diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-06-04-chow-hang-tung-never-forget-never-forgive-8964.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-06-04-chow-hang-tung-never-forget-never-forgive-8964.md
index e66a5476..faa10b4f 100644
--- a/_collections/_columns/2022-06-04-chow-hang-tung-never-forget-never-forgive-8964.md
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-06-04-chow-hang-tung-never-forget-never-forgive-8964.md
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ layout: post
title : "邹幸彤：毋忘六四、抗争到底"
author: "雨里"
date : 2022-06-04 12:00:00 +0800
-image : https://i.imgur.com/O4qMgu9.jpg
+image : https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/c1/c1-20220604-02.jpg
image_caption: "前香港支联会副主席邹幸彤"
description: "「“无蜡烛之地”吧，即是说你连点支蜡烛都不可以，其实这个不是等如令到人们是不记得、会忘记（六四）的，你（当局）愈是压制，大家的心里面愈记得吧，因为会不断提醒我们会记着嘛，只不过我们不能够聚在一个地方，但是都会分散不同的地方，都会去记着这个伤痛，以及记着这些事件，令我们更加会加深，相信（六四）那一日大家都会心目中一定有那支蜡烛在那里，只不过在不同的地方出现。」"
---
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-06-04-from-1989-into-1984.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-06-04-from-1989-into-1984.md
index cbb5844e..c0f8f096 100644
--- a/_collections/_columns/2022-06-04-from-1989-into-1984.md
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-06-04-from-1989-into-1984.md
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ layout: post
title : "來自「1989」進入《1984》"
author: "滕彪"
date : 2022-06-04 12:00:00 +0800
-image : https://i.imgur.com/DNiGJRx.jpg
+image : https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/c1/c1-20220604-03.jpg
#image_caption: ""
description: "坦克人代表的是中國人民的勇氣與希望。"
---
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ description: "坦克人代表的是中國人民的勇氣與希望。"
中國政府已幾乎撕毀了對香港許下的「一國兩制」承諾；換句話說它正在違背1984年簽署的《中英聯合聲明》。中國透過貿易歧視、假信息、媒體滲透、多次威脅對台灣發動軍事侵略，介入台灣政治。中國也違反一項於2016年根據《聯合國海洋法公約》（UNCLOS）做出的仲裁決定，威脅對菲律賓開戰。中國肆無忌憚地以阻止獨立非政府組織發聲、懲罰民運人士、騷擾及恫嚇聯合國職員和專家、阻止聯合國通過某些決議或削弱其效力，以及與擁有最糟人權紀錄的獨裁政權合作等方式來操縱聯合國的人權機制。
-
+
▲ 中國政府從未放鬆對社會與國民的審查、監視與支配。如果說中共從六四事件學到了什麼，那就是中共應不惜一切維護一黨專政。
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-06-08-shanghai-does-not-believe-in-tears.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-06-08-shanghai-does-not-believe-in-tears.md
index d0456fd3..175d66a8 100644
--- a/_collections/_columns/2022-06-08-shanghai-does-not-believe-in-tears.md
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-06-08-shanghai-does-not-believe-in-tears.md
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ layout: post
title : "上海不相信眼泪"
author: "维舟"
date : 2022-06-08 12:00:00 +0800
-image : https://i.imgur.com/826mIzM.png
+image : https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/c1/c1-20220608-01.jpg
image_caption: "现在全上海的人，都是幸存者，也带有幸存者特殊的心态"
description: ""
---
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ description: ""
我们永远不应遗忘，在那些天的暗夜里的嘶吼、歌哭与沉默。不要忘记他们，那些已死去的人们，再也回不来。那些看似零碎的片段，可能将决定我们往后如何在瓦砾上重建生活。记忆并不必然只是伤感或虚假的抚慰，它也可能是治愈的力量源泉。
-
+
▲ 上海五原路 6月3日凌晨 做核酸
可能要不了多少年，我们的后人就将无法理解我们为什么会经历这些，而我们也很难向他们解释，那仿佛是一场暴雨，人们虽然被淋了一身，但并不清楚它是怎么发生的。在这个时代的迷宫里，我们都只看到一个幽暗的角落。
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-06-09-memorial-of-6.9-what-is-the-memory-for.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-06-09-memorial-of-6.9-what-is-the-memory-for.md
index e61d7896..ccfb36e6 100644
--- a/_collections/_columns/2022-06-09-memorial-of-6.9-what-is-the-memory-for.md
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-06-09-memorial-of-6.9-what-is-the-memory-for.md
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ layout: post
title : "「6.9」，記憶是為了什麼？"
author: "書生"
date : 2022-06-09 12:00:00 +0800
-image : https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/83/June9protestTreefong02.jpg
+image : https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/c1/c1-20220609-01.jpg
image_caption: "Hennessy Road demonstration view, 9 June, 2019."
description: "「守護香港反送中」大遊行，通稱「6.9大遊行」，由民間人權陣線（「民陣」）於2019年6月9日舉辦，旨在反對逃犯條例修訂草案（「反送中」）。——維基百科"
---
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-06-09-the-li-jiaqi-paradox.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-06-09-the-li-jiaqi-paradox.md
index ba9fe179..f9883381 100644
--- a/_collections/_columns/2022-06-09-the-li-jiaqi-paradox.md
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-06-09-the-li-jiaqi-paradox.md
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ layout: post
title : "李佳琦悖论"
author: "昌西"
date : 2022-06-09 12:00:00 +0800
-image : https://i.imgur.com/3HXYLDK.jpg
+image : https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/c1/c1-20220609-02.jpg
image_caption: "“如果不想触碰政治禁区，那么必须了解所有政治禁区。”"
description: "「当知道一件事比装作不知道一件事的难度更大时，犯错几乎就变得不可避免。」"
---
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ description: "「当知道一件事比装作不知道一件事的难度更大时
由于[“坦克人”影像画面](https://www.abc.net.au/chinese/2019-06-04/tiananmen-30th-anniversary-young-people-dont-know-tank-man/11178938)的存在，坦克一词同样成为了中国政府针对六四事件的“敏感词汇”。坦克蛋糕在这样的时段出现，无疑为负责审核李佳琦直播的平台带来了巨大负担。在微博上，李佳琦当晚对外宣称“内部设备故障无法继续直播”，并且之后再没有发任何一条新的微博。
-
+
▲ 1989年6月5日，王维林在北京长安街上阻挡中国人民解放军坦克车队前进。图：Bettmann/Getty Images
#### 无知的代价
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ description: "「当知道一件事比装作不知道一件事的难度更大时
不过和李佳琦团队经历最像的，其实是当年在共享单车领域曾经与ofo、摩拜三足鼎立的小蓝单车（BlueGoGo）。在2017年6月3日到6月4日，小蓝单车与掌游天下联合推出名为“王牌大作战”的推广活动。该活动鼓励用户寻找带有坦克标示的单车骑行。而在小蓝单车的手机应用上，随即出现了在长安街上排列的“一排排坦克”。这一推广活动在上线数小时后便全面下架，根据中国科技媒体品玩的[存档报导](https://web.archive.org/web/20171116092303/http://www.pingwest.com/bluegogo-die/)称，6月事发之后确有警察进入小蓝单车内部调查，而小蓝单车自此进入静默反省期。更直接的结果是2017年11月，在缺乏后续融资的背景下，小蓝单车CEO跑路，公司也随后倒闭，交给滴滴托管收购，至此，距离坦克车推广事件爆发仅隔五个月。
-
+
▲ 2018年1月3日，上海，美容博主李佳琦在淘宝上直播时涂口红。图：VCG via Getty Images
#### 无孔不入的政治
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ description: "「当知道一件事比装作不知道一件事的难度更大时
对于李佳琦和更多需要依靠中国客户群体的本土商人来说，他们与“明处”政治的交集可谓已经无法避免，同时，接触这些明面上的政治行动，其本质是为了规避陷入任何“禁区政治”可能带来的负面影响。但对于阴暗面的避而不谈，以及不知所谓，却在诸如现在的关键时刻害苦了自己。
-
+
▲ 2021年1月5日，上海 ，人们走过直播主持人李佳琦的广告。摄：VCG via Getty Images
#### 过于成功的审查
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-06-11-never-forget-8964-liberate-hk.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-06-11-never-forget-8964-liberate-hk.md
index d95eaeb2..465a800c 100644
--- a/_collections/_columns/2022-06-11-never-forget-8964-liberate-hk.md
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-06-11-never-forget-8964-liberate-hk.md
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ layout: post
title : "勿忘六四？光复香港？"
author: "鹿馬"
date : 2022-06-11 12:00:00 +0800
-image : https://i.imgur.com/a1sfN4q.jpg
+image : https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/c1/c1-20220611-01.jpg
image_caption: "东京新宿街头六四纪念集会，2022年6月4日。"
description: "六四当天，东京新宿街头有纪念六四的集会，难得有机会近距离接触，我也去凑了个热闹。"
---
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ description: "六四当天，东京新宿街头有纪念六四的集会，难得
当然，在战术层面，从提升港人内部的凝聚力这一目的出发，“光复香港，时代革命”也远比以六四为主题的口号有力的多，同时也更能吸引日本当地人的注意力。毕竟，一个集会能聚集人气才是王道，理不理解内容倒还是其次。
-
+
▲ 这两则投稿我都非常认同，左边那则是出于感性的共感，而右边那则出于理性的理解。
#### 作为一个参与者的感受
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-06-11-youth-enlighteners-and-their-times.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-06-11-youth-enlighteners-and-their-times.md
index f44b4092..a89c1add 100644
--- a/_collections/_columns/2022-06-11-youth-enlighteners-and-their-times.md
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-06-11-youth-enlighteners-and-their-times.md
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ layout: post
title : "青年启蒙者与他们的时代"
author: "陈纯"
date : 2022-06-11 12:00:00 +0800
-image : https://i.imgur.com/YOMBh9S.jpg
+image : https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/c1/c1-20220611-02.jpg
#image_caption: ""
description: ""
---
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-06-12-memorial-of-6.12-tyranny-shooting-at-us.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-06-12-memorial-of-6.12-tyranny-shooting-at-us.md
index b186ecae..b859b356 100644
--- a/_collections/_columns/2022-06-12-memorial-of-6.12-tyranny-shooting-at-us.md
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-06-12-memorial-of-6.12-tyranny-shooting-at-us.md
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ layout: post
title : "「6.12」，暴政向我們開槍"
author: "蘇查哈爾燦"
date : 2022-06-12 12:00:00 +0800
-image : https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f5/Harcourt_Road_tear_gas_view_20190612.jpg
+image : https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/c1/c1-20220612-01.jpg
image_caption: "Harcourt Road tear gas view, 12 June, 2019."
description: "反對逃犯條例修訂草案佔領行動，又稱「6.12示威」，是2019年6月11日深夜起，香港市民自發的集會及佔領街道運動，目的在於要求香港特區政府撤回修訂逃犯條例。——維基百科"
---
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-06-16-memorial-of-6.16-glad-to-protest-along-with-you.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-06-16-memorial-of-6.16-glad-to-protest-along-with-you.md
index 21e44435..7c130632 100644
--- a/_collections/_columns/2022-06-16-memorial-of-6.16-glad-to-protest-along-with-you.md
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-06-16-memorial-of-6.16-glad-to-protest-along-with-you.md
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ layout: post
title : "「6.16」，和你抗爭我很愉快"
author: "書生"
date : 2022-06-16 12:00:00 +0800
-image : https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/30/June16protestTreefong17.jpg
+image : https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/c1/c1-20220616-01.jpg
image_caption: "Johnston Road demonstration view, 16 June, 2019."
description: "「譴責鎮壓，撤回惡法」大遊行，通稱「6.16大遊行」，由民間人權陣線（「民陣」）於2019年6月16日舉辦，是「6.9大遊行」後再一次同類遊行。本次遊行提出「五大訴求」，追究警察在6月12日街道佔領時濫權的呼聲令運動遲遲不能收場。——維基百科"
---
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-06-17-disregarding-human-rights-but-pro-feminism.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-06-17-disregarding-human-rights-but-pro-feminism.md
index 6a700c65..43e2fc41 100644
--- a/_collections/_columns/2022-06-17-disregarding-human-rights-but-pro-feminism.md
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-06-17-disregarding-human-rights-but-pro-feminism.md
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ layout: post
title : "漠视人权却支持女权？"
author: "鹿馬"
date : 2022-06-17 12:00:00 +0800
-image : https://i.imgur.com/wkMlxkE.jpg
+image : https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/c1/c1-20220617-01.jpg
#image_caption: ""
description: "一直以来，我不是很喜欢在墙内的语境下讨论女权这个话题，很重要的一个原因是女权这个词在中国已经严重污名化，而且内涵越来越不清晰。"
---
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-06-29-jumbo-sinking-as-a-funeral.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-06-29-jumbo-sinking-as-a-funeral.md
index 427c209b..a68dd7f1 100644
--- a/_collections/_columns/2022-06-29-jumbo-sinking-as-a-funeral.md
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-06-29-jumbo-sinking-as-a-funeral.md
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ layout: post
title : "沉船以葬"
author: "西辭"
date : 2022-06-29 12:00:00 +0800
-image : https://i.imgur.com/bAv9Ttm.jpg
+image : https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/c1/c1-20220629-01.jpg
image_caption: "珍寶海鮮舫內籠，如今連同船隻一道葬身海底。"
description: ""
---
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-07-01-decolonization-a-mission-impossible.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-07-01-decolonization-a-mission-impossible.md
index edae9214..a91f3979 100644
--- a/_collections/_columns/2022-07-01-decolonization-a-mission-impossible.md
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-07-01-decolonization-a-mission-impossible.md
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ layout: post
title : "此地无银“去殖化”"
author: "荒原狼"
date : 2022-07-01 12:00:00 +0800
-image : https://i.imgur.com/oVTOTW0.jpg
+image : https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/c1/c1-20220701-01.jpg
image_caption: "只有把殖民问题回归到所在地政治（politics of location），才能面对真正的政治问题。"
description: "殖民主义并不满足于把它的法律强加于被殖民国家的现在和将来。殖民主义并不满足于把人民锁在铁网里，不满足于只是清除被殖民者脑袋里的一切形式和内容。殖民主义透过一种逻辑上的变态，指向被压迫人民的过去，将之扭曲、毁容、消灭。——法农《大地上的受苦者》"
---
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ description: "殖民主义并不满足于把它的法律强加于被殖民国家
香港原本列名于联合国的非自治领土的名单之中，却在中共取代中华民国成为联合国成员后，被要求褫夺香港的非自治领土的身份，令香港人无法按联合国的民族自决原则，决定自身的命运。当然，不在非自治领土的名单不代表该地变成自治，香港始终没有得到自治自主的机会（下文会再详述）。那么在九七前的香港，在法理上属于殖民地／非自治领土吗？
-
+
▲ 1997年6月30日，香港回归前夕，港英旗在维港上飘扬。
一如前述，《同文》的文章访问香港考试及评核局历史科前评核发展部经理、曾任教于香港中学及大学的杨颖宇博士，点出1843年《英皇制诰》（Letters Patent）文本中，清楚订明香港岛作为一个香港殖民地（the Colony of Hong Kong）的名称和法理地位。这份《英皇制诰》自然是来源自鸦片战争后签订《南京条约》（1842）的立法结果。条约中文版本订明：
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ _“香港、澳门属于历史遗留下来的帝国主义强加于中国的一
那么，如果是把香港问题看作为外在主权中的威斯特伐利亚主权（Westphalian sovereignty）争夺，即有关主权国领土和权力范围的国际认可，那可能是最合理的诠释。但是，威斯特伐利亚主权不同于前述的内政主权，在于前者更强调国际社会或者相关国际法程序对此的认可，不能单方面自把自为。这就等同于国家独立跟联合国承认为主权国之间，是有著相应的差异，这直接影响了该政治体的国际法地位和相应权益。而从七十年代中国政府邀请和接见香港港督，八十年代谈判后共同发布《中英联合声明》。这些举动也是实然地承认了英属香港的外交地位，香港问题也不属中国内政，因此需要寻求中英之间，以至国际社会的外交协议规范和认可。
-
+
▲ 2020年10月15日，香港历史博物馆的“香港故事”展馆暂停开放前，大量市民入内参观。
同样地，九七前英属香港在不同国际协议和组织中都有著独立的成员位置，而在九七后，这些协约成员的身份都保留下来。例如香港早于1995年有份创立世界贸易组织（WTO），而中国则是迟至2001年才加入世贸。九七后香港的成员身份也保留下来，跟中国属于两个不同世贸成员的单位，可以独立在其他国家设立经贸办，跟其他世贸代表谈判和处理贸易纠纷。这些一国两制安排固然可称之为因事制宜的便利（`饶戈平，《与时偕行—一国两制与基本法在香港的实践》，香港城市大学出版社，2019，p.228`），但在国际法框架下也可理解为香港拥有一定的外在主权位份（或称相互性主权，interdependence sovereignty）和权利（但如今在后国安法年代的香港，应否继续享有独立世贸成员身份和待遇也开始受到质疑）。把跨国殖民与解殖问题称作内部主权问题，无视主权的国际认可机制，无疑是自欺欺人的说法。
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ _“Is there a uniform law of nations? There certainly is not the same one for a
法律史家Antony Anghie提醒我们，此条约被称作不平等条约，不仅是因为强权压下不得不为的丛林法则，更是因为这条约为的是强化英国的贸易特权，如逼使大清放开港口，容许英国商品进口的关税限额有特别宽待之类，这些条件完全脱离了国际法下的精神，纯然满足于帝国利益下的产物。（`Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.72-3`）
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▲ 2020年10月15日，香港历史博物馆“香港故事”展馆暂停开放前，大量市民入内参观，其中展出有关鸦片战争及割让香港。
同时期出现的还有治外法权（legal extraterritoriality），领事裁决权（consular jurisdiction）的定立，剥夺了殖民国家相当的司法自主权利。这自然也是建基在对象国家不是文明国家的行列，因此其司法主权不获尊重的前提下，治外法权成了不平等条约的条件之一。值得注意的是，日本在十九世纪，曾经跟大清一样有过治外法权的待遇。然而，经过1905年的日俄战争，日本明治维新后的强大军力打败欧洲强国，使其迅即进入主权国家俱乐部的行列，不单国内的治外法权全面消失，甚至可以在中国境内设置多达三十多个领事法庭（比起英法还要多），在外国境内行使司法管辖权。而不顾中华民国多次抗议，欧洲殖民主一直坚持要中国先完整地方的财产和商业法，保障了当地侨民的财产安全，让跨国企业能安全进入中国市场谋利，治外法权才可以取消。（`Kayaoglu Turan, Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and China, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p.151`）
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ _“Is there a uniform law of nations? There certainly is not the same one for a
过去香港作为英殖的地方，教育语言自然是十分重要的政治议题，母语教学其实反复提过差不多近百年，但自主教育的道路仍然漫长。虽然香港整体人口绝大多数都是以粤语作为母语，而英殖政府一直有容许在中小学使用中文教育，但是从官方政策到家长老师，都强烈地重英轻中。
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+
▲ 2021年7月1日，北角培侨中学有庆祝建党100周年活动，其中出席的不少学生都每人手持一支小国旗。
根据许宝强引述谢锡金的研究数字，从1958年到1988年，英文中学从74间大幅升至343间，学生人数由25000人升至365000；但同时中文中学的数字却不升反跌，由89间跌至57间，学生人数由22000微升至32000多。九七回归后曾因为推行中文教育，令英文中学从九成学校比例锐减至三成，剩下114间，结果“英（文）中（学）”成了名校的别名，每年中（文）中学生流失率都远高于英中学校。直至2000年，曾荫权在教改后推出“微调”政策，容许学校自行调整授课语言的班别和科目，令开办英文授课班别成了每年招生的噱头。母语教学在所谓国际化或者容易找工作的价值视野下，沦为殖民的鸡肋。
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ _“Is there a uniform law of nations? There certainly is not the same one for a
但不论如何，香港农业的大幅萎缩是无可置疑的，过往香港农业最高峰时，农地使用面积达到一万三千公顷，粮食自给率差不多50巴仙（%）。如今根据渔农处的资料，从1997年到2021年，农地使用面积从六千公顷减至七百五十公顷，粮食自给率也从14巴仙跌至不足2巴仙，而进口食物占了香港食物供应90多巴仙。
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+
▲ 2021年3月21日，上水的一位香港农夫在耕作。
固然可讨论的是，农业曾经兴盛是否意味著只能发展农业，但城市化和金融化推动的经济发展，又是否代表著看起来“落后的”、劳动力主导的农业应该退场呢？视城市发展和金融经济作为先进的象征，对应著工农业的落后，本就是现代性的表现，因为通过控制资本密集的生产消费链上流，借助全球化的运输和分工，能够更有效地剥削劳动力集中的生产地区，使得利润能够最大化。只是能够分享庞大利润的，往往是少数跨国公司的中高层，例如华润五丰有限公司（前称五丰行）便是主要代理香港入口中国大陆肉类的机构，业务遍及全球，营业额上百亿元，如此影响全港市民肉类供应的价格，香港政府却无权干预其价格厘定。
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ _“Is there a uniform law of nations? There certainly is not the same one for a
所以如叶荫聪曾在论文中提到，当初英殖政府批评华人居所的卫生问题之一，便是欠缺阳光和通风导致病菌滋生。但同时在英殖政府主理的徙置大楼，却为了节省成本和空间而采用背靠背的设计，结果同样是欠缺阳光和通风，十足十英国十九世纪穷人的恶劣蜗居。（`叶荫聪，〈一个卫生城市的诞生：香港早期公共房屋的殖民建构〉，《城市与设计学报》，no.13/14，03/2003，p.360-1`）
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▲ 2022年5月19日，九龙的住宅区。
但回归后的香港，城市规划便得到自主了吗？在殖民地留下来的不民主议会，委任式行政会议的行政主导下，香港多项大型（大白象）工程，不论是高铁香港段、港珠澳大桥还是机场的第三跑道，都是背向强大反对的民意、一意孤行的推行，不单费用极为浩大（不论是金钱上、生态上还是发展所牺牲的社区），且在工程上得益的也不是广大的市民，而是大财团、顾问公司，以至整个跨国的利益网络。同时，市区重建却处处见到幽灵般的殖民心态，依旧在管治思维中久久不灭。原先富有香港历史和特色的湾仔利东街（喜帖街），经过重建改造后变成了仿欧洲的购物大街“囍欢里”。类似的重建发展还有尖沙咀的旧水警总区总部，现在成了“1881”美轮美奂的十里洋场。
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-07-01-role-playing-game-of-covid-zero.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-07-01-role-playing-game-of-covid-zero.md
index e12a34e3..43cd5b6d 100644
--- a/_collections/_columns/2022-07-01-role-playing-game-of-covid-zero.md
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-07-01-role-playing-game-of-covid-zero.md
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ layout: post
title : "《清零》：当疫情再次战胜我们"
author: "池骋"
date : 2022-07-01 12:00:00 +0800
-image : https://i.imgur.com/y3XhKv0.png
+image : https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/c1/c1-20220701-02.jpg
image_caption: "……最后变成了一群人对另一群人的猎巫游戏。"
description: ""
---
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ description: ""
我当然不是李文亮那样高尚的人。只是这次被朋友邀请，参加一场以新冠疫情为背景的桌游《清零》，我抽中了这个角色。看着屏幕上亮起“吹哨人”三个字，我顿时感到肩上有了重量。
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▲ 《清零》为上海疫情期间，部分上海市民通过微信、腾讯会议等网络通讯平台苦中作乐的狼人杀类游戏。图为疫情期间，用作游戏说明书的线上共享文档。游戏截图
《清零》的故事发生在一个最普通不过的上海居民小区。小区里住着各种各样的人，一些是居民经常打交道的人，比如小区保安、超市老板娘和外卖小哥。另一些人也和你一样都是普通居民，只是在疫情期间有了新的身份，比如负责协助防疫工作的小区志愿者，还有小区内部的秩序组织者——团长。你的生活离不开他们，你们都希望疫情能够早日结束。但有消息说，人群之中混杂着一些危险份子，比如零号病人，还有谣言散布者和恶意传播者，这些人的存在将会让普通人不断受害。我们好人阵营的目标就是将这些坏蛋揪出来，撕下伪装，送往方舱医院……
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ description: ""
这款桌游的设计灵感来自《血染钟楼》，一款最近非常流行的社交类桌游。《血染钟楼》的基础逻辑类似狼人杀，但玩法更丰富，角色更多元。基于《血染钟楼》的架构，人们创作出不同的故事版本，《清零》就是其中一套以新冠疫情为背景的原创剧本。用桌游设计者的话说，《清零》是“用于纪念我们曾经经历过的、体验过的特殊时期”。
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▲ 上海解封后，游戏推出卡牌实体版。游戏截图
这确实是特殊时期。由于一系列严格的封控政策，人们的日常生活发生许多变化，产生了新的职位、新的职业、新的名词，甚至新的价值判断标准，过去的一些身份也被赋予新的意义。
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ description: ""
游戏的设计者借游戏提出的问题是：当疫情来临之时，我们都能做些什么？这同样也是我想知道的。但我更好奇的问题是，当宏大的抗疫叙事浓缩在一个小区，浓缩在几个普通人身上，人与人之间的关系会变成什么样？
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▲ 2022年5月5日，上海，2019冠状病毒病流行期间，一个住宅区的入口被封锁。摄：Aly Song
#### 混乱
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ description: ""
我能接受自己是个精神病，但如果我都不是我，那么场上谁是谁呢？谁又能清楚知道自己的身份和技能？谁又能真正做到什么？这会不会是一个彻头彻尾的骗局？
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▲ 2020年3月26日，一位匿名的中国艺术家在捷克布拉格展示纪念李文亮医生的作品。摄：Libor Sojka
#### 徒劳
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ description: ""
从某个时刻开始，这就成为了一个谁也救不了谁、谁也帮不了谁的局面。看起来零号病人只有一个，恶意传播者已没有别的技能，只要找到零号病人就能获得胜利，但为了做到这件事，我们不停地讨论、询问、怀疑，号召别人把怀疑对象赶到方舱。但事实证明，我们这么多人从头到尾就没有做出过一个正确的决定，而这些决定的代价是什么？在桌游中就只是输掉罢了。在现实生活中，我们得到的信息更少，能做的事情更少，但可能为此付出了难以承受的代价。
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▲ 2022年5月24日，上海，疫情期间，一名妇女在封城期间的一条主要街道上骑自行车。摄：Aly Song
#### 过于苦涩的共鸣
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ description: ""
当人们在网络上讨论疫情时，我经常看到诸如“一颗老鼠屎坏了一锅粥”的说法——人们确信是确诊病例而非对待病例的政策毁掉了他们本来正常的生活。对阳性感染者的污名化在今年上海封控期间达到了高潮，人们为感染者和一些针对感染者的行为创造了具有侮辱性的简称。比如说，阳性感染者一开始被称作“小阳人”，后来又简化为“羊”和“🐑”，且每个环节都有对应的新话：排查小区里的感染者叫“捉羊”，感染者被转运方舱叫“牵羊”，新检测出来的感染者叫“新羊”，以性别和年龄来区分，这些“羊”又可以分为“公羊”“母羊”“老羊”“小羊”……多么荒诞又多么正常，一场防治病毒的运动，最后变成了一群人对另一群人的猎巫。
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▲ 2022年3月27日，上海疫情期间，人们在医院外的核酸检测站附近排队等待检测。摄：Aly Song
我记得，在疫情刚刚开始全球流行的时候，《瘟疫公司》因为和现实形成强烈映射，一跃成为非常受欢迎的游戏。这款十年前问世的作品突然登上了全球各大游戏排行榜的首位。当时有位朋友跟我说，《瘟疫公司》无论输赢都让人感到乐观，因为它的本质是“人类VS病毒”，所以无论如何都能获得一些乐趣——“赢了，说明玩家水平高，顺便感慨一番生命的脆弱和短暂；输了，说明人类已经有了一套成熟的疾病应对体系，即使面对真正的瘟疫也有获救的信心。”
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ description: ""
《清零》确实用自己的方式为我们留下了一个“特殊时期”的缩影。出于种种非常现实的理由，我并不要求它来承担太过分的表达责任。能做到这样就已经非常不错了。在一个充满了正能量教育的社会，我感谢这款游戏为我们留下了不那么和谐的噪音——用一种轻巧的、游戏的、不那么严肃的方式。
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▲ 2022年3月31日，上海进行第二阶段封锁，一名饿了么快递员将一个袋子递给封锁区屏障后的居民。摄：Aly Song
如果有朝一日我们建造一座疫情博物馆，那么这套桌游就可以被摆放出来，作为一份游戏化的忠实记录，是无数抗疫叙事中较为真诚的一种。我清楚地知道，我从中感受到的苦涩并非来自它本身，而是它所指涉的那个巨大的幽灵——有朝一日，我们可能会战胜疫情，但我们什么时候才能战胜这个社会的真正瘟疫？
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-07-01-those-gone-in-the-past-25-years-in-hong-kong.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-07-01-those-gone-in-the-past-25-years-in-hong-kong.md
index 0fe4b4e8..00124f9e 100644
--- a/_collections/_columns/2022-07-01-those-gone-in-the-past-25-years-in-hong-kong.md
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-07-01-those-gone-in-the-past-25-years-in-hong-kong.md
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ layout: post
title : "25年后，香港所失去的"
author: "林振东"
date : 2022-07-01 12:00:00 +0800
-image : https://i.imgur.com/63iinTZ.jpg
+image : https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/c1/c1-20220701-03.jpg
image_caption: "2022年6月25日，香港坪石邨金石楼悬挂大量国旗及区旗"
description: "「这城变得太快，今天忘记了昨天。在一片旗海和花簇中，香港到底失去了什么？」"
---
@@ -20,97 +20,97 @@ description: "「这城变得太快，今天忘记了昨天。在一片旗海和
今天，一国两制转眼开始第26年。这城变得太快，今天忘记了昨天，明日也将冲刷今日。在一片旗海和花簇中，香港到底失去了什么？
-
+
▲ 2022年6月30日，国家主席习近平乘高铁抵港，凖备出席新一届港府就职宣誓仪式及视察香港，大围一家酒楼电视播放有关新闻片段。
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▲ 2022年6月22日，香港金紫荆广场前有年轻人在拍短片。
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+
▲ 2022年6月29日，湾仔一条围封铁丝网的天桥，网外有巨型庆回归灯饰。
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▲ 2022年6月26日，尖东一间酒楼晚宴，窗外有一幅国旗在风中飘扬。
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▲ 2022年6月14日，有逾70年历史的珍宝海鲜舫，由多艘护航船拖走离开香港仔。
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▲ 2022年6月22日，九龙一个建筑工地，旁边桥墩有九龙皇帝的笔迹。
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▲ 2022年6月28日，黄大仙广场有庆回归装饰，也悬挂国旗及区旗，有市民在场内练习升旗仪式。
-
+![image08]https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/c1/c1-20220701-0308.jpg)
▲ 2022年6月21日，元朗竖立巨型花牌庆回归。
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▲ 2022年4月20日，尖沙咀一间按摩中心，消毒人员为疫后开店准备。
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▲ 2022年6月15日，中环皇后像广场昃臣爵士铜像，背后则是香港终审法院。
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▲ 2022年6月23日，深水埗一间棺材房住户正在查看连花清瘟胶囊。
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▲ 2022年6月24日，“鉴往知来─庆祝香港回归25周年大型主题展”在香港会展中心开幕。
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▲ 2022年6月19日，上水的东江水管。
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▲ 2022年3月30日，香港国际机场的出境大堂。
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▲ 2022年6月19日，候任特首李家超公布新一届特区政府主要官员名单，并全体会见传媒。
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▲ 2022年6月28日，荃湾有大量国旗及区旗悬挂庆回归。
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▲ 2022年6月18日，香港街头的一幅墙上，涂鸦了《苹果日报》标志。
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▲ 2022年6月22日，尖沙咀展出12米长的机动君王暴龙 。
-
+
▲ 2022年6月28日，香港维多利亚公园有巨型国旗与特区区旗的装饰。
-
+
▲ 2022年6月28日，深水埗一间专售卖皇家香港警察纪念品的店，店前有市民遛狗横过马路。
-
+
▲ 2022年6月3日晚上，大批身穿防刺背心及护颈的警员在维园足球场，以橙带及铁马围封。
-
+
▲ 2021年12月14日，罗湖监狱外有骑马人士经过。
-
+
▲ 2022年5月19日，香港天际100观景台上，游客正俯瞰维港夜景。
-
+
▲ 2022年6月28日，荃湾市民在打篮球。
-
+
▲ 2022年6月29日，金钟添马公园有市民举行快闪活动，庆祝回归25周年。
-
+
▲ 2022年6月29日，湾仔会展一带采取严格的保安措施，不少地方围上了水马。
-
+
▲ 2022年7月1日，市民于IFC苹果店透过玻璃窗观看国家主席习近平的车队。
-
+
▲ 2022年7月1日，香港维多利亚公园庆回归活动于三号风球下暂停。
-
+
▲ 2022年6月29日，北角皇都戏院正进行复修保育，市民经过其中的建筑围板。
-
+
▲ 2022年6月21日，一双情侣在落马州边境遥看深圳。
-
+
▲ 2022年6月29日，金钟添马公园有市民举行快闪唱国歌行动，期间展示巨幅国旗及特区区旗。
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-07-02-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-june-2022.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-07-02-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-june-2022.md
index 9c578c73..fc160d9b 100644
--- a/_collections/_columns/2022-07-02-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-june-2022.md
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-07-02-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-june-2022.md
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ layout: post
title : "俄乌战争・六月战局"
author: "当代张敬轩"
date : 2022-07-02 12:00:00 +0800
-image : https://i.imgur.com/36ItXQS.jpg
+image : https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/c1/c1-20220702-01.jpg
image_caption: "（2022年6月1日—30日）"
description: "俄罗斯对乌克兰的侵略战争，目的是把作为德、法等帝国主义国家附属国的乌克兰的全部或局部重新纳入俄罗斯帝国主义的控制下，乃至于进一步变成殖民地。"
---
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ description: "俄罗斯对乌克兰的侵略战争，目的是把作为德、法
在战略消耗中，北约的筹码多于俄罗斯，俄罗斯又多于乌克兰。因此，战局的走向，仍然取决于双方谁的短板更短一筹。
-[](https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/536579201)
+[](https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/536579201)
▲ 原载《知乎》链接。
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-07-04-ni-kuang-anti-ccp-consistently.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-07-04-ni-kuang-anti-ccp-consistently.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..63b6c938
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-07-04-ni-kuang-anti-ccp-consistently.md
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "倪匡反共 一以貫之"
+author: "蘇查哈爾燦"
+date : 2022-07-04 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/c1/c1-20220704-01.jpg
+image_caption: "「妓女比共產黨更可信」我不會說這種話 我很尊重妓女"
+description: ""
+---
+
+出身知識份子，做過公安、參與過「土改」鬥地主，從大陸逃難來香港的倪匡，在香港一隅避風港成為一代文俠。
+
+
+
+倪匡的價值，遠不止他在當代文壇殺出一條新路，成就「衛斯理」等經典人物，在他的小說裡，充滿對現實世界的警示、諷刺甚至是預言。他不中斷點出強權之下做奴隸的醜陋，他預言東方有一個城市會因它的優點悉數喪盡而毀滅，他斷言，共產黨管治的地方怎麼會有希望。
+
+倪匡對中共的徹底不信任，是他相較同年代文化人極為鮮明的特徵。從反對九七主權移交、不相信中共會遵守《中英聯合聲明》、《基本法》，不認同「民主回歸論」，一以貫之。事實也證明中共的虛偽是由始至終的，任何對其改良、改革抱有幻想的，都註定以失望告終。
+
+民主派在香港，從八九十年代到新世紀，更多是「愛國民主派」在香港，他們相信大陸會改變，相信中共會朝向世界文明方向走向民主和開放，相信這股力量會反過來讓新的「宗主國」賜予香港民主。因為高喊「結束一黨專政」彼此相安無事，因為香港對其仍有價值。加上當時的中共最高掌權人鄧小平說出「共產黨是罵不倒的」，更給予香港人幻覺：在愛國的背景下，不愛黨是可行的。然而共產黨的面皮沒有完全撕開，在中共的眼中，愛國必須愛黨，它只會在特殊的時間視乎利益做一些妥協。因為中共本質是一個邪惡的政權，它狹隘記仇，它摧毀人性，它統治的地方創造力盡失，它容不下任何自由。
+
+倪匡的叛逆，是走在這些主流民主派的對面，「共產黨什麼時候靠得住過？」
+
+「妓女比共產黨更可信」，倪匡叔笑說，我不會說這種話，我很尊重妓女。反共的人，很少有他的透徹清醒和從一而終。
+
+倪匡總是一副笑著的模樣，他或許未及其他幾位才子瀟灑，但是他的內斂裡，透露著一份對正義的執著，他永遠警惕權力、支持年輕人，他不攀附權、說好聽的話，他就像一個俠客，游走在自由的香港。香港造就了他，他和那個香港一起駕鶴西去。
+
+他在另一個世界哈哈大笑著，帶著那些美好的童心和自由，很可惜，好像也不那麼可惜。
+
+
+▲ 倪匡（1935年5月30日－2022年7月3日），本名倪聰，字亦明，先後使用過的筆名包括衛斯理、沙翁、岳川、魏力、衣其、洪新、危龍等，香港知名作家、編劇、評論家，被喻為「香港四大才子」之一，一生極爲高產，創作了300多部小説及400多部電影劇本，以寫作風格天馬行空、想象奇巧著稱，代表作包括小説《衛斯理系列》 、《原振俠系列》、《女黑俠木蘭花系列》、《六指琴魔》等。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-07-11-secularization-and-the-new-religious-movements.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-07-11-secularization-and-the-new-religious-movements.md
index 3f4a370f..69209f33 100644
--- a/_collections/_columns/2022-07-11-secularization-and-the-new-religious-movements.md
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-07-11-secularization-and-the-new-religious-movements.md
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ layout: post
title : "世俗化与新兴宗教"
author: "胡清心"
date : 2022-07-11 12:00:00 +0800
-image : https://i.imgur.com/YrX0pKw.jpg
+image : https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/c1/c1-20220711-01.jpg
#image_caption: ""
description: ""
---
@@ -18,13 +18,13 @@ description: ""
短时间内发生数起与另类宗教团体有关新闻事件，不禁让人对它们的来路不断揣测，“邪教”、“敛财”、“洗脑”等画面立刻在脑中浮现。
-
+
▲ 2015年3月3日，韩国加平郡，数千对夫妇参加统一教会集体婚礼。
-
+
▲ 2022年7月4日，香港特首李家超接受央视访问时称经常“练气功”。
-
+
▲ 2019年10月26日，中国西安市，林二汶参加某财神庙前合影。
对于李家超、林二汶等的批评，有很多除却个人因素之外的、与公众利益密切相关的公共基础。但一提起这些另类宗教团体，就会联想产生这些负面印象，也存在一些不精确的部分。原因恐怕离不开二十世纪下半叶，数起骇人听闻的大规模群体杀人或自杀事件背后，都有它们的身影。比如分别在七十和九十年代发生集体自杀事件的人民圣殿教（The Peoples Temple of the Disciples of Christ）和天堂之门（Heaven’s Gate），以及策划实施1995年东京地铁沙林毒气事件的奥姆真理教。然而事实上，这只是新兴宗教团体中极少数的个案，大多情况下，并不至于“邪”到反人类反社会的地步。
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-07-12-egg-freezing-and-her-body.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-07-12-egg-freezing-and-her-body.md
index c419895e..6ea822df 100644
--- a/_collections/_columns/2022-07-12-egg-freezing-and-her-body.md
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-07-12-egg-freezing-and-her-body.md
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ layout: post
title : "冻卵和她的身体"
author: "阿菠"
date : 2022-07-12 12:00:00 +0800
-image : https://i.imgur.com/Kn9o19F.jpg
+image : https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/c1/c1-20220712-01.jpg
#image_caption: "「这里的女权在成功触及父权之前，就被规训成熟的母权温柔地按下去了。」"
description: "一切似乎从那个关于冻卵的决定开始，抑或早就上演了许多年⋯⋯"
---
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ description: "一切似乎从那个关于冻卵的决定开始，抑或早就上
### 联盟
-
+)
今年是迦牟的本命年，鱼仔也已三十三。若近期无生育打算，未来又想要小孩，在鱼仔三十五岁卵子质量下降前，冻卵是一个保险方案。
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ description: "一切似乎从那个关于冻卵的决定开始，抑或早就上
### 白马
-
+
迦牟当丁克的愿望越来越强，他的步步坚守让冷冻胚胎一事也很难推进。在意基因的其实是迦牟。他的郁结不在身体，而是在心。
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ description: "一切似乎从那个关于冻卵的决定开始，抑或早就上
### 梦想
-
+
鱼仔现在的压力叠着三个家。长辈不知道，强灵魂追求的低欲望生活是她和迦牟共处的基底。吸引两人的，恰是要剪断精神脐带的共同希望。
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ description: "一切似乎从那个关于冻卵的决定开始，抑或早就上
### 基因
-
+
“我很想和你聊一聊，你有时间吗？”
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ description: "一切似乎从那个关于冻卵的决定开始，抑或早就上
### 容器
-
+
以琛看到鱼仔狼狈地被哈德逊河刮来的寒风推进商厦。他张开双臂，朝鱼仔小跑，在周日早上无人的商场里给了她一个大大的拥抱。
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-07-12-unlocked-catering-after-shanghai-lockdown.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-07-12-unlocked-catering-after-shanghai-lockdown.md
index cb1ae465..0ea66998 100644
--- a/_collections/_columns/2022-07-12-unlocked-catering-after-shanghai-lockdown.md
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-07-12-unlocked-catering-after-shanghai-lockdown.md
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ layout: post
title : "上海解封餐饮业"
author: "王丹阳"
date : 2022-07-12 12:00:00 +0800
-image : https://i.imgur.com/nm8mvpx.jpg
+image : https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/c1/c1-20220712-02.jpg
image_caption: "2022年6月初，上海解封后仍禁止堂食，有餐厅老板关门熄灯招待熟客「静默」用餐。"
description: ""
---
@@ -46,12 +46,12 @@ description: ""
6月1日，上海宣布“全面恢复正常生产生活秩序”，2500万常住人口走出住宅。外卖和扫码点单率先启动，街上人头攒集，店家清一色在门口竖起二维码招牌，食客足不入店，一时间造成了人人坐在马路牙子上吃流水席般的盛景。
-
+
▲ 六月初，上海，食客露天进餐。
复工不堂食，微信成了魔幻场面的中枢，胆大商家偷开包房，引食客入堂，“暗黑料理”，“堂食谍战”，“游击战”的照片疯传，绝大多数只是“焦头烂额的小餐厅”和“食客无处安放的屁股”。
-
+
▲ 六月初，上海，食客围坐熄灯，手机打光，仿如秘密聚会。
沪上餐饮人吴天旗在6月第三周和餐饮老板们来到徐汇滨江夜跑，黄梅天的燠热化作夜雾和汗水，每年此时会在体感上提醒他们。但今年不同的是，滨江从早到晚汇聚着“获赦”的市民，他们把塑料餐盒带到这片空旷地带，拾阶而坐，如同节庆般地重新打量黄浦江上来往的驳船。
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-07-12-unmanageable-livelihood.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-07-12-unmanageable-livelihood.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b01be969
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-07-12-unmanageable-livelihood.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "失控的生活"
+author: "维舟"
+date : 2022-07-12 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/c1/c1-20220712-03.jpg
+image_caption: "网传《核酸检测上河图》反应两极化"
+description: ""
+---
+
+睡到半夜，隐隐约约地听到楼下人声嘈杂，惊醒过来一看，还只2点多。静下来终于听清楚，竟然是要做核酸。幸好没有人来敲门。后来楼组长说，还真有几个门栋的住户被叫下楼做了，但她推脱掉了，“大家明天都还要上班”。
+
+
+
+那天是7月4日。在那之前，即便是封城那两个月里，我也没遇到过半夜叫起来做核酸的，只是听西安朋友说过，在1月的寒冬，半夜1点半被叫起来做核酸，也有4点多全员核酸的，那时还觉得不可思议，没想到有一天差点就发生在自己头上了。和朋友说起，她冷嘲：“真棒啊，居民晚上多睡四五个小时，全上海就会多感染10万人呢。”
+
+之所以那么紧张，是因为又有理发店检出阳性，而其中一位理发师就住离我家不远的上钢二村。核酸检测常常深夜才出结果，想来是在恐慌之下，街道立即安排半夜就筛查，也许他们还觉得应对迅速及时。新村入口第一时间就被钢板隔离起来，只留下一个口子递送外卖进去。
+
+那两天，新的一波疫情在上海眼看着卷土重来。7月5日，我上班的办公楼还宣布因“疫情形势持续向好，大厦已恢复短驳车运行”，但第二天一早正要出门，公司行政发来紧急通告：凌晨2点接防控部门要求，大厦所属街道即日起开展“3天2检”全员核酸筛查（即3天内完成两次核酸检测，至少间隔24小时），必须持有当日核酸采样记录方可进入大厦。
+
+本来那会我已经出门了，心想昨晚刚做过核酸，24小时内阴性应该没事，但转念一想，还是不要心存侥幸，万一大厦真的只认当日核酸采样记录，那在楼下做核酸肯定要排很长的队。于是重又折返回小区门口捅了下喉咙，那儿几乎没人排队。
+
+事实证明，幸好我多此一举，那天一早很多同事都被挡在大厦外，不仅大排长队，而且做完后得半小时才有记录，至少要在街头徘徊1小时。
+
+到了下午，传闻陆家嘴有办公楼紧急疏散，不知该算是久经世事还是人心惶惶，人们流传着一个笑谈：“今天下班前再好好看一眼同事吧，说不定下次再见面都要穿棉袄了。”
+
+原本我还想着恢复“读城”的访谈计划，先去杭州、嘉兴一趟，但这计划不得不再次推迟。虽然理论上我还是来自低风险地区，但却可能是当地“不想接纳的低风险”。
+
+和朋友谈起时，我叹气说，还是消停点吧，万一被关在杭州可没意思，想想看，任我行被关在闷热的西湖底黑牢里多少年？她答：“有白娘子关得久？”
+
+虽然上海6月29日就已开放堂食、行程卡取消星号，同一天，上海市文旅局还发布通告，决定自7月1日起逐步开放全市博物馆、美术馆和室内外所有A级旅游景区，7月8日起逐步开放电影院和演出场所，然而没几天，形势就又全然变了。
+
+时隔三个多月，附近的体育馆重开，但7月3日我带着孩子去上羽毛球课，却死活进不去：门卫说，体育局的通知是要求72小时内核酸阴性，我当日的采样结果还没出来，“谁知道你结果是不是阳性？”但他对孩子倒是不看，只测了下温就放他进去了。
+
+过了两天再去，这回我是72小时内绿码，但这次，孩子的核酸码他也要看。也是我掉以轻心，再次被打个措手不及，孩子刚好过了72小时，只能向教练道歉，教练也无可如何，回了个笑哭的表情。
+
+乍看起来，门卫的规则和办公楼的规则相反，一个不认当日采样证明，一个只认当日采样证明，但他们又都遵循同样的规则：照我说的做，别的都不管。愤怒、讲理都没用，只要碰到，你就只能打回重来。
+
+这是无法预见、甚至没有预警的风险，180度的急转弯变成了生活常态。7月5日，上海沈坚强游泳俱乐部刚发了“开馆通知”，仅1个多小时后，又紧急发了个“闭馆通知”。
+
+也难怪人们现在普遍觉得，想做什么事就去做，因为甚至用不着等到明天，你可能就做不成了。Suda那天去西岸美术馆看了曾孝濂的插画展，事后她庆幸说，还好去了，现在又看不了了——不止是西岸美术馆，余德耀美术馆今天起也临时闭馆，“恢复时间另行通知”，本来该馆的奈良美智个展从3月5日起展出半年，到现在为止的一大半时间都没人能去看一眼。
+
+长远计划已失去了意义，人们只能随机应变，就好像是一群小鸡，躲避着巨兽的脚掌随机的踩踏。往好处说，这让人更珍惜当下的每一刻和自己已有的事物，只能认真过好每一天；但往坏处说，这摧毁了延迟满足和勤勉努力的精神，让人倒向及时行乐和短线思维，能捞就捞一点，“我死后，管它洪水滔天”。
+
+就在两三年前，我们可能都不曾想到会是这样。现代化曾许诺给个人以解放和自主，这曾使人相信勤勉、积累、发展能最终得到回报，但如今社会正在加速，而且那种加速的压力强大到席卷一切，原有的信念却变得愈发虚幻。
+
+Kenneth Gergen曾生动刻画了这种新社会形态下的全新心态：
+
+`慢慢的，我学会心平气和地放弃想控制我周遭一切事物的欲望。深思熟虑地在海洋中驶向某地——乘风破浪驶向目的地——跟随波逐流、悠游不问漂向何处，是截然不同的。`
+
+我们的生活其实已经失控了——“失控”的意思是说，对当代人来说，要作为一个独立的个体，自主掌控自己的生活，即便不是不可能，也已变得越来越困难。勉力掌控辛苦不堪，完全放弃则被动麻木，而鲜有人地平静地顺其自然——在有些人看来，那甚至可能是少数人才能享有的特权。
+
+所有人都已疲惫不堪，如果你问问周围人近况如何，最经常得到的答复可能是“过一天是一天”。这给我一种感觉：人们虽然生活在当下，但他们只想把这日子早点过完，却又不知道这日子什么时候是个头，更不清楚所谓“未来”会是个什么样子。
+
+于是，一种潜在滋长的心态是，许多人默默地敷衍了事，听说北京现在花坛都种草不种花了，那样更方便。我的朋友“室内滂沱”一直在北京生活，他说，感觉现在全社会都处在“睡不醒”的状态：
+
+`昨晚九点去一商场，先去一连锁饭馆吃饭，定九点半打烊，九点钟进去就说不做饭了；去肯德基吃个汉堡，头顶空调通风口向下滴水，没店员说一句别往那儿坐；进出电梯、地铁，已经根本没有先下后上那说；谁不小心踩了谁的脚，再没人会说句保意思。`
+
+这种社会交往上不约而同的简化，表明讲究礼数的老北京已经渐渐没了力气去维护这些额外的仪式。虽然这究竟意味现代抑或倒退还不好说，但有一点似乎可以肯定：这与其说是“无礼”，不如说是人们在别的地方消耗了太多精力。
+
+现在，我们可能不得不承认，要完全自主掌控自己的生活已不可能。认清这一点很有必要，至少可以让我们因此卸下因无法做到而产生的焦虑和羞耻，重要的是想清楚我们究竟还能做什么、又想做什么，因为那关系到我们愿意成为一个什么样的人。这是我们无法被剥夺的自主选择。
+
+
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+---
+layout: post
+title : "斯里兰卡“人民抗争”"
+author: "罗瑞垚"
+date : 2022-07-13 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/c1/c1-20220713-01.jpg
+image_caption: "2022年7月9日，斯里兰卡反政府示威者占据总统府。"
+description: "“我们的车已经两个月没有开动了。我们以前没有这么好的路，但我们的生活更好。”"
+---
+
+7月9日，经过三个月的“人民抗争”（Aragalaya），斯里兰卡抗议者终于等到了好消息：总统戈塔巴雅·拉贾帕克萨和新任总理拉尼尔·维克勒马辛哈均承诺将辞职。91天前，抗议者在“抗议村”（GotaGoGama）搭建了第一顶帐篷。
+
+
+
+让斯里兰卡政府宣布破产的外汇危机，早在去年下半年就初现端倪。2021年10月，穆迪投资者服务公司因“外汇储备不足、外债维持高水平将导致违约风险上升”，将斯里兰卡的主权信用评级接连下调。当时，斯里兰卡的外汇储备仅能够支撑约1.3个月的进口，并且远低于政府每年需偿还的债务额度。
+
+这场外汇危机，看似是由于斯里兰卡的外汇收入行业——出口、旅游及劳务汇款都受到了Covid疫情的严重冲击，但实则进一步暴露了它本身经济增长模式的隐忧：自2014年起，斯里兰卡的GDP增长率就在逐步走低，到2020年降为负增长，与此同时，政府的债务已经与国内生产总值持平。
+
+外汇危机在今年初开始加速恶化，燃气和燃油短缺加剧，每天停电长达十几个小时，生活必需品价格飞涨，外汇储备探底。
+
+伴随着经济危机的恶化，民众的示威意欲持续高涨。新一场抗议示威从7月初开始策划，由反政府的活动人士发起，多个反对党、协会和社会团体均加入支持。尽管政府在7月8日晚上九点宣布在科伦坡的多个区域实施宵禁，并且多地开往首都的火车都出现停运，也未能阻止翌日有上万人出现在了抗议现场。
+
+7月9日早上9点，抗议民众开始往科伦坡西北方向“抗议村”游行聚集。在科伦坡的滨海大道高尔路（Galle Road），少部分人骑着自行车或摩托车，大多数人都步行前往抗议地点，手中挥舞着斯里兰卡的国旗。“总统下台”（GotaGoHome）是大家心照不宣的接头口号。偶尔有一辆卡车或大巴车驶过，满满当当地载着从更远处参与游行的人群。
+
+抗议在10点半左右升级，越来越多的人聚集在约克路通往总统府邸的路口，他们计划在那里冲破路障，进入总统府邸。路障后的军警连续发射了多枚催泪弹。除了个别抗议者准备了护目镜和防毒面具之外，大多数抗议者都只用布蒙着脸，在吸入烟雾后需要用水清洗。据媒体报道，抗议民众还遭遇了高压水枪攻击，且有三名民众中弹受伤。
+
+但最终，在下午两点左右，民众突破了路障，冲进了总统已经离开的总统府邸。民众此后还进入了总统办公室和总理拉尼尔·维克勒马辛哈的私人住宅，且总理住宅被人放火点燃。几小时后，总统戈塔巴雅·拉贾帕克萨和总理拉尼尔·维克勒马辛哈相继宣布将辞职，虽然总理维克勒马辛哈并未宣布具体时间，而总统拉贾帕克萨则承诺于13日辞职。
+
+据斯里兰卡媒体Newsfirst报道，这场冲突中有3人因涉嫌纵火而被捕，有包括11名记者在内的103人在抗议示威中受伤，其中55人在医院接受治疗，还有1人位于重症监护室。
+
+人们要求总统下台的愿望似乎要达成了，但破产的斯里兰卡，眼下与未来都困难重重。
+
+
+▲ 2022年7月9日，斯里兰卡首都科伦坡，反政府示威者占据总统府，有示威者挥动斯里兰卡国旗。
+
+#### 91天的生活起义
+
+因为燃油短缺，在过去的三四个月里，杜山每天骑自行车上班。29岁的杜山曾是一名专业的乒乓球运动员，曾在斯里兰卡国内和国际比赛上获过奖，现在在科伦坡的某地区秘书处（行政登记机构）工作。被问到作为公务员可以参加抗议吗？“当然不行，”他笑着说，“但我必须要来，我的同事们也会来。”
+
+“他们窃取了我们的钱财！”杜山没有点明“他们”是谁，只说他会一直支持和参与抗议示威。
+
+7月9日这一天，他和朋友们一早就步行出发，前往离他家十几公里的“抗议村”所在的高尔菲斯，在半路上遇到了去往抗议现场的车队，免费载了他们一程。
+
+高尔菲斯（Galle Face）是科伦坡寸土寸金的黄金地段。这里毗邻印度洋，老国会大厦、总统办公室和总统府都在咫尺之遥，汇集了科伦坡最高端的商场和近十家豪华酒店。中国“一带一路”项目科伦坡海港城也坐落于此。
+
+2020年初，总统戈塔巴雅·拉贾帕克萨在他的办公大楼旁边预留了一块空地，作为“示威专用点”，以显示自己是一位乐于倾听异见的领导人。但讽刺的是，斯里兰卡的人权监测机构INFORM在2020年5月发布的一份报告显示，从该年2月的新冠宵禁起，政府对异见人士的压迫就逐渐加剧。
+
+2022年，在这块空地上，“抗议村”逐渐落成、壮大。
+
+民众的反政府抗议早从3月初就开始发酵了，最初主要由斯里兰卡的主要反对党团结人民力量（SJB）发起，零星爆发在总统住宅等地点。进入4月后，在总统戈塔巴雅·拉贾帕克萨试图通过宣布紧急状态来遏制抗议，且有社会活动家被捕后，越来越多的民众和社会名流自发加入了抗议示威。
+
+4月9日有一场大规模的“占领高尔菲斯”示威，更多的民众、歌手、板球运动员都自发加入到其中。示威结束后，一些民众选择留了下来，在高尔菲斯搭起了帐篷，顶着雷暴与烈日生活，宣称“除非你们下台，我们永不回家”。这是抗议村的雏形。4月14日，民众在“抗议村”甚至一起度过了僧伽罗新年，点燃鞭炮，高呼“人民抗争胜利”等词口号来迎接新年。
+
+5月9日，“抗议村”成立一个月当天，时任总理马欣达·拉贾帕克萨的支持者进入“抗议村”，与现场的民众发生冲突，超过130人受伤住院，且一些帐篷也被捣毁，这次冲突在全国各地引发了多起暴力事件，在巨大的谴责声浪中，马欣达·拉贾帕克萨终于辞职。此后，政府还曾再次宣布紧急状态，并在现场临时部署军队。
+
+但“抗议村”并没有消失，甚至成为了一个多元的“正义之地”：LGBTQ群体竖起帐篷呼吁平等，有标语为内战中失踪的泰米尔人呼吁正义，在总统秘书处外高高的黑色铁栅栏上，悬挂着一排巨大的黑色海报，上面是失踪或被谋杀的斯里兰卡记者。最热闹的时候，“抗议村”有五六十顶大大小小的帐篷，入口设立在斯里兰卡的传奇政治人物所罗门·班达拉奈克雕像处，对面竖立着几幅大型的标语和绘画，上书“赋权人民”，“我们是自己的领袖”。除了住人之外，还扩张出了医疗救助、法律援助、图书馆、食堂、学校、移动厕所、理发店等不同的部分，建立了自己的网站和在线直播频道，物资均由民众捐献，由现场的志愿者协调管理。
+
+
+▲ 2022年5月18日，科伦坡，反政府示威者在中国基建项目科伦坡港国际集装箱码头（CICT）外设帐幕。
+
+7月9日这天，游行队伍在“抗议村”入口到总统府邸间约一公里的道路上来回游行，或喊着“总统下台”、“总理下台”的口号，或齐声唱着抗议的歌曲。人们身着黑色的服装，手持大大小小的着黑色的旗帜。作为一个佛教徒占大多数的国家，斯里兰卡人民日常偏爱白色服饰，白色衬衫也是政客们最常见的穿着。于是，黑色成为了抗议的标志色。
+
+虽然号召抗议的活动家和驻扎在“抗议村”的民众以年轻的大学生和白领为主，但当天到达现场的民众则明显来自更为多元的阶层和社区。旷日持久的经济危机波及了所有人，包括这个国家的中上社会阶层、46岁的国际学校生物老师阿万蒂（Avanthi）和女儿塔琳（Taryn）。
+
+从三月起，母女俩就经常参加抗议示威。当天她们都穿着一身运动装、戴着遮阳帽，步行6公里来到了“抗议村”。“我们还能买得到食物，但我们没有电、没有燃气、没有燃油，我一辈子都在辛勤工作，我不认为我们应该遭受这种境遇。”阿万蒂说，虽然自己并没有像其他人一样遭受到更为严重的影响，但她感同身受，“有些小孩现在每天只能勉强吃到一餐或两餐饭。”
+
+在过去近三年里，阿万蒂基本上都在线上教学，好不容易疫情逐渐散去，学校又因为能源短缺而关门。“孩子们失去了他们的童年，这时候他们应该在学校里和朋友们社交，但我们的政府和政客放弃了他们所有人，这是不可逆转的。”她说。
+
+15岁的塔琳正在读高中，学校再次停课后，这场危机就成了她和同学、朋友们之间最重要的话题。“在当前的政治局势下，我们看不到任何希望。我们想要改变，想要我们最基本的权利。”她说。
+
+在阿万蒂看来，参与抗议示威是一种对民主的问责。“政府没有遵守他们的承诺，让我们能够购买燃油、电和食物，这是他们对权力的滥用。如果是公司的管理人员失职，那他就应该辞职，这就是我们所要求的问责机制。”
+
+阿万蒂希望，民众的抗议能推动选举出一个新政府，“我们希望有新的、不腐败的、正派的政治家出现，他们能有公平的竞争环境，而不是被目前正在统治国家的家族黑手党（所把持）。”
+
+
+▲ 2022年4月4日，科伦坡，市民到市中心独立广场示威。
+
+#### 破产原因，是国内腐败还是中国？
+
+在“抗议村”，一顶挂着红十字医疗标志的帐篷外，挂着一面小旗子，上书“中国边境药房”。31岁的拉迪卡（Radhika）从事社工工作，从四月起就在这里做志愿者。她告知，这里的药品都是民众捐赠的，平时由志愿者在这里轮流值班。“我们背后就是中国的土地（海港城），所以这里叫做‘中国边境’。”
+
+被问到他们对中国投资的看法，拉迪卡和帐篷里的志愿者对政府表达了强烈的不满，她说，“这是我们的土地，我们不需要中国人！”随后又补充说，“我们欢迎投资，但政府不应该把土地永久地‘出卖’给中国，或其他任何国家。”
+
+科伦坡海港城是一个占地269公顷的围海造地工程，于2014年9月中国国家主席习近平访斯的第二天签订协议。海港城计划在建成后作为科伦坡中央商务区的延伸，包括金融、居住、码头和国际保税区等多个功能。今年1月，海港城的滨海观景长廊向公众开放，但主体工程仍在建设中，承建方为中国交通建设股份有限公司全资子公司中国港湾工程有限责任公司。建成后，43%的面积将以99年的租约由中国港湾工程公司享有使用权。
+
+与斯里兰卡南部的汉班托塔港港一样，科伦坡港口城项目从启动就伴随着巨大争议。主流英文媒体将其称之为“中国飞地”，认为中国政府通过在贫穷的国家投资昂贵的基础建设项目，是希望通过这种手段来取得政治外交上的战略优势，以获得这些设施的使用权，但这最终会有损斯里兰卡的国家主权。欧美国家的多家智库和咨询机构，都认为中国在斯里兰卡的投资是典型的“债务陷阱”，主流英文媒体也大多将此次外汇危机归因为中国“债务陷阱”的恶果。
+
+这种说法也在印度等亚太区域的大国广受认同，最近，一家位于新德里的智库Red Lantern Analytica就发布报告称，自2010年以来，斯里兰卡的GDP与债务比率一直在持续上升，然而，中国利用这种情况增加了斯里兰卡的债务负担，印度则向之伸出了援助之手。
+
+
+▲ 2022年5月18日，科伦坡，中国“一带一路”基建项目工地。
+
+但斯里兰卡现场的抗议群众，却不是为反对中国投资而来，他们的目标是总统和他的政治亲信们。“我们想让全世界知道，拉贾帕克萨家族抢劫了我们！”一名年轻的男性抗议者喊道。
+
+和很多参加抗议的民众一样，阿万蒂也认为危机的关键是政府失职，而不是其他国家。对外投资只让像拉贾帕克萨这样的政客家族通过回扣获利，而没有惠及到普通民众。
+
+“作为一个贫穷的国家，斯里兰卡需要投资，我们应该接受中国吗，我不确定。”阿万蒂说，“我没有管理过国家，但我管理我的家庭，如果我没有钱买吃的，我就不会把钱花在装修上。负责外国投资的人应慎重处理它，但人民的基本需求应该首先被满足，如果我们没有食物，我不需要高楼大厦。”
+
+斯里兰卡的经济学家，也将这场空前的危机归因于政治腐败和政府失职——政府在贷款如何使用上缺乏透明度，且未能发展出其他的外汇营收行业来偿还贷款，本身的经济模式就不可持续——而非中国或其他外国投资者。根据斯里兰卡外部资源部的数据，中国所持斯里兰卡债权占比排名第三（10%），大头是47%的国际资本市场借款，其次为亚洲开发银行（13%）。
+
+“我不认为中国或任何其他国家应该为这场危机负责，我宁愿说是国际主权债券一直在困扰斯里兰卡。在2009年到2019年间，有近170亿美元商业债券借贷陆续到期，但政府无力支付。”科伦坡大学经济系主任、经济学教授阿贝拉特纳说，“（2019年）恐怖袭击和随后的COVID-19全球大流行、以及旅游收入下降，都只是引发当前危机的增量原因。”
+
+然而也正是在拉贾帕克萨家族主导的内战中，中国与斯里兰卡走得越来越近。内战结束后，斯里兰卡也成为了中国“一带一路”倡议的关键参与者之一。
+
+2005年至2015年间，前总统马欣达·拉贾帕克萨领导的政府举债大兴基建，在中国的支持下启动了多项重要的交通、能源和电信项目，包括2006年的诺罗霍莱燃煤电站、2007年的汉班托塔港、2010年的马塔拉国际机场，及2011年的科伦坡港国际集装箱码头（CICT）等项目。不过，目前马塔拉国际机场因为需求低迷而停止运营，汉班托塔港也曾出现还款困难。
+
+“与印度一样，中国对斯里兰卡也很重要。人们不能责怪中国，因为在20世纪70年代发生粮食危机时，是他们拯救了斯里兰卡，”贾亚瓦德纳普拉大学（Sri Jayewardenepura）的经济学教授赫拉特（Nimal Herath）认为，“没有人强迫斯里兰卡政府借款。了解情况的人会指责政府，而不是借钱（给斯里兰卡）的国家”。
+
+#### 基本生活资料丧失，自救还是自灭？
+
+和很多中产阶级一样，这场危机也给大学老师希玛莉（Himalee）的生活带来天翻地覆的变化。她的丈夫在国营电视台从事技术工作，两个儿子都在读高中。几年前，一家人在科伦坡郊区购置了一套三层独栋住宅，带有一个漂亮的花园。
+
+变化是从去年下半年开始的。2021年8月，斯里兰卡还因疫情处在断断续续的封锁之中，政府宣布实施“粮食紧急状态”，由军队介入基本食品的销售，以控制物价飞涨。但这反倒进一步助推了粮食价格的膨胀，大米、奶粉等基本必需品的价格几乎翻了一番。如果说食品涨价仍在希玛莉的可承受范围之内，紧随其后的燃气短缺则再也无法被忽视。
+
+11月，一罐液化气从1400卢比涨到了2500卢比，并且供不应求，往往要等到一周左右才能买到。于是，希玛莉一家开始了自救行动，他们购置了电磁炉等备用厨具。但到了今年2月，科伦坡开始出现大规模的停电，每天停电超过十个小时。
+
+丈夫购买了太阳能备用电池，给房间里的灯和无线网络接上了备用电。电力短缺逐渐缓解后，他们又购置了生物降解燃气装置，每天往里面堆砌三到四斤的厨余垃圾，即可产生燃气用来做饭。家里也放弃了电动割草机，改为手动给花园锄草。但燃油的短缺是一个无法解决的问题，希玛莉的学校现在是线上、线下混合上课，从家到学校近五公里的距离，以前三轮车只要200卢比，现在翻了两倍不止，很多时候根本就打不到车。
+
+
+▲ 2022年5月14日，科伦坡，市民在一所警局外排队轮候购买石油气。
+
+“有时候我丈夫会顺路送我，而回来时我就只能走路了。”希玛莉说，家里的车也已经很久没开动了，为了省油，丈夫只在必要时骑摩托车出行。本来，丈夫每个月都会开车载着儿子们去老家看望父母，但过去这几个月，他只自己骑着摩托车回去了一次。
+
+虽然希玛莉也希望政府下台，但他们一家并没有去参与抗议。她也曾询问儿子是否有出国留学的打算，但两个儿子都表示想留在斯里兰卡，“说到底，这还是我们的家。”她说。
+
+但更多的底层民众并没有像希玛莉这样自救的资源。他们挣扎在温饱线上，希望粮食见底的那一天晚一点到来。
+
+斯里兰卡北部和东部是泰米尔人的聚居区，1983年到2009年间，由泰米尔猛虎组织领导的斯里兰卡内战席卷了这里，当地民众的生计遭到重创。即使战争已经结束了13年，贾夫纳（25%）、穆莱蒂武（44.5%）和基里诺奇（25%）等受内战影响地区，泰米尔人的贫困率仍远高于全国平均水平（14.3%）。
+
+渔业仍然是穆莱蒂武人最主要的收入来源。但在过去的一个多月里，燃油的短缺导致渔民无法出海捕鱼，整个渔业都陷入了停滞。不仅是渔民，还有靠分拣渔获、修补渔网为生的村民都落得衣食无着。
+
+内战结束后，中央政府在泰米尔地区的资源投入仍然有限，除了渔业，当地鲜有其他替代产业。仅有的几家服装厂，也只雇佣20-40岁年轻女性。对57岁的库马尔（Kumar Selvamalar）来说，燃料短缺、渔业停滞可能是致命的，她说，如果未来两个月情况继续如此，她和她的家人一定会被饿死。
+
+“以前，我从渔网中分拣鱼、以及出售鱼干来挣钱，每天大概能挣800-1000卢比（约人民币15-18元）。但现在我几乎颗粒无收。”库马尔说，她的丈夫也一样靠零工为生，家里还有一个失明的儿子和待嫁的女儿。“这些天我都是从小卖部赊账来买些食材，但这能持续多久呢？”她问道。数据显示，斯里兰卡6月份的总体通货膨胀率上升到54.6%，创下了历史最高水平。
+
+像库马尔这样的穷人，每天过的都是“从手到口”的生活，失去了收入之后，她们被迫人进入林地寻找木柴，用它来作为做饭的燃料。他们没有储蓄，也没有土地可以耕种，在经济危机中脆弱得不堪一击。与此同时，政府因面临债务重组而紧缩开支，并没有为极端贫困的人口发放援助。他们只能靠自己。
+
+蒂鲁库（Tirukunabalasingham）另一名同村渔民，他的两条腿都在内战中受伤，曾在难民营之间辗转流离，也失去了家人。战争结束后，他靠缝补渔网的微薄收入养活一家四口人。
+
+“战后，我们住在难民营，什么东西也没有。土地是政府给的，房子是用外国援助建造的，所以，我们没有任何储蓄来渡过这场危机。”他说，“战争时我们流离失所，但至少我们有吃的，现在我们真的是食不果腹。”自四月以来，他和家人已经每天只吃米饭配一个咖喱，还得小心计算着用量。
+
+
+▲ 2022年4月30日，科伦坡，入夜后示威仍持续，灯柱之间悬挂横幅，要求政府“归还我们被偷走的钱”。
+
+#### 未来局势如何？
+
+虽然数百万穷人正在陷入饥饿，但处在风雨飘摇中的斯里兰卡政府已经自顾不暇。当下，政府的首要目的是债务重组，把整个国家的经济从“破产”的境地捞起来。
+
+斯里兰卡的经济学家们，也对政府在当下解决饥饿和贫困问题的能力不抱希望。阿贝拉特纳（Sirimal Abeyratne）在接受端传媒采访时说，目前由外汇危机导致的政治危机对经济产生了螺旋效应的影响，且政府并没有立即行动来解决国内不断恶化的贫困和饥饿问题。
+
+他说，“（尽管）知道我们正在走向危机局势，在过去的六个月里，政府却没有任何连贯的应对举措。”
+
+阿贝拉特纳认为，目前没有谁能预测未来的局势。在五月，财政部长曾警告，经济危机的影响将至少再持续两年。但民众已经决意将希望寄托在新的领导人身上，希望全新政府的能带领斯里兰卡走出危机。
+
+抗议者占领总统府邸和总统办公室之后，将它们改造成了抗议的新地标。他们将“抗议村”的图书馆搬进了总统办公室，参观了总统的厨房、卧室和健身房，很多民众还跳入泳池庆祝胜利。来自现场的视频显示，抗议者在成功占领总统府后，打开电视观看了“抗议者冲入总统府”的新闻直播，在办公室里模拟斯里兰卡与IMF的谈判，还在钢琴伴奏下演唱了戈塔巴雅·拉贾帕克萨的竞选歌曲，在这首歌里，他将自己称为“战争英雄”，“将为我们效劳的英雄，将永远热爱这片母亲大地……”
+
+此外，抗议民众在第二天清理了现场，并将在总理府邸中搜到的1785万卢比（约和5万美元）的现金上交了法院。7月11日，总理拉尼尔·维克勒马辛哈办公室宣布，整个内阁都同意，在全党派临时政府成立后辞职并将权责交由临时政府。
+
+斯里兰卡律师协会向媒体解释，在总统和总理辞职后，将由国会议长担任代理总统。7月11日的各党派领导人会议决定，如果总统真的遵守承诺在13日辞职，议会将于7月20日投票选出新的总统，为组建全党临时政府铺平道路。反对党还希望，在六个月后举行大选。
+
+经济学家们建议，政府应该专注于给穷人提供救济，解决贫困和饥饿问题，因为经济改革需要时间来解决。但最大反对党SJB的领袖、有望成为下一任总统的普雷马达萨（Sajith Premadasa）目前尚未提供更为明确的扶困计划，他说，SJB有一个能让国家摆脱目前局面的经济战略，需要四到五年的时间才能让经济像2019年那样重回正轨。
+
+但由于拉贾帕克萨的斯里兰卡人民阵线党（SLPP）仍在议会占有多数席位，最大的反对党SJB也仅在225席中拥有约50席，建立一个全党派临时政府也并非易事。
+
+与此同时，总统戈塔巴雅·拉贾帕克萨扔不知所踪。前财政部长、戈塔巴雅·拉贾帕克萨的弟弟巴西尔·拉贾帕克萨在试图离开机场时，被机场工作人员阻止而未能成行。
+
+在离开抗议现场的路上，我遇到了约拉尼（Yolani）和她的另外七个家人。他们住在十公里之外，早上也是走路到抗议地点的。街上为数不多的车辆都驶往“抗议村”的方向，她可能不会像早上那样，幸运地搭到车。两辆大巴载着军警驶过，坐在最后一排左侧的一名士兵，朝窗外的民众竖起了大拇指。
+
+“我们的车已经两个月没有开动了。我们以前没有这么好的路，但我们的生活更好。”她说。
+
+
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diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-07-13-what-malicious-hostility.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-07-13-what-malicious-hostility.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ceaaabe0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-07-13-what-malicious-hostility.md
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "恶意的恶意"
+author: "米高的树洞"
+date : 2022-07-13 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/tiolTyA.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "屁民不好糊弄了~"
+---
+
+最近内地有个大新闻，很多烂尾楼的业主们各自联合起来，停止向银行继续偿还贷款，看来百姓急了，终于也觉醒了，不想再这么赤裸裸的被收割。当然，不出意外，这样的新闻必定在赵家人的威逼下，全网下架、删帖，名曰维稳。
+
+
+
+这件事，值得记录下来，让后世更多的人知道，虽然我知道国人大多的记忆不过三秒，顺民当惯了，大腿骨已然退化，毕竟，跪着要轻松多了。同样我知道，自己记录下来并没有什么用，但不以善小而不为，只要有一个人看到，能了解一些时代的真相，这就有意义。
+
+我在想，烂尾楼不是今年才有，为什么今年会集体爆发强制停贷呢？当然不排除之前也有这样的事件，但是可能没有刻意去关注，总是感觉很少听到这样的事情扎堆爆出。细想了一下，可能最大的原因，是内地一刀切的防疫政策，导致百姓越来越艰难，腰包越来越瘪，再加上恒大暴雷，大众信心跌到谷底，然后纷纷揭竿而起。人在退无可退的时候，才会豁出一切，管他娘的征信和违法，活都要活不下去了，还管的了那么多？！
+
+既得利益的赵家人，当然不懂也不会真正在乎底层人民的生死，更多的时候，无非作秀式的喊喊口号、开除几个临时工，装模作样的鞠个10度躬（不能再弯腰了，好家伙，屁民想让领导低头就已然不易，意思一下就行了，毕竟人家的腰杆子硬，腰里有枪，怕弯腰过头走火崩着自己的裆），自罚酒三杯，然后搞个文字游戏整个免职处分（毕竟大部分百姓连免职和撤职有什么区别也搞不清楚），然后换一张青天老爷的皮，继续马照骑，舞照跳。你能拿他们怎样？人家有暴力机构，有狗腿子，有纳投名状的爪牙，你小胳膊能拧的过大腿？哎，还是省省吧。只能自认倒霉，以后多长点心眼。
+
+以前听相声和评书的时候，老先生定场诗有云：修桥补路瞎眼，杀人放火儿多，到了西天问我佛，佛说我也没辙！小时候听起来觉得好笑，现在听起来依然好笑——笑我自己，笑这个魔幻的时代——老先生们毕竟有生活体验，几句定场诗用来形容现世，贴切不过如此。
+
+万物皆可恶意，恶意返乡、恶意不买房、恶意种地、恶意讨薪、恶意维权，对了，刚加一个恶意停贷，赵家人的小笔记本估计都不够用。要我说，赵家人是恶意的恶意才对，你们才是最大的恶意。
+
+屁民在强权的胯下苟延残喘，现在终于不堪其辱，要奋起反抗了，赵家人的大厦表面上稳如泰山，就像十九世纪的经典物理学一样，看似牢不可破，但隐约有两朵乌云萦绕其间，而最后撼动大厦的正是这两朵薄云。那么赵家人的大厦什么时候有乌云盖顶，不妨拭目以待。
+
+为见证这一天，从现在起，努力锻炼身体，争取活的久一点，一定要睁眼看到这一天的到来。
+
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-07-27-1960s-born-chinese-who-want-to-emigrate.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-07-27-1960s-born-chinese-who-want-to-emigrate.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d9aea223
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-07-27-1960s-born-chinese-who-want-to-emigrate.md
@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "想“润”的60后"
+author: "白莉莉"
+date : 2022-07-27 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/c1/c1-20220727-01.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "从文革到计划生育，压倒他们的最后一根稻草是上海封城"
+---
+
+90后张明发现，过去一些敏感话题开始在家庭内部脱敏。
+
+
+
+比如台海问题。过去，父亲张立达总是振臂一呼或双指扣桌：“打！必须拿下！”现在，他的观点是：同胞当然不能打同胞。
+
+再比如面对疫情，父母曾是坚定的“清零派”。过去一年，张明最熟悉的场景是：在位于杭州上城区的家中，在那个他自称“大得能打羽毛球”的客厅里，母亲向莉靠在沙发上刷抖音，父亲张立达侧卧在一旁的贵妃椅，通过手机看股市行情——65寸液晶电视，滚动播放央视新闻频道关于美国、欧洲的抗疫新闻。“国外死那么多人，就是躺平！”
+
+一聊到“清零还是共存”，张明总和父母吵得不可开交。但如今，母亲的态度是：“清零的次生灾害，谁来负责?”父亲则会说，“说国内防疫好的，看看上海的现状吧。”
+
+在张明看来，让父母态度彻底出现“大转弯”的，是封城期间舅公经历的一次意外。4月23日，上海浦东新区政府下发通知，要求对区内封控片区、楼栋实施硬隔离措施。所谓“硬隔离”，即用钢条、金属围栏、围挡焊死有阳性病例的单元楼。
+
+因为同一栋楼头天晚上发现两例阳性，张明舅公所在的浦东某小区当即被硬隔离——即原则上不允许楼内居民外出，包括就医。舅公有一子一女，女儿在加拿大当家庭主妇，儿子在苏州上班，因为疫情管控进不去上海，为舅公请了一位日常看护。但因为上海严格的防控政策，看护进不去舅公家，从四月初浦东封城起，舅公的日常起居，全靠几个好心邻居照料。
+
+24日晚，舅公“心脏突然堵得慌”，找了半天也没找到治心脏的速效药——那天正好断药了。他赶紧给邻居拨电话，邻居想办法向同栋一户人家借了几粒速效救心丸，才让舅公转危为安。
+
+向莉用“简直胡搞”来形容这次意外。“之前看到有人发上海人在封城期间的悲惨遭遇，我还不信，直到老舅快被隔离政策搞死了，我才发现那些人间惨剧都是真的。”
+
+舅舅出事后，向莉时刻关注上海的防疫政策，生怕哪天“一个拍脑袋的政策一出，又是折腾大一批普通老百姓”。张立达安慰妻子，“你急也没用，咱们眼下能做的，只能是自求多福。”
+
+张明说，自从舅公经历意外，父母房间的灯“经常通宵亮着”。“我爸天天想着把银行里的钱一点一点取回家，我妈就一直刷手机看新闻。”张明也感觉到父母在观念上的明显转变：看今日头条时间少了，拉儿子帮忙下载VPN，看/听所谓“敌台”时间多了，比如纽约时报中文网；不再积极下楼做核酸，“做那玩意没什么用”；会特意叮嘱张明“你在外网看到什么新闻，记得截一下屏，我们也想看看”……
+
+直到6月2日，也是上海解封的第二天，向莉和张立达第一次向张明打听移民的事。
+
+那天，程序员出身的张明刚回到家，一推门，就听见父母问话：“最近有咨询移民中介吗？”“现在移出去是不是比以前更难了？”“如果你出去的话，可以带上我们吗？”
+
+#### 顺从它，适应它，最终你就会习惯它
+
+在外人看来，张明生活优渥。一个佐证是他位于杭州中心城区上城区的家——那是十三年前、他初二时，父母买下的江景“豪宅”：150平米的房子被分成四个房间，除了父母的主卧和自己的小房间，张明还拥有自己的一个书房。
+
+在全家来到这个江景房居住之前，父母在九十年代末，各自从所在单位分到一套房。自张明出生起，一家三口就住在母亲单位分的70平米两房一厅，“据说只花了几万块。”等到张明读初二，父母决定买新房，父亲把单位分的房卖了，倒腾出了“一点钱”。当时均价是1.3万元/平米，如今已是涨了5倍。
+
+从小，父母就教育张明要“听老师的话”，“为学校争荣誉”，“早点融入集体对你以后有好处”。父亲张立达是土生土长的杭州人，退休前在机关单位从事人事方面的工作，一向是公司的“五好员工”，“党员先进模范”。“你爸就是管人事的，人与人之间最重要的就是和谐相处，中国社会只有你去适应的份，没有它反过来适应你的道理。”这是张立达经常跟张明说的一句话。
+
+张明记得，小学开家长会时，父亲张立达总穿白衬衫、黑西裤去学校。“班主任也是个势利眼，一看我爸就是机关干部，于是有意无意打探他的职位，‘您哪个系统的啊’、‘您是科级还是处级啊’、‘您电话多少，我记一下……’”那些时刻激起了父亲对“体制”的深刻认同，也成为他交际时一枚隐而不见的勋章。
+
+在张立达看来，这枚勋章象征家庭出身和社会地位。“我小时候文革差不多结束了，但老听我父母说出身、成分这些事。后来我才知道，在中国，成分是相当重要的——我父亲是贫农，到家里有地的母亲家‘倒插门’后，母亲才‘家凭夫贵’——如果被划成地主阶层，你一家子就完了。”
+
+张明的母亲向莉出生在上海一个普通家庭。她还记得当年第一次去男友家吃饭时，未来公公在圆桌上一边喝茶，一边看似无心地问：“长挺漂亮的，家里干什么的？”向莉当时一愣，没答上来，幸亏张立达为她解围，“她父母都是普通工人，出身不错的”，才换得公公一个安心的微笑。
+
+向莉在杭州读了大专后，就留在那里工作，如今已经退休。退休前，她在事业单位做行政，平日里最爱玩抖音，朋友圈遍布岁月静好式的“九宫格”照片矩阵。和丈夫一样，向莉对体制的印象是：它会带给你很多好处。最明显的一个例子就是分房。她依然记得当年戴着黑框眼镜的行政经理走到自己办公桌前，递来一张职工分房信息登记表，“签个字，你就有房了。”
+
+向莉经常回忆起福利分房的“好年代”——在客厅沙发看电视时，在后阳台洗拖把时，在主卧梳妆台打扮妆容时，张明都不止一次地听母亲叨唠过，“不在体制里，我们现在能有这条件吗？”
+
+张明从小在父亲那里学到的是“适应中国社会”，在母亲那里听得最多的一句话则是“别抱怨”。18岁生日当天，向莉向张明送了一份成人礼：美国作家威尔·鲍温写的《不抱怨的世界》。
+
+“我妈老说，抱怨没有任何意义，只会增加自己的烦恼——在一个抱怨解决不了所有问题的社会，你与其抱怨，不如顺从它，适应它，最终你就会习惯它。”张明说。
+
+#### 别说话，也别围观，赶紧逃离现场
+
+从上大学起，张明就习惯在饭桌上“抱怨”，一张铺着方格花纹的饭桌，也成了一家三口这几年观点交锋的“主战场”：读书时，张明抱怨评学分遭遇不公，张立达会告诉他“自己问心无愧就行”；毕业后，他在互联网大厂常年996，张立达和向莉心疼他，夫妻俩总会在晚上十点准时去厨房一通忙活，做几道宵夜给儿子备着。家里的门是密码锁，每次听到儿子在门外摁密码的“滴滴滴”声，夫妻俩就赶紧把热菜端上桌，有时还不忘唠叨几句，“早知道这么累，还不如听我们的话，当初考个公务员。”
+
+退休后的向莉喜欢在小区里串门打麻将。有个邻居的儿子在市财政厅上班，“她摸一把牌，就夸一次儿子”，这让向莉感到不适，“后来她一夸儿子，我就去倒水或者上厕所。”向莉说，绝大多数60后对体制都有种执念，“哪怕你赚得再多，你不在体制内，也称不上铁饭碗。”
+
+在问答网站知乎上，“如何评价60后这一代父母？”问题下方点赞最多的回答是：
+
+“他们懂得自我牺牲，懂得付出和奉献，不懂得什么是放手。所以劳碌一生，也不懂到底什么是真正的幸福。”
+
+有网民分析，60后父母出现以上情况，是因为他们是“最苦难的一代”：“生在新社会，长身体时遇上三年自然灾害，读书遇文革，工作遇到上山下乡，结婚遇到价格闯关，生娃遇到计划生育，中年遇到国企下岗，退休遇到医疗改革。”
+
+每一段经历，都让这些接近退休年龄、或已经退休的60后笃信所谓“中庸之道”，坚定认为“不抱怨”才能“守得云开”，“不添乱”才能“安稳过日子”。
+
+和张明的父母一样，90后郜乾的父母也是力主不抱怨的两位60后。郜乾读小学时，父亲郜阳告诉他“世界多娇，祖国最美”；中学时，父母让他向周恩来学习，“为中华崛起而读书”；郜乾读大学时，头两年中国大陆还能上谷歌和外网，学外语的他，天天看的是BBC、CNN，也和同学一起看《天安门》纪录片。有一年暑假他回家和父母聊起“六四事件”，父母当即提醒他“千万不要出去乱说”。“他们告诉我，中国的事情就是这样，你没法改变，千万别做出头鸟。”郜乾说。
+
+用郜乾的话来说，父亲郜阳的父母、也就是自己的爷爷奶奶，属于经历过战乱、饥荒和政治运动的一代人——爷爷来自河南，奶奶来自湖北，两人年轻时都去了N市念书，建立了“朴素的革命感情”。父亲郜阳是家里最小的孩子，一出生就赶上文革，在一个省吃俭用、静默无声的环境里长大，“我爸现在还舍不得那些七八十年代家里用的物件，不肯丢掉。”现在郜乾家依然丢放着父亲郜阳保留下来的铁制电扇、旧式石英钟和用了三十多年起锈的取暖器，“我妈管这些叫破铜烂铁。”
+
+郜乾小学毕业时，和公公婆婆合住了十年多的郜阳、崔颖两口子终于搬出来单住——是从单位分到的福利房。房子面积不到80平米，但离崔颖的单位非常近，走路五分钟，让她享受到了“下楼即办公”的优越性。
+
+在崔颖的描述里，一家三口过着“并不紧巴”的小日子，用“工薪阶层”来描述这个家庭似乎较为准确：郜阳是单位的办公室主任，崔颖则在一家服务型公司做过出纳、财务直至财务总监，在物价和消费水平并不高的N市，两口子在退休前每年共三十来万的收入在小城市里不算低，而这个家庭的消费，70%用在伙食和教育上——郜阳力主“只有吃好，事情才能做好”，所以家里的客厅专门摆了两个大收纳盒，分别存放水果、坚果和各类零食。崔颖则主抓儿子教育，“我爸妈给我报班从不含糊，初三时最多一周有五节小课，一个月补课就要花掉上千块钱。”郜乾说。
+
+和张明父母“忠于祖国忠于党”式的育儿理念相比，郜乾倒不觉得父母的思想“有多红”，尤其是母亲崔颖，“有时候聊天，聊着聊着我会觉得，我妈其实什么都懂，但她很会隐藏自己。”
+
+郜乾听崔颖讲过一个她小时候的故事，“我小时候碰上文革，我爸爸，就是你外公当时是保皇派。我记得很清楚，一个月黑风高夜，造反派来家里抓人，你外公就被戴着一顶高帽，拉去游街。半夜三点，街上还有很多人围观啊，但他们都没说话，一个字也没说。”
+
+崔颖依然记得那个夜晚——南方的雨夜寒风蚀骨，饶是气候严酷，街头依然站了不少围观的人。有人在喊“革命方知北京近，造反更觉主席亲”，也有人在摇红宝书。崔颖记得自己穿着一件花棉袄，跟着母亲来到了那个插满红旗的小广场，“我爸一出现，我妈就捂住我的眼。”
+
+棉袄袖管很长，崔颖从袖口缩起一只手，掰开母亲捂在自己眼睛上的手，“眼睛一睁开我就发现，眼前的景象实在是荒谬。”崔颖抹了抹眼泪，“后来我学到了一点：出了事别说话，也别围观，赶紧逃离现场。”说完她拍拍儿子的肩，“我希望你也这样。”
+
+#### 怎么这么懒？入党有什么不好？
+
+崔颖的母亲是土生土长的上海人，和一个苏州人、也就是崔颖的父亲结婚后，两人被分配到了南方的N市工作。
+
+1964年起，中央决定在三线地区（中国西北、西南地区）大规模兴建国防、科技、工业、电力、交通等基础设施，数百万人在“备战备荒为人民”、“好人好马上三线”的号召下加入建设。湖南、广东、江西、福建、安徽、广西等省开始各自建一批省属的“小三线地方军工企业”。后来，人们把这次迁徙潮称为“献了青春献终身，献了终身献子孙”的“小三线建设”（三线建设的背景包括越南战争的升级、美国在中国东南沿海的军事攻势以及中苏交恶等）。
+
+崔颖的父母，当年就从上海迁到N市支援“小三线建设”。他们在N市结婚、生育、定居，崔颖是他们最小的女儿。从小，生在上海的母亲就告诉崔颖，上海滩多气派，黄浦江多浩荡，法租界多时髦。每年夏天，母亲都会带崔颖回上海住上几个月，“我从小就羡慕那些洋气的衣服、帽子，向往梧桐树下喝咖啡的生活。要有机会，我还想去国外看看。”崔颖说。
+
+所有和时髦、洋气有关的记忆，都属于儿时“经常回去”的上海，而那些和痛苦相关的回忆，则大多发生在N市，比如文革。目睹父亲“戴高帽游街”时，崔颖9岁。她9岁起就“不相信任何人了”。“你没法相信，因为那时候真的人人自危。每个人看上去都正常，但在很多极端情况下，都会变得很不正常。”
+
+所以她教育郜乾从小就“不要管别人的事”。“管那么多事干嘛？就图别人给你发个奖状？都没意义，保护好自己才最重要。”郜乾还记得，2006年“彭宇案”后，“扶不扶”、“救不救”、“到底应不应该做好事”的话题成了公众热议的焦点，而崔颖告诉自己，“在路上一定要尽量避开老年人，如果可以，尽量不要去扶老人家，免得自己陷进去。”
+
+> #### `彭宇案`
+
+`2006年11月20日，南京市民彭宇陪同一名在路上跌倒的徐寿兰老太太前往医院检查，检查结果表明徐寿兰股骨骨折，需进行人造股骨头置换手术。徐寿兰随即向彭宇索赔医疗费，彭宇自称是乐于助人，拒绝了老人的要求。后在各种调解失败后，于2007年1月4日在鼓楼区法院提出民事诉讼。`
+
+多年后郜乾回忆起妈妈当年的告诫，“我可以理解她是不想让我有受伤害的风险”。他用“精致的利己主义”来形容母亲，“这么说或许有点重，但一些事情也证明这个说法没错。”
+
+比如一件让崔颖和郜乾“几近决裂”的事：入党。崔颖和郜阳都是超过30年的老党员，郜乾读高中时，两人就鼓励唯一的儿子入党，老房子的客厅成了夫妻俩向儿子灌输主流价值观的“主战场”，但郜乾当时觉得入党“太麻烦”，总以耽误学习为由，仓皇逃进房间。有时夫妻俩会追到房间，在散发暗黄光的台灯下，对着郜乾一通“布道讲述”：“你以后就知道爸妈说的都是对的”。郜阳总是拿习题、练习册作为挡箭牌，“那让我以后再入党吧，别打扰我了。”
+
+后来郜乾去北京读大学，新生入学日，夫妻俩把郜乾送到学生宿舍后开始给儿子“吹风”：“你就写一下申请书，好简单的，找个模板抄一抄，花不了几分钟的，对你以后加学分、找工作肯定有帮助！”
+
+郜乾不从，他觉得入党后麻烦事会“一件接一件”，结果被崔颖怒批一顿，拿着手边的充电宝对着桌子一通猛敲：“你怎么这么懒？入党有什么不好？都是为了你好，怎么就不听话？”
+
+“好脾气”的崔颖很少对郜乾发火。在他印象里，父母都是那种待人接物合理得体的人，外出吃饭总是事先主动订包房，抢着买单，去超市“扫货”时也不忘想着小区内或者单位里的好兄弟、好姊妹，跟外人从来没生过大气。
+
+“入党事件”是郜乾第一次见母亲发火。他没想到，母亲能气得把充电宝敲了足足半分钟。郜乾回：“你们不是告诉我不要谈论政治，不要参与政治吗，入党不就是掺和政治嘛！”
+
+崔颖愣了一下，没说话，头也不回地拽着丈夫郜阳走了。
+
+#### 为什么当年一个论调，现在完全相反的论调？我不明白，不理解，不懂
+
+对张明父母和郜乾父母这样的60后来说，“政治”是一个空泛、复杂而又无处不在的词。
+
+张明的父亲张立达眼里的政治“就是人事变动”。“小到我们系统内换了哪个科长，大到全国人民喜迎二十大，都和人员变动有关。如果你能从人事变动里找到生存的规律，你就是下一个‘上去’的人。”
+
+母亲向莉则把政治具象化，“融入单位集体，服从领导要求，这就是最大的政治。”她特别看不惯在互联网大厂做程序员的儿子，“你说你考个公务员多好，体制内福利好，铁饭碗，旱涝保收。”
+
+但对体制的不以为然，根植于张明和郜乾的观念深处，让他们的家长感到担心。“个人意识太强的话，别人会说你是个怪人，说你不合群。”崔颖曾这样告诫儿子，但后者总能轻松反击：“在一个不正常的社会，正常人通常就会被说成不合群。”
+
+那么，政治是什么，集体又是什么？
+
+郜乾的父亲郜阳说：“不同人的看法不一样。我是一个办公室文员，我眼里的政治可以是六四，那年我刚30岁，六四离我那么近又那么远。近指的是如果我当时在北京，很可能也会上街；远当然更直观，现在回看一下，这个事件离我们日常太遥远了，中国也不会再发生那样的事了。”
+
+对于集体，他认为“对我们父辈来说，集体就是红宝书和一场又一场的政治运动；对我们这代人来说，集体就是体制，是铁饭碗；对我儿子那一代人来说，集体的概念很微弱，它可能只是一个指代家长作风或者特权阶层的词。”
+
+崔颖在谈到集体一词时，联想到计划生育政策。儿子郜乾4岁时，她曾再次怀孕，但为了响应计划生育政策，为了所谓“事关政治觉悟”的集体荣誉，也为了保住自己在单位的工作，她选择了堕胎。郜乾依然记得母亲和他说过的一句话，“你在4岁时本来可以有个弟弟，但我没让他来到这个世界。”
+
+同样的情况也发生在向莉身上。和在民企工作的崔颖相比，向莉的事业编更不能容忍违反计划生育。“我们单位当时有个同事，就因为老婆生了的二胎，被领导开会点名批评，在单位抬不起头，说他是三无分子——无组织、无纪律、无集体意识。”
+
+回忆起上海舅公的意外经历，向莉形容“这有点像改变我想法的最后一根稻草”。在此之前，她因亲历计划生育政策在这些年的反复变迁，对曾经坚信的某些事情“开始有了一点动摇”——
+
+> 2015年的一个周末，她和丈夫在厨房备菜，一边把客厅的电视机声音调到最大，以便一边做饭一边听新闻。两人在听到“坚持计划生育基本国策，积极开展应对人口老龄化行动，实施全面二孩政策”的新闻时，同时对视了一眼。向莉的第一反应是：“既……也要……？拿我们当年坚持只要一个孩子的家庭当什么了？”
+
+`2011年底起，中国实施双独二孩政策。10年后的2021年，中国开启三孩政策。`
+
+放开生育的新闻在近十年接踵而至。向莉依然记得，1998年她再次怀孕，哭着喊着想留住孩子，而收到消息后，居住街道、居委会的几个穿着白衬衫的“女同志”就上家里来了，一进屋就拉着向莉的手，“握完也不松开”，一个劲地做她思想工作，劝她“以集体和大局为重”。
+
+胳膊拧不过大腿。街道干部上门后的第四天，向莉在丈夫张立达的陪同下，去医院做了“那个手术”。她现在还记得当时是一个春天，杭州的街道上冷清清的，去医院的那条路离家只有一公里，但显得“特别遥远”。进手术室之前，医生问了她几个简单问题，她魂不守舍似的敷衍答了，手却一直攥着丈夫张立达的胳膊。张立达去签手术同意书时，她还特意叮嘱丈夫“签完就赶紧回来”。
+
+做完手术后的三天，她没怎么和其他人说话。向莉觉得自己的身体“被掏空了”。她在公司的记事本上，用钢笔蘸上红色墨水写下了一行字：不能再对自己更坏了。这次是最坏的一次。
+
+写完她给记事本上了把锁，还配上了一把当年特别流行的日记本小钥匙。“当时的感觉，和我现在看到这些荒诞的新闻也差不多。”
+
+她有一个闺蜜微信群，群里有十多个她这些年的好友，都在那个年代只生育了一胎，“我在群里发牢骚，说：‘为什么当年一个论调，现在完全相反的一个论调。我不明白，不理解，不懂，不知道你们懂不懂？’”然后她@了所有人，其中有一半人“在那个年代做过手术”。
+
+有人回她，说“时代变了”。有过同样打胎经历的朋友给她小窗：“我们都要看开点。”只有一个退休前开公司的朋友发了一句“唱反调”的话，“韭菜不够割，他们开始慌了。”
+
+#### 时代的一粒灰，只有落在你自己或者你家人头上，才会成为一座山
+
+“在一个不正常的社会，正常人通常就会被说成不合群。”
+
+这句当年怼过母亲的话，郜乾在上海封城期间，在微信朋友圈又原话转发了一次，转发的缘由是一条上海市民被强制转送方舱隔离的新闻。发布后十分钟，崔颖打来电话，劝儿子“不要经常公开发言”，“有些事你自己知道就好”，丈夫郜阳则在一旁补充：“互联网都有大数据监控的，不要随便议论政治。”
+
+郜乾的回应是：这不是政治，这是日常生活，“这种事发生在上海，也有可能发生在你所在的城市。”
+
+崔颖起初不信，她和郜阳都认为，上海出现的很多负面新闻是“小概率事件”。“上海的主要问题是前期学欧美，搞躺平共存那一套，后来就失控了，应该尽早封城。”郜乾不禁一笑，问她这观点从哪看来的。
+
+“抖音上人家都这么分析。”崔颖说。
+
+郜乾父母的这个观念，在得知上海亲戚家的小侄女在封城期间挨饿经历后，发生了根本转变。崔颖有个亲戚家在上海，一家人都在美国定居，就留了小侄女在复旦读书，打算毕业了就去美国工作。“没想到还没毕业就被困在家里，天天等着社区团长送吃的，有次一整天都没吃的。”崔颖说。
+
+自己曾经向往的那个上海，正在加速走向另一个极端：送方舱、硬隔离、激进措施层出不穷。看到微信视频号上流出的一些大白进入上海普通人家里“消杀”的视频，“很难不让我想到当年造反派进我家，揪我爸出去戴高帽，游街认错的旧事。”很多视频，她看完会不自觉地摁下一个红星键（即收藏），但五分钟后，她就发现视频已经被删得干干净净，“我大概能明白，这些视频为什么留不下来了。”
+
+同样被身边人在防疫过程中的离谱经历所触动的，还有张明的父母。向莉还记得，2020年初武汉封城时，自己还质疑过作家方方，认为后者“干什么不好，非给美国人卖命，写那些抹黑我们的文章”。两年过去了，现在结合舅公的经历，向莉觉得方方的记录很有意义，“我觉得我要向她道个歉——没经历过这些事情的人，都不知道真相到底是什么。”
+
+作家方方在武汉封城期间，通过微博等平台连载自己在封城期间的日记。2020年3月11日，在一篇题为《记住，没有胜利，只有结束》的日记中，方方贴出了自己答媒体问的部分内容。有媒体问：“时代的一粒灰，落在个人头上，就是一座山。这句话成了此次疫情中最广为流传的一句话，回过头来看这句话，有没有觉得它变成了一个预言？”方方的回答是：“这不是预言，这只是一个事实，是任何时代都存在的一个事实。”
+
+两年前，郜乾和母亲崔颖讨论过方方的这句话。郜乾认为，方方这句话只说对了一半，“时代的一粒灰，只有落在你自己或者你家人头上，才会成为一座山，否则它只是一粒灰，或者连一粒灰都不是。”
+
+当时，崔颖不同意郜乾这个解读。直到2022年上海封城，郜乾再次在家庭群里贴出自己说过的这句话。
+
+隔了大概10分钟，崔颖回了六个字：“儿子，你是对的。”
+
+#### 就算再差，应该也没我们这儿能折腾
+
+60后父母决定“润”（因润的汉语拼音rùn与英文单词run一样，被用来指代「跑」的意思，表示逃离中国、移民海外），这个念头冒出来的原因可能是多样的。对崔颖来说，这是一种因为长期处于“不确定状态”而导致的“不安的感觉”。她所说的“不确定状态”，包括但不限于：国内防疫政策反复多变；上海封城悲剧随时可能复制在其他城市；经济下行导致“钱袋子”急剧缩水；年轻人都不工作了，自己和下一代人的养老问题堪忧；常态化核酸检测，可能让长期居家的自己和家人心态失衡；接种完疫苗半年后，国产疫苗负面消息频出，不敢接种第三针……
+
+过去，崔颖喜欢在抖音和微信视频号上点赞一些唱流行歌或者教做菜的短视频，但她最近忽然想明白了一个道理，“都在说生逢大时代，但这不会在你看病时减免一分钱，也不会在你失业时补贴你一分钱。大时代没用，能不折腾地过好小日子，就挺好。”
+
+她开始看那些介绍马尔代夫、安道尔和法罗群岛的小视频，“人家国家小，但生活简单，至少不会有国内这些糟心事。”
+
+她和丈夫郜阳最近在研究“润”向泰国的方案。“如果要找一个地方养老，欧美成本和门槛太高，语言也不通；日本感觉也融不进去。想来想去，东南亚最好，比如泰国，华人多，成本相对低，可以考虑一下。泰国就算再差，应该也没我们这儿能折腾。”从计划生育政策下“国家养老”到“自己养老”的转变，到疫下动辄封城+常态化的全员核酸，这些在崔颖看来都叫“折腾”。
+
+郜乾整理了一份泰国“养老签”的资料发给父母后，崔颖发现，只要真想走，“其实也没想象中那么难。”根据泰国“养老签”规定，年满50岁首次办理可以居留15个月，以后每年需要续期，一年一签，养老签证在有效期内允许持有者自由多次出入泰国。资产方面，在泰国开设的个人银行账户内有至少80万泰（约16万人民币）的存款，或者每个月至少有6.5万泰铢（约1.3万人民币）的退休金收入就行。
+
+崔颖和郜阳的打算是，今年开始计划准备，明年争取落实实施。两人家里都有还在世的老人，但好在60后不像80、90后，他们有足够多的兄弟姐妹可以照顾老人，“泰国养老签也不是出去就回不来了，只是给生活提供另一种选择——你可以待在那边，也可以有时去国外，有时待在国内。”
+
+张明的父母则希望儿子能“先行一步”。“每个父母都希望子女能生活得比自己好。儿子做技术出身，如果他能技术移民先出去，那么我们不会排斥跟着一起出国生活。”张立达说。
+
+崔颖依然记得5月底、自己第12次下楼做核酸时碰见的一个穿着破了洞白色背心的老头，“看上去快八十了吧”。他跟着已经排成长龙的队伍，一直低着头慢慢挪步，眯着眼，不说话，也不抬头。到了自己就张开嘴，三秒钟完事后眼神涣散地慢慢回家。“这种状态，想想都害怕。”
+
+（文中人名均为化名。）
+
+
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diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-07-28-us-forces-transformation-in-indo-pacific.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-07-28-us-forces-transformation-in-indo-pacific.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9ae80f09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-07-28-us-forces-transformation-in-indo-pacific.md
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "美军印太转型"
+author: "祁昊天 "
+date : 2022-07-28 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/Ww7CR2l.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "能力转向与盟伴协同"
+---
+
+美军全球大国军事竞争与作战方向一直存在欧洲和印太两个重点，印太是当前更为重要的一端。俄乌冲突在一定程度上将强化美国及北约在欧洲的军事准备和投入，但同时由于俄罗斯常规军力方面长期存在经费、管理、技术、官僚、方向等各方面问题，此次冲突进一步暴露了俄军的弱点与缺陷，长期则可能加大俄战略包袱。因此，欧洲战略态势目前的发展对于美军未来对印太战区的倾斜不会产生根本动摇。
+
+
+### 能力转向
+
+面对印太潜在军事冲突的可能场景，美国强调加强高端常规战争能力。这意味着针对具有类似先进军事能力的对手必须重新准备大规模、高强度、技术先进的常规能力。高端常规战争能力不同于反恐、反游击、治安战所需要的能力。在采办计划、军力准备、演习和作战实验等方面，美军都已开始加速和扩大强国间常规对抗的能力范围。
+
+在美国整体军事准备及转向规划中，正在展开的主要措施包括：发展新作战概念，力量结构和部署转向更为分散、灵活，更多地使用无人平台，并在不同作战域（太空、网络空间、空中、陆地、海洋和深海）之间采用更高程度的集成；增加远程飞机和导弹的数量，在印度-太平洋地区加强空军基地和其他设施建设，使美军在对手远程精确打击武器射程内更加安全；强化无法被对手迅速抹平的优势的领域，如水下战能力；加强美国C4ISR和后勤方面的防御能力和韧性；增强美军联合部队战备水平和应急作战能力；加强美国盟友的军事能力，提高军事互操作性；通过诸如“太平洋威慑倡议”（PDI）等机制从法律、组织和预算角度对美国的印太军事准备以及同盟伙伴国联合力量的建设进行统筹。
+
+美军调整重点是降低对关键节点的依赖性、提高力量部署的分布化，形成新攻守平衡，使己方力量更具生存能力，更能够在集中时间和分散空间实现集中效能。关键是对数据、信息的管理能力，对指挥控制和火力通道的联通能力，正如各军种均在尝试实现的“联合全域指挥与控制”（JADC2）能力。2022年3月，联合全域指挥与控制执行计划签署实施，当前的工作重点是关键网络的连接和协议转换，空军的“先进战斗管理系统”（ABMS）、陆军的“汇聚/融合”项目（Project Convergence）和海军的“超越/压制”项目（Project Overmatch）均如此。在战区级别，印太司令部与中央司令部在这方面进展比较领先。
+
+
+### 盟伴准备
+
+2022年3月，印太司令部首次将关岛、日本、菲律宾、澳大利亚明确界定为印太战区美军的四个最主要的“中心”。美军要求加强这些节点的力量存在，并在包括台湾海峡在内的热点地区一旦出现危机或冲突时形成对华慑止、迟滞、干预介入等不同阶段和不同支持方式的能力准备。
+
+以“太平洋威慑倡议”为代表，美国的盟伴规划在数量、质量方面均有提升，“太平洋威慑倡议”在对外政策与表层定位上，一是确保地区军事优势；二是强化印太地区的优先战略地位。在深层次，该倡议在美国国家安全战略与政策过程中的政军关系定位更加重要，本质上是通过预算管理对军事战略与转型进行协调和统筹的顶层机制。
+
+在针对遏制中国的整体规划当中，相关举措包括加强美国与澳大利亚、日本和韩国的军事合作；扩大美国与印度的接触；与新加坡、泰国和菲律宾发展更多的军事联系；以及加强美国与台湾的伙伴关系等。其中包括加强小多边机制，如：美、英、澳“三边安全伙伴关系”（AUKUS）；美、日、印、澳“四方安全对话”（QUAD）；美、英、加、澳和新“五眼联盟”（FVEY）；美、日、澳“三边战略对话”（TSD）等。在这些机制下，美国与其盟国、伙伴国频繁进行联演联训，以印太地区多处热点地区对华潜在军事对抗为想定，不断强化多边防务合作。
+
+
+### 美菲军事合作
+
+在双边层面，西太地区美日、美澳合作是近年来美国战略调整相对较为显性的体现，而菲律宾似乎在西太岛链中是对华压力较小的一个节点。事实上，美菲军事合作在具体业务层面虽没有过去驻军时期的深度与广度，菲律宾国内政治形势也对美军事存在构成影响，但美菲两军在印太区域的合作正在稳步推进。以2021年7月美菲恢复《访问部队协议》、2022年2月美国务院发布《印太战略》等动作为牵引，美菲两军在业务和行动层面的合作在近中期有向进一步深度发展的趋势，其发展方向紧密围绕着美军的转型准备进行。
+
+在陆上，菲陆军与美太平洋陆军将继续加强以下方面的合作，如支持菲国内安全与领土防卫、提高两军联合军演中的中高级指挥官和参谋人员交流、在联演联训中纳入多域能力、完善菲国内基地和训练设施、进一步提高现有机构如夏威夷太平洋多国联合战备中心（JPMRC）在双边军事互动中的角色等。
+
+在空中，从供应链管理到一体化防空反导的协同问题，从强化亚太情报信息网络（APIIN）到加强联络官制度等人事安排，从提高菲空军与美太平洋空军合作到在美菲与第三方空中力量强化合作，美菲两军正在进行多个新领域合作的探讨。
+
+在海上，双方合作在原有基础上稳步提升，包括强化P-8A反潜巡逻机的部署，加强菲海上巡逻和侦察飞机的空中打击能力，以及继续强化原有双边演习和多边升级可能。在陆战队方面，美菲也正从任务、部署、指挥、人员等各方面协商加强合作和协同作战能力。由于群岛和海岸线情况较为复杂，菲也希望从美得到从单边防空到岸基机动反舰、防空能力的支持，并进一步在美支持下提高两栖、网络、电磁等不同任务场景和作战域的能力。
+
+美菲共同防御委员会和安全接触委员会（MDB-SEB）是两军日常接触协调的主要平台之一，下设各领域委员会、分委会、工作组，业务涵盖范围非常广，每年召开会议对过去一年、本自然年和下一年度的防务合作进行回顾、计划和展望。在政治舆论、装备采购、联演联训、设施强化等各方面，美菲军事合作已有重上快车道的趋势。虽然美菲双方在军事合作上并非铁板一块，但在大的方向上却是一致的。在继续加强原有联演联训传统项目的基础上，两军合作在以下几个方面呈现出新的深化趋势：更为多边的倾向；更具深度的态势感知融合；更为广泛的人员交流机制；更为完善的美菲联军区域行动支援体系等。
+
+在海上情报和态势感知方面，菲面对区域内国家的领土及海洋声索、岛礁改造、军民舰船部署和活动、吕宋和巴士海峡的穿越等问题，不排除在近中期菲军的信息、数据、情报系统将更紧密地嵌入美印太联合作战体系。P-8A反潜巡逻机和MQ-9等型无人机的部署都可能进一步加速和强化，而为了实现更为深度的融合，空海态势感知网络的数据实时传输问题也必会成为未来重点工作方向，或包括亚太情报信息网络的调整和升级。
+
+美菲《强化防务合作协议》（EDCA）对菲军多项设施有资助项目，包括机场修缮、燃料、后勤和物流设施建设、城市战训练设施建设等，美军也可以通过这些项目使用相关设施。不过考虑到双方在具体出资进度上一向存在矛盾，而美国国内相关法律流程又经常推迟进度，美军对部分设施特别是对远征部队至关重要的后勤和物流设施使用可能会出现延迟。不过总体而言，这方面的合作依然在深化。
+
+美菲联合行动能力将进一步提升，且这一提升在近年已有向多边协同框架演变的趋势。为此，考虑到美军整体转型需求，在近中期我们可以预估美菲联合协同中心等机构和平台将持续升级，特别是提高应急磋商协调能力，完善联合行动指挥体系和数据融合支撑能力。此外，由于菲军相对落后的战斗能力，美菲既有联演联训项目需要在全要素战斗测试等方面进行加强，并完善尚不成熟的共同防御概念。
+
+多边方面，“美菲+”的模式正在愈加成熟。如美-日-菲三边对话和演习，包括指挥和参谋人员的交流逐年有序推进。在美菲传统军演中，如“肩并肩”“海上勇士合作”“安全防卫”“共同”海上训练行动等，我们能够看到包括日本在内的第三方参与。
+
+菲军与美军在印太区域其他盟军、伙伴国军队相比整体能力较弱，两国军事合作深度与广度也并不算突出，且菲律宾国内政治局势并不允许菲律宾完全重新捆绑在美国以中国目标的同盟战车上。但是近年两国的防务合作有重新深化趋势，这一趋势已在具体的业务层面和中（高）层人员交流中得到显著体现。在双边情报和态势感知共享、军种间协同能力建设合作、联合行动互操性、双边向多边转化、美军行动保障等方面，两军合作正在稳步发展，需要持续跟踪。这一过程中两国在具体问题上存在差异，特别是关注重点优先次序、设施授权和资金使用等方面。这些问题并不足以动摇美菲军事合作的整体趋势，但也同样值得重视。
+
+（祁昊天，北京大学国际关系学院助理教授。）
+
+
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diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-08-02-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-july-2022.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-08-02-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-july-2022.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : "俄乌战争・七月战局"
+author: "当代张敬轩"
+date : 2022-08-02 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/88Razz0.jpg
+image_caption: "（2022年7月1日—31日）"
+description: "俄罗斯对乌克兰的侵略战争，目的是把作为德、法等帝国主义国家附属国的乌克兰的全部或局部重新纳入俄罗斯帝国主义的控制下，乃至于进一步变成殖民地。"
+---
+
+七月俄乌战局，以俄军拔城开始，以战略相持告终。月初，俄军利用乌军撤守顿巴斯北线战略支撑点北顿涅茨克之机，趁胜追击，夺取双子城要塞另一座——利西昌斯克。然而，此后双方陷入战略消耗，俄军战略优势所剩无几。
+
+
+
+### 一、本月战局进展
+
+#### 1、顿巴斯北线方向
+
+2022年6月20日，俄军在休整20天后发动了新一轮的攻势（也是俄军开战以来的第三次进攻战役），并且在佐洛特方向打开了突破口。6月24日，乌军被迫弃守其在顿巴斯北线最主要的战略支撑点、同时也是卢甘斯克最后两个主要城镇之一的北顿涅茨克。显然，这是乌总统泽连斯基为首的人民公仆党政治家们对以乌军总司令扎卢日内上将为首的军部的一个让步，因为军部早在5月底就已主张放弃北顿涅茨克。俄军则抓住机会，趁胜追击，又对双子城中的另一座即利西昌斯克实现了合围。乌军面对这一不利局面，果断放弃利西昌斯克，向经营了2个月之久的谢韦尔斯克—苏勒达尔—阿尔焦姆斯克（巴赫穆特）防线转进。7月2日，俄军从南部、西南部攻入利西昌斯克市中心。7月4日，乌军承认从利西昌斯克撤退。7月5日，俄军完全占领利西昌斯克，继而控制了整个卢甘斯克州。然而，乌军的撤退相当成功，俄军仅俘虏后卫部队数十人。
+
+夺取利西昌斯克后，俄军并未转入休整，而是继续趁胜追击，向谢韦尔斯克发动进攻。俄军认为，乌军虽然在这一线经营2个月，但也不能与先前经营8年的要塞城市北顿涅茨克相比，而谢韦尔斯克位于谷地、较之利西昌斯克更显易攻难守，所以俄军趁胜攻击似有一鼓而下的可能性。然而实情却非如此，俄军在7月9日对谢韦尔斯克发动进攻后，在横渡北顿涅茨河时又受到乌军炮兵精确打击，渡河建立桥头堡后又被摧毁了一个师级指挥部，总之是困难重重。尽管俄军在7月13日仍然是完成了强渡北顿涅茨河，并宣称自军在7月16日攻入谢韦尔斯克，然而不久便被证明是受困于谢韦尔斯克城郊区，难以再前进一步了。
+
+眼看在谢韦尔斯克一线不能突破，俄军又另辟蹊径，命令盘踞在伊久姆地区的战役集群转而向东进攻乌军在顿巴斯最大的战略支撑点之一斯拉维扬斯克。然而7月15日俄军开始进攻后，虽曾夺取几个村庄，但随即也停滞不前了。到了月底，俄军又试图在阿尔焦姆斯克方向展开突破，虽夺取了几个居民点，但仍未接近阿尔焦姆斯克。这样，俄军在顿巴斯战前的第三次进攻战役就陷入停滞。随着俄军从顿巴斯抽调超过10个加强营驰援赫尔松等方向，在顿巴斯实现突破的希望就更加渺茫了。
+
+#### 2、赫尔松方向
+
+赫尔松方向，乌军分兵多路继续向赫尔松、新卡霍夫卡反击。
+
+2022年7月以来，乌军从西方获得大批远程火箭炮兵装备并完成训练，其纵深打击能力得到较大加强，并且对俄军纵深的补给线展开新一轮的打击，在哈尔科夫、顿巴斯都有对俄军后方纵深补给节点的攻击。其中，乌军尤其利用赫尔松方向俄军孤悬第聂伯河以西、补给通道较少的特点，重点攻击该方向俄军。乌军炮兵在赫尔松方向压制住了俄军，并且在敌后游击分队的配合下对跨第聂伯河的俄军补给线进行了猛烈打击。部分受此影响，前线俄军的压力逐渐增大。7月23日，乌军在赫尔松州北部的维索科皮利亚镇以南困住了俄军数个加强营，然而俄军且战且退，乌军虽然推进了10—15公里，但并不能围歼这股俄军。不过，俄军也发觉赫尔松方向的军事压力大增，遂在7月底从顿巴斯方向抽出10—15个加强营兵力，转用于赫尔松和扎波罗热方向。
+
+在赫尔松和扎波罗热州，伴随着俄军殖民地建政工作的推进，乌克兰游击部队的行动也日益活跃，甚至有乌克兰游击队深入克里木半岛活动。7月31日，乌军游击队以无人机袭击塞瓦斯托波尔的俄黑海舰队司令部，迫使俄联邦取消在塞瓦斯托波尔的海军节纪念活动。
+
+#### 3、其他方向
+
+在顿巴斯南线，特别是顿涅茨克方向，俄军发动了牵制性的进攻，主要是再度进攻马林卡和阿夫迪夫卡镇，然而成果寥寥无几。
+
+在扎波罗热方向，双方的军事行动也有所升级。乌军试图阻止俄军增援赫尔松方向，俄军则试图克服这一企图。
+
+在哈尔科夫方向，双方主要是炮战。俄军宣称摧毁的乌军远程火炮数量，已经超过乌军所拥有和获得的总和，只能反过来说明俄军对于乌军获得这一类武器的恐惧心理，也从侧面证明了乌军远程炮兵对俄军进攻能力的削弱。然而，乌军也无力发动大规模的进攻战役，歼灭加强营以上级别的俄军。故此，在这些战线上，双方主要还是相持。
+
+
+### 二、战争现状
+
+俄军在占领北顿涅茨克和利西昌斯克后，对于乌军新防线的进攻并不顺手，而又在赫尔松方向上承受乌军越来越多的压力，只得抽调兵力南下西进赴援。乌军远程炮兵力量增强后，俄军的后勤压力也越来越大。这些都是导致俄军进攻能力下降、战略优势削减的重要因素。俄方也清楚自己在战略相持中陷入困境，因此在7月陆续通过了一系列有关军事动员的法令：如7月5日通过的一系列经济动员法令要求强化国民经济的动员以支撑前线战争；又如命令俄联邦麾下的85个联邦主体各自组建一个“志愿营”，合计34000人，训练一个月后即用于填补前线人力缺口；甚至不惜以减刑为代价，招募监狱里的刑事犯为雇佣军。由于前线战事不利，俄军还对前线的主要指挥官进行了调整，侵略军几个主要战略战役军团的指挥官都被撤换。
+
+乌军方面在丢失北顿涅茨克和利西昌斯克后，军事上局势有所缓解，但政治上却出现了不小的内部矛盾，即出现了为前线丧师失地承担政治责任的问题。因此，人民公仆党内出现了内斗，反映为泽连斯基政权开始对乌克兰国家安全局（SBU）展开内部清洗，并暂停其局长以及乌克兰总检察长职务。如前所述，泽连斯基政权在军事决策上对扎卢日内上将领导的军部进行了妥协，但是矛盾并未完全消失，泽连斯基总统也和普京总统一样撤换了包括乌军特种部队总司令在内的一批高级军官。
+
+俄方为了扭转外交上的被动局面，在7月间于外交战线上发动了攻势。7月13日，俄方利诱朝鲜承认顿涅茨克、卢甘斯克的两个傀儡政权，并与后者“建交”；乌克兰遂与朝鲜断交。朝鲜是继叙利亚复兴党政权之后第二个承认上述两个俄帝傀儡政权的主权国家。7月19日，普京又亲赴伊朗，协调俄罗斯、土耳其、伊朗在中东的势力范围，最终结果以俄、土对伊朗作出较大让步告终而实现了妥协。另一方面，美国总统拜登同时期访问沙特却收效不佳，因此在中东问题上也就未能协调一致对抗俄帝方面，试图拉拢伊朗以降低油价打击俄帝经济、缓解西方国家滞胀危机的企图也失败了。俄帝还获得了另一些外交成绩，兹不赘述。
+
+同俄帝相反，美帝领导的西方诸帝面临滞胀危机等一系列问题，从而在政治上出现不稳，对俄立场也有所分裂。美帝虽然与委内瑞拉妥协较为顺利，但是未能与伊朗实现妥协，所以不能够在经济打击俄帝、纾困己方。在经济危机、英欧矛盾以及（由于英欧矛盾而起的）内部政治危机打击下，援助乌克兰最力的英帝首相约翰逊黯然下台，宣布看守政府直至新首相选出。约翰逊利用乌克兰危机转移内部政治问题的企图遭到失败，说明西方诸帝国主义对于乌克兰的注意力已有所下降。欧洲诸帝对俄的态度虽无明显的让步，依然推动经济脱俄，但也在本月解除了对加里宁格勒州等俄联邦飞地的经济封锁。在自己内部的危机和俄帝步履蹒跚的侵略步伐面前，西方诸帝进一步扩大对乌克兰援助的可能性也有下降的趋势。
+
+7月22日，在联合国协调下，俄帝与西方诸帝在经济战中有所妥协，签署了敖德萨运粮协议，以扩大乌克兰对外部世界的粮食出口，缓解第三世界国家面临的粮荒。
+
+
+### 三、战争趋势
+
+目前，双方都难以打破战略僵持的局面，俄军的主动权进一步下降，战争从俄军的重点进攻完全演进到了俄、乌两军战略相持的阶段。双方都无力展开大规模的进攻战役，而是力图在各自拥有兵力、兵器优势的方向，集中力量展开一系列小的进攻战役，削弱敌方的力量，让力量对比的天平倾向于自己。战争的胜负，必将取决于双方获取力量和使用力量的能力。
+
+[](https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/548767183)
+▲ 原载《知乎》链接。
+
+
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diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-08-07-a-middle-aged-pinkies-overseas-boycott.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-08-07-a-middle-aged-pinkies-overseas-boycott.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : "一位中年粉紅的海外杯葛記"
+author: "William"
+date : 2022-08-07 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/k7ucmuB.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "筆者所在城市有非常多中餐廳，但絕大多數都是售賣為迎合當地人口味而改良過的廉價菜式。"
+---
+
+數年前，偶然接觸到一家打著台灣菜旗號的餐廳，一試之下便覺味道不差。更難得的是，這間餐廳不僅能做台菜，還能做川菜，上海菜，廣東菜等不同菜式，皆是可口怡人。自此便長期幫襯，一來二去也成了餐廳的熟客，還被老闆熱情地邀請加入所謂的熟客專享菜譜的WeChat群組。
+
+
+
+當時筆者還未有WeChat帳戶，但為了所謂的專享菜譜，還專登去申請了一個WeChat帳戶，加入了這個群組。也由此為契機，筆者陸陸續續聽完了這位餐廳老闆的傳奇故事。原來這家餐廳雖然主打所謂的台灣菜，但老闆卻是中國福建人。老闆早已到了知天命的年紀，兒女也都已經大學畢業了，辛苦半生，現在終於生活愜意。不過，實際上老闆年輕的時候可是吃過非常多的苦頭，他國中畢業後就偷渡來美，在各式的中菜餐廳打了十年黑工，才拿到綠卡，結婚生子。因為他勤奮好學，在打工的同時竟然也學會了做不少不同地區的菜式。可能因為他家鄉鄰近台灣的關係，他最擅長的還是台菜，這也是為什麼當他拿到護照，儲到錢後開自己的餐廳時，仍然是主打台菜。
+
+雖然老闆這一生在美國的時間已經超過了中國，但至今為止英文程度非常有限。他的娛樂方式，也一直和普通的中國人沒什麼區別。他仍然以WeChat，Weibo，Zhihu等中國社交平台為主要獲取訊息的來源，他也酷愛看一些所謂愛國KOL的文章。可能因為這個熟客群組大多是中國移民，他也時常將他在各大中國平台上看到的影片，文章分享到這個熟客群組，並附上他的點評，筆者也因此見識到了許多所謂的「愛國觀點」，跟著老闆緊追中國國內發生的時事熱點。老闆已經持有美國護照，但是仍然以中國人自居，亦非常痛恨美國政府。當他在群組裏時常感嘆自己年輕的時候聽信長輩的話選錯了路錯過了中國的發展機遇，要是自己還留在中國肯定早就發大財了時，曾有另一位中國熟客揶揄他為什麼不回國，這位老闆支支吾吾講不出個所以然來。後來聽別人講這位老闆當年為了擺脫黑工的身分，曾經申請過政治庇護的簽證，理論上再回中國被發現了的話，是可能被政府以欺騙為理由褫奪他的身分。故此他已經多年沒回過故土，一直通過社交平台瞭解中國驚人的發展和中國人民的幸福生活。
+
+此次美國眾議長Nancy Pelosi要訪台的訊息傳出後，這位老闆看著中國國內的分析報導認為她在中共的威嚇下已經不敢去台灣了，感嘆中共的強大已經讓美國嚇破了膽。可當訊息被國際媒體確認時，他義憤填膺之餘又非常興奮，異常頻繁地在群組裏轉發一些中國必然會擊落Nancy座機，中國一定會趁機收復台灣的文章。這些文章裏，既有不少中共官方部門的發言和中共喉舌媒體的社評，也有不少所謂KOL的推演。筆者甚至還看到一位中國網友預測共軍會把Nancy包圍在台灣，然後一小時擊潰國軍，蔡英文試圖逃跑未果被活捉，全島望風而降，當天晚上就會做完核酸檢測，第二天就發中共身分證，半個月後就消滅台灣疫情的預測。老闆對此深以為然，還故意tag群組內的僅有的幾位台灣顧客，不過無人回應。Nancy從馬來西亞出發後，這位老闆激動地徹夜未眠，一直在群組裏直播中共政府的動作和共軍的佈置，驚嘆統一大業在此一舉，自己將見證這一歷史性的時刻。
+
+筆者當時實在忍不住了，就講了一句「老闆身體要緊，先睡覺吧，不會有事的」。老闆當時就不高興了，還特別把之前他之前分享過的胡錫進的推文，中共國防部宣稱備戰等screenshot又重新分享了一次，並言之鑿鑿地講這次一定會打的，中國人民盼望了這麼多年，祖國終於要統一了。我應了一句「今年聖上登基，穩定才是最重要的，就算打也不會是今年」，老闆說嚇死美國，統一台灣就是習大大連任的最大功績和理由，所以一定會打的。見老闆情緒亢奮，筆者甚至都能想像得到老闆老淚縱橫的場面，因此筆者識趣地閉上了嘴。群組裏也有幾位年紀較大的中國移民附和，老闆當時和他們一直發voice message，就等待那「神聖」的一刻。第二日起身，已見到群組裏有非常多的留言在直播解說進程。Nancy的座機當時還未到台灣，不過看航線還避開了南海，這也成為了老闆認為中共贏了的又一鐵證。但筆者上午忙著工作，就沒再實時關注動態，直到午餐時間，才看到新聞講Nancy已經抵達台灣了，休息一晚將和蔡英文總統以及其他中港台的民主活動人士見面。筆者這才想起群組，連忙打開WeChat食花生。
+
+本來盼著擊落美國飛機，趁機一統台灣的老闆發現事情並沒有照著他想的那個樣子走，一時有些震驚。不過他很快反應過來這可能是中央在下一盤大棋，為此他還找到了一篇文章認為共軍的戰略叫做請君入甕，圍點打援，目前共軍其實已經悄悄包圍台灣了，就等時機一到，一聲令下，美軍必受重創，老妖婆與蔡英文就此雙雙隕命總統府。但是事情仍然沒有按照他第二次轉彎的方向發生，Nancy順利結束了在台灣的行程，前往日本。老闆這次是真的有些失望了，但他很快收到風講共軍要在台海演習，可能會趁機核平台灣，本來抑鬱的內心又一下活躍起來。他還不得不感嘆一句，果然領導人還是有智慧的，目前還不宜和美國正面衝突，趁機找到藉口拿下台灣就行。總之一切交給國家，我讀書不多，跟著國家走就對了。
+
+但是讓老闆有些略為失望的是，共軍的演習就真的是演習，看樣子並不準備真的打台灣。但是接二連三地預判失敗，並沒有增添老闆對黨國的失望，老闆總能迅速找到理由安慰自己，而結論無非是黨國在下一盤大棋，自己的思維層次和領導人還是差得太遠。他很快又找到一篇文章，分析共軍的戰略其實是步步進逼，蠶食台灣，目前已經跨過海峽中線，今後海峽中線將不復存在，共軍可以在台灣周圍想來就來想走就走，軍艦會常態巡航台灣，最後鎖死，耗死台灣。老闆分享了這一篇文章後還評論了幾句，「這個戰略真不簡單，用最少的代價統一台灣。」群組裏一個中國人實在看不下去，就講了幾句，「你可真會自己欺騙自己，祖國虐你千百遍，你待祖國如初戀，總之贏就對了。」老闆惱羞成怒，罵了他幾句數典忘祖，美國的狗，香蕉人後就將其移出群組，宣稱自己的餐廳對其永不招待。
+
+筆者當時本來也想講幾句話，揶揄一下這位老闆，但看到那位仁兄的下場，想了想找一間好吃的中菜不容易，老闆除了政治立場外人還是不錯，經常親自給我們送外賣給折扣，就刪掉了本想發出的話，給了老闆一個大拇指emoji。
+
+想起有一次在等的士時，有一位白人姨姨想向我傳他們的教，我一聽她講什麼跟著他們教主練習十年就可以不染病痛，末日審判之類的宣傳語就當即判斷這是一個邪教，當即想讓其走開。但此人鍥而不捨，糾纏不休，筆者同時又感覺她不像是一個壞人。閒著無事，我就問她入教多少年了，她聲稱自己已經是十三年的虔誠教徒。我又問她有沒有感染過Covid-19，她說有感染過一次。我當即反問她以你的修行不是可以不染病痛嗎？她說自己前幾年還做過手術，之所以這樣教主說是因為她不夠虔誠，一切都會暗中注定，機緣來的時候她自然會不染病痛，逃離審判的，一切神和教主自有安排。我望了她一眼，上了剛好到達的車離開了。
+
+
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diff --git a/_collections/_heros/1907-06-10-HoChin-a1_l-the-feminist-manifesto.md b/_collections/_heros/1907-06-10-HoChin-a1_l-the-feminist-manifesto.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a7eb16dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_heros/1907-06-10-HoChin-a1_l-the-feminist-manifesto.md
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title: "女子宣布书"
+author: "何震"
+date: 1907-06-10 12:00:00 +0800
+image: https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/a1/0x13_a1_l-19070610.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "原载《天义》第一号“社说”栏，1907年6月10日，第1-7页。"
+position: left
+---
+
+ 呜呼！世界之男女，其不平等也久矣。印度之女，自焚以殉男。日本之女，卑屈以事男。欧美各国，虽行一夫一妻之制，号为平等，然议政之权，选举之权，女子均鲜得干预。所谓平权者，果安在邪？更反观之吾中国，械系其身，以为妃妾。由是，男为主而女为奴，是以剽掠妇女之时代。继因剽劫易起争端，乃创为俪皮之礼，故古礼所言纳采、纳征，均沿财昏之俗，盖视女子为财产之一也。由是男为人而女为物，是为买卖妇女之时代。积此二因，由是男女之间，遂不平等。今即古制可考者言之，厥有四事。
+
+
+
+
+▲ 《天义》第一号（创刊号）目录
+
+ 一曰嫁娶上之不平等。古代之时，位愈尊者妻愈众。如殷代之制，天子娶十二女，诸侯娶九女，大夫三女，士二女。至于周代，则为天子者有一后、三夫人、九嫔、二十七世妇、八十一御妻，岂非以百余之女，匹一男子邪？而后世之嫔妃，则更无限制。贵显之家，蓄妾尤众。其不平者，一也。
+
+ 二曰名分上之不平等。男权既伸，其防范女子亦日严，创“一与之齐，终身不改”《礼记》。之说，使女子终事一夫。有谓夫尊妻卑，夫犹天而妻犹地，妻不去夫，犹地不得去天。《白虎通》说。由是，爵则从夫，姓则从夫，而谥亦从夫，以女子为男子附属物。宋人因之，遂有扶阳锄阴之论。其不平者，二也。
+
+ 三曰职务上之不平等。中国“妇”训为“服”，象持帚之形。而《礼记·曲礼》篇亦言：“纳女于诸侯曰备酒浆，于大夫曰备洒扫。”是古代之妇人，仅以服从为义务。又创为女子不逾阈之说，以禁其自由。后世以降，为女子者，舍治家而外无职务，以有才为大戒，以卑屈为当然。其不平者，三也。
+
+ 四曰礼制上之不平等。夫之于妻，仅服期丧；而妻之于夫，则服丧三年。非惟为夫服重丧也，即夫之父母，亦为之服斩衰；于己之父母，转降为齐衰：非所谓厚于所薄，薄于所厚者邪？且古代之时，父存母殁，为母服齐衰，尤为失理之尤。其不平者，四也。
+
+ 略举四端，则男子之压制女子，昭昭明矣。夫以男陵女，犹可言也。女子而甘于自屈，抑独何心？岂非社会之习惯、腐儒之学术有以钳制之邪？吾今以一语告女界同胞：男子者，女子之大敌也。女子一日不与男子平等，则此恨终不磨。试将女界所应争者，分列如左：
+
+ 一曰实行一夫一妻之制。如男子不仅一妻，或私蓄妾御，性好冶游者，则妻可制以至严之律，使之身死女子之中。其有既嫁之后，甘事多妻之夫者，则女界共起而诛之。若男子仅一妻而妻转有外遇，无论男界、女界，亦必共起而诛之。
+
+ 二曰既嫁之后，不从夫姓。如从夫姓而遗母姓，仍属不公。故生当今时者，当并从父母得姓。即双姓并列是。俟满洲革命以降，则男女均去其姓，以合至公之理。
+
+ 三曰为父母者，俱男女并重。视女犹子，视女之所出如其孙，一矫轻女重男之恶习。
+
+ 四曰男女自初生以后，即与以相等之养育。稍长以后，即授以相等之学术。既长以后，即与以相当之职务。无论社会间若何之事，均以女子参预其间。
+
+ 五曰如夫妇既昏而不谐，则告分离。惟未告分离之前，男不得再娶，女不得再嫁，否则，犯第一条之禁。
+
+ 六曰以初昏之男，配初昏之女。男子于妻死后，亦可再娶，惟必娶再昏之妇。女子于夫死之后，亦可再嫁，惟必嫁再昏之夫。如有以未昏之女嫁再昏之男者，女界共起而诛之。
+
+ 七曰废尽天下之娼寮，去尽天下之娼女，以扫荡淫风。
+
+ 以上七事，非女子欲争权利也，特以天赋之权，男女所同。男女同为人类，若不能平等，是为不公，是为背天理。故女子之所争，仅以至公为止境。顾世人之所疑者，犹有三事：
+
+ 一曰女子有生育之苦，而生子以还，又有鞠养之劳，故职务不可与男同。不知吾所倡者，非仅女界革命，乃社会革命也，特以女界革命为社会革命之一端。社会革命既实行，所生子女，既生以后，即入公设育婴所，不必自为养育也。无养育子女之劳，所尽职务，自可与男相等。
+
+ 二曰，女多而男少，则行一夫一妻之制，转属不公。不知女子之多，由于女子不从事战争，而战争之役悉属于男。男子日有死亡，故女多男少。今为女子者，与其甘心为妾，受辱而死，曾不若实行破坏，死于沙场，犹有日后之荣名也。故女子果实行革命，事平以后，女子之人数必与男子之数相等。
+
+ 三曰男既多妻，女亦可多夫，以相抵制。不知女界欲求平等，非徒用抵制之策已也，必以暴力强制男子，使彼不得不与己平。且男子多妻，男子之大失也；今女子亦举而效之，何以塞男子之口乎？况女子多夫，莫若娼妓。今倡多夫之说者，名为抵制男子，实则便其私欲，以蹈娼妓之所为，此则女界之贼也。
+
+ 要而论之，男女同为人类。凡所谓男性、女性者，均习惯使然，教育使然。若不于男女生异视之心，鞠养相同，教育相同，则男女所尽职务，必亦可以相同。而“男性”、“女性”之名词，直可废灭。此诚所谓男女平等也。近日中国之女子，欲争此境，凡种族、政治、经济诸革命，均宜先男子着鞭，勿复落男子之后，而男女之革命，即与种族、政治、经济诸革命并行。成则伸世界惟一之女权，败则同归于尽，永不受制于男。此则区区之见也。知我罪我，非所计矣。
+
+---
+
+
+▲ 前排左至右：何震（字志剑）、刘申叔、柳亚子。
+
+__何震__（何殷震，1886-1920?），原名何班，字志剑，江苏仪征人，晚清著名才女，中国女性主义早期理论家。
+
+1907年2月13日，何震与其丈夫刘师培东渡日本，参加东京同盟会本部《民报》的工作。除了同盟会本部活动外还与章太炎等人成立“亚洲亲和会”，该会宗旨“在反对帝国主义，期使亚洲已失主权之民族各得独立”。随着孙中山组织的党人起义不断失败，何震夫妇对孙中山等人依靠会党力量、实行武装起义的革命思路逐渐产生怀疑，后赞成以幸德秋水等人的硬派主张，接受并极力宣传无政府主义理论，主张通过总同盟罢工和暗杀活动来实现革命目标。
+
+1907年6月，何震受斯宾塞《女权篇》的影响，与陆恢权等人发起成立“女子复权会”。同年6月10日出版《天义》作为该会机关报，何震担任该报“编辑兼发行人”，其宗旨是：“破除国界、种界，实行世界主义。抵抗世界一切之强权。颠覆一切现近之人治。实行共产制度。实行男女绝对之平等”。来年四月又与丈夫刘师培开办《衡报》，组织社会主义讲习所活动，举办世界语讲习班。后受日本政府镇压国内无政府主义者活动的影响，最终《衡报》被查禁，《天义》也随即正式办理停刊手续。1908年11月上旬，何震与丈夫先后回国。
diff --git "a/_collections/_heros/2007-03-29-Comit\303\251Invisible-a1_c-the-coming-insurrection.md" "b/_collections/_heros/2007-03-29-Comit\303\251Invisible-a1_c-the-coming-insurrection.md"
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3e346924
--- /dev/null
+++ "b/_collections/_heros/2007-03-29-Comit\303\251Invisible-a1_c-the-coming-insurrection.md"
@@ -0,0 +1,618 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title: "革命将至"
+author: "Comité Invisible"
+date: 2007-03-29 12:00:00 +0800
+image: https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/a1/0x13_a1_c-20070329.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "资本主义崩坏宣言及推翻手册"
+position: center
+---
+
+> 我们已陷入绝境，不再有未来。
+在各地发生的暴动，
+无关种族、阶级或城乡，
+而是对现实的全面反对。
+所有用“社会”来思考、定义的社会问题都无解。
+国家只能动用警察，人民只能更为激烈。
+
+
+
+无论从哪个角度来看，现状已陷入绝境。这还不是最糟糕的。在那些满怀希望的人们面前，现状抽空了希望的支撑。那些满口声称掌握了解决办法的人，一下子就被证明满口胡言。大家早已心知肚明，状况只会越来越糟。「未来不再有未来」是这个时代的至理名言，在极为正常的表面底下，它达到了当年庞克精神的高度。
+
+代议政治形成了一个封闭的阶层。从左派到右派，无论看似能干的老手或贞洁的处女，同样出自廉价的伪装，他们在同样的商品陈列架上、彼此交换著从情报中心得来的最新消息。那些依旧去投票的人，似乎只是为了用反对票把投票箱塞爆而已。人们不免怀疑，正是为了反对投票本身，大家才继续投票。任何既有的办法都无法解决这种情况。人民即使处在一片沉默当中，比起抢著要统治人民的那群小丑来说，也显得无比地成熟。巴黎美丽城区的随便一位老北非移民说出来的话，也比那些所谓的官僚发言来得更有智慧。社会压力锅的锅盖被牢牢地盖上了，然而锅内的压力正在不断升高。人民对阿根廷政党的那一声呐喊「全部都该下台！」，现在变成幽灵，挥之不去地纠缠著政客的脑袋。
+
+二〇〇五年十一月的纵火事件在所有人的心里投下一道不断延伸的阴影。这几把揭开节庆序幕的火焰，是对于过去这信口开河的十年进行的一次清洗。媒体编造了一则「郊区对抗共和国」的童话故事，尽管很动听，却并不真实。被纵火的建筑一直扩散到市中心，只是消息被有效地封锁了。在连锁效应下，巴塞隆纳也被烧掉了几条街，然而除了当地居民外，没有人知道这件事。甚至在那之后，法国也没有停止发生火灾。我们可以在嫌犯里找到形形色色的面孔，他们的共通点不在于阶级、种族或区域，而是对现实社会的恨。整件事的新奇之处并非「郊区暴动」——这早在一九八〇年就已经不是新闻了——而是它和以往的暴动形态之间产生了决裂：暴动者不再听从任何人，无论是长辈还是有能力让一切回归正常的地方组织。任何反种族歧视团体都无法在这起事件里发挥作用，只因为媒体的不耐烦、造假和选择性的不报导，才假装这件事有个了结。这一连串的夜间突袭、匿名攻击、直接的破坏行动中，最可贵的地方就在于它将政治和政治性之间的裂口拉开到最大限度。任何人都无法轻易否定这场攻击的严重性，它除了恐吓之外，没有任何诉求、任何主张；它完全是个政治动作。除非是瞎了眼，才看不到在这种对政治的全盘拒绝里面，有著一切最政治的东西，也才会无视于三十年来的青年独立运动。人们像失落的孩童一样，把装饰社会的摆设烧个精光，而且这个社会心里清楚得很，它与巴黎公社末期的巴黎古迹已经没有什麼两样。
+
+没有任何社会方案足以对付当前的情况。首先，这个由阶层、机构和泡沫般的个人组成的空泛集合体，这个我们用反话称之为「社会」的东西，是非常脆弱的；其次，我们失去了传达共同经验的语言。一旦我们没有可以彼此分享的语言，我们就没有可以彼此分享的财富。启蒙运动的抗争历经了半个世纪，法国大革命才可能发生，劳工运动接著抗争了一个世纪，才孕育出强势的「福利国家」。抗争创造出新秩序所需要的语言。今天，一切都不同了。欧洲成为一块没钱的大陆，它偷偷地在利多连锁超市里买东西，为了还能继续出国旅游而参加廉价旅游团。以社会语言所提出的任何「问题」都没有解决办法。「退休」问题、「经济不稳定」问题、「青少年」问题和他们的「暴力」问题，所有的问题都悬而未决，人们只晓得动用警力防止社会问题演变成抗争行动，以免这些行动最终酿成不可收拾的问题。草率处理独居老人的方式令人不敢恭维，然而老人自己却没有发言权。有些人发现，比起维持表面的和谐，采取犯罪的手段不会比较可耻，并且更为有效，于是他们再也不肯缴械投降，更何况监狱也不再用热爱社会那一套为犯人洗脑了。退休员工是充满愤怒的一群，他们对于删减退休金不再逆来顺受，看到有一大部分的年轻人拒绝工作则更是气得要命。最后，当类似暴动的情况一旦发生，任何补助津贴的发放都将无助于推动新的政策、新的条约、新的和平。因为社会的情感早已变得非常稀薄了。
+
+说到解决办法，不许任何状况发生的压力，以及随之而来的警察对国土的分区监控，只会越来越严重。警方已经出面证实，二〇〇六年七月十四日他们在塞纳－圣德尼省（Seine-Saint-Denis）上空出动了一架负责监控的无人驾驶飞机，这比所有人道主义的烟雾弹都更令我们看清未来。警方还特别强调这架飞机没有配备武器，这反倒暴露出我们踏上了什麼样的不归路。国土将被切割成越来越密不透风的区块。座落在「敏感城区」边缘的高速公路便是一道隐形的围墙，恰好把它和高级别墅区分隔开来。在好心的共和国主义者看来，「以社群为单位」的城区治理方式是公认最有效的办法。在这场越来越诡谲、越来越失真、越来越眩目的解构当中，这块土地上的繁华大都会和主要市中心继续过著它们的浮华生活。它们用七彩光芒照耀整个星球，与此同时，犯罪防治大队和私人保全公司的巡逻队伍——简而言之就是民兵——在越来越粗暴的法令掩护之下无尽地繁衍。
+
+这条现状的死胡同到处都遇得到，只是没有人承认。从来没有如此多的心理学家、社会学家、文人被搅和在一块，他们各有自己的一套专业说词，也很专业地无法达成任何结论。只要听听这个时代的歌曲、小资产阶级细诉心情的「新香颂」小品，再听听饶舌乐团Mafia K'1 Fry的宣战歌曲，就知道和平共存已经接近尾声，决定性的时刻即将来临。
+
+这本书由一个想像的群体共同署名。它的编辑群并非作者群。这群人只是想把这个时代的陈腔滥调、那些围著酒吧桌子或在卧房门内的窃窃私语整理一番。他们所做的，只是要凝视绝对的真相；普遍的压抑情绪，充斥在精神病院和绝望的眼神里。他们把自己当作抄写现况的工人。危急时刻所享有的特权，就是公理正义会合乎逻辑地趁机将一切推向革命。我们只需要说出眼前所看到的，而不是去逃避任何结果。
+
+
+### 第一部 我们所深陷的世界
+
+#### 第一圈 I AM WHAT I AM
+
+> I AM WHAT I AM是有史以来最好的统治口号。
+我越想做我自己，越感觉空虚。
+我越想做我自己，越无话可说。
+我越追求自我，越疲惫不堪。
+于是我像残障，用部落格、财产、名声、八卦作为我的义肢，
+永远处于半毁损与半衰弱的状态。
+
+「I AM WHAT I AM.」这是行销为这个世界举行的最后献祭，广告进化的终极阶段，远远领先所有激励人心的话，叫你要与众不同，要做自己，要喝百事可乐。这些概念历经数十年的变化，只是为了完成纯粹的同语反覆。我＝我。他对著健身俱乐部的镜子，奔跑在跑步机上。她开著她的Smart小汽车下班回家。这样的两个人能彼此相遇吗？
+
+「我就是我。」我的身体属于我。我是我，而你是你，但是一切越来越不对劲了。大众被拟人化。生命、工作、不幸的遭遇，乃至于所有状态都被个体化。精神分裂四处蔓延。忧郁症节节逼近。原子化将人化成罹患妄想症的细碎微粒。接触人群令人歇斯底里。我越想做我自己，越感觉空虚。我越想谈我自己，越无话可说。我越追求自我，越疲累不堪。我和你，我们看守著我们的自我，就像看守著无聊的柜台。我们从事著一桩怪异的买卖，变成了我们自己的推销员，变成了拟人化的代言人——虽然这更接近把人肢解的过程。我们或多或少假装自己是毫不勉强地在做担保，直到破产为止。
+
+与此同时，我管理。追求自我、我的部落格、我的房子、最新流行的废话、闺房秘辛和狗屁八卦等等，管理这一切用来支撑起我的义肢！如果说，「社会」还没有变成一个完全抽象的东西，它大概也只是别人供应我撑起存在的骨架，让我起码还有个样子，尽管这个样子只是把我拼装起来的零件总和，用来交换我的身分认同。如今，残障是公民身分的典型。曾经剥削残障的机构组织，现在却为残障争取「生存津贴」，这一切是有迹可循的。
+
+「当个有头有脸的人物」，这道命令无所不在，让人觉得自惭形秽、觉得需要这个社会。命令人要更坚强，是为了制造这道命令继续被服从所需的软弱，软弱到一切似乎都有某方面需要被治疗，不管是工作，还是爱情。每天人们问候彼此「还好吗？」互相取暖，感觉却像是一群病人在管理对方。今天的社会交往是由成千上万的保温箱、密密麻麻的避难所组成的，似乎待在里面总比在外头吹冷风好。然而，里面的一切都是假的，因为取暖只不过是藉口。待在里面不会有任何好转，因为我们被暗中安排好只能靠在一起发抖。只有让每颗社会原子保持恢复健康的幻觉，这个社会才能维持下去。这个社会是一座水力发电厂，在眼眶打转的泪水就是它取之不尽的泉源。
+
+「I AM WHAT I AM.」没有任何统治者发明过比这句话更无可挑剔的口号。当前的秩序和规范严守著一个秘密，就是把个人的自我维持在一种永远有一半损毁、另一半慢性衰竭的状态。耗弱的我、抑郁的我、自我批评的我、虚拟的我，这个我其实是不断在适应的主体，被一种建立在革新、科技加速淘汰、社会秩序陷入混乱、顺从被普遍化的生产模式所需求。这个我是最贪婪的消费者，但是吊诡的，这个我也最具有生产力，以最旺盛的精力和欲望扑向最没有计画的未来，使得这个我逐渐退化到刚出生的幼儿期。
+
+那么，「我是谁」呢？一条漂浮著牛奶、气味、故事、声音、爱、儿歌、物体、姿态、观念、印象、眼神、歌曲和食物的河流，从童年开始穿越了我。我是谁呢？无论如何，我和许多地方、许多苦难、许多祖先、许多朋友、许多爱情、许多事件、许多语言、许多回忆摆脱不了关系，可是很明显的，这许许多多的东西并不是我。所有使我依存于这个世界的连系、所有组成我的关系、所有充满我的力量，这些东西交织而成的并不是认同——就像人们迫使我出示的身分一般——而是存在，独特的、共享的、活生生的存在，这个在不同场所不同时刻现身，开口说「我」的存在。我们感到不安，只不过是因为我们盲目信仰著一个永恒的我，对于塑造我们的一切反而不太在意。
+
+于是，我们头晕目眩地看到上海的一栋摩天大楼高高挂起Reebok的那句话：「I AM WHAT I AM」。西方世界向四面八方进攻，化身为它最疼爱的那匹特洛伊木马，在我和世界之间、个体和群体之间、束缚和自由之间制造要命的矛盾。自由并不是摆脱一切束缚的姿态，而是面对束缚、展开行动的实践能力，能够在各种关系中游刃有余，将它们重组或是打理一番。只有当人们放弃改变家庭那令人泄气的运作方式、或是根本不知道怎麼办时，家庭才会显得如此像个家庭，换句话说，如此像个地狱。把自己连根拔除的自由一直都是自由的幽灵。当我们甩开了阻挡我们的人，我们同时也失去了对他施加影响力的机会。
+
+所以说，「I AM WHAT I AM」不单只是一个谎言、一种广告战术，更是一场军事战争、一声作战口号，攻向所有存在于人们之间的东西，所有不分你我的行动，所有我们之间隐密的连结，所有荒凉的战地上仅有的障碍物，所有我们赖以存在的事物，所有世界上还未被高速公路、游乐园或新市镇完全覆盖的地带：这场战争让世界只剩下纯粹的无聊，没有激情、百依百顺地成为一个荒芜、冰冷的空间，只剩下被精密控管的身体，让如分子般排列组合的汽车、美好的商品在其上快速通过。
+
+法国是对抗忧郁症的天堂，疏解心里郁闷的乐园，精神病的圣城麦加，但也是全欧洲每小时生产力的冠军。疾病、劳累、抑郁都可以被视为必须根治的个人症状，它们让现行制度得以维系，让我对愚蠢的规范逆来顺受，让我的义肢获得改良。它们代替我选择什么是适当、合群、有益的癖好，什么又是最好乖乖丢掉的东西。「你知道，总得做些改变。」可是，我个人的身心问题既可以被当作事实看待，也可以将「我」这个假设瓦解。就这样，个人问题一下子变成抵抗眼前这场战争的行动依据。它变成造反的能量核心，对抗所有让我们残废、让我们规格化的阴谋。「我」并不是我们遭受的危机，而是我们寻求自我表达的形式。人们总是要把我们切分成多个有限的、分裂的、可以被分类和量化统计的我，简而言之，就是可以被控制的我；然而我们每个人都是创造物，都在我们的相似处里混杂着独特性，我们都以活生生的血肉之躯，共同组成这个世界的样貌。和我们从小被灌输的说法相反，聪明才智不应该被用在适应社会上，否则这种聪明，也只是奴隶的聪明。只有在想要驯服我们人看来，我们的不适应才成为问题。其实，不适应为我们指引了一个开端，一个新共犯结构的交会点。它让我们看到一片残破的景象，虽然看起来和这个社会精心捏造的幻觉如此不同，但却更贴近我们可以互相分享的共同经验。
+
+我们并不消沉，我们只是在罢工。对于拒绝振作的人来说，「消沉」不是一种状态，而是一种过渡，是跟现状说再见，是迈开偏行的步伐闪避政治的收编。从那开始，就再也不需要妥协——只有医疗体系和警察才需要表面的和解。这也是为什么，这个社会可以毫不犹豫地为过动儿童吃利他能，从各方面强化我们对药物的依赖，甚至计划从三岁起即早治疗「行为偏差」的问题。这全都是因为，「我」的假设已经布满了裂痕。
+
+#### 第二圈 异乡人
+
+> 我们都是流亡者。
+「社会」已经是诈骗才会用的词汇：
+学校只是为了教育国家的主体，
+家庭只是让人退化的幻影，亲密关系还不如色情工业。
+如今，「成为一个独立自主的人」的正确意义是：
+学会如何在街头开战、如何占领空屋、如何疯狂相爱、如何抢劫商店。
+
+一个宣布进入戒备状态，以对抗十五岁青少年的政府。一个把足球队员当神明膜拜的国家。一位躺在病床上、抱怨自己成了「暴力事件」受害者的警察。一个达成禁止民众自行建造树屋决议的市政府。在谢勒市（Chelles），两个十岁的孩子因儿童游乐中心的纵火案而被控告。这个时代最了不起的地方，就是充满了怎么想也想不到的各种怪诞的情况。可是，媒体却只会营造一种义不容辞的愤怒情绪，故意把这些本来很好笑的新闻处理得让人笑不出来。
+
+对于所有新闻最爱引爆的严重「问题」，我们都可以用笑得东倒西歪来回应。从法国最老掉牙的移民问题开始：根本就没有所谓的「移民问题」。谁在自己出生的地方成长？谁住在自己成长的地方？谁在自己住的地方工作？谁在自己的祖先曾经生活过的地方生活？这个时代的孩子是谁的小孩，是电视的还是他们父母的？真相是，我们全都是被连根拔除的一群，我们全都无家可归，并且伴随而来的是前所未见的观光旅游热，和无法甩脱的痛苦。我们的历史就是殖民史、移民史、战争史、流亡史，是一切生根立足的基础皆被毁坏的历史。在这部历史里，我们成为这个世界的异乡人、我们自己家庭里的访客。教育剥夺了我们的语言，综艺节目剥夺了我们的歌，色情工业剥夺了我们的肉体，警察剥夺了我们的城市，薪资剥夺了我们的朋友。这还不够，在法国，国家权力长期进行着凶猛的个体化工程，从最年轻的时候就将人们予以评比、分类、规训、隔绝，凭着一股冲动将所有超出掌控范围的团结组织全部捣毁，只剩下幻影般的公民身份，让人误以为伟大的共和国是唯一的归属。比起其他国家，法国人是最贫乏、最可悲的人。法国人对外国人的恨，交杂着对自己身为异乡人的恨。对于「城邦」，他们心怀嫉妒又十分恐惧，因为他对于失去的一切感到悔恨；他无法不去羡慕那些所谓「被流放」的社区，那里还顽强地存在着一些社群生活、一些人和人之间的联系、一些非国家的团结精神、一种非正式的经济模式、一种尚未与组织者完全分离的组织。然而，我们依旧无可挽回地失去了一切，于是感觉自己是个法国人的唯一方法，就是去羞辱移民，反对那些其实跟我们一样、但是看起来比我们更像异乡人的人。移民在这个国家占有一种奇怪的主权地位：如果他们不在法国，法国人恐怕也不存在了。
+
+法国的学校制造了法国，而非相反。我们生活在一个极度学院化的国家，每个人想起大学联考的过程，都觉得是一生当中的重要时刻。有些人到了退休后，都还会跟你提起四十年前他们在什么样的一场考试中落榜，又如何因此搞砸了他们的职业、他们的一辈子。一个半世纪以来，伟大共和国的学校塑造了一种国家化的主体性，使得每个人都被个别管理。于是，只要有公平的机会，人人都接受挑选和竞争。人人都期望在人生的竞赛中表现优良，得到奖赏。人人都学或在获得之前，先请求许可。人人都无话可说地尊敬文化、纪律和班上的第一名。即使他们依恋具有批判性又有名的知识分子、坚决反对资本主义，也只是彰显了他们对于学校的爱。随着教育机构的衰落，这种主体性的国家建设每天都在一点一点地崩溃。近二十年来，民间学校和街头文化的兴起，使得国立学校和虚有其表的国家文化相形失色，对于法国的普式信仰造成空前的严重创伤。在这点上，极右派和极左派的意见一致，连讨论都省下了。只要想想如勒·费里（Jules Ferry）这个名字，我们就可以知道学校有多么的可疑——这个法国现代教育改革的推动者，同时也是血腥镇压巴黎公社时期法兰西第三共和国的总理、法国殖民扩张的理论家。
+
+至于我们，常看着那些不知道从哪个「社区治安委员会」冒出来的老师、在晚间八点的新闻节目上哭哭啼啼地说他们的学校被烧掉了的时候，我们想起了小时候有过多少次同样的欲望。当听着某位知识分子大骂那些成群结队的青少年是野蛮人，指责他们对街上的路人叫嚣、抢劫商店橱窗里的东西、纵火烧车、跟镇暴警察玩猫捉老鼠游戏的时候，我们想起了一九六〇年代的郊区青年，他们穿着象征摇滚精神的黑色皮夹克四处游荡，甚至还想起了第一次大战之前的「美好年代」，那时人们称呼流氓为阿帕奇（apaches）。一九〇七年，一位赛纳（Seine）省最高法院的法官如此写道：「近年来流行以阿帕奇一词，泛指所有危险人物、有前科的帮派组织、社会的公敌、没有国家和家庭观念的人、逃避义务者，这些人随时都会犯下胆大妄为的罪行，危害到个人及其财产的安全。」这群游手好闲、把社区的名字据为己有、和警察对峙的非法之徒，是法国式的、被个体化的良好公民的噩梦：他们体现了所有法式公民所抛弃的东西，所有法式公民无法企及的快乐。在一个儿童开心地歌唱、却被警告「你小心挨揍」的国家里，在一个学校的阉割手术大批制造出一代又一代驯良雇员的国家里，存在是一种放肆。有「千面大盗」、「头号公敌」之称的法国黑帮分子梅林（Mesrine），他的光环之所以能够在死后继续发亮，不只是因为他的见义勇为，而是因为他对我们所有人都应该报复的东西、持续采取报复行动。或是说，因为我们从未直接地去报复什么，我们总是在绕路、再拖延。不用怀疑，法国人有的是一千种中伤人的卑鄙手段、花样百出的恶意毁谤、冷酷的凶狠和含毒的礼貌，他永远在不停地报复一切，报复他被碾得粉碎——虽然他被碾得心甘情愿。是时候了，不要再对大财主唯唯诺诺，对警察大声骂干吧！在这方面，某些团体的那股直截了当的敌意，只不过是比别人更不加修饰地表达了这种糟糕的气氛、糟糕的精神状态、并且在一场毁灭之中，解救这个日趋衰竭的国家。
+
+把一群生活在一起的异乡人称之为「社会」（societe），简直是一种诈骗行为，就连社会学家们都打算报废这个养活了他们一个世纪的概念。如今，他们偏爱使用网络（reseau）这个隐喻，来描述受到精密控制的孤独个体彼此连结的方式，以及在「同事」、「死党」、「关系」、「来往」或「其余」等各种状况底下，人们之间微弱的互动行为。不过，这些网络仍然有可能凝聚成一个阶层，在这个阶层里，人们只以暗码沟通，身份认同只是一场不断重组的游戏。
+
+要在现有的社会关系中，把一切奄奄一息的事物例举出来，根本是在浪费时间。人们呼喊着家庭和伴侣关系的回归，可是回归的和当初离去的并不是同一个家庭。回归家庭只是加深了无所不在的分裂——而那正是家庭急于掩盖的真相——家庭因此变成了谎言。每个人都心知肚明，每一年的家庭节日都比往年过得惨淡，一边尴尬看着大家徒劳地挤出勉强的笑容，一边感觉仿佛餐桌上摆着一具尸体、大家却视而不见。从勾引到离婚，从同居到重组家庭，每个人都感受得到家庭是个不幸的幻影，可是多数人还是认为，没有了这道幻影会更加不幸。家庭代表的不全然是老妈令人窒息的管东管西、或老爸打在嘴边的几巴掌、而是一种人有了软绵绵的依靠、就会退化到幼儿一般的懒散，一种什么都亲切熟悉的状态，一种无忧无虑的时刻，让人忘记这个世界正在无可阻止地崩毁。在这个世界上，「成为一个独立自主的人」只是「找到一个好老板」的委婉说法。我们想要在原生家庭的熟悉感中寻找一个借口，用来反制那股几乎将我们撕裂的外力，仿佛只要有人看着我们长大，我们就可以像遗忘童年创伤一样，安心地不去理会任何重大的变动。而面对外力的腐蚀，我们必须自保。
+
+亲密关系是这场社会大崩坏的最后一个阶段。它是人性沙漠中的绿洲。戴着「亲密」的护身符，我们在这片绿洲当中寻找一切在当代社会关系里早已消失的事物：人情味、淳朴、真实感、一种没有剧场也没有观众的生活。然而，一旦恋爱退烧，「亲密」便卸下了它的伪装：它本身就是社会的一项发明，说着女性杂志和心理学的语言，它是人们在还没把恋爱谈腻之前仅有的武装策略。跟别的地方比起来，亲密关系并没有更真实，一样充斥着谎言和怪异的法规。就算我们运气好，在亲密关系里找到某种真实感，我们在和众人分享这份感觉的同时，必然超出了亲密关系的形式：让人彼此相爱的一切，也会让人变得可爱，并让眼中只有对方的两人世界被瓦解。
+
+事实上，所有社会形式的瓦解，是一份天上掉下来的礼物。这对我们来说是个绝佳的状况，让我们可以狂野地进行一场大众的实验，部署新的组织，寻求新的合作。大家口中「不负责任的父母」，正好驱使我们迎战这个世界，提前在我们体内培养出一种清醒的意识，预见即将发生的美丽暴动。在今天，性器官遭受严重的磨损，阳刚和阴柔都只剩下爬满蛀虫的外衣，色情工业在三十年来不断地推陈出新，已经耗尽了所有叛逆和解放的诱惑力；这时候，在亲密关系的死亡中，我们看见一种具有号召力的集体感性正在诞生。在亲属关系里被无条件接受的一切，我们都将拿来作为政治串联的骨干，就像吉普赛人的营地一样能够防堵国家的干预。无止尽的国家补助，只是逼着走投无路的家长抚养无产阶级化的后代，它无法成为一种有利于社会反叛的资助管道。「成为一个独立自主的人」，当然，这话的意思也可以是：学会如何在街头开战、如何占领空屋、如何不工作、如何疯狂地彼此相爱、如何抢劫商店。
+
+#### 第三圈 工作是唯一的秩序
+
+> 今天，工作与其说是为了生产以满足要求，
+还不如说是为了生产生产者和消费者。
+工作本身并不恐怖，
+恐怖的是它有效地在几个世纪之内消灭了工作之外的一切，
+工作的秩序就是唯一的世界秩序。
+于是我们参与自我剥削，让自己「好用」，连打炮都在强调生产力。
+
+在法国，没有比工作更错综复杂的问题了。也没有任何一种关系，比工作关系更让法国人扭曲畸形。去安达卢西亚吧，去阿尔及利亚吧，去那不勒斯吧，在那里人们打从心底藐视工作。去德国吧，去美国吧，去日本吧，在那里人们崇拜工作。没错，情况也有所改变。就像日本有御宅族，德国有快活失业族，而安达卢西亚也有工作狂。但这只是一时的奇景而已。在法国，我们以双手双脚爬向阶级的顶峰，私底下却喜欢拍自己马屁地说不在乎那一点地位。被工作淹没时，我们会加班到晚上十点。但我们也会毫不迟疑地这里一点、那里一点地偷走办公室的文具用品，或是到仓库里把准备转卖的二手零件带一些回家。我们讨厌老板，却不惜代价想成为员工。有工作是种荣耀，但工作却是奴性的标记。总之，法国是完美的歇斯底里症临床解说图。我们爱着我们讨厌的东西，我们讨厌我们爱的东西。每个人心里都明白，当他失去了工作，他等于同时失去了他的受害者和主人，这时候歇斯底里会发作到令他陷入瘫痪和极度混乱。而且，通常他好不了。
+
+在法国这个极度讲究政治的国家，工业权力总是屈服于国家权力。经济活动一直被多疑又拘泥的政治部门硬塞入制式的框架内。一个大老板若非出身于国家的贵族阶层——所谓巴黎综合理工学院和国家行政学院（ENA）打造出来的菁英，那么在幕后操作的权力世界里，他便只配当个可悲的贱民。赛车手出身的法国大亨贝尔纳·塔比（Bernard Tapie）就是他们的悲剧英雄，这位老兄在商业、政治、媒体上获得巨大成功，后来因为涉及法国足球赛的贿赂案而入狱：今天饱受奉承，明天送进监牢，永世成为贱民。即使他现在还拥有自己的一片舞台，也没什么好大惊小怪。法国观众看着他就像在看一只怪物，他们欣赏着这出引人入胜的无耻剧场，同时保持着安全距离，小心不要被他波及。尽管一九八〇年代的法国企业一度很张狂，然而法国从来没有企业崇拜。谁要是写了一本诋毁企业的书，保证登上畅销冠军。企业主管们虽然老爱在公众面前炫耀他们的风采、说些漂亮的空话，在他们四周依旧存在着一道冷笑的封锁线、一汪睥睨的海洋、无边无际的讥讽。企业家不是自己人。总的来说，在被厌恶的等级里，他比警察还讨厌。当个公务员，起码是在不顾一切地对抗那些操盘交易的金童们和私有化，是大家认定的好工作。我们也许嫉妒企业家拥有那些原本不属于他们的财富，但我们不羡慕他们的职业。
+
+正是基于这种神经官能症到达了顶点，一任又一任的政府可以继续向失业议题宣战。企图发动「就业战役」；然而同时，那些失业的前高阶主管们正抓着他们的手机，扎营塞纳河岸，窝在世界医生组织提供的帐篷中。国家就业局（ANPE）用尽了所有在统计学上作假的花招，大量地注销失业人口的登记数字，还是难以将失业人数压低到两百万一下。面对随时可能会发生的社会大爆炸，最低收入补助（RMI）和职业咨询中心所提供的唯一保障，就是寄寄津贴通知单，发发就业情报。当这一切正在发生，法国人的精神统御法变得和稳定的国家政策一样重要，只有两者联手演出工党杜撰的故事，故事才能继续下去。
+
+很抱歉，我们对这种故事他妈的不感兴趣。
+
+我们所属的时代，是没有这个虚构也活得非常好的时代。这是一个从不指望退休、也不信任劳动法的世代，更别说相信有工作权这回事。这并不是一个「不稳定」的世代。就像那些最激进的左派分子所乐于理论化的那样，因为不稳定是相对于工作的领域而言，或者这么说更符合现在的状况：是相对于正在瓦解的工作而言。我们承认赚钱是必要的，无论用什么方法都行，因为没钱就是万万不能，但是我们并不觉得非工作不可。于是，我们再也不工作了：我们干活。公司并不是我们存在的场所，我们只是偶尔经过。我们不是犬儒，我们只是对自己被过度滥用有所保留。那些关于动机、优势、个人投资的言论，只是主管们用来对付大混乱的一套人性化的处理方式，我们只当耳边风。大家都说对大企业感到失望，因为大企业不但没有加冕我们父母的忠诚，还随随便便地遣散他们。大家都在说谎。只有曾经怀抱希望，才会感到失望。我们对大企业从来不抱任何期望：我们早就发现企业是怎么一回事，它的把戏就是以多变的形式设下安抚人心的骗局。我们只是为我们受骗的父母感到惋惜，他们或多或少都曾经相信过。
+
+我们可以这样解释围绕着工作问题所产生的情感混乱：工作的概念总是涵盖了两个彼此矛盾的面向，剥削和参与。以私人或社会的名义占有剩余价值，剥削个人和集体的劳动力；在生产领域的中心组织合作关系，参与共同的工作。在工作的观念里，这两个面向总是被恶意混淆：有些人以马克思主义的修辞解释工人的疏离感，因此否定了工人有参与的可能；另一些人以管理学的修辞解释这种疏离感，因此否定了工人有被剥削的可能。工作关系中的矛盾感也是由此而来，我们感觉自己受到羞辱，因为工作关系让我们和自己所做的事变得毫不相干，但我们同时又感觉自己被喜爱，因为我们在这场戏局里扮演了一定的角色。再此，毁灭是先决要素：一切都应该被破坏，所有人都必须被连根拔起，好让工作最终成为无依无靠的我们唯一的生存方法。工作本身并不那么恐怖，恐怖的是它有方法地在几个世纪之内消灭了工作之外的一切：工作让我们对任何区域、任何技艺、任何村落、任何抗争、任何亲属关系，都不再有归属感；对任何地方、任何声明、任何季节、任何说话与做事的习惯，都不在感到依恋。
+
+这就是当前的吊诡所在：工作已经大获全胜，其他的存在方式则是一概不剩，连工人都显得多余。生产力的提升，企业外移，生产的机械化、自动化和数位化，这一切是如此的进步神速，以至于在商品的制造方面，必要的人力劳动量已经被缩减到近乎于零。我们生活在这种吊诡里，活在一个只有工人没有工作的社会里，这个社会有的只是消遣、消费和娱乐，唯独缺少了让娱乐消遣成为必需品的工作。过去一个世纪，法国南部的矿场卡尔莫（Carmaux）向来以暴力罢工而闻名，如今它已经转型成发现角（Cap Decouverte）——一个「多功能休闲中心」，可以玩滑板、骑单车，并以「矿坑博物馆」著称，专门为游客模拟瓦斯爆炸。
+
+在企业里，分工变得越来越清楚，有高技术性的研究部门、企划部门、人事管理部门、协调部门和宣传部门，这些部门掌握了全新的自动生产过程所需的知识，剩下的就是低技术性职位，负责维持和监控整个生产过程。前者人数少、薪水高，因此令人垂涎，以至于占据这些职位的少数人做到累死也要保住这份工作。可以说，他们是和工作焦虑地抱在一起。经理、科学家、说客、研究人员、程式设计师、开发商、开发顾问和工程师，说这些人从未停止工作真的一点都不夸张。他们就连打炮都在提升生产力。而且他们说话都像哲学家。一位法国国家人力资源部（DRH）的哲学家曾提出这样的理论：「最有创意的企业也是拥有最多亲密关系的企业。」另一位宾士汽车集团的哲学家对这番理论表示肯定：「企业的合作伙伴，是企业资本的一部分……他们的积极性、技术专业、创新能力，以及他们对客户需求的照顾，构成了全新服务的主要内容……他们的应对进退、社交能力和情绪管理能力，在他们的各项考绩中所占的比重越来越高……新的考绩方式将不再以工作时数为评量标准，而是以目标的达成与否和成果的品质如何为基础。所有人都是企业家。」
+
+凡是不能交由自动化处理得工作，皆属于模糊不清的职务范畴，也就是说这些工作机器无法处理，所以随便什么人都能处理——例如搬运工、仓储管理员、生产线工人、季节性工人等等。这些劳动力是弹性的、没有职业分工的，工人们从一个工作换到另一个工作，永远无法在一个企业里待太久，无法聚集成一股力量，不但从未处于生产过程的核心，简直就是在数不完的缝隙中被压得粉碎，然后用他们来填补尚未被机械化的漏洞。临时工是一种再也不是工人的工人形象，他不再拥有技术，只有能卖就卖的能力，连有求必应都是他的工作。
+
+在工作这台大机器的核心，是对它的良好运转有效和必要的劳动力，但是在机器的边缘，大多数人将成为多余的劳动力，他们除了帮忙机器生产之外便一无是处，而且一旦他们失业而游手好闲，很可能就会开始破坏这台机器。集体遣散的威胁是缠绕着目前这个生产体系的鬼魂。对于《解放报》提出的问题「到底为什么要工作？」，并不是每个人都会像这位领过最低收入补助的人这样回答：「为了我所享受的福利，我需要做点什么。」这个问题有个更大的风险，因为我们终将发现，我们的游手好闲就是我们的工作。浮动的人群必须有事做，或是被安置。然而如今我们仍未发现比薪水更能令人服从的方法。因此，有人大力主张废除一切「社会福利」，这样一来，最倔强的人也只好回归薪资的怀抱，否则他们只有两种选择，饿死或是吃牢饭。各种蓬勃发展的奴隶贸易和「个人服务」必须持续下去：女清洁工、维修工人、按摩业、家庭帮佣、娼妓、护理、特殊教育、具有治疗效果的休闲活动、心理咨询等等。伴随这一切而来的，是持续升高的安全规范、卫生规范、行为规范与文化规范，以及越来越短命的赶流行。其实，光是为了赶流行，就可以让这些奴隶般的服务业变得不可或缺。在鲁昂（Rouen），停车自动售票机已经被「人力停车计时器」所取代：某个在路边无聊得发慌的人会给你一张停车卡，如果碰到下大雨，还会提供出租雨伞的服务。
+
+曾经，工作的秩序就是世界的秩序。眼睁睁地看着工作的秩序崩溃，让许多人光是想到接下来的日子，就害怕得全身抽搐。今天，工作与其说是为了生产商品以满足经济需求，还不如说是为了生产生产者和消费者，用尽一切方法拯救工作秩序，以符合政治需求。在这个生产变得失去目的的社会里，自我生产正在成为一项主导性的行业：就好比一位被剥夺殆尽的木匠，连个可以刨木头的地方都不剩，只好绝望地自己刨自己。这正是我们的年轻人每天上演的戏码：为了工作面试努力练习微笑，为了工作升迁努力把牙齿刷白，为了提振团队精神一起去混夜店，为了事业进展而去学英文，为了再次达到性高潮而结婚离婚，为了成为领导者而报名表演课程，为了增强「危机管理能力」而参加「自我提升」训练——某某心灵导师表示：「为每个人个别设计的自我提升训练，能够让情绪更稳定，让人在开放的交际场合更自在，思路更敏锐清晰，因此，也能让人拥有更出色的经济表现。」在这一小撮拥挤的人群里，每个人都巴不得快点被上司挑中，同时又要锻炼自己保持自然，这是因为大家都必须学会一种能动性（mobilisation）的工作伦理，唯有如此才能挽救工作的秩序。具备能动性，就是不把工作当成一件自己的差事，而是一种自身的可能性。假设某个失业的人，某天突然不玩穿孔和刺青而改上发廊，开始积极地「规划」未来，在工作上努力证明自己就像大家所说的「很好用」，他便成功地表现了他的能动性。能动性，就是感觉自己和自己轻微地剥离，是把我们从构成我们一切当中最低限度地抽离出来，是把我从工作的主体变成客体的诡异情境，使得我贩卖的不是我的工作能力，而是我贩卖我自己，老板付我薪水不是因为我做了什么，而是因为我是什么，因为我的社交手腕特别细腻、因为我擅长交际、因为我会微笑又会推销。能动性就是社会化的新形式。能动性让工作中的两极合二为一：我们参与了对自己的剥削，我们剥削了对一切的参与。我们就是自己最理想的中小企业，自己的老板和自己的产品。无论我们有没有工作，我们必须积累人脉，积累资历，积累「工作网络」，简而言之，累积做人的「资本」。人们几乎不需要任何理由，就可以发布全球动员令，无论对抗的是癌症、「恐怖主义」、地震，还是无壳蜗牛都一样。这些现象只是证明了掌权者的意志力有多么强大，能够在工作名存实亡之后，让我们还愿意接受工作的统治。
+
+因此，今天的生产工具有两种功能。一方面，它是一座巨大的机器，能够在身体上和精神上动员所有人，把人类过剩的能量榨得一干二净；另一方面，它也是一台挑选淘汰的机器，把生存权分配个愿意服从多数的人，剔除掉那些「危险分子」，因为他们用另外一种方式过活、他们不服从。一方面，我们让幽灵复活；另一方面，我们要活人去死。这就是今天生产工具所拥有的政治功能。
+
+为了超越工作和反对工作而组织起来、集体反叛动员的体制、展现一种只有在不动员的散乱无序里才存在的生命力和严谨，这些都是我们来日无多的文明所不允许的罪恶——但也正是我们活下去的唯一方法。
+
+#### 第四圈 不断延伸的都会边缘
+
+> 不是乡村，也不是城市，我们拥有的是大都会。
+混杂着轻快的曲调、伸缩警棍和棉花糖，
+权力的监控完美地融入了商品的景观。
+贫民区是唯一还有活力、让人还能活下去的地方，
+事业群众让这些废弃的空屋再度活过来，
+用郊区的黑话和火焰，绽放出比拉丁区更耀眼的光芒。
+
+我们再也不说「城市」（ville）和「乡村」(campagne)了，更别提两者直接古老的对比关系。在我们周遭扩张的景象，长得不像乡村，也不像城市：它是铺天盖地的都市计划，不具形体又毫无规则可循，形成一片无边无际、无线荒芜的地带，一个由博物馆化的超市中心和自然公园、巨大的集合住宅区和农业开发地、工业区和别墅区、乡间小屋和连锁酒吧相连而成的世界。简而言之：一座大都会（l'urbain）。过去曾经有古代城市、中世纪城市、现代城市，就是没有大都会城市。大都会代表的是领土的整合。与其说是在地理上让一切彼此相邻，不如说是把所有网络交织在一起。
+
+正是因为城市已经完全消失，如今城市才跟历史一样，变成恋物癖的对象。法国北方里尔（Lille）的手工业变成剧场表演，勒阿弗尔（Le Havre）市中心的混凝土建筑被联合国教科文组织列为世界遗产。人们先是把围绕着紫禁城的北京胡同拆个精光，然后为了满足观光客的猎奇心态，才又在更远的地方建了几条假的。在法国的特鲁瓦（Troyes），人们用木结构和泥土填充制成传统样式的立面，然后把它摘贴在空心砖塔盖的建筑物上，简直是一种仿冒的艺术，不禁令人联想到巴黎迪士尼乐园的维多利亚风格商店。许多历史古迹曾是发生暴动的历史所在地，现在一律乖乖听从大都会计划的整顿和安排，转型成观光旅游景点，炒热消费气氛。古迹成为被商品魔法控制的孤岛，全靠市集、美学还有暴力维持着魔法的效力。每年圣诞节都有矫揉造作得要命的圣诞市集，但也有市政府出动的夜间警察和巡逻队。权力的监控完美地融入了商品的景观，但也不忘显露出它权威的一面。这是一个混杂的时代，混杂着轻快的曲调、伸缩警棍和棉花糖。每个被警察严密监控的地方，看起来都奇幻无比！
+
+在这种对于「历史真实性」的喜好里，总是掺杂着对于控制的喜好；随着这种喜好而来的，是小资产阶级对于平民生活的社区所展开的殖民。小资产阶级从超市中心被赶了出来，便到平民社区去寻找别墅区里找不到的「社区生活」。接着，小资产阶级赶走穷人、汽车、移民，把每个地方弄得干干净净，把细菌统统杀光，然而他所消灭的，正是当初他想来到这里寻找的。一张市政府的海报上，印着一位清洁人员把手伸向一位治安警察，以及一串标语：「蒙托邦（Montauban），清洁城市」。
+
+为了面子，都市设计师现在不谈「城市」，城市已经被他们摧毁了，他们改说「都会」；基于相同的理由，他们也不谈「乡村」，乡村早就不存在了。取而代之的，是在紧张焦虑、无依无靠的人群面前展开的一片风景，是在农民逐渐消失的今天，一段放在舞台上供人欣赏的过去。人们大肆行销每一块「领土」，地面上的一切都必须被增值、指定为历史古迹。冷冰冰的空虚不断扩大，连最偏远的城镇也不能幸免。
+
+大都会让城市和乡村同时死亡，它坐落在所有中产阶级的交会地带，位居中上阶层的衔接地段，他带领大批人潮从乡村出走，使得乡村不断地被「外环都市化」（periurbanisation），以便都会的边缘被无尽延伸。整片大地正在变成一面巨大的玻璃橱窗，这个时候，当代建筑的犬儒主义合乎时宜地出现了。无论是一间中学、一家医院，还是一栋影音图书馆，都不过是同一主题的不同伴奏罢了，呈现的都是透明、中性、统一。在设计上，根本不需要考虑这些蔓生的建筑物是盖来做什么用的，它可以盖在这里，也可以被盖在任何地方。盖在法国第一大的商业区拉德芳斯（La Defense）、第二大的帕拉迪厄（La Part Dieu）、第三大的欧罗里尔（Euralille），那一圈又一圈的办公室大楼是做什么用的？法文有句俗话说得好：「新得过火」（flambantneuf），一语道破了这些新大楼的用途和命运。一七八一年五月，群情激愤的暴民放火烧掉了巴黎市政厅，一位苏格兰游客亲眼目睹了熊熊燃烧的怒火、如何享有光彩夺目的权力：「……眼前的景象美得教人难以想象，真是太壮观了！我不否认，巴黎公社的那群坏蛋实在很恐怖，但他们也实在是了不起的艺术家啊！而且他们没有意识到自己正在创作！……我曾在意大利看过地中海的蔚蓝海水拍打着阿玛尔菲城（Amalfi）的遗址，在横跨印度和巴基斯坦的旁遮普（Pendjab）地区看过锡克教神庙的遗迹，游览过罗马和其他风景名胜；但没有任何东西能和今晚我的双眼所见相比。」
+
+当然，在大都会的版图里，仍旧保有几块城市的残骸和乡村的残渣。不过城市和乡村的生命力并没有消散，这股生命力将流放地占领下来，建造了自己的社区。于是吊诡的情况出现了：表面上最无法住人的地方，反而才是唯一适合居住的环境。一栋被非法占领的老公寓，比起只是用来摆摆家具、修修装潢、以便等待下次搬家的豪宅，总是显得更有人味。在许多超大型市中心里，贫民区都是唯一还有活力、让人还能活下去的地方，尽管毫无疑问，也是生命最容易受到威胁的地方。贫民区是世界级大都会电子化布景的反面。在巴黎北边的郊区，小资产阶级纷纷离弃集体住宅、搬进独栋别墅，是失业的民众让这些废弃的空屋再度活过来，用郊区的黑话和火焰，绽放出比拉丁区更耀眼的光芒。
+
+大家对于二〇〇五年十一月的那场大火有一种普遍的误解，认为是极端的剥削引发了暴动，其实刚好相反，暴动来自对土地全然的占有。烧掉几台汽车可能只是因为一时不爽，但是要让暴动四处蔓延，让警察连吃一个月的败仗，就必须掌握组织动员的技巧，而要达成战略上的默契，则必须准确地了解地形，并拥有共同的语言和共同的敌人。无论相隔多少公里，多少个礼拜，都无法阻挡战火燃烧，就在最毫无预警之处，第一道火焰的余烬酿成后续的大火。暴动者的耳语躲过了监听系统。
+
+大都会是潜在冲突连绵不绝的战场，国际列强对伊拉克的巴士拉（Basorra）、索玛利亚的摩加迪休（Mogadiscio）、巴勒斯坦的纳布卢斯（Naplouse）发动的侵略战争，只不过是潜在冲突的白热化。对军队来说，打仗最怕遇到城市，要打的话就必须得用大规模的围攻战术，而大都会在这方面完全可以被视为一场大战。武装冲突只是战争大势已定的一个时刻而已。这些由国家发动的战争，就像是为了填补大都会的治安黑洞而一再重复的治安工程——「无论这个黑洞是布吉纳法索（Burkina Faso）、纽约的南布朗克斯（Bronx du sud）、大阪的釜崎（Kamagasaki）、墨西哥的恰帕斯州（Chiapas），还是巴黎近郊的拉库内夫（Courneuve）」。「国家干预」不全是为了打胜仗，甚至也不是为了恢复秩序和安定，而是为了维系一种社会治安从未受到损害的安全感。如今，战争不只发生在与世隔绝的地方，他衍生成了一系列细微的军事活动和维安措施，以确保「安全」无误。
+
+警察和军队哥俩好一般合作无间。一位犯罪学家曾要求法国镇暴警察组成小巧灵敏的专业化编制。军队机构向来是各种教训惩罚方式的开创者，如今则反过来怀疑其这种阶级化的管教模式。一位北大西洋公约组织的官员说，为了训练组织的精锐部队，他们运用了一种「参与的方法，让每位成员共同分析、准备、执行、评估一项军事行动。每一次计划都用好几天的时间反复讨论，并根据训练过程和接收到的最新资讯作调整……没有什么比共同发展一项计划更能凝聚向心力，使得每个人的行为都来自于他对团队的认同感」。
+
+武装军队不只融入了大都会，也塑造了大都会。这就是为什么，纳布卢斯战役以来，以色列士兵把自己称为国家的建筑师。巴勒斯坦游击队利用危机四伏的巷道展抵抗敌人，反倒迫使以色列士兵学会在都会闹区以垂直和水平的方式进攻，打穿墙壁和天花板以便行动自如。一位在以色列国防部任职、学哲学出身的军官如此解释：「敌人用传统、古典的方法诠释空间，而我拒绝听从敌人的诠释、掉入他们的诠释陷阱……相反，我要突袭敌人！这就是战争的本质。我必须赢得胜利……这么说吧，我采取了一种能够让我穿透围墙的方法学……我就像一条虫，在前进的路上把阻碍全部啃光。」而都会不只是冲突的剧场，更是突围的手段。的确，这令我们想起布朗基（Blanqui）所做的建议，特别是他站在了暴动阵营的立场。布朗基叮咛未来巴黎的暴动者，打街垒战的时候，必须将街边的房屋层层包围，才能保卫自己的阵地；必须将所有的墙壁都开一个大洞，把空间打通：必须打掉建筑物地面层的楼梯、在天花板上穿孔，才能提防埋伏在周围的政府军；必须把门板拆下来当作窗户的屏障，并在每一层楼规划一个良好的射击位置。
+
+大都会不只是都会化的团块，不只是城乡冲突的极致，它更代表了生命和无生命物的涌现。它是一股潮流，流经由光纤电缆、高速火车路线、人造卫星、监视摄像机所组成的网络，推湧着这个世界加速冲向死亡。它的能动性令所有人无从抵抗地随它摆布，并动员着每一个人。在这股潮流中，我们遭受资讯污染，被互相敌对的势力撕扯。但我们只能随波逐流、加速冲刺。于是，等待变得困难，就连在频繁的班次间隔等待一班地铁也如此困难。
+
+移动工具和沟通媒介的多样化，不断地将我们从此地和此刻抽离出来，让我们总是渴望身在他方。搭乘高速铁路、区间快车，或只是拨一通电话，都是为了让自己感觉已经到了别的地方。这种能动性令我们失根、孤绝、流离。它之所以还不至于令人无法忍受，是因为它创造了移动式的私人空间，方便携带的内在世界。个人就像泡沫般轻盈，但并不破灭，而是在潮流中载浮载沉。宅男宅女们并没有破茧而出，而是带着茧壳移动。从一座车站到另一座车站，一栋购物中心到另一栋购物中心，一家商业银行到另一家商业银行，一间饭店到另一间饭店，到处都是人们早已见怪不怪的怪物，以至于本来陌生的东西成了唯一熟悉的事物。繁华的大都会是一架巨大的搅拌器，它随机选取某些特殊情境，再拼装成龄琅满目的花样。在这样的情况下，每个市中心不再是性质彼此相似的地点，而是特殊情境的供给站，我们从这一站换到下一站，选择这一站放弃另一站，根据消费的喜好选择酒吧的风格、人的风格、设计的风格和存在的风格，就像再点选ipod的播放清单一样。「只要有一台mp3播放器在手，我就是全世界的主宰。」要在这个同质性越来越高的环境里生存下去，唯一的办法就是不断改装自己的内在世界，但就像小孩子堆叠的玩具屋，盖出来的综合推倒的一模一样。也像是鲁宾逊在荒岛上复制了他那充满了市侩的世界，只不过我们的文明本身就是这座荒岛，而我们则是几十亿拼命爬上岸的人。
+
+其实，大都会就是个潮来潮去的建筑群，人类史上还未出现过如此脆弱的组织方式。它灵活、精密，但是脆弱。都会的边界一旦因为流行疾病的迅速传染而突然关闭、粮食供应一旦出现不足、通讯网络一旦被有计划地封锁，大都会的整面布景便随之倒塌，再也无法遮掩后台里血腥杀戮的战争场面。如果这个世界不是在被它的毁灭紧跟在后，它不会跑得这么快。
+
+紧密交错的网络组织、各种科技环环相扣的底层结构、四处扩散的建筑物，这一切都是为了保护大都会免于瘫痪。即使被核子弹爆炸，网路也不能断线。大量流通的资讯、人和商品，一律必须受到严格的管理，追溯来源和流向，以便大都会运作顺畅、保证仓库里货物齐全、商店里没有偷窃行为、机舱里没有恐怖分子。这全都要感谢电子标签、生物特征护照和DNA鉴定的功劳。
+
+然而，大都会在发明了上述这一切的同时，也发明了毁灭自己的方法。一位美国安全专家曾提出警告，让伊拉克游击队学会如何运用新的通讯科技，是美军的一大失误。美国的侵略战争没有带给伊拉克多少民主，到是再当地架设了无线电通讯网路。就这样，美国带给了伊拉克一样能够打败美国的武器。行动电话和上网地点的增加，让游击队发明出许多过去不曾出现的组织方法，使得美军的这场仗变得更难打了。
+
+每个网络都有它的弱点，只要我们设法松开其中几个环节，交通就会瘫痪、防护网就会内爆。二〇〇六年十一月四日晚间发生的那场欧洲大停电是最好的证明：只要一条高压电缆出了状况，一大块的欧洲就会沉入黑暗。要在大都会里制造突发事件、使得其他的可能性能够被开启，首先要做的就是打断大都会永远急切的节奏感。泰国的叛乱分子总是先炸毁发电系统，就是这个道理。同样地，法国二〇〇六年因反对《首次聘雇就业法案》（CPE）而引发的一连串抗争行动，就是利用罢课瘫痪大学，进而瘫痪经济市场。二〇〇二年十月发生的美国码头罢工潮亦然，工人们为了保住三百个工作机会，在十天之内瘫痪了西部海岸的主要港口。美国的经济体十分依赖从亚洲进口的货源，每封港一天就多增加数十亿美元的损失。只要一万人，我们就能撼动世界第一大国的经济体系。诚如某些「专家」所言，要是这场罢工运动持续一个月以上，我们说不定会看到「美国回到经济大萧条的时代，东南亚的经济噩梦成真」。
+
+#### 第五圈 经济改革方案的破碎声
+
+> 我们终于懂得这个道理：经济并没有陷入危机，经济本身就是危机；
+就业机会并没有萎缩，而是工作量太大；
+令人喘不过气的，不是经济危机，而是经济成长。
+我们都是经济的产物，一代又一代地被驯服、
+被改造成自动生产又乐于消费的主体。
+经济是一种政治。
+
+三十年来，各种「危机」不断，失业群众扩大，国家成长停滞不前，却还有人要我们相信经济。的确，这三十年间也有过几次中场休息，让人产生可以松一口气的幻觉：第一次中场休息是在一九八一年到八三年之间，我们幻想左派执政可以真正为人民谋福利；第二次中产休息是一九八六年到八九年的经济热潮，我们幻想跟着投资者和投机客的脚步一夕致富；第三次中场休息是一九九八到二〇〇一年的网路普及，我们幻想只要上网就能找到一份虚拟的工作，同时幻想着一个多元族群但团结一致的法国——多元文化又有教养的法国，一定可以抱回每一届世界杯足球赛的冠军奖杯。结果我们把仅存的幻想都用光了，我们见底了、干枯了，要不就是被掏空了。
+
+历尽千辛万苦，我们终于懂得这个道理：经济并没有陷入危机，经济本身就是危机；就业机会并没有萎缩，而是工作量太大；不能否认，像经文般一长串的股市行情数字，有些人听起来就像听拉丁文弥撒一样感动，多么幸运，我们之中还有这样的人存在——让我们可以不用理会那群只靠偷抢骗拐、非法走私、或是最低收入补助过活的人；那群无法对工作产生认同感、每天只想着及时行乐的人；那群边缘人、弱势者，以及所有被视为少数、其实数也数不清的人；那些生怕莫名其妙就被整个社会大规模遗弃的人，尤其是退休没事可干的人，和遭受剥削、却仍然任劳任怨的工人。我们不用理会他们，尽管这群人和我们一样，是受到股市行情波及的人。
+
+我们无法不理会的是，先是一个又一个的国家，然后是一整片一整片的大陆，都陆陆续续失去了对经济的信仰。大家发现国际货币基金组织只会驾着波音客机霸道地飞来飞去，世界银行集团只会让我们吃足苦头，然而西方国家日益严重的经济空转，这些集团却完全避而不谈。从几内亚到俄罗斯，从阿根廷到玻利维亚，经济的神圣地位和神职人员一样面临严重的信用破产。有一则关于世界银行集团的笑话是这么说的：「请问，一千多个国际货币基金组织的经济学家葬身海底，第二天的新闻标题是什么？」答案是：「世界有救了。」另一则俄罗斯的笑话则是：A和B是两位经济学家，有一天A问B：「你了解发生了什么事吗？」B回答：「当然，我来跟你解释。」A火大了：「不对！你没有回答我的问题！解释有什么难的！我也是经济学家，要解释我自己会来！我把问题再重复一遍：你到底了不了解到底发生了什么事？」神职人员总是能够伪装得天衣无缝，假装自己是抨击教条的异端。最近在「经济科学领域」里流行一种学说，这种学说自称为——这可不是在开玩笑——「非自闭的经济学」（economie non autistique），力图将经济学内部各种被歪曲的事实、各种花招和掺假的痕迹清洗干净，并主张经济学最明确的角色，就是炒热掌权者以冠冕堂皇的理论布置成圣坛，帮忙用斯文的语气包装高压的律令，最后再像自古以来的宗教一样，为这一切提出解释。因为真正难以承受的苦难，是没有什么原因和理由可解释的苦难。
+
+金钱不再万能，对有钱人如此，对穷光蛋亦然。百分之二十的德国年轻人被问到未来要做什么时，回答「艺术家」。工作不再是人类非忍受不可的生存条件。许多企业里的会计员都承认，他们不知道自己的工作价值在哪里。恶名昭彰的商业市场本来还想为它的邪恶说一则动听的故事，它说了十年，最后却说出了一部充满暴力和暴发户的寓言。进步在每个地方变成了灾难的同义词，这已经是常识了。一切都在经济统治的世界里消失无踪，仿佛在重演前苏联总理安德洛波夫主政的苏联末期。只要对这段时期稍有了解的人，就会很容易在我们的主政者呼吁人民要有坚强意志的时候、在加速飞奔到我们不知道会奔向何处的未来里、在告诉人民无论如何都要相信「改革」的政令宣导里，听见柏林围墙开始碎裂的声音。社会主义集团的瓦解带来的不是资本主义的成功，这整个跨国集团其实是资本主义的一种形式，它的瓦解表示了这种形式的破产。同样地，苏联的破产并不是人民起义反抗的结果，而是国家的特权阶级露出了他们真实的嘴脸。因为一旦社会主义宣布投降，一大部分的统治阶级就可以名正言顺地切断他们对人民应尽但过时的义务，以私有制和民主之名，更全面地控制过去已经被他们控制的东西。以前，工厂里的工人常说：「反正国家只是假装付我们薪水意思一下，我们也假装工作意思一下。」后来，露出真面目的寡头政权回应工人：「你不喜欢假装？那我们就来真的！」就这样，原物料、基础工业、整个复杂的军事工业网络、银行、夜总会陆续被私有化，贫民潮和移民潮相继涌现。就如同安德洛波夫时代的人民不再信任苏联，今天的人民不管是在会议厅、工厂，还是办公室里，都找不回一点对法国的信任。大老板们和主政者异口同声地说：「那我们就来真的！」为了贯彻「经济的铁律」，他们毫不手软，半夜先把工厂迁走，清晨再对员工宣布关闭工厂，然后毫不考虑地派遣宪兵特勤部队去镇压罢工——例如「科西嘉地中海国家渡轮公司」的罢工事件，以及二〇〇六年发生在雷恩（Rennes）的民众占领邮件处理中心事件，皆以此告终。当权者以谋杀行动来管制眼前的这片荒芜，为「新经济」打好基础。
+
+事实上，我们都是经济的造物。我们一代又一代地被驯服、被安抚、被改造成自动生产又乐于消费的主体。结果，我们努力要遗忘的一切，现在反而显得更清晰了，那就是：经济是一种政治。而今天，这种政治可以说是一种在人性变成多余的群体里，适者生存的政治。从路易十四的财政大臣科尔贝（Colbert）到拿破仑三世，再到二次大战后的戴高乐，经济之于国家一直都是政治，获得经济利益的资产阶级对此一清二楚，反抗经济剥削的无产阶级就更不用说了。只有这群奇特的中间阶层群众似乎什么都不知道，他们是一团怪异的物质，由没有任何力量也不做任何表态的人所组成——也就是所谓的小资产阶级。小资产阶级相信经济就是现实，因为经济让他们的中性立场受到保护。小生意人、小老板、小公务员、职员、老师、记者，这群位居中间地带的中间人在法国形成了一种非阶级（non-classe），一种由大众组成的透明社会粘着剂。他们一心只想在历史的风暴之外安稳地过完他们小小的私人生活。他们就是法国大革命时期的中间派，天生是伪善的捍卫者，让自己总是处于半睡半醒之间，这样才能对爆发在周遭的战争视而不见。这也是为什么，法国许多反对阵营提出的解决方案，常常只是发明了新的空想。近十年来的「课征金融交易税以协助公民组织」（ATTAC）和他们虚晃一招的托保税就是一个好例子，他们成立的时候宣称自己是反全球化的社会运动团体，创造出来的却正是一个全球化的政府组织，成天喊着要用「真实的经济」对抗金融市场，骨子里充满了对国家的怀旧情感。这场闹剧要闹多久随他们高兴，反正他们也变不出新把戏。一场空想接着又是一场空想，然后有些人又想出了逆成长（decroissance）这个概念。如果说「课征金融交易税以协助公民组织」试图透过一连串教育宣导课程挽救经济的科学价值，逆成长则是为了挽救经济的道德感。世界末日即将到来，而我们唯一能做的就是降低经济成长。减少消费、减少生产。我们要知足常乐、吃有机食品、每天骑脚踏车、戒烟，购买任何产品就要严格检查一遍。我们要最快乐地过最艰苦的生活，心甘情愿当个头脑简单的人。「我们将会发现，真正美好的财富是友善的社会关系，和一个健康的世界。」「自然是我们的资本，请勿过度使用。」我们要迈向一种「健康的经济」。「拒绝混乱的合理化。」「拒绝制造社会危机，全力拥护民主和人道主义。」简而言之：我们要变得更节制，更经济。我们要回到爸爸爷爷那一辈的经济模式，回到小资产阶级的黄金岁月，回到一九五〇年代。「当一个人养成节俭的好习惯，他的所得便能完全补偿他为工作所做的付出，并使他可以随心所欲地享受公共的社交生活，或是个人的私密生活。」
+
+在富有异国情调的咖啡座上，一位插画家穿着纯手工羊毛衫，和朋友一起喝着水果鸡尾酒。在座的每个人是那么能言善道，爱开玩笑又不失分寸，不会太吵又不会美化可聊，看着对方面带微笑，自我感觉很难不好。大家心想：我们是多么文明的一群人哪！接下来，有人要去整理社区的花圃，有人去上陶艺课，有人去参加禅修班，有人去看动画电影。我们同样拥有正确的情感，一起发明了新的人性，变得比之前更聪明、更细腻。而且，我们是对的。关于人类文明的未来，苹果电脑的想法和逆成长的主张想法几乎一模一样。回归往昔的经济模式这种逆成长分子的论调，恰好为高科技业者提供掩护，让他们躲在过去的迷雾后面大幅度地攻占未来。在历史里，根本没有回到过去这回事。鼓励大家回归往日生活，永远只是对于自己所处的时代有感而发的一种表达方式，本身就是最具有现代感的时间意识。像逆成长这种概念，必然只有被《广告终结者》（Casseurs de pub）那种看似反广告、其实完全是广告业者创办的杂志，拿来设计杂志封面的主视觉。不要忘了，发明零成长的理论专家、一九七二年罗马俱乐部的会员，这批人本身都是政府机关的员工和工业家，他们的理论基础是麻省理工学院的远端遥控学者所做的研究。
+
+逆成长理论、广告和高科技的结合完全不是偶然。这三者一直走在同一条行军的队伍里，为了寻找经济的解决方案而并肩作战。过去的资本主义为了自己着想，彻底攻陷了关系紧密的传统社会；如今的资本主义买入了重建的阶段，依据有利于自己的作战位置架设新的社会网络，而当代大都会的人际互动关系就正在孵化这片网络。资本主义曾经毁灭了大自然，现在它以同样毁灭性的方式，疯狂地投入铺天盖地的建设工程，让每个环境受到监控，到处安装防范各种意外发生的感应器。资本主义开创了新的人性，自然需要搭配新的经济模式。新的经济模式不想成为独立于个人存在的一块领域，而是变成紧贴着存在的一层薄膜、变成发展人际关系的必需品；新的职业定义是自我职业化，新的资本论是人类的资本化；新的生产观念是利益关系的生产，新的消费观念是生活情境的消费；最后，新的价值观，就是创造能够总结一切生命意义的价值。目前还在孕育阶段的「生物经济学」把全地球当作一个封闭的管理系统，试图找到能够衡量所有生命价值的科学根据。等到这种科学正式诞生的那一天，我们就可以叹口气说，过去我们如何用欺骗性的指标虚构了美好的时光——譬如用国内生产毛额的成长衡量人民的幸福——现在我们终于赢得了人民的信任。
+
+「重新发现生命力每个非经济层面的价值」，这就是逆成长理论的指导原则，同时也是资本改革的进程。低碳生态村、监视摄影机、心灵成长团体、生物科技和社交生活，这一切都属于同一个正在发生的「文明进程」，一座从地底浮现的总体经济。它的知识模型就是遥控理论、系统科学，换句话说，系统的控制学。打从十七世纪开始，为了强力执行经济统治，让人屈服于它的工作伦理和它的贪得无厌，凡是游手好闲的人、乞丐、巫师、疯子、享乐主义者、穷人和流浪汉，不是被关进监狱，就是被驱逐出境，只因为这类人的存在状态违反了获取利益和节制浪费的法则。新经济的实现还是得靠旧有的淘汰机制，筛选出听候差遣的自愿者，划定出方便管制的区域范围。新经济宣称世界陷入了混乱，筛选的时刻到了，然而这场混乱也可以是我们获得胜利的时刻，一举消灭新经济这一切可恶的计划。
+
+#### 第六圈 环境问题是二十一世纪经济的王道
+
+> 我们和世界的关系是建立在管理上。
+他们说：如果我们还想挽救美好的文明生活。
+唯有减少消费，才能继续消费。
+这就是当今世界的逻辑，
+满口保证要和过去的历史一刀两段，
+其实只是延续了过去的历史
+
+环保是本年度的重大发现。三十年来，我们把环保问题留给绿党解决，在星期天取消环保人士的大惊小怪，好在星期一放心地继续污染环境。结果呢？环保问题还是回过头来把我们困住了，从广播电台到暑假发行的流行歌曲都在大谈环保，因为十二月居然出现了摄氏二十度的高温。
+
+四分之一的鱼类从海洋里消失。剩下的看来也活不了多久。
+
+禽流感进入全面警戒状态：政府保证会从空中射下几千只候鸟，避免疫情扩大。
+
+最新研究显示，母乳所含有的汞，比政府限定的牛乳含汞量高出十倍。连从菜市场买来的苹果都会造成食物中毒，咬一口就嘴唇肿胀。生活中每个最小的动作都有毒。有人三十五岁就死于「慢性疾病」，还好，我们迟早有一天会把疫情控制住。不过得加快脚步了，至少得赶在我们被送进安宁病房之前找到解决办法。
+
+我们必须承认：面对大家高谈阔论的这一切「灾难」，我们没有太多感觉。至少，在诸多灾难还没有真的兑现之前，我们实在没什么感觉。灾难和我们也许息息相关，可是与我无关，这才是真正的灾难。
+
+根本没有什么「环境灾难」，环境本身就是一场灾难。所谓的环境，就是当人类失去了一切之后，唯一剩下来的东西。那些栖身在小社区、乡村、工厂里的人，那些在街道、战场上的人，这些人拥有的不是「环境」，而是一个包罗万象的世界，里头充满了危险、朋友、敌人、各种生活和死亡机能、各式各样的生命体。本来这就是一个互相牵连的世界，只是我们和每个人、每个场所之间的依存关系，有着性质和程度上的差异而已。但是如今，我们成为被极端剥削的孩子和最新一批的流亡者，在一栋又一栋的水泥方块里出生长大，在超级市场里采收水果，透过电视荧幕偷窥世界新闻：这一切都是为了拥有一个自己的环境。我们正亲眼目睹自己的灭亡，却只感觉到气氛不太一样。我们对于灾害持续扩张感到非常愤怒，但却只晓得上网补充百科全书的条目。
+
+我们只剩下环境这个僵化的概念，因为我们和世界的关系是建立在管理上，换句话说，是建立在莫名其妙上。只要和世界保持这种关系，我们便不觉得，树林间飒飒作响的树叶、从屋子里飘散出来的油炸气味、闪耀在溪流上的波光、学校教室里传出的喧闹声、夏夜潮湿的水汽是我们的一部分。在这个世界里，只有我和我的环境有关系；环境包围着我，但不是我的一部分。我们全部变成地球资产董事大会上排排坐着的与会者。没有人能够想象比这更接近地狱的画面。
+
+世界上从来没有任何地方足以被称为「环境」，除了今天的大都会之外。播音员的声音被数位化，电车的汽笛声被二十一世纪化，泛着蓝光的路灯活像一根巨大的火柴棒，路人把自己打扮的像拙劣的时尚模特儿，监视摄影机无声转动着镜头，进出地铁站时清脆的刷票声，超级市场一字排开的收银机，办公室的电子打卡机，高科技的网路咖啡馆，无所不在的电浆电视、快速道路和乳胶制品。从来没有任何一面像大都会这样的布景，能将台上穿梭往返的生灵消融于无形。从来没有任何地方，像大都会那么自动化。从来没有任何社会脉络比大都会更冷漠，并且反过来要求所有在里头讨生活的人们表现得同样冷漠。说穿了，所谓的环境，就是大都会特有的一种和世界的关系，它将这种关系织成天罗地网，让任何东西都逃不出它的手掌心。
+
+我们面对的状况如下：曾经，我们的父亲被雇佣来摧毁世界，现在，我们被派遣的工作是重建世界，而且还是一个能够获取暴利的世界。君不见，新闻业者和广告业者总是兴致勃勃地追踪地球暖化的每一个最新数据，在这种病态的热情背后，是新绿色资本主义冷酷的微笑。早在一九七〇年代，新绿色资本主义就预告自己即将到来，可是我们等到二十世纪都过完了，它还是没来。万万没有想到，它真的出现了！环保，就是它！替代性的解决方案，也是它！拯救地球，还是它！不必怀疑：连绿色和平组织都没有新资本主义来得绿！环境才是二十一世纪政治经济的王道。从今以后，针对每一次新冒出来的灾难，都会隆重推出一系列的「工业解决方案」。
+
+氢弹之父爱德华·泰勒（Edward Teller）曾说，他打算在大气中的平流层喷洒数百吨的金属尘，以此对抗气候暖化，美国太空总署多年来一直愤愤不平，觉得自己多年来苦心研发的反导弹防御系统是多么伟大的构想，最后却只能被陈列在冷战时代的胡思乱想博物馆里；现在它又跳出来发誓，可以在月球轨道外围摆设一面巨大的反射镜，这样就能保护我们免受紫外线的危害。其他关于未来的幻想包括：一种光吃生物燃料，就可以从圣保罗一路跑到斯德哥尔摩的汽车；长期被欺压的农夫所做的一场大梦则是，他们要把地球上的每一片沃土，全部变成种植大豆和甜菜的农田。当然，还有环保汽车和再生能源，以及刊登在时尚杂志光滑的内页里、香奈儿最新商品广告的旁边，却一点也不会让人觉得尴尬的环保常识和建议。
+
+因为大家都是这么告诉我们的，没有任何东西能和环境相比，它是人类最重要的全球问题。全球问题，也就是只有全球化的组织才握有解决办法的问题。我们跟这些组织可熟了。在过去不到一个世纪的时间，这些团体成了各种灾难的首领，他们最擅长的就是用最小的代价，让灾难换个名目持续下去。就说法国电力公司吧，明明是回锅的核能计划，他们却下流无耻地硬说是解决世界能源危机的最新方案。由此可见，新解答和老问题可以完全一模一样。
+
+于是，从国务秘书办公室到另类咖啡馆的小包厢，从过去到现在，人们谈论焦虑的词汇永远一模一样，说来说去，总之就是要你动起来。不是为了重建家园，那是二次大战结束后的事；不是为了拯救伊索比亚饥荒，那是一九八〇年代的事；不是为了努力工作，那是一九九〇年代的事。不，这一次是为了环保，我们的环境将由衷感谢您所做的一切。高尔、逆成长团体、生态主义者尼克拉·宇洛，这些人都体现了共和国的精神，被奉为伟大不朽的灵魂，善尽职责地让左派小团体和每个人年轻时都有过的理想主义死而复生。他们就像义和团一样义愤填膺，像慈善团体的义工一样义不容辞，不计一切代价想要让我们相信「生态环境已经进入了紧急状态」。他们把自己那坨粘嗒嗒的罪恶感丢到我们疲惫的肩膀上，督促我们耕耘自己的花园，为自己的垃圾做好分类，并且在享用完餐桌上丰盛的尸骸之后，不要忘记回收生下来的残渣，制成有机肥料。
+
+我们必须提防核能外泄、空气中的二氧化碳过量、冰山融化、飓风、传染疾病、世界人口过剩、水土流失、大批物种濒临灭绝……凡此种种，皆为我们应尽之责任。他们说：「每个人都要从生活习惯的改变做起」，如果我们还想挽救美好的文明生活。唯有减少消费，才能继续消费。唯有生产有机商品，才能继续生产。唯有先约束自己，才能约束别人。这就是当今世界的逻辑，满口保证要和过去的历史一刀两段，其实只是延续了过去的历史。这就是他们的花言巧语，一心想说服我们加入本世纪最伟大的工业挑战。惊吓过度如我们者，常常就这样带着脱离混乱的希望奔向别人的怀抱，忘却了制造混乱的、和张开双臂的是同一个人。
+
+环保不只是总体经济的运作逻辑，也是资本主义的新道德观。体制内部的危急状况越是紧张、筛选过程越是苛刻得令人难以忍受，我们就越渴望新的标准出现，让淘汰机制照旧运行。从古至今，美德都是败德发明的概念。如果没有环保的概念，我们就难以解释为什么如今会有这两种饮食习惯存在：一种是「健康有机」的吃法，属于有钱人和他们的小孩；另一种简直像毒瘾般的吃法，属于贱民和他们胖死活该的后代。反正，最值得效法的就是全球超级资产阶级的生活风格，他们连卖弄风骚都能小心避免「对环境造成伤害」。没有任何东西比环保拥有更大的权力，让控制的范围迅速扩张，教所有反对声音全部闭嘴。
+
+货品来源追踪、咨询透明、资格认证、环境税、环境优先权、国家水资源警察，这一切语言了环保在今天的地位。环保想怎么样就怎么样，因为赋予它权力的是自然、健康和公共福利。
+
+「当新的经济和新的态度成为文化和生活习惯的一部分，自然而然，所有强制措施便再也不需要强制执行了，」某位电视上的名嘴说。只有像他那么勇于胡说八道的人，才能理直气壮地说出那么麻木不仁的话：一方面呼吁我们要起身行动，全然地表达「对地球的歉意」；一方面又要我们全然地麻痹自己，保持文明和理性的态度面对问题。控制好你自己，这就是新的环保禁欲主义，我们每个人都必须参加这场苦行，才有资格在解救地球的行动中和体制谈判。我们必须忍受饥饿，从前是以经济之名，现在则是以环保之名。所有马路都有可能被改建成自行车道，甚至有一天，我们的收入也很可能得到合理的保障，因为健康的环境和生活都有利于工作，促进经济成长。有人说，人只要自己管好自己，就不用去管环保是否变成了独裁，这种人在说谎：良好的自我管理和环保互为因果，我们则是陷入了因果循环。
+
+在人和环境之间，永远有警察存在。
+
+环保论述里的一切都必须被重新推翻。譬如说，环保人士口中的「灾难」是指现行体制在人事物方面的管理疏失，然而在我们看来，正是因为这个体制运作得完美无缺，才会导致灾难来临。历史上最大的一波发生在亚热带地区的饥荒是在一八七六到一八七九年之间，这段时间刚好碰上了全球性的干旱，然而，这段时间同时也是殖民扩张的全盛时期。当农民生活的世界和农耕技术一起被消灭，人类因应粮食短缺的办法便跟着消失了。绝不只是缺水，就能让亚热带的大地上布满几百万具干巴巴的尸体，真正的原因是殖民经济的快速扩张。地球上所有看似生态浩劫的灾难，其实都在向我们证明，我们和世界之间形成了一种毁灭性的关系。我们在这种关系中被消耗殆尽，以至于面对任何系统故障和气候异常，我们都不堪一击。在二〇〇四年的南亚大海啸里，当海啸的巨浪逐渐逼近，游客却还在踏浪玩水，而住在岛上的猎人和农夫早已察觉苗头不对，赶紧跟着飞离的鸟群从海岸逃走了。今天环保的吊诡在于，它以拯救地球为理由，但真正拯救的却是经济基础，而正是如此稳固的基础把地球变成一颗荒凉的行星。
+
+这个世界正常规律地运作，让我们忘记日常生活的剥削本身就是一种灾难状态。环保人士所说的「灾难」，只不过是暂时把我们的注意力从这种状态中移开，让我们在所剩不多的快乐时光里为自己还活着感到庆幸。其实，我们大可以快一点用光石油存量，断绝国际之间的资本流通，打乱大都会的节奏，为社会全面失控而热烈欢呼！「民众回到野蛮状态」又怎样？「地球遭受威胁」又怎样？「人类文明结束」又怎样？任何失去控制的场面，都比装模作样地危机管理更有意义。从现在开始，不要再去询问永续发展的专家，期待从他们那里得到什么良心的建议。只有当社会运转失灵，系统发生短路，所有问题最合理的解决方式才会一一浮现。想想看，签署京都议定书是为了什么？是为了帮地球降温，还是让乌克兰和罗马尼亚这些国家，可以靠着出售温室气体排放配额振兴经济？想想看，如果不是因为冷战结束、苏联垮台，逼得卡斯特罗必须经济独立，古巴怎么会从一九八九年摇身一变，成为今天「有机农业」的世界大国？反过来说，为什么偏偏是在穷困的非洲，而不是在其他发达工业的国家，汽车修理的技术可以普遍到成为一种全民艺术？想想看。
+
+危机的迷人之处，在于危机一旦发生，环境就不再只是环境了。危机迫使我们和现状重新取得联系——即便取得的是危险关系也好，它让我们重新感受现实的脉动。它使环绕在我们四周的不再是风景、一览无遗的展示图、虚构的剧场，而是我们赖以生存、创造、学习的一切。我们不会再被那些三句不离「灾难」的人唬住，他们自己就是灾难制造者。管理阶层的人整天只会空想，彼此讨论着如何对体制发出有力的一击，又能「造成最小的伤害」；刚好相反，我们认为最实际的反抗策略，就是要「造成最大的伤害」，最好大到把整个体制搞垮，证明我们有多强悍。
+
+二〇〇五年的纽奥良，卡崔娜飓风过境后没几天，在末日般的氛围当中，生命重建的工作在四处渐渐展开。面对毫无行动的公权力，看到政府只会忙着打扫「法国区」（Carrefrancais）这样的观光地段、为街上的商店进行消毒，城市里贫穷的居民感到格外无助。于是，被遗忘多时的抗争形式，又再度重生了。不管政府想用如何强制的手腕驱离居民，也不管白人至上主义者如何趁机散播「猎杀黑鬼」之类的种族仇恨言论，许多居民硬是不肯弃守家园。他们拒绝成为被迫迁离的「气候难民」。在昔日的黑人武装抗争组织黑豹党号召之下，来自世界各地的人纷纷加入反迫迁的行列，一种自发性的抗争组织就这样出现了。过没几个礼拜，公共医疗诊所正式成立。从看诊的第一天开始，这件看似乡下医院的诊所便提供免费、但是优良的医疗服务，源源不绝来到这里的志工更是帮了大忙。到了今天，这间诊所已经成为平时抗争的基地，大家时常聚在这里抵挡政府出动的怪手，防堵国家把整块社区铲平，把整座城市卖给房地产商炒地皮。从公共食堂、粮食供应站、街头义诊、临时动员，到建立紧急收容所，大家一辈子积累的实用知识，都在这里派上用场。而且，这里不需要制服，也不用警报器。
+
+谁要是在灾难发生之前造访过纽奥良的这些社区，见识过居民是如何被剥夺了快乐的权利，对统治他们的国家如何充满了不信任，却又如何普遍地拥有一种灵活的行动力，便不会对灾后的纽奥良所展现的可能性感到吃惊。相反地，只有被我们苍白贫血的日常生活、沙漠一般荒凉的住宅区完全困住的人，才会对灾后居民的意志力感到怀疑。我们必须拨开自己经年累月规格化的生活，重新挖掘出被埋在底下的各种可能性，因为这些被遗忘的可能性是我们唯一的机会，防止自己和这个世界一起陷落。因为我们仍然有机会，重建我们所热爱的生活。
+
+#### 第七圈 我们背着的这具尸体
+
+> 我们面对的不是社会危机，而是文明灭亡；
+我们身上背着一具尸体，但无法就这样摆脱它。
+文明是否已死，那是历史学家感兴趣的问题，我们需要做的是决定。
+决定是种政治行动。
+让我们决定文明已死，连同它的死法也包括在内：
+只有决定，才能将我们背上的尸体卸下。
+
+从一九一四年到一九一八年，第一次世界大战这座世界第一大的屠宰场，一举解决掉城市和乡村里大部分的无产阶级，以自由民主和文明的名义让他们去死。这几年来，所谓的「反恐战争」在表面上也是基于同样的名义，派出大批的特种部队展开暗杀活动。不过，两者间的平行关系就结束在这三个字：「表面上」。今天，我们不再可以二话不说，就把自以为是的「文明」搬到别人家里。阳光下每一面涂满标语的墙上，我们再也找不到「自由」一词，如今的它总是拖着长长的阴影出场，那是道名为「安全」的阴影。至于名气最响亮的「民主」，则已经完全溶解成一条有一条的特别法条文了——例如，美国正式立法恢复使用酷刑，以及法国「使司法适应犯罪发展」的《贝尔本二号法》（La loiPerben II），造成了司法暴利的强化、司法保障的弱化。
+
+短短一个世纪，自由、民主、文明全部退回到假设阶段。情况走到了这个地步，国家领导人只剩下一件事好做，就是在物质、道德、象征、社会等每一个层次上，捏造出这些假设仍然可以被印证的条件，虚构出一个自由民主运作完善的文明空间。只要能够达到这个目的的办法就是好办法，即使是最不民主、不文明、反自由的办法也一样。上个世纪就是这样过去的：民主总是比法西斯更有理由永久地统治世界；文明总是在华格纳的歌剧和铁娘子的演说声中，发动毁灭性的侵略战争；自由则是在华尔街股市暴跌的那一天露出真面目，银行家因自由市场大萧条而跳楼自杀，接下来是一整个工人家庭跟着饿死。我们就直说吧！打从二次大战结束的一九四五年起，操控群众、间谍战、限制公共自由、各种警察权限的不断扩充，全都是为了巩固民主、自由和文明而发展出来的手段。时至今日，这些手法的演化迈入了最新阶段，我们终于选出了有史以来第一位社会党的巴黎市长贝特朗·德拉诺埃（Bertrand Delanoe），却看着他只是完成了前人未了的都市安全措施、加派警力管理贫民区，并且以小心选择的词汇说：「在此，我们打造了一个文明的空间。」该说的都说了，该毁的也毁了。
+
+尽管文明问题听起来大得像个哲学问题，但其实它一点也不哲学。文明并不是超然于生命的形而上。每个最平凡、最个人的生活细节，都有被文明规训过、占领过、殖民过的痕迹。文明同时掌握了我们最广泛和最私密的面向。在法国，文明和国家密不可分。当一个国家越是强大，历史越是悠久，她所扮演的角色就越会多样化，彼时国家不再只是传统定义的上层建筑或社会框架，而会发展成一种决定人民性格的主体形式。法国正是如此，她深入地渗透了每一个法国式的主体、数百年来阉割着自己的人民。了解了这一点，我们便不会讶异于，在法国的精神病院里，病患对于世界的妄想总是和政治人物有关；我们总是很有默契地认为，我们一切病痛的根源就是我们的领导者；我们是如此乐于在这些领导者的背后说他们的坏话，而正是因为我们只敢偷偷地说，这些坏话和鼓掌欢迎他们成为我们的主人，在效果上也没什么分别。在法国，我们关心政治，不是因为政治是外在的现实，而是因为政治是自我的一部分。我们奉献给政治人物的，和我们被夺走的，是同一条生命。
+
+如果说法国有什么特色，那一定是从这种主体性的阉割来的。就是令全世界赞叹不已的法国文学，也是动过手术的结果。在法国，文学是专为去势者量身打造的娱乐空间。文学是一种形式上的自由，是一种替代品，让人们不至于无法面对真实的自由全然消失的事实。这就是为什么，法国的政客和文人可以连续好几个世纪猥亵地互相抛媚眼，热衷于借穿彼此的衣服。这也是为什么，法国的知识分子总是地位越低说话越大声，并且总是在某个决定性的时刻突然哑口无言，不知道是该为了存在的意义而继续说真话，还是留在这个圈子里继续往上爬。
+
+根据文学专家的权威观点，现代文学是跟着波德莱尔、海涅、福拜楼一起诞生的，是对于一八四八年六月的政府军血腥镇压革命群众的某种反抗。现代文学的形式，是从巴黎造反群众的鲜血里诞生的，是拒绝保持沉默的文人对于大屠杀的反应——忧郁、矛盾、唯美主义、颓废皆由此而来。法国人在他们的法兰西共和国面前总是显得如此地多愁善感，一旦触动了这股神经质的伤感，随便一块墨迹都显得价值连城，任何荒淫无耻之徒都可以翻身成为尊贵高雅的文人。吊诡的是，正是这种伤感让我们越来越难以感受革命牺牲者所体现的意义。一八四八年六月革命发生的那几天，光是武装冲突就死了一千五百多人，成千上万的犯人在监狱里未经审判就被处死，而国民议会在听到街垒战的最后一道障碍已被移除时，所含出来的第一句话正是：「共和国万岁！」一八四八年的大屠杀和血腥镇压巴黎公社一样，让我们的记忆在出生时便染上血印，无论文学艺术可以引发多么伟大的净化作用，都无法将它清洗干净。
+
+法国哲学家科耶夫（Kojeve）曾于一九四五年写道：「法国和法国人民在政治理想上的对外‘正式’说法，仍旧是民族国家，一个‘团结一致的共和国’。但是另一方面，这个国家从灵魂深处意识到这个理想的缺陷，她知道按照严格的定义来说，‘国族’的概念在政治上早已不合时宜。这种不合时宜的感觉从未达到一个高度，成为清楚明白的概念：法国既不能、也一直不愿意把将这种感觉条理分明地公开表达出来。而且，正是因为法国在国族主义上有过非常辉煌的成就，对于这个国家来说，要全盘承认、坦然接受‘国族的’历史阶段已经结束的事实，并为这段历史做出总结，才显得格外困难。过去，这个国家从一颗一颗的零件架构出国族主义的意识形态，然后把这套意识形态的架构输出到全世界去，现在要它承认所有的零件已经过时了，的确是很残酷的一件事。」
+
+半个世纪以来，民族国家以及民族国家的消失，形成了某种我们可以称之为法国式不适应症的问题核心。它是一种我们文绉绉地命名为「政党轮替」的间歇性痉挛，就像钟摆一样左派发作完了换右派，右派发作完了换左派；就像躁郁症患者经过了狂躁阶段，紧接着又是抑郁阶段，每个阶段的结束都正在开启下一个阶段；就像在法国，人们一下子对个人主义发表最雄辩的批判、一下子宣扬最愤世嫉俗的犬儒主义，或者一下子对群众展现无比的慷慨，一下子又觉得他们很烦。只有在一九六八年的五月革命里，这种不适应症曾被暴动的狂热短暂地治愈过，除此之外，从一九四五年到今天，法国的病情越来越严重。国家、国族、共和国的时代结束了，法国则被吓傻了，毕竟它为这些理念已经奉献了多少青春。前总理若斯潘（Jospin）才说了一句简简单单的「国家不是万能的」，就在国内引发了一场大爆炸，而其实还有一场更大的爆炸即将发生，因为法国人迟早会发现国家全是无能的。一种被欺骗的感觉像伤口上的脓疮不断扩大，一种潜伏的愤怒正在不断加温。我们必须为国族的时代举行一场告别式，否则法国的时间错乱就无法解开，革命的可能性也将持续被国家没收。
+
+无论未来每一届的总统大选结果如何，选举唯一的功用，只是让法国一再地幻灭，让我们习以为常的历史幻影破裂，使得某些事件有可能继续发生。例如反对《首次聘雇就业法案》的社会运动，这在别的国家看来仿佛是一九七〇年代躲过的一场噩梦，而我们就是要让噩梦成真。这就是为什么，大家其实都不想去投票。也难怪，法国的选举投票率总是在西方世界里吊车尾。
+
+今天，西方是美国陆军一边把音量开到最大听着重金属乐，一边开着M1艾布兰主力战车向伊拉克的费卢杰（Falloudja）猛烈进攻。西方是在蒙古大草原上迷路的观光客，一边装作满不在乎的样子，一边紧捏着手中的信用卡，仿佛这是他最后的一线生机。西方是为了夹杀商场对手而去上围棋课的企业主管。西方是在流行服饰、润肤乳液、年轻男孩之中追求幸福的年轻女孩。西方是来自瑞士的人权运动者，忙着到世界各地表达和抗争者团结一致的决心，只不过他总是在抗争失败了才出现。西方是不在意自己拥有多少政治自由的西班牙人，他只要有性爱自由就足够了。西方是对现代艺术如痴如醉的艺术爱好者，从超现实主义到维也纳行动主义都被他奉为天才，因为这些艺术家花了一个世纪的时间比赛谁能对准文明的脸吐痰。最后，西方是在佛教里发现意识控制理论的系统工程师，是在印度哲学里为了他的最新发现找灵感的量子物理学家。
+
+西方是用尽种种诡计，才从各种关于西方没落的预言存活下来的文明。就像资产阶级势必否认资产阶级是一种阶级，这样才能从工人到大老板、再到整个社会都中产阶级化。就像资本势必得先以薪资关系的名义牺牲奉献，才能获得认可成为最主要的社会关系，以至于如今除了经济资本之外，我们还要有文化资本和健康资本。就像基督教势必得先以宗教信仰的态度牺牲奉献，才能成为一种获得永生的情感结构、一种对人性和同情心罗嗦个没完的教诲、一种只有对软弱的人才有用的命令。就像以上种种，西方先以牺牲奉献的精神创造具有独特性的文明，才能强迫世人接受它是具有普遍性的文化。它的诡计可以概述如下：一个即将溃散的整体牺牲了它的内容，以便让它的形式得到永生。
+
+原子化成碎片一般的个人得救了，因为心理咨询的「灵性」疗法让他看起来还像个完整的人。父权体制得救了，因为它让女人同样充满了最糟糕的阳刚特质：意志力、自我控制、冷漠无情。分崩离析的社会得救了，因为社交和娱乐就像一种传染病蔓延开来。这一切纯属于西方过时的虚构，它用来维持性命的招数也在一点一点地瓦解自己。
+
+根本就没有「文明冲突」这回事。我们有的只是一种临床上呈现死亡状态的文明，它必须靠人工仪器才能维持生命，全地球的空气中都散播着它身上的恶臭和瘟疫。到了这个地步，连它也无法相信自己还有任何「价值」了，所有对它的肯定反而都会被它当作下流的行为，或是一种挑衅，必须加以拆除、解构，回复到一切皆可疑的状态。今天的西方帝国主义就是相对主义，就是「你有你的观点我有我的观点」，就是只敢斜眼瞪人，对于那些愚蠢、原始、自大到以为还有什么可以相信、随便什么都予以肯定的人即使气得要命也没辙。这种相对主义就是把问问题变成一种教条，是学院里的知识分子和文学教授彼此像共犯一样地眨眼睛。后现代的理论家根本没有任何激进的批判，他们的批判只不过是把现成的虚无和不确定感打包起来。过去一个世纪，最要不得的是嚣张地为否定而否定，而今天，最可耻的就是坚定不移的肯定。
+
+没有任何社会秩序可以持久地建立在一切皆非的原则上。于是，我们只能尽量小心。我们今天把「安全」的感念运用在每一件事情上，反映出我们希望将每个场所、每个行为、甚至每个人，固定在一个其实谁也不会服从的理想秩序里。对于世界，「一切都不是真的」等于什么也没说，但对于西方的真实概念，这句话却道尽了一切。西方人所理解的真实，并不是一种生命或物体的属性，而是生命或物体被再现的状态。只要事物的再现和我们的经验相吻合，那就是真实的。科学就是这种普遍真理验证法的最后帝国。问题是，一切最平凡无奇和最值得深究的人类行为，都是建立在一个无法被均质化的事实基础上，一切实践活动的起点，都是一种事物和再现无法区分的状态，因此，一切生命都包含了某种西方的概念所无法理解的真实成分。当然，西方人也会说某个人很「真实」，不过十之八九都是用来嘲笑那个人很天真。正因如此，被殖民者眼中的西方人一律都是骗子和伪君子。正因如此，人们所羡慕的不是西方人，而是西方人所拥有的东西，例如先进科技——而西方人只配被别人鄙视而已。我们无法在中学里教学生萨德、尼采和亚陶（Artaud），自己却不先把这种西方式的真实观念废除掉。没完没了地抵制一切断然的肯定，小心翼翼地防范一切终将浮现的确定感，这就是西方知识分子经年累月在做的事。警察和哲学只是表面上看起来有所不同罢了，其实他们是西方知识的两种方法。
+
+不难理解，这种相对性的帝国主义很容易在随便任何一种空洞的教条主义、列宁马克思主义、伊斯兰原教旨主义、新纳粹主义里，找到适合它的对手它们全都像西方人一样，混淆了肯定和挑衅。
+
+在现阶段，就连最严肃的社会论战都不愿意承认，我们面对的不是社会危机，而是文明灭亡；这使得这些争论自己沦为文明的共犯，只为了让文明天长地久。社会论战甚至成为时下的一种策略，表面上是批判社会，事实上是徒劳地挽救文明。
+
+情况就是如此。我们身上背着一具尸体，但我们无法就这样摆脱它。其实，我们不必等到文明正式结束，等到有人正式宣判它的死亡。文明是否已死，那是只有历史学家才会感兴趣的问题。历史学家要寻找的是事实，我们必须要做的是决定。事实是一种修辞技巧，决定是一种政治行动。让我们决定文明已死，连同它的死法也包括在内：只有决定，才能将我们背上的尸体卸下。
+
+
+### 第二部 为新世界而战
+
+#### 上路吧！
+
+> 六十年来的生活，
+已经将我们麻痹，
+削弱我们对现实的决断力。
+不需要期待、愤怒，
+我们处于文明崩塌当中，
+现在必须拿定主意了。
+
+革命，我们甚至不再知道它们是从何而起。六十年来的和平与对于历史性动乱的暂时悬置，六十年来民主的麻醉与对于事件的管控，都削弱了我们对现实的某些直断感知以及对当前战事的感受。我们必须寻回这种感知，一切才能开始。
+
+没有什么好再愤怒的，对于那一条这五年来公然违宪的《日常安全法》。要合法地对法律框架内部彻头彻尾的破裂提出异议是无用的。因此，我们必须组织起来。
+
+没有什么好再参与的，无论是在这个或那个公民团体中、在极左派这个或那个死胡同中，或是在最终的联合骗局里。所有声称反对现有秩序的组织，它们自己更像受到操纵的傀儡般，具有微型国家的形式、习惯和语言。
+
+所有想以「另一种方式从事政治」的企图，迄今为止，除了无限期延长这些伪状态之外，别无贡献。
+
+没有什么好再回应的，对于每日的新闻。但必须了解，每项资讯都像是在怀有敌意的策略下进行的一种操作，等待着被解译。这种操作正企图在此处或彼处，引发某种类型的回应。而我们必须视这种操作为包藏在这些新闻下真正的讯息。
+
+没有什么好再期待的——天光乍晴、革命、核子启示或一场社会运动。持续等待下去是种疯狂。这场灾难不是即将来临，而是已经存在那里了。我们已经处于文明崩溃当中，现在必须拿定主意了。
+
+不再等待，这是某种进入革命逻辑的方法。这是在我们统治者的声音中，重新去听见恐惧发出的轻微震颤——恐惧从未离他们而去。政府从来都以万千托辞去推迟你加入人群的时刻，而他们的行为从来都只有一种目的，就是为了不要失去对人民的控制。
+
+我们从一个极端孤立的点出发，极端的无奈。一切都等着透过革命程序来建立。一切似乎都比革命更有可能发生，但是，没有什么比革命更加重要。
+
+#### 聚首
+
+> 在我们身边发生、经历的才是真理，
+而对真理的坚持终能让我们找到朋友。
+当人们聚首、相处融洽并决定一起结伴而行，
+这个过程就是公社。
+当某些人摆脱个人束缚，开始一切只靠他们自己、
+开始衡量他们在现实中的实力时，公社就慢慢成形。
+
+__`专注于我们所经历的，以此为真。由此开始`__
+
+一次相遇、一个发现、一场大型罢工活动、一场地震：所有这些事件都是从真实中产生，同时改变着我们在这个世界的存在方式。相反地，那些于我们显得无关紧要的、不会改变我们的，也不会牵涉任何事物的某个客观状态，根本不配获得真理之名。在每一个动作、每一次实践、每一段关系、每一种情况的背后，都有一个潜在的真相，尽管我们习惯去规避、管理造成这个时代中许多特有的偏离状态之事，但事实上，所有事息息相关。生活在谎言里的感觉也是一个真相。这意味着不要放弃，甚至就由此出发。真理不是对于世界的一个观点，而是使我们与世界紧密连结之物。真理不是我们掌握的某物，而是撑持着我们的东西。它创造了我又将我拆解，构筑了我并将我析离成为一个个体，它离我很远，但透过了经历与我相连。
+
+依附其中的单独个体不可避免地会遇到他的某些同伴。事实上，所有的革命程序都是从一个我们绝不放弃的真理开始。在八〇年代的汉堡，曾经有少数居民占据了一栋房子，并且决定，此后若要驱逐他们就必须从他们身上辗过。我们见到被坦克和直升机包围的街区、持续好几天的巷战、浩大的游行——以及最终举白旗的市长。乔治·甘广（Georges Guingouin），「法国首位马基团员」，他的游击生涯是从一九四〇年拒绝被占领受到肯定后展开。在当时，对于共产党而言，他不过是一个「住在树林里的疯子」——直到这些生活在树林中的狂人变成了两万人，并且解放了利摩日（Limoges）这个地区。
+
+__`在所有政治情谊之前，不要退缩`__
+
+关于情谊，我们被灌输的是一个中立的概念，像是一种无关紧要的情感。然而，所有情感的投合都是在一个共同真理中的投合。所有的相遇都是在一个相互肯定中的相遇，甚至是对破坏的肯定。在一个坚持不放弃某些东西、而经常性地导致失业的时代，或是为了工作必须说谎、接着又为了维护谎言而工作的时代，人们的互相联系并不是无意的。有些人从量子物理学出发，发誓要找出各个领域中的所有相关影响；这些人联系的方式，并不会比那些领导反对农产品加工多国化运动的同志们更少政治意味。迟早，他们都将被带往叛逃，以及战斗。
+
+劳工运动的先驱先后有了工作室和工厂可供聚首。他们透过罢工来自我肯定，同时揭穿那些破坏罢工的人。他们那些引起资本主义政党与工党争端的薪资收入，足以联系全球各处的支持者与战线。而我们，有全部的社会空间可以聚首。我们可以透过那些桀敖不驯的日常行为自我肯定，并揭穿那些破坏的人。我们对这个文明的厌恶，足以联系全球各处的支持者与战线。
+
+__`不要期待组织。不要信任所有现存的圈子，并且不要成为其中之一`__
+
+在彻底退出的过程当中，人们相信组织的情况并不少见：政治组织、工会组织、人道组织、协会等等。甚至我们可能会去相信某些诚恳却绝望的人，或者热情却狡猾的人。组织的吸引它们表面上的稳定可靠——它们都有一段历史、一处总部、一个名字、许多资产、一位领袖、一套策略及一部理论。然而它们当中空洞的架构，就像他们要移植对其英雄起源的尊敬时、所遭遇的障碍一样多。对所有的事，就像对它们的每个层级一样，组织关心的首在于它们能够像组织般地生存，别无其他。而它们一再的背弃，常常使它们丧失了与自己基础的联系。这正是为什么我们在当中有时可以遇到几位值得尊重的人，但是在相遇时所得的承诺，只有在组织以外的地方才得以实现，而且必然地，是反组织的。
+
+更可怕的是各种圈子，以它们的软性质地、它们的八卦和非正式的阶级结构存在。所有的圈子都该避离。它们当中的每一个都像被指派用来压制真相。文艺界用来压制书写的事实。自由主义的圈子压抑直接的行动。科学界要人们记住，从今起他们的研究牵涉最广最多。体育界则致力在其场馆中展演生活的各种不同样貌，而不是去发扬不同形式的运动。特别要远离的是文化圈和工会圈子。它们是两个葬身之所，传统上所有的革命欲望都在那里受到压制。文化圈的任务是找出刚开始形成的力量所在，一面展示它自己，一面向你诈取你作为的意义。工会圈子的任务则是夺走你行动的活力。工会在整个法国领土上延展它们的网络，然后齐聚在一条路上：所有一切都将成为革命性的。然而它们拥有的只是多次的失败，以及它们所设想的苦涩。它们的耗损，如同过多的无力感，都使它们不再能够掌握现状的可能性。此外，它们对于这些也谈论得太多了，以至于产生了一种不幸的消极态度；这样的情况使它们在治安上显得很不可靠。既然在它们身上期望什么都是徒劳无用的，那为它们的僵化感到失望就太愚蠢了。就让它们自行毁灭吧。
+
+所有的圈子都是反革命的，因为他们唯一从事的，就只是保持其差劲的舒适性。
+
+__`建构公社`__
+
+公社，是当人们聚首、相处融洽并决定一起结伴而行的过程。公社，也许是在离群已成为常见情形的时刻开始的。在令人窒息的严峻情势下存留下来的，是相聚的快乐。也就是它让人们言称「我们」，而这是一个很重要的事件。然而，令人感到奇怪的不是互相了解的人们组成公社，而是他们仍旧维持着分离的状态。为什么公社不会不断地无限繁衍？它不会在每个工厂、每条街道、每个村落、每所学校里无尽繁衍，直到作为基础的委员会有重大影响力！而是接受它原本、原处的状态。然而如果可能，衍生的公社将会取代社会机构：家庭、学校、工会、体育倶乐部等。因为，在纯粹的政治活动之外，公社也无惧于组织起来，为了成员以及所有围绕着他们的迷途者、因物质上或道德上的生存而行动。公社不会用内部和外部来自我定义——像一些团体普遍会做的一样——它的定义是透过它们之间的联结密度。不是由组成的人，而是由领导这些人的精神来定义。
+
+当某些人摆脱个人束缚，开始一切只靠他们自己、开始衡量他们在现实中的实力时，公社就慢慢成形。所有自然发生的罢工都是一种公社，所有在正当基础上由群体居住的房舍都是公社。一九六八年的行动委员会，正如当年美国逃亡的黑奴组成的村落，或是如一九七七年意大利博洛尼亚（Bologne）的艾莉丝电台一样，都是公社。所有的公社都寻求成为自己的基础，它希望解决基本需求的问题，它想摧毁所有政治上的拘束、如同毁弃所有经济上的依赖；而当失去与奠基它的真理的联系时，它便退散回环境当中。我们有各种各样的公社可以组织，不必等待人数、金援，更不必等待从不会降临的「适当时机」。
+
+#### 组织起来
+
+> 公社，会改变工作与生活的关系，
+会尽可能为每个人释放最多的自由时间。
+不是不需要工作，而是不需要为生活而工作。
+自由时间让我们去学习，一切关于社会生活的直觉。
+然后以生活实践开始建立国家看不到的地域，
+并且建立起统治者看不到的身分。
+
+__`组织起来，不再需要工作`__
+
+清闲的差事并不多，而且事实上，我们在当中只觉得无聊，往往浪费了太多时间。更何况，这些工作还以乏善可陈的午顾和阅读著称。
+
+我们知道，个体的存在仅为了赚取他的生活，他必须以他的时间来交换些许的社会存在。从个人时间，到社会存在：这里意味着工作、意味着交换市场。公社的时间一举逃避了工作，它不靠取巧的手段运作，宁愿用另一种方式。阿根廷的纠察队（piqueteros）集体实施一种局部性的基本工资，条件是必须工作数个小时。但他们并不累计工时，而是将他们的收入汇集公用，以设立服装店、面包店，建设他们需要的花园。
+
+为了公社，我们需要资金，但绝不必要为了赚取生活而工作。所有的公社都有它们的秘密金库。手段是多样的。除了基本工资，还有各种补助、疾病救助、进修奖学金、流产保险金更多其他获取资金的方法，会随着每一次控制权的移转而诞生。我们不需要为这些手段辩护，也不必将自己置于这些资产的庇护下，或是将它们保留在内部或成为圈内人的特权。我们必须去培养、传播的重点是，将这些不当行为视为必要的机制，并分享其中创新的部分。对于公社而言，工作只是为了增加其他收入。另外也不要忘了，这些过程中的某些工作、训练或适当的职务，可以使我们获得有用的知识。
+
+公社的要求，是尽可能为每个人释放最多的自由时间。这样的要求，不仅仅考虑不受工资剥削的时数。自由时间并不都是假期。清闲的时间、停工的时间、无所事事的时间以及对于无所事事的害怕，这些都是工作时间。现在，不再需要去填满时间，而是去释放任何「时间」都没有的能量。路线逐渐显露、明确，我们可以从容不迫地跟随它，直到尽头，直到看着它们与其他路线交会。
+
+__`盗窃、培育、制造`__
+
+欧洲金属公司（Metaleurop）的前辈们愿意当强盗胜于担任狱警。法国电力公司的员工将如何透过电表作假的秘密传授给他们的亲友。「从货车上掉下来」的商品被到处转卖。一个如此公开宣扬自己厚颜无耻的世界，不能期待无产者能够多么诚实正直。
+
+一方面，公社不能指望永恒的「福利国家」；另一方面，它也不能依靠着偷窃商品、回收超级市场垃圾桶里的东西、暗夜里在工业区的仓库里找东西、侵占救济款、诓骗保险金以及其他的诈欺方式——简言之就是盗窃——而长存下去。它应该关心于如何保持自身组织在程度及广度上的不断增长。那么在一座工厂关闭时将车床、铣床、影印机削价出售，再用来策画某些对抗商业化社会的计谋，没有什么比这些更合乎逻辑了。
+
+今日，即将崩溃的感觉如此鲜明地无所不在，以至于在建设、能源、材料、非法活动或农业各方面进行的实验不胜枚举。这里有一整套的知识与技术，等待着被剽窃、被揭除它道德上的包装。但这套知识不过是所有直觉、才能当中的一部分。如果我们打算在都会荒漠中再移入住民，并且保障他们在革命期中的生存能力，我们必须要好好运用贫民窟特有的巧思。
+
+如何在一个流动全面中断的情况下生活及互相沟通？如何恢复农村地区的粮食种植，直到他们能再次支持六十年来的人口密度？如何将水泥空间转换成城市林园，像古巴为了在美国的封锁和苏联的清算下维持下去所做的那样？
+
+__`培训与养成`__
+
+我们在商业民主的许可下如此消遣娱乐，现在我们还剩下什么呢？是什么促使我们在某天决定星期天早上去跑步？如果不是为了消磨闲暇时光、重建起工作的力气或者「健康资本」，那又是什么在支持着空手道的狂热拥戴者、自己动手做、钓鱼或者真菌学的爱好者？大部分的消遣娱乐都能够轻易地摆脱它们荒谬的特性，变成娱乐以外的东西。拳击并不是一直都是为了在Telethon这个节目上示范演出，或是为了提供场面华丽的比赛。二十世纪初期的中国，处于被野蛮的移民瓜分及长时间的干旱所带来的饥饿当中，出现了不可计数的、由贫困农民组织起的露天拳击倶乐部，想要夺回他们被富人或殖民者掠夺的东西。这就是义和团起义。学习和实践我们在动乱、难以预料的时代所需要的，从来都不会太早。在现在，对于大城市的依赖——依赖它的医学、它的农业、它的警政——使我们无法攻击它而不危及我们自己。意识到这种脆弱性，即使未明言，也使我们对于当前的社会运动自发地自我设限，这引起了对于危机的畏惧和对于「安全」的想望。因为这样，罢工者以革命途换取回归正常生活的前景。要摆脱这个命运，需要经过长时间不断地大量、多方面学习与实验。这意味着要知道如何战斗、撬开门锁、治疗骨折及咽喉炎、建造地下电台发射器、在街道上煮食供餐、瞄准目标，以及汇集散乱的知识来建构战争农艺学、了解浮游生物的生物学、土壤的组成、研究植物间的关联，从而寻回已失去的直觉：关于一切社会生活、关于与我们所处环境的一切可能连结、关于我们依存的环境的界限。这一切就从今天开始，从今天及为了那些我们必须得到的食物和生活所需要比象征部分更多的日子。
+
+__`建立地域。复制难以界定的地区`__
+
+今天，愈来愈多的改革派同意，「石油危机将至」和「为了减少温室气体的排放」，必须要「将经济重新局限」，以便助于地区性的民生物资供给、缩短管销距离、放弃从远地进口的便利性等等。然而他们忘记的是，所有地区性经济的本质都是地下化、以「非正式」的方式存在；这个将经济重新局限的简单生态措施，意味着丝毫无法摆脱国家控制，或无保留地服从它。
+
+现今的地域划分是几个世纪以来警政行动的产物。人民被驱离他们的田舍、他们的街道、然后是他们的街区，最后是他们的住所大厅，疯狂地希望将全部生活囊括在维系隐私的四堵墙内。关于地域的问题，对我们与对国家而言是不同的。这部意味着要保留地域。而是意味着地区性地增加公社、交通和互助机构的密度，期使对权力当局而言，地域变得看不见、难以界定。这无关占领，而就是地域。
+
+每个生活实践都会产生一个地域——进行交易的地域或狩猎的地域，儿童嬉游的地域、恋人们或暴动的地域，农民、鸟类学家或漫游者的地域。规则很简单：当与某一特定区域重叠的地域愈多，它们之间的交流就更多，而权力能左右的就更少。小酒馆、印刷厂、运动中心、住宅区间的空地、旧书摊、建筑物天台、流动市场、烤羊肉串的摊位、车库，都可以很容易地摆脱他们的正式身分，只要他能够找到足够的同谋。地区性的自我组织，在将自己的地理学与国家制定的地图学重叠时，会扰乱后者、或将它消除。它则会产生自己的分裂。
+
+__`旅行。规划我们自己的沟通路线`__
+
+公社的原则，并不是将城市及它的流动性对立于在地区的生根和缓慢的速度。组建公社的扩张运动应该同时也是城市的建构运动。我们不反对商业设施所提供的交通和通讯的可能性，仅仅要知道其局限性。在当中只要足够谨慎，也就没有什么危险。互相拜访更是安全、不留痕迹，并且能够建立起比任何网际网路上的联络人名单更坚固的联系。我们当中某些人被赋予的特权，是可以在整个欧洲大陆「自由行动」，以及在全世界自由行动而不会遭遇太多问题。这是不可忽视的重要手段，可以联系共谋的家庭。允许美国人、希腊人、墨西哥人和德国人悄悄地在巴黎重新回到共谋策略的时光，这是大都市的好处之一。
+
+友好的公社之间经常性的交流，是防止它们枯竭及步向放弃命运的方式之一。接待同志、与他们保持联络并了解他们的创举、思考他们的经验、补充他们已经掌握的技术，这些对公社而言，都比那些偷偷进行、对意识的无效检查更有价值。如果低估了在过去的这些夜晚、我们对当前战事的意见进行交换时所发展出的决定性想法，那将是错误的。
+
+__`逐步地推翻所有的障碍`__
+
+众所皆知，街道上充斥着缺乏公民品质的粗野行为。在真正的劣行与即将成为的劣行之间，有一股所有宪警形成的向心力，竭尽所能地维持住秩序，相对的则有我们，也就是相反的离心运动。我们庆幸于他们出现时的狂怒和混乱。至此，不再庆祝什么的全国性节庆最后总是失败收场，也就没有什么令人惊讶的了。光彩或崩解的都会设施——然而它是从何开始？又要在那里结束呢？——具现了我们共同的缺乏归属感。耽溺在虚无中，它只要求真正地回到过去。仔细看看我们周围：一切都等待着它的时机，城市突然弥漫着怀旧的气息，这种情形仅仅废墟才有。
+
+即使这些粗野的行为逐渐具有方法性、系统性，它们还是大量出现在分散却有效率的游撃战中，这使我们得以回到难以控管、缺乏纪律的原初状态。令人的错愕的是，缺乏纪律恰恰是参与者认可的诸多军事法则之一。事实上，狂乱与政治性不应该分开来看。若没有前者，后者便只是空谈；而若失去了后者，前者将在嘶吼声中筋疲力竭。「激进分子」或「狂热分子」这些词语再次出现在政治上，并非没有恫吓之意。
+
+关于方法，我们从怠工之中获取的原则如下：在最低的风险下行动，在最短的时间，造成最严重的破坏。关于策略，我们记得，一个被翻转但未被压制的障碍——例如一个被解放但无人入住的空间——很容易被另一个更坚实、且争议较少的障碍取代。
+
+不必再强调工人怠工的三种形式：减缓工作速度、从「有节制的行动」到「合法罢工」；毁损机器，或妨碍它的运转；最后是泄露企业机密。如果将层面扩大到社会工厂，怠工的原则对于从生产到流通的各方面也都适用。大城市的技术设备很容易受到攻击：它的流动并不仅止于运载人们以及货物，资讯和能量也透过网络、光纤、管道等传布着，要攻击是可能的。阻碍社会机器的运作，必须承担某些后果，在今天意味着重新获得、重新创造阻断网络的方法。如何使高铁路线、电力网络无法被使用？如何找到电脑网路的弱点？如何扰乱电波以及使电视荧幕变白？
+
+至于重要的障碍，认为不可能破坏它的这个想法是错误的。这其中的理想主义精神，将归结为一种对战争的适应。西元前三百五十六年，艾罗斯特拉特（Erostrate）放火焚毁了世界上七大奇迹之一的阿泰米斯神庙（Atemis）。在我们这个彻底衰退的时代，这些神庙不再壮观，只剩下可悲的事实：它们已经是废墟了。
+
+灭绝这种虚无感只是一件令人难过的工作。然而执行这个灭绝，将重新获得新的活力。一切都有意义，一切突然间都组织起来，无论是空间、时间或情谊。用尽一切方法，找回社会经验——我们只是标示出方向。在时代的苦难中，「游戏人间」也许代表着——我们得承认，并非毫无道理——最后的集体诱惑。
+
+__`使自己不被看见。将无名人士移置于战斗位置`__
+
+在一场示威游行中，一个工会人士摘下一位不知名人士的面具——他刚刚才打破一面橱窗——并且说：「与其将自己藏起来，不如承担起你的行为。」使自己被看见、也就等着被发现，首先便是容易受到攻击。所有国家的左派人士，不停地让他们的主张——关于流浪、家庭主妇、非法居留者的主张——「能被看见」、希望能因此得到支持，但他们所做的正好与他们该做的相反。不让自己被看见，而将无名人士在对我们有利的情况下，移置于我们曾被驱离的地方，并且透过共谋、夜间行动或秘密行动，安排一个无懈可击的攻击位置。二〇〇五年十一月的纵火行动提供了一个范本。没有领导者、没有请愿、没有组织，然而有发言、有动作、有共谋书人。在社会上什么都不是并非一种屈辱、无人承认的悲剧——被谁承认？——相反地，是最大的行动自由。不用为他所造成的危害负责，只要利用缩写符号——我们还记得昙花一现的塔特黑社会住宅的反警察大队BAFT（BrigadeAnti-Flic Tarterets）——将自己贴上这些字母缩写，就是一种保障自由的方法。显然，建构出一个称为「郊区」的主体、作为「二〇〇五年十一月暴动」的主事者，是统治机关最初的防御性手段之一。只要看看这个社会中大人物的样貌，也许就能够帮助我们了解作为无名小卒的快乐。
+
+使自己不被看见。但一股聚集在阴影中的力量永远无法回避。这意味着我们的出现将被视为一股力量，在适当的时机我们才会站出来。因为我们被看见时刻愈晚。这股力量也就愈强。一旦被看见了，我们也进入倒数计时的阶段，若非在短期内使他的统治灰飞烟灭，那么就是他毫不迟疑地将我们粉碎。
+
+__`组织起自卫行动`__
+
+我们生活在警察的占领之下。在大街上对于非法居留者的公然袭击、未标记的汽车在道路上来来往往、以沿袭自殖民地统治的方法来维持城市街区的平静，内政部长对抗「帮派」的宣言像是回到阿尔及利亚战争，这一切每天都在告诉我们——我们生活在警察的占领之下。我们有足够的动机不再让自己被压垮，我们有足够的动机展开自卫行动。
+
+随着公社的壮大与扩展，权力运作逐渐地将它的组成视为目标。这些反击以诱惑、操纵，并在最终以暴力的方式展现。对公社而言，自我防卫对团体来说应该是一件不容置疑的事，无论是在理论或实践方面。闪避逮捕行动、迅速集结众人以对抗驱逐的企图、保护我们当中的人，这些在即将来临的时刻，都是有用的应对方式。我们不能不停地重建我们的基础。当我们不再谴责镇压，我们就在为反镇压做准备。
+
+事情并不简单。因为随着对群众中警察工作——从告发到暂时性的雇用民兵——增加的期待，警察的武力逐渐深入人群。即使是在骚乱的情况下，警察通用的介入方式就是便衣警察。在上一次《首次聘雇就业法案》的游行中，警察的效能便是来自这些混杂在人群中的便衣，他们等待事件发生时再揭露身份：然后便是瓦斯、警棍、逮捕。这一切都与工会的纠察队协调好了。只要他们可能现身，便足以在示威者中引起疑惧：谁是谁？并因而瘫痪整个行动。因为示威游行并不是为了展现重要性，而是一种应对的方式，我们因此具有揭发、驱离便衣，或者在万一有必要时，救回他们企图逮捕的人的方法。
+
+警察在街道上并非无敌，只是他们有办法进行组织、训练，以及可以不断尝试新式武器。相较之下，我们的武器始终是简陋的、拼凑起来的，而且在使用当下常常会有不可预期的结果。这些武器无论如何都不是为了竞争火力大小，而是用来保持距离、转移注意力、施加心理压力，或者出奇不意地攻打出一条通道，取得进展。在城市游击战中，法国宪警备战中心的所有创新方法，明显地不足以、也永远不会足以迅速应付同时在许多地区出击、总是力求保持主动的移动式攻击。
+
+公社在犯罪侦查科与情报局的监视与侦查之下，显然容易受到攻击。在意大利对无政府主义者，以及在美国对环保战士的一波波逮捕行动，都是监听下的产物。所有的拘留都必须做DNA采样，然后加入愈来愈完备的档案资料中。一个非法占据空屋的巴塞隆纳人，因为他留在他所分发的传单上的指纹，而被警察找到。整理资料档案的方式不断演进，尤其是眼球辨识技术。电子身分证一旦上路，我们的工作就会变得更加困难。巴黎公社部分地解决了档案的问题：纵火的人将市政厅烧毁，再将所有记录公民资料的档案销毁。现在剩下的，就是要找出可以永久消除电脑资料的方法。
+
+#### 揭竿而起
+
+> 不存在和平的起义。武力是必要的。
+真正的示威抗争必须是「野蛮的」，无需向警察局报备，
+能够选择战场，让我们能够绕过禁区并避免直接冲突。
+我们还能决定路线，
+牵着警察（包含工团主义者和和平主义者）的鼻子走，
+而不是被他们牵着鼻子走。
+
+对革命同志而言，现实乃是以公社为基础单位。也许，暴动的升高不是别的，而是各个公社的增生、沟通与连结。随着事件的发展，各个公社将融入规模更大的实体中，或甚至自我分裂。如同兄弟姊妹般「生死与共」地紧密连结的集团，和为了在暴动时规画物资和街区（乃至整个区域）的自卫而由各种群体、委员会和社团所形成的集团之间，只有层级的差别，但它们全都是公社，并没有差异。
+
+每个公社都只能追求自给自足，并在其内部认知到金钱的渺小可笑，或者说不合时宜。金钱的力量在于建立联系，I缺乏联系者之间，为陌生人给连结起来，由此拉平一切的价值，让一切流通。金钱联系一切的能力，其代价是这种联系的肤浅，其规则则是欺骗。怀疑乃是信用关系的基础。就此而言，金钱的绝对权力永远会是控制的绝对权力。在实务上废除金钱，只能透过扩张公社来实现。并且应该确保公社的扩张不超过某个规模，因为一旦超过这个规模，它就会失去和自身的联系，而毫无例外地导致一个统治阶层的兴起。公社宁可分裂并由此扩展，也要避免此一悲剧性的结果。
+
+阿尔及利亚年轻人的起义，在二〇〇一年春天席卷整个卡比立亚（Kabylie），几乎占领了整个区域；他们攻击宪兵、法院，以及所有代表国家的东西；暴动蔓延，直到执法力量单方面撤退、以及肉身阻止了选举的进行才有歇息。运动的力量，在于其内部多样化的组成部分间，弥漫散逸而又互补——这通常只有在男性主宰得没完没了又无望的乡村委员会，和其他的民间委员会之间，被部分地表现出来。阿尔吉利亚起义中一直蠢蠢欲动的「公社」，这一刻呈现出那些头戴钢盔、热昏了头的年轻人的面孔，在提济乌祖（TiziOuzou）的屋顶朝警察投掷汽油弹；下一刻又呈现出老反抗军挂在他连帽斗篷里的苦笑；再下一刻又呈现出山里村妇坚毅不拔地执行传统农业的能量——如果没有他们，当地的经济封锁永远不可能如此持续又有系统地进行。
+
+__`尽其所能利用危机`__
+
+「此外还得补充：我们无法处理全体法国民众。因此我们得做出选择。」二〇〇五年九月七日，当禽流感疫情爆发时，一位病毒学家在《世界报》上如此做结。「恐怖主义威胁」、「自然灾害」、「病毒警戒」、「社会运动」和「郊区暴力」等等，对社会的管理人而言，是多得无法胜数的不稳定时刻，让他们只能透过拣选那些逢迎他们的人、并歼灭那些妨碍他们的人，来强化自身的力量。也因此，理所当然地，这也是所有其他力量互相集结与巩固自身的机会，在它们选择站到对立面之后。打断货物的流通、终止正常状态——只要看到在一栋突然失去电力的建筑里，社会生活是如何回归的，就可以想象在一个失去一切的城市里，生活会变得怎样——和警察控制，都能解放在其他情境下无法想象的自我组织潜力。这逃不过任何人的眼睛。具有革命性的劳工运动对此理解得一清二楚，并利用中产阶级经济的危机来集聚力量。今天，伊斯兰教政党最强大的时刻，是在他们了解到要聪明地弥补国家弱点的时候1也就是当他们在阿尔及利亚的布梅尔德（Boumedes）地震后提供援助，或是在以色列军队进犯后提供曰常援助给黎巴嫩南部居民时。
+
+一如我们先前所述，卡崔娜飓风在纽奥良所带来的破坏，给了北美洲无政府主义运动的边缘势力一个机会——透过团结所有拒绝被强行疏散的人，获致某种陌生的凝聚力。路边食堂需要事先安排供应，紧急医疗援助则要求必要知识与物资的获得，设立地下电台亦然。这其中所包含的喜悦、对个人独善其身的超越，都彰显了逃脱日常秩序和工作氛围的具体现实，在在保证了这种经验的政治丰富性。
+
+在法国这样一个国家，辐射污染云就停在国界上，并且癌症研究中心就建立在欧盟指定需要报告有毒化学物质的前AZF厂址上，显然此处较需要考虑的不是「自然」危机而是社会危机。灾难的常态过程最常在社会运动中被打断。当然，最近这几年的各种罢工，主要是给政府和企业管理阶层机会，好测试他们维持不断提高的「最低服务」的能力，使罢工止于纯属象征的面向上——造成的伤害和一场暴风雪或是卧轨自杀相比，多不了多少。藉由撼动体制化的行动实践，以及透过有系统地占领各机构和顽强的封锁线，中学生在二〇〇五年的抗争和《首次聘雇就业法案》的抗争提醒了我们，大型运动破坏秩序和散播攻击的能力。透过所有在其航线中所诞生的团体，我们瞥见了在什么条件下，运动可以成为新公社涌现的场所。
+
+__`破坏所有代表性机构 推展街头集会 废除代表大会`__
+
+确切地说，早在与警力对峙前，所有社会运动遇到的第一个障碍，来自于两股势力：工会、和其他所有坐在小办公室里打着领带、职业是领导和管理抗争的人。公社、底层团队和组织会本能地防备他们。这也是为何二十多年来，这些官僚主义反对者创造出一些因为不带标签而看似较为天真的协调委员会，但事实上这些都是他们的演练场所。当一个迷途的群体试图获得自治时，他们只会透过坚定地排除真正的问题来停止清空自己。他们发狂，脑子发热：不是为了对论辩的热情，而是为了某种对辩论的回避——出于其职业需要。而当他们那被冷漠所搨起的辩护总算在总体上有道理时，他们却以政治意识的缺乏来解释其失败。必须这么说：在法国，青年革命拥护者并不欠缺政治操弄的艺术，这显然应归功于托派信徒各个不同分支的狂热活动。但他们显然在二〇〇五年的动乱中记取如下的教训：只要有协调存在，就不需要协调；在已经自我组织的地方，组织就多余了。
+
+另一个反射动作是，连在最小规模的反抗运动中，也开代表大会并进行投票。这是一个错误。一个简单的投票和决定赢家的作法，都足以将大会变成一场恶梦，变成权力竞逐对抗的舞台。在此我们承受的是资产阶级国会式的错误范例。会议并非为了取得决定而设置，而是为了得以彼此阔谈，令言论无目的地自由展现。
+
+在人类的习性中，彼此聚集的需求，大概和决策的必要性之罕见一样真切。彼此聚合回应了感受某种集体力量的快乐。决定只在某些紧急情况下是重要的，而在这些情况下实行民主无论如何都只是一种折衷的方式。在其他情况下，「决策过程的民主性」就只是狂热的程序主义者的问题。这不在于批判大会或是废除大会，而是在于解放其言论、姿态和个体之间的互动。只需要看到每个来参加大会的人不只是带着他们的观点和提案到场，还带着他们的欲望、连结、能力、力量、悲伤，以及对他人的某种敞开，就可以明白。如果我们能够撕碎这种对代表大会的幻想、代之以一种出席性集会（assembleedes presences），如果我们能击退权威不断重生的诱惑，如果我们能停止将决策当作终点，就有机会在我们之间产生某种大众结合——某种集体结晶的现象——此时决策便能掌握个体，不论是其整体或仅只是部分。
+
+这对于行动的决策而言也是同样道理。因为若从「行动应当指导集会议程」的原则出发，将让激烈的辩论和有效的行动变得不可能。一个由彼此陌生的人聚集而成的大型集会，必然会要求专业的行动，亦即，为了控制的需要而放弃行动。一方面，代表们依定义会阻碍他们自己的行动，另一方面，没有什么能妨碍他们欺骗任何人。
+
+以形式而言并不存在理想的行动。重要的是行动会塑造形式，它会让形式浮现，而非强加一个形式在行动上。这代表了站在相同的政治和地缘立场——像是法国大革命期间的巴黎公社地区——I以及共享知识的流通。对于行动的决策而言，原则如下：每个人都自行出发侦查：讯息被统整后，决策会自己来到我们身边，而非我们做出决策。知识的流通会消除阶续差异，从高处获致平等。让横向沟通不断增加，这是不同公社之间的最佳协调形式，以终结权威。
+
+__`封锁经济，以我们自我组织的程度衡量我们阻挡的力量`__
+
+二〇〇六年六月底，整个瓦哈卡州（Oaxaca）出现了越来越多的市政府占领行动，反抗者占据了大型公共建筑。在某些市镇，市长遭到驱逐，公家车被征收。一个月后，某些前往旅馆和游客住宿区的通道被阻断。墨西哥的旅游部长说这是「可与威尔马飓风相较」的灾难。早在几年前，封锁就成了阿根廷反抗运动最主要的行动形式之一，不同的地方团体互相支援，封锁这条或那条主要干道，并透过共同行动持续威胁要瘫痪整个国家——如果他们的要求不能得到满足。数年来，这样的威胁在铁路工人、卡车司机和电气供应工人的手里，是有力的手段。在法国，反对《首次聘雇就业法案》的运动中，在封锁火车站、外环道路、工厂、高速公路、超商甚至是场上，毫不迟疑手软。在雷恩市，只需不到三百人，就将主要干道封锁了好几个小时，并造成了四十公里长的交通阻塞。
+
+封锁一切，这是现今所有起身反抗现存秩序者的第一个反应。在一个去地方化的经济中，公司运作分秒不差，价值衍生于与网络的连接中，高速公路是非物质化的生产线上的一个环节，从外包商到外包商、直到另一个工厂组装，因此，封锁流通也就是封锁生产。
+
+但封锁的有效程度，只能和反抗者的自给能力与沟通能力相当，只能和不同公社间有效的自我组织程度相当。一旦所有事物都被瘫痪，该如何喂饱自己？搬空店家，像是阿根廷反抗运动的情况，这有其限度；尽管消费的圣殿无比巨大，却仍不是无底的食物储藏室。在这段时期中，获得某种能力好提供一个人自己基本的生存所需，这意味着拥有生产这些东西所需的方法。在这一点上，再等待下去似乎毫无用处。让百分之二的人为所有其他人生产粮食——今日的处境便是如此——这是历史与策略上的荒诞。
+
+__`将领土从警察的占领中解放出来。尽量避免直接对抗`__
+
+「这件事表明了，我们面对的不是对社会有更多要求的年轻人，而是对共和国宣战的个人。」一位清醒的警察对最近的冲突如此说明。从警察的占领中解放领土的攻势已经展开，而这波攻势可以依靠现存秩序所积聚的反对力量本身所保存的怨愤。就连「社会运动」本身都一步一步地被反抗行动拉拢过去，情况就像在雷恩市二〇〇五年的每周四晚上，狂欢群众纷纷和法国镇暴警察（CRS）发生冲突；或是在巴塞隆纳，寻欢作乐者在路边聚会（botellion）时掠劫破坏了一整个商业区。在反《首次聘雇就业法案》的运动中，我们持续地看到莫洛托夫鸡尾酒的一再出现。但在这点上，某些郊区行动仍然是难以超越的。特别是这个许久之前便流传至今的技巧：埋伏突击。像是二〇〇六年十月十三日在艾皮内（Epinay）的那次：犯罪防治特警队（BAC）的部队在接获一起汽车窃盗警报后出发，当他们到达案发现场，其中一个小队「被两辆横过马路的汽车给堵住，三十多个手持铁棍与其他武器的人对着警车投掷石块，并用催泪瓦斯对抗警方。」在较小的规模上，想想那些在晚上关门时间被攻击的各区警察局：玻璃窗被打破，警车被焚毁。
+
+这是最近几场运动所获得的认识之一，即从今以后，一个真正的示威抗争必须是「野蛮的」，无需向警察局报备。能够选择战场，让我们能够绕过禁区并避免直接冲突，像二〇〇一年意大利热那亚的黑块行动一样，并且我们还能决定路线，牵着警察（包含工团主义者和和平主义者）的鼻子走，而不是被他们牵着鼻子走。于是我们看到了，上千个意志坚决的个人推着整个意大利国家宪兵队的车子后退，直到放火烧掉所有的车。重要的不是更好的武装，而是采取主动。勇气算不得什么，对自身勇气的信任才是一切。而拥有主动性对此大有帮助。
+
+然而，一切都促使我们将直接冲突视为牵制敌对势力的手段，让我们得以争取更多时间并且攻击其他地方——甚至我们身边。我们无法防止对抗的发生，但这不能禁止我们将其视为转移注意力的手段。比行动更重要的，是行动必须积极涉入对方的组织协调中。骚扰警察，这是为了让他们分散各处，而变得在任何地方都没有效率。
+
+每个纠缠骚扰的行为都将复苏这个道理，一八四二年的这段话已足以说明：「一个警员的生活是痛苦的；他在社会中的位置和罪犯一样既羞辱又受人鄙视……羞耻与侮辱从四面八方包围他，社会将他从中逐出，像贱民一样孤立他，将辱骂连同工资啐在他身上，而毫无愧疚、悔恨与怜悯……他放在口袋里的警察证件是羞耻的证明书。」二〇〇六年十一月二十一日，在巴黎示威的消防队员用榔头攻击镇暴警察，打伤了十五个。这是个提醒：「以助人为志业」永远不会是加入警察的正当借口。
+
+__`武装起来。但尽其所能让武装的用途变成多余。面对武力，得胜之道在于政治`__
+
+不存在和平的起义。武力是必要的：这是为了尽力使其用途成为多余。起义指的是拿起武器，一种「武装的持续性」，而不是通往武装抗争的过程。分清楚武装与使用武力，对我们只有好处。武力是一种革命的常数，尽管在巨大转变的时刻，武力的使用并不频繁，也很少是决定性的，例如在一七九二年八月十日、一八七一年三月十八日、一九一七年十月。当权力落入阴沟里，跨过去就好了。
+
+在将我们与他们分开的距离中，武器获得了魅惑与令人厌憎这两面特质，只能由支配它们来克服。真正的和平主义不能拒绝武力，只能拒绝使用武力。作为和平主义者却无法开火，这只能算是阳痿的理论化，这种理论上的和平主义，对应的是一种预防性质的解除武装，这是种纯粹的警察操作。在现实中，只有对有能力开火的人才能认真地提出和平主义的问题。而在这种情况下，和平主义相反地应该是一种力量的标志，因为只有从一种极端有力的位置，人们才能从开火的必要中被解放。
+
+从一种策略的观点来看，间接的、不对衬的行动，似乎是最有利、最合乎时宜的方式：我们不和职业军队正面交锋。然而，伊拉克式郊区游击队的打法，在困境中拖延却又无进攻的可能，这应该值得害怕而不是值得考虑。内战的军事化发展是起义的挫败。红军在一九二一年是赢了，但俄国革命却已然失败。
+
+我们必须要考虑国家两种类型的反应。一种是公然的敌意，另一种则较为隐晦而民主。第一种反应召唤的是直率的破坏，对第二种反应而言，则是精微而无情的敌意：它要的不是别的，而是我们的参与。我们可能会被独裁统治打败也可能败于被减弱为仅仅反对独裁统治。挫败存在于输掉战争，也存在于输掉开启哪一场战争的选择权。两种都有可能，如同西班牙在一九三六年所证明的：革命者被击败了两次，败在法西斯主义手上，也败在共和国手上。
+
+当情势变得严峻，军队就会占领地势。交战与否则较不确定。这需要国家做出杀戮的决定，而现在这已不过是种恫吓，有点像是半个多世纪以来使用核子武器的恫吓。总之，国家这只野兽，尽管已经受伤许久，但却仍然危险。总之，面对军队，需要数量庞大的群众，进犯敌方的队伍，并与士兵亲善。我们需要一八七一年的三月十八日。军队上街，这就是揭竿而起的形式。军队开火，大局便已底定。每个人都发现自己被要求选边站，在无政府与无政府的恐惧中做选择。起义是以政治力量获胜的。在政治上，战胜军队绝非不可能。
+
+__`在地区层级废除权力`__
+
+对任何革命而言，重点是要使自身不可逆转。不可逆性的实现，是在我们同时战胜权威以及对权威的需求、同时战胜财产以及对占有的体验、同时战胜霸权以及对霸权的渴望。这就是为什么在革命的过程自身中便包含了其胜利的形式，或是其失败的形式。破坏从来就不足以让事物具有不可逆性。重要的是做的方式。有些破坏的方法绝对会刺激它所压碎之物的回归。猛烈追赶某一秩序之尸首的人可以肯定，这绝对会挑起复仇的志业。因此，在任何经济被阻滞、警察失去作用的地方，重要的便是在推翻权力时，煽情越少越好。权威必须由审慎的从容与嘲讽来废除。
+
+这个时代，革命中心的终结，回应着权力的去中心化。冬宫还是存在但比起反抗者，它更是设计给游客攻击的对象。今天，我们可以占领巴黎、罗马，或是布宜诺斯艾利斯，而不需要向谁回报这个决定。占领杭吉斯集散市场会比占领爱丽舍宫更有效。权力不再以世界的某一点为中心聚集，权力就是这个世界本身，这世界的潮流和街道、它的人和规矩、它的密码与技术。0权力就是大都会的组织本身。它在自己的每个点上，都是这个商品世界完美的整体。同时，任何人在地方层级打败它，都会产生出一股穿越整个星球网络的震动波。克力奇苏柏的暴动让不只一1个美国家庭欢欣鼓舞，瓦哈卡州的反抗者在巴黎市中心也找得到同志。对法国而言，中心化权力的失落，意味着巴黎作为革命中心的结束。一九九五年的罢工之后，所有的新运动都在肯定这一点。最无畏、最坚定的行动，已不再发生在巴黎。一言以蔽之，单纯作为一个暴动攻击的目标上，如同一片纯然为了遭到掠夺和攻击的土地般，巴黎展现着它的与众不同之处。入侵来自于他方，短促而猛烈地攻击大都会支流网络中最稠密之处。是这些散播着的狂怒在这个荒漠虚假的丰沛上划下刻痕，而后消失。这样的一天将会到来，首都可怖的权力凝结体将被完全毁弃，那将会是某个过程的终结，而这个过程将在各处以更为进步的方式进行。
+
+一切权力归于公社！Tout le pouvoir aux communes!
+
+---
+
+### 后记：火焰燃烧的街头……
+
+> 广播电台不断地向反抗者报告政府武力的撤退状况，
+一枚火箭破开了克莱沃监狱的围墙。
+已经无法确切地说「事件」开始之后，
+究竟过去了几个月还是几年。
+首相呼吁冷静，
+看来却无比孤单。
+
+在地铁里，我们再也看不到令人局促不安的荧幕、如往常般妨碍行人的动作。陌生的人们彼此倾谈，不再互相攻击。同志们正在街角密商。大街上有更大的集会，正在进行严肃的讨论。一个又一个的城市中，攻击正在展开。新的兵营被掠夺，继之焚毁。被逐出的公寓住户不再和市政府协商——他们直接进驻。一场清醒的发作中，一位公司经理在会议中途，杀了他为数不多的同事。文件外泄，内容包含了所有警察、宪兵的私人住址，导致了一波史无前例的剧烈大风吹。在乡下的老杂货铺酒吧，我们将生产的多余产品带去，并取走我们缺乏的东西。我们也聚在一起讨论情势、以及机械工作室里需要什么设备。广播电台不断地向反抗者报告政府武力的撤退状况。一枚火箭破开了克莱沃（Clairvaux）监狱的围墙。已经不可能确切地说究竟在「事件」开始之后，究竟过去了几个月还是几年。首相呼吁冷静，看来却无比孤单。
+
+---
+
+### 再版后记：定调
+
+> 这场战争也是语言的战争。
+如果人们花了如此大的力气，以恐怖主义的理由，
+将几个年轻共产主义农夫关起来，只因为认定他们参与《革命将至》的编辑与撰写，
+这不是为了「思想罪」的罪名，
+而是因而他们正式代表一种行动与思想都体现在生存里的作风，
+或更确切地说，他们将字词、行为与生活坚固地联接。
+
+所有人都同意，事情就要闹大了。议会场外，我们神情严肃或者逞好汉地承认这一切，一如昨晚在酒馆里不断重复的，我们热衷于风险评估。就地盘上的分区控制，我们已经作了详细的预防性作战计画。那些新年庆典代表着关键性的转折。「明年就不会有蠢蛋了！」为了不让节庆被一片混乱的传统覆盖地黯然失色，内政部长阿利欧-马力(紧急派遣了三万六千名警力和十六架直升机；这位女士，在十二月的中学生示威游行时，也曾害怕希腊暴动的传染力，而惊惶发抖地戒备着最微不足道的征兆。在那些只是要人安心的谈话背后，我们更清楚听到的却是，准备公开宣战的骚乱。再没有人能无视于它炫耀、冰冷且重实效的施行手段，它甚至不再花力气自我介绍、说这是场调解行动。
+
+报纸有意识地编列清单，细数这些暴起焦虑的原因。危机存在，那当然，因为有爆炸般的失业现象、一箩筐的社会方案和绝望，还有银行交易员凯维尔或马多夫的金融丑闻。学校系统垮台了，它不再能生产工作者，也无法将公民规格化，即使是中产阶级的孩子也不受控了。大家都说，青少年的苦恼不适，没有任何一个政治代表可以与他们相符，最好的发泄就是，焚烧汽车，并将它推向那些人们为自己方便所准备的免费脚踏车。
+
+然而这些焦虑的原因，却不应该显得难以克服，毕竟这个时代的主导政权，正善于掌握与管理危机局势。除非政府将迎战的对象，不再视作一项危机，也非一连串长期慢性的问题、多多少少都在预料中的失常，而一种奇特的风险，也就是这些冲突争端的形式与处境所显现出来的：它们是不受管理的。
+
+到处都可见这种奇特风险，与其去探讨对抗行动的理由与可能性，不如去讨论它呈现的问题，因为无论如何，这个对抗都会发生，而且总是会有跟随者。想想希腊的混乱，如何会在法国的情境中产生回响？不能因那边所发生事件，而认为这里的造反，纯粹是这样简单转移过来的。全球性的公民之战，今天在每一地方都有其特异性；在法国，一个普遍的骚动情势，则会诱发另一问题的暴燃。
+
+希腊的闹事者在人民的支持下，和一个衰弱无能的政府打交道。
+
+我们不应该忘记，不过是三十年前，要从一场政治暴力行动开始反抗军阀政体、民主才又重建。；对绝大多数的希腊人来说，关于这场暴力的记忆并不遥远，它至今看来仍是个明显的事实。即使是那些地方社会主义党，的大老，也都曾在年轻时尝过莫洛托夫鸡尾酒的滋味。要回应这一切，传统的政治可能很熟悉各种调停变动的策略，也非常了解如何地采取行动、然后对闹事者宣传一些意识形态的蠢话。若不是这场希腊战役自己决定在街头结束——看得出来，警察当时已完全无能应付——军方压制也会在其他地方上演。事实上，没有什么比这传统政治更令人疲乏的、更宿命的——它和它那些干涸的仪式、它那从不思考的思想、它那封闭的小世界。
+
+在法国，我们那些最激昂的社会主义官僚，从来只做严峻的议会核心人物，和铁板着脸的负责人，更确切地说，他们所有的努力都是为了摧毁最小形式的政治紧张。这种政治手段总让人们可以将公民和捣蛋者对立起来，也让人可以继续在无底容器中掏取矫揉造作的对比：使用者对抗罢工者，反封锁者对抗绑架人质者、勇敢的人对抗社会败类。这几乎是一种语言学上的作战计画，同时还会并行近乎军事的措施。二〇〇五年十一月的闹事者，以及另一个不同背景下，二〇〇七年秋天的社会运动，都提供了几个这种手段的例子。巴黎第十大学那些同谋的学生，面对驱赶他们同学的警察时，鼓噪喊叫「去啊！蓝衫军」的画面，只不过是关于我们已被安排好的未来，那微弱的一瞥。
+
+法国人对国家的依恋，是不用再说的——国家可说是对普世价值的担保、对抗灾难的最后一道壁垒——这种依恋已成为一门病理学，复杂得难以摆脱。它尤其是一个不知如何继续编造下去的虚构。然而面对这则国家神话，执政者们每天多少都认为，它只是个没用的阻碍——既然他们最终都得用武力承担眼前的冲突。他们这群人完全没有任何情结，便能轻易地派遣反恐菁英部队去压制郊区的骚动者，好比去解放一间被它的员工所占领的资源回收中心。随着国家保护人的外表逐渐龟裂，在那些渴望秩序和再也不想要秩序的人中间，最原初的对抗已然发生。
+
+所有法国政治过去能够钝化噤声的，现在都正脱离常轨、暴怒发作。一切被它镇压过的，它也将无法从中重振。在社会就要提前解体的情况下，我们可以指望行动，起码它是为了在危机停滞后，还能回复原先必然虚无的生气。而它也绝不会忘了将这些暴露在其他限制之下。
+
+革命运动并不是一种传染病，它的散播靠的是回响与共鸣。有些在这里组织起来的事件，便是要回应另一处事件所传送而来的冲击波。每一件事物都会以它自己的方式来反应现象。暴动并不是像瘟疫或森林火灾的蔓延——后者只是种线性发展的进程，从最初的星星之火逐渐地扩展开来。暴动更具体，比较像是音乐，即使被驱散于时间与空间中，它的成员一样能够以自己的颤动，强迫大家听到他们的节奏，让一切更加地厚实浓密。要让回归原来的正常不再被渴望，或甚至不再能被预想。
+
+当我们谈到帝国时，那些权力机构便是被指派要将局势里有革命倾向的变化都拦截住，以预防、外科手术的方式。因此，我们要面对的敌人并不是帝国，而是一种非此不可的节奏，一种让现实涌出又再流逝的方法。相较于所谓世界的秩序，这毋宁可说，更是一种悲伤、沉重、充满物理味道的世界的消散。
+
+我们所理解的暴动群党，是另一种组织的开端，属于另一面的现实，从希腊到法国的郊区，这群人都在找寻对此一致的观点。
+
+这已是众所周知的，危机情势就是奉送给统治者的机会、让他可以重新整顿。所以萨科齐可以不带太多说谎的神情，大声宣布财务危机意味着「一个世界的终结」，二〇〇九年将会看到法国进入新的纪元。总之，经济危机这把戏会是件新鲜事：创造丰功伟业的时机到了，大家一起吧，一起对抗不平等和气候暖化。然而对我们这个正好在危机当中出生、只认识经济、财务、社会、自然生态等种种危机的世代，这一切却相对地难以接受。「我们将重新出发」、「只需要勒紧裤带一阵子」，这种话是不会让我们从危机的打击中站起的。说真的，公布那些悲惨的失业数据，已经无法，激起法国人任何感觉了。危机成了统治的手段。这个世界，似乎只能靠着无止尽地处理自己的溃败来维持下去。
+
+人们想要看我们躲在国家的背后，等着被动员，连带负责对这社会还不定会有的马虎修补。如果想要摆脱道些，除非我们厌恶加入这种动员，更甚至是，由我们自己来决定行动——终极地出撃、打倒资本主义。
+
+正在争战的，并不是管理这个社会有哪些多变的方法，而是那些关于幸福的想法与他们的世界、是如此不能缩减与妥协。权力者知道这些，我们也是。激进的废物看我们总是较多数、较难辨认的一群，绝望地想将我们塞进他们的小头小脑中。然而，他们向我们张开双臂，却只为了从他们的失败、瘫痪、衰弱的核心问题中压制我们。这些从「过渡阶段」的选举出身的人，只会使我们一次次地离共产主义的可能更加遥远。庆幸的是，我们不会对背叛和欺瞒将就太久。
+
+过去的日子给了我们太多糟糕的答案，也让我们从中了解到，那都是问题本身就太过糟糕。
+
+> 我们根本就没得选择：
+恋物癖般地热爱大自然，
+对作战的网络修修补补，
+绝望地立刻做些什么。
+
+或
+
+> 麻木地接受组织的控制，
+对阶级的指挥棒唯命是从，
+绝望地再等一阵子。
+
+> 以天堂为名义，
+将当下的生活和体验暂时悬置，
+然而天堂离我们越来越远，
+以至于看起来更像地狱。
+
+或
+
+> 行尸走肉一般得过且过，
+以为只要多种些胡萝卜，
+便足以让我们脱离这场恶梦。
+
+多么困窘的选择。
+
+那些组织，对于组织起来这件事就是个障碍。
+
+老实说，在我们是什么、我们做了什么还有我们将成为什么之间，并没有差别。但无论是政治的或工会的、法西斯式的或无政府主义式的那些组织，总是很实用性地先将存在的面向分开来。接着情况就有利于他们去介绍他们愚蠢的形式主义，好像那正是解决此种存在被切割的唯一良方。组织起来，指的并不是给无能为力一个结构。其实首要的是，去连结那些非中立的关系、那些被过分定位的关系。而组织的程度，则是由物质和精神上分享的强度来衡量。
+
+从今以后，可以这么说：「为了生存而实质组织，正是为了攻击而实质组织。」共产主义的新概念开始在各地兴起。在酒吧、印刷厂、非法占据空屋、楼梯间、农场、健身房等地的暗处，都能产生攻击性的同谋关系；因为这些共谋，这世界的发展趋势突然更被强调了。不应该拒绝这些珍贵的串通，以及他们所要求用以展现自己力量的方式。
+
+从中，我们可以找到这时代真正的革命可能。越来越频繁的鲁莽斗殴，便是令人生畏的一种，每一次都造就了这一类共谋关系的机会，有时昙花一现、但有时也持久不灭。可以肯定的是，那之中有一种累积的形成过程。当这一刻无数年轻人决心放弃与破坏这世界，你还是可以像愚蠢的警察一样，去找一个付钱单位、一个老板，或者一个不用发愁的工作。
+
+两个世纪以来的资本主义和商业的虚无主义，导致了对自我、他人和对所有世界，最极端的奇异感。而个体这则虚构物，瓦解的速度就和成真的速度一样快。身为大都会的孩子，我们来打这个赌：就是要从对生存最深层的剥夺，那总是被扼杀阻止的共产主义的可能性，才能由此展开。
+
+归根究柢，其实这是一部关于我们总在战争的人类学，所有的一切都是人的想法所造成。
+
+因此，共产主义就像是预先的假定，也像实验。分享一种同情感受，也设计一种分享。是一种属于众人的明显事实，也是一种力量的构成。共产主义就像模具，专门生产细心又大胆的袭击，用以对坑统治。它就像号召也像名字，属于所有反抗帝国压制的世界、所有在交易王国顽强抵制的团结力量，以及所有担当战争必要性的友谊。共产主义。我们知道，这是一个需要被谨慎使用的词。不是因为在字词的队伍中，它可能不再流行；而是我们恶劣的敌人不仅将它用坏了，而且还一直这样利用。我们要坚持着。
+
+有些字就像战场，一定得要透过全力地争夺，才能将它真正革命或反动的意义赢回来。
+
+背弃传统政治意味着承担战争，这场战争也发生在语言的领地上。确切地说，是关于将字词、行为与生活坚固地连结一道的方法。如果人们花了如此大的力气，以恐怖主义的理由，将几个年轻共产主义农夫关起来，只因为认定他们参与《革命将至》的编辑与撰写，这不是为了「思想罪」的罪名，而是因为他们正足以代表一种行动与思想都体现在生存里的作风——而普遍来说，这却不被宽容。
+
+人们对这些人的指责，并不是因为他们写了什么东西，也不是因为他们坪击了那灌溉整个大都会、神圣不可侵犯的潮流。而是因为他们可能以思想的深度与政治立场，指责了那些潮流。这里，只要一个行动，就能根据这世界不同于帝国沙漠般的稳固，产生意义。反恐主义试图打击「干坏事联盟」形成的可能。然而，现实中真正被攻击的，是转变的局势。这可能来自于，在每个小市民背后都隐藏了某些恶意，而在每个意图背后都有它所唤求的订动。这可能性也来自于，一个政治概念的传播，是匿名却又能找到彼此的散布又不可控制的，它无法被收纳在只自由表达的小房间里。
+
+几乎不用再怀疑，青少年便是第一个粗野地指责权力的人。过去几年，从二〇〇一年春天在阿尔及利亚到二〇〇八年冬天在希腊发生的那些骚乱，不过只是一连串的警告。已经有三十或四十年都是这样了，那些起身反抗父母道德的年轻人，必然会被减低为世代间的新冲突，好像这只是青春期可预见的效应。
+
+而一个「世代」唯一的未来，就是成为上一代，循着这条不变的道路，最终就是通向墓园。
+
+对于传统而言，它希望一切都从「社会运动」开始。尤其是此刻，当左派无法遏止地解体、仍假惺惺地要寻回他们在街头的威信。但是，它再也不能垄断街头势力。只需要看看，在每一次新的中学生动员里——就像左派至今还敢支持的所有运动一样——有一道越来越深的鸿沟，横跨在爱叹气诉苦的请愿、暴力的程度和行动的决心之间。
+
+这道鸿沟，我们应当拿来作为战壕。
+
+如果我们看着这些「社会运动」相继而来、又彼此相互排挤，在身后什么都没留下，势必得要确认，还有什么坚持在那里。每一次事件的导火线都能连结上那份坚持，这坚持不因一条法律的撤销或其他托词所产生的荒谬时间性，便任凭自己遵守纪律。照着它自己的节奏再加把劲，我们会看到某些事正显现着力量。这股力量不会忍受它的时代，反而是无声无息地强加于上。
+
+这时代不再预言崩溃，也不再是从崩溃中论证令人欣喜的可能。无论这些崩溃来得早或晚，都要准备好。用不着设想提纲来规画革命该长什么样，但是要重现起义的可能，革命从不停止同时成为：青春的生命冲动和通俗的智慧。如果我们知道如何行动，那么没有提纲不会造成阻碍，反倒是个机会。对造反者而言，提纲的空缺正是唯一可以保证本质的空间：保卫积极创举的精神。还有的就是，如同维持燃烧之火，要激起和延续某些注目、某些战略的狂热，在现在、在到来的时刻，这股狂热表现出具有决定性，并且是坚决意志的恒久泉源。有些问题再次出现，即使他们昨日看来还显得滑稽或过时；我们要做的就是将这些问题夺过来，不是为了要明确地解答他们，而是为了让他们活跃起来。此外，再度重提这些问题所能达到的效果，不会比希腊暴动的效果差：
+
+普遍的动乱局面，要如何变成革命的形势？警察持续地败北，而一旦街头被我们占夺，我们又该做些什么？国会值得我们一直去袭击攻占吗？下放权力到地方的意义是什么？如何抉择？如何存活下去？
+
+如何重新上路？
+
+二〇〇九年一月二十二日，巴黎
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2022-07-01-Xiaowaves-a1_r-the-crying-pearl-of-the-orient.md b/_collections/_heros/2022-07-01-Xiaowaves-a1_r-the-crying-pearl-of-the-orient.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0f4062a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_heros/2022-07-01-Xiaowaves-a1_r-the-crying-pearl-of-the-orient.md
@@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title: "哭泣的東方之珠"
+author: "晓波助澜会"
+date: 2022-07-01 12:00:00 +0800
+image: https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/a1/0x13_a1_r-20220701.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "後《國安法》時代香港自由報告"
+position: right
+---
+
+2020年7月1日中國共產黨在香港實行《國家安全法》，完全摧毀香港的自由基石，破壞香港法治和香港《基本法》所載人權保障。《基本法》第39(1)條規定《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》適用於香港的有關規定繼續有效，通過香港特別行政區法律予以實施，而《國家安全法》嚴重侵犯香港居民擁有的上述《公約》保障言論、思想、新聞、結社、集會自由以及司法獨立、獲得公平和公開審訊的權利、參與公共事務、在真正的定期選舉中投票和成為公職候選人的權利和其他基本自由的權利。香港急速淪陷成為專制主義恐怖之地。
+
+
+
+作為列寧主義政黨和東方專制主義結合體的中國共產黨，本質就是反人類、反文明、反社會。中國共產黨使用謊言與暴力來維繫其一黨專政的獨裁統治，牢牢控制國民的精神和生活。在上世紀八十年代，中共在掌權三十多年不斷製造一次又一次的人為災難，導致中國國民經濟一片凋敝，瀕臨崩潰邊緣，中共為了擺脫困境，不得不對中國農村和城市經濟放鬆控制，開始了所謂“改革開放”，實質就是中共在經濟瀕臨崩潰的時候，給了國民一點活下去的寬鬆的機會，在堅決不放棄對政治的控制、保持政治封閉的同時，經濟有控制地開放，包括對外資開放。
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+在當時中國共產黨的眼裏認為香港可以幫助中國大陸推動開放過程，所以對香港制訂了“長期打算，充分利用”的政策，也就是中英聯合聲明對所謂“一國兩制”的由來。然而，中國共產黨作為獨裁主義組織，在其崛起到統治的過程中劣跡昭彰，不但從來沒有遵守過文明社會的條約體系，相反謊言與欺騙才是其血腥發家之寶，香港一直並且始終為中國共產黨獲得資源的“利用”物件，所以才有了中共現在悍然撕毀中英聯合聲明，不顧廉恥地宣稱聲明只是一份不具現實意義的“歷史檔”，公然踐踏基本法，置“一國兩制”為一黨專政的“遮醜布”現實。
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+中國共產黨之所以摧毀香港的自由基石，原因是香港已不再是上世紀的能“利用”的物件，隨著香港市民經過2014年“雨傘革命”與2019年“反送中”運動而日益高漲的爭取民主、自由的訴求，成為對中共統治造成威脅的對象。歸根到底，香港自開埠迄今一百多年所形成的公民社會的思想自由、言論自由、集會自由、結社自由、新聞自由等人類文明基本價值與中國共產黨專制政權的對國家和人民的全方位的、不留死角的控制是天然衝突的。對中國共產黨來說，是絕對不能容忍任何一個地方出現爭取民主的敍事，即使是香港這樣的東方之珠，因為極權主義最恐懼的就是多米諾骨牌效應，害怕一個地方的民主運動成為獨裁統治下其他地方民眾效仿的對象，而“雨傘革命”和“反送中”確實在中國大陸成為爭取自由的民主運動的動員力量之一，所以中國共產黨不惜一切代價地撲滅香港的自由之火，消滅香港的公民社會，讓這顆東方之珠黯淡，無聲。
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+港版國安法故意含糊而寬泛，幾乎任何事情都可被認作對國家安全的威脅，賦予當局廣泛的自由裁量權，可對持不同政見者扣上“分裂國家罪”、“顛覆國家政權罪”、“恐怖活動罪”、“勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全罪”等罪名。《國家安全法》的實施，使香港長期受到保護的基本公民權利和政治權利全部被扼殺，使香港賴以成功的要素毀於一旦。本報告向公眾全面介紹香港在實行《國家安全法》後，從一個自由社會蒙塵為專制跋扈社會的真實狀況。
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+
+### 新聞自由
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+在2020年7月1日香港實行《國家安全法》前，香港的新聞自由雖然在1997年“回歸”後不斷消減，中國共產黨控制的資金大舉進入香港媒體業，籍此控制、引導香港的輿論聲音，同時通過廣告、市場誘導的手段以利益拉攏媒體的輿論導向，甚至通過威脅的手段迫使媒體進行自我審查。
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+從香港中文大學傳播與民意調查中心持續訪問公眾對媒體公信力的評分來看，1997年主權移交以來，市民對於“香港整體新聞媒介”公信力評分不斷下降。但自2016年後，在眾多媒體、記者的努力堅守下，特別是在《立場新聞》和《蘋果日報》兩間媒體的努力下，使香港媒體的公信力顯著提升，而《蘋果日報》更在全港報紙中一枝獨秀，是近幾年來唯一一份公信力不斷提升的報紙。這些媒體對新聞自由的堅守使它們堅持報導香港的真實情況，亦因此成為炮製謊言為業的中國共產黨的眼中釘肉中刺。自從中國共產黨表示對香港擁有“全面管治權”以來，香港媒體一直成為中國官方希望整頓的一環，在《國安法》公佈以後，有北京或香港官員怪罪香港傳媒經常報導國家的負面新聞，希望整頓香港輿論導向，控制輿論導向，改寫歷史和重塑語語。
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+《國安法》實施後，中國共產黨的清算浪潮席捲香港媒體，媒體倒閉，高層換血，節目審查，記者失業，香港的新聞自由迅速崩塌。2021年，香港記者協會在5月3日世界新聞自由日公佈的“新聞自由指數”，創自2013年有記錄以來最低分數，只有32.1分。2022年的世界新聞自由日“無國界記者”發表的世界新聞自由指數顯示，香港於全球180個國家及地區中大跌至148名，較前年遽跌68位元，是該組織訂定指數以來，香港的最大跌幅，亦是今次報告內跌幅最大的地區，排名亦為有紀錄以來新低，與東南亞的菲律賓、非洲國家蘇丹、盧旺達等地方，同被歸類為“新聞自由情況艱難”。
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+香港以致各國的評分，是按新的五大範疇及其下的117條子問題的情況評分，在“政治脈絡”、“法律架構”、“經濟脈絡”、“社會文化脈絡”及包括記者身心和職業安全的“安全性”等五個評分範疇中，香港只有“社會文化脈絡”的評分合格，有57.45分，其餘四個範疇均低於50分，最差的是包括記者身心和職業安全的“安全性”評分，只有31.78分；次差是包括政府經濟限制和廣告主限制在內的“經濟脈絡”評分，次好的法律架構得42.58分。
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+中國共產黨強迫香港政府進一步收緊新聞自由，透過警察部門修改所謂的警察通例，攬奪所有記者的“發牌權”。換言之，今後只有香港政府才可以界定誰是記者誰不是記者。2020年9月22日，香港警察公共關係科去信香港記者協會、香港新聞行政人員協會、香港新聞工作者聯會和香港攝影記者協會四個新聞工作者協會，指將修改《員警通例》中對“傳媒代表”的定義，不再承認香港記者協會和攝影記者協會的會員證，改為僅限已登記政府新聞處的傳媒機構，和國際認可、知名的傳媒機構發出的認可證明檔，亦表示將來網媒和學生記者可能被認定為“非法採訪”。其後，包括香港記者協會、香港攝影記者協會、明報職工協會等多間傳媒工會發表聯合聲明，聲明指“傳媒代表”定義相關指引實施了多年，批評警方在未作任何諮詢的情況下，單方面作出重大修訂，等同實施官方發牌制度，嚴重影響新聞自由及採訪自由。新聞行政人員協會則要求確保記者採訪不會受到無理及不必要限制。另外，亦有20多個網媒發表聲明，認為這是落後愚昧的舉動，並表明反對一切篩選媒體、反對一切篩選記者的做法。聲明又指，記者採訪是合法實踐香港制度及法律和新聞自由，任何形式篩選，都是破壞新聞自由及香港的制度；警方修改《員警通例》明顯違背一國兩制、基本法及國安法原意，更削弱香港作為國際大都會的成功基石，令香港在國際上蒙羞，亦有負市民及國家期望。另外，有8個新聞工會同樣發表聲明，表達對警今次修訂的不滿，當中包括香港記者協會、香港攝影記者協會、獨立評論人協會、大專新聞教育工作者聯席、明報職工協會、壹傳媒工會、香港電臺節目製作人員工會，及眾新聞工會。聲明批警在完全未有任何諮詢的情況下，單方面作此重大修訂，是一手“破壞雙方建立多年的關係”，警方的修訂，等同變相由官方定義記者，無異于官方發牌制，破壞香港原有的採訪自由和新聞自由。
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+中國共產黨強迫香港政府以香港電臺為目標把這家獨立的公共廣播機構轉變為親北京的喉舌。長期以來，香港電臺大膽嘗試批評和追究政府、官員責任，因此受到警方、建制派立法會議員和親北京活動人士的攻擊。電臺的批評者提交了數千份投訴，指責它對政府存在偏見。對香港電臺的鎮壓始於2020年2月左右，香港警方投訴自1989年以來一直在運行的流行節目《頭條新聞》的一集諷刺情節，稱其“誤導”了觀眾對警方的看法。然後在2020年5月，通信管理局裁定該諷刺事件“侮辱了員警”。2020年6月，香港電臺暫停了該節目。
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+2020年5月，負責監管香港電臺的商務及經濟發展局啟動了對港臺管理層的“檢討”。香港政府隨後用一個沒有媒體經驗的職業官僚李柏全取代了香港電臺的負責人。在他上任的第一個月裏，李柏全就停播了幾集製作人或嘉賓持有民主觀點的時事節目，稱這些節目“缺乏客觀性”，但他沒有提供細節。他還告訴工作人員，他將在三個時事節目播出之前審查所有劇集。2021年4月，港臺管理層告訴製片人可能要對取消的劇集承擔經濟責任。李柏全還命令工作人員在2021年退出新聞獎項的考慮，因為頒發獎項的機構將表彰港臺對時事的報導，包括2019年的抗議活動。
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+在北京對BBC報導新疆地區的人權侵犯行為進行報復，禁止其世界新聞頻道進入中國後，香港電臺也放棄了其BBC節目。2021年5月，香港電臺承認它正在從其YouTube和Facebook頁面中刪除超過一年的節目。
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+因報導而出名的香港電臺記者受到處罰。以盤問世界衛生組織官員臺灣問題而聞名的唐若韞在北京擁有的報紙針對她的個人生活攻擊她後辭職。港臺於2021年5月28日解雇了港臺助理節目主任利君雅，利君雅於2019年元朗7.21事件翌日的政府記者會上，質問特首林鄭月娥7.21事件是否“官警黑合演的大龍鳳”，並在追問期間要求林鄭“講人話”，被部分媒體和線民譽為“良心記者”。2021年7月備受推崇的節目《鏗鏘集》有6名第二類服務提供者（CAT II）接獲通知毋須再提供服務，亦“不用回公司”；連同早前辭職的3名公務員，《鏗鏘集》製作團隊共減少約半數人手。《鏗鏘集》監製李賢哲則因高層否決其所提出有關六四事件，和元朗721事件的報導主題而辭職。
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+香港電臺新聞專題節目《鏗鏘集》外判編導蔡玉玲，2020年5、6月期間製作7-21元朗白衣人無差別襲擊市民事件一周年電視特輯，名為《7-21誰主真相》，她兩度透過車牌查冊尋找事發時懷疑運送木棍等武器的汽車車主，讓觀眾瞭解事發時更多細節。由於蔡玉玲申請車牌查冊的時候，運輸署修改了查冊申請表，不再提供其他原因的選項，亦沒有提供傳媒報導作為查冊原因的選項，蔡玉玲選擇“其他道路交通運輸相關事項”為理由，取得車牌查冊資料，她2020年11月被警方拘捕及控告她兩項“為取得道路交通條例下的證明書明知而作出虛假陳述”罪名。案件2021年4月22日在西九龍裁判法院作出裁決，蔡玉玲被判罪名成立，合共被判罰款6千港元（折合約775美元），成為首位香港記者因查冊作調查報導而被定罪。
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+香港最具公信力和最受民眾歡迎的報紙之一《蘋果日報》因為促進民主和捍衛自由而成為中國共產黨不能容忍的對象。2020年8月10日，200多名香港員警突襲了《蘋果日報》的辦公室，逮捕了《蘋果日報》的所有者黎智英、他的兩個兒子，以及《蘋果日報》母公司壹傳媒集團的四名高管，警方國安處人員則進入壹傳媒大樓搜證。警方表示，黎智英涉嫌觸犯國安法，包括勾結外國或境外勢力、危害國家安全罪、串謀欺詐及煽動罪。黎智英小兒子黎耀恩涉嫌違反《香港國安法》、勾結外國或境外勢力以及危害國家安全罪；長子黎見恩涉嫌觸犯串謀欺詐罪。被捕的壹傳媒集團4名高層，執行董事、財務總裁周達權涉嫌勾結外國或境外勢力及串謀欺詐。另一執行董事、行政總裁張劍虹、行政總監黃偉強，壹傳媒動畫公司總經理吳達光涉嫌串謀欺詐。同日警方亦持手令搜查日本《日經新聞》在中環的香港辦公室，被搜查的原因是約一年前，《日經》曾接受一則以《香港眾志》名義刊登的抗爭文宣。
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+2021年4月，中國共產黨擁有的兩家香港傀儡媒體公開施壓香港政府要求取締《蘋果日報》。5月，香港保安局利用“國安法”凍結了黎智英的5億港元（6400萬美元）的資產和股份。2021年6月17日香港警務處國安處以涉嫌違反“國安法”第29條中勾結外國或境外勢力罪，派出500名警察突襲被當局稱之為“犯罪現場”的《蘋果日報》新聞編輯室，拘捕五名壹傳媒高層，包括壹傳媒行政總裁張劍虹、營運總裁周達權、《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏（女性）、總編輯羅偉光及動新聞平臺總監張志偉，警察並到他們住處搜查，再被押返大樓調查。逾百名警員及國安處警員直闖將軍澳工業村蘋果日報大樓，封鎖大樓對開範圍及各個出口，所有進入大樓的員工均須登記身份證、職員證、電話號碼及位址等個人資料，記者不能返回崗位工作，他們被禁止拍攝，限制範圍在5樓餐廳，禁止進入大樓其他地方。警員除了在辦公室搜查，也打開職員的電腦。警方稱《蘋果日報》發表的約三十篇文章涉嫌違反國家安全法。這是當局稱媒體文章可能違反有爭議的國安法的首宗案例。羅偉光和張劍虹被控“勾結外國或外部因素危害國家安全”，在西九龍裁判法院出庭，被總裁判官蘇惠德拒絕保釋。
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+2021年6月23日《蘋果日報》宣佈，基於員工安全及人手考慮，決定午夜後即時停止運作，24日出版的將是最後一份實體報紙，網站將於午夜後停止更新。由於香港保安局凍結了三家與蘋果日報相關公司的資產，蘋果日報面對資金困難，壹傳媒旗下的《壹週刊》亦宣佈將結束營運，創刊26年的蘋果日報在“國安法”的壓迫下被迫停刊，成為國安法下首家受壓關閉的媒體。壹傳媒董事會在6月30日發給集團員工的郵件中宣佈，公司由於資金凍結，不得不停止運作。
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+《蘋果日報》的消失標誌著香港新聞自由邁向終結。《蘋果日報》在關閉時擁有60萬付費訂閱者，網站在5月份的訪問量接近1,870萬。該報在臉書上有260萬粉絲，在YouTube頻道上有189萬粉絲，在Instagram帳戶上有100萬粉絲，在推特上有超過50萬粉絲。所有這些帳戶的刪除切斷了過去10年精心收集的用戶。
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+2021年7月21日香港警方國安處撤銷前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏及前英文版執行總編輯馮偉光的保釋安排，再次拘捕二人。另外，國安處亦以涉嫌違反《國安法》，拘捕前《蘋果》執行總編輯林文宗和《蘋果日報》前主筆楊清奇。至今已有13名與壹傳媒有關的人士以《國安法》拘捕，包括黎智英父子、壹傳媒現職或已離任的高層。其中黎智英、壹傳媒行政總裁張劍虹、《蘋果》總編輯羅偉光，被落案起訴違反《國安法》，需要還押，壹傳媒營運總裁周達權、高層黃偉強則被控欺詐罪，獲法庭保釋。
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+在《蘋果日報》淪陷半年後，屢受到中國共產黨媒體狙擊和香港高官點名批評的香港民主立場的網媒《立場新聞》在中聯辦指使下受到打壓。警方國安處2021年12月29日出動逾200人，以涉嫌“串謀發佈煽動刊物罪”大舉搜查《立場》，並拘捕7人，包括《立場新聞》前總編輯、前董事鍾沛權（52歲），前董事周達智（63歲）、吳靄儀（73歲）、方敏生（63歲）、何韻詩（44歲），以及署理總編輯林紹桐（34歲）。另正被還押的鍾沛權太太、《蘋果日報》前副社長陳沛敏再被捕。《立場》被警方凍結6,100萬港元資產，即日網上宣佈，即時停止運作，包括網站及所有社交媒體立即停止更新，並將於日內移除。署任總編輯林紹桐已請辭，立場新聞所有員工已即時遣散。港警稱，案中涉發佈“被失蹤”等煽動文章，包括“國際線逃犯”博文，正調查有否“勾結外國勢力”，現正通緝多人。助查的立場副采主兼記協主席陳朗升受訪形容，“這是傷感的一天”。
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+警方國安處對《立場新聞》引用的“串謀發佈煽動刊物罪”屬於《刑事罪行條例》下的第9及第10條，為始於1938年的刑事條文，而非《國安法》列明“四大罪行”涵蓋範圍。此《刑事罪行條例》下的第9及第10條，自香港1967年“六七暴動”後，再未被採用。至2020年6月《港區國安法》實施後，港警國安處引用該兩條例，先後拘捕多人，包括2020年9月的快必譚得志“煽動文字”案，為香港回歸以來首案；另外還有“鍾翰林案”、“羊村繪本案”、“蘋果日報案”和本次“立場新聞案”等。《刑事罪行條例》下的第9及第10條一直被法律界和國際社會批評，指警方國安處動用此“塵封半世紀的殖民地惡法”去“炮製文字獄”，打壓言論自由，拘捕大批公民團體成員、泛民人士和記者，顯示中國共產黨為了鎮壓香港的新聞自由無所不用其極。
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+《蘋果日報》及《立場新聞》的停刊，導致近860名新聞工作者失業。在《立場新聞》新聞受到狙擊後，人人自危的香港媒體不堪重壓，《立場新聞》停運兩星期後，再有最少7家規模較小的非建制陣營獨立網媒相繼停運，包括《香港獨媒新聞》、《IBHK網路媒體》、《眾新聞》、《癲狗日報》、《夠薑媒體》、《聚言時報》及《白夜》。《聚言時報》的停運公告表示，“在這風雨飄搖的時間，很遺憾要向各位讀者道別”。公告表示，該報2013年在一個網上討論區內成立，提供空間發放本土民主聲音。不過在2022年，香港市民無法如昔日般暢所欲言，價值已被外力輾碎。公告又表示，所有記者如今已成為“戰地記者”，“安全採訪和撰寫評論已非必然”，宣佈1月7日零時起停運，編輯部解散。
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+2022年1月4日，《眾新聞》宣佈停運，管理層表示因無法掌握“紅線”，決定停運是無可奈何。《眾新聞》成立5年，2019年因社會運動而知名度大增，在《蘋果日報》、《立場新聞》相繼倒閉後，被稱為香港傳媒最後的“綠洲”。
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+《眾新聞》成立於2017年1月1日，由香港10名新聞工作者和學者創辦，包括資深新聞工作者李月華、前《明報》總編輯劉進圖、前《明報》執行總編輯姜國元等。《眾新聞》成立時正值回歸20周年，當時希望凝聚公眾，擴大言論光譜，平臺主要透過讀者捐款和廣告作為收入。《眾新聞》過去因報導示威奪得多個獎項，包括報導“元朗7.21襲擊”，獲亞洲出版業協會2020年度“卓越資料圖像獎”；報導針對警員被指沒有展示警員編號，獲2020年人權新聞獎“解釋性特寫優異獎”等；講述反送中運動理大衝突、新聞紀錄片《紅磚危城》（Save PolyU），奪洛杉磯獨立短片節“最佳網站及新媒體作品獎”、紐約電視電影節“人道紀錄片金獎”等。2018年，《眾新聞》“社運抗爭資料庫”奪人權新聞獎“多媒體大獎”。
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+《眾新聞》過去曾被中共媒體點名，成為被打壓目標是有跡可尋。而在宣佈停運後，中共媒體央視同晚即發出快訊，形容為“發佈多篇煽動暴力文章的香港網路媒體停止運作”。
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+2022年6月10日，成立近7年的新聞通訊社《傳真社》宣佈即日起停運，停運聲明說，鑒於近年傳媒行業巨變，《傳真社》屢次思考是否仍有繼續下去的空間，但每次最終都決定“本著信念、謹守崗位、報導事實”，但“惜萬物有時，現在是時候告別了。”
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+《傳真社》成立於2015年，報導曾獲多個獎項。在2020年，報導包括《太子站831到底有無死人？》獲亞洲出版業協會“卓越調查報導獎”，《追擊反修例風波的假資訊》則獲“公共服務新聞大獎”；同年有關“太子831的調查專題”亦獲人權新聞獎優異奬。
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+2020年12月1日香港有線寬頻以節省資源為由裁減旗下香港有線電視臺新聞部約40名員工，當中包括專門負責調查報導的《新聞刺針》全組編采人員，中國組丶港聞組丶主播等其他不同組別亦有員工被裁。《新聞刺針》是該台獨有欄目，專門製作調查式報導，其作品獲獎無數，近期的報導多次對香港警方和政府提出質疑，最新一則是質疑建制派多番引用的民意調查欠缺科學支持。消息公佈後，該台旗下負責中國大陸新聞的團隊“有線中國組”宣佈集體辭職，負責香港本地新聞的團隊“港聞組”隨後也宣佈集體辭職。香港記者協會表示高度關注此次裁員事件，並指出《新聞刺針》過去一年時有針對警方或政權的報導，不難令人聯想是以節流為名，實際目的卻是減少或不作敏感的報導。有線中國組和《新聞刺針》均是有線新聞的王牌團隊，過往作品有口碑，獲獎無數，經常在大陸突破種種採訪困難，進行不同社會專題報導以及採訪維權人士，例如揭發2008年四川地震的“豆腐渣工程”，以及跟進廣東省烏坎村征地事件。在2012年，有線中國組採訪監禁年期最長的八九民運人士李旺陽，訪問播出後他死於湖南醫院病房，頸部纏繩。官方原先宣稱他自殺，後來改為“意外死亡”，他的死亡在香港引發極大迴響，觸發過萬人遊行關注，認為他是“被自殺”。
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+2021年3月10日，香港的中國人權民運資訊中心發出聲明，稱為了避免誤撞“國安法”,資訊中心創辦人盧四清已在當天刪除網站上自2017年9月11日至今年3月11日的全部內容。中國人權民運資訊中心是一個人權組織，在香港成立三十多年，專門提供中國大陸違反人權新聞的媒體。
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+2021年6月28日，資深傳媒人區家麟宣佈，其在香港電臺主持了11年的節目“自由風自由Phone”，被告知不用需要他主持。區家麟說，他是即日被告知，週一晚是最後一晚做主持。區家麟認為，是管理層不喜歡他在電臺節目以外所撰寫的文章。中共百年党慶臨近，繼《蘋果日報》被停刊後，香港的網媒及自媒體均出現“自我審查”。香港記者協會同日表示，傳媒業界“自我審查”之風氣“已吹得如颶風猛烈”
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+《蘋果日報》被停刊之後，網媒《852郵報》2021年6月28日公佈，為保安全已下架早前發佈的所有影片。創辦人遊清源表示，之前發佈過的YouTube影片全部暫時下架，他形容香港現時的政治氣氛是“黑色暴雨，甚至十號風球”，要“留有用之身”，只能無奈把影片下架。
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+2022年4月25日，中國共產黨擁有的香港媒體《大公文匯》發表題為《自行解散是記協唯一出路》的文章。全文大肆攻擊香港記者協會，指記協早已不是記者專業的團體，而是一個長期受外國政治勢力操控的政治組織，早日自行解散是唯一出路；如果以為有外國勢力撐腰，就可以無視香港的法律，最終等待他們的將是法律的嚴懲。文章指，記協與外力關係千絲萬縷，比如每年跟“國際特赦組織香港分會”等組織聯合舉辦的所謂“人權新聞獎”，並指由BBC北京分社拍攝的新聞紀錄片、獲獎的《China’s Hidden Camps》，內容造謠、抹黑；文中又稱記協不解散唯有被取締。
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+在受到中國共產黨的媒體攻擊、施壓下，主辦人權新聞獎的香港外國記者會（FCC）突然以“不想誤墮法網”為由，宣佈暫停頒發今年的人權新聞獎。人權新聞獎由香港記者協會、香港外國記者會及國際特赦組織香港分會合辦，獎項是為表揚新聞工作者就有關人權範疇的專業及傑出報導，旨在加強公眾對基本權利的尊重、提高對人權議題的意識、及集中注意力于發生人權危機的地區。
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+26年來首次停辦人權新聞獎，香港外國記者會被質疑是自我審查及損害新聞自由。會內由多名記者組成的“新聞自由小組”，過半人集體辭職抗議。中共党媒施壓導致人權新聞獎停辦是因為該獎項已完成評審，原定於5月3日“世界新聞自由日”公佈得獎名單。得獎名單有已停運的網媒《立場新聞》在中文組別共獲9個大小獎項，涵蓋“35+初選”案、元朗7.21襲擊事件、支聯會及《蘋果日報》停運等報導；同樣已停運的《眾新聞》共獲5個獎項；臺灣《鏡週刊》有關《蘋果日報》停刊及香港新聞自由的報導，就獲突發新聞大獎。得獎名單惹怒了中共，所以悍然攻擊施壓。
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+外國記者基於事實的中立報導也成為了《香港國安法》的目標。繼《紐約時報》2020年7月14日宣佈因應《港區國安法》，將香港的數碼新聞業務遷往韓國首爾後，《華爾街日報》2020年7月15日宣佈該報及《華盛頓郵報》等其他傳媒也正考慮重新編配人手到其他分社的可能性。
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+當局以不批工作簽證續期等方式向記者施壓，以此強迫傳媒自我審查。2020年7月香港特區政府拒絕為《紐約時報》記者儲百亮（Chris Buckley）的工作許可續簽。現年52歲的儲百亮是資深中國記者，駐華長達22年，他近年有份揭露新疆人權問題，並報導有關新型冠狀病毒肺炎狀況。至2020年5月，中國政府當局拒續批儲百亮工作簽證，並要求他離開北京；現在香港政府亦拒絕儲百亮工作簽證申請。總部設在紐約的保護記者委員會（Committee to Protect Journalists）7月15日發表聲明，指禁止《紐約時報》記者在港工作，違反港人的新聞自由承諾，破壞香港一直賴以成功的資訊自由流通。
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+儲百亮不獲續批一個月後，香港英文網路媒體《香港自由媒體（Hong Kong Free Press）》的愛爾蘭籍編輯麥固侖（Aaron Mc Nicholas）則在送出申請近半年後，香港入境事務處在沒有提供任何解釋的情況下拒絕麥固侖的工作簽證，是第二個簽證被拒的外媒工作者。《香港自由媒體》總編輯格蘭迪（Tom Grundy）強調，“我們似乎是因為基於事實的中立報導而成為了《香港國安法》的目標。”格蘭迪警告說，《香港國安法》陰霾籠罩下，其他機構也可能會遭遇類似的“繁文縟節、官僚作風”。“目前，簽證問題不再是一個漏洞，而是成為一種特徵。這樣的情況可能會導致香港不再是（跨國公司）建立地區總部的合適場所。”
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+2021年11月，英國《經濟學人》雜誌記者黃淑琳（Sue-lin Wong）申請延續工作簽證被港府拒絕，是港版國安法生效後第3名簽證被拒的外媒工作者。《經濟學人》在11月13日發表聲明，表示香港入境當局並沒有為拒絕延續黃淑琳簽證提供任何原因。黃淑琳主要報導中國大陸及香港的社會及政治新聞，曾在路透社及金融時報工作，在2019年期間曾報導香港反送中浪潮。由於香港當局沒有對外解釋，到底黃淑琳過往有哪篇報導或者哪些行為觸動了當局紅線，到現在還是一個謎。
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+國安法的“白色恐怖”下，香港媒體人紛紛離港。2021年8月，香港電臺證實，曾主持過香港電臺英文節目The Pulse、在港35年的資深媒體人、香港外國記者會前主席韋安仕（Steve Vines），已經離開香港回到英國。韋安仕自1987年移居香港，曾任職英國《衛報》駐港記者，也曾為BBC、《每日郵報》和《獨立報》及《亞洲時報》等媒體撰稿，曾獲人權新聞獎。
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+韋安仕在一封發給親友的電郵中提到，“白色恐怖”已經橫掃香港，而他看不出短期內情況有任何好轉的跡象。他還表示，是在“帶著沉重心情、混雜極大遺憾與解脫”的情緒下做出的決定。
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+2022年4月26日，香港監察（Hong Kong Watch）發表題為《站在抗爭前線—香港新聞自由遭受的各種打壓》的最新研究報告，訪問了多位流亡海外的新聞工作者，講述他們在香港受到的打壓。
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+有記者憶述在採訪“反送中運動”時遭警方暴力對待，例如當時任職《明報》的Matthew Leung表示，在衝突前線採訪期間，至少被胡椒彈射中四次，包括一次在“721元朗襲擊事件”後的元朗，他走上扶手電梯拍攝一個高空鏡頭，突然被員警用胡椒彈直射他的眼罩；另外一位前《南華早報》的外籍攝影記者表示，多次被近距離施放催淚氣體，目的明顯是故意針對記者。
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+在編采上，記者亦受到不同程度的審查，例如曾在香港電臺主持英文節目《脈搏》的資深傳媒人Stephen Vines表示，當局透過不通過撥款、暫緩計畫進度等來干預其工作，親中陣營又會定期發文指責港臺“不忠”等來向其施壓；另外，無線新聞前主播王俊彥則憶述，在報播前區議員趙家賢被咬甩左耳一案中，被上司要求讀成是趙家賢的耳朵自然脫落，並非被咬了一口，企圖掩飾親中“藍絲”的罪行。
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+報告亦提到自《港區國安法》實施後，香港不少傳媒工作者被收監，包括網台“D100”主持、人稱“傑斯”的尹耀升，因為發起“千個爸媽”眾籌計畫，助流亡臺灣的年輕港人上學，而被控“資助分裂國家”及“洗黑錢”；《蘋果日報》的情況亦非常嚴重，一名前《蘋果日報》的記者表示，《港區國安法》落實前並沒有太多恐懼，也沒有甚麼寫作限制，但到創辦人黎智英首次因《港區國安法》而被拘捕後，一切都改變了。
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+報告最後指出，政府收緊了車輛查冊、公司登記查冊等，嚴重阻撓了記者的工作，未來亦計畫實施“假新聞法”，香港的新聞空間只會愈來愈窄。報告呼籲各國政府採取行動，包括向面臨被捕風險的香港新聞工作者簽發緊急旅遊證件及簽證、以及繼續向香港政府施壓，要求香港政府維護受《基本法》保障的新聞自由。
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+2022年2月10日，在全球100個國家擁有60萬名會員的國際記者聯盟發佈報告表示，自從2020年《國安法》實施，香港的新聞自由迅速崩塌。國際記者聯盟呼籲世界各國對希望離開香港尋求庇護，以繼續其新聞工作的記者提供支援。這份報告題為“熄燈：香港新聞自由是否走到盡頭？”。前言寫道，北京和其揀選的香港領導人將一座曾經開放的城市變成恐懼之城，自由討論被扼殺，新聞工作者及機構被迫自我審查，任何挑戰官方敍述的人都會受到《國安法》的打壓，“換句話說，他們正將香港變成另一個中國大陸的城市”。報告指，即使是親北京的香港媒體如《明報》也遭受攻擊，因為《明報》刊登質疑《國安法》的作者的專欄文章，中聯辦旗下的《大公報》指責《明報》試圖吸引《蘋果日報》的讀者群。
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+報告也講述消息人士被迫噤聲，因初選案還押的前立法會議員毛孟靜保釋申請被拒，控方的理由之一是毛孟靜經常接受外媒訪問。報告指，毛孟靜保釋被拒產生了寒蟬效應，有長期消息來源的人士要求外媒記者刪除其聯繫方式。報告還提到外媒紛紛撤出香港，2020年7月《國安法》實施後，《紐約時報》將大批員工轉移到南韓首爾，網媒《端傳媒》也在2021年8月宣佈將總部遷往新加坡。報告指，香港記者必須避免踩到“國安紅線”，但“紅線”模糊不清，一旦被認為踩到“紅線”將面臨被捕、不准保釋、有罪假定以及定罪後漫長的刑期。在報告最後，國際記者聯盟表示嚴重憂慮香港自由媒體的崩塌以及香港記者的安全，並呼籲國際媒體及傳媒組織為香港媒體發聲，反對香港和中共政權打壓新聞自由和言論自由。報告也預計部份香港記者會選擇移民海外繼續工作，呼籲各國支援他們，向他們發出簽證及提供庇護。
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+
+### 言論自由
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+香港曾經是言論自由的堡壘。《國安法》實施後，這個人們長期以來享有言論自由和獲取資訊的城市，言論空間不斷收窄，每個人都被迫閉嘴不敢再說真實的話，中國共產黨在香港禁止政治口號，審查藝術，甚至設立了“國安熱線”，鼓勵人們互相舉報違反國安法的行為。國安法的界限模糊不定，因此藝術家、記者、活動人士、學者和其他人的言論、寫作或推文都面臨著觸犯法律而被捕的風險。
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+《國安法》實施數小時後，香港警方於2020年7月1日在抗議活動中逮捕了10人，因為他們持有標有“港獨”或“光復香港”字樣的橫幅、傳單或貼紙。次日，香港政府禁止了2019年的抗議口號“光復香港，時代革命”，因為它“含有港獨”，因而“顛覆國家政權”。
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+“結束一黨專政”的口號也被指控違法《國安法》。香港行政長官林鄭月娥在回應媒體對該口號的詢問時表示，人們“應該尊重”中國共產黨。
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+2020年7月4日，《國安法》實施才4天，全港已彌漫白色恐怖。康文署轄下的公共圖書館，對多名民主派人士的書籍進行覆檢，當中包括學者陳雲的《香港城邦論》、前香港眾志秘書長黃之鋒的《我不是英雄》，和公民党立法會議員陳淑莊的《邊走邊吃邊抗爭》等。據圖書館網頁顯示，以上書籍的館藏現況都是“覆檢中”，並顯示“目前沒有專案在館內架上可供外借”。圖書館職員向傳媒透露，收到上級通知將以上3人的部分著作下架，書籍狀態改為“覆檢中”。需覆檢的書單包括陳雲的《香港城邦論》、《香港城邦論2》、《城邦主權論》、《香港遺民論》和《身土不二》；黃之鋒的《我不是英雄》和《我不是細路：十八前後》及陳淑莊的《邊走邊吃邊抗爭》等。到2021年11月，康文署已下架29本有關六四及天安門事件的書籍，包括民運領袖王丹的《王丹獄中回憶錄》和熊焱的《從六四到伊拉克戰場：熊焱牧軍日記》等。被問到有關書籍是否已下架，下架原因為何，館方按何準則審查書籍等，康文署指當發現有關館藏內容可能違反《香港國安法》或有關法律，會以嚴肅態度處理，並暫停有關館藏的服務。
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+2020年8月，香港公務員事務局發出新指引，公務員在試用期間若參與公眾活動而被捕或被起訴，便須即時解雇。林鄭月娥稱，公務員是公職人員，而據《國安法》第6條，所有公職人員必需擁護《基本法》及效忠特區，當局觀察公務員在各方面的表現是否符合雇主要求，包括其在網頁上的言論，若令雇主對有關人士有負面看法，特區政府作為雇主是“大條道理不再聘用”。
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+香港一名視覺藝術科中學老師“黃sir”，因在網上創作政治漫畫而遭匿名投訴，2021年4月底被教育局裁定專業失德，至今仍未收到當局裁決或處分。“黃sir”2021年6月10日在其臉書表示，已辭去教師工作。“黃sir”的帖文表示，這年半來教育局對他的困擾，“令我個人身心俱疲，直至轉換學校後仍咄咄逼人。為免加重學校壓力及影響我的學生，我不得不選擇離開”，他又指出，即使失去穩定收入，但仍會畫下去，活下去，並呼籲網友繼續支持他的創作理念。2019年起，“黃sir”以帳戶名稱“vawongsir”於臉書、Instagram等社交平臺發佈諷刺政權和警暴漫畫，2020年1月被當時學校的校長及副校長通知，校方接獲教育局轉介的投訴，有人指其創作的政治漫畫“不恰當”，要求他回應“vawongsir”帳戶是否屬其所有，以及他畫有關漫畫的動機。
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+2021年6月27日，香港著名政治漫畫家黃照達宣佈暫時關閉專頁《黃照達漫畫》。他在Facebook承認，看到《立場》暫時下架文章，《蘋果》主筆盧峯被捕，“悲痛不已”。承認自己“心裏有恐懼，仍覺得要盡力保持自己的生活。”然而最近香港情況令他感到“分析盤算都已沒有意思”，“為了希望減輕自己少少壓力”，決定暫時關閉專頁一段時間。黃照達是香港浸會大學助理教授，其專頁有近2萬名粉絲。
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+2021年7月29日，有“香港第一健筆”之稱、香港信報創辦人之一的林行止在其專欄文章宣佈擱筆，說自己在信報不同崗位工作48年零27天，“今天要和讀者同儕道別了”。他雖然沒有詳談決定是否與目前政治氣氛相關，但形容是“在大環境仍有選擇自由之下作出的自由選擇”。自國安法實施以來，不少以評論香港時政為主的評論員，都選擇離開香港、封口和封筆，例如網路評論員蕭若元、劉細良等，在國安法生效前相繼離開香港。時事評論員李怡、公務員事務局前局長王永平，以及中文大學政治與行政學系高級講師蔡子強相繼宣佈封筆或休筆。在國安法下，香港評論界一時風聲鶴唳。
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+2021年8月3日，曾任香港理工大學助理教授，並常就政治題材進行創作的香港藝術家黃國才在臉書上發佈道別短片。人已在臺灣的黃國才表示，將會在“不會自我審查、被審查”的地方繼續創作，相信留守香港的人難免要潛藏一下，“必須要有創意去面對政治潰壞的新時代”。現年51歲的黃國才畢業于康乃爾大學。黃國才在2018年的一件名為《愛國者》的行為藝術作品中，把自己關在一個紅色鐵籠中，用手風琴演奏了中國國歌。2019年，他曾獲邀赴維也納TED Talk談香港的民主抗爭。
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+2021年8月9日，香港4名藝術發展局委員周博賢、陳錦成、李俊亮及丘亞葵最近先後辭職。當中除了丘亞葵，其餘3人為民選委員，而他們近期屢被親共報章抨擊。陳錦成稱，自己及家人近半年內遭相關親共媒體的記者跟蹤，被仔細記錄日常生活行蹤，深感人身安全受威脅。李俊亮和周博賢稱，雖未受即時威脅，為“顧全大局、保護局方和藝團權益、考慮家人情況”，惟有請辭。前3人曾遭親中報章點名力斥為“攪事三人組”。藝發局成員盧偉力受訪時坦言深感壓力，指現時香港充斥無中生有的指控。香港文化評論員彭志銘則歎言，恐懼深入每個角落。
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+2021年9月，香港歌手何韻詩、藝人阮民安先後遭遇個人演唱會場地被當局臨時取消，疑是因其政治立場而受到壓制。何韻詩和阮民安是由反送中事件開始活躍於社會運動的歌手。2022年2月15日香港警方國安處以違反“國安法”為名拘捕香港少數公開支持民主抗爭運動的藝人之一的歌手阮民安。當局對他的指控是，涉嫌作出煽動意圖行為及挪用籌款。
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+2021年10月，屹立香港大學校園超過20年的雕塑“國殤之柱”（Pillar of Shame），一直是港人紀念六四的重要象徵之一。然而隨著中共禁辦香港六四燭光晚會、清算香港市民支持愛國民主運動聯合會（支聯會）成員，香港大學本月更向支聯會發信，要求移走“國殤之柱”。12月22日，港大校方通宵拆除國殤之柱，把雕塑遷離校園。移除國殤之柱的行動來得很突然，港大校方事先沒有對外發佈任何消息。12月22日晚上約十一點，工人掛起數層樓高的白布，完全遮蓋國殤之柱，又搬出圍板封鎖國殤之柱四周，大批保安在場戒備，並且以電筒向趕到現場的媒體照射。23日淩晨，工人把國殤之柱拆件，以吊臂分批把塑膠包裹的雕像組件吊進貨櫃，由貨櫃車從港大運走。校園原先放置國殤之柱的位置留下了一片空地，鋪上了帆布，用2米高的塑膠板圍封。
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+2021年12月24日，擺放在香港中文大學廣場的民主女神像清晨被校方移走。有清潔工人在原本放置雕塑的位置洗刷地面。很多中大學生及校友收到消息後趕到現場。跟民主女神像同年來到香港的六四浮雕週五淩晨也從嶺大樑球鋸樓外空地被移除。保安員在場以強光照射拍片的學生，並連同工程部人員把浮雕拆件移至儲物室。浮雕原有位置被校方以圍板圍封，地上遺留碎片。學生會中庭的民主女神畫像早上被塗上灰色油漆覆蓋。
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+2022年1月29日，香港歷史最悠久的香港大學把校園內紀念六四事件的手寫標語遮蓋住，這顯示了中共繼續在香港這個金融中樞壓制不同意見的聲音。位於港大太古橋上、20米長的標語寫道：“冷血屠城烈士英魂不朽，誓殲豺狼民主星火不滅”。它是在1989年北京對學生和民主運動家進行流血鎮壓後不久，由港大學生創作的。每年在六四周年紀念日前夕重新粉刷橋上的標語，已成為港大學生們的一項傳統。大約十幾名建築工人在該則“烈士標語”周圍豎起了灰色的金屬建築圍板，隨後工人們以鐵板將標語完全遮蓋住。這是繼12月港大校方拆除“國殤之柱”後，再度有六四相關的紀念物遭到港大移除。
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+2022年5月16日，距離香港貿發局舉辦的香港書展僅約2個月，出版社“山道文化”無故突遭當局取消參展資格，該出版社負責人為有“爆眼教師”之稱的楊子俊。“山道文化”過去兩年均順利參與貿發局舉辦的書展，直到5月初，貿發局多次以“技術問題”為由，取消其攤位選擇權，並於16日通知其“申請不獲接納”，但拒絕交代理由。曾任拔萃女書院通識科教師的楊子俊，有“爆眼教師”之稱。在2019年6月12日被子彈擊中右眼受傷，導致視力受損。楊子俊于2016年成立“山道文化”，經常出版發售關於民主運動和社會政治的書籍。
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+在去年的香港書展，“山道文化”成功參展，並售賣柳俊江的《元朗黑夜》、《逆權教師》及《如水赴壑──香港歷史與意識之流》等書籍，被親中團體“香港政研會”指控涉違《港區國安法》。
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+2021年11月開放的新當代藝術博物館博物館M+，中共的媒體和親中共的政客進行了抨擊，香港的藝術界首次經歷文化、思想審查。中聯辦背後支持的《大公報》在頭版炮打M+博物館，以標題“M+燒公帑 天價偽術品你識欣賞咩？”形容博物館藏品被人揾笨。而《文匯報》形容藏品是“挑戰國家尊嚴、侮辱英雄、無視社會道德底線、貶低宗教、涉及孌童意識”。親中共政客屈穎妍於《大公報》及《港人講地》發表文章，批評藏品“小市民辛苦工作交的稅，就是用來給政府一擲千金買垃圾”。親中共政客容海恩指部分展品，如艾未未的《透視研究：天安門》作品散播涉嫌違反“港區國安法”、“侮辱國家尊嚴”，要求政府成立部門為有關展品進行審查是否違反“港區國安法”和“基本法”，同時要求防止有仇中情緒的展品上架。M+最終以合法性審查為由從其網路目錄中刪除了艾未未的照片，以及三幅希克展廳的作品被更換，包括中國藝術家王興偉隱喻六四事件的《新北京》、王廣義的《毛澤東：紅色方格二號》，以及由希克捐出藏品並親自錄製語音導賞的周鐵海《新聞發佈會IIII》。
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+關於2019年抗議期間員警圍攻香港理工大學的獲獎紀錄片《紅磚牆內》經歷的政治審查開啟了香港電影的喪鐘。在《紅磚牆內》預定放映前幾個小時，劇院因為“受到太多關注”而取消了這部電影。中國共產黨媒體和親北京政客譴責這部電影煽動對香港政府的仇恨，並且攻擊電影發行商的資助者香港藝術發展局，這些文章點名了一些藝術發展局的受資助者和表演藝術團體，認為這些團體是親民主的，因此違反了國安法。藝術發展局很快屈服於壓力，公開宣佈任何“在現行法律下推動港獨”的團體現在都可能被切斷資金來源。然後在2011年6月11日，香港政府首次在香港引入電影審查制度，禁止“危害國家安全”的電影。
+
+完全被中共掌控的香港立法會2011年10月27日三讀通過《電影檢查修訂條例草案》，不利國家安全的電影將被禁止上映。新修訂的電影審查制度規定，檢查員應留意片中“可能構成危害國家安全罪行”的行為，或活動所描繪，以及留意被視作認為“認同、支持、宣揚、美化、鼓勵或煽動”等內容。如影片“相當可能”構成危害國安罪行，例如煽動分裂國家、宣揚恐怖主義、或展示具有煽動性的刊物等，並考慮到影片對觀眾的影響，使其可能危害國家安全，該影片便“不宜上映”。電影和紀錄片已經成為當局試圖清理的許多文化領域之一，電影審查制度故意相關條文界線模糊，完全執行中共一直以來的控制社會手法，不止收窄電影業人員創作空間，亦對電影投資者造成影響，損害香港蓬勃發展的電影業，加劇自我審查，加劇電影人的恐懼。
+
+網路的開放性和香港沒有網站封鎖，長期以來一直是香港訊息環境與中國大陸的主要區別。在國安法下，這種區別正在迅速消失。中共操控香港員警進行思想審查，封鎖網站和限制訪問公共資料庫來限制人們獲取資訊。2021年1月，香港警方利用國安法的不需要司法令狀的權力，命令互聯網服務提供商阻止訪問香港編年史網站（HKChronicles.com），該網站記錄了犯下暴力和虐待行為的員警，透露了有關他們的個人資訊，如電話號碼，以及有親政府觀點的人的資訊。2021年6月18日起，應香港警方的要求，香港互連網服務供應商封鎖流亡網站2021年香港憲章網站（2021hkcharter.com），這是一項主張其願景的香港流亡倡議，但在受到廣泛抗議後又恢復了該網站。這是2021年在香港被封鎖的第六個知名網站。暫時或永久被封鎖的網站還包括多個臺灣網站，例如臺灣過渡司法委員會的網站。可以預計在未來更多的網站會被封鎖，包括主要的社交媒體平臺，因為希望消滅反對和批評的聲音是中國共產黨的一貫手段。隨著新法要求實名SIM卡註冊，香港居民在網上保持匿名的能力將被剝奪，進一步授權員警和檢察官對批評性言論進行報復。香港的言論自由空間最終將和中國大陸一樣鴉雀無聲。
+
+
+### 學術自由
+
+在香港言論和新聞自由空間遭到嚴重摧殘的同時，大學的學術自主和學術自由也不斷受到侵蝕和擠壓。《國安法》下恐懼籠罩香港的大學校園，討論空間急劇縮小，一向以開放自由，百花齊放見稱的香港高校頻頻出現學者疑因持不同政見遭到解職或被拒簽合同或被拒絕晉升。《國安法》實施後，中國共產黨對參與社會運動的教育界人士進行全面“秋後算帳”。接連有香港的大學的教職員不獲續約或被解雇，當中包括港大法律系副教授戴耀廷、浸大社工系講師邵家臻，被外界認為是對參與社運的大學界的清算行動。
+
+2020年7月28日，香港大學週二晚間決定解聘“占中三子”之一的法律系副教授戴耀廷。戴耀廷表示，做出這個決定的不是港大，而是校外“勢力”通過代理人做出的。戴耀庭在臉書上發文表示，港大的這個決定“標誌著香港學術自由的終結”。另外一名被大學解除教職的是泛民主派議員邵家臻。他已經得到香港浸會大學通知，將不再與他續約。在該校擔任講師的邵家臻批評校方政治打壓。
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+2020年8月，嶺南大學文化研究系助理教授兼副系主任葉蔭聰因曾撰文批評政府，已接獲校方通知不獲終身合約，下一年要離職。這一波對教育界的秋後算帳，令不少敢於批判時弊的學者變得謹慎和低調。2021年7月，與嶺南大學的一年臨時合約即將到期，原本打算在合約結束後，從下學年開始以兼職形式教授四門文化研究系碩士課程，但近日他從同事口中獲悉，學系及文學院均同意聘請他擔任兼職老師，但遭學院以上的部門否決，7月初校方通知他有關決定，連兼職任教都被校方禁止，這意味著他將離開任教18年的嶺大校園。
+
+2021年3月，肝病權威專家、香港大學醫學院內科及肝臟科講座教授黎青龍，不獲校方續約。黎青龍以敢言見稱，曾多次呼籲港府封關抗疫；港大校長張翔去年安插背景相若的大陸學者宮鵬及申作軍任副校後，屢次不批准國際知名學者續約，肅清敢言學者。港大公共衛生學院院長、政府專家顧問福田敬二去年亦不獲港大續約。
+
+2021年9月，嶺南大學文化研究系客席副教授羅永生及許寶強失去教席，遭校方單方面終止合約。羅永生及許寶強是活躍於社會運動的香港學者，曾高調支持佔領運動，屢次評論時政，羅永生至8月初仍敢於發言，在報章撰文，形容港區國安法令香港民主選舉機制一夜“完善”，踏進“威權統治”年代。
+
+2022年2月，專門研究性別權利的美國法律學者里安•索瑞森（Ryan Thoreson）被香港大學聘為助理教授後，卻在申請赴香港簽證時被拒簽，此失去獲得終身教職的機會。此事加深了對香港學術自由的擔憂。
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+2020年12月26日，有50多年歷史的被譽為全球“中國研究的麥加”的香港中文大學“中國研究服務中心”，傳出遭校方決定關閉，功能拆解分散到大學其他部門。而幾年來一直對該中心抱有雄心的外籍主任則辭職以示不滿。中國研究服務中心的前身“大學服務中心”在成立之初便一直被中國當局認定是美國中央情報局的站點，並向港英當局施壓。港英官員經調查瞭解，認定是純學術機構，並無騷擾。多年來，中心逐步發展成中國研究的學術聖地。原中大社會學系副教授、被稱為“占中三子”之一的陳健民，2012年4月就任中國研究服務中心的主任。占中三子2013年3月正式提出在2014年10月1日用和平佔領中環的抗爭方式爭取港人獲得北京承諾的特首真普選。為避免給中心帶來嫌疑，陳健民2013年8月辭去中心主任職務。而實際的占中運動則是2014年9月底才提前啟動，且持續了長達近3個月。儘管陳健民參與占中是與教職無關的個人社會行為，但該中心還是屢遭親中派誣告。幾十年來形成的中心體系不復存在，為校方解除了一個政治憂患，尤其是在“港版國安法”這把利劍懸在脖子上的情況下。儘管中大高層以“重組”名義拆解中心，並嚴詞否認受到中聯辦或外部壓力，但不管如何辯解，都排除不了要麼中大高層受到壓力，要麼中大自設紅線、自我閹割。
+
+香港的大學面臨越來越大的中國共產黨的政治壓力，要求控制民主派學生和教職員工。大學已經關閉、審查甚至向警方報告學生在校園內的和平活動。香港中文大學於2020年11月對和平遊行抗議《國安法》的學生和畢業生報警。警方隨後以“非法集會”罪名逮捕了包括中大畢業生在內的8人。“煽動分裂”，因為他們高喊了2019年的抗議口號“光復香港，時代革命”。
+
+大學對學生會的敵意也越來越大：三所大學宣佈將拒絕代表學生會收取會費，而兩所大學則拒絕為其活動提供場地。大學沒有做出任何明顯的努力來保護因競選工會而受到中國官方媒體和親北京個人恐嚇的學生，就中大學生會而言，這涉及對工會領導人及其家人的死亡威脅。到2021年，八所大學中只有一所擁有正常運作的學生會。
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+學術界還面臨著中國共產黨擁有的報紙和親共政客的恐嚇。如2021年在網上論壇發表“香港屬於世界”的演講後，由中聯辦控制的文匯報、大公報接連刊出報導，指科技大學教授李靜君的發言“不應將香港思考成一個中國城市”“我認為我們不屬於中國，而是屬於全世界”。她因此被指宣揚港獨，還被質疑其言論已違犯國安法，呼籲警方和大學對她進行調查。香港前特首梁振英在臉書發文，呼籲李靜君儘快去警署自首，否則請警方主動調查。
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+《國安法》生效後，5所大學校長曾發連署聲明支持，指理解訂立《國安法》的必要性。不過香港科技大學校長史維、香港城市大學校長郭位、浸會大學校長錢大康沒有參與連署。其中城大當時回應也說要秉持政教分離的原則。郭位曾經多次提及，高等教育理應政教分離，教研合一。在中國共產黨對大學的強力介入後，香港城市大學校長郭位決定2023年約滿後離任，香港科技大學校長史維原本任期5年，在2021年11月決定提早離任，成任期最短的科大校長。史維在反送中運動期間，22歲科大學生周梓樂墮下重傷至11月8日科大畢業禮當日傷重不治，當時史維于臺上得悉學生死訊，即中斷儀式並默哀，期間一度落淚。相信由此引起中共的不滿。除了郭位及史維宣佈將卸任，浸會大學校長錢大康已於2021年8月底退休，意味3位未連署聲明支持《國安法》的校長都已或將卸任。
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+香港親共人士經常指責香港的社會運動活躍是源於“教育出了問題”。通過國安法後，香港政府立刻清洗教育界，在教科書中刪除敏感字眼、字句及題材，如六四事件的內容遭大幅刪減。多本教科書在刪除多個與香港法治、社會運動議題相關的內容及字眼。其中一家出版社的教科書刪除一整頁有關公民抗命的資料回應題，而有關三權分立的內容，出版社也刪除了“社會普遍認為香港實行三權分立”的字句，及三權互相制衡“以防其中一方權力過大”的內容。當提到香港社會運動議題時，多個“本土”字眼改為“本地”，部分政治組織的名字如“本土民主前線”“香港眾志”等也被刪除。香港政府不斷以各種手段整肅教育界。教育局九次就政治罷課、參與社運、《國歌法》、《禁蒙面法》及《港區國安法》等向全港學校發信，被外界批評是向校方及老師施壓。
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+教科書有關現代中國的內容亦遭大篇幅修改。教科書刪減1989年的六四事件的起因、過程及結果的知識增潤部分，僅簡略說明1989年曾發生過六四事件。另一家出版社的教科書雖有保留六四事件的簡述，但同時加入鄧小平南巡期間強調“發展才是硬道理”的內容。而在講述中國政制發展的部分，有出版社刪除“村委會選舉與民主發展”部分有關2011年烏坎村事件的內容，被質疑是討好國安公署署長鄭雁雄。鄭雁雄在烏坎村事件的官僚角色曾受到廣泛批評。
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+親共媒體如《文匯報》、《大公報》經常對老師在社交媒體上的言論大造文章進行攻擊；也有親共團體對老師某句說話，而到學校門口要求學校解雇涉事老師。
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+《國安法》之下紅線處處，影響入侵中學，港府公佈的《國家安全：學校具體措施》，要求學校需確保校園內的書本、刊物和單張，不涉及危害國家安全的內容，迫使老師為自保自我審查，將“不友善”作者的書本下架。根據香港《明報》取得的3家中學圖書館下架書單，數量從39本至超過200本不等，內容廣泛，除政治書籍外，也有與歷史和教育等有關的書本。出版社負責人表示，學校的做法如同協助政權對學生洗腦。有學者認為，港府的做法就像鼓吹現代版的“焚書坑儒”。
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+2020年10月13日，香港前特首、全國政協副主席梁振英繼續狙擊教育界，在社交網公開18名因示威活動被控罪的教師資料，包括名字、涉及案件、年齡及任教學校。有教育界人士批評有關做法卑劣，侵害教師的權益。並對教育界製造仇恨。梁振英成立的“803基金有限公司”（803基金）此前致信教育局，要求公開已被裁定專業操守失當的教師與學校名稱等資料，質疑教育局只是譴責和警告失德教師，並無實際行動。
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+中共在香港的目標很明確：培養忠誠愛國的新一代香港青年，讓青少年在成長過程中接受的中共教育而相信沒有中國共產黨，他們就沒有未來。中共在大陸使用這種意識形態控制策略富有成效，所以侵蝕香港學術自由的聲譽對中共來所順理成章。
+
+
+### 集會、結社、選舉自由
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+曾經是亞洲“抗議之都”的香港在中國共產黨的嚴令下現在禁止任何和平抗議集會活動。北京政權透過香港政府來壓制香港的反對力量，集會、結社、選舉自由大受打擊。政府面對民心盡失的狀況以及接近失控的情勢，頻繁採取秋後算帳的方式來阻嚇，罪名及相關的刑罰則是愈來愈重。過去都只是會用襲警或非法集結的罪名，如今都以較嚴重的妨擾罪甚至暴動罪加諸于被告身上。而在國安法生效後，至2022年6月28日，已有198人因國安法被捕，10人完成審訊，定罪率達100%。截至2022年2月，香港警方在多場示威活動拘捕超過1萬人，年齡介乎11歲至84歲，被捕人士數字為香港歷年社會運動之最；其中有超過2,800人被檢控、2,100宗相關案件，包括被控暴動的750人，當中逾1170人被定罪，這些逮捕和定罪的理由常常違反了國際人權法保障的權利。香港員警因堅持專業精神和尊重權利而一度被認為是“亞洲最佳”，但他們在中國共產黨的指使下成為党衛軍，大規模侵犯香港人的自由而不受任何懲罰。
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+國際人權組織“人權評量倡議組織”（Human Rights Measurement Initiative, HRMI）在2022年6月22日發佈2021年度人權指數，披露三十個地區在十三項人權指標上的得分，以量化方式顯示不同地區的人權狀況變化。當中香港的公民和政治權利暴跌至“非常惡劣”，香港在“賦權”方面所得的平均分，在三十個有調查資料的地區排名當中，排倒數第三位，僅略高於排倒數第二的沙烏地阿拉伯和排最後的中國，比委內瑞拉、越南和印度更差。在三項“公民和政治權利”上的得分，都從有紀錄以來的2019年持續下跌，當中包括“集會和結社權利”、“持有和發表意見權利”，以及“參政權利”。以10分為滿分，香港在“集會和結社權利”上，得分由2019年的4.5分，下跌到2020年的3.1分，再跌到2021年的2.5分。而在“持有和發表意見權利”和“參政權利”上，情況也相若，2021年的評分分別跌至2.7分和2.4分，全部都屬於“非常惡劣”級別。這顯示在香港很多人無法享受作為公民應有的發表言論、集會結社，以及民主和政治自由。
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+在2021年7月1日香港“回歸”24周年，適逢中共100周年党慶和《港區國安法》實施一周年，警方動員逾萬人各區佈防。繼“六四”集會連續兩年被禁後，“7.1遊行”也連續第二年被禁。民陣在政治壓力下18年來首不申辦遊行，而社民連等多個團體早前申請當日遊行及集會則被警方反對。惟職工盟、賢學思政分別在銅鑼灣和旺角擺街站時，被警方截查和圍封，警告他們違反《公安條例》和“煽動他人參與未經批准集結”等罪；擺街站的賢學思政召集人王逸戰及兩名成員更被警員帶走。
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+香港人的集會自由大幅度萎縮，市民在街上展示橫額、叫口號，甚至是聚集的權利都受到員警限制。每當防暴員警聽到有人叫口號，就會到沖到群進截查、拘捕。所有組織在街上合法擺放宣傳站亦會被驅趕，宣傳品和橫額亦一律禁止展示。
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+國安法實施後，香港公民社會走向末路，2021年至今，已有接近上百個民間組織宣佈解散，而且在可見將來還將有更多團體在壓力下瓦解。中國共產黨清楚，香港的社會自由基礎不僅是政治團體、政黨、政治人物，也來自于社會公民意識而組織的公民團體。中共以國安法施壓，強迫民間組織解散，目的是徹底瓦解香港的公民社會。
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+2021年6月26日，因為中共當局在香港強推國安法造成的政治肅殺局面，香港泛民主派政黨之一的新民主同盟被迫宣佈解散。新民主同盟在臉書（Facebook）上發表聲明表示，過去兩年，急劇變化的香港社會政治環境大不如前。在2021年7月1日香港“回歸”24周年前夕的一周，至少有6個公民組織宣佈解散，除新民主同盟外，當中包括民主派組織沙田區政；醫學界組織前線醫生聯盟及杏林覺醒；宗教界的春天教會以及資訊科技界的g0v.hk（香港零時政府）。
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+2021年8月10日，有著48年歷史的香港最大的教師工會“教育專業人員協會”（教協）被迫宣佈解散。最近中共的官媒和港府對教協展開大批判，給這個教師工會施加了巨大的政治壓力。教協會長馮偉華表示，決定突然，是基於對全盤環境及形勢作出的分析。他表示，近幾年香港社會、經濟及政治環境出現變化，而教協近期更感受到巨大壓力，曾嘗試延續會務，但仍然看不到前景，無法化解危機，解散是此時此刻最好的決定。教協成立於1973年，其成員包括大、中、小學及幼稚園各級學校的教師，現有會員96,670人，是香港最大的單一行業工會和人數最多的民主派組織。在2019年的“反送中”民主抗爭運動中，教協曾積極參與。
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+隨著中共把政治清算的矛頭從民主派政界人士和民主派媒體轉向香港的大專院校，教協自然就變成的他們的主要攻擊目標。7月底，中共官媒新華社及喉舌人民日報分別發表評論文章，批評教協運作偏離宗旨、不務正業，“變成不折不扣的政治組織”。新華社的評論文章更威脅說，教協這種逃避追責（退出民陣、支聯會）的障眼伎倆，不僅無法洗脫其涉嫌違法的有關問題，更不能勾銷其過往煽暴搗亂、禍害香港的罪責。香港教育要正本清源、重回正軌，就必須徹查“教協”，剷除毒瘤。隨後，香港教育局宣佈，全面終止與長期從事“反中亂港活動”的“香港教育專業人員協會”的工作關係，令教協陷入空前的威脅和危機。
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+2021年8月15日，近20年舉辦大型遊行的民間人權陣線宣佈解散。過去一年民陣不斷受到打壓，中共媒體《大公報》13日在頭版，刊登香港警務處處長蕭澤頤的專訪，蕭澤頤表示，民陣自2002年成立以來，一直未有註冊為公司或社團，近年更組織一系列大型非法遊行集會，涉嫌違反《港區國安法》，警隊將會深入調查取證，隨時採取行動，即使民陣解散，亦不排除繼續調查和檢控其骨幹成員。民陣在聲明表示，政府過去一年不斷以疫情為由，拒絕民陣及不同團體的遊行申請，各成員團體遭受打壓，公民社會面臨前所未有的嚴峻挑戰。
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+2021年9月2日，在香港社會運動中發揮過牧靈基督徒的香港教牧網路在臉書（Facebook）宣佈解散。教牧網路在臉書上帖文宣佈，該網路決定解散、停止運作，臉書專頁亦會暫停更新，但不會刪除專頁。教牧網路的前身是香港基督教教牧連署籌委會，在2019年《逃犯條例（修訂）草案》醞釀的時候，一群基督教牧者為牧養需要而組成連署籌委會，多次發起教牧連署聲明、籌辦祈禱運動和公禱會。2020年五月，香港基督教教牧連署籌委會成立教牧網路，並發佈《香港2020福音宣言》。宣言發佈後，7月，中共控制的官方《大公報》及《文匯報》報導批評該網路，直斥他們在《港區國安法》實施下，“向信仰群體滲透、洗腦，意圖策動分裂國家。”宣言的宣傳短片，亦被指有“港獨”、分裂國家或顛覆國家政權含意。
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+其後，“教牧網路”將該短片在臉書專頁下架。影片下架後，在同月發表澄清聲明，強調教牧網路為基督教信仰群體，與兩報指控政治滲透、煽動顛覆沾不上邊，從未策動或參與任何政治滲透行為。他們認為兩報的指控全屬作者主觀聯想和猜測，譴責報導屬“毫無事實根據的誤導指控”。
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+在國安法的政治陰影下，香港的形勢每況愈下，大批的香港民主人士、市民入獄，逃離，移民，包括基督教在內的香港民間組織紛紛解散或關閉。由2019年反送中運動開始每月舉行的守望香港祈禱會，在七月一日清晨曾在網上舉辦七一公禱會，此後，他們不曾再舉辦祈禱會便已宣佈解散。
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+2021年9月3日，香港泛民主派政黨“熱血公民”宣佈解散。這是國安法實施後，又一個被迫選擇自行解散的泛民組織。熱血公民主席鄭松泰在社交平臺發表的一份聲明中表示，熱血公民自2012年成立以來，有幸得到眾多支持者擁護，一同經歷了多個寒冬，該黨會銘記大家的愛戴及支持。聲明說，縱然得到眾多同路人支援，該黨面對目前已無政治進路的現實，因此宣佈即日起解散。熱血公民是香港泛民主派中的修憲派政黨，該黨主張“永續基本法”以及“推動憲政改革”。
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+2021年9月9日，香港警方突襲了為悼念1989年天安門事件罹難者而設立的六四紀念館，並從紀念館中搜尋、帶走幾十箱證物。警方並未就突襲搜查六四紀念館的原因做出任何解釋，媒體質詢也未獲回復。香港六四紀念館本來也是由支聯會籌建與營運，但是在港版國安法實施後給香港民主派形成的蕭殺氣氛和政治與法律的強大壓力下，支聯會已經在今年6月2日宣佈關閉六四紀念館，轉而在網上展現六四和人權的紀念物品。六四紀念館展示的是1989年北京學運和民運以及最終被血腥鎮壓的歷史事件，以圖片、剪報、實物和影片記錄那段歷史，同時也讓港人瞭解銘記這段歷史，並借此推動中國的民主運動。
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+2021年9月25日，支聯會召開特別會員大會，就是否解散舉行投票。表決結果是：41票贊成，4票反對。解散成了定局。支聯會的解散是香港實施國安法一年多來被迫解散的公民團體中最新的一例。支聯會的核心人物何俊仁和李卓人因參加2019年的反政府抗議活動而被捕入獄。當局按照國安法給他們定的罪名是煽顛罪，也就是煽動和顛覆國家政權罪，這是國安法列出的四大刑事罪名之一。該組織的副主席鄒幸彤因拒絕向警方提交該組織的所謂外國代理人的材料被捕。支聯會常委梁錦威、鄧岳君和陳多偉等也因同樣罪名被捕。2021年10月29日，支聯會被警方國安處指控為外國代理人，並以國安法“煽動顛覆國家政權罪”，起訴支聯會以及支聯會前主席李卓人、兩名前副主席何俊仁及鄒幸彤。
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+2021年9月21日，中國維權律師關注組宣佈啟動解散程式，成為又一個因《香港國安法》而倒下的民間組織。中國維權律師關注組成立於2007年，經常發起遊行聲援中國被捕維權人士，尤其是維權律師，且公開資助一些維權訴訟，和對維權律師家屬等提供人道援助。其主席何俊仁律師目前因2019年香港“反送中”示威相關案件正被監禁。此前，中共的《大公報》曾公開指控中國維權律師關注組向美國國家民主基金會（NED）申請資助，以“直接聯絡‘維權’律師、培訓學生頭目、製造更多的上訪事件”。
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+2021年10月3日，香港最大的獨立工會組織“香港職工會聯盟”（職工盟）正式解散。國安法的實施以及其賦予員警廣泛的權力，進一步引發了人們對當局扼殺異議人士的擔憂。職工盟是香港泛民主派的重要組織，成立於1990年，有會員14萬5千名。在星期天召開的特別會員大會上，解散議案以57票贊成，8票反對，2票棄權獲得通過。職工盟主席黃乃元在會後的記者會上說，代表們非常明白職工盟的處境，在非常沉重、充滿掙扎心情下做出無奈決定。他說，職工盟解散是獨立工運的重大挫折，但工人反抗力量不會消失。他期待工運同路人和港人不要懷憂喪志。因為國安法的恐嚇，在職工盟解散前至少有29個工會組織解散。
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+2021年10月7日，成立逾半世紀的香港中文大學學生會宣佈解散。會方指決定是考慮到法律意見，以及為同學的最大利益著想。有中大學生及校友感到可惜、揪心，認為學生會受到《國安法》及校方的壓力。在學生會解散的同一天，中大校內“民主牆”亦被圍封。中大學生會是香港社運先鋒。學生會于1971年即大陸文革運動期間，由新亞、祟基、聯合三所書院之學生代表合組而成，有濃厚的愛國情懷及時代背景。至今已有半個世紀，多年來積極投入諸如保釣、六四天安門等愛國民主運動，並堅持民主自治、員生共治的精神。解散前是香港八大院校學生會中，惟一一個仍根據其大學條例設立的大學學生會。有別于其餘大學的學生會自行向警務處進行社團註冊，屬獨立法人。
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+2021年10月25日，國際特赦組織決定在2021年年底前關閉香港的兩個辦事處，其中香港分會辦事處10月31日停止運作，香港分會網站及社交媒體將停止更新。其區域辦事處將於今年年底關閉，並會轉到亞太區其他辦事處。國際特赦新聞稿表示，香港原是國際公民組織的理想區域基地，但在國安法下，香港人權組織和工會備受針對，顯示當局加大力度消除所有反對聲音，在如此不穩定環境下，要持續經營越來越困難。2020年7月實施的港版國安法衝擊國際公民社會對香港的認知。他們感受到遊戲規則在國安法底下已徹底扭轉，認為香港的法治制度已不像以往可靠，關鍵是港版國安法涵蓋的都是嚴重罪行，條文字眼又模糊不清。香港實施國安法的其中一個目的就是切斷香港公民社會和國際公民社會的聯繫。
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+1961年成立，總部設在倫敦的國際特赦組織，目前在全球155個國家及地區設有辦事處。其中香港分會在1982年成立。在2019年反送中浪潮期間，香港分會曾批評香港警方無差別及以過分武力攻擊示威者。分會也一直批評“港版國安法”損害香港人權，早在2020年頒佈前，國際特赦已發文批評國安機構威脅人權。
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+2022年5月12日，香港警務處以“串謀勾結外國勢力或者境外勢力危害國家安全”的罪名拘捕了已經解散的“612人道支持基金”的四名信託人，即天主教香港教區榮休主教陳日君樞機、前嶺南大學學者許寶強、前立法會議員吳靄儀和歌手何韻詩。“612人道支持基金”於2019年7月6日成立，目的是為所有在反送中運動中被捕（不論罪名）、受傷或有關人士提供人道支持，包括醫療費用、心理/精神輔導費用，刑事/民事法律費用以及緊急經濟援助等支持。在香港國安員警要求它交出包括捐贈者和受益人資訊在內的運營記錄後，該基金於2021年8月宣佈關閉。該基金會的另一位信託人是擔任過多年泛民會議召集人的前立法會議員何秀蘭，她因為參加未經批准的政治集會的罪名而在獄中服刑。
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+在英國成立的非牟利組織“香港勞權監察”（Hong Kong Labour Rights Monitor）2022年6月發表報告指，在國安法影響下，最少有62個工會被迫解散，一個工會被取締，11名工會組織者被捕或被檢控。香港的工會正面臨三大挑戰，包括人才流失，行動掣肘及資金短缺。
+
+報告指出，香港兩個大型工會香港教育專業人員協會（教協）和香港職工會聯盟（職工盟）的解散過程，清晰勾劃出中共向獨立工會運動施壓的三步曲：先由官方媒體抹黑，其後香港執法機關配合，高調宣稱這些工會有可能觸犯《國安法》，最後派出代表北京的中間人以“約談”等形式要脅，迫使工會組織解散。報告指，職工盟前總幹事蒙兆達曾經在一個月內被中間人問話三次，最後一次會面時更提及會轉介到香港警方國安處。
+
+除此以外，於殖民地年代訂立的法例和做法，在現時的香港重新被應用於工會身上。例如香港《刑事罪行條例》之下的煽動罪，在去年七月拘捕香港言語治療師總工會五名成員，並拒絕給予保釋。香港勞權監察指出，殖民地政府曾經引用《職工會條例》遏制中共控制的工會，但諷刺的是，現在同一條法例被用作打壓香港的獨立工會，例如是香港記者協會。
+
+中國共產黨廢除了香港的自由選舉，把香港半民主的立法會縮減為橡皮圖章機構。2020年11月中國共產黨宣佈取消“宣傳或支持獨立”、“尋求外國干涉”或從事“其他危害國家安全活動”的香港立法會議員資格。作出這一決定後，香港政府立即取消了四名民主派立法會議員的資格。其他15名民主派立法委員辭職，使立法會沒有任何有效的民主反對派。
+
+2021年1月6日，香港警方出動大批員警展開了香港國安法實施以來的規模最大的搜捕行動，以“顛覆”罪拘捕了53名泛民主派人士，因為他們組織或參與了2020年7月泛民舉辦的初選，以協調民主派候選人參加即將舉行的立法會選舉。在國安法的鐵蹄之下，大批香港民主派人士被收柙，外界形容為“港版美麗島”。
+
+2021年3月，北京實施了進一步的“選舉改革”，改變了香港的選舉規則，規定只有效忠於中國共產黨的人才能在香港選舉中贏得席位。親中共的候選人資格審查委員會現在審查所有立法候選人。2021年4月，在市民呼籲投空白票以抗議改革後，香港政府還提交了對選舉法的修訂，以禁止“煽動他人投空白票”，最高可判處三年有期徒刑。
+
+2021年9月初開始，香港政府分批安排區議員宣誓，最終宣誓無效被取消資格的民主派區議員共49人，缺席宣誓直接喪失議席的6人；加上宣誓前因政府宣稱已訂立負面清單進行清算而主動辭職的超過260名民主派區議員，目前全香港只剩下63名民主派區議員，比2019年區議會選舉勝出的389人大幅減少84%。中國共產黨指使香港政府用宣誓取消資格民主派區議員來推翻2019年區議會選舉民主派大勝的結果。
+
+
+### 司法獨立
+
+香港奉行司法獨立，法院獨立進行審判，不受任何干涉，為《基本法》第2條、第19條及第85條所保障。三權分立曾經是香港各界的共識，但國安法實施後司法獨立在中國共產黨的壓力下漸漸被改變。
+
+2008年習近平在以國家副主席身分訪問香港時，首次提出“三權合作論”，2015年時任中聯辦主任張曉明發表“特首超然論”，到了2019年反送中運動期間，港澳辦及中聯辦發稿稱“三權分立在香港也從未存在過”，重申行政長官和港府的管治權威，以及中央對香港的全面管治權。
+
+2020年北京繞過香港立法程式實施《港區國安法》，進一步衝擊司法獨立。這部新法與香港普通法存有不少矛盾。例如第44條稱行政長官可在現任、前任法官中“指定若干名法官”處理國安案，被指特區政府有可能干預法庭判案的嫌疑，與司法獨立原則背道而馳。第55、56條更指在“複雜情況”、“嚴重情況”下的國安案件，由國安公署和國家有關機構行使管轄權和審判權。《國安法》第5條雖保障普通法下的“無罪推定”原則，但第42條又指被告如要獲准保釋，法官必須“有充足理由相信其不會繼續實施危害國家安全行為”。國安法實施後絕大部分國安案件被告都不獲保釋，經常在未審先判下被關押數以年計。
+
+香港國安委的決定不受司法復核、律政司司長有權自行禁止陪審團參與違反《國安法》案件的聆訊、以及特定情況下國家安全案件會移交內地法院審理，香港司法權的獨立性會更進一步萎縮。
+
+中國共產黨加大了對香港司法獨立的壓力，對法官的表現表示憤怒，尤其是在處理與2019年抗議活動有關的案件方面。《文匯報》和《大公報》發表文章和評論文章，一再點名和攻擊堅持司法獨立的法官，並呼籲以“助長街頭混亂”為由懲罰這些法官。
+
+2020年11月，香港大律師公會致函律政司司長鄭若驊，呼籲她“捍衛司法機構和個別法官免受這些有害指控”，稱其“徘徊在藐視法庭的邊緣”。
+
+中國共產黨的報紙和親共政客也攻擊了律師協會的新任主席夏博義，夏博義曾呼籲政府修改《國家安全法》，使其與《基本法》保持一致。這些檔指責夏博義有代表“外國勢力”的“悠久歷史”，是“反華政客”，並將他共同創立的組織香港人權觀察與美國情報機構毫無根據地聯繫在一起。他們要求夏博義辭職的呼聲越來越高。中聯辦在夏博義批評法院因紀念天安門大屠殺而判處民主派領導人入獄後，直接要求夏博義辭職。他們還威脅說剝奪律師協會的法定權力，包括證明大律師的權力，這將對律師的獨立性造成嚴重後果。
+
+2021年4月，夏博義接受香港《立場新聞》專訪，提到香港民主派領袖因8.18及8.31和平示威，而被判處監禁式刑罰，表示若市民和平表達的權利被剝奪，最終或會轉向以具破壞力的途徑表達，包括暴力。中聯辦立刻批判夏博義“日前借香港法院就有關案件的判決散佈歪曲言論”，中聯辦發言人又指，夏博義當選大律師公會主席以來，“接二連三地狂言要修改香港國安法，挑戰全國人大常委會權威，對抗香港法治和憲制秩序。”聲明又批評夏博義是“反華政客”，不可能履行大律師公會“維護特區法治、基本法，支援一國兩制”的目標，又說“縱容夏博義繼續擔任主席，無異是對大律師公會的最大諷刺”。
+
+中國共產黨利用這些攻擊來建立一個香港需要“司法改革”的案例。行政長官林鄭月娥在2020年9月表示希望行政、司法和立法部門相互合作。中央政府港澳事務辦公室副主任張曉明斷言，“現在是司法改革的時候了。”儘管政府尚未正式宣佈具體措施，但親共政客提出了多項建議，從解雇“不愛國的法官”到對法官進行“政治教育”等。
+
+2020年9月以來，中共在香港的喉舌《大公報》、《文匯報》接連抨擊香港法官的判決，指法官屢“輕判反送中示威者”，更有親共陣營發起一人一信投訴施壓。民建聯立法會議員周浩鼎及葛佩帆更引述一封未知真偽的匿名信，誣衊高院法官黃崇厚告誡“藍絲”裁判官，並指控批准被捕者保釋的法官“集體妨礙司法公正”。
+
+2020年11月20日，高等法院法官周家明裁定警方不展示警員編號做法違反《人權法》後，親共的《大公報》以整版頭版報導“司法改革不能拖系列8”向法官施壓來影響裁決，標題為《警員不展示編號 高院裁違人權法暴徒惡曬 員警冇人權》，並附以漫畫，顯示手持燃燒彈的示威者向員警喊話，指自己有法官支持。另有四篇報導，引述各界人士反駁周家明的判詞和他之前裁定禁止蒙面法部分違憲的裁決，以及警員心聲。
+
+2020年12月23日，法官李運騰批准親民主媒體大亨黎智英保釋，但對他的活動進行了廣泛限制，禁止他使用社交媒體、接受採訪，或離開自己的家。《環球時報》24日在網上刊登香港建制網媒《橙新聞》的報導，引述由警務人員轉入法律界的中國港澳研究會會員傅健慈說，若香港律政司就黎智英保釋的上訴失敗，建議港府引用國安法第55條和第66條，將黎移交中國內地審訊。作為中共機關報的《人民日報》在微博“人民銳評”發表題為《批准黎智英保釋，對香港法治傷害太深》的評論，指國安法規定，被控涉嫌違反香港國安法者，除非法官有“充足理由”相信他不會繼續危害國家安全，否則不得准予保釋，而“黎智英惡名昭彰，極度危險”，卻成為首個涉嫌觸犯國安法而獲得保釋者，實在匪夷所思。同日，香港親中的《大公報》在第三版要聞版亦狙擊黎智英，在題為《黎智英密會攬炒派或違保釋條件》一文中引述有政界人士指出，“黎智英近日頻頻在家中與攬炒派頭目密會，無法保證他不會違反保釋條件中『不得直接或間接與境外機構、人員進行敵對國家的行動』的規定，呼籲香港特區維護國家安全委員會和駐港國安公署及時出手，撥亂反正”。李運騰法官因批准黎智英保釋後遭建制派猛烈攻擊，中共在香港報紙《文匯報》社評李運騰欠缺國安意識，《大公報》評論不點名質疑有法官玩小聰明等。
+
+2021年8月21日，香港律師會會員羅彰南宣佈，將放棄律師會理事選舉的選舉人資格。羅彰南說，他之所以退出這次選舉是為了個人和家人的“安全”。聲明說：“我們引以為榮的律師會的選舉淪落到目前的水準，對於香港來說，是可恥和可悲的一天。”香港律師會是一個專業組織，有12000名律師。律師會和大律師會都是香港律師業的專業組織，前者的專業色彩更為保守。它們在香港法律變革中都發揮著重要的作用，並在推薦和任命法官程式中擁有一定的發言權。律師會理事選舉計畫在8月24日舉行，11名候選人角逐5個理事席位。這11中，有5人屬“專業派”，其餘6人至少有4人被認為是“開明派”。羅彰南就是其中的一人。
+
+國安法的實施給香港這個全球金融中心的法律體系帶來了巨大的壓力。雖然香港和北京的官員都拒絕承認這一現實，但親共的港媒和港府官員對香港律師會此類非常不起眼的選舉還是給予了高度的關注。中國共產黨對香港法律界在落實國安法方面的消極表現非常不滿，甚至公開對“開明派”進行譴責。香港行政長官林鄭月娥日前放話，如果律師會繼續讓政治淩駕專業之上，政府將考慮與其終止關係。而中共喉舌人民日報指責香港律師會不應該成為一個“政治化團體”，還把香港律師協會叫做“過街老鼠”。
+
+隨著中國共產黨擴大對香港的控制，在中共及其代理人對司法人員的拉攏、收買、分化、威脅下，香港的獨立司法體系千瘡百孔，倒塌是必然的，中共的極權主義容忍不了香港的司法不受共產黨的控制，而覆巢之下安有完卵。香港的司法人員也和香港警察一樣，越來越多地表明自己是中國共產黨控制的工具，而不是法治的執行者。
+
+2020年4月24日，區域法院法官郭偉健在審理2019年8月20日的50歲男導遊洪震在將軍澳“連儂隧道”內持刀砍人案，砍傷三人，其中一名26歲《信報》女記者肺部重創，一度命危，需切除部份肺組織，患上創傷後壓力症候群。郭偉健雖判被告意圖傷人罪成，但他未有片言隻字斥責行兇的被告，反而在判詞中稱讚被告“情操高尚”，又花上三分之一時間狂轟社運活動，批評爭取民主的和平示威者是進行恐怖活動。郭偉健法官的言論引來社會各界極之震驚，被形容為顛倒黑白是非。
+
+2020年9月17日，香港東區裁判法院審理4月16日香港一名親中挺共的8旬老翁黃森球在中聯辦附近持刀襲擊民主派人士前立法會議員梁國雄，造成梁國雄腰部受傷一案，黃森球在法庭上揚言若要有槍絕對槍擊梁國雄，該案的主審法官鄭紀航竟贊黃森球的襲擊行為是熱愛社會，因此不用坐牢只需完成社會服務令即可，判決引發香港社會一片譁然。
+
+一些法官，例如國安法指定法官蘇惠德、蘇文隆、羅德泉，區域法院法官練錦鴻、陳廣池，裁判官香淑嫻、陳慧敏、吳重儀，都在香港的各類司法案件的審理中，成為積極投靠中國共產黨，賣身極權主義，殘害香港自由的儈子手。這些司法人員淪為中共暴政的幫兇，為虎作倀，也顯示了香港的司法獨立體系正在中國共產黨的步步緊逼下淪陷的現實。
diff --git "a/_collections/_heros/2017-04-19-Comit\303\251Invisible-a1_l-maintenant.md" "b/_collections/_heros/_0x12/2017-04-19-Comit\303\251Invisible-a1_l-maintenant.md"
similarity index 99%
rename from "_collections/_heros/2017-04-19-Comit\303\251Invisible-a1_l-maintenant.md"
rename to "_collections/_heros/_0x12/2017-04-19-Comit\303\251Invisible-a1_l-maintenant.md"
index c9b35595..9c19ec75 100644
--- "a/_collections/_heros/2017-04-19-Comit\303\251Invisible-a1_l-maintenant.md"
+++ "b/_collections/_heros/_0x12/2017-04-19-Comit\303\251Invisible-a1_l-maintenant.md"
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ layout: post
title: "现在"
author: "Comité Invisible"
date: 2017-04-19 12:00:00 +0800
-image: https://i.imgur.com/QtPndmD.jpg
+image: https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/a1/0x12_a1_l-20170419.jpg
#image_caption: ""
#description: ""
position: left
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2018-10-22-OutOfTheWoods-a1_c-the-uses-of-the-disaster.md b/_collections/_heros/_0x12/2018-10-22-OutOfTheWoods-a1_c-the-uses-of-the-disaster.md
similarity index 99%
rename from _collections/_heros/2018-10-22-OutOfTheWoods-a1_c-the-uses-of-the-disaster.md
rename to _collections/_heros/_0x12/2018-10-22-OutOfTheWoods-a1_c-the-uses-of-the-disaster.md
index 06ca2fbb..7d729378 100644
--- a/_collections/_heros/2018-10-22-OutOfTheWoods-a1_c-the-uses-of-the-disaster.md
+++ b/_collections/_heros/_0x12/2018-10-22-OutOfTheWoods-a1_c-the-uses-of-the-disaster.md
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ layout: post
title: "人祸资本主义和灾时共产主义"
author: "Out of the Woods"
date: 2018-10-22 12:00:00 +0800
-image: https://i.imgur.com/OPkfuOk.jpg
+image: https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/a1/0x12_a1_c-20181022.jpg
image_caption: "“气候变化正在发生。在暴风雨中，一个打破资本主义及其恶性不平等的机会出现了。让我们趁早抓住这个机会。别无他路。”——丽贝卡·索尼特"
description: "索尼特（Rebecca Solnit）声称原先认为灾难揭示人性最丑恶一面的市侩哲学具有误导性。相反，她展示了我们如何在许多诸如此类事件中发现“一种比幸福更重要，却更加深刻而积极的情感”，一种促成她谓“灾时共同体”的目标清晰的希望。"
position: center
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2022-06-02-GiorgioAgamben-a1_r-sul-diritto-di-resistenza.md b/_collections/_heros/_0x12/2022-06-02-GiorgioAgamben-a1_r-sul-diritto-di-resistenza.md
similarity index 98%
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+++ b/_collections/_heros/_0x12/2022-06-02-GiorgioAgamben-a1_r-sul-diritto-di-resistenza.md
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ layout: post
title: "抵抗的权利"
author: "Giorgio Agamben"
date: 2022-06-02 12:00:00 +0800
-image: https://i.imgur.com/iefq1MN.jpg
+image: https://github.com/agorahub/_meta/raw/agoran/theagora/pen0/assets/images/a1/0x12_a1_r-20220602.jpg
image_caption: "利维坦，即是暴政挡箭牌。"
description: ""
position: right
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2018-01-19-national-defense-strategy-2018-summary.md b/_collections/_hkers/2018-01-19-national-defense-strategy-2018-summary.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : National Defense Strategy
+author: US Department of Defense
+date : 2018-01-19 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/xOwJyGi.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The Department of Defense’s enduring mission is to provide combat-credible military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our nation. Should deterrence fail, the Joint Force is prepared to win. Reinforcing America’s traditional tools of diplomacy, the Department provides military options to ensure the President and our diplomats negotiate from a position of strength._
+
+
+
+Today, we are emerging from a period of strategic atrophy, aware that our competitive military advantage has been eroding. We are facing increased global disorder, characterized by decline in the long-standing rules-based international order — creating a security environment more complex and volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory. Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.
+
+China is a strategic competitor using predatory economics to intimidate its neighbors while militarizing features in the South China Sea. Russia has violated the borders of nearby nations and pursues veto power over the economic, diplomatic, and security decisions of its neighbors. As well, North Korea’s outlaw actions and reckless rhetoric continue despite United Nation’s censure and sanctions. Iran continues to sow violence and remains the most significant challenge to Middle East stability. Despite the defeat of ISIS’s physical caliphate, threats to stability remain as terrorist groups with long reach continue to murder the innocent and threaten peace more broadly.
+
+This increasingly complex security environment is defined by rapid technological change, challenges from adversaries in every operating domain, and the impact on current readiness from the longest continuous stretch of armed conflict in our Nation’s history. In this environment, there can be no complacency — we must make difficult choices and prioritize what is most important to field a lethal, resilient, and rapidly adapting Joint Force. America’s military has no preordained right to victory on the battlefield.
+
+This unclassified synopsis of the classified _2018 National Defense Strategy_ articulates our strategy to compete, deter, and win in this environment. The reemergence of long-term strategic competition, rapid dispersion of technologies, and new concepts of warfare and competition that span the entire spectrum of conflict require a Joint Force structured to match this reality.
+
+A more lethal, resilient, and rapidly innovating Joint Force, combined with a robust constellation of allies and partners, will sustain American influence and ensure favorable balances of power that safeguard the free and open international order. Collectively, our force posture, alliance and partnership architecture, and Department modernization will provide the capabilities and agility required to prevail in conflict and preserve peace through strength.
+
+The costs of not implementing this strategy are clear. Failure to meet our defense objectives will result in decreasing U.S. global influence, eroding cohesion among allies and partners, and reduced access to markets that will contribute to a decline in our prosperity and standard of living. Without sustained and predictable investment to restore readiness and modernize our military to make it fit for our time, we will rapidly lose our military advantage, resulting in a Joint Force that has legacy systems irrelevant to the defense of our people.
+
+
+### STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
+
+The _National Defense Strategy_ acknowledges an increasingly complex global security environment, characterized by overt challenges to the free and open international order and the re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition between nations. These changes require a clear-eyed appraisal of the threats we face, acknowledgement of the changing character of warfare, and a transformation of how the Department conducts business.
+
+The central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the _reemergence of long-term, strategic competition_ by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model — gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.
+
+China is leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage. As China continues its economic and military ascendance, asserting power through an all-of-nation long-term strategy, it will continue to pursue a military modernization program that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future. The most far-reaching objective of this defense strategy is to set the military relationship between our two countries on a path of transparency and non-aggression.
+
+Concurrently, Russia seeks veto authority over nations on its periphery in terms of their governmental, economic, and diplomatic decisions, to shatter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and change European and Middle East security and economic structures to its favor. The use of emerging technologies to discredit and subvert democratic processes in Georgia, Crimea, and eastern Ukraine is concern enough, but when coupled with its expanding and modernizing nuclear arsenal the challenge is clear.
+
+Another change to the strategic environment is a _resilient, but weakening, post-WWII international order_. In the decades after fascism’s defeat in World War II, the United States and its allies and partners constructed a free and open international order to better safeguard their liberty and people from aggression and coercion. Although this system has evolved since the end of the Cold War, our network of alliances and partnerships remain the backbone of global security. China and Russia are now undermining the international order from within the system by exploiting its benefits while simultaneously undercutting its principles and “rules of the road.”
+
+Rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran are destabilizing regions through their pursuit of nuclear weapons or sponsorship of terrorism. North Korea seeks to guarantee regime survival and increased leverage by seeking a mixture of nuclear, biological, chemical, conventional, and unconventional weapons and a growing ballistic missile capability to gain coercive influence over South Korea, Japan, and the United States. In the Middle East, Iran is competing with its neighbors, asserting an arc of influence and instability while vying for regional hegemony, using state-sponsored terrorist activities, a growing network of proxies, and its missile program to achieve its objectives.
+
+Both revisionist powers and rogue regimes are competing across all dimensions of power. They have increased efforts short of armed conflict by expanding coercion to new fronts, violating principles of sovereignty, exploiting ambiguity, and deliberately blurring the lines between civil and military goals.
+
+_Challenges to the U.S. military advantage_ represent another shift in the global security environment. For decades the United States has enjoyed uncontested or dominant superiority in every operating domain. We could generally deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and operate how we wanted. Today, every domain is contested — air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace.
+
+We face an ever more lethal and disruptive battlefield, combined across domains, and conducted at increasing speed and reach — from close combat, throughout overseas theaters, and reaching to our homeland. Some competitors and adversaries seek to optimize their targeting of our battle networks and operational concepts, while also using other areas of competition short of open warfare to achieve their ends (e.g., information warfare, ambiguous or denied proxy operations, and subversion). These trends, if unaddressed, will challenge our ability to deter aggression.
+
+The security environment is also affected by _rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war_. The drive to develop new technologies is relentless, expanding to more actors with lower barriers of entry, and moving at accelerating speed. New technologies include advanced computing, “big data” analytics, artificial intelligence, autonomy, robotics, directed energy, hypersonics, and biotechnology — the very technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.
+
+New commercial technology will change society and, ultimately, the character of war. The fact that many technological developments will come from the commercial sector means that state competitors and non-state actors will also have access to them, a fact that risks eroding the conventional overmatch to which our Nation has grown accustomed. Maintaining the Department’s technological advantage will require changes to industry culture, investment sources, and protection across the National Security Innovation Base.
+
+States are the principal actors on the global stage, but _non-state actors_ also threaten the security environment with increasingly sophisticated capabilities. Terrorists, trans-national criminal organizations, cyber hackers and other malicious non-state actors have transformed global affairs with increased capabilities of mass disruption. There is a positive side to this as well, as our partners in sustaining security are also more than just nation-states: multilateral organizations, non-governmental organizations, corporations, and strategic influencers provide opportunities for collaboration and partnership. Terrorism remains a persistent condition driven by ideology and unstable political and economic structures, despite the defeat of ISIS’s physical caliphate.
+
+It is now undeniable that the _homeland is no longer a sanctuary_. America is a target, whether from terrorists seeking to attack our citizens; malicious cyber activity against personal, commercial, or government infrastructure; or political and information subversion. New threats to commercial and military uses of space are emerging, while increasing digital connectivity of all aspects of life, business, government, and military creates significant vulnerabilities. During conflict, attacks against our critical defense, government, and economic infrastructure must be anticipated.
+
+Rogue regimes, such as North Korea, continue to seek out or develop _weapons of mass destruction_ (WMD) — nuclear, chemical, and biological — as well as long range missile capabilities and, in some cases, proliferate these capabilities to malign actors as demonstrated by Iranian ballistic missile exports. Terrorists likewise continue to pursue WMD, while the spread of nuclear weapon technology and advanced manufacturing technology remains a persistent problem. Recent advances in bioengineering raise another concern, increasing the potential, variety, and ease of access to biological weapons.
+
+
+### DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OBJECTIVES
+
+In support of the _National Security Strategy_, the Department of Defense will be prepared to defend the homeland, remain the preeminent military power in the world, ensure the balances of power remain in our favor, and advance an international order that is most conducive to our security and prosperity.
+
+Long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities for the Department, and require both increased and sustained investment, because of the magnitude of the threats they pose to U.S. security and prosperity today, and the potential for those threats to increase in the future. Concurrently, the Department will sustain its efforts to deter and counter rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran, defeat terrorist threats to the United States, and consolidate our gains in Iraq and Afghanistan while moving to a more resource-sustainable approach.
+
+Defense objectives include:
+
+- Defending the homeland from attack;
+
+- Sustaining Joint Force military advantages, both globally and in key regions;
+
+- Deterring adversaries from aggression against our vital interests;
+
+- Enabling U.S. interagency counterparts to advance U.S. influence and interests;
+
+- Maintaining favorable regional balances of power in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere;
+
+- Defending allies from military aggression and bolstering partners against coercion, and fairly sharing responsibilities for common defense;
+
+- Dissuading, preventing, or deterring state adversaries and non-state actors from acquiring, proliferating, or using weapons of mass destruction;
+
+- Preventing terrorists from directing or supporting external operations against the United States homeland and our citizens, allies, and partners overseas;
+
+- Ensuring common domains remain open and free;
+
+- Continuously delivering performance with affordability and speed as we change Departmental mindset, culture, and management systems; and
+
+- Establishing an unmatched twenty-first century National Security Innovation Base that effectively supports Department operations and sustains security and solvency.
+
+
+### STRATEGIC APPROACH
+
+A long-term strategic competition requires the seamless integration of multiple elements of national power — diplomacy, information, economics, finance, intelligence, law enforcement, and military. More than any other nation, America can expand the competitive space, seizing the initiative to challenge our competitors where we possess advantages and they lack strength. A more lethal force, strong alliances and partnerships, American technological innovation, and a culture of performance will generate decisive and sustained U.S. military advantages.
+
+As we expand the competitive space, we continue to offer competitors and adversaries an outstretched hand, open to opportunities for cooperation but from a position of strength and based on our national interests. Should cooperation fail, we will be ready to defend the American people, our values, and interests. The willingness of rivals to abandon aggression will depend on their perception of U.S. strength and the vitality of our alliances and partnerships.
+
+_Be strategically predictable, but operationally unpredictable._ Deterring or defeating long-term strategic competitors is a fundamentally different challenge than the regional adversaries that were the focus of previous strategies. Our strength and integrated actions with allies will demonstrate our commitment to deterring aggression, but our dynamic force employment, military posture, and operations must introduce unpredictability to adversary decision-makers. With our allies and partners, we will challenge competitors by maneuvering them into unfavorable positions, frustrating their efforts, precluding their options while expanding our own, and forcing them to confront conflict under adverse conditions.
+
+_Integrate with U.S. interagency._ Effectively expanding the competitive space requires combined actions with the U.S. interagency to employ all dimensions of national power. We will assist the efforts of the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, Energy, Homeland Security, Commerce, USAID, as well as the Intelligence Community, law enforcement, and others to identify and build partnerships to address areas of economic, technological, and informational vulnerabilities.
+
+_Counter coercion and subversion._ In competition short of armed conflict, revisionist powers and rogue regimes are using corruption, predatory economic practices, propaganda, political subversion, proxies, and the threat or use of military force to change facts on the ground. Some are particularly adept at exploiting their economic relationships with many of our security partners. We will support U.S. interagency approaches and work by, with, and through our allies and partners to secure our interests and counteract this coercion.
+
+_Foster a competitive mindset._ To succeed in the emerging security environment, our Department and Joint Force will have to out-think, out-maneuver, out-partner, and out-innovate revisionist powers, rogue regimes, terrorists, and other threat actors.
+
+We will expand the competitive space while pursuing three distinct lines of effort:
+
+- First, rebuilding military readiness as we build a more lethal Joint Force;
+
+- Second, strengthening alliances as we attract new partners; and
+
+- Third, reforming the Department’s business practices for greater performance and affordability.
+
+#### Build a More Lethal Force
+
+The surest way to prevent war is to be prepared to win one. Doing so requires a competitive approach to force development and a consistent, multiyear investment to restore warfighting readiness and field a lethal force. The size of our force matters. The Nation must field sufficient, capable forces to defeat enemies and achieve sustainable outcomes that protect the American people and our vital interests. Our aim is a Joint Force that possesses decisive advantages for any likely conflict, while remaining proficient across the entire spectrum of conflict.
+
+_Prioritize preparedness for war._ Achieving peace through strength requires the Joint Force to deter conflict through preparedness for war. During normal day-to-day operations, the Joint Force will sustainably compete to: deter aggression in three key regions — the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and Middle East; degrade terrorist and WMD threats; and defend U.S. interests from challenges below the level of armed conflict. In wartime, the fully mobilized Joint Force will be capable of: defeating aggression by a major power; deterring opportunistic aggression elsewhere; and disrupting imminent terrorist and WMD threats. During peace or in war, the Joint Force will deter nuclear and non-nuclear strategic attacks and defend the homeland. To support these missions, the Joint Force must gain and maintain information superiority; and develop, strengthen, and sustain U.S. security relationships.
+
+_Modernize key capabilities._ We cannot expect success fighting tomorrow’s conflicts with yesterday’s weapons or equipment. To address the scope and pace of our competitors’ and adversaries’ ambitions and capabilities, we must invest in modernization of key capabilities through sustained, predictable budgets. Our backlog of deferred readiness, procurement, and modernization requirements has grown in the last decade and a half and can no longer be ignored. We will make targeted, disciplined increases in personnel and platforms to meet key capability and capacity needs. The _2018 National Defense Strategy_ underpins our planned fiscal year 2019-2023 budgets, accelerating our modernization programs and devoting additional resources in a sustained effort to solidify our competitive advantage.
+
+- _Nuclear forces._ The Department will modernize the nuclear triad — including nuclear command, control, and communications, and supporting infrastructure. Modernization of the nuclear force includes developing options to counter competitors’ coercive strategies, predicated on the threatened use of nuclear or strategic non-nuclear attacks.
+
+- _Space and cyberspace as warfighting domains._ The Department will prioritize investments in resilience, reconstitution, and operations to assure our space capabilities. We will also invest in cyber defense, resilience, and the continued integration of cyber capabilities into the full spectrum of military operations.
+
+- _Command, control, communications, computers and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)._ Investments will prioritize developing resilient, survivable, federated networks and information ecosystems from the tactical level up to strategic planning. Investments will also prioritize capabilities to gain and exploit information, deny competitors those same advantages, and enable us to provide attribution while defending against and holding accountable state or non-state actors during cyberattacks.
+
+- _Missile defense._ Investments will focus on layered missile defenses and disruptive capabilities for both theater missile threats and North Korean ballistic missile threats.
+
+- _Joint lethality in contested environments._ The Joint Force must be able to strike diverse targets inside adversary air and missile defense networks to destroy mobile power-projection platforms. This will include capabilities to enhance close combat lethality in complex terrain.
+
+- _Forward force maneuver and posture resilience._ Investments will prioritize ground, air, sea, and space forces that can deploy, survive, operate, maneuver, and regenerate in all domains while under attack. Transitioning from large, centralized, unhardened infrastructure to smaller, dispersed, resilient, adaptive basing that include active and passive defenses will also be prioritized.
+
+- _Advanced autonomous systems._ The Department will invest broadly in military application of autonomy, artificial intelligence, and machine learning, including rapid application of commercial breakthroughs, to gain competitive military advantages.
+
+- _Resilient and agile logistics._ Investments will prioritize prepositioned forward stocks and munitions, strategic mobility assets, partner and allied support, as well as non-commercially dependent distributed logistics and maintenance to ensure logistics sustainment while under persistent multi-domain attack.
+
+_Evolve innovative operational concepts._ Modernization is not defined solely by hardware; it requires change in the ways we organize and employ forces. We must anticipate the implications of new technologies on the battlefield, rigorously define the military problems anticipated in future conflict, and foster a culture of experimentation and calculated risk-taking. We must anticipate how competitors and adversaries will employ new operational concepts and technologies to attempt to defeat us, while developing operational concepts to sharpen our competitive advantages and enhance our lethality.
+
+_Develop a lethal, agile, and resilient force posture and employment._ Force posture and employment must be adaptable to account for the uncertainty that exists in the changing global strategic environment. Much of our force employment models and posture date to the immediate post-Cold War era, when our military advantage was unchallenged and the primary threats were rogue regimes.
+
+- _Dynamic Force Employment._ Dynamic Force Employment will prioritize maintaining the capacity and capabilities for major combat, while providing options for proactive and scalable employment of the Joint Force. A modernized Global Operating Model of combat-credible, flexible theater postures will enhance our ability to compete and provide freedom of maneuver during conflict, providing national decision-makers with better military options.
+
+ The global strategic environment demands increased strategic flexibility and freedom of action. The Dynamic Force Employment concept will change the way the Department uses the Joint Force to provide proactive and scalable options for priority missions. Dynamic Force Employment will more flexibly use ready forces to shape proactively the strategic environment while maintaining readiness to respond to contingencies and ensure long-term warfighting readiness.
+
+- _Global Operating Model._ The Global Operating Model describes how the Joint Force will be postured and employed to achieve its competition and wartime missions. Foundational capabilities include: nuclear; cyber; space; C4ISR; strategic mobility, and counter WMD proliferation. It comprises four layers: contact, blunt, surge, and homeland. These are, respectively, designed to help us compete more effectively below the level of armed conflict; delay, degrade, or deny adversary aggression; surge war-winning forces and manage conflict escalation; and defend the U.S. homeland.
+
+_Cultivate workforce talent._ Recruiting, developing, and retaining a high-quality military and civilian workforce is essential for warfighting success. Cultivating a lethal, agile force requires more than just new technologies and posture changes; it depends on the ability of our warfighters and the Department workforce to integrate new capabilities, adapt warfighting approaches, and change business practices to achieve mission success. The creativity and talent of the American warfighter is our greatest enduring strength, and one we do not take for granted.
+
+- _Professional Military Education (PME)._ PME has stagnated, focused more on the accomplishment of mandatory credit at the expense of lethality and ingenuity. We will emphasize intellectual leadership and military professionalism in the art and science of warfighting, deepening our knowledge of history while embracing new technology and techniques to counter competitors. PME will emphasize independence of action in warfighting concepts to lessen the impact of degraded/lost communications in combat. PME is to be used as a strategic asset to build trust and interoperability across the Joint Forces and with allied and partner forces.
+
+- _Talent management._ Developing leaders who are competent in national-level decision-making requires broad revision of talent management among the Armed Services, including fellowships, civilian education, and assignments that increase understanding of interagency decision-making processes, as well as alliances and coalitions.
+
+- _Civilian workforce expertise._ A modern, agile, information-advantaged Department requires a motivated, diverse, and highly skilled civilian workforce. We will emphasize new skills and complement our current workforce with information experts, data scientists, computer programmers, and basic science researchers and engineers — to use information, not simply manage it. The Department will also continue to explore streamlined, non-traditional pathways to bring critical skills into service, expanding access to outside expertise, and devising new public-private partnerships to work with small companies, start-ups, and universities.
+
+#### Strengthen Alliances and Attract New Partners
+
+Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to our strategy, providing a durable, asymmetric strategic advantage that no competitor or rival can match. This approach has served the United States well, in peace and war, for the past 75 years. Our allies and partners came to our aid after the terrorist attacks on 9/11, and have contributed to every major U.S.-led military engagement since. Every day, our allies and partners join us in defending freedom, deterring war, and maintaining the rules which underwrite a free and open international order.
+
+By working together with allies and partners we amass the greatest possible strength for the long-term advancement of our interests, maintaining favorable balances of power that deter aggression and support the stability that generates economic growth. When we pool resources and share responsibility for our common defense, our security burden becomes lighter. Our allies and partners provide complementary capabilities and forces along with unique perspectives, regional relationships, and information that improve our understanding of the environment and expand our options. Allies and partners also provide access to critical regions, supporting a widespread basing and logistics system that underpins the Department’s global reach.
+
+We will strengthen and evolve our alliances and partnerships into an extended network capable of deterring or decisively acting to meet the shared challenges of our time. We will focus on three elements for achieving a capable alliance and partnership network:
+
+- _Uphold a foundation of mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and accountability._ Our alliances and coalitions are built on free will and shared responsibilities. While we will unapologetically represent America’s values and belief in democracy, we will not seek to impose our way of life by force. We will uphold our commitments and we expect allies and partners to contribute an equitable share to our mutually beneficial collective security, including effective investment in modernizing their defense capabilities. We have shared responsibilities for resisting authoritarian trends, contesting radical ideologies, and serving as bulwarks against instability.
+
+- _Expand regional consultative mechanisms and collaborative planning._ We will develop new partnerships around shared interests to reinforce regional coalitions and security cooperation. We will provide allies and partners with a clear and consistent message to encourage alliance and coalition commitment, greater defense cooperation, and military investment.
+
+- _Deepen interoperability._ Each ally and partner is unique. Combined forces able to act together coherently and effectively to achieve military objectives requires interoperability. Interoperability is a priority for operational concepts, modular force elements, communications, information sharing, and equipment. In consultation with Congress and the Department of State, the Department of Defense will prioritize requests for U.S. military equipment sales, accelerating foreign partner modernization and ability to integrate with U.S. forces. We will train to high-end combat missions in our alliance, bilateral, and multinational exercises.
+
+Enduring coalitions and long-term security partnerships, underpinned by our bedrock alliances and reinforced by our allies’ own webs of security relationships, remain a priority:
+
+- _Expand Indo-Pacific alliances and partnerships._ A free and open Indo-Pacific region provides prosperity and security for all. We will strengthen our alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific to a networked security architecture capable of deterring aggression, maintaining stability, and ensuring free access to common domains. With key countries in the region, we will bring together bilateral and multilateral security relationships to preserve the free and open international system.
+
+- _Fortify the Trans-Atlantic NATO Alliance._ A strong and free Europe, bound by shared principles of democracy, national sovereignty, and commitment to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is vital to our security. The alliance will deter Russian adventurism, defeat terrorists who seek to murder innocents, and address the arc of instability building on NATO’s periphery. At the same time, NATO must adapt to remain relevant and fit for our time — in purpose, capability, and responsive decision-making. We expect European allies to fulfill their commitments to increase defense and modernization spending to bolster the alliance in the face of our shared security concerns.
+
+- _Form enduring coalitions in the Middle East._ We will foster a stable and secure Middle East that denies safe havens for terrorists, is not dominated by any power hostile to the United States, and that contributes to stable global energy markets and secure trade routes. We will develop enduring coalitions to consolidate gains we have made in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere, to support the lasting defeat of terrorists as we sever their sources of strength and counterbalance Iran.
+
+- _Sustain advantages in the Western Hemisphere._ The U.S. derives immense benefit from a stable, peaceful hemisphere that reduces security threats to the homeland. Supporting the U.S. interagency lead, the Department will deepen its relations with regional countries that contribute military capabilities to shared regional and global security challenges.
+
+- _Support relationships to address significant terrorist threats in Africa._ We will bolster existing bilateral and multilateral partnerships and develop new relationships to address significant terrorist threats that threaten U.S. interests and contribute to challenges in Europe and the Middle East. We will focus on working by, with, and through local partners and the European Union to degrade terrorists; build the capability required to counter violent extremism, human trafficking, trans-national criminal activity, and illegal arms trade with limited outside assistance; and limit the malign influence of non-African powers.
+
+#### Reform the Department for Greater Performance and Affordability
+
+The current bureaucratic approach, centered on exacting thoroughness and minimizing risk above all else, is proving to be increasingly unresponsive. We must transition to a culture of performance where results and accountability matter. We will put in place a management system where leadership can harness opportunities and ensure effective stewardship of taxpayer resources. We have a responsibility to gain full value from every taxpayer dollar spent on defense, thereby earning the trust of Congress and the American people.
+
+_Deliver performance at the speed of relevance._ Success no longer goes to the country that develops a new technology first, but rather to the one that better integrates it and adapts its way of fighting. Current processes are not responsive to need; the Department is over-optimized for exceptional performance at the expense of providing timely decisions, policies, and capabilities to the warfighter. Our response will be to prioritize speed of delivery, continuous adaptation, and frequent modular upgrades. We must not accept cumbersome approval chains, wasteful applications of resources in uncompetitive space, or overly risk-averse thinking that impedes change. Delivering performance means we will shed outdated management practices and structures while integrating insights from business innovation.
+
+_Organize for innovation._ The Department’s management structure and processes are not written in stone, they are a means to an end — empowering the warfighter with the knowledge, equipment and support systems to fight and win. Department leaders will adapt their organizational structures to best support the Joint Force. If current structures hinder substantial increases in lethality or performance, it is expected that Service Secretaries and Agency heads will consolidate, eliminate, or restructure as needed. The Department’s leadership is committed to changes in authorities, granting of waivers, and securing external support for streamlining processes and organizations.
+
+_Drive budget discipline and affordability to achieve solvency._ Better management begins with effective financial stewardship. The Department will continue its plan to achieve full auditability of all its operations, improving its financial processes, systems, and tools to understand, manage, and improve cost. We will continue to leverage the scale of our operations to drive greater efficiency in procurement of materiel and services while pursuing opportunities to consolidate and streamline contracts in areas such as logistics, information technology, and support services. We will also continue efforts to reduce management overhead and the size of headquarters staff. We will reduce or eliminate duplicative organizations and systems for managing human resources, finance, health services, travel, and supplies. The Department will also work to reduce excess property and infrastructure, providing Congress with options for a Base Realignment and Closure.
+
+_Streamline rapid, iterative approaches from development to fielding._ A rapid, iterative approach to capability development will reduce costs, technological obsolescence, and acquisition risk. The Department will realign incentive and reporting structures to increase speed of delivery, enable design tradeoffs in the requirements process, expand the role of warfighters and intelligence analysis throughout the acquisitions process, and utilize non-traditional suppliers. Prototyping and experimentation should be used prior to defining requirements and commercial-off-the-shelf systems. Platform electronics and software must be designed for routine replacement instead of static configurations that last more than a decade. This approach, a major departure from previous practices and culture, will allow the Department to more quickly respond to changes in the security environment and make it harder for competitors to offset our systems.
+
+_Harness and protect the National Security Innovation Base._ The Department’s technological advantage depends on a healthy and secure national security innovation base that includes both traditional and non-traditional defense partners. The Department, with the support of Congress, will provide the defense industry with sufficient predictability to inform their long-term investments in critical skills, infrastructure, and research and development. We will continue to streamline processes so that new entrants and small-scale vendors can provide cutting-edge technologies. We will also cultivate international partnerships to leverage and protect partner investments in military capabilities.
+
+
+### CONCLUSION
+
+> #### Jim Mattis
+
+_This strategy establishes my intent to pursue urgent change at significant scale._
+
+_We must use creative approaches, make sustained investment, and be disciplined in execution to field a Joint Force fit for our time, one that can compete, deter, and win in this increasingly complex security environment. A dominant Joint Force will protect the security of our nation, increase U.S. influence, preserve access to markets that will improve our standard of living, and strengthen cohesion among allies and partners._
+
+_While any strategy must be adaptive in execution, this summary outlines what we must do to pass intact to the younger generation the freedoms we currently enjoy. But there is nothing new under the sun: while this strategy will require sustained investment by the American people, we recall past generations who made harsher sacrifices so that we might enjoy our way of life today._
+
+_As it has for generations, free men and women in America’s military will fight with skill and valor to protect us. To carry out any strategy, history teaches us that wisdom and resources must be sufficient. I am confident this defense strategy is appropriate and worthy of the support of the American people._
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+---
+layout: post
+title : National Military Strategy
+author: US Joint Chiefs of Staff
+date : 2019-07-12 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/dbEdDQR.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Description of the National Military Strategy 2018"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The 2018 National Military Strategy (NMS) provides the Joint Force a framework for protecting and advancing U.S. national interests. Pursuant to statute, it reflects a comprehensive review conducted by the Chairman with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified combatant commanders._
+
+
+
+As an overarching military strategic framework, this strategy implements the substantial body of policy and strategy direction provided in the _2017 National Security Strategy_, the _2018 National Defense Strategy_ (NDS), the _Defense Planning Guidance_ (DPG), and other documents. The 2018 NMS provides the Chairman’s military advice for how the Joint Force implements the defense objectives in the NDS and the direction from the President and the Secretary of Defense.
+
+The 2018 NMS also reflects lessons learned from implementing global integration over the last two years. The strategy articulates a continuum of strategic direction to frame global integration into three strategy horizons to meet the challenges of the existing and future security environment. _Force employment_ addresses planning, force management, and decisionmaking to fulfill the defense objectives of the NDS. _Force development_ adapts functions, capabilities, and concepts to improve the current Joint Force. _Force design_ innovates to enable the Joint Force to do what it does differently to retain a competitive advantage against any adversary.
+
+The vision of the Joint Force articulated in the 2018 NMS is a Joint Force capable of defending the homeland and projecting power globally, now and into the future.
+
+
+### Strategic Approach
+
+From its global perspective, the NMS premises an adaptive and innovative Joint Force capable of employing its capabilities seamlessly across multiple regions and all domains — continuing the transition from a regional to a global mindset and approach.
+
+This strategy anchors its approach against a set of clearly identified security trends outlined in the NDS (see inset).
+
+> #### `NDS Relevant Security Trends`
+
+- `Reemergence of great-power competition`
+
+- `Post-World War II order — resilient but weakening`
+
+- `Technology and the changing character of war: diffusion, competition, and new threats`
+
+- `Empowered non-state actors`
+
+- `Homeland is no longer a sanctuary`
+
+- `Threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)`
+
+- `Allies and partners — evolving opportunities`
+
+- `Battle of narratives`
+
+- `Scale and urgency of change`
+
+These trends, especially those posed by the reemergence of great power competition with China and Russia, represent the most difficult challenges facing the Joint Force. However, the full scope of global integration must recognize uncertainty and be vigilant for emerging threats to the security and interests of the United States, its allies and partners. In a security environment where the homeland is no longer a sanctuary and every operating domain is contested, competitors and adversaries will continue to operate across geographic regions and span multiple domains to offset or erode Joint Force advantages.
+
+To achieve military advantage over competitors and adversaries, the NMS introduces the notion of joint combined arms, defined as _the conduct of operational art through the integration of joint capabilities in all domains_. The Joint Force and its leaders must be as comfortable fighting in space or cyberspace as they are in the other three traditional domains of land, sea, or air.
+
+
+### Force Employment
+
+To guide force employment, the 2018 NMS orients on the defense objectives in the NDS as its ends. To implement those ends, the 2018 NMS articulates five mutually supporting mission areas (see inset) as the principal ways that the Joint Force operates across the continuum of conflict in multiple regions and in all domains. Defending the homeland is a Joint Force activity that cuts across all five mission areas and spans all joint functions.
+
+> #### `NMS Mission Areas`
+
+- `Respond to Threats`
+
+- `Deter Strategic Attack (and proliferation of WMD)`
+
+- `Deter Conventional Attack`
+
+- `Assure Allies and Partners`
+
+- `Compete Below the Level of Armed Conflict (With a Military Dimension)`
+
+The Joint Force will leverage a wide range of means to enhance force employment. Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) serves as the force management framework to prioritize preparedness for war while meeting current force demands in day-to-day operations. By proactively shaping the security environment through identifying and exploiting strategic opportunities, DFE aligns Joint Force actions across multiple global campaign plans, defense critical missions, time horizons, warfighting domains, and geographic boundaries.
+
+As one of the principal methods by which the Joint Force operationalizes the NDS’s Global Operating Model, DFE will assist in balancing current operational needs with readiness recovery and modernization to preserve Joint Force competitive advantage.
+
+The 2018 NMS acknowledges the unique contributions of allies and partners, a strategic source of strength for the Joint Force. Building a strong, agile, and resilient force requires better interoperability and enhancing the combat lethality and survivability of our allies and partners. The NMS also informs engagement with interagency partners, both abroad and domestically, to enable the Joint Force to best support the application of all instruments of national power throughout the continuum of conflict.
+
+To prepare the Joint Force for employment, exercises build readiness, interoperability, and the mutual trust required for a joint combined arms approach to global campaigning. Those exercises are key to building interoperability, relationships, and capabilities of allies, partner nations, and interagency partners, as well as enabling units and leaders to “punch above weight class” when necessary. Exercises can also facilitate near-term experimentation to rapidly incorporate innovative ideas and disruptive technologies that promote competitive advantage.
+
+
+### Force Development and Force Design
+
+Force Development and Force Design are the expression of Joint Force adaptation and innovation under global integration to implement the NDS’s direction to build a more lethal force. _Force Development_ adapts current planning, decisionmaking, and force management processes to enable the Joint Force to do what it does better. _Force Design_ enables the Joint Force to do what it does _in fundamentally different and disruptive ways_ to ensure the Joint Force can deter or defeat future adversaries.
+
+As with force employment, the ends for force development and force design are drawn from the defense objectives of the NDS. To implement those ends and build a combat-credible Joint Force capable of defending the homeland, deterring competitors, and defeating adversaries, the NMS outlines three ways oriented on the investments in the Joint Force’s people, ideas, and equipment to maintain its competitive advantage.
+
+To implement the force investment priorities of the NDS, the 2018 NMS provides guidance to inform the development of a Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). The CCJO will express the collective vision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a Joint Force designed and able to out-think, out-maneuver, and out-fight any adversary under conditions of disruptive change. It will mark a shift to a concept-driven, threat-informed, capability development process and provide a campaign approach to unify service capabilities across materiel and non-materiel solutions.
+
+Achieving the Joint Chiefs’ vision will require people — the Joint Force’s primary source of competitive advantage — to continuously adapt and innovate to maintain their competitive edge.
+
+Consistent with the guidance laid out in the NDS, capability investments must emphasize military advantages in lethality and operational reach, while enabling the Joint Force to compete effectively below the level of armed conflict.
+
+
+### CONCLUSION
+
+The _2018 National Military Strategy_ describes a roadmap for how the Joint Force will defend the homeland and retain its competitive advantage to deter competitors and defeat adversaries, whether great power competitors like China and Russia or other security challenges, now and into the future.
+
+Implementation of the strategy is informed by strategic frameworks, input from the field, and the judgment of senior leaders. The NMS guides other joint documents including the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan, global campaign plans, the CCJO, and other capability development and program advice documents, and the body of assessments that benchmark those documents.
+
+Collectively, the strategy and its related processes will enable the Joint Force to provide a range of military options that enhance the military contribution to national security and best serve the national interests of the United States.
+
+> #### Strategy Development Division
+
+> #### Deputy Directorate for Joint Strategic Planning
+
+> #### Directorate for Strategy, Plans, and Policy (J-5)
+
+> #### The Joint Staff
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2020-09-18-information-advantage-jcn-2-18.md b/_collections/_hkers/2020-09-18-information-advantage-jcn-2-18.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Information Advantage
+author: UK Ministry of Defence
+date : 2020-09-18 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/oqzLEcT.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Joint Concept Note 2/18 is primarily for Defence and joint commanders, staffs and students; cross-government and industry partners; and principal allies."
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_We live in a data-rich information age in which the combined power of exponential growth in computer capability, data, and digital connectivity is fundamentally shaping almost every facet of modern life. Those who could adapt have thrived, others have clung to old methods and withered. Information, in all its manifestations, must change the way we execute business and prosecute warfare, both at home and overseas in an era of constant competition. Defence must harness this digital horsepower or be left behind; we have reached the tipping point. Information is no longer just an enabler, it is a fully-fledged national lever of power, a critical enabler to understanding, decision-making and tempo, and a ‘weapon’ to be used from strategic to tactical level for advantage._
+
+
+
+The smart use of information through the mass customisation of messaging, narrative and persuasion, can vastly extend reach and deliver disproportionate influence on targeted audiences. It is underpinned by core digital technologies and digitally savvy people. This digital race – human and machine – is increasingly geopolitical in nature. Currently we are being challenged in a ‘grey-zone’ short of armed conflict by agile state and non-state actors – notably Russia – who understand our vulnerabilities and seek to exploit them through multifarious asymmetric approaches and the flouting of rules-based norms. Central to these strategic contests are ‘information battles’; battles in which information is ‘weaponised’ and ones in which we increasingly lack the initiative.
+
+To regain the initiative and achieve information advantage we must rapidly up our digital game, fundamentally shift the way we think, act, invest, and move with pace through the incremental development of new capabilities. Defence, as part of a national and allied effort, must become a potent and resilient strategic actor; postured for constant competition both home and away. This requires a cultural transformation and a conceptual foundation that puts information advantage at the heart of 21st Century deterrence and campaign design. Information advantage must become part of our doctrinal lexicon and joint action practice; a bedrock upon which a range of physical, virtual and cognitive effects will be built, including the use of information as an effecter in its own right.
+
+This joint concept note explains why information advantage must be at the heart of how Defence operates if we are to enable credible military options and political utility, regain and maintain initiative, and achieve influence in a more complex and competitive world. It has been written primarily for Defence and joint commanders, staffs and students; cross-government and industry partners; and principal allies. I encourage you to read it.
+
+
+## Introduction and context
+
+> #### `Emile Simpson, War from the Ground Up`
+
+> _`War today is in the process of undergoing another evolution in response to social and political conditions, namely the speed and interconnectivity associated with contemporary globalisation and the information revolution.`_
+
+1.1. We live in the Information Age in which the combined power of exponential growth in computer capability, data, and connectivity is fundamentally shaping the way people live and work. Today, thanks to smartphones, the Internet and social media, our perception of the world is being manipulated at an extraordinary pace and on a previously unimaginable scale. Never have so many people been connected in an instantly responsive network, through which ‘memes’ can spread more rapidly than natural viruses. Experts are out, opinion is in; it matters not how verifiable the assertion, it only matters that it attracts attention – true believers, sceptics, conspiracy theorists and artificial intelligence can do the rest. Information is no longer just an enabler, it is a fully-fledged national lever of power and a strategic, operational and tactical weapon. If used in a timely and coherent manner it can generate advantage over an adversary, and deliver both mass effect and precision ‘fire’, to disrupt, confuse, agitate and radicalise. And it not only fuels conflict, it can create conflict. This is not some vision of an apocalyptic future; it is here today and it cannot be ignored.
+
+
+### Purpose
+
+1.2. Joint Concept Note (JCN) 2/18, Information Advantage identifies the requirement for a fundamental shift in the way Defence executes its business and prosecutes warfare – a transformational opportunity that must be at the heart of how Defence operates. It outlines the requirement to: further develop our current thinking regarding the use of information; invest and act differently in response to such thinking; and introduces the concept of information advantage to enhance our influence in a complex and uncertain operating environment.
+
+__`Russia and information`__
+
+_`Vladimir Putin’s Russia has many weaknesses but it has seized Crimea, launched a murderous insurrection in eastern Ukraine, meddled in elections and hacked the Danish Ministry of Defence and the Bundestag, among many other acts. Russia has adopted an assertive and constant whole-of-government approach – with disinformation at its core – to achieving strategic objectives. As the Prime Minister, Theresa May stated in November 2017:`_
+
+_`‘...[Russia] is seeking to weaponise information. Deploying its state-run media organisations to plant fake stories and photo-shopped images, in an attempt to sow discord in the West and undermine our institutions.’`_
+
+_`From a national to an individual level, both home and away, we are being outmanoeuvred in a ‘grey zone’ short of armed conflict by actors unconstrained by previously accepted norms. Central to this strategic contest is an information battle; where we increasingly lack the initiative. In the shades of ambiguous indirect ‘grey’ that provides the context for constant competition, the Kremlin moves quickly and opportunistically, taking risks and breaking rules. Their aim is known: to play divide and rule games between western nations and within them, exploiting ethnic, political, regional, religious and social elements, increasing polarisation and weakening our political will.`_
+
+
+### Context
+
+1.3. Joint Concept Note (JCN) 1/17, Future Force Concept recognises the potential of information to deliver transformative change and disproportionate influence. To exploit this opportunity we must up our game in several key areas, and set the requirement across Defence to gain information advantage as a prerequisite for success. This is necessary because we are being outmanoeuvred in the information environment by agile state and non-state actors who understand our vulnerabilities and use multifarious, asymmetric approaches to exploit them. This involves the synchronised and persistent use of the diplomatic, informational, military (if often limited) and economic instruments of power, irrespective of the norms of the rules-based international order.
+
+1.4. Actions by states such as Russia demonstrate that while the deterrent threat or coercive use of force remains a vital means by which military power influences people or changes the course of events, the power of a potent narrative amplified by contemporary technology offers significant advantage to adaptable and agile actors. So, in the contemporary, complex and dynamic environment, we must take account of a much broader audience than simply the ‘enemy’ – success will prove elusive if we continue to embrace only traditional views of conflict. Strategy is therefore increasingly sensitive to tactical actions and our perceptions of local, regional and global audience opinions. Success is, and will continue to be, significantly influenced by the extent to which competing narratives influence, or fail to connect with, audiences. We therefore need to do things differently if we are to enable credible military options, maintain our freedom of action and political utility, and achieve influence in a more complex and competitive world.
+
+> #### `David Patrikarakos on eastern Ukraine`
+
+> _`I began to understand that I was caught up in two wars: one fought on the ground with tanks and artillery, and an information war fought largely, though not exclusively, through social media. And, perhaps counter-intuitively, it mattered who won the war of words and narratives (rather) than who had the most potent weaponry.`_
+
+1.5. Using propaganda and disinformation is not new. What is new is the ease, global reach, speed of propagation of ideas, efficiency and low cost of such efforts, coupled with our political sensitivity to national and global opinion. We cannot control who accesses this capability and we do not hold the initiative – it is driven by commercial, societal and geopolitical forces that will determine how the technology unfolds and is used. It is effective too. The nimble player who can shape perceptions will more likely achieve their objectives. Defence must therefore become a more potent and agile strategic actor; effective in competitive and constantly evolving sensing and shaping activity against adversaries who seek to achieve strategic objectives through a pre-emptive whole-of-government approach including limited, yet swift, use of force. Doing things differently will require us to better integrate information and physical activity across multiple domains – cyber, space, maritime, land and air – to leverage our influence to deter as part of fusion doctrine, a new approach to the orchestration of our national security capabilities.
+
+1.6. In an era of constant competition at home and overseas, influence will only be achieved with a clear and persistent focus on audiences, and effects (reassuring allies whilst presenting multiple dilemmas to adversaries). All activities in all domains must be focussed on, and complementary to, the information strategy to achieve influence. Defence, with information at its core and a clear understanding of freedoms and constraints, must seek to contribute more effectively as part of national and military strategy. Adopting a more proactive approach will require careful consideration of permissions and authorities both within and outside Defence. At the joint force level, enhancing joint action seeks to undermine an actor’s will. This is achieved by affecting their understanding and capability through the mutually reinforcing integration of information activities with fires, outreach and manoeuvre and will provide more options and greater potential to gain advantage in time and space. Although the smart use of information – through the mass customisation of messaging, narrative and persuasion – can vastly extend reach and deliver disproportionate influence on targeted audiences, our ability to deter will be underpinned by our capability and will to escalate to the use of force.
+
+
+## Information advantage
+
+> #### `Benjamin Disraeli, 1804-1881`
+
+> _`The most successful people in life are generally those who have the best information.`_
+
+2.1. Information advantage is defined as: the credible advantage gained through the continuous, adaptive, decisive and resilient employment of information and information systems. As depicted at Figure 1, information advantage can be conceptualised through four broad lenses. These are:
+
+- Information as an enabler;
+
+- Information resilience;
+
+- Information denial; and
+
+- Information as an effecter.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 1 – The concept for information advantage_
+
+2.2. The three lenses of ‘enabler’, ‘resilience’ and ‘denial’ serve as mutually supporting foundational elements providing the potential for information advantage, specifically enhancing joint action through greater choice over applying information effecters, to influence target audiences. This enables greater opportunities to manoeuvre in the physical and virtual dimensions, which when synchronised, are key to achieving effects in the cognitive, and delivering success both today and in the future. In the cognitive dimension we aim to create friction, uncertainty and even paralysis in our adversaries to create advantage. This has profound implications for an institution imbued with the primacy of fires and physical battlefield manoeuvre. All four lenses are forms of manoeuvre, as they seek to protect and secure, to deter and deceive and ultimately deliver information advantage through effects on an adversary’s understanding, physical capability, will and cohesion.
+
+
+### Section 1 – Information as an enabler
+
+> #### `Joint Concept Note 2/17, Future of Command and Control`
+
+> _`‘We will see a progression beyond the use of machines to support the intelligence cycle, towards human/machine planning, decision-making and mission execution. Ultimately, humans and technology should be parts of the same team, with either technology providing personal assistance or with humans and machines being agents of the team.’`_
+
+2.3. Information is a critical enabler to understanding and decision-making; it can significantly enhance tempo and momentum, thereby offering significant advantage. Such decision support includes articulating the credibility or completeness of information that is available, as well as clarifying where information is not available. Timely analysis and assessment, exploitable at a pace better than our adversary, and at least as good as allies, is critical to future mission success. A general shift away from traditional command hierarchies to more dynamic, lateral networks, with greater delegations of authority will allow decision-making to be pushed to the edges of an organisation, and the exploitation of the most relevant information at speed.
+
+2.4. Persistent review of multiple audiences, whether they be adversarial, supportive, unsupportive or undecided, is critical to enhancing our broader understanding. Embracing developing technologies such as artificial intelligence could offer significant advantage in this area. However, we must be mindful that the pace and growth of information can risk undermining comprehension and decision-making and weaken the distinction between information and knowledge. Therefore, to be truly useful, information must be placed within a broader context of history, geography, social behaviour and psychological interactions to emerge as actual knowledge. The increasing capabilities of robotic and artificial intelligence systems will be limited not only by what can be done, but also what actors trust their machines to do. The fundamental factors affecting our trust in systems are: mechanical understanding, predictability, familiarity and context.
+
+
+### Section 2 – Information resilience
+
+2.5. Resilience matters as it is an essential element for credible deterrence and defence against the full spectrum of hybrid threats. It is also imperative that information systems focus on the protection, confidentiality, integrity and availability of our own information. This will require us to adequately defend the data and networks which help to provide our understanding through the ‘enabler’ element. The development of multi-layered and multi-spectral intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems will help deliver agility and contingency, offering the ability to continue when attacked.
+
+> #### `Defence Resilience DCDC study, 2018`
+
+> _`Resilience is about preparedness, about understanding potential vulnerabilities and looking at how best to mitigate them. Resilience is relative as threats evolve and as vulnerabilities change. No organisation, person, network or system can be absolutely resilient and so the key to resilience, whilst subject to constant change, is adaptability. Resistance, reliability, redundancy, response and recovery are the components of resilience.`_
+
+2.6. Information resilience will also require the ability to defend in a contested cyber and electromagnetic domain. Resilient communications and information systems should be interoperable with partners across government and allies, with the necessary bandwidth, security, availability and agility. This resilient foundation, consisting of robust, secure and agile processes, and trained, adaptable people, must be seamless across the operational domains.
+
+
+### Section 3 – Information denial
+
+2.7. It is critical that we develop mindsets and capabilities that deny information to our adversaries – to degrade their understanding – using a layered sensor and weapon network, incorporating both passive and active measures. This does not have to focus on physical capabilities; it can range from encouraging the responsible use of social media by our own personnel through promoting and developing and continuous reinforcing of a security culture, to camouflage, concealment and deception techniques and jamming across the electromagnetic spectrum.
+
+2.8. We also need to contest an adversary’s ability to understand by developing the capability to selectively degrade and deny their space, cyber and electromagnetic capabilities, as well as adopt niche aspects such as counter-artificial intelligence capabilities. Experimentation and testing could help us to determine whether such an approach is more cost-effective than denying such capabilities through traditional kinetic activities.
+
+> #### `Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore`
+
+> _`The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has, over the past 15 years, acquired considerable hardware to boost its anti-access and area denial (A2AD) capabilities. Sea denial has been greatly improved by the acquisition of new submarines, anti-ship cruise missiles and modern sea mines. Several hundred fourth generation combat aircraft, an arsenal of air defence systems, and the development of an anti-satellite capability, combine to deny adversaries the ability to gain information. China is also working hard to improve its offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, including computer network attacks, electronic warfare, and setting up ‘information blockades’ of its computer networks.`_
+
+
+### Section 4 – Information as an effecter
+
+> #### `Joseph Nye`
+
+> _`‘In the information age, it’s not just whose army wins, but whose story wins.’`_
+
+2.9. A range of non-lethal tools and options can be used to deliver information at speed, mass and reach to effect understanding, perceptions and behaviour. The focus of activities is to create effects in the cognitive dimension and information is being increasingly ‘weaponised’ in this manner by our adversaries, to gain advantage. They have recognised how technology can be harnessed to amplify the power of a commanding strategic narrative, and influence attitudes, behaviours and perceptions in pursuit of strategic goals.
+
+__`Counter-Daesh – information as an effecter`__
+
+_`The UK Government’s counter-Daesh task force created several cross-government bodies that successfully neutered Daesh’s online presence. The UK led the coalition communications cell that effectively marshalled overt, international media and communications. This provided a strong counter-narrative, and using consistent messaging then applied a range of increasingly covert operations to negate Daesh’s ability to create effect through the information domain. Much of these operations must remain secret, but as Director Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) has recently stated, at their most complex we were able to synchronise and fuse the special intelligence agencies output; cyber, kinetic fires, overt and covert messaging, and the military campaign, to render Daesh’s online and media persona significantly downgraded to the point that the previously triumphalist ISIL brand looked badly threadbare.`_
+
+2.10. Since every military action, whether it be through a bomb or a byte, produces a cognitive effect on behaviour, influence will only be achieved with a clear focus on audiences and effects, and by integrating and synchronising kinetic and non-kinetic activities conducted across the physical and virtual domains to try to achieve those effects. Notwithstanding the challenge of orchestrating and assessing information activity we must recognise the ability of strategic communication to shape policy and develop strategy, as well as its ability to communicate our narrative and enable dialogue with audiences. This should be part of a continuous, proactive, national approach that provides a consistent link between strategy and tactics.
+
+
+## Insights and deductions
+
+> #### `David Patrikarakos War in 140 Characters`
+
+> _`Central to the change in method is the idea that military operations can become a form of informational operation and seek political rather than specific military outcomes.`_
+
+3.1. Translating the following insights and deductions into applied capability requirements through experimentation and testing will be critical to delivering information advantage. Development activity should be focussed upon the following elements.
+
+#### Cross-cutting elements
+
+a. __Status of information.__ At the strategic level, we should elevate the status of information by positioning it as a national lever of power rather than an underpinning element. At the operational and tactical levels, we should adopt information as a joint function and bring together the separate aspects of information operations and information management. These actions will acknowledge the broader use and potentially shaping nature of informational power. This will include such elements as cyber and electromagnetic activities, security, media communications and intelligence.
+
+b. __Review the levels of warfare.__ Serious consideration must be given to the relevance of the accepted levels of warfare in the context of information advantage, not just for current and future military operations but also for any response to ‘below threshold’ hybrid activity.
+
+c. __Culture.__ We must strive to change our culture and instil an information-centric approach, as part of a whole of government effort alongside our partners and allies. Developing of a conceptual and doctrinal base that puts Information Advantage at the heart of Defence, rather than on the periphery, will help to achieve this.
+
+d. __Embrace technology.__ Rapid developments in data analytics, machine learning, processing power and connectivity, offer the potential to significantly enhance Information Advantage and raise the prospect of sustained initiative. To capitalise on developing information technologies, we must foster as part of a continuous evolution, partnerships with the commercial sector and leverage their expertise.
+
+e. __Training.__ It does not matter how good our equipment or technology is if Defence does not have sufficiently trained, educated and equipped people to exploit it. Individual and collective training must place information advantage at its core.
+
+f. __Recruitment.__ In an immensely competitive market place, Defence must fight to attract and retain people with the right skills to deliver information advantage. Data scientists, security specialists, architects, communicators, software engineers, programmers, bloggers and hackers will all have a place. Diversity of thought and perspective will pay significant dividends.
+
+#### Information as an enabler
+
+a. __Linking data.__ Data, its management, quality and subsequent exploitation, is at the heart of information advantage; we require data that can be understood, manipulated, shared and exploited. We must cohere and align the constituent elements, including allies and partners, to deliver agility and adaptability; vulnerabilities and stove pipes must be ruthlessly eliminated.
+
+b. __Enhance understanding.__ Defence needs a more pervasive and ubiquitous situational awareness capability, at scale and across the full spectrum of activity. Understanding how individuals, groups and organisations interact is vital to shaping perceptions and behaviours; this can be done through the development of an insight, evaluation and measurement (IE&M) model. We must adopt an audience-centric approach and develop an ‘unblinking eye’, focussed on our target audiences.
+
+c. __Information architecture.__ As part of realising information advantage and improve the effectiveness of information as an enabler Defence needs to strengthen its ability to deliver a government-owned open architecture for information. This must define the necessary interfaces and standards and enable delivery teams and suppliers to realise a system-of-systems that enables information advantage – interoperability necessitates it; across domains, systems, Government and allies.
+
+d. __Enhance command and control.__ Today, every action could reach a global audience in near real time – the time to plan and decide is subsequently dramatically reduced. Full-spectrum operations demand a more adaptable multi-level command and control construct, to assess multiple prospective courses of action and enable faster decision-making. A robustly networked collection of command and control nodes, enabling widespread access to, and the sharing of information, would improve interaction and enable the broadest possible distribution of decision rights. A multi-level Defence command and control construct could also be scalable to provide the same function for Government; Defence is well placed to support the development of a national command and control element.
+
+#### Information resilience
+
+a. __Connectivity.__ Assured and secure connectivity could be viewed as the backbone of information advantage. It is essential that resilient communications and systems are interlinked across Defence and Government, and are interoperable with allies, whilst maximising availability and agility.
+
+b. __Communications.__ Multi-path communications can deliver reach and resilience, and enable access to real-time understanding and mission information through a ‘combat cloud’ resource and enhanced secure (and likely mobile) communications across the entire Defence enterprise.
+
+c. __Fused.__ A joint approach with cross-government and commercial partners will be a fundamental element of ensuring the resilience of our operations in an increasingly contested environment. Simple messages, clearly articulated and disseminated regularly increase information integrity, resilience and confidence.
+
+#### Information denial
+
+a. __Deception.__ Deception involves measures designed to mislead adversaries. Information can be used to create deception or as ‘camouflage and concealment’ to support deception. We must strive to understand where we are being deceived and the possible impact of, and counter to, that deception.
+
+b. __Multi-domain denial.__ We need to develop and harness cyber (including electromagnetic), space, maritime, land, and air capabilities that allow us to contest an adversary’s ability to gain information and shape the information that they do gain. We must also degrade their understanding and capability, at a time and in a manner of our choosing.
+
+#### Information as an effecter
+
+a. __Regulations.__ The proliferation of information has outpaced the development of associated rules and regulations. Defence must adapt to catch up in order to better defend its own vulnerabilities and in turn exploit adversary vulnerabilities.
+
+b. __Behavioural analytics.__ This emerging analytical capability looks to deliver a significant capability advantage to Defence. Having greater understanding of how and why individuals and groups behave will enable predictions of how they are likely to act in the future. How information is targeted and projected to have the greatest influence will be central to this capability, which could create operational and strategic effects.
+
+c. __Permissions.__ Within the operational domains, the level of permissions is routinely lowered to enable expeditious action and the seizing of initiative. Effective information activities require a similar degree of delegation albeit central orchestration is required to achieve consistency and to maximise influence. Adopting a more proactive approach to influence the understanding, perceptions and behaviour of specific individuals and groups will require careful consideration of permissions and authorities both within and outside Defence.
+
+d. __Offensive options.__ Our ability to act offensively should be enhanced by adopting a far broader range of conventional and non-conventional options using information. These could include new operational tools such as offensive cyber and information activities.
+
+#### Summary
+
+3.2. If we wish to shape the world, rather than be shaped by it, we need a fundamental shift in the way we think, act and invest. We need a strategic and ‘front-footed’ information advantage posture at the heart of 21st Century deterrence and, more broadly, for achieving better defence and security outcomes for national advantage. And the clock is ticking, as new technology capabilities accelerate and adversaries build skilled human-machine teams to beat us. We need to use information at the heart of a multi-domain approach integrated within a national and partnered endeavour, in a smarter, persistent and more assertive way. Senior leaders and politicians must understand information’s potential for disproportionate influence and success.
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Integrated Operating Concept
+author: UK Ministry of Defence
+date : 2020-09-30 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/vg2ofpz.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "IOpC 2025 introduces the Integrated Operating Framework to a broad audience, but is primarily aimed at the force development and operational communities."
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The strategic context is increasingly complex, dynamic and competitive. We live in an era of strategic competition in which long-held assumptions are challenged daily. Old distinctions between ‘peace’ and ‘war’, between ‘public’ and ‘private’, between ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ and between ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ are increasingly out of date. Our authoritarian rivals see the strategic context as a continuous struggle in which non-military and military instruments are used unconstrained by any distinction between peace and war. These regimes believe that they are already engaged in an intense form of conflict that is predominantly political rather than military. Their strategy of ‘political warfare’ is designed to undermine cohesion, to erode economic, political and social resilience, and to compete for strategic advantage in key regions of the world._
+
+
+
+The Integrated Operating Concept is designed to deal with this challenge. It updates our thinking on deterrence, recognising that our rivals are seeking to win without eliciting a warfighting response. Hence it establishes the need to compete below the threshold of war and it distinguishes between ‘operating’ and ‘warfighting’. It emphasises the importance of integration with allies, of the levers of statecraft, and across the five operational domains – multi-domain integration. This requires a transformation of the military instrument, including the need to structure forces to operate that can be adapted at graduated readiness to warfight while retaining some forces, including the Reserve, that are optimised to warfight. The ability to warfight is fundamental to our credibility. Defence is confronted with two imperatives. We must establish a strategic culture, posture and ‘way of warfare’ that is fit for purpose in this new era of global competition; and we must modernise at the pace of relevance to be able to handle future threats. The Integrated Operating Concept is designed to guide our approach to addressing these challenges in the immediate term and represents a significant shift in military philosophy.
+
+> #### `Ben Wallace, Secretary of State for Defence`
+
+> _`The more competitive age has changed not just the context for operations but their conduct. We must think and act differently. This Integrated Operating Concept is not about what capabilities or structures we require – all too often our focus – but rather how we will be more integrated, active and agile to become truly threat driven and campaigning.`_
+
+The Integrated Operating Concept sets out a new approach to the utility of armed force in an era of strategic competition and a rapidly evolving character of warfare. It represents the most significant change in UK military thought in several generations. It will lead to a fundamental transformation in the military instrument and the way it is used.
+
+
+### The imperative for change
+
+The strategic context is increasingly complex, dynamic and competitive. The UK, our allies and alliances, and the multilateral system that has assured our security and stability for several generations, all face diversifying, intensifying, persistent and proliferating threats, from resurgent and developing powers, and from non-state actors such as violent extremists.
+
+These threats blend old elements – competition for resources, territory and political power – with new approaches. Our rivals engage in a continuous struggle involving all of the instruments of statecraft, ranging from what we call peace to nuclear war. Their strategy of ‘political warfare’ is designed to undermine cohesion, to erode economic, political and social resilience, and to challenge our strategic position in key regions of the world. Their goal is to win without fighting: to achieve their objectives by breaking our willpower, using attacks below the threshold that would prompt a warfighting response. These attacks on our way of life, from assertive authoritarian rivals and extremist ideologies, are remarkably difficult to defeat without undermining the very freedoms we want to protect. We are exposed through our openness.
+
+The pervasiveness of information and the pace of technological change are transforming the character of warfare. Old distinctions between ‘peace’ and ‘war’, between ‘public’ and ‘private’, between ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ and between ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ are increasingly out of date.
+
+Our rivals employ an expanding, diverse and largely unregulated set of information tools to influence target audiences’ attitudes, beliefs and behaviours. These weapons are increasingly employed above and below the threshold of war. They challenge international norms and restrict our response options. They work in the seams of our institutions, exacerbate societal divisions and prejudices, and lead people to cooperate, wittingly or unwittingly, in the undermining of democracy.
+
+The triumph of the narrative increasingly determines defeat or victory and hence the importance of information operations. They can be used to support conventional military operations and those utilising proxies and deniable para-military forces, military coercion, offensive cyber operations, and of course lawfare. Established techniques, such as assassination, deception, economic coercion, espionage, theft of intellectual property and subversion gain potency through the clever use of cyber, digitised information and social media. Psychological insights into how these channels can be manipulated enhance their effectiveness.
+
+The combined effect is designed to force a rival to become politically cowed, thus achieving objectives without the need to escalate above the threshold of war. Operations previously considered merely as ‘shaping’ can now be ‘decisive’. Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014 provides a stark case study in which a fait accompli strategy changed facts on the ground below the threshold at which a warfighting response would be triggered.
+
+__`Militias in Crimea`__
+
+_`Following the ousting of the Ukrainian President in early 2014 and the establishment of a pro-Western interim government, Russia moved quickly to regain an influence in the country. Whilst strategic communications were focused on discrediting the new government, specialist military forces wearing unmarked clothing were covertly moved into Crimea. They began supporting and training separatist movements in the region under a cloak of ambiguity, allowing the Russian authorities to deny any responsibility and claim they were ethnic-Russian nationalist militia. Using this tactic they were able to coordinate street protests and encourage demonstrations that amplified the strategic messaging of an illegitimate Ukrainian government. Ultimately, this activity affected the perceptions and beliefs of the local population, Ukrainian leadership and the international community, allowing strategic objectives to be swiftly achieved following the deployment of conventional military forces.`_
+
+The pace of technological change and proliferation is rapidly broadening and deepening the threat spectrum. As evidenced in Syria and Iraq, commercial technologies have disrupted the economics and character of warfare. They are – increasingly – cheaper, faster, lighter, smaller and stealthier. They offer a persistent and pervasive presence in the battlespace. They are readily available in large numbers and at low cost.
+
+Such capabilities sit alongside more sophisticated traditional weapons available to well-resourced states, as well as threats from cyber and space. These high-end rivals continue to develop increasingly sophisticated military capabilities. Many have modernised and expanded their capability, as well as proliferating it to their proxies, to challenge us above and below the threshold of war, looking to counter the advantages we have enjoyed for the last 30 years such as air superiority, strategic mobility and unconstrained use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Additionally, the challenge to nuclear stability is growing. Existing nuclear states are modernising their strategic capabilities and limited tactical nuclear weapons are a credible operational consideration for some. Nor do weapons of mass effect reside exclusively in the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) spheres, but extend to the cyber domain and throughout the electromagnetic spectrum.
+
+As we look further ahead, into the next decade, the combination by then of proven technologies such as pervasive availability of data via enhanced cloud connectivity, machine learning and artificial intelligence, and quantum computing will allow not just a new generation of weapons systems but an entirely new way of warfare. A mix of crewed, uncrewed and autonomous systems look set to make a step change in lethality and utility. The pervasive nature of data – private, commercial, governmental and military combined – gathered from constellations of sensors and crunched at speed by artificial intelligence, will make it extremely hard to hide today’s military signature anywhere on the globe.
+
+Expensive, crewed platforms that we cannot replace and can ill afford to lose will be increasingly vulnerable to swarms of self-coordinating smart munitions – perhaps arriving at hypersonic speeds or ballistically from space – designed to swamp defences already weakened by pre-emptive cyberattack. The economics of warfare are changing the balance between platforms and weapons, and between crewed and uncrewed systems. In short, we face an inflection point between the Industrial Age and the Information Age – Defence will need to take the initiative if it is to retain its competitive edge.
+
+The old distinction between foreign and domestic defence is increasingly irrelevant. When ‘fake news’ appears to originate not abroad but at home, it gains credibility and reach, stoking confusion, disagreement, division and doubt in our societies. This has been particularly evident with the significant uptick in disinformation and misinformation during the coronavirus crisis. ‘Home’ is no longer a secure sanctuary whence we may choose to launch interventions unhindered. ‘Away’ is no longer a regional horizon but a global one, involving space and the electromagnetic spectrum. Similarly, the ‘front’ no longer lies in some distant theatre of operations, but is within the port, airfield, or barracks. It sits across the electromagnetic spectrum; it is in space and inside our networks; it is already loitering in our supply chains. Sub-threshold operations are continuously executed at reach by malign actors who seek to undermine our military readiness, our critical national infrastructure, our economy, our alliances and our way of life. This raises questions about military resilience, particularly in our strategic base, and this has been brought sharply into focus by the coronavirus.
+
+Our rivals, in short, use an array of capabilities, including their militaries, below the threshold of war and in ways outside of our legal and political norms. They have proven themselves willing and increasingly able to confront us at home and away, and to operate with freedom throughout the spectrum, from peace up to the threshold of war. In this highly dynamic and fluid security context we cannot remain reactive in our processes, capability development, and – most importantly – in our approach to using the military instrument. And the threat of unwarranted escalation leading to miscalculation is clear and present. We must acknowledge that we are in a state of strategic competition, which can veer to confrontation, and as the threats and opportunities continue to evolve, so too must we. More of the same will not be enough.
+
+__`Malicious cyber campaigns`__
+
+_`In December 2018 the UK and its allies announced that a group known as APT10 had acted on behalf of the Chinese Ministry of State Security to carry out a malicious cyber campaign against Europe, Asia and the United States (US), named Cloud Hopper. This group was almost certainly responsible for a campaign of activity against managed information technology service providers, which targeted global companies within the health care, defence and aerospace sectors. This gave the group potential access to sensitive commercial information for the likely purpose of intellectual property theft and subsequent exploitation. Capable actors are increasingly tailoring their tactics to evade security tooling, as illustrated in the compromise of Solarwinds Orion enterprise security software suite in 2020. In this case, actors modified a software update which was then installed by thousands of clients globally across a range of sectors, then subsequently exploited them using tailored and sophisticated techniques.`_
+
+
+### How we respond
+
+Our response starts by recognising that we need a more active approach to deterrence when confronted with rivals who seek to defeat us without inducing a warfighting response. This must acknowledge that while the character of warfare is changing, the nature of war does not change, it is always about the violent interaction between people. Our response will be integrated, and it will require significant modernisation, for the pace of technological change means we must move from an Industrial Age of platforms to an Information Age of systems.
+
+We will continue to resource our strengths.
+
+a. __The quality of our people__ enables our adaptive edge, and by moving beyond a ‘closed-loop, base-fed approach’ we will have a better chance of accessing the best talent and skills.
+
+b. __Allies, partners and NATO__ remain central to the pursuit of our strategic ends. It is the only Alliance that can generate sufficient mass and integrate the conventional and nuclear forces capable of credibly deterring the most dangerous threats to our security. But the centrality of NATO does not mean ‘NATO only’. We must look beyond NATO to other alliances and partnerships, giving real meaning to interoperability and burden sharing and constructing our campaigns with allies in mind.
+
+c. __Innovation and experimentation__ enable modernisation and while we have access to world-class science and technology capabilities, we must recognise that the engine room for innovation often lies outside of government. We need to create a systematic programme in which military professionals can air operational challenges with industry, technologists and academia to determine the most appropriate mix of technologies to provide our future competitive edge.
+
+d. __Respect for the rules, conventions and protocols of war__ are a centre of gravity which must be protected. But the pace of technological change and the blurring of ‘peace’ and ‘war’ means that our legal, ethical and moral framework needs updating to deny our rivals the opportunity to undermine our values.
+
+e. __Integrated action__ is a doctrine that requires commanders to think beyond the enemy and consider the additional effects that need to be applied to the many other actors (particularly local populations) who are relevant to the achievement of the objective, before orchestrating the appropriate mix of physical, virtual and cognitive actions. Importantly information advantage enables improved understanding, assessment, decision-making and execution.
+
+
+### Integrated for advantage
+
+The central idea of the Integrated Operating Concept is to drive the conditions and tempo of strategic activity, rather than responding to the actions of others from a static, home-based posture of contingent response. This means employing the military instrument to compete below the threshold of war, gaining advantage through offering a wider breadth of political choice and credible military options that can be threatened or used to break the will of our rivals. But maximising advantage will only be realised through being more integrated: within the military instrument, vertically through the levels of warfare – strategic, operational and tactical; across government and with our allies; and in depth within our societies. Cohesion, trust, shared values, social habits and behaviour all form vital lines of defence against our adversaries’ sub-threshold attacks on our societies and decision-making. On the new sub-threshold battlefield, assuring societal resilience constitutes deterrence by denial.
+
+We need to create multiple dilemmas that unhinge a rival’s understanding, decision-making and execution. This requires a different way of thinking that shifts our behaviour, processes and structures to become more dynamic and pre-emptive, information-led and selectively ambiguous. In essence, a mindset and posture of continuous campaigning in which all activity, including training and exercising, will have an operational end. This suggests our posture will be:
+
+- __Integrated across all five operational domains__ – space; cyber and electromagnetic; maritime; air; and land. This ‘multi-domain integration’ will change the way we operate and warfight, and the way we develop capability. We are moving beyond ‘joint’. Integration is now needed at the tactical level of war – not just at the operational level where the term ‘joint’ applies. Effective integration of space, cyber and electromagnetic, maritime, air, and land achieves a multi-domain effect that adds up to far more than simply the sum of the parts – recognising that the overall effect is only as powerful as the strength of the weakest domain.
+
+- __Integrated nationally__ as part of cross-government and broader national integration. Comprehensive integration acts as a force-multiplier of all the instruments of national power. We need a mindset that magnifies the employment of the military instrument as part of a ‘total’ national enterprise involving industry, academia and civil society.
+
+- __Engaged internationally__ to enhance our understanding and help pre-empt strategic threats, to detect and attribute hostile state actors and to seize strategic opportunities. This will enhance our capacity to operate below the threshold of war. This will necessitate Defence actively exporting the UK ‘brand’ to project global influence and promote (and protect) prosperity. It also requires us to become ‘allied by design’ to improve interoperability and burden share more effectively, thus amplifying our weight and mass, particularly through NATO.
+
+- __More assertive__ to demonstrate our Defence and national resilience globally; to demonstrate our political will and lethal and non-lethal capability to confront threats early, to present our adversaries with multiple dilemmas to enhance our deterrence posture, and to be poised to seize opportunities. It will require greater investment in research and development and exploitation of the UK’s science and technology base with the deliberate energy and common purpose previously reserved for ‘wartime’. Key to all this will be a renewed focus on the resilience, readiness, reach and responsiveness that enables us to withstand shocks and assures our capacity to operate and warfight.
+
+- __Continuously hunting for and exploiting information to fuel information advantage__ – the competitive edge that underpins integration. At the heart of this is data: collected by the internet of things; hosted by the cloud; automated by robotic processing; and applied by artificial intelligence.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 1 – Multi-domain integration goes beyond ‘joint’ and adds up to far more than the sum of the parts_
+
+
+_▲ Figure 2 – The military instrument must be integrated within a total national enterprise_
+
+
+### Delivering the concept: the conceptual component
+
+The character of the strategic context requires a strategic response that integrates all of the instruments of statecraft: defence, diplomacy, development, intelligence and security, and trade policy. A credible capability to deter war remains central to our military purpose. In an era of strategic competition our deterrent posture needs to be more actively managed and modulated, necessitating the introduction of a fifth ‘C’ – that of competition – to the traditional deterrence model of comprehension, credibility, capability and communication. This recognises the need for more active deterrence: which includes a more competitive posture and way of operating to better compete below the threshold of war in order to deter war, and to prevent our adversaries from achieving their objectives in fait accompli strategies.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 3 – Competition – the fifth ‘C’ of deterrence_
+
+Competing involves a campaign posture that includes continuous operating on our terms and in places of our choosing. It will also require actions to be communicated in ways that may test the traditional limits of statecraft. The willingness to commit decisively hard capability with the credibility to warfight is an essential part of the ability to operate and therefore of deterrence. They are not mutually exclusive.
+
+The Integrated Operating Concept is therefore based on a new conceptual framework – the Integrated Operating Framework – to differentiate military activity between ‘operate’ and ‘warfight’.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 4 – The Integrated Operating Framework_
+
+Operating includes the complementary functions of protect, engage and constrain.
+
+#### Protect
+
+Protect is the enduring foundation to both operate and warfight, and it is fundamental to deterrence and denial. Protect is focused on the UK, our Overseas Territories and the Crown Dependencies. Its purpose is to prevent modern threats exploiting our vulnerabilities. It encompasses: hardening Defence’s critical infrastructure and contributing to the resilience of critical national infrastructure; sustaining the continuous at sea deterrent; countering air, maritime and cyber incursions; and reinforcing and enabling civil authorities in countering terrorism and in civil emergencies.
+
+As the nature, reach and persistence of the threats that adversaries can bring to bear against the home base have radically evolved, our contribution to domestic security and resilience is likely to increase in scale and importance. The coronavirus pandemic has demonstrated the essential contribution of an adaptable and skilled Defence workforce to other government departments during a period of national and global crisis. It has also highlighted that natural hazards and other risks can cause as much disruption to the UK’s core interests as security threats. We will therefore need to be able to respond rapidly to a wide range of national and overseas events and crises from environmental hazards through to malicious attacks by terrorists or states, including CBRN incidents. Indeed, extreme threats to the UK and our allies have not gone away. Meeting these challenges will require us to mitigate Defence’s own vulnerabilities, and to recognise the critical role of protect is not just enabling Defence’s freedom of action but is contributing to maintaining our way of life – as such, it is non-discretionary.
+
+#### Engage
+
+Engage is founded on a forward deployed posture to assure influence, to deter and to reassure. Activities that establish and maintain the human networks, enhanced through digital connectivity, are the foundation on which posture is established and are at the heart of engage. Our global military footprint is an expression of our international and alliance resolve and can be modulated and enhanced through a blend of Defence attachés, strategic hubs, permanently forward-based forces and stockpiles, episodic training and exercises, and mobile command and control nodes. Building partner capacity through train, advise and assist operations strengthens coalitions, enhances regional security and provides an alternative to the offers of our rivals, by securing influence and denying it to them. Engage also involves developing appropriate channels of communication with rivals to build understanding, avoid miscalculation and to underscore credibility. All engage activities should contribute to insight and understanding.
+
+As with protect and constrain, engage is not an isolated or sequential activity within a linear model. It is an enduring function to pursue our foreign policy objectives and shape conditions for stability and is therefore a critical component of how the force will operate. It requires a longer-term campaigning mindset focused more on posture and the use of the force as part of an overall operational design; thus, securing the political and policy permissions to achieve desired effects will be vital. Persistent engagement, prioritised in places where we can achieve impact against prominent challenges, will increase our ability to pre-empt and manage crises before they escalate and minimise the opportunities for state and non-state actors to undermine international stability.
+
+__`Countering violent extremist organisations in Africa, 2020`__
+
+_`To foster cooperation and enable stabilisation across North and West Africa, the UK participates in an annual exercise in the region that is focused on tackling violent extremist organisations (VEO). Led by the US and involving in excess of 1500 personnel from more than 30 African and partner nations, the UK Armed Forces makes a significant contribution to training, advising and assisting across a spectrum of activities. Areas of focus include developing the command and control of operations, improving tactical skills and enhancing intelligence sharing between nations. A sustained approach to training and advising in this way builds the capacity of African nations to counter the threat, thereby reducing sanctuary and support for VEOs. At the same time it increases the ability of UK forces to integrate with all participating nations, which provides the opportunity to build stronger networks and a forum for better understanding for all.`_
+
+Our effectiveness will be enhanced by driving the tempo of strategic activity in a sustained, dynamic, calibrated approach that is integrated with other government departments and the international engagement networks of our allies. Persistent engagement will enable a fusion of real time, accurate understanding to inform the development of options, decision-making and influence, and will help us to achieve strategic advantage. Overall, enhanced presence and greater commitment will strengthen our partnerships and create the unity which our adversaries fear. It will contribute to trade and prosperity, deter adversaries and reassure our allies.
+
+#### Constrain
+
+Constrain is the most proactive and assertive element of the model. It may involve the use of force, for example, by escalating beyond training, advising and assisting to accompanying partners to enable them to act offensively; restricting a rival’s choice of action by deploying armed forces or strategic effects to demonstrate reach and responsiveness; shaping an adversary’s behaviour through covert and overt activity; contesting the cyber domain to protect our networks; challenging assertions of sovereignty through deployments and freedom of navigation operations that aim to constrain fait accompli strategies; and prevent an adversary from achieving escalation dominance. The potential level of intensity and violence encountered mean that constrain operations may well involve combat operations and require nuanced judgements about risk.
+
+The intensity at which constrain activity takes place will not be fixed. It will be modulated in relation to the nature of the broader relationship that the UK has with our rivals at any one time. Constrain will require us to demonstrate the will and capability – lethal and non-lethal – to confront threats early. Only through a more confident, consistent and active approach will we enhance deterrence and be able to seize opportunities as they arise. This will a require a force that is agile, resilient and ‘front-footed’ in mindset and posture. And we will be more effective as part of an integrated wider government approach to addressing conflict and instability, and alongside allies and partners where we can present adversaries with multiple dilemmas to shape and alter their decision calculus. The credibility of constrain activity will at times require us to operate with our partners in hostile environments to counter and deny state and non-state threats. It must therefore be underpinned by the will and capability to reconfigure, surge and apply hard power when the threat demands it.
+
+The protect, engage and constrain functions are interdependent and must not be thought of as a linear progression. Their successful application requires a mindset that thinks in several dimensions so that escalation and de-escalation is dynamically managed up and down multiple ladders and across domains. One might actively constrain in the cyber domain to protect physical infrastructure in the space domain. The primary aim is to orchestrate effects and modulate activities to deter rivals and de-escalate to keep the competition below the threshold of war.
+
+#### Warfight
+
+Warfighting is an escalation from operating and is a tool of last resort. It is characterised as a contest between the regular armed forces of states, including irregular elements. Distinct from combat operations within ‘operate’, warfighting demands an appetite for significant political and military risk and financial commitment. It is a highly resource-intensive activity with often protracted and unrestrained violence. In its ultimate form, warfighting requires the full resources of the state. Warfighting will also be subject to a distinctive legal framework, including international conventions and the Law of Armed Conflict. The ability and willingness to commit hard capability to fighting wars, up to and including declared war in a NATO Article 5 context, is the foundation of our influence and deterrence. Above all we must never lose sight of always being prepared to fight the war we might have to fight. History may not repeat itself, but it does have a rhythm. And invariably the enemy ensures that we don’t get a choice.
+
+The consequences of warfighting can be politically, physically and psychologically costly – decisively so. We should therefore seek to warfight in ways that alters this calculus such as securing decisive outcomes at greater reach across all domains; use of a very different balance of human-machine teams; and constantly searching for opportunities to de-escalate to a favourable sub-threshold status. And warfighting will never be a stand-alone activity; it will always be concurrent with the operate functions. Even in the case of large-scale conventional warfare, military activities of a highly irregular variety are also likely to be prosecuted. Belligerents will shift back and forth in modes of warfare as their circumstances require.
+
+An important and complicating feature of conflict is the relationship between strategic and nuclear thresholds; they are no longer synonymous. Some states are now significantly increasing and diversifying their nuclear arsenals. They are integrating nuclear weapons into their military strategies, threatening to use nuclear capabilities below the strategic threshold to gain advantage over the UK or its allies in a conventional conflict either through coercion or action.
+
+In parallel, the increase in global competition and proliferation of disruptive and often dual-use technologies expands the range of options to achieve strategic effect such as long-range precision strike weapons; offensive cyber operations; information operations; artificial intelligence; and weapons aimed at degrading space-based infrastructure. These non-nuclear capabilities increasingly share traditionally highly compartmentalised nuclear warning, surveillance and communications systems, and blur the increasingly complex interface between conventional and nuclear conflict. They have the potential to threaten strategic stability through miscalculation and rapid escalation, or by offering incentives to move first and fast in a high-end conventional fight.
+
+Both elements introduce more complex routes for escalation, across the threshold of war and to the nuclear threshold. In response, we must improve our ability to manage and de-escalate a multi-domain crisis in which there will be asymmetries of capabilities, domains and interests. This will require us to be better able to detect, understand, attribute and act in response to aggression across the full range of possible threats. Exercising whole-of-government responses alongside NATO and like-minded partners will be a vital part of improving understanding and addressing the challenges of managing conflict escalation.
+
+
+### Delivering the concept: the physical component
+
+It is clearly not possible to immediately abandon the current force structure and create a bespoke one from scratch. Important operations continue, legacy programmes and platforms retain utility. We must mobilise to better mitigate today’s challenges, improving readiness and enhancing resilience, while also modernising the force to meet the threats of the 2030s and transforming our culture to become constantly adaptive. Any decisions and actions taken now must take account of the force we need in the future and be aligned with the guiding principles of what the future force must be able to do. As we develop what will be the Future Operating Concept for this force, trend analysis suggests that it will involve an intense competition between hiding and finding, thus it will:
+
+- Have smaller and faster capabilities to avoid detection;
+
+- Trade reduced physical protection for increased mobility;
+
+- Rely more heavily on low-observable and stealth technologies;
+
+- Depend increasingly on electronic warfare and passive deception measures to gain and maintain information advantage;
+
+- Include a mix of crewed, uncrewed and autonomous platforms;
+
+- Be integrated into ever more sophisticated networks of systems through a combat cloud that makes best use of the mass of data;
+
+- Have an open systems architecture that enables the rapid incorporation of new capability, and rapid integration into the network;
+
+- Be markedly less dependent on fossil fuels and be more self sufficient;
+
+- Employ non-line-of-sight fires to exploit the advantages we gain from information advantage; and
+
+- Emphasise the non-lethal disabling of enemy capabilities, thereby increasing the range of political and strategic options.
+
+We might think of these as ‘sunrise’ capabilities, with the corollary being ‘sunset’ capabilities that could be used for a while in the emerging operating environment but will increasingly become too vulnerable or redundant in the Information Age. This modernisation will require us to embrace combinations of information-centric technologies to achieve the disruptive effect we need. Predicting these combinations will be challenging. We will have to take risk, accept some failure and place emphasis on experimentation by allocating resources, force structure, training and exercise activity to stimulate innovation in all lines of development, with a responsive commercial function at the leading edge. This will enable adaptive exploitation as opportunities become clear.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+The Integrated Operating Concept calls into question the traditional approach that structured the armed forces to warfight and adapted them for all other missions. We now need to structure forces to operate that can be adapted at graduated readiness to warfight while retaining some forces, including the Reserve, that are optimised to warfight. Distinguishing in this way between operating and warfighting represents a fundamental shift in military philosophy. It requires us to think very differently about the employment of the military instrument as a more active approach to deterrence; and it establishes the doctrine needed to compete decisively with our adversaries who do not distinguish between peace and war.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2020-12-02-multi-domain-integration-jcn-1-20.md b/_collections/_hkers/2020-12-02-multi-domain-integration-jcn-1-20.md
new file mode 100644
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Multi-Domain Integration
+author: UK Ministry of Defence
+date : 2020-12-02 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/unhw6ww.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Joint Concept Note 1/20 is primarily orientated towards developing the idea of integration within Defence but acknowledges it relies on the will of the Whole Force, partners across government, private sector and multinational elements."
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The Information Age has been upon us for some time but we, in UK Defence, remain configured for joint operations more suited to an era of industrial warfare. Our adversaries have developed counter strategies from studying the Western way of warfare. They engage in a continuous struggle using cyber and information combined with all other instruments of statecraft – ‘political warfare’ – with the goal of winning without fighting. This has stretched our understanding of the definition of warfare well beyond the narrow boundaries within which our traditional approach can hope to succeed._
+
+
+
+Our response is to pursue integration – as joint is no longer enough. This is not simply a case of making Defence a little more connected by incorporating activity in the space and the cyber and electromagnetic domains – it is far more significant. To better compete with our adversaries in this era of persistent competition we must be able to operate and war fight in a way that generates advantage through being better integrated across three levels of warfare and all five operational domains: maritime, land, air, space, and cyber and electromagnetic. This multi-domain integration (MDI) will change the way we operate and war fight, and the way we develop capability. Effective integration of the domains will achieve a multi-domain effect that adds up to far more than simply the sum of the parts. This integrated force must also be fused across government and interoperable with principal allies.
+
+Integrating by instinct and by design will allow us to draw on as many effective capabilities as possible, including non-military, to apply combinations the adversary doesn’t expect or cannot guard against. We must inculcate an instinctive inclination to survey all the domains and intervene where we choose in pursuance of our given objectives.
+
+There is no fixed route to a known MDI destination, so this concept provides a headmark to allow us to explore and develop our MDI ambition. In so doing, we will have to take risk, accept some failure and place emphasis on experimentation, training and operations to stimulate innovation in all lines of development. We will adopt an iterative approach, moving quickly where possible, and learning by doing.
+
+
+### Purpose
+
+The principal purpose of Joint Concept Note (JCN) 1/20, Multi-Domain Integration is to provide the UK interpretation of multi-domain integration (MDI). It is an exploratory concept that offers an ambitious vision for maintaining advantage in an era of persistent competition. However, it is not possible with current means and the journey towards realising the vision, which we have already started, needs to be tested. This JCN therefore informs the Defence Experimentation Pathway and should undergo formal review within 12 months of being published. This allows the evidence base to be considered and an iterative conceptual approach towards MDI to be developed.
+
+
+### Context
+
+This concept is founded on the Integrated Operating Concept 2025. It focuses on how to integrate across the domains and levels of warfare and provides a vision for the development of an integrated force out to 2030 and beyond. It does so in the context of integration with partners across government, the private sector and allies. Being integrated across all five domains – maritime, land, air, space, and cyber and electromagnetic – and at every level of warfare will change the way we fight and the way we develop capability. We are moving beyond ‘joint’ to an era when modern manoeuvre in any domain will be enabled by effects from all domains. This integrated force must also be integrated nationally and with our key allies and partners.
+
+
+### Aim
+
+This concept has four specific aims. These are to:
+
+- Define the UK interpretation for applying MDI beyond the current force to deliver advantage over our adversaries out to 2030 and beyond;
+
+- Outline how Defence can achieve integration across the domains and levels of warfare in the context of integration with allies, partners across government and the private sector;
+
+- Present the policy question of our level of ambition for MDI; and
+
+- Provide a catalyst for Defence experimentation across concept, capability and warfare development.
+
+
+### Structure
+
+JCN 1/20 is divided into four chapters and one annex.
+
+__[Chapter 1 – Responding to the challenge.](#responding-to-the-challenge)__ Chapter 1 examines the problem presented by our adversaries and proposes a response constructed around MDI.
+
+__[Chapter 2 – Domains and environments.](#domains-and-environments)__ Chapter 2 re-conceptualises our understanding of the domains and environments in the context of MDI.
+
+__[Chapter 3 – The core tenets.](#the-core-tenets)__ Chapter 3 introduces, expands and explains the four core tenets of MDI: information advantage, strategically postured, configured for the environments and creating and exploiting synergy.
+
+__[Chapter 4 – Force development implications.](#force-development-implications)__ Chapter 4 considers the implications of developing MDI through the prism of the joint functions, offering insights to how command and control, intelligence, fires, manoeuvre, outreach, information, support and resilience interplay in achieving MDI. It examines risks including the balance between ambition and vulnerabilities.
+
+__[Annex A - MDI specialisation.](#mdi-specialisation)__ Annex A suggests how specialisations within Defence can evolve to meet the orchestration element of MDI.
+
+
+### Assumptions
+
+This JCN is based on the following assumptions.
+
+a. MDI applies across the operate and war fight spectrum of the Integrated Operating Concept 2025.
+
+b. Russia is our primary adversary and pacing threat. Albeit in an era of persistent competition we face an array of state and non-state threats.
+
+c. The UK will be allied by design and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains central to the pursuit of our strategic ends.
+
+d. Partners across government are amenable to integrating in the way proposed. This is a critical assumption without which MDI will not be achievable.
+
+e. Interoperability with the United States is achievable.
+
+f. Experimentation and testing of the ideas in this concept are essential. We must iterate our way forward through evidence and judgement.
+
+
+### Audience
+
+This JCN seeks to inform a wide audience. It is primarily orientated towards developing the idea of integration within Defence but acknowledges it relies on the will of the Whole Force, partners across government, private sector and multinational elements. It is therefore intended to be circulated widely but will need to be complemented by a bespoke primer for non-Defence readers.
+
+
+### Linkages
+
+JCN 1/20 is underpinned by a number of publications and key documents that provide key linkages, greater detail and broader context to this publication. These include:
+
+- Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine, 6th Edition;
+
+- Joint Doctrine Note X/20, Integrated Action;
+
+- Integrated Operating Concept 2025;
+
+- JCN 1/17, Future Force Concept;
+
+- JCN 2/17, Future of Command and Control;
+
+- JCN 1/18, Human-Machine Teaming;
+
+- JCN 2/18, Information Advantage;
+
+- JCN 2/20, Future Electromagnetic Activities;
+
+- Global Strategic Trends – The Future Starts Today; and
+
+- Five Eyes Future Operating Environment 2040.
+
+
+## Responding to the challenge
+
+> #### `Prime Minister Boris Johnson Launching the Integrated Review, February 2020`
+
+> _`But we cannot rest on our laurels. We must do more to adapt. We will be judged by how we respond to the opportunities ahead.`_
+
+_Multi-domain integration is the posturing of military capabilities in concert with other instruments of national power, allies and partners; configured to sense, understand and orchestrate effects at the optimal tempo, across the operational domains and levels of warfare._
+
+1.1. This chapter describes the threat we face from adversaries and the challenges and opportunities afforded by technological advancement. It considers how our allies are answering these challenges and concludes by proposing that multi-domain integration (MDI) is part of the UK response to being ‘integrated for advantage’.
+
+
+### Section 1 – The threat
+
+1.2. __Adversary threat in general.__ The UK faces threats from resurgent and developing powers, state and non-state actors, and violent extremism. A strategy of ‘political warfare’ is being used by our pacing threat (Russia), which is designed to undermine our cohesion, erode economic, political and social resilience, and challenge our strategic position in key regions of the world. The strategy does not distinguish between peace and war; for them the landscape is characterised by a continuous struggle involving all the instruments of statecraft. Their goal is to achieve their objectives below what we call war. Our deterrence, in combination with allies, is not symmetrical with this way and is only partly effective against it.
+
+1.3. __Adversary systems thinking.__ The Western way of war in recent decades has been observed and studied by our main adversaries. They have concluded there is a need to counter advanced opponents by exploiting vulnerabilities in information and communications systems. Russia, China, Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) all emphasise superiority in information as critical to success. They use it to deceive, confuse, disrupt, divide, influence and ultimately defeat an adversary with superior conventional forces. Systems thinking is very prominent in adversary designs. It aims to exploit vulnerabilities in the interdependent systems of their opponents to minimise their technical advantage; in effect, to attack our cohesion.
+
+1.4. __Adversary multi-domain capability.__ Neither Russian, Chinese, Iranian nor the DPRK doctrine contains explicit multi-domain references. But, their absence in written theory does not mean an absence of multi-domain thinking and practice. It is possible to infer a multi-domain practice, particularly with Russia and China, from these nations’ actions and force structures. Russian and Chinese military thinking acknowledges the value of non-military measures for creating a desired effect in support of military plans. In the Russian case, this is reflected in departments and agencies falling within the defence establishment, including organisations responsible for humanitarian aid and exploiting broader civilian business activity overseas. So, while our principal adversaries do not have direct multi-domain equivalent concepts, they are already interoperating military and non-military capabilities and operating with freedom across the domains, both home and away.
+
+__`Russian multi-sphere operations`__
+
+_`In August 2020, Russia conducted an exercise in its Central Military District that gave insight into its version of MDI. The exercise was a test of command and control in forming flexible force groupings to repel a global strike from an adversary through a multi-sphere operation (mnogosfernoy operatsii), as reported in an article in the Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer (Military Industrial Courier) on 25 August 2020. The exercise involved motorised, armoured, air, unmanned aerial vehicle, air defence, missile, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) and electronic warfare force elements working in support of each other in a defensive action, particularly testing command and control arrangements. According to the Russian journal, electronic warfare penetrated deep into enemy air defence systems and physical targets including enemy command and control systems. This exercise underlines that Russia can use an effective range of capabilities across multiple domains at the tactical level, noting that such a capability will be employed as part of a wider spectrum of non-military measures. (‘Russian Armed Forces Test Multi-Domain Operations’, Roger McDermott)`_
+
+1.5. __Sub-threshold challenge.__ Sophisticated operations that target systems can be combined with more conventional military operations such as proxies, coercion, offensive cyber and lawfare. The result is a way in war that leads to objectives being achieved without the need to escalate above the threshold of armed conflict. Additionally, they are executed in such a way that would disrupt our systems in the early stages of any conflict; thereby turning ‘shaping’ operations into ‘decisive’ ones. The experience gained in exploiting cyber, electromagnetic and information technologies in recent conflicts has provided Russia and China with these obvious start points, as well as a head start for any potential future conflict with the UK.
+
+1.6. __Differing problem sets.__ In developing a multi-domain approach, there is a need to consider the geostrategic differences in relation to our adversaries. Russia is a land power and is weighted in that domain. In competition and armed conflict with Russia, the large continental land mass affects the MDI requirement as does the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) considerable geostrategic land depth to Russia’s west. In contrast, a confrontation with China is likely to be centred on the air and maritime domains, emphasised by new capabilities on the island chains and the relative lack of Western strategic depth. Thus, there are choices about our multi-domain composition depending on who we expect to compete alongside and against.
+
+
+### Section 2 – Technological developments
+
+1.7. __New technological possibilities.__ The pace of technological advancement has been, and remains, a driver for change. New technologies that combine processing power, connectivity, automation, quantum computing, machine learning and artificial intelligence will allow not just a new generation of weapons systems but new ways in war. It will allow the processing and analysis of large amounts of data, together with the generation of a near complete picture of the environment and activity within each domain, at all levels of warfare. It will become harder to hide significant military signatures anywhere on the globe. A mix of manned, unmanned and autonomous systems will bring a further change in lethality and utility whilst hypersonics, layered systems of ballistic and long-range missiles and counter-space capabilities will continue to extend the competitive space.
+
+1.8. __Precision effects.__ The passing of the Industrial Age of warfare has brought a shift of emphasis in which static concentrations of fielded forces are more vulnerable in light of the increased range and accuracy of modern weapons and sensors. The domains of space, and cyber and electromagnetic, although mostly unseen, are already part of the competitive battlespace; more of the contest is virtual and involves information. Well-connected, and continually evolving, systems and networks will therefore be the key enablers in delivering precision, timing and especially targeted audience effect.
+
+1.9. __Blurred boundaries.__ The range and speed of these new munitions and non-munitions ‘fires’ combined with improvements in detection through visual, electromagnetic, acoustic and other signatures means the traditional boundaries between land, maritime and air forces have become blurred or non-existent. For example, it might be possible in some cases to achieve sea denial of a maritime environment through land-based long-range systems; the same could apply in reverse. In such scenarios, single Services may be primarily focused on creating integrated effects in other domains.
+
+1.10. __Time compression.__ The expanded battlespace amplifies the importance of timing because geography is less limiting. Whereas troops in close contact battles will typically have the same immediate time horizons as before, there is likely to be less time at the higher levels than there used to be. This will require re-evaluation of those traditional rhythms of military activity used for planning and executing operations; particularly when integrated with our partners across government and other actors. There is a requirement to be more dynamic, pre-emptive and, where necessary, selectively ambiguous.
+
+
+### Section 3 – Our allies
+
+1.11. __United States.__ The United States (US) Army published a multi-domain operations concept in December 2018. It identified that its adversaries had developed lethal and non-lethal capabilities that have expanded the battlespace in time and physical space, particularly through enhanced anti-access and area denial (A2AD) systems. The US Army designed a response to contest adversary activity more effectively sub-threshold and to be better placed to cross into, and back from, armed conflict. Whilst these challenges are fully recognised within the context of the US Army, UK MDI is not a copy of the US Army concept. Taking account of the differences in scale and geostrategic ambition, this joint concept note (JCN) is closer to the US Joint Staff global integration idea which focuses on trans-regional, all domain, multifunctional integration.
+
+1.12. __North Atlantic Treaty Organization.__ A NATO-led multi-domain concept is currently being developed, but the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept recognises the same condition of persistent competition as the UK and also identifies the same main threats, which are global in nature. NATO’s ‘shape, contest, fight’ framework reflects the need to contest on a daily basis and seeks to refocus towards a multi-domain approach.
+
+
+### Section 4 – Regaining advantage
+
+1.13. The UK must respond to the actions of our adversaries and the new possibilities afforded by technology. More military formations, platforms and long-range systems than our adversaries cannot realistically be acquired. Instead, the UK should increase the range of capabilities that can be brought to bear beyond maritime, land and air force deployments, including non-military capabilities, and synchronise their employment for best overall impact.
+
+1.14. __Relationship with the Integrated Operating Concept 2025 and integrated action.__ The Integrated Operating Concept 2025 (IOpC 25) introduces the central idea of being integrated for advantage. This advantage comes from being integrated across government, integrated with allies and integrated across the domains and levels of warfare as illustrated in Figure 1.1. Integrated action is the newest tenet of UK capstone doctrine and addresses this integration challenge to ensure the military instrument delivers its contribution to national objectives. MDI, the focus of this JCN, will amplify and help to optimise integrated action. MDI and the integrated force developed must also be integrated nationally and with allies and partners.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 1.1 – Integrated for advantage_
+
+1.15. __Fusion across government.__ Everything Defence does should be in support of the overall national objectives and be integrated within the fusion doctrine framework of National Security Strategy Implementation Groups. Orchestration of military strategic effects (OMSE) describes how Defence delivers its outputs in support of these national objectives as either a supporting or supported actor to other departments of government. This JCN recognises these relationships and the need to work as a system with the instruments of national power; equally it recognises that Defence will not have full freedom of action across the domains. For example, offensive cyber is not under the exclusive control of Defence and activities in space will have immediate consequences for other departments. This adds layers to military judgement and mission command because the drivers for, and consequences of, MDI are extensive.
+
+1.16. __Past experience.__ The idea of integrating military with non-military capabilities is not new. The difference with MDI is that the integration applies in a domain context in which partners across government either wholly or partly control domain capabilities. In pursuing MDI beyond Defence, cultural differences, trust, information sharing, and organisational inertia should be anticipated. For a start, the idea of operational domains will be new to most people outside Defence. We will need to build institutional familiarity.
+
+1.17. __Integrating across the levels of warfare.__ As MDI must consider partners across government it means that MDI automatically spans the levels of warfare. Integrating across the levels however, does not mean trying to delete the levels, as each contributes to the control of capabilities at its disposal and manages the various time horizons. They also protect other levels of warfare from being overwhelmed and allow appropriate tempos to be determined. This means integration is about synchronising as much of the timing and tempo cycles as possible. For example, we will need to orchestrate strategically tasked space and offensive cyber assets working at the speed of light with physical tactical manoeuvre.
+
+1.18. __Dependencies and deficiencies.__ In considering how MDI can be achieved it is important to identify where we are now. The current system is already capable of a certain degree of MDI and programmes are underway such as the Information Advantage Change Campaign and the MDI Change Programme. Equally, Defence should identify deficiencies that are and will become critical to delivering MDI, examples being: seabed to space situational awareness, target audience analysis and an agile global support system. It is also necessary for Defence to address the deficiencies and dependencies beyond Defence, as these are part of the overall system. For example, in the space domain it will require Defence to consider how it interacts with the private sector over the control of space assets.
+
+1.19. __A response through multi-domain integration.__ Our response to the threats, challenges and opportunities we face is to pursue integration; joint is no longer enough. MDI is more than being good at joint or simply adding space, and cyber and electromagnetic considerations. MDI is about designing and configuring the Whole Force for dynamic and continuous integration of all global capabilities together, inside and outside the theatre, munitions and non-munitions, above and below the threshold of armed conflict. The greatest effect will be from drawing in as many capabilities as possible to apply combinations the adversary does not expect or cannot guard against. Forcing the enemy to defend all domains all the time from all directions will impose multiple dilemmas and open up vulnerabilities. It is not just an offensive concept; the ideas and designs are as applicable in defence and in engaging for influence.
+
+
+### Key points
+
+- Our principal adversaries are already operating in all the domains all the time. They will use the full spectrum of capabilities to undermine cohesion, erode economic, political and social resilience, and challenge our strategic position in key regions of the world.
+
+- The potential of new technologies and the competitive arenas of the space, and cyber and electromagnetic domains are blurring the traditional boundaries between military forces, compressing time at the higher levels of command.
+
+- The UK needs to increase the range of capabilities that can be brought to bear beyond maritime, land and air.
+
+- This MDI concept proposes how to integrate the domains and levels of warfare but also recognises the vital importance of being integrated nationally and with allies and partners.
+
+- MDI is about more than actions in one domain supporting another; it is about the synergy of capabilities and activities in and from multiple domains and levels of warfare.
+
+
+## Domains and environments
+
+> #### `Ben Wallace, Secretary of State for Defence, July 2020`
+
+> _`I have a vision of UK Defence, where we’re able to join the dots between space, air, surface and sub-surface, so that the sum of the parts means much more than the value of the individual parts, and where we can do this in real time at the time and place of our choosing.`_
+
+
+### Domains
+
+2.1. To understand how multi-domain integration (MDI) can deliver advantage, there is first a need to consider what constitutes an operational domain. This provides the basis for understanding how effects can be created by combining capabilities across the domains and, significantly, how Defence can focus its activity alongside other actors to achieve objectives in the practical arenas – the environments.
+
+2.2. __Relationship between the domains.__ The operational domains are useful as a mental framework for planning. In particular, the use of domains serves to emphasise the importance of thinking laterally about the full range of capabilities that could be at one’s disposal. While allies and adversaries generally recognise maritime, land, air and space, only the UK combines cyber and electromagnetic into one, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Cyber and electromagnetic activities overlap and are inextricably linked, while cyberspace and the electromagnetic environment are where activities happen.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 2.1 – Illustration of domains as described in UK doctrine_
+
+2.3. __Unequal domains.__ The five operational domains are not equivalent or equal. There is a significant difference when considering the relationship of the space and the cyber and electromagnetic domains. Space is a constant in relation to the air, land and maritime domains beneath it, as well as being a domain in which discrete activity is also possible. The UK is reliant on space for critical services such as position, navigation and timing, and satellite communications. Therefore, activities in space, especially destructive actions, are almost certainly of strategic significance and involve high stakes in terms of deterrence. The cyber and electromagnetic domain is ubiquitous and pervades all other domains; in all cases some degree of freedom of action in the cyber and electromagnetic domain is indispensable. The space and the cyber and electromagnetic domains underpin MDI with its emphasis on systems and networks and links to information activities; they are critical enablers and effecters, yet they are the least understood domains in UK Defence.
+
+2.4. __Moving on from domain seams.__ The three traditional domains of maritime, land and air broadly map across to the single Services. However, boundaries are ambiguous and not clearly delineated. For example, army attack helicopters in the littoral operate in the maritime, land and air domains simultaneously; in the space domain, a ground station connects with satellites via the medium of the electromagnetic spectrum while rockets ascend through the air, but all are part of the space domain. Most of the domains interplay in the majority of real-world situations. Therefore, seams, inculcated into military thinking as vulnerable fissures, are less relevant because the domains overlap, for example, all are present in a coastal environment. Multi-domain thinking transcends seams; the most likely ‘seams’ to worry about in MDI are those among the instruments of national power, among allies and with the private sector.
+
+2.5. __Using the domains.__ The aim in MDI is not to use as many domains as possible when planning for effects; rather it is to create, find and exploit unprotected vulnerabilities by extending the range of activities and capabilities that can be brought to bear across the domains. Doing this presents too many combinations for the adversary to guard against. Multi-domain action is a way of doing this. For example, a naval surface combatant expects to defend itself from hostile aircraft or cruise missiles fired from the coast but will be less familiar with the threat from long-range land-based fires in combination with disruption to satellite navigation systems.
+
+
+### Environments
+
+2.6. When it comes to executing military operations, activity actually takes place in environments. Environments provide the settings, or surroundings, for military activities and they exist prior to, during and after military activity. Each is unique and therefore has an influence on how different headquarters and formations conduct their activities. For example, operating in the Persian Gulf could include: force elements at sea in the restricted waters of the Strait; the island of Bahrain; air assets in Qatar; the sea lines of communication via Suez; the Mediterranean island of Cyprus; Gibraltar; and the UK home base. Each of these physical places has different environmental characteristics and weather, different localised audiences, actors, adversaries and enemies (A3E) and particular ways of conveying information.
+
+2.7. The detailed practical business of MDI therefore comes down to orchestrating activity in these environments. Advantage is most likely to be gained where an activity or capability is effected unexpectedly from the adversary’s perspective and exploits a vulnerability. Activities across the domains and levels of warfare, integrated across government, with allies and private sector elements is a way of creating these unexpected situations. This creates a direct physical, virtual or cognitive effect on A3E, or overwhelms the adversary by creating dilemmas, which weakens will and cohesion, thereby altering perceptions, beliefs and behaviours. This could be because it was effective in exploiting the specific conditions and vulnerabilities in the operating environment and/or because it comes from a domain that the adversary was not prepared for: MDI is manoeuvrist. Environments are central to the idea of MDI because it is where the domains interplay, where activity actually occurs and where outcomes are sought. Further expansion of the environments is covered in Chapter 3.
+
+
+### Key points
+
+- The ‘traditional’ domains of maritime, land and air broadly map across to the single Services, but boundaries are ambiguous and are not clearly delineated.
+
+- The five operational domains are not equal: space is global and encompasses the air, land and maritime domains while the cyber and electromagnetic domain permeates and pervades all the others.
+
+- The aim in MDI is not to use as many domains as possible; rather it is to create and find opportunities for exploitation, through extending the range of activities and capabilities that can be brought to bear.
+
+- When it comes to the practical execution of activities and the realisation of effects, it is environments that should be the focus of integration and not domains.
+
+
+## The core tenets
+
+> #### `General Sir Nick Carter, Chief of the Defence Staff, December 2019`
+
+> _`We have to move beyond ‘jointery’ – integration is now needed at every level – not just at the operational level where the term ‘joint’ applies.`_
+
+
+#### Core tenets – an overview
+
+3.1. This chapter explains the core tenets of multi-domain integration (MDI), as summarised below. The MDI model is shown in Figure 3.1.
+
+- __Information advantage.__ Enabling and effecting orchestration through comprehensive and persistent sensing and understanding of environments and audiences, which must be common across government and with allies.
+
+- __Strategically postured.__ The global, domain-centric arrangement of capabilities.
+
+- __Configured for the environments.__ Readiness for multi-domain activity in operating areas and environments to influence the behaviour of selected audiences.
+
+- __Creating and exploiting synergy.__ Generating, timing and exploiting windows of opportunity for relative advantage by creating synergy.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 3.1 – The multi-domain integration model_
+
+
+### Section 1 – Tenet 1: Information advantage
+
+_Enabling and effecting orchestration through comprehensive and persistent sensing and understanding of environments and audiences, which must be common across government and with allies._
+
+3.2. In an era of persistent competition, information advantage will anchor all our activities, from the tactical to the strategic. MDI involves a contest for information advantage. The side that gains the upper hand, both above and below the threshold of armed conflict, is the one that takes the most timely, well-targeted decisions and actions over time. Knowing what to do and when rests on the ability to sense and understand the whole set of influences and opportunities at play. The ability to then orchestrate the right blend of actions among the multiplicity of levers at one’s disposal into an integrated overall effort is what realises desirable outcomes. To be able to do this continuously better than the adversary requires sustained information advantage relative to the adversary.
+
+#### Sense, understand and orchestrate
+
+3.3. The Integrated Operating Concept 2025 (IOpC 25) introduced the imperative to sense, understand and thereafter orchestrate effects. This is the driving force of MDI; it is analogous to an engine in which sense and understand are the fuel mix and orchestrate is the motor. All three are needed; they must be matched and in balance and of appropriate power for the purpose. The more powerful the engine is, the more windows of opportunity can be exploited across the continuum of competition. If sense and understand are inadequate in comparison to orchestrate, there is a likelihood of misdirected activity that could be counterproductive.
+
+3.4. Sense, understand and orchestrate is not a new framework for the observe, orient, decide and act (OODA) loop. It is less transactional, applies across all the levels of warfare, should be more conducive to non-military elements and is the way we will work out what to do, when, with whom and to what aim. These three related functions have always been necessary, only now are they specified along with a need for balance between them. Additionally, MDI places a much-inflated demand upon them because of the challenge of integrating across the levels of warfare, domains and with other actors.
+
+3.5. In MDI, the sense, understand and orchestrate functions are enabled and expressed through a command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (C4ISTAR) system that connects everything together and allows the system to function cohesively. Advantage in MDI is achieved through being better at sensing and understanding than the adversary, enabled through the means of a C4ISTAR system. This C4ISTAR system can be understood in the following way.
+
+a. The first two Cs in C4ISTAR are __command and control__. Command and control is orchestration, which covers integrating, planning and executing; it thrives on decision advantage.
+
+b. The second two Cs are __communications and computers__. This enables a single information environment connecting the orchestrators with the understanding. It must therefore connect the force elements of our own force; along with those of our allies and partners across government. The single information environment is likely to include a ‘digital backbone’ and cloud-based capabilities.
+
+c. The final part – ISTAR is __intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance__. It is the sense, which is likely to be an overabundance of data, and understand, which will apply processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED) capacity, to convert it into insight and foresight. This is shared among orchestrators via the single information environment.
+
+#### Sense
+
+3.6. Sensing is the essential precursor to understand but needs to be considered more broadly in MDI than just military surveillance systems; it needs to be part of an enterprise approach involving partners across government, allies and the private sector. Sensing provides the raw material for the PED loop through the surveillance and reconnaissance tasks of detection, classification, recognition, tracking and identification to support target acquisition and generate understanding. MDI requires a comprehensive blending of physical sensing with cyber and electromagnetic signatures. MDI particularly requires the ability to sense behaviour among audiences, actors, adversaries and enemies (A3E) for opportunities to exploit and to inform our measures of effectiveness. Audience sensing will need to track social media and other sources in the information environment. Much of this will be open-source information; the trick will be to sift it, interpret it and visualise it in a timely fashion through the C4ISTAR system to those that need it.
+
+3.7. It will be necessary to link the sensors directly to effecters in some situations and to actively probe and stimulate responses. Where the situation is bounded, fast moving and does not require too much integration, the emphasis is likely to be on high tempo through automation and autonomy. A collective and well-resourced machine-readable intelligence mission data system is therefore critical. In more complex situations with higher integration demands or where the need for reliable situational awareness is higher, the requirement will be for more deliberate understanding through PED activity coalesced with sensing from, and in support of, the other instruments of national power.
+
+#### Understand
+
+3.8. Understanding is the perception and interpretation of a situation to provide the context, insight and foresight required for effective decision-making. It involves developing knowledge to a level that enables us to know why something has happened or is happening (insight) and be able to identify and anticipate what may happen (foresight). Understanding must focus on the A3E relevant to the integrated force as a whole and must be persistent. The A3E set will need to be understood in the context of the specific operating environments and the global information environment. Commanders who understand these interplays will make better-informed decisions and increase their chances of achieving the intended behaviour changes, or at least know if they are not. A richer audience analysis capability is needed than is currently possessed.
+
+3.9. Common understanding is the ability to comprehend perceptions of groups other than our own and to establish an accepted and relevant baseline for communication, interpretation and action. This common understanding will need to be achieved among the allies and non-military elements, especially through the orchestration of military strategic effects (OMSE) process, whilst assessing aims and risks as broadly as possible. These groups will have differing interpretations of events and views to one another but sharing and fusion will be needed if integration is to be achieved, and the product made available at the right classifications.
+
+3.10. Understanding our own capabilities is as important as understanding the adversary’s. To be able to identify where we may possess a domain advantage or disadvantage (a domain mismatch) and foresee windows of opportunity, it will be necessary to understand future and potential capabilities among our own and allied force elements. How we reconfigure the force or augment it with additional capacity by domain will have an impact on this. Traditional comparisons of strengths will therefore have a domain dimension to identify the potential for mismatch. Understanding the ‘newer’ domains is of particular importance in this respect; for example, the UK must develop a means to achieve sufficient space domain awareness.
+
+#### Orchestrate
+
+3.11. Orchestration is the planning and execution of activities, achieved through integration, that is necessary to influence the behaviour of A3E. It is based on the sensing and understanding of our own, allied and adversary situations and must proceed on the evidence of the actual effects of the activity being executed rather than an assumption of successful intended effects. Orchestration must be resilient and able to continue functioning when the environment becomes so contested and degraded that a clear picture of audience influence is difficult to achieve. In this case judgement will have to apply, but the idea of persistent audience understanding remains valid. The more that is understood and orchestrated when operating, the greater the chance of success if we are required to war fight.
+
+#### Information systems requirement
+
+3.12. __Vision of the multi-domain integration single information environment.__ Federating UK military and non-military information is essential for a fusion approach – it is the linking ‘glue’. There must be timely access to shared situational awareness and decision-making in a form that is readily understood at every required level of warfare from the home base to the operating environments, through a user-defined operating picture. Mission and targeting data must be discoverable and available globally, in real time and without risk. While a digital backbone is a good visualisation of a bearer system permitting connections into the integrated multi-domain force, this joint concept note (JCN) does not attempt to describe its technical form but the effect is a single information environment. As well as connecting across government the UK single information environment must be capable of integrating into an Alliance framework.
+
+3.13. __C4ISTAR system.__ The information exchange requirement associated with MDI is unprecedented. The mass of data derived from myriad sensors will necessitate artificial intelligence and machine learning to detect patterns where previously there was only noise. It must be secure, yet with broad and flexible access, have minimal data latency and bandwidth, be amenable to network management and conform to information technology and data standards. The more extensive the system, the greater its potential to integrate, but the greater the risk of a security breach. A C4ISTAR system as described will require technical leaps and major investment, but it is fundamental to enable MDI – it is the key requirement.
+
+
+### Section 2 – Tenet 2: Strategically postured
+
+_The global, domain-centric arrangement of capabilities._
+
+3.14. This tenet proposes direction for one of the four foundational principles outlined in the IOpC 25 – an agile and adaptable posture. Successful MDI is founded on having the right capabilities in the right places to be able to converge with others across the domains. This starts with setting the strategic stage through multi-domain posturing. Posture includes policy decisions and it is here that fundamental choices on how Defence is constructed need to be taken with a multi-domain mindset. The equipment that we purchase; how we select and train our personnel; and deciding the tasks Defence is expected to fulfil should be decisions made with this mindset. Due to the intra-governmental dependencies associated with MDI, these decisions cannot be divorced from other government departments with whom Defence must be integrated. These decisions should be constantly informed and reviewed through our sensing and understanding, with the ability to enact changes when they are required.
+
+3.15. __Domain balance.__ At the grand strategic level, the UK could decide to seek an overall domain balance15 in its force structure; alternatively it could deliberately design in an imbalance or a selective domain(s) bias. This would be a complex calculation based upon our potential adversaries with a weighting given to our pacing threat, anticipated Defence contribution to National Security Objectives and expected participation from allies and partners. For example, it could be that the circumstances of our expected operating environments mean that a suitable domain capability can be employed from other domains, for example, denying an adversary space capability through action in the land domain against its ground segment.
+
+3.16. __Burden-sharing arrangements.__ The UK already burden-shares with Five Eyes partners in strategic intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence analysis,16 but could apply the idea of burden-sharing by domain in a systematic way. For example, the UK could agree to weight the air, cyber and electromagnetic domains in an allied arrangement, which could be coalition or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-based. This would allow allies to specialise in the domains they value most and are best at, or to preserve options for independent operations if they prefer. This is a major policy question dealt with later in the JCN, but posturing should start with considerations of domain balance.
+
+3.17. __Support.__ Support considerations are integral to the multi-domain posture; they impact decisions about force structure, overall domain balance and domain-centric burden-sharing. The requirement to take a global perspective when dealing with global challenges, violent extremist organisations, and employing capabilities in domains that have global reach (for example, space and offensive cyber), drives the support aspect of strategic posturing. Depending upon the force structure, domain balance and burden-sharing decisions, support arrangements in strategic posturing could focus on: forward basing; pre-positioning; power projection from the home base; afloat/on-wheels stocks; the forward production of items and equipment; increased self-sustainment capabilities – or permutations of them all. The point is that the ability to do MDI is reliant on good strategic posturing and a ready and sustainable integrated force.
+
+3.18. __Strategic effects management process.__ Force employment at the strategic level is part of the strategic effects management process (SEMP), but a more domain-centric approach could be adopted. This kind of strategy could include calibrating selected domains to dislocate the pacing threat’s domain laydown. This could be achieved by holding domain capability at responsive states to exploit anticipated gaps at moments of vulnerability and enabled through the support posture described above. The SEMP could apportion by domain or monitor domain weightings across the global set-up, including the homeland, as part of overall allied multi-domain arrangements. The SEMP and Joint Commitments Strategic Steering Group (JCSSG) could expend a proportion of overall UK domain capabilities to satisfy campaign requirements, but also consider upcoming strategic windows with strategic A3E in their sights. This is strategic multi-domain posturing: a deliberate activity, which must naturally support the wider UK’s international posture by integrating the domain-related capabilities they and private sector industry can bring to bear.
+
+__`Strategic posturing in the Far East`__
+
+_`China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative can be seen as a form of domain-centric strategic posturing. The idea is enacted through a ‘string of pearls’ in which China develops relationships and access arrangements in geostrategically important ports dominating the sea lanes between China’s Hainan island through the Bay of Bengal to the Arabian Sea, the Middle East region and beyond. Initially a maritime domain affair, as China builds its aircraft carrier and naval power projection capabilities, the maritime road will strategically complement the land-based Belt and Road Initiative and prepare the wider region of the Indian Ocean for Chinese multi-domain activities.`_
+
+
+### Section 3 – Tenet 3: Configured for the environments
+
+_Readiness for multi-domain activity in operating areas and environments to influence the behaviour of selected audiences._
+
+3.19. This tenet will predominantly be driven by the operational level and centred on the doctrine of integrated action. However, the operational and strategic level must be in harmony to ensure consistency in desired strategic effects and to manage those capabilities that may be controlled at the strategic level, particularly within the space and cyber and electromagnetic domains. To ensure this harmony is generated necessitates an expansion on the idea of environments introduced in Chapter 2.
+
+3.20. __Operating environments.__ Operating environments represent the composite of local conditions and circumstances in which military and non-military capabilities must be orchestrated to achieve influence. Operating environments are the surroundings or settings for military operations, and they will be specific to that portion of the battlespace, depending on the relationship with the sub-environments within them. It is the combination of these sub-environments that we need to sense and understand, trying to identify and create points of potential advantage in the interplay between them. These sub-environments are described below and illustrated in Figure 3.2.
+
+- __Human sub-environment.__ The system of individuals, groups, organisations and their beliefs, values, interests, aims and interactions. It should be possible to categorise people into A3E to plan the cognitive influences required upon each.
+
+- __Physical sub-environment.__ The surface, sub-surface, above surface and space where physical activities take place, where the A3E live, where objects and infrastructure exist, and weather and atmospheric conditions affect operations.
+
+- __Information sub-environment.__ The data, information, media plus the information systems, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum that convey information and influence A3E.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 3.2 – The sub-environments_
+
+3.21. __Levels of warfare in operating environments.__ With their focus on audiences, all levels of warfare are present, or at least latent, in operating environments in two respects. First, control of some capabilities is held at certain levels, for example, strategic communication, so there needs to be channels available to intervene with them at lower levels in an integrated fashion at the right moment. Secondly, activities at lower levels create effects at higher levels, intentional or otherwise, for example, allegations of human rights abuses on the ground. Operating environments are therefore not synonymous with the operational level of warfare. Figure 3.3 illustrates the interplay of the three levels of warfare and how activity will involve at least one of the three levels: it may be a combination of human, physical and information factors that necessitates consideration at the strategic level, potentially involving another government department, or operational or tactical. Although not illustrated, a sub-environment combination could have implications across all levels of warfare.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 3.3 – The operating environment_
+
+#### Multi-domain operating areas – a new spatial framework
+
+3.22. The strategic context, the continuum of competition and the influence of the space and cyber and electromagnetic domains means that geographically bounded operating areas are less suitable. There could be exploitable domain-centric synergies between geographically separate operating areas. It is these factors that give rise to a need for a new spatial framework – a multi-domain operating area. This new framework sees the contest in its broadest possible scope that may be global or regional and is likely to contain several operating environments, linked by national and alliance strategic aims, or by adversary interest.
+
+3.23. The operating area is global when we, or our adversaries, can manoeuvre in a geographically unconstrained domain, such as space or where the effects unfold in an unconstrained way as it does in the information environment. Where adversaries, such as some insurgent groups or less developed militaries, are mostly limited to the traditional domains of maritime, land and air, the operating area could be reduced in scope, so perhaps regional rather than global. The relationship between the MDI operating area and the operating environments is depicted in Figure 3.4.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 3.4 – A multi-domain operating area_
+
+
+_▲ Figure 3.5 – A global operating area_
+
+3.24. Introducing regional operating areas and global operating areas (Figure 3.5) helps to establish the need to integrate across the levels of warfare, understand the interplay between the various actors and to consider situations and potential influences as broadly as possible, as opposed to only having joint operations areas with their narrower connection to the operational level. This creates the space for maximum use of the domains in a way that might outmatch an adversary.
+
+3.25. __Global information environment.__ In addition to the localised information sub-environment, there is always a global information environment to consider. The global nature of the information environment means that an activity on one side of the globe can quickly yield effects on the other, commonly at the strategic level. This environment includes social media in cyberspace, international print, opinion formers and broadcast media with whom we have no direct channels. It may also include global A3E who are affected by second and third order effects, such as the allies of the adversary.
+
+#### Configuring for the environments
+
+3.26. At the operational level, Defence seeks to achieve strategic objectives in accordance with the OMSE process. In MDI, this is enabled through multi-domain configuration. Configuration is an operational-level task, which fashions the force elements allocated from strategic posturing and focuses on the relevant A3E. It integrates them with other capabilities such as in-theatre partners, other UK government or non-military elements to prepare and plan activities specific to operating areas and environments.
+
+3.27. The aim is to ensure military capabilities are arranged, readied and optimised to be brought together for synergy to exploit windows of opportunity within the environments. This will be a continuous process of dynamically managing the operational and tactical laydown of military force elements to not only operate sub-threshold but also be ready to war fight if required. The scope for reconfiguring dynamically will be enabled by the strategic posturing described in Section 2, particularly the support arrangements.
+
+3.28. When planning the configuration of the force, the operational level should also consider the best domain balance in operating environments. This especially includes the responsiveness of domain capabilities that are relatively light in theatre in comparison to the adversary and those which might have high pay-off potential. While it might be useful in some circumstances to designate a supported domain such as cyber and electromagnetic, it will be more normal to think in terms of complementary action and convergence of domains and to consider economy, concentration and surging of domain activity.
+
+3.29. The tactical level will be as domain-agnostic as possible, employing fires and actions from any domain to create effects that exploit windows of opportunity. Domains will be balanced or biased according to operational plans. However, there could be options for tactical concentration, supporting/supported relationships, employing domain-based reserves or surges to achieve domain-overmatch and synergy. Examples of enablers and capabilities at the tactical level include:
+
+- fires and other effecters capable of reach across domains;
+
+- commanders willing and capable of operating across domains; and
+
+- a support system capable of sustaining at the desired tempo and scale of physical action.
+
+3.30. __Configured for outcomes across the levels of warfare.__ MDI is likely to gain advantage in the immediate operating environments where effects are created, especially advantages of an operational or tactical nature. They might also have a significant or principal effect in the global information environment. They could also have a domain-centric effect by unsettling an adversary’s domain balance in another, or multiple other, operating environments, which might be geographically separated, and perhaps amplified by an ally’s similar action somewhere else. This could be a way of perpetrating a strategic offset action.
+
+
+### Section 4 – Tenet 4: Creating and exploiting synergy
+
+_Generating, timing and exploiting windows of opportunity for relative advantage through the creation of synergy._
+
+#### Synergy
+
+3.31. Synergy is achieved through the interaction of two or more agents to create a combined effect greater than the sum of their separate parts. It is what sense, understand and orchestrate should be trying to create and exploit; it is therefore a core tenet of MDI. MDI envisages complementary synergies that multiply effects and thereby enables Defence to fulfil its objective in an agile, assertive and adaptable way. The prize of synergy encourages Defence to understand where to focus to achieve an advantageous cumulative effect.
+
+#### Cross-domain synergy
+
+3.32. MDI specifically seeks advantage through cross-domain synergy. Cross-domain means imparting an effect from one domain into another. Cross-domain synergy is therefore a product of MDI, where advantage is achieved in a single domain or combination of domains through cross-domain manoeuvre; it is a specific product of integrating the domains. Cross-domain synergy can be achieved at all levels of warfare from strategic to tactical. Action at the strategic level will create the conditions for cross-domain synergy by augmenting operating areas with domain capabilities either directly, through reachback or through synchronising strategic activity with lower levels.
+
+3.33. Cross-domain synergy exploits vulnerabilities across the levels of warfare. A strategic raid could be a single or multi-domain action with the purpose of affecting an adversary’s global multi-domain calculus. The intended effect could be to threaten domain overmatch in a region, thereby imposing a dilemma on the adversary of whether to react in such a way that affects its domain balance. This would be a strategic-level exploitation of a window of opportunity, which might subsequently open an operational-level window somewhere else.
+
+3.34. At the operational and tactical levels, advantage is most likely to be gained where an action comes from a domain that the adversary was not prepared for, by virtue of being cross-domain, and because it is effective in exploiting the specific conditions and circumstances in an operating environment. Good MDI will involve orchestrating manoeuvrist combinations from the full range of capabilities available to generate cross-domain synergy against these windows of opportunity. Cross-domain manoeuvre is the way to achieve cross-domain synergy. A design to converge multiple domains into a focused effort will almost certainly require synchronised cross-domain manoeuvre.
+
+#### Windows of opportunity
+
+3.35. Windows of opportunity will be created or sensed within the combination of human, physical and information sub-environments. They should directly or indirectly target vulnerable parts of the adversarial system. This is represented in Figure 3.6. For example, in a technology-savvy, densely populated island city state, where everyone has immediate Internet access, information will spread quickly so an effective window of opportunity might be an action in cyberspace. Alternatively, the upcoming signing of a trade agreement with a state that is sympathetic to our adversary opens an opportunity in the global information environment, which can be linked to an engagement activity in a related operating environment due to local audience sentiment there.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 3.6 – Windows of opportunity_
+
+3.36. A window of opportunity may also be generated through a domain mismatch. These can occur in the following ways:
+
+- foreseeing an impending stress, stretch or gap in an adversary domain or domain balance, for example, intelligence of a snap exercise drawing maritime assets to one place;
+
+- enabled through augmentation of domain capabilities from higher (dynamic strategic apportionment) or through allies, for example, the allocation of remotely piloted air systems capable of strike and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance;
+
+- by applying other levers of national power which deliver or enable domain impact, for example, increase in stabilisation funding improves attitudes towards UK forces;
+
+- enabled through pre-planned surging and economising of in-theatre domain activity, for example, attaining high aircraft availability through an engineering maintenance surge;
+
+- developed through the use of deception; and
+
+- brought about through cross-domain manoeuvre, synchronisation across domains and converging the domains.
+
+#### Integrating levels in windows of opportunity
+
+3.37. In MDI, windows of opportunity may be fleeting or extended and will exist at different levels. Some actions within an operating environment will seek tactical or operational objectives but will resound at the strategic level or will be specifically intended to affect global audiences. Alternatively, operating environments might offer a locus for a strategic intervention for other instruments of national power or allies seeing opportunities in tactical settings. Figure 3.7 illustrates this relationship and shows how a window of opportunity within a combination of sub-environments, indicated by the green dot, may have tactical or strategic relevance.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 3.7 – Windows of opportunity across the levels of warfare_
+
+3.38. Figure 3.8 illustrates the key terms introduced in this section. In this instance cross-domain manoeuvre between the land, space and cyber and electromagnetic domain results in cross-domain synergy in a window of opportunity with both strategic and tactical relevance.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 3.8 – Cross-domain manoeuvre and synergy to exploit the window of opportunity_
+
+3.39. __Operational art.__ Operational art will be in the planning, creation and exploitation of windows of opportunity. The best effect and tempo will flow from a sequence of windows or a near simultaneous array of windows that seek to disrupt an adversary across an operating area. Windows must be foreseen and identified, which is enabled by the force having configured and planned for it with other instruments of national power as part of a coherent system. The idea is close to full spectrum targeting (FSpecT), seeing windows as targets and arrays of them as target systems.
+
+3.40. __Maximising cross-domain synergy.__ It is easier to visualise MDI in situations when we have the initiative and are able to foresee or engineer windows of opportunity and to plan advantageous sequences. However, MDI applies equally in defensive or reactionary scenarios where an adversary is denied an outcome. Reactive and fast-moving situations will make significant demands on our C4ISTAR systems; cross-domain synergy in these circumstances arising from rapid cross-domain manoeuvre may be the key to regaining the initiative. The ability to seize fleeting opportunities will come when commanders in ‘other’ domains have the instinctive awareness and enterprise to manoeuvre across domains or command in another domain, thereby generating cross-domain synergy in novel or unexpected combinations. Cross-domain synergy is proportionate to what can be integrated, as shown in Figure 3.9.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 3.9 – Increasing cross-domain synergy_
+
+3.41. __Timing.__ Timing is a key challenge for MDI because integrating the domains and levels of warfare in time will be at least as important, if not more so, than integrating in geography/space. Time is a form of ‘depth’ in the MDI battlespace because the higher levels of command and partners across government will probably be looking further ahead for windows of opportunity. Inserting and synchronising windows in the longer term with those in the near term for synergistic effect will be the aim. The compression of time, especially at the higher levels of command, reinforces the challenge of the timing factor. The strategic level will have to be close enough to events to be capable of seeing and seizing the moments for synchronisation without overriding the other levels. Understanding the integration demand in time, particularly across government, is both an art and science and will be the key challenge for senior commanders. Important aspects of timing are outlined below.
+
+- __Synchronisation.__ Synchronisation is about integrating events in time to establish favourable rhythms that complement each other. Synchronisation covers not just the coordination of activities that Defence may undertake with partners across government, but the different tempos of these spheres of activity over time. For example, synchronisation might revolve around a strategic window of opportunity in the form of a diplomatic or planned government strategic communication intervention. This could temporarily drive the tempo of all other activities across the levels of warfare until that particular point in time, or perhaps subsequent to it.
+
+- __Simultaneity.__ Simultaneity concerns multi-domain activities happening at the same time for shock or to overload an adversary with multiple dilemmas.
+
+- __Regeneration.__ Regeneration is a timing factor, particularly with military activity at the lower levels of command. Multi-domain capability will vary over time as platforms need to be repositioned, reset for maintenance or resupplied after intense use. The aim should be to configure the force over time to exploit windows of opportunity consistent with available multi-domain capabilities.
+
+- __Tempo.__ Tempo is defined as: the rate of military action relative to the enemy. A high tempo relative to the enemy is generally thought likely to maintain the initiative by trapping the adversary in the early parts of the OODA loop, struggling to ‘act’ and being inundated with dilemmas. In high-intensity combat at the tactical level, this is highly applicable and may increase chances of success. However, it is a fallacy to think in terms of a single adversary OODA loop; instead there are multiple OODA loops in play at any time both within the levels of warfare and especially between them. This is an important consideration: identifying the most pertinent loops in respect of the constellation of A3E and then integrating the different tempos to deliver the most advantage, as shown in Figure 3.10.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 3.10 – Multiple OODA loops_
+
+3.42. __Audience focus.__ Aspiring for the highest tempo possible is not always required and could be counterproductive. Going too fast may result in a situation where the effects we seek have not yet played out on the target audience and proceeding further at the fastest rate denies the A3E the cognitive room to change their behaviour in the way we desire. This may be true at the higher levels of command, particularly where other allies or instruments of national power are involved, or where audience-influence ‘soak time’ is crucial and requires sensing and measuring, or where a cornered enemy’s few remaining options include weapons of mass effect. A smarter approach in which tempo adapts to match the actual effects being created on A3E, evidenced by measures of effectiveness, should be sought. This emphasis on playing the audience rather than the rate of military activity places a high demand on the sense, understand and orchestrate functions as audience perception and loyalty can take a long time to change.
+
+
+### Key points
+
+_Tenet 1: Information advantage. This tenet is about enabling and effecting orchestration through comprehensive and persistent sensