported technologies.
+
+The MLP introduced the concept of “indigenous innovation,” defined as “enhancing original innovation through co-innovation and re-innovation based on the assimilation of imported technologies.” The concept of indigenous innovation has been carried forward in subsequent Chinese industrial developmental measures to the present day. However, indigenous is perhaps a misnomer. The 2018 study by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, which looked at China’s misappropriation of U.S. technology, offered extensive evidence of that assessment.
+
+Sixteen “mega projects” were created in 2006 pursuant to the MLP to “help China master the core technologies of various strategic industries, driving the indigenous innovation effort.” According to one source, the government planned to invest $100 billion in these projects between 2006 and 2020. The megaprojects were tasked with the “assimilation and absorption” of technologies imported from outside China.
+
+The MLP is a well-focused, well-funded, long-term effort supported by the Chinese government’s 11th, 12th, and 13th Five-Year Plans (2006–2020) for economic development. In addition, between 2006 and 2008, central government agencies published 79 innovation policies designed to implement the MLP, including sector-specific plans for key industries like semiconductors and renewable energy equipment.
+
+#### Made in China 2025
+
+Reflecting the continuity of these plans, in May 2015 the Chinese government announced its Made in China 2025 strategy, a 10-year, $300 billion plan for promoting manufacturing that “brought together all existing policies across related fields, some of the ‘strategic emerging industries,’ and targeted priorities in automation, IT, robotics, AI, and much more under one umbrella.” The Made in China 2025 strategy remains “consistent with the goal of ‘indigenous innovation.’”
+
+It is also a remarkably ambitious strategy. With a goal of achieving global dominance in key technologies, it sets market share targets for designated industries and seeks to localize supply chains for those industries. China has set a target of being able to provide 70 percent of the key materials and components from domestic sources by 2025.
+
+Funding for the strategy is equally ambitious. A prodigious volume of central and regional government funds flowed through many channels to participating firms in the form of equity investments, loans from government financial institutions, and huge public/private investment funds. Reflecting the government’s long-term commitment, China also established R&D centers across the country to develop priority technologies and support their commercialization.
+
+In addition, China has launched new large-scale “mega” or “high end” thematic R&D projects — described as “large scale infrastructures and expensive funding initiatives in strategic industries and frontier technologies” — continuing a policy tool introduced under the 2006 MLP.
+
+China has also set targets for achieving “green” and “smart” manufacturing in the key sectors, incorporating digital technologies in the effort, with the government designating “pilot demonstration projects” across the country to facilitate dissemination of newly developed technologies. These indigenous investments are complemented by government-supported investment funds that acquired foreign firms possessing technologies deemed to be supportive of China’s development effort.
+
+#### Significant Economic Impact
+
+China’s actions have proven effective and have even generated notable successes. As Professor Shirley Ze Yu, a political economist at Harvard’s Kennedy School, observed in March 2024, “Made in China 2025 is an exceptionally successful industrial strategy.” She went on to note, “In six years, China’s smartphone manufacturing surpassed 50 percent of the global market share. In eight years, China’s solar, wind and lithium battery production all rose to global dominance.” Although the Made in China 2025 strategy was initially “grossly underestimated,” it is now “considered in the West, especially in the United States, as a master plan for China to secure dominance in global technology, connected with the expansion of its global influence using the Belt and Road Initiative.”
+
+
+### China’s Innovation Vulnerabilities
+
+Despite this progress, the widespread view that China’s bid for global technological leadership is relentless and unstoppable has its share of skeptics, and in fact the recent record of innovation successes masks systemic weaknesses.
+
+#### Reliance on Foreign Research
+
+China’s total R&D spending, based on 2019 figures, allocates only around 6 percent of total outlays to basic research and 11 percent to applied research, compared with 16.6 percent and 19.2 percent, respectively, for the United States (Figure 5).
+
+The remainder is allocated to “experimental development” — that is, according to the NSF’s definition, “drawing on knowledge gained from research and practical experience and producing additional knowledge, which is directed to producing new products or processes or to improving existing products or processes.” Underfunding of basic and applied R&D presumes the continued ability to absorb foreign technology and manufacture products based on it. China’s R&D overspending on development at the expense of basic and applied research “may jeopardize the long-term prospect of the country’s scientific, economic, and social development,” scholars have found.
+
+To date, the indigenous innovation approach, drawing upon the fruits of foreign research, may have enabled China to escape the consequences of its underdeveloped basic and applied research efforts. As the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), a European think tank specializing in China, observed in March 2024, “Most of the [technology] successes China can point to have some degree of foreign inspiration. Digital giants in search, e-commerce, ride hailing and social networking started by translating U.S. models to Chinese contexts.” MERICS went on to point out, “In hardware sectors like solar panels, batteries, electric vehicles, smart phones, and commercial drones, Chinese overseas returnees and local entrepreneurs gained global market share by building on ideas and components pioneered elsewhere.”
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 5: R&D Expenditure by Type, United States and China, 2019.__ Source: Deitz and Freyman, The State of U.S. Science and Engineering 2024._
+
+But as recent events have underscored, China’s degree of access to foreign technology, especially at the cutting edge, will not necessarily continue. The Biden administration is reportedly considering blacklisting Chinese semiconductor firms linked to Huawei Technologies and imposing sanctions on Chinese memory chipmaker ChangXin Memory Technologies.
+
+In particular, “access to core components and technology is a prerequisite for China’s advancement in emerging industries,” MERICS scholars wrote in 2019. “Chinese tech firms have already gotten into serious trouble when cut off from access to chips or other high-tech components from abroad, as U.S. measures towards companies like ZTE and Huawei have proved.” The recent imposition of more stringent export controls on semiconductors, quantum computing, and AI technology by the United States and its allies has underscored this vulnerability.
+
+#### Encumbrances of Government Involvement
+
+While the Chinese government’s deep involvement in innovation is often cited as a source of strength, it is also problematic. The 2023 ITIF study, which warns of China’s growing prowess in this regard, acknowledges that “state involvement in the Chinese economy will almost certainly hinder productivity growth.” But it is important to keep in mind that China is not seeking to maximize efficiency; rather, it strives to dominate strategic sectors with national security implications, and it is willing to spend heavily to do so.
+
+Still, Chinese scientists sometimes complain that as they seek funding, they are “encumbered by arduous red tape,” while their peers are “becoming obsessed with recognition,” undermining the nation’s drive for innovation and technological self-sufficiency.
+
+For example, in August 2023, China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology decreed that all mobile app providers must submit their business details to the government or face punishment, a move that Chinese software developers said will “stifle local innovation and hinder access to advances created overseas.”
+
+#### Limited Freedom to Think and Associate
+
+While China is graduating more students in S&E fields, it remains uncertain whether sheer numbers will be sufficient to move China ahead in innovation. One recent analysis observed that
+
+> while innovation has been elevated to a very high status in China, and on the surface Chinese researchers are encouraged to think outside the box, equally important are the other ingredients of a true innovation culture, namely, autonomy, free access to the flow of information and especially dissent, both scientific and political, which at present are not adequately applauded or tolerated.
+
+#### Growing Friction with Trading Partners
+
+Huang Yiping, dean of Peking University’s National School of Development, warned recently that China’s massive investments in high-tech manufacturing sectors could lead to overcapacity and friction with China’s trading partners, noting that the United States and Europe were moving to decouple their supply chains from China and invest in increased domestic production. “If it really turns into a relatively common wave of trade protectionism against Chinese products, it may actually be detrimental to our next stage of development, especially in innovation,” he said.
+
+Yet while it is true that China’s innovation system has weaknesses and vulnerabilities, China can point to spectacular achievements during the past decade in numerous technology-intensive fields. In virtually every case, China got its foothold through acquisition and adaptation of foundational foreign technology. But it has gone on to develop and improve manufacturing capability, frequently surpassing its foreign counterparts in quality and efficiency and eventually achieving a dominant global market position. As a 2023 study pointed out, “While the development of novel products and processes is obviously an important aspect of innovation, effective commercialization is at least as important.” And successful commercialization is essential for the revenue to fund the R&D to drive the next wave of innovation.
+
+
+### A Growing Challenge in Strategic Sectors
+
+In 2023, CSIS published a major study of the new controls imposed by the United States and its allies on technology exports to China, whose coauthors included William A. Reinsch, formerly in charge of U.S. export controls at the Department of Commerce. Although the study’s focus was on export controls, it concluded by stating that “the important question is not how to hold China back [through controls], as the U.S. capability for doing that is limited, but rather how to stay ahead. A strategy for that lies in the various U.S. policy initiatives enacted in the past two years, most notably the CHIPS Act, but that alone will be insufficient to achieve long-term U.S. strategic objectives.”
+
+At present, the policies adopted amid much fanfare to address this existential competition are effectively stalled. The “science” portion of the CHIPS Act — the principal longer-term scientific promotion measure of the current administration — remains unfunded, a circumstance that may well continue for the foreseeable future. Congress, instead of dramatically expanding funding for federal science agencies, as in the Sputnik era, is reducing it. This is not an abstract problem. A survey of three critical cross-cutting foundational technologies that will enable many strategic technology sectors essential for U.S. national defense capabilities — AI, quantum technology, and semiconductors — indicates that while the United States may still lead in all three, China is rapidly closing the technology gap.
+
+#### Artificial Intelligence
+
+AI is the development of computer systems to perform tasks and exercise cognitive functions that usually require human intelligence, such as decisionmaking, pattern recognition, problem solving, “learning” from available data, and translation of languages. It is rapidly being deployed across a broad range of human endeavors, transforming economies and societies. A high-stakes AI race, reminiscent of the U.S.-Soviet race to the moon in the 1960s, is emerging between the United States and China. Unlike the race to the moon, however, the race for AI has no short-term finish line. On the contrary, it involves competition across national innovation ecosystems including universities, small and large companies, and government funding and policy support.
+
+China recognizes this is a long-term contest and is taking a long-term view, with investments commensurate with the stakes. For example, in 2017 China’s State Council released its New Generation Artificial Intelligence Plan, which set 2030 as a target date by which China will achieve global leadership in AI, turn AI into a $150 billion domestic industry, and be the world leader in developing ethical norms and standards for AI.
+
+_WHAT ARE THE STAKES IN THE AI RACE?_
+
+Policy experts increasingly recognize the importance of AI in the context of national defense. AI can make multiple decisions and enable actions with a speed and performance level that, in the future, is expected to exceed the capabilities of human operators. “As AI does not get fatigued, does not forget, and has no emotional fluctuation, AI is expected to be able to help commanders make decisions by processing large quantities of data quickly and accurately,” the Japanese National Institute of Defense Studies said in 2021.
+
+The U.S. National Security Commission for Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) was formed in 2018 to assess AI, machine learning (ML), and related technologies as they may affect U.S. national security and defense, and to make recommendations to the president and Congress. The commission released its final report in March 2021, which concluded that the United States “is not prepared to defend or compete in the AI era. . . . This is the tough reality that we must face,” in the words of Chair Eric Schmidt, former chief executive of Google, and Vice Chair Bob Work, a former deputy secretary of defense.
+
+The NCSAI warned that “for the first time since World War II, America’s technological predominance — the backbone of its economic and military power — is under threat. China possesses the might, talent, and ambition to surpass the United States as the world’s leader in AI in the next decade if current trends do not change.” The commission said that “our armed forces’ competitive military-technical advantage could be lost within the next decade if they do not accelerate the adoption of AI across their missions.” It also emphasized the potential consequences, asserting that “defending against AI-capable adversaries operating at machine speeds without employing AI is an invitation to disaster.”
+
+The NCSAI noted that while the U.S. private sector was making dramatic strides in AI, “commercial agendas are dictating the future of AI, and concentrating heavily in one discipline: machine learning (ML).” It added, “Despite promising moves, government funding has lagged behind the performative potential of the field, limiting its ability to shape research toward the public good and support progress across a range of AI disciplines. As a result, the [U.S.] AI innovation environment rests on a narrowing foundation.”
+
+Although the NSCAI’s report was released three years ago, recent comments by industry and government experts indicate that the commission’s basic findings with respect to the national security dimensions of AI remain sound. This is reflected in both the scale of Chinese investments and their focus, which prioritize AI-related research in defense applications instead of consumer services such as the ChatGPT chatbot: Alexandr Wang, the founder of Scale AI, said in 2023 that while China’s People’s Liberation Army is spending between 1 and 2 percent of its annual budget on AI, the Pentagon is spending between 0.1 and 0.2 percent.
+
+In mid-2023, Work, the former deputy defense secretary, commented that in “marginal terms, we’re flat and the Chinese are outspending us. This is why China is so different. In the past we’ve always been able to outspend our competitors.”
+
+Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Horowitz said in a January 2024 interview that “the [AI] adoption capacity of the Department is improving . . . but we have more work to do, frankly, as we’ve been very public in stating.”
+
+_PAYOFFS FOR CHINA_
+
+China is making great strides in developing defense-related applications of AI. The 2023 ASPI assessment of research trends in 23 critical technology areas concluded that in six key thematic areas relevant to AI and autonomy, China already leads in three (Table 1).
+
+
+_▲ __Table 1: Research Leaders in Defense-Related AI Applications.__ Source: [“AUKUS Relevant Technologies: Top 10 Country Snapshot,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Critical Technology Tracker, June 2023](https://www.aspi.org.au/report/critical-technology-tracker)._
+
+The Department of Defense (DOD) is beginning to respond to the AI challenge. In 2022, Brookings released a study of all federal AI-related contracts in the preceding five years, and the next year it released a follow-up study covering August 2022 to August 2023.
+
+Over a five-year period from 2017 to 2022, it found a total of 472 AI-related federal contracts. In just the one-year span from 2022 to 2023, there were 489. The potential value of federal awards for AI research grew 1,200 percent in the 2022–23 period, to $4.6 billion, from $355 million over the preceding five-year period, primarily driven by the DOD (Figure 6).
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 6: Comparing Potential Value and Contract Counts, Past vs. New Contracts.__ Source: [Jacob Larson et al., The Evolution of Artificial Intelligence (AI) Spending by the U.S. Government (Washington, DC: Brookings, March 26, 2024)](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-evolution-of-artificial-intelligence-ai-spending-by-the-u-s-government/)._
+
+However, as reported in Time, the Pentagon questioned the Brookings analysis, stating that DOD requested $874 million for AI research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) in FY 2022 and $1.8 billion in FY 2024.
+
+In either case, the U.S. defense establishment is clearly increasing its commitment to AI, although whether this will match China’s effort is unclear. In its November 2023 strategy to promote the adoption of AI by the armed forces, the Pentagon’s stated goal was to “help accelerate the speed of commanders’ decisions and improve the quality and accuracy of those decisions, which can be decisive in deterring a fight and in winning a fight.”
+
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Horowitz disclosed in his January 2024 interview that with a program dubbed the Replicator Initiative, the Pentagon expects to be able to “field in the multiple thousands attritable autonomous systems in the next 18 to 24 months. . . . We’re on track to achieve that goal.” This could mean the deployment of thousands or tens of thousands of low-cost autonomous units for use in swarms which, from a cost standpoint, the United States could “afford to lose.”
+
+Matt Turek, deputy director of the Information Innovation Directorate at the DOD’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), said at a March 2024 CSIS event that about 70 percent of all DARPA initiatives now have some form of AI, machine learning, and autonomy associated with them, with the broad goal of “preventing or creating strategic surprise.” He noted that technology firms like Microsoft, OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google were all participating in a DARPA program and were providing access to state-of-the-art models.
+
+Despite such developments, as former deputy secretary of defense Work said in mid-2023, while the Pentagon is increasing its R&D spending on AI, it is not doing so at a pace sufficient to close the gap with China.
+
+_CREATING AN INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE_
+
+The Biden administration is creating an institutional architecture for the application of AI throughout the federal system. In October 2023, the administration released an executive order on AI that emphasizes safety, governance, and the establishment of standards and consumer protections; sets up task forces and advisory committees; and requires specific actions by big tech companies and federal agencies, including the promulgation of guidelines. The administration is requesting $3 billion for federal agencies’ use of AI in its FY 2025 budget and $300 million to increase agency funds for AI to address risks and advance AI’s use for the public good.
+
+The budget allocates $32 million to a National AI Research Resource (NAIRR) pilot, which will provide AI researchers with the computational tools they need to conduct AI research. Federal agencies would get $70 million to establish chief AI officers (CAIO) to promote the use of AI and manage its risks. Meanwhile, an “AI talent surge,” aimed at boosting the federal talent pool with AI expertise, is allocated $32 million.
+
+While these measures will undoubtedly facilitate the application of AI in the federal agencies, they appear to be primarily focused on safety measures, consumer protection, and safeguards against abuses of AI. They are not focused on the strategic AI competition with China.
+
+_AI CHALLENGES FOR CHINA_
+
+Despite its gains in AI, China faces obstacles in its effort to capture world leadership in the field by 2030. While the government has been a critical actor in promoting the development of AI, its authoritarian character is, at times, counterproductive.
+
+In the summer of 2023, Chinese authorities proposed regulations for generative AI, requiring that all images and text must align with the “core values of socialism” and must not undermine state authority or national unity. At that time several Chinese companies had already launched chatbots but found it impossible to compete with U.S.-based OpenAI’s ChatGPT in part because of the many restrictions imposed by the state.
+
+A major U.S. advantage is that the private sector is investing heavily. According to the Stanford University Institute for Human-Centered AI’s 2024 annual report, the United States leads China in private sector investment in AI by an enormous margin, with $67.2 billion invested in 2023 compared with $7.8 billion by China. U.S.-based “big data” companies like Meta, Google, and Microsoft are pouring large sums of money into AI research. The United States is also spawning AI start-ups at over three times the rate of China. OpenAI, a U.S. nonprofit AI research organization, launched ChatGPT in 2022 powered by a large language model, and it became the fastest-growing consumer software application in history.
+
+Recently imposed Western export controls are limiting China’s access to the leading-edge chips that are essential to drive advanced AI systems. China is unlikely to be able to produce such chips in volume by itself for a number of years, although Huawei’s recent announcement of seven-nanometer technology in its latest smartphone is a troubling sign for U.S. policymakers. Still, Paul Scharre, director of studies at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), noted that if the Western controls work as intended, “Chinese AI developers will remain boxed out of that supply chain, working with less powerful chips, and thus a year or two behind the cutting edge as AI continues its rapid advance.”
+
+These controls can be effective in delaying China’s progress in AI. According to numerous industry experts, “Even as the country [China] races to build generative A.I., Chinese companies are relying almost entirely on underlying systems from the United States,” and China lags behind the United States by a year and may be falling further behind in generative AI.
+
+China faces obstacles in developing large language models, such as the relatively lower quality of data from Mandarin-language internet sources versus English and strong competition from Google’s Gemini and ChatGPT, but is apparently finding workarounds. In March 2024, the Department of Justice indicted a Chinese national and former Google AI software developer for allegedly stealing 500 files of confidential code that the company uses for its supercomputing data centers to train large language models. The indictment alleged that the researcher concurrently went to work for Google rivals in China. Indeed, a hidden Chinese competitive advantage in AI and other high-tech sectors is its large-scale state-supported theft of Western intellectual property.
+
+#### Quantum Information Science
+
+Quantum information science (QIS) employs principles derived from quantum science to achieve new and potentially revolutionary capabilities in communications, computing, sensing, and encryption/decryption. Quantum information technology has rapidly moved from pioneering theoretical work by U.S. scientists to the emergence and pursuit of practical applications in the United States, China, and Europe. Many of these applications will have major impacts on national security.
+
+For instance, quantum computers may soon be able to decrypt information stored on encrypted systems, which, according to a 2022 Biden administration National Security Memorandum, could “jeopardize civilian and military communications systems, undermine supervisory and control systems for critical infrastructure, and defeat security protocols for most Internet-based financial transactions.”
+
+Among other uses, application of quantum concepts to sensors could enable the detection of concealed underground structures, submarines, and nuclear weapons.
+
+Quantum-based communications systems could ensure secure communications that could not be breached by adversaries. And quantum accelerometers could be used for navigation when GPS is not available, including underwater and underground situations and scenarios in which GPS has been knocked out by adversaries.
+
+_THE U.S. NATIONAL QUANTUM INITIATIVE ACT_
+
+In a major positive step to address this challenge, the National Quantum Initiative Act (NQIA) of 2018 established a coordinated federal program to promote quantum R&D to ensure U.S. economic and national security. The act authorized federal agencies to establish consortia and research centers to enable QIS R&D and required the coordination of QIS programs across the federal government and in conjunction with academia and industry. The NQIA was authorized for five years and is up for reauthorization in 2024.
+
+Reauthorization of the act is crucial. As a principal analyst at UK-based data analytics firm GlobalData observed, “If reauthorization fails, it will damage the U.S.’s position in the global quantum race.”
+
+Significant QIS developmental efforts are ongoing at over a dozen federal agencies including NIST, DOD, DOE, NASA, and within the intelligence community. DOD’s QIS developmental efforts have been under way for years and are implemented pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act. Since 2023, DARPA has been pursuing Underexplored Systems for Utility-Scale Quantum Computing (US2QC) to determine whether revolutionary approaches to QIS can reach utility scale more rapidly than conventional wisdom predicts. There are multiple paths to pursue. These opportunities were recognized in the increased spending authorized in the science portion of the CHIPS Act for quantum research at NSF, NIST, and DOE, but as noted above, the necessary funds have not been appropriated.
+
+_A GROWING COMPETITIVE THREAT_
+
+Where the United States and China stand in comparative terms in QIS is subjective and difficult to assess, particularly given that the research efforts that are under way are frequently not transparent.
+
+A 2022 RAND Corporation study concluded that the United States led the world in most, but not all, quantum technologies. In 2022, GlobalData concluded that the United States led China in quantum technology by about five years, but two years later, in 2024, the same firm concluded that the two countries were “nearly equal.” Underscoring this assessment, in May 2024, research teams in China, the United States, and the Netherlands independently reported simultaneous breakthroughs that could eventually enable the creation of “nearly unhackable” quantum-based internet services. The 2023 Australian ASPI survey of critical technologies found that of four quantum-related research domains, China led in three: quantum sensors, quantum communications, and post-quantum technologies. The United States leads in one defense-related field, quantum computing. In the three fields led by China, that country is producing more S&E papers and has the foremost research organizations in the world, the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the University of Science and Technology of China.
+
+According to a 2023 study by the Wilson Center, “opacity reigns in China’s public and private financing for quantum technologies.” The same can be said, to a degree, about U.S. outlays.
+
+The Chinese government has committed to spend $15 billion in developing QIS between 2024 and 2028, but the extent to which it will actually do so has been questioned. In the United States, the government has reportedly committed $3 billion to various quantum projects, another $1.2 billion to the National Quantum Initiative, and possibly additional outlays in the DOD’s mostly classified “black budget.” Although U.S. public outlays are smaller than China’s, as a recent CSIS study observes, “The United States has begun to mitigate its investment gap with China by teaming up with key allies leading global QIS innovation on research and development efforts.”
+
+_MAJOR ACHIEVEMENTS, YET VULNERABILITIES REMAIN_
+
+Recent anecdotal reports out of China underscore both its achievements in quantum technology and some of its vulnerabilities. In October 2023, Chinese scientists announced that the country’s latest quantum computer, the JiuZhang 3, had solved a highly complex mathematical problem in a millionth of a second, more than 20 billion years faster than the world’s fastest supercomputer could solve the same problem. In January 2024, a Chinese quantum computer company, Origin Quantum — founded by scientists from the University of Science and Technology of China — unveiled a “China independent-developed state-of-the-art quantum computer” dubbed Origin Wukong (Monkey King) which was open for access by users around the world. Within 10 days, the computer had performed 33,871 quantum computing tasks for global users. “No other nation funds more R&D for [quantum] communications than China,” the Wilson Center study noted.
+
+Chinese research institutes are reportedly creating a quantum communications network using satellites in low and medium-to-high Earth orbits. The network would utilize quantum technology for encryption and secure transmission of data and communications.
+
+In March 2024, Guo Guoping — a quantum physicist, cofounder of Origin Quantum, and leading figure in China’s quantum promotional effort — warned that China was dependent on Western countries, mainly the United States, the Netherlands, and Finland, for dilution refrigerators, which are used to create the ultra-low temperatures required by quantum computing. Guo also noted that China lagged behind the West in industrial applications of quantum computing, citing high costs and inadequate market demand.
+
+#### Semiconductors
+
+All major U.S. defense platforms, domestic infrastructures, and technology-intensive products and industries are based on semiconductor chips, the basic building blocks of digital technology. AI systems, for example, “operate on a foundation of interconnected computer hardware driven by cutting-edge semiconductor devices.” The U.S. semiconductor design industry leads the world, representing a crucial U.S. asset in the strategic competition with China.
+
+The CHIPS Act of 2022 was intended to address twin U.S. vulnerabilities in the chip manufacturing sector that were revealed by the Covid-19 pandemic — most notably the shortfall of U.S. production capacity needed to supply the needs of domestic industry and the U.S. military, and the fact that U.S. chipmakers trail Taiwan and South Korea in their ability to make chips at the most advanced nodes. At present, the United States is dependent upon chipmaking facilities in Taiwan, which makes 90 percent of the most advanced chips, and South Korea for these devices. Taiwan, of course, faces significant levels of geopolitical risk but also seismological ones: the island suffered several earthquakes in April 2024 alone.
+
+After a necessary ramp up, CHIPS Act funds are now being awarded to firms to expand both leading-edge and foundational semiconductor manufacturing capacity in the United States. Moreover, the U.S. government, in conjunction with key allies, is enforcing new and more stringent controls on exports of chips and chip manufacturing technology to China, especially on tools and devices necessary to support advances in AI.
+
+China has responded by redoubling its commitment to developing its own semiconductor technology through domestic innovation. At the end of 2022, the Chinese government was reportedly planning to spend 1 trillion yuan ($143 billion) over the next five years to support its semiconductor industry, more than the United States and the European Union combined. In 2014, China established the China Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund (the “Big Fund”) to support investments in the domestic semiconductor industry, comprised of government, quasi-public, and private funds. By 2019, the Big Fund had raised 204 billion yuan (28 billion USD). In May 2024, China launched a new phase of this effort with a registered capital of $47.5 billion to support investments in China’s semiconductor value chain, including production capacity, equipment, materials, and advanced packaging.
+
+China is rapidly expanding its production capacity for higher node chips, sometimes called “foundational” semiconductors. These chips account for most current applications worldwide — and Chinese firms may come to dominate that market segment to the detriment of U.S.-based chipmakers, including those currently investing in new facilities with support from the CHIPS Act.
+
+For the moment, the U.S.-based semiconductor design industry leads all other countries, including China, by virtually any measure of international competitiveness. Advanced artificial intelligence chips designed by the U.S. fabless firm Nvidia account for over 80 percent of the market and “underpin all of the most advanced AI systems.” Nvidia reportedly holds a 92 percent global market share in data center graphics processing units (GPUs). But in June 2024, a Huawei executive stated that the company’s Ascend 910B AI chip can deliver 80 percent of the efficiency of an Nvidia A100 when training large language models, and, “in some other tests, the Ascend can beat the A100 by 20 percent.” The United States has a number of world-leading integrated device makers (IDMs) that design and manufacture their own chips, such as Intel Corporation and Texas Instruments. Intel is reportedly pursuing the astonishing goal of incorporating 1 trillion transistors on a single processor package by 2030, about 10 times the current number.
+
+In addition, U.S.-based firms dominate crucial upstream chip design sectors such as electronic design automation (EDA) tools and IP blocks, which enable faster and less expensive chip designs. Loss of access to these enabling technologies as a result of Western export controls is proving disruptive to China’s AI sector.
+
+Some experts regard China’s prospects for achieving technological leadership in semiconductors through its own efforts as impossible, while others see it as inevitable. If a loss of leadership in semiconductor design did occur, it would be a strategic calamity of monumental proportions for the United States, with a more far-reaching impact than the offshore movement of chipmaking that has been unfolding since the 1990s. Once lost, such leadership would be difficult to recapture. And as the 2021 NSCAI report warned, “If a potential adversary bests the United States in semiconductors over the long term or suddenly cuts off U.S. access to cutting-edge chips entirely, it could gain the upper hand in every domain of warfare.”
+
+For that reason, in addition to building out domestic chipmaking capacity, U.S. policymakers should be sensitive to the health and competitive standing relative to China of the domestic chip design industry, with an eye to preserving and even increasing U.S. leadership. The United States cannot be complacent about its current leadership. In that regard, in 2022 the Semiconductor Industry Association and the Boston Consulting Group warned that the U.S. chip design industry’s global market share has been eroding as design firms face challenges such as rising costs, labor shortages, and exclusion from important foreign markets.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+It is crucially important to understand that AI, QIS, and semiconductors are increasingly interrelated and mutually supporting fields. Over time, the advances in these domains may transform both national economic capabilities and the strategic balance. The interdependencies are powerful.
+
+AI systems run on advanced chips, and AI software is increasingly being deployed to design those chips. Researchers are identifying composite materials that could integrate quantum devices into semiconductor technology, making chips “significantly more powerful.” Semiconductor technology is in turn being used to fabricate qubits, the basic building blocks of quantum computers. AI systems based on quantum processing could “be millions of times faster than the fastest microchip computers today,” experts say.
+
+Chips, AI, and QIS will therefore not only advance all twenty-first-century technology-intensive industries but also drive, enhance, and possibly disrupt each other. Chinese authorities understand this competition and are dedicating massive amounts of funding toward capturing the benefits of these transformative technologies.
+
+Given the stakes of this competition, it is jarring that in the space of just a few days in March 2024, the United States both failed to fund the science portion of the CHIPS Act and implemented budget cuts for key federal science agencies. Meanwhile, the Chinese government increased planned R&D spending by 10 percent. China has pledged to “harness the entire nation’s resources to speed homegrown breakthroughs, reaffirming what it sees as a central priority to become self-reliant in spheres from AI to chipmaking and ultimately wrest technological supremacy from the West,” experts say.
+
+Sudip Parikh, chief executive of the nonprofit American Association for the Advancement of Science, warned that the race for leadership in key technologies like AI, quantum, and fusion would have long-term strategic implications: “Once you lose the lead in that kind of a race, the benefits accrue to whoever’s in the lead, and they’ve been accruing to us for the last 75 years. They will begin to accrue somewhere else.” U.S. policymakers need to recognize that danger and make the investments needed to secure the nation’s future.
+
+---
+
+__Sujai Shivakumar__ directs the Renewing American Innovation (RAI) Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he also serves as a senior fellow. He brings over two decades of experience in policy studies related to U.S. competitiveness and innovation.
+
+__Charles Wessner__ is currently a research professor at Georgetown University, where he teaches global innovation policy. He is active as a speaker, researcher, and writer with a global lens on innovation policy and frequently advises technology agencies, universities, and governments on effective innovation policies.
+
+__Thomas Howell__ is an international trade attorney (currently in solo practice) serving as a consultant to the CSIS Renewing American Innovation project. During the course of his 40-plus-year legal career, he has represented U.S.-based semiconductor companies and organizations in matters such as the U.S.-Japan trade disputes and litigation of the 1980s; the formation of Sematech in 1986–87; trade disputes with China (including the first WTO dispute settlement challenge to that country in 2003); and numerous other public policy initiatives.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-18-the-wests-azerbaijan-question.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-18-the-wests-azerbaijan-question.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0ba7d196
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-18-the-wests-azerbaijan-question.md
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : The West’s Azerbaijan Question
+author: Callum Fraser
+date : 2024-06-18 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/BMJPVk8.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Pragmatism over Values?"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_As Azerbaijan’s leader revels in his victory in the recent Karabakh conflict, the West faces the all-too-familiar choice of whether to engage with an unsavoury regime for geopolitical gain, or to stay true to its values in the global struggle between democracy and authoritarianism._
+
+
+
+Azerbaijan’s success in Karabakh has sealed President Ilham Aliyev’s legacy, finally drawing him out of his father’s shadow. Yet, amid the celebration of reunification, the population is beginning to refocus on domestic issues, namely the repression of political opposition and media freedoms by the state. Azerbaijan’s rapid rise in geopolitical influence places it in a dominant negotiating position over Armenia. However, months after they began, peace talks are still meandering in the preliminary stages. Ultimately, peace does not suit Aliyev, and the West should be cautious about repeating the same mistakes that it made with Ukraine.
+
+After three decades, Azerbaijan finds itself without a foreign military presence within its borders, symbolising its emergence as an independent global actor pursuing its own interests. Now a rising power within the region, Azerbaijan is poised to leverage its position as a bridge between the West and Central Asia, bolstered by increased European imports of Azerbaijani fossil fuels. Through an emerging multi-vector foreign policy, Azerbaijan is cautiously balancing relations between the West and Russia. However, Aliyev’s increasing military spending and irredentist state rhetoric underscore potential territorial ambitions, which should send a clear warning signal to the West.
+
+
+### Does Azerbaijan Need Peace?
+
+The peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan has been a stagnant one. Border skirmishes, domestic unrest, and a long-held mutual distrust have impeded prospects of peace. Yet, the recent transfer of four villages from Armenia’s Northeastern Tavush province to Azerbaijan is a decisive move in delineating the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, as well as a crucial positive step towards a sustainable peace agreement after three decades of war. Despite this progress, there is a clear imbalance in the momentum emanating from Yerevan and Baku, with the latter clearly much more languid in its efforts. Despite Armenian concessions, Azerbaijan still occupies internationally recognised Armenian territory and, after the flight of 120,000 Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, has set about bulldozing Armenian settlements within the region, including the destruction of churches and monuments. Baku is well aware of its military dominance within this dyadic relationship, and this confidence has led to prolonged peace negotiations which are frequently stalled by Azerbaijan’s strategic manoeuvring. For example, the issue of the Zangezur corridor – a proposed transit route for Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhichevan – has transformed from a suggestion to an outright demand before a peace deal can be agreed upon.
+
+Given the significant historical grievances between them, difficult concessions will need to be made by both sides. However, further increasing the concessions forced upon Armenia could exacerbate domestic protests, which are already destabilising this young democracy. This situation heightens the threat of Armenian populist movements, as evidenced by Arch-Bishop Bagrat Galstanyan’s “Tavush for the homeland” campaign.
+
+___`Aliyev’s increasing military spending and irredentist state rhetoric underscore potential territorial ambitions, which should send a clear warning signal to the West`___
+
+Currently, the status quo suits Azerbaijan’s interests, enabling it to continue to extract concessions from Armenia without an urgent need for a definitive peace settlement, as long as its unchallenged regional dominance continues. Following Aliyev’s landslide election victory, he finds himself at the pinnacle of his political career. With the successful operation in Karabakh under his leadership, he has effectively emerged from his father’s shadow, securing his legacy as an Azerbaijani national hero.
+
+However, while Aliyev basks in his geopolitical triumph, domestic challenges remain prevalent. Press freedoms are increasingly restricted, with complete state control of domestic media, harassment and detainment of independent journalists, and a foreign agent law seemingly inspired by Russia’s oppressive media strategy. Political dissidents and oppositional civil society are blackmailed, arrested and tortured, with any challenge to Aliyev’s rule quickly stifled. It is important not to forget that Aliyev’s 92.12% win in the February elections was achieved through total media control and boycotts by the political opposition. While Azerbaijan’s economy has soared over the last decade, it remains dependent on fossil fuel exports, with increasing regional wealth disparity between Baku and other provinces, impacting educational standards among the rich and poor. Azerbaijan’s Dutch disease has previously led to rapid inflation, with little having been done to rectify the situation, save for a number of renewable energy projects aimed at increasing gas exports. Meanwhile, Aliyev continues to put an emphasis on greater militarisation, increasing defence and national security spending to 17.4% of the state’s budget. Now that Karabakh is unequivocally Azerbaijani and Armenia is looking to ameliorate relations, Azerbaijani society can finally refocus its attention on domestic concerns, and with this, even Aliyev’s manufactured support may struggle in the face of public discontent.
+
+While both states suffer from irredentist elements within their constitutions, Azerbaijan’s military strength and authoritarian governance represents a much more pressing concern for regional stability. The concept of “Western Azerbaijan” – the idea that further Armenian territory historically belongs to Azerbaijan – has been utilised within the Azerbaijani parliament, with Aliyev also known to include this rhetoric in his speeches. Exploiting nationalist tendencies is a tried and tested method used by authoritarian states to divert the population’s attention away from the failings of the state.
+
+In a similar manner to the Argentine military junta and the Falklands, or Vladimir Putin and the annexation of Crimea, one can expect to see Aliyev using this conflict to shore up his domestic political support when it ultimately begins to slide, as well as a clear trend towards exploiting ingrained anti-Armenian sentiments within Azerbaijani society. By fostering animosity towards Armenia, Aliyev will effectively consolidate power with minimal internal dissent. Aliyev’s political stronghold benefits from the current situation; Armenia is a convenient scapegoat, and the prospects of a sustainable peace agreement remain rocky.
+
+The West appears to only be paying nominal attention. Yet not only is this issue playing out in Europe’s backyard, but it represents a microcosm of the rising global struggle between democracy and authoritarianism.
+
+
+### Treading on the Same Rake?
+
+Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is a stark reminder of the threat posed by authoritarian regimes to Western security. While Azerbaijan’s policies may not directly threaten the West, its equidistant approach between Russia and Western powers raises significant concerns. As the West deepens its economic ties with yet another authoritarian state, the mirroring of errors made over the last decade is obvious, with the West indirectly financing another authoritarian state’s military ambitions.
+
+Should the West escalate its dependence on Azerbaijani fossil fuels, it risks a recurrence of the Ukraine scenario, with Armenia paying the price for Western negligence. The ongoing tension between democracy and authoritarianism may require morals to take a backseat, but the West’s inconsistent adherence to its proclaimed values is exacerbating its global image problem. The consolidation of authoritarian power in the South Caucasus further erodes the foundational principles of the West, posing a direct challenge to its core values.
+
+___`As the West deepens its economic ties with yet another authoritarian state, the mirroring of errors made over the last decade is obvious`___
+
+By overlooking the risks associated with increasing economic support for another militarising authoritarian state, the West is demonstrating a failure to learn from repeated examples of authoritarian aggression. Despite Azerbaijan’s displays of concern over the threat of sanctions, the West has yet to fully leverage its economic weight to incentivise stability in the region.
+
+This raises a pertinent question over the future of Western rules-based ideals: do current geopolitical tensions require a pragmatic adaptation, or is supporting democracy in an increasingly authoritarian world a cornerstone of the liberal international order? Regardless of the decision that it comes to, if the West is to survive multipolarity, its stance must be clear and consistent. Peace is beneficial for the South Caucasus, but it may not suit its most powerful politician. The chances of conflict remain high in the region as long as the West fails to learn from its mistakes.
+
+---
+
+__Callum Fraser__ is a Research Fellow in the International Security Studies department at RUSI, specialising in the confluence between Russian foreign policy and its periphery states. Callum is particularly interested in the evolution of geopolitics within Eurasia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. He also specialises in researching the underlying motivations, justifications, and dynamics of conflict within the Eurasian space along ethnic, identity, cultural, and political dimensions.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-19-crunch-time-in-somalia.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-19-crunch-time-in-somalia.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..45ce873a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-19-crunch-time-in-somalia.md
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Crunch Time in Somalia
+author: Michael Jones, et al.
+date : 2024-06-19 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/U3XpW1U.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_With timelines for the elimination of the al-Shabaab insurgency repeatedly pushed back, Somalia’s government risks losing any progress it has made in the absence of a wider political settlement._
+
+
+
+Somalia faces a “crucial” – arguably existential – year as political and security deadlines start to converge. Referencing advances made in mid-2022, President Hassan Sheikh Mohammed (HSM) declared plans in August 2023 to liberate the country from the militant group al-Shabaab within five months. Speaking at RUSI in November, he revised the timeframe to late 2024, a date subsequently amended again to April 2025. But with a phased drawdown of the African Union’s Transitional Mission (ATMIS) set to conclude in December, the feasibility of these latest claims seems tenuous. The same issues haunting a decades-long process of state-building have sapped momentum from the current offensive, with elite conflict undermining confidence in the federal government’s (FGS) ability to deliver, and state-level elections and constitutional disputes exacerbating political divisions. These problems were further complicated when, on New Year’s Day, Somaliland’s breakaway administration announced a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Ethiopia, the fallout of which continues to preoccupy Mogadishu.
+
+Against this backdrop, faltering progress raises important questions. Clan-led, locally organised resistance to al-Shabaab had previously been cited as the missing ingredient in counterinsurgency efforts. The diminishing returns of recent years may now test such assumptions, (re)exposing the need for a coherent settlement if military advances are to become a sustainable basis for consolidated governance. With only six months left on ATMIS’s mandate, international attention drawn to emergencies in other parts of the world, and political turmoil in Mogadishu, HSM’s strategic aspirations are at risk of floundering only two years into his second term.
+
+
+### Spent Optimism
+
+HSM began his second stint at the helm in May 2022. Early indications suggested that reconciliation would be a priority, repairing ties with external donors and Somalia’s various federal member states (FMSs) after the controversial tenure of his predecessor, President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (“Farmaajo”). Dealing with al-Shabaab was seen as a subsidiary of these wider efforts, reflected in HSM’s tacit acknowledgement of the need for a negotiated solution. However, the initial focus on political unanimity quickly gave way to military exigency as, in June 2022, Hawiye clan-members – weary of jihadist extortion, aid appropriation, and forced conscription – launched an extraordinary campaign of resistance across Galgaduud and Hiraan. Keen to leverage local resentment, the federal government in Mogadishu started to provide support – including weapons and ammunition – laying the groundwork for a fresh offensive in August. Under a rubric of “total war”, the new president threw his full weight behind the push, supplementing kinetic operations with a concerted effort to counter al-Shabaab’s ideology and revenue streams, both by clamping down on companies paying the group’s taxes and by systematically targeting false bank and money-transfer accounts.
+
+With air support provided by Turkey and the US, accompanied by the logistical backing of ATMIS, these approaches yielded remarkable gains. Reinforced by the Somali National Army (SNA), Hawiye militiamen – referred to as “Macawiisley” for the sarongs that many wear – took control of settlements across Central Somalia, with more than 215 locations reportedly “liberated”. By November 2022, international commentators were suggesting that the offensive could bring an end to al-Shabaab altogether.
+
+The successes were billed as a turning point in Somalia’s bid to defeat the group, a shift to relying on local anti-Shabaab sentiment rather than foreign forces. However, any optimism was relatively short lived. Attempts to galvanise clan support beyond areas where the resistance had first started proved difficult, and militants began to conduct high-casualty retaliatory attacks. Most concerningly, it was clear that the SNA and Macawiisley were struggling to keep hold of newly reclaimed territories and protect civilians, leaving communities susceptible to al-Shabaab blackmail and taxation. Clans suffered significant losses and various elders sought to reconcile with the group, agreeing “peace deals” in exchange for safety. Momentum began to slow in early 2023, and the offensive was effectively put on hold.
+
+___`There is no indication that the government has learned from previous mistakes, including hasty and uncoordinated military movements, political infighting and a failure to deliver services to those in newly “liberated” areas`___
+
+Discussions subsequently turned to a second phase, referred to as Operation Black Lion. With “frontline states” (Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti) pledging additional military support, it had been suggested that operations would expand into southern Somalia, where al-Shabaab are comparatively well entrenched and enjoy broader support. In March 2023, HSM announced the offensive’s resumption. However, the focus remained on Galgaduud and Hiraan, largely due to the initial failure to consolidate early gains. To date, there has been little-to-no progress in Jubaland or South-West State, where political divisions and local demographics present significant obstacles. The proposed involvement of frontline states has all but been forgotten.
+
+Seeking to galvanise the support of clans and resurrect the offensive, the president spent considerable time on the frontline, visiting Mahas in Hiiraan and Adan Yabal in Middle Shabelle, and basing himself out of Galmudug’s Dhusamareb for three months. But operations in late 2023 were not nearly as successful as those in the second half of 2022. In August, the government experienced significant setbacks. Militants routed the SNA in Osweyne, Galmudug, and troops were withdrawn from several other locations, including El Dheer, Gal’ad, Budbud and Masagaway. The defence minister was criticised for exposing an inexperienced unit at Osweyne, and concerns were raised around the impact of endemic corruption on the army’s combat capabilities. Some sources also claim that regional leaders like Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Madobe) in Jubaland hesitated before joining the offensive, in part because of a lack of belief in the government’s ability to reinforce local efforts.
+
+By late 2023, a “Super El Niño” brought operations to a standstill once again as the country grappled with flooding and its dire humanitarian consequences. By the time the rains subsided, HSM had become preoccupied with two other existential challenges to Somalia’s state-building process. First, an agreement between Hargeisa and Addis Ababa – which would reportedly provide Ethiopia with access to the sea in exchange for recognition of Somaliland’s independence – presents a significant challenge to Somalia’s sovereignty. Second, efforts to rush through major constitutional changes have been met by fierce opposition and renewed divisions between the federal government and FMS leaders (in April, Puntland declared it was cutting formal ties with Mogadishu and has since strengthened relations with Ethiopia).
+
+As recently as 17 April 2024, the government still insisted that al-Shabaab would be defeated “by 2025”. Such repeated declarations are unrealistic and risk further undermining faith in the FGS. The reality is that there has been little evidence of any substantial gains in recent months, civilians continue to be displaced by violence, and morale among SNA troops remains low. Moreover, amid growing donor fatigue, there is no indication that the government has learned from previous mistakes, including hasty and uncoordinated military movements, political infighting and a failure to deliver services to those in newly “liberated” areas.
+
+Meanwhile, buoyed by an increase in local support following the deal between Addis and Hargeisa, al-Shabaab attacks continue apace across the country. The group stepped up the frequency of its operations over the recently concluded Ramadan period, particularly in Mogadishu, while also consolidating its control of adjacent areas across Middle and Lower Shabelle.
+
+Additionally, Mogadishu’s response to the MoU has entrenched fears for Somalia’s security once African Union forces depart. In early June, the National Security Advisor declared that Ethiopian troops would not be part of any post-ATMIS arrangement. The announcement came as a shock to many. The Ethiopians – both as part of ATMIS and present on a unilateral basis – play an essential role in efforts against al-Shabaab. While Mogadishu was perhaps seeking to capitalise on anti-Ethiopian sentiment in some parts of the country, the move has undermined fragile reparations between the FGS and the FMSs, particularly South-West State and Jubaland which rely on the Ethiopians to keep al-Shabaab at bay. It is unclear how Mogadishu will sustain any offensive operations without the support of Ethiopia.
+
+
+### Intractable Problems
+
+Despite “more progress in [2022] than…in the previous five years”, any genuine appraisal of HSM’s military timeframes must therefore fall back on a familiar script of delays, inefficacy and missed opportunity.
+
+While the days of mass desertion have passed, and commendable improvements are being made, the SNA arguably remains less a national army than a “strategically deployed brand”, a “Fabergé” confection of militiamen beset by graft, amateurism and a clan-centric disposition. The security sector development plan endorsed back in December may be encouraging, as is the lofty aspiration of training 40,000 law enforcement personnel across the regional and federal level. But after more than $1 billion in external assistance, there is no getting away from the fact that Somalia still resembles a fragmented, highly congested “security arena”. Delineating between army, police, militia and bandit continues to be difficult, with an “informal economy of clans, conflict [and] entrepreneurialism” driving the pursuit of profit and power. As a result, institutional affiliations are often secondary to the rentier logic of a thriving political marketplace, one enabled (or actively encouraged) by poorly coordinated donor funding.
+
+Against this backdrop, the challenge – as with Operation Badbaado I and II in 2019–21 and the Gulwade Plan of 2014 – is not so much the recapturing as the holding of territory. Yes, there is improvement: community sensitivities are increasingly baked into stabilisation programmes from the outset, and internationally backed schemes are pushing for quicker delivery, greater contextual specificity, and better expectation management. But after years of inefficiency, or outright criminality, there is scant public confidence in the reliability of federal troops. Instead, garrison operations have been regularly delegated to elite units like Somalia’s Danab Brigade or Turkish-trained Gorgor Commandos – counterterrorism outfits with little experience in, or resourcing for, local policing. This both hampers SNA force-generation (sapping manpower from any new offensive) and risks squandering much-needed technical expertise as specialist battalions are attritted by excessive demands. Unfortunately, the impending departure of African Union peacekeepers (and European financiers) will only further accentuate these difficulties. Speaking to the Economist in October, State Minister for Foreign Affairs Ali Mohamed Omar conceded: “we don’t have the [men necessary] to hold on to…positions that will be vacated by ATMIS”. Members of the security services expressed similar concerns: “we are not ready to face [al-Shabaab] alone”.
+
+Of course, these strategic and military issues stem from wider political problems. Rifts over land expropriation, displacement, the creation of “mono-clan” districts and enclave cities, and enduring patterns of “ethno-hegemony” have fed violence since the late 1980s. At the same time, long-standing rivalries between different tiers of government have left the Somali state akin to a “disassembled patchwork of public authorities and political entrepreneurs”, lacking any real capacity or inclination to standardise policy. In this context, al-Shabaab is the most pronounced but far from the only symptom of a more complex conflict ecosystem, one reducing various iterations of Western “state-building” – often an embellished synonym for top-down technocracy – to propping up shell structures starved of any legitimacy or local relevance. Many criticised Farmaajo’s “security first, everything else afterwards” approach for being too reductive, ignoring the socio-economic, political and humanitarian crises that drive militancy in the first place. But having prioritised temporary clan coalitions above broad-based reconciliation, HSM arguably fell into a similar trap by conflating anti-Shabaab sentimentality with FGS support. These dynamics are not the same.
+
+___`Somalia’s powerbrokers and their international partners need deadlines fitted around a credible plan, and not the other way around`___
+
+Unresolved tensions quickly waylaid progress across Hiiraan, for instance, as Governor Ali Jayte Osman (a prominent figure in Macawiisley regional networks) fell out with President Ali Gudlawe of Hirshabelle over revenue disbursements once al-Shabaab had been cleared, “souring” the government’s ties to several sub-clans. As Daisy Muibu, a security expert, likewise describes, Hawiye-majority army units clashed with EU/UN-trained Darwish policemen over tax collection and checkpoint control in South-West State, reflecting the inherent fragility of recovery efforts as inter-communal rivalries, resource competition, and historical grievances impede cooperation between ostensibly “allied” forces. The latest political disputes and constitutional changes have escalated this friction further. Complaints are mounting over delayed state elections, and sittings of the National Consultative Council – a coordination body – remain ad hoc at best, and boycotted at worst. Following Puntland’s protest over the expansion of HSM’s executive powers and replacement of Somalia’s clan-based [s]electorate with universal suffrage, not only does the FGS’s proposed timeline for military victory look doubtful, but the country’s sovereign integrity also appears increasingly precarious.
+
+
+### The Same Tough Questions
+
+The lifting of a decades-long arms embargo in December 2023 can help modernise the SNA, improving mechanisation, morale and mobility. Five additional Danab training centres will similarly scale up Somalia’s security capabilities, and debt relief could provide a financial lifeline for development and economic investment, especially if the World Bank can delay a transition from grants to loans. But in the absence of a convincing peace dividend, wider social contract, or robust policing, many residents may continue to see al-Shabaab governance as a safer, more expedient bet. Militant courts are regularly considered the preferred avenue for civil arbitration, even among some Somali officials, and the group’s taxmen continue to extort businesses, clan elders, civil servants and NGOs across FGS-held areas. In Kismayo alone, companies previously shelled out “between $300–$600 monthly depending on their size”, amounting to around $6 million a year. Though al-Shabaab’s reach was briefly tempered in the early months of the offensive, they seem to have rebounded in full force.
+
+Challenging these perceptions requires a comprehensive political settlement, one that is unlikely to be delivered via federal fiat. This raises difficult questions. Some experts envisage a “type of Somali statehood that is much more horizontal, organised around alliances between major trading states which will have to bargain resources and power-sharing [among] themselves”. Others reject this premise entirely, with many donors and FGS leaders pushing for an increasingly centralised polity. Whatever the compromise, a workable arrangement needs genuine buy-in from a sufficient cross-section of Somali society, which in turn requires dialogue and deal-making. HSM’s priorities in the early months of his tenure were correct, as regional analysts like Aden Abdi and Alexander Ramsbotham argue: reconciliation cannot be dismissed as an “appendix or afterthought”.
+
+The absence of political consensus has immediate implications. The achievements of 2022 are considered by many to vindicate a locally owned, clan-led strategy, with Mogadishu empowering Darwish and Macawiisley forces – groups benefiting from legitimacy among their host communities – rather than relying exclusively on an unpopular, partisan and functionally lacklustre army. Despite numerous imperfections, such an approach can start to offer comparatively effective security provision, and appears to currently be the only realistic pathway for doing so. However, it is unlikely to succeed unless nested within a wider political framework, one that combines security with predictability, opportunity, sustainable social development, and peacebuilding. Without these ingredients, the experiment will likely yield diminishing returns, as clans see less and less reason to collaborate with federal authorities.
+
+Of course, a negative feedback loop is not inevitable. Though lost momentum today risks reduced support tomorrow, progress is not just a product of military action. Gains require engagement and dialogue, coherence and political consensus which local and national stakeholders can see, believe and invest in. This takes time, money and political capital, and cannot simply be willed away or ignored in an effort to accommodate donor schedules. Nor can individual achievements – lifting the arms embargo, passing the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries completion point or gaining a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council – substitute for a clear strategy. Somalia’s powerbrokers and their international partners need deadlines fitted around a credible plan, and not the other way around; anything less could turn stagnation into outright regression.
+
+---
+
+__Michael Jones__ is a Research Fellow in the Terrorism and Conflict team examining political violence, non-state armed group governance, and the convergence of violent extremism and insurgent militancy in East and Sub-Saharan Africa. He has led investigative fieldwork across numerous countries; managed conflict focused projects focused on Somalia and Sudan; worked in RUSI’s Nairobi Office; and explored the efficacy of UK foreign policy across the Horn.
+
+__Christopher Hockey__ joined RUSI’s Nairobi office as a Research Fellow in 2019. He has been involved in several countering violent extremism projects in Kenya, with an emphasis on research, monitoring and evaluation and violence tracking. As of 2023, he leads the research and violence monitoring component of the UK CSSF Borderlands project addressing insecurity on the boundaries between Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia.
+
+__Stig Jarle Hansen__ is an Associate Professor at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU), where he works primarily within the fields of organised crime, security, and risk. He is a world leading expert on Islamism in the Horn of Africa and the Al-Shabaab group.
+
+__Mohamed Gaas__ is the Founding Director of the RAAD Peace Research Institute and a Research Associate at the Conflict Research Programme (CRP) at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). His recent research interests encompass governance, including rebel and non-state governance, and his scholarly work has been published in leading journals and global policy platforms, including the International Security Programme at the Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University.
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Degrade Russian Arms
+author: Jack Watling and Gary Somerville
+date : 2024-06-26 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/xE234K2.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "A Methodology for Degrading the Arms of the Russian Federation"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has continued to access critical components from abroad, expanded the production of core weapons, and continued to increase the sophistication of some key capabilities._
+
+
+
+Ukraine’s international partners have been seeking to curtail Russian defence production through the sanctioning of Russian-affiliated individuals and entities and the disruption of Russian sanctions circumvention and covert procurement of military components on the international market since 2014. This effort accelerated after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Despite a considerable amount of government effort, it has so far failed to have a material impact.
+
+Failure to limit Russian defence production is not inevitable. Russia is highly dependent on access to raw materials, machine tooling and components for its weapons that it must source from abroad, often from NATO member states. Failure to adequately choke Russia’s access to critical foreign-origin materials and components to date has arisen from three primary causes:
+
+1. Governments have been overly reactive, rather than proactive, in disrupting Russian procurement networks. These efforts have therefore persistently been too slow.
+
+2. Governments have tried to conduct the relevant work at too high a classification, with the ability to scale actions to disrupt Russian procurement hindered by the challenges imposed on sharing time-sensitive targeting data between multiple law enforcement entities and the private sector, on which sanctions enforcement relies.
+
+3. Governments have also been slow to grant permission for interventions that collectively could have made a difference, because many officials and policymakers have maintained unrealistic expectations on how to measure effect. Rather than preventing Russian weapons reaching the front, efforts can degrade the reliability of systems, reduce the volume produced, or increase the price, imposing difficult trade-off decisions on Russia’s military over the longer term.
+
+Addressing these shortcomings in efforts to counter Russian military production requires the collaboration of a coalition of contributing states. These states should form an intelligence fusion centre, premised on building a common recognised target picture of the Russian defence industry, and drawing on unclassified and declassified materials. This should form the basis for identifying key bottlenecks and opportunities for disruption, communicating these opportunities to the private sector, and then synchronising and sequencing enforcement action to maximise the disruptive effect on Russian industry.
+
+Visibility among participating official bodies of the unclassified synchronisation matrix should also enable observer countries to synchronise unilateral covert actions to expand these effects and reach parts of the Russian industrial processes that sit beyond what is reachable by overt methods. A recognised common target picture and shared synchronisation matrix should also enable deconfliction of actions between Ukraine’s international partners.
+
+The methodology guiding this effort should be to identify the key classes of Russian weapons, to identify each step in the process of supply, production and distribution, and to target it end to end, so that lags, shortages and loss of key capabilities afflict Russian defence production. The broad target categories that should be mapped and assessed include:
+
+- People: procurement agents, couriers, financiers, lawyers, engineers and machinists.
+
+- Tooling: machine tools, spare parts and software.
+
+- Components and materials: nitrocellulose, microelectronics, metals, fibres and fuels.
+
+- Enablers: revenue, ships, corporate structures, insurance mechanisms and warehousing.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+Ukraine’s international partners have committed to enabling Ukraine to preserve its sovereignty in the face of sustained Russian aggression. NATO has also adopted a new deterrence posture in anticipation of a major and sustained threat from Russia in the event that Moscow’s campaign in Ukraine succeeds. The outcome of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the credibility of NATO’s deterrence are, in the first instance, a consequence of the balance of conventional forces between NATO and Russia. Since NATO’s industrial base is critical to sustaining Ukraine, it is ultimately NATO’s production as compared to Russia’s that underpins deterrence. One line of effort critical to succeeding in enabling either Ukraine’s survival or NATO’s security is to expand the defence production capacity of NATO members. The other side of the net assessment, however, is the level of Russia’s military–industrial production.
+
+Russia’s defence industries are far from self-sufficient. All of Russia’s complex weapons are dependent on microelectronics manufactured by NATO members and other states, including South Korea, Japan, Switzerland and Taiwan. A significant proportion of Russia’s machine tooling is procured from companies outside Russia. Access to many of the raw materials necessary for explosive energetics production and fabrication is shaped by international supply. Given that access to these components plays an important role in determining the output of Russian industry, it is in the interests of those supporting Ukraine or contributing to NATO’s deterrence to explore how they can constrain, diminish or disrupt Russia’s military production. The delivery of European security must in part be based on the disarmament of Russia. It is not feasible to fully disarm Russia via such means. Nevertheless, the volume of key weapons systems available can be reduced. The reliability of systems can be degraded. The robustness of Russian planning assumptions about supply can be challenged.
+
+Noting the importance of degrading Russian military production, several countries have taken deliberate repeated steps to try to harmonise efforts to limit seepage of components made in their countries, or manufactured abroad, to Russia. This has largely revolved around the adoption of export restrictions related to Russia and a regular drumbeat of updates to sanctions lists, the interdiction and seizure of identified shipments, and the prosecution of a limited number of individuals. There has also been a systematic effort to identify and disseminate information about the breadth of Russia’s dependence on access to these components, such as the publication in the UK, the US, the EU and Japan of the Common High Priority Items List. As will be detailed hereafter, most of these efforts have been manifestly ineffective. There may well be covert activities carried out by states that have disrupted Russian industry, but the expansion of Russian production of war material speaks for itself to demonstrate that any such efforts have been insufficient. The volume of components reaching the Russian defence industry has consistently met the requirement, and Russia has increased the production of key platforms and systems throughout the war. There are multiple reasons for this, but at its core, the failure to transform intent into effect is a result of a lack of methodologically rigorous targeting, coordination and collaboration, both within and between governments.
+
+Given the stakes, and the failure that has characterised these efforts to date, this paper endeavours to map what is required to have a tangible impact on Russia’s defence industries. The purpose of the paper is to provide a methodology for target and effect selection and synchronisation to constrain Russian defence production. This is informed by the systemic study of Russia’s weaponry, its production dependencies and access points, and the tools available to deliver effects through those action points.
+
+The paper has three chapters. Chapter I examines the problems that have bedevilled recent attempts to curtail Russia’s defence production. Chapter II takes a case study of a weapons system to map out the relevant dependencies in its production. Chapter III outlines a methodology for how those dependencies can be exploited to disrupt the production of key weapons.
+
+This paper considers efforts to disrupt the Russian defence industry globally. Officials in various states may protest at some of the loopholes discussed, or limitations in approaches to sanctions enforcement, on the basis that they are aware of these issues and have taken steps to mitigate them. This paper is not an audit of each country’s approach, but rather assesses the aggregate effectiveness of what is a global system. Thus, while some of the criticisms made in this paper may not apply to all countries mentioned in the paper, where the criticisms are applicable to the practice of some countries endeavouring to disrupt Russia’s defence industries, the likelihood is that that country can be used as a route for sanctions evasion.
+
+
+### I. Why a Methodology is Needed: Assessing the Causes of Failure
+
+The level of dependence on foreign-supplied components in the Russian defence industries was significant prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s most modern tanks rolled into Ukraine equipped with French-made thermal sights, while their bodies had been cut by exquisite machine tooling manufactured across Europe, the US and Taiwan. Its cruise and ballistic missiles struck Ukrainian cities guided by field-programmable gate arrays manufactured in the US. Russia’s artillery hammered Ukrainian soldiers in their defensive positions with explosive payloads manufactured from German nitrocellulose, and supported by UAVs critically dependent on Dutch pressure sensors and bespoke servo motors made by a South Korean-owned factory in the Philippines. Russian air defences denied Ukraine access to its skies thanks to oscillators acquired from a British company prior to the invasion, while Russian electronic warfare and signals intelligence systems used crystals supplied by Japan.
+
+Before assessing the impact of efforts by Ukraine’s partners to limit ongoing access to these components and materials since the invasion, it is important to briefly outline these measures.
+
+Immediately following Russia’s full-scale invasion, the EU, the US and the UK immobilised the assets of Russia’s central bank held overseas, with much ongoing discussion as to whether they can be seized. Alongside these measures, many countries began a process of sanctioning Russian nationals and corporate entities associated with Russian politicians and officials. Sanctions caused assets to be frozen, and anyone doing business with these individuals or entities risked also becoming sanctioned, thus isolating the targets from the financial systems and trade that touched the economies of sanctioning states. Trade in key categories was also prohibited for certain industries, with the threat of sanctions against those facilitating such transactions as outlined in US Executive Order 14066, issued on 8 March 2022. Given the significance of private businesses functioning as wallets for the Russian state, a heavy emphasis was also placed on freezing the assets and holdings of Russian oligarchs. After it became apparent that Russian weaponry was heavily dependent on components that were not previously subject to export controls, restrictions on the goods that could be shipped to Russia increased, as reflected by the Common High Priority Items List. These sanctions regimes were initially highly patchy, but have become more comprehensive and aggressive over time. Further US Executive Orders, such as 14114, issued on 22 December 2023, have endeavoured to close further avenues for financing Russian illicit procurement. Over time, sanctions packages have become more focused and comprehensive in targeting networks, reflecting a growing understanding of how the Russian defence industry functions.
+
+Initial efforts across governments were often sporadic and siloed. There was also a significant gap between the rhetorical messaging around sanctions, the actual rate at which governments were able to sanction Russian entities, and the enforcement necessary to make sanctions have a tangible effect. In some countries, a capacity shortage redirected the same teams from counterterrorist finance to counter-Russia efforts. In others, it simply took time to build both cross-government teams and awareness of efforts by different departments of state. International cooperation has slowly expanded but remains messy. Enforcement has also begun to accelerate. The arrest and prosecution of individuals from the Netherlands to New York demonstrates that enforcement is happening.
+
+One challenge has been raising awareness among industry actors about how they are manipulated by Russian front companies, and how they can guard against this. Beginning in summer 2022, the US and others began significant efforts at capacity building and liaising with industry to endeavour to tackle upstream flows of goods to Russia. Further, there has undoubtedly been a significant volume of covert activity aimed at disrupting supply chains, as has been the case in almost all previous major conflicts.
+
+And yet Russian defence production – still dependent on Western components – continues to expand.
+
+#### Assessing the Extent of Failure
+
+An assessment of Russian production demonstrates that, despite all the above measures, efforts to curtail the Russian defence industry have thus far in aggregate failed.
+
+Russian artillery – the backbone of its battlefield successes – consumes vast quantities of ammunition. Nevertheless, at the beginning of 2022, Russian industry was producing a mere 250,000 rounds of 152 mm ammunition per year. By the beginning of 2023, it had increased production to 1 million rounds per year. Over the course of 2023, Russian production of 152 mm shells rose further, so that the country expects to manufacture 1.325 million rounds in 2024. Meanwhile, 122 mm artillery ammunition increased to an expected output of 800,000 rounds over 2024. The production of multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) started from a much lower base, but has increased at a faster rate. In 2023, Russian 122 mm Grad production was just 33,000 rounds, but in 2024, production is on track to exceed 500,000 rounds. Similarly, 220 mm Uragan rocket production was just 2,800 rounds in 2023, but is on track to reach 17,000 rounds in 2024, with a similar rate of increase anticipated into 2025. This prioritisation of MLRS production is intended to compensate for shortages of replacement barrels in 2025.
+
+In addition, Russia has set about refilling and restoring the approximately 20% of its pre-war munitions stockpile that was severely degraded. Combined with munitions orders from Iran, Belarus, Syria and North Korea – also heavily sanctioned – Russian overall munitions availability is likely to remain steady at 4 million munitions for 2024 and 2025. Despite efforts to curb this increase among Ukraine’s international partners, Russia has continued to be able to import nitrocellulose from Germany, Türkiye and Taiwan, and other precursors for explosive energetics from around the world, to sustain this rapid expansion of its munitions production.
+
+A similar story can be told about Russia’s manufacture of long-range missiles. One of the cruise missiles most widely employed by Russian forces during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been the Kh-101. In 2021, prior to the full-scale invasion, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) had a target of producing 350 of these missiles per year. Actual production was just 56 missiles. In 2022, the Russian MoD set a target of producing 460 Kh-101s per year. By 2023, actual production had reached 420 Kh-101s per year, not only dwarfing pre-war production, but also closing the gap between Russia’s ambitions and its outputs. At the beginning of 2023, Russia had approximately 50 9M723 ballistic missiles left in stock. Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia produced approximately six of these missiles per month. Production has since more than tripled, such that, despite using Iskanders throughout 2023, Russia began 2024 with 180 9M723 and 9M727 in stock.
+
+Shahed-136 production, meanwhile, has similarly expanded drastically. Original Iranian production rates were close to 40 per month. Between Russia and Iran, current production of these munitions has surpassed 250 per month. Given that all these munitions are critically dependent on US- and foreign-origin microelectronics, these figures clearly demonstrate that sanctions and other measures have entirely failed to slow production. Indeed, in some instances, access to specific components has increased. When the Russian military began to drop aerial bombs with UMPK glide kits, they were guided by Kometa-M satellite navigation modules using antennae from the Irish company Taoglas. Despite these components being identified early in 2023, Russia has not only significantly increased production of Kometa-M, now using it across a number of UAVs including Geran-2s, but has also developed an eight-antennae array for the UMPK, doubling the number of Taoglas antennae used per system. The Russian MoD assesses that the impact of Western sanctions on production of key weapons systems has been to impose a 30% increase in the price of microelectronic components. This is not trivial, but it is also manageable.
+
+The picture of Russian armoured vehicle production is distorted by the volume of equipment that the Russians can withdraw from storage and refurbish. For example, Russia is producing approximately 1,500 tanks and 3,000 other armoured fighting vehicles in 2024 and is set to produce a similar number in 2025. Approximately 85% of these are vehicles refurbished from storage. Nevertheless, the number of newly produced vehicles has also been rising. For example, the Kurganmashzavod plant produced 100 BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles during Q1 2023. In Q2, this rose to 108 vehicles. In Q3, 120 BMP-3s rolled off the production line and in Q4, 135 were produced. This increase may seem modest, but it shows that Russia is steadily expanding production capacity. In some cases, this is achieved by cutting corners and reprioritising. For example, in 2023, Russia produced 728 Tigr-M, a rate that is anticipated to fall to 721 in 2024, while the level of environmental protection from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats on the vehicle is being reduced. This frees up capacity elsewhere. There is also some substitution away from components sourced from the US and Europe. Refurbished tanks, for example, had used Catherine thermal sights made by Thales before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Refurbished tanks today are instead fitted with Chinese- or Belarusian-supplied tank sights, which are less capable, but adequate. Here, therefore, there has been some successful import substitution. Ultimately, however, the refocusing on capability requires changes to machine tools, and large volumes of these continue to flow to Russia from the US, Europe, Taiwan and further afield, along with the software updates to run them.
+
+In summary, despite the diligent efforts of many civil servants, backed by the political will to disrupt Russia’s military–industrial output, there is little to show for it. The question arises as to why efforts so far have proven so ineffective. This may in part be answered with reference to the initially chaotic approach to building the sanctions architecture, with the presumption that it will become more effective over time. However, this paper argues that there are also long-term, systemic challenges in how governments are approaching the issue. The remainder of this chapter suggests that there are three structural problems in how governments approach the issue:
+
+1. Being reactive rather than proactive.
+
+2. Over-classifying information and thus not fully empowering the private sector charged with implementing sanctions.
+
+3. Having unrealistic expectations of success that warp targeting. Understanding these causes of failure is critical if an effective methodology is to be applied.
+
+#### Reactive Rather Than Proactive
+
+Following the start of the full-scale Russian invasion, there was a scramble in Western capitals to sanction Russian entities. After the initial sanctioning of big names and low-hanging fruit, a more deliberate search for Russians who actually mattered for the war effort commenced. This led, in April 2022, to the sanctioning of Vladimir Yevtushenkov, who owned Sistema, a large Russian corporation involved in a wide range of defence-related enterprises, including the production of radar, long-range missile complexes and UAVs.
+
+Despite the rapid sanctioning of Yevtushenkov and his Russian holdings, Sistema continued to function and to do significant volumes of business within Europe to sustain its work for the Russian MoD. It did this through a range of front companies. In Switzerland, Serbian national Ivan Kokeza founded ERSO Energy Solutions AG, an apparent affiliate of Yevtushenkov’s ERSO Holding JSC, likely to provide funds for Yevtushenkov’s structure outside the sanctions net. In 2021, ERSO Energy Solutions and Kokeza were listed as shareholders in Electrozavod Group, alongside several Sistema subsidiaries. Meanwhile, Waldemar Reuswich, a German with a history of engaging in controversial Russian-linked business schemes, began a round of company registrations across Europe, including taking over control of entities previously linked to Sistema, such as Segezha Packaging in Denmark. At the same time, Reuswich’s Swiss Precision Holding AG was also listed as a shareholder in Electrozavod. Similar holding companies and fronts appear to have been established in Luxembourg and Ireland. Yevtushenkov meanwhile transferred shares in Sistema to his son Felix, while his daughter continued to run a firm in the UK until she was sanctioned in April 2023.
+
+The details of these structures for avoiding sanctions and enabling Sistema to continue to obtain critical components and raw materials were presented to the British authorities in early 2023. As one of the officials who received the information put it, “we were very grateful. We looked into these people, and it turned out they were a thoroughly rotten set”. Actions were taken, and some of Sistema’s more ambitious schemes were disrupted. The irony of this was that while British officials were pleased with their success, so were the Russians. Russia had succeeded in continuing to obtain what it needed for almost a year after the invasion. The network of front companies was discovered, but this simply caused Russia to move on to the next scheme. In fact, Russian planning documents drawn up weeks after the invasion of Ukraine highlight how post-facto sanctions were anticipated and not seen as a setback. For the Russians, failure meant the breaking up of a scheme before materiel got through, not its discovery after it entered Russia.
+
+At the heart of the failure to prevent Sistema’s circumvention of sanctions was, and is, that many official bodies targeting these entities have entirely the wrong mindset about how to use the tools at their disposal and in whose hands those tools should be placed. While the US has a long history of using sanctions against state adversaries such as Iran, many European states have neither had the capacity nor the inclination to approach sanctions from the point of view of economic warfare, instead treating them as regulatory instruments or as measures to limit proliferation to terrorist groups. Where there were dedicated teams both designing and implementing sanctions in Europe, most were focused on counterterrorism. Where nation states were targeted, there was more interest in the political message sent by sanctions than in their practical effect. Even in the US, where the architecture for economic warfare exists, permissions to act were less forthcoming, and mechanisms for planning sanctions and enforcement with allies and partners were limited.
+
+Unlike terrorists, Russia can function at scale. It is notable how unsuccessful comparable attempts have been to tackle sanctions evasion by Iran, a much less capable actor than Russia. It is therefore essential that those crafting and enforcing sanctions and export controls do not see the imposition of these mechanisms as the end of the process, but rather the beginning. Imposing these restrictions simply creates the legal basis to move against entities and the people facilitating the activity, but the adversary will immediately begin to shift to using alternative structures. Enforcers must, therefore, proactively use intelligence to anticipate what the new structures will be, target them pre-emptively when they are being used to conspire to violate export controls and sanctions (rather than when they have already successfully done so), and arrest those running these front companies at a pace that genuinely slows the speed of Russia’s reaction. Rather than being a reactive tool, enforced when Russia succeeds in illegally importing Western components, sanctions must be used as a weapon to proactively hunt those who assist Russia, and to neutralise them before they succeed in exporting technologies. Those in the private sector in allied countries that manufacture and export these components must also be proactively engaged to understand the extent to which their components are being procured by the Russian war machine. Most importantly, this needs to be done across Ukraine’s partners, rather than in siloes within each state.
+
+A proactive approach is entirely possible to implement. The Yevtushenkov network used obvious individuals with links to his companies before the full-scale invasion to evade the effect of sanctions. The individuals involved could have been identified before even Yevtushenkov was sanctioned. But this would have required someone to ask the question. The information existed in the import, export and company registration information of the states that eventually moved against Yevtushenkov’s network. But this information was not exploited because of a lack of official curiosity to retrieve it. Until the machinery of government begins to think offensively and proactively, Russia will continue to be one step ahead.
+
+#### Over-Classification
+
+Support for Ukraine has been heavily dependent on those who hold stockpiles of Soviet-legacy equipment, from fighter jets to air defence systems. Many of these countries are NATO members. Greece operates S-300 and Tor. Finland operated Buk. Other pieces of Russian equipment were obtained by Ukraine’s international partners in Syria and Libya, such as when the US seized a Pantsir-1 air defence system. Ukraine’s international partners had to maintain these systems, and were therefore aware that they contained a significant number of non-Russian components. Ukraine has been pointing out the dependence on foreign-origin components in Orlan-10 since 2018. The extent of Russian dependence on Western components was therefore not a revelation to Ukraine’s international partners when Ukraine began publishing images of foreign-origin chips in Russian weapons systems in April 2022. It was, however, news to Western ministers, who quickly started demanding something be done about it. The curious thing is that, despite the issue being understood in detail by Western defence establishments for decades, no plan was immediately available to exploit this vulnerability in Russia’s defence industries at the beginning of the war. Despite knowledge of the extent of dependence sitting in government, and there being viable means to explain how that knowledge was obtained without exposing sources and methods, it was not briefed and exploited.
+
+The structure of classification within many governments – while critical to a range of functions – is a major problem in scaling action against Russia’s military–industrial complex. During the War on Terror, two trends in intelligence contributed to the emergence of this problem. First, the need to find terrorists among a large civilian population drove investment in powerful analytical tools. The tendency towards “need to know” that had created many lateral compartments in the intelligence community gave way to “need to share”, and the development of all-source intelligence fusion. The result is that, within most governments, the experts able to analyse large data sets and the tools they need to do their job are hosted on Above Secret systems. During the War on Terror, most action was either undertaken by the military directly, or was small in scale. Thus, the intelligence community could either provide target packs (information sufficient for the planning and execution of an action) to the military, or specific declassification could be undertaken for law enforcement.
+
+The problem when tackling an adversary like Russia is that enforcement action, if it is to have a measurable impact on production, must be executed at scale and across multiple jurisdictions, to include the private sector producers of critical components. Most of this action must be undertaken by law enforcement, and, to have the permissions to act, law enforcement must have evidence. In reality, most of the underlying intelligence necessary to build target packs aimed at the Russian defence industry is low-grade information. Most of the evidence necessary to obtain warrants for law enforcement is available in unclassified business records. The scale at which Russia operates means that much of its activity cannot be concealed except insofar as it can disappear into the noise of the general volume of business transactions. Much of it is commercially available and does not rely on covert collection.
+
+Nevertheless, because the analytical tools sit on Above Secret systems, the data is ingested into these systems for analysis. Any product subsequently created using the data in combination with limited volumes of Above Secret-origin information receives an Above Secret classification. The release of Above Secret information to foreign law enforcement with sufficient explanation of sourcing to stand up in court as the basis for a warrant – for example – is a painstaking task. Declassification requires a review of exactly what is being declassified, what risk this poses to sources and methods, and how the information is subsequently attributed. This is necessary because of the ease with which the release of Above Secret information could pose a threat to life for sources or undermine ongoing intelligence collection by revealing the capabilities of national technical means. What it also means, however, is that target packs cannot be declassified at scale.
+
+There is a wider ongoing revolution in intelligence that offers a way round this problem. Open source intelligence allows for the harnessing of publicly accessible data to build an unclassified, robust evidence base for target packs. This can be shared freely between governments. Pioneers such as investigative journalism group Bellingcat have demonstrated how commercial systems can be used to reconstruct what would previously have only been available through national technical means. This is recognised by the intelligence community. As General Jim Hockenhull observed when head of UK Defence Intelligence, the majority of collection could now be of open source information, with closed sources filling the gaps. This process of reconstructing evidence outside secure environments is being used by governments, but few have the capacity of expertise to do this at scale both inside and outside secure environments. This has had detrimental effects on efforts to disrupt Russia’s defence industry.
+
+For example, Russia’s procurement of Nvidia microelectronics for use in image processing on its military UAVs was carried out by an individual named Igor Ievlev. It is a matter of public record that Ievlev is a graduate of the Cherepovets Military Institute of Radioelectronics, where he specialised as an engineer in radio communications. Now named the Military University of Radio Electronics, the institute is reportedly a training establishment for officers of the GRU (Russian military intelligence), including those who specialise in the procurement of critical technologies for weapons and military equipment. Ievlev made purchases from Nvidia partners who sold their chips to him directly. Although Ievlev’s history was known to Western governments, this information was not public, so companies had no ability to screen their millions of customers for those that might raise concerns. The result was that, despite information being publicly available, a likely GRU officer could directly procure sensitive Western microelectronics and ship them to Russia to directly support its arms industry. Western officials could subsequently use the trade data to show that a crime had been committed and close the channel. But getting ahead of the problem at the scale necessary to have an effect requires analysis to be conducted at a lower level of classification and for information to be made as accessible as possible.
+
+This not only facilitates coordination of law enforcement across jurisdictions, but also means that companies cannot plead ignorance when they sell to Russian front companies. This shifts the burden of proof, and thus the legal risk, creating a deterrent effect.
+
+#### Unrealistic Expectations
+
+The third major government structure problem is the way in which many of Ukraine’s international partners have sought to impact Russia’s defence industry, which has largely driven a cycle of inflated expectations, followed by a sense of futility when those expectations are not realised. Many official concepts in the years preceding Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine tried to push the idea of smart power over hard power: the precise use of capabilities in order to have disproportionate effects. In the UK, this has undoubtedly been driven by diminishing capacity to operate at scale. In the US, it has arguably been driven by the threat of stretch, as challengers emerge in three separate theatres. The desire to be clever shaped a response to the Russian defence industry that emphasised which specific components would have the greatest impact if they were denied. While in and of itself an interesting question, this framing demonstrated a misunderstanding of the problem. The desire was to go after components that would prevent Russia from building key systems.
+
+Not all components are equal, and some were more susceptible to disruption and more important for the capabilities being targeted. Generally, however, there is no exhaust port on the Russian death star. The loss of a critical component will tend to lead to the alteration of the production sequence until a new supply of the component can be found, or it is substituted with an inferior component. This will impose cost and delays, and often impact the reliability of the system when it enters Russian service. But it does not stop the system being made. Two interesting examples highlight this trend.
+
+When Shahed-136 UAVs began to hit Ukraine, it was noted that they had servo motors that manipulated their control surfaces which were built in the Philippines by South Korean-owned company HiTec. Pressure was subsequently put on HiTec to stop manufacturing the product. But this did not stop the Russians and Iranians from building Shahed-136s. Ukrainian observers noted that the original servo motors were swapped for Chinese ones, and that these were of inferior quality, causing some Shahed-136s to crash and limiting the acuteness of manoeuvres the aircraft could perform, simplifying its interception by air defence. As a result, Russia must launch more Shahed-136s to deliver the same effect, and has less assurance that it will be achieved.
+
+Another good example is how Russia has responded to limitations in accessing sufficient quantities of explosive energetics. Many factories continued to fulfil orders but filled shells with less hexogen (Russian military-grade explosive). Others provided rounds with fewer charges. Eventually, Russia began to import nitrocellulose with a lower level of enrichment, thus reducing the explosive energy of the charges with which it would eventually fill its ammunition.
+
+The impact at the front was therefore counterintuitive. The Russians had to fire more rounds to achieve the same level of effect or had to use higher-echelon capabilities to conduct counterbattery fire because the lower echelon systems lacked the range. Thus, the immediate effect was to increase the volume and calibre of Russian fires. The impact on consumption and therefore endurance of the Russian artillery was significant until the problem could be resolved. If the cost of producing key systems can be raised sufficiently, it will not prevent Russia from making munitions. But it will reduce how long Russia can sustain the war.
+
+There are very few historical examples where economic efforts have decisively prevented the manufacture of a capability. The Third Reich was exceptionally effective at finding alternatives as its industries were destroyed or disrupted by blockade and bombing. However, the attritional effect of measures targeting defence industries, whether in terms of cost, opportunity cost, or reliability and performance, is significant. Another important point is that any intervention will be time limited in its effect. However, sequences of disruptions can leave a system functioning in an extremely inefficient manner. The cumulative effect of restructuring can be more significant than the direct effect of a given intervention.
+
+The reason why properly assessing the impact of interventions is important is that unless the right metrics are briefed, interventions are unlikely to achieve approval from policymakers. If policymakers expect to be given options to bring production of a Russian system to a standstill and none of the options provided meet that threshold, it may be that none of them will receive the green light. No single operation is likely to justify itself in terms of the risks and resources involved versus the impact. However, a package of interventions over time can have a disproportionately disruptive impact. Setting the right policy expectations is, therefore, critical if permissions are to be forthcoming at a scale that has impact.
+
+
+### II. The Vulnerability of Russia’s Supply Chains
+
+Given the level of effort expended in sanctioning entities connected with Russia as compared with the limited effects achieved, there are some who argue that it is a fruitless endeavour. This argument can be countered when examining the Russian military–industrial enterprise and the extent of the threat surface against which Ukraine and its international partners can operate. This chapter seeks to demonstrate the level of vulnerability by offering a detailed case study of a Russian defence enterprise and its vulnerabilities.
+
+The case study is the Zala Aero Group, a now-sanctioned Russian UAV manufacturer partially owned by Kalashnikov Concern, a subsidiary of the Rostec Group defence conglomerate. Zala Aero Group’s and its subsidiaries’ supply chains span the US, Europe and East Asia. Documents and trade data show that Zala Aero Group leans on dozens of Russian companies to procure foreign items to manufacture UAVs.
+
+#### Zala Aero Group’s Significance
+
+The war in Ukraine has seen an unprecedented increase in the use of UAVs as integral pieces of the reconnaissance-fires complex. One-way attack drones are increasingly used to facilitate rapid strikes against targets. The sophistication of these drones ranges from off-the-shelf first person-view models rigged with explosives to purpose-built loitering munitions with increasingly advanced sensor suites. Zala Aero Group is one of the leading companies in Russia that can design and produce UAVs and loitering munitions, offering an all-in-one reconnaissance-strike package.
+
+Zala’s Lancet-3 is one of Russia’s most effective loitering munitions, responsible for disabling or destroying hundreds of Ukrainian weapons platforms since mid-2022. As a result, Russia’s defence industry has placed significant emphasis on expanding production. In May 2023, Zala Aero Group’s corporate owner announced the creation of a “Division of Special Machines” to expand the output of these systems, stating that the company expects to increase production of UAVs several-fold in 2024. In parallel, Russia’s Ministry of Industry and Trade has drafted a strategy for the coordinated development of UAVs until 2035.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 1: Zala Aero Group’s Ownership Structure and Sample Products.__ Source: Author generated with reference to [Zala Aero Group](https://web.archive.org/web/20230405000224/https://zala.aero/) and [Sayari Analytics](https://sayari.com/)._
+
+Zala Aero Group has begun ramping up UAV production, including of Lancet-3s, by purchasing shopping malls and converting them into manufacturing plants. In February 2024, one such plant caught fire.
+
+The company’s aspirations also include the development of more advanced loitering munitions that use AI to create lethal autonomous weapon systems. Such an expansion will require Zala Aero Group to tap into international supply chains to acquire the requisite technology to build and field these systems.
+
+#### Zala Aero Group’s Procurement Networks
+
+From January 2022 to May 2023, Zala Aero Group paid dozens of Russian companies millions of roubles for various “products”. Many of these companies are vendors, distributors and importers of the components and tools required to produce UAVs. Often, these companies’ websites advertise such items – including those produced abroad.
+
+Trade data confirms that these companies import large quantities of foreign goods, including those manufactured by Western companies. Sanctions following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine do not appear to have hindered these companies’ ability to import dual-use, export-controlled items which, in some cases, have seen an increase in imports since February 2022.
+
+The largest recipient of Zala Aero Group’s payments was Aeroscan LLC, which uses UAVs for geospatial surveying and topographical mapping. Aeroscan’s owner, Nikita Zakharov, is the son of Zala Aero Group’s founder and majority shareholder, Aleksandr Zakharov, and has appeared at several public events with the Zala Aero Group, even helping to purchase a shopping centre that was later converted into a UAV factory. Aeroscan has Russian government contracts to conduct maintenance on Zala Aero Group’s UAVs for government departments.
+
+Aeroscan remitted more than RUB 2.3 billion to Zala Aero Group from January 2022 to May 2023, and Zala Aero Group remitted more than RUB 2.5 billion to Aeroscan. Like Zala Aero Group, Aeroscan has not imported any items used to produce UAVs, except for a single $8,000 shipment of gas analysers in January 2022. However, Aeroscan did make payments from January 2022 to May 2023 to Russian companies that import and distribute items for UAV production. Zala Aero Group also paid several of the same companies that import these goods. Aeroscan appears, therefore, to be procuring dual-use components and technologies for Zala Aero Group. Zala Aero Group’s suppliers’ trade data shows they have procured large amounts of materials and tools used to assemble UAVs.
+
+#### Microelectronics
+
+Zala Aero Group’s UAVs contain dozens of microelectronics: the KUB-BLA contains at least 11 components, and the Lancet-3 at least 27. Almost all the microelectronics were designed by semiconductor companies in the US and Europe. At least three in the KUB-BLA and five in the Lancet-3 are dual use and subject to export controls.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 2: Western-Made Components Inside the Zala Lancet-3.__ Source: Author generated using documents and photographs seen by RUSI. ECCN = Export Control Classification Number._
+
+From January 2022 to May 2023, Zala Aero Group and Aeroscan paid millions of roubles to Russian microelectronics importers, many of which are now sanctioned by the US and the EU.
+
+Some UAVs contain export-controlled Nvidia microchips in an apparent attempt to improve their sensor suites and, in the case of the Lancet-3, create an autonomous weapons system immune to jamming. One specific Moscow-based microelectronics importer, ID Solution, is likely to be the key supplier of these Nvidia modules to Zala Aero Group and responsible for more than 90% of the Nvidia imports into Russia since the invasion began. From March 2022 to December 2023, ID Solution imported more than $14 million in microchips and related items to Russia.
+
+#### Cameras
+
+ID Solution also imported thousands of cameras, including ones compatible with Nvidia modules, and high-spec electro-optical cameras produced by Sony Corporation and South Korea’s Wonwoo Engineering. Zala Aero Group and Aeroscan also paid other Russian companies that import cameras and specialise in digital surveillance systems. One of these companies received nearly RUB 200 million from January 2022 to May 2023.
+
+#### Batteries
+
+UAVs require a constant supply of lithium-ion batteries, particularly for loitering munitions, when such batteries are unretrievable. One company that has likely supplied Zala Aero Group with lithium-ion batteries has partnership agreements with more than 25 electronic component and battery manufacturers. Before the war, this company’s annual imports were valued at only a few thousand dollars. In 2023, however, the company imported more than $730,000 in lithium-ion batteries from Chinese companies. While some batteries were labelled as produced by Chinese brands, their model numbers revealed that they were produced by Samsung.
+
+#### Motors
+
+UAVs require various motors to operate. Lightweight UAVs and loitering munitions use AC motors with air blades to generate propulsion and lift. Servo motors manipulate control surfaces for balance and direction of travel, and stepper motors can stabilise and rotate gimbal-mounted cameras.
+
+Several of Zala Aero Group’s and Aeroscan’s Russian customers import these types of motors, despite not appearing to specialise in supplying these products. One such company was paid more than RUB 1.4 billion by Zala Aero Group and has imported millions of dollars in AC motors from Chinese companies. Another company also imported thousands of stepper motors from Chinese companies from March to December 2023.
+
+While intended for radio-controlled aircraft models, servo motors are also crucial components used in UAVs, and have been found in UAVs used by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF). One Russian company imported 3,400 servo motors from HiTec RCD Philippines in December 2021. Between October 2023 and December 2023, ID Solution also imported at least 400 HiTec RCD servo motors. HiTec RCD servo motors have been found in the Shahed-136/Geran-2 loitering munitions used by the AFRF in Ukraine, as well as in loitering munitions built and fielded by Houthi rebels in 2019.
+
+#### Carbon Fibres and Polymers
+
+High-performance UAVs, such as those produced by Zala Aero Group, often use carbon fibre and similar composite materials, as these allow UAVs to be more agile, lightweight and durable.
+
+From March 2022 to December 2023, one likely supplier of such composite materials to Zala Aero Group imported $5.6 million in acrylic polymers, epoxy resins, fibreglass fabrics and liquid polyesters. The supplier’s largest composite materials supplier is an Estonian company that exported synthetic materials with defence and aerospace applications produced by European companies, meaning that European materials are likely to be in a range of Russian UAVs.
+
+#### Machine Tools and Injection Moulding Machines
+
+Manufacturers such as Zala Aero Group also require sophisticated machine tools and robot arms to produce UAVs. Russian state media, while visiting one of Zala Aero Group’s converted shopping centre factories, showed various foreign machine tools used to manufacture Lancet-3s. These were manufactured by Hyundai, DN Solutions and Fanuc Machines. Additionally, Zala Aero Group uses plastic injection moulding machines purchased from Japan to synthesise components it can no longer import, including propeller blades.
+
+Zala Aero Group and Aeroscan have paid several Russian importers and distributors of machine tools and injection moulding machines, one of which claims to supply industrial equipment to several sanctioned Russian defence conglomerates. This distributor has historically imported machine tools from various European manufacturers. Another Russian company imported more than $22.2 million in machine tools and spare parts from March 2022 to December 2023, primarily from one Hong Kong company. The types of machine tools imported include those used by Zala Aero Group.
+
+Meanwhile, a third Russian company that received more than RUB 24 million from Aeroscan imported more than $4.2 million in injection moulding machines and related parts from March 2022 to December 2023. These shipments included $3 million in injection moulding machines and spare parts produced by Japan Steel Works, the same brand as that used by Zala Aero Group.
+
+#### Triaging Points of Vulnerability
+
+Despite Russia’s efforts to reduce its dependence on foreign materials for its war machine, its scramble to increase production following its invasion of Ukraine shows that it is still highly reliant on international supply chains. While sanctions and the will of companies to cut business ties with Russia impacted the country’s imports in the first few months of the war, procurement networks have adapted significantly. Trade patterns show that shipments to Russia are now routed through third countries that are friendlier to Russia, are more permissive of dubious trade flows, or have porous export controls.
+
+Zala Aero Group’s procurement flows underscore why Ukraine and its allies must change tactics in relation to disrupting Russia’s defence supply chains, by targeting the flows of specific items or technologies, instead of focusing sanctions action on the most obvious entities and individuals facilitating these networks. When targeting individuals and entities, it would be more impactful to prioritise those actors facilitating the procurement of these specific materials.
+
+Russia’s procurement of more advanced materials requires individuals outside of Russia to facilitate this procurement. For example, several owners and shareholders of Russian microelectronics importers are graduates and affiliates of military radioelectronic institutes, and many would appear to have extensive academic knowledge of microelectronics. The proactive detection, investigation and prosecution of these individuals and those who assist them are critical to disrupting Russia’s defence supply chains, which usually start within the jurisdiction of states with an interest in limiting Russian military–industrial output. This is especially relevant for individuals procuring European-made materials exported directly from the EU to Russia, as Western allies have greater purview in these jurisdictions.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 3: Russian Military–Industrial Complex Sequential Target Categories.__ Source: Author generated._
+
+Companies such as Zala Aero Group require a constant supply of specific components and materials to sustain UAV production, and these same materials are used across all Russian military-grade UAVs. Stemming the flow of these components would have more significant ramifications for Zala Aero Group’s production cycle than targeting the company and its leadership alone. Procurement networks, instead of merely having to reorganise through unsanctioned companies connected to unsanctioned individuals, would also have to source completely new materials, at great expense in terms of funding, time and resources.
+
+Targeting the supply of industrial equipment like machine tools, milling machines, lathes and injection moulding machines is equally imperative. Russian defence manufacturers rely on and will continue to need additional industrial equipment – along with regular maintenance and access to spare parts – to expand production. Although Russia has gradually imported larger quantities of Chinese machine tools, it also continues to source these tools from companies in the US, Europe, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.
+
+Targeting this supply would force these networks to prioritise analogous components and tools of lower quality, or unreliable counterfeits, increasing the chance of failure and degrading the overall effectiveness of Russian systems in Ukraine. The integration of new components and tools is also an arduous, time- and labour-intensive process, as replacements are tested and certified for battlefield use. This is particularly important as Zala Aero Group seeks to improve its UAVs with more advanced technologies – including AI capabilities – which would be difficult to replace adequately.
+
+
+### III. A Methodology of Effects
+
+The previous chapters have outlined the extent to which existing approaches to disrupting Russia’s defence industry have failed. In Chapter I the causes of failure were identified as: a reactive approach taken by governments; over-classification resulting in siloed and exclusive actions taken at too small a scale; and unrealistic expectations of what can be achieved. Chapter II demonstrated that the effort to disrupt Russia’s defence industries is far from futile, given the large threat surface against which Ukraine’s international partners can operate. This chapter therefore proposes an approach to targeting and synchronisation of actions to deliver relevant effects at scale.
+
+#### Building a Recognised Common Target Picture
+
+Fundamental to scaling the disruption of Russia’s defence industry is ensuring that the various bodies involved – intelligence, customs, law enforcement, sanctions units, financial institutions, industry and militaries – have a detailed understanding of the target and how it is functioning. Moreover, this picture must be accessible to the relevant bodies, in multiple countries, with as little latency as possible. The effective interdiction of a shipment may well require that a purchase traced from Country A is flagged to law enforcement in Country B before it is exported to Country C, and that a warrant is issued and relevant action taken immediately. The foundational requirement for such a rapid process to succeed is for states to have a shared picture of Russia’s industrial system, and to agree that this picture is sufficient to form the basis for planning actions.
+
+The framework for building a recognised common target picture (RCTP) of Russia’s defence industry should be a confidential but unclassified data fusion centre hosted by one state as a framework nation, and with liaison officers from a coalition of willing states. Which country acts as the framework nation is clearly a matter for negotiation. The core of this fusion centre should be a network map of Russian procurement channels and manufacturing systems, databases of associated corporate entities and individuals, and financial flows. The fusion centre must have the full range of commercially available analytical tools, and participating states should enable access to import and export data, transaction records, company records and other relevant databases from participating countries. Using investigative powers, states should also request trace data from financial institutions and make it available to the fusion centre. In some cases, ingesting these data sets may be periodic or may be subject to access requests. This should therefore be managed by participating analysts from contributing countries. Each country is also likely to have a significant volume of commercial trade data and company records obtained through technical collection. While individual records from these sets may be sensitive insofar as they reveal points of access, in aggregate, these data sets are often very low-level intelligence because they have so many potential points of origin. To that end, analysts from participating states with security clearances should be able to assess what their countries hold at Secret and Above Secret classifications away from the fusion centre and, understanding the gaps in the fused picture, be able to request the declassification and sharing of key data sets. In many cases, this may simply be the sharing of prompts taken from collection – names of individuals or specific companies – that can be flagged to the analysts at the fusion centre to target when trawling publicly available information.
+
+Perhaps one of the most important effects that can be delivered by the team managing the RCTP is the ability to publish an approved subscriber database that key industry partners can log in to to screen their customers and get greater insight into their downstream supply chains. The existence of such a database could remove the legal protection of pleading ignorance, shifting the legal jeopardy onto suppliers and thereby creating a deterrent effect against turning a blind eye to profitable orders for products to dubious clients.
+
+If one group of analysts is focused on maintaining an accurate picture of where Russia is procuring material, where it is going, what it is being used for, and who is involved in obtaining it, two additional teams are also necessary. The first is a team responsible for assessing opportunities to disrupt. The basis for this should be to analyse dependency within the system and to evaluate the resilience of the system to interference at each stage. The result is comparable with a road map showing congestion, which must also indicate where intervention can have the greatest effect. The broad target categories that should be mapped and assessed include:
+
+- __People__: procurement agents, couriers, financiers, lawyers, engineers and machinists.
+
+- __Tooling__: machine tools, spare parts and software.
+
+- __Components and materials__: nitrocellulose, microelectronics, metals, fibres and fuels.
+
+- __Enablers__: revenue, ships, corporate structures, insurance mechanisms and warehousing.
+
+The third team of analysts should be tasked with producing target packs, mainly on request by participating countries, to package parts of the RCTP to be presented to courts, policymakers and others to authorise interventions or to release the target pack to non-participating countries for the purpose of diplomacy. This team needs to understand the legal frameworks of participating states, so that fused data can be turned into actionable information. Another function of this team should be to allow participating states to observe the activities being prepared by others. A challenge that has confronted Ukraine’s international partners so far has been deconfliction. With activities at higher classification or in compartments, and without mechanisms for deconfliction, shipments that one state allowed to pass in order to gather data on who would redirect it have been stopped by a different state. Multiple states have also wasted time and energy trying to act against the same shipment. By having a multinational team building these packs, it becomes possible for deconfliction issues to be flagged and addressed.
+
+The significance of the framework nation is that it should control the security cell and access to the fusion centre. The work of the fusion cell should be based on confidentiality – as is the case with law enforcement – rather than classification. To that end, the framework nation should be able to exclude analysts if they breach confidentiality. The sensitive element of the fusion centre’s work is its relationship with planned actions, rather than the RCTP itself. There is a precedent for such an approach. The counter-piracy command-and-control centres in Singapore and the Bab al-Mandab, for example, necessarily involved participating states which needed a common operating picture to deconflict their activities, but which were also competitors.
+
+It could be argued that such a structure will be too easily penetrated by Russia. To a large extent, as long as there is latency in Russia’s access to certain materials, this will not disrupt enforcement and is not overly problematic. It is also clear that these problems are manageable. The support effort for Ukraine, coordinating the delivery of material from a large number of countries, is a good example of how operations can remain sufficiently secure to enable the mission while being largely unclassified but with specific elements of the effort managed at higher classification. Many of the countries supporting Ukraine are not Five Eyes states, or even NATO members, and Ukraine itself is acknowledged to be a penetrated bureaucracy that must have sight of shipments. In spite of this, Russia has so far failed to interdict shipments. The security issues are real, but they can be managed.
+
+#### Synchronising and Layering Effects
+
+While states will hold information at higher classification that will be withheld from an RCTP, the most sensitive element of the work of the fusion centre is planning interventions to impact Russia’s defence industry. The identification of key target sets by the fusion centre should form the basis for minilateral or unilateral effects planning, with the level of classification appropriate to the participants involved. Nevertheless, if effects are going to scale, then most will be unclassified and implemented by various branches of the participating states’ official bodies.
+
+If a targeting board were convened to assess options against an identified procurement network, it would become possible for participating states to propose actions to disrupt the procurement that collectively leave very few reversionary options for Russia. Synchronising effects thereby allows amplification of impact. Where there are gaps in interventions that different countries have proposed, this can become the area of focus for unilateral measures planned at higher classification.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 4: A Typical Russian Procurement Network.__ Source: Author generated._
+
+For example, consider the following procurement scheme. A Russian dual national is financed to purchase US microelectronics via a front company and ship them to Germany, where they will be driven to another country in the Schengen Area, exported to another front company in Türkiye, and then be mislabelled and shipped to Russia. The finance for the operation might be provided by a Russian gold shipment converted to cash in the UAE under the auspices of a front company and thereafter made available to the procurement agent. A single action – such as interdicting the shipment – might disrupt it, but if the procurement agent is not detained and is warned off by the seizure, they can simply restart the process using an alternative front company. If sanctions are applied against the importing company in Türkiye, a different one can simply be used.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 5: How Coordinated Multi-Jurisdictional Actions Can Disrupt a Russian Procurement Scheme Across Multiple Points.__ Source: Author generated._
+
+However, if the sanctioning of the Turkish company, the raiding of the procurement officer’s home, and the media publication of the abuse of Turkish customs regulation can be synchronised, it is difficult for an alternative route to be set up quickly. If, at the same time, the flight carrying the gold can be denied overflight rights and so delayed, and the company converting the gold to capital sanctioned simultaneously, the funds may not be available to pursue an alternative avenue of supply. This of course requires collaboration between several countries. It also becomes possible for other states to be in a position to add friction to Russia’s activities as required. This could mean getting Russian actors excluded from a flight, for example, so that they are stuck in a jurisdiction where they can be detained while the other actions are taken. If we imagine, therefore, a synchronisation chart showing the steps for the Russian procurement and manufacture of a system along one axis, and the measures being lined up by the participating states to simultaneously disrupt each stage, then the cost to Russia will be high. Procurement agents and other enablers are less replaceable than front companies. And, of course, pooling evidence gathered during seizures to the fusion centre to refine the RCTP allows for the cycle to be accelerated and the impact of each intervention magnified.
+
+It is necessary to consider the impact of not only actions taken in parallel, but also those taken in sequence. The prevention of a large shipment reaching a Russian factory may have a fairly limited impact on production. The factory may use stockpiled components to get itself over the stop in supply while alternative procurement channels are established. Alternatively, the stockpile may be used to allow engineers to work out a substitute Chinese component – albeit potentially reducing reliability – so that output can continue even if the part does not become available. However, suppose the disruption of a supply route is staggered with the subsequent disruption of the financing of supply routes, and that the actions against the alternative supply route are worked out in advance. Suppose then that once the engineers have become satisfied with a substitute component, there is disruption to the functioning of their machine tooling. While they are resolving the issue with the tooling, production is disrupted so that supplies of other materials begin to accumulate in storage at the factory. But as they are close to resolving the supply issue, the Ukrainian military uses one-way attack UAVs to destroy or damage a significant quantity of the stockpiled material. This kind of sequencing, such that production remains continuously off balance, inefficient and disrupted, is likely to have a far wider impact on output – both quantitative and qualitative – than any single action.
+
+The scale of effect that is needed against Russia’s defence industry, and the lead roles of both law enforcement in taking enforcement action, and private sector manufacturers and exporters in ensuring integrity in their supply chains, mean that the bulk of activities must be conducted in the confidential but unclassified space. There are discrete actions, however, reaching targets beyond legal jurisdiction, that some participating countries may wish to pursue using covert means where planning must be classified. Furthermore, different participating members may have quite different risk tolerances for what they are prepared to do unilaterally. Ukraine, for example, has no qualms about conducting kinetic operations. This is a problem that Western states have managed before. The US, for example, could collaborate with Israel on its efforts to constrain Iran’s nuclear programme without participating in Israel’s assassination programme targeting Iranian nuclear scientists. Nevertheless, the question arises as to how the synchronisation process can function at the unclassified, the minilaterally classified and the unilaterally classified level. There is the risk, of course, that if multiple countries endeavour to conduct covert activities targeting the gaps in the synchronisation chart, that the effort could become fratricidal.
+
+The layering of overt, covert and clandestine effects is achievable by participating states having an outline of the overt synchronisation matrix. There may also be occasional participants given observer status to the RCTP as a basis for their collaboration on effect delivery. Nevertheless, it becomes possible for states to work minilaterally or unilaterally away from the fusion centre to plan and execute effects, and to deconflict with others.
+
+Another area for consideration is where the intent of a covert operation is to spike a Russian procurement process rather than to deny it. This could involve taking the money of Russian procurement agents and then failing to supply the goods, or providing microelectronics that are defective. If synchronised with disinformation suggesting that a procurement agent is defrauding their employer, these kinds of techniques can result in Russian enablers being targeted even if they are beyond the jurisdiction of the participating states. Attacking trust and confidence in Russian procurement processes is valuable because it forces validation mechanisms and frictions into all operations. However, to carry out such actions it becomes necessary for states to avoid having the fusion centre coordinating interdiction of the related shipments. A system of red flags – preventing interdiction of specific shipments – brings with it both the risk that the Russians are tipped off, and the potential for participating states to undermine the process by red-flagging actual targets. These issues can be managed, however, as they are similar to some of the methods used by law enforcement to target drug cartels. Again, minilateral explanation can enable appropriate handling of such opportunities.
+
+
+_▲ __Figure 6: The Workflow of the Multinational Fusion Centre.__ Source: Author generated._
+
+The metrics of success for operations targeting Russia’s defence industry will be harder to measure in open sources. The relevant metrics are: reduced production output of key weapons systems; reduced reliability of key weapons systems; or increased cost of production. The volume of weapons being fired is a poor and methodologically challenging proxy for any of these variables. Although they will correlate over time, there is often a considerable lag between disruption to production and shifts in use at the front. This makes it difficult to attribute cause and effect. The problem is that the metrics must necessarily derive from inside Russia’s defence industry and are therefore likely to only be accessible via covert collection. How, therefore, can the fusion centre assess its impact?
+
+In some respects, participating states will only continue to support the endeavour if they see a return on investment. That they each conduct damage assessments using their own collection capabilities therefore provides those funding the effort with internal validation of impact. This kind of data is often available from relatively low-level collection. Individually, the sourcing is highly sensitive, but once aggregated, it becomes difficult to attribute it to a source. To that end, it should be possible for participating states to declassify aggregated assessments relating to these metrics periodically, at intervals that allow for meaningful changes to be picked up.
+
+
+### Conclusions
+
+If Russia can be stopped in Ukraine, the prospects for European security will immeasurably improve. If Russia achieves its objectives in Ukraine, the credibility of NATO’s conventional deterrence posture becomes critical to the security of Europe. In either case, the industrial capacity of NATO states is important in ensuring that Ukraine can continue to fight or that NATO’s forces are ready to deter. The strain, however, can be lessened by reducing Russia’s capacity to arm and equip its forces. The extensive dependence of Russia’s defence industry on international supply chains makes it vulnerable to disruption. Thus far, however, Ukraine’s international partners have failed to significantly curb Russian defence production.
+
+This paper has sought to identify the cause of this failure. Ultimately, it has concluded that Ukraine’s international partners have been reactive rather than proactive in targeting Russian defence industries; have suffered from the over-classification of relatively low-level intelligence and have thus failed to properly empower the manufacturers of the goods they are trying to disrupt; and have had policy frameworks orientated around unrealistic expectations of what can be achieved. Despite this, the exposure of Russia’s defence industry to international efforts at disruption was shown to be considerable. There are multiple stages throughout the production process where intervention, both overt and covert, can cause delay, degradation in quality, or a serious increase in cost to Russia’s arms production.
+
+The methodology proposed for increasing the effectiveness of efforts at disarming Russia is threefold:
+
+1. It is necessary to have an unclassified and therefore releasable RCTP of Russia’s defence industry, with mechanisms for sharing target packs among participating countries that fit with those countries’ legal requirements for authorising interventions.
+
+2. It is necessary to synchronise and layer effects, spanning multinational overt action, minilateral covert action and unilateral clandestine action, to cause Russia’s defence industry to be maximally disrupted.
+
+3. It is necessary that states use intelligence collection to assess impact and then aggregate the collected data to reduce the sensitivity of their conclusions, enabling these to be shared to refine the targeting process.
+
+After two years of largely ineffectual and poorly cohered efforts, the time to act is now.
+
+---
+
+__Jack Watling__ is Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at RUSI. Jack works closely with the British military on the development of concepts of operation and assessments of the future operating environment, and conducts operational analysis of contemporary conflicts. His PhD examined the evolution of Britain’s policy responses to civil war in the early 20th century. Jack has worked extensively on Ukraine, Iraq, Yemen, Mali, Rwanda and further afield. He is a Global Fellow at the Wilson Center in Washington, DC.
+
+__Gary Somerville__ is a Research Fellow in RUSI’s Open Source Intelligence and Analysis Research Group.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-27-georgia-at-crossroads.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-27-georgia-at-crossroads.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Georgia At Crossroads
+author: Callum Fraser and Natia Seskuria
+date : 2024-06-27 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/xX6sEDu.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Can the West Still Compete?"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Recent protests over Georgia’s “foreign agents” law, which is widely believed to be based on similar Russian legislation, highlight the fractious political situation in a country that was once a hub of pro-Western democracy. With the West in danger of losing out to Russian and Chinese influence, it is urgent to reassess what it can offer the region._
+
+
+
+Following more than a month of protests, on 3 May 2024, the speaker of Georgia’s parliament signed off a controversial law on “transparency on foreign influence”, better known as “the Russian law”. The new legislation obliges all non-profit and media organisations that are receiving more than 20% of funding from abroad to register as entities pursuing foreign interests. The Georgian government insists that the law does not intend to crack down on critical voices but rather ensures transparency of funding. Yet, tens of thousands of protesters as well as the president of Georgia argue that the foreign agents law resembles Russian legislation introduced in 2012 and used against dissent. Many believe that the government will weaponise the law ahead of parliamentary elections scheduled in October 2024 in order to suppress media and watchdogs.
+
+
+### Georgia’s European Future at Stake
+
+The backlash over the foreign agents law indicates that Georgia’s current political crisis is not just about the protection of civil liberties and independent media, but has broader geopolitical implications. Once a champion of democracy in the region, Georgia’s European future is now much more uncertain. The ruling Georgian Dream party is increasingly employing anti-Western rhetoric and claiming that Western funds are in some cases being used to encourage regime change in Georgia. The ruling party’s officials have gone as far as spreading conspiracy theories regarding the alleged existence of a “Global War Party” that is pushing for a repeat of the Ukraine scenario in Georgia.
+
+Georgia, which has remained consistently pro-European and pro-Western over the last two decades with over 89% of citizens favouring EU integration, has never experienced such a swift rise in anti-Western narratives. Ironically, this official mood swing is taking place at a time when Georgia has finally become an EU candidate country, with the prospect of opening accession talks with Brussels in the near future.
+
+___`The turbulence in Georgia is a reminder to the EU of how state policy can drastically shift during the protracted waiting periods for European candidacy`___
+
+In light of recent developments and the country’s democratic backsliding, Georgia’s EU integration process is likely to be officially paused, as indicated by a number of EU officials. According to EU High Representative Josep Borrell, the foreign agents law is “incompatible with European values”. On 24 June 2024, following a Foreign Affairs Council meeting where political developments in Georgia were discussed, Borrell clearly reiterated that unless the Georgian government changes its course of action, Georgia will not progress on the EU path. Moreover, in response to the foreign agents law, the EU is considering downgrading diplomatic relations with Georgia and freezing financial aid to the government. Yet, the law is only one example out of a set of divisive laws that the Georgian government has adopted or intends to adopt soon, making the country’s EU integration dream even more distant.
+
+Recently, the Georgian parliament bypassed the presidential veto over the so-called “offshore law” which intends to encourage asset transfers from offshore accounts to Georgia through exemption on taxation until 2028. The law threatens to make Georgia a target of money laundering activities, especially from sanctioned individuals. On 4 May 2024, just a day after the foreign agents law was finally approved, the ruling party brought another piece of legislation forward targeting LGBT propaganda. This initiative comes from the same anti-Western playbook, with the government accusing Western partners of using local NGOs to spread LGBT propaganda.
+
+Despite the unwillingness of the government to listen to tens of thousands of protesters tirelessly rallying in the streets of Tbilisi to protect Georgia’s European future, much remains uncertain in the run-up to this year’s elections. The government of Georgia has been increasingly looking for alternative strategic partners such as China, emphasising the economic benefits of bringing Chinese investment into the country. Recently, the Georgian government announced that a Chinese consortium had won the much anticipated major strategic Anaklia deep sea port project. Yet, given overwhelming support for Georgia’s EU integration, it does not appear that Georgians see China as an alternative to the West and the billions of dollars of investment that Western countries, particularly the US and the EU, have made in democracy-building efforts in Georgia. Thus, the stakes could not be higher for the upcoming 2024 parliamentary elections, which will largely be about a choice over Georgia’s foreign policy trajectory.
+
+
+### How Can the West Respond?
+
+The turbulence in Georgia is a reminder to the EU of how state policy can drastically shift during the protracted waiting periods for European candidacy, particularly when reinforced by rival authoritarian states interfering in domestic politics through disinformation, corruption and hard power coercion. Moreover, for the West as a whole, it is a stark warning that promises of integration are no longer enough to incentivise cooperation amid lucrative Chinese economic incentives in the form of development projects and with Russia waging potent disinformation campaigns that are effectively distorting public opinion towards Western values.
+
+This tug-of-war between the West and the rest is particularly noticeable in Georgia and the wider former Soviet Union (FSU). The South Caucasus and Central Asia stand at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, and influence in these regions is key to accessing Eurasia, with the Middle Corridor developing into one of the fastest growing inter-state trade networks. Naturally, this has caught the interest of both the East and the West, with both looking to expand into Russia’s former sphere of interest. However, Western expansion is currently restricted by several factors. First, Russia’s geographic position and historic economic links within these regions still incentivises cooperation. Second, the amount of money that China is willing to throw at development projects within the FSU dwarfs what the West has offered so far. Third, there is growing evidence of state capture in several states in the FSU, such as Georgian Dream’s increasing control over Georgian institutions and media with the aim of limiting external influence from unwelcome parties, which now include the EU.
+
+Despite these limitations, the fact remains that with Russia embroiled in Ukraine, the West has an opportunity to get its foot in the door in the FSU. Currently, the momentum is negligible, as exemplified by UK Foreign Secretary Lord Cameron’s visit to Central Asia, culminating with a commitment of £50 million for “assistance” to the region. Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to Uzbekistan saw over £300 million invested in the construction of a nuclear plant, a far more concrete contribution that will pay much larger political and economic dividends in the future. Similarly, France’s supply of military equipment to Armenia has done far more to influence the South Caucasus than the many years of EU “peacekeeping” along the Armenia–Azerbaijan border. If the West wants to increase its influence in the FSU, it must focus on what tangible benefits it can provide and be prepared to foot the bill.
+
+___`The sooner multipolarity in the region is embraced, the more quickly Western foreign policy can begin to compete with expanding Russian and Chinese influence`___
+
+Within the emerging multipolarity of the FSU, there are clear limits to the effectiveness of current EU integration policy. Decades of waiting for approval has empowered individuals with vested interests to extend their influence in domestic politics, while allowing authoritarian powers the time to sway opinion through development projects, economic investment, and disinformation campaigns. Now is the time for a policy reassessment to understand what the EU can tangibly offer these regions that can compete with Russia and China’s authoritarian advantage.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+Georgia’s drastic policy shift threatens to further destabilise the geopolitical balance in the South Caucasus. What was once a hub of pro-Western democracy has been swayed by the allure of populism, likely amplified by the geopolitical interests of Russia and China. Despite Georgian Dream’s legislative crackdown, many in Georgia still hold European aspirations, setting the scene for what will be a critical election for the future of Georgia later this year.
+
+This is an opportunity for the West to demonstrate its worth in the South Caucasus and the wider FSU. Geographic proximity, existing economic links, and an authoritarian focus on development projects mean that there is little that Western powers can do to incentivise these states to completely sever ties with Russia and China. The sooner multipolarity in the region is embraced, the more quickly Western foreign policy can begin to compete with expanding Russian and Chinese influence.
+
+---
+
+__Callum Fraser__ is a Research Fellow in the International Security Studies department at RUSI, specialising in the confluence between Russian foreign policy and its periphery states. Callum is particularly interested in the evolution of geopolitics within Eurasia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. He also specialises in researching the underlying motivations, justifications, and dynamics of conflict within the Eurasian space along ethnic, identity, cultural, and political dimensions.
+
+__Natia Seskuria__ is an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). She is also a Founder and Executive Director of the Regional Institute for Security Studies (RISS), a Tbilisi-based think tank and an official partner of RUSI. Additionally, Natia holds an advisory position at Chatham House and is a lecturer in Russian politics. She has a broad experience in policy-making, strategic foresight and provides analysis on defence and security issues.
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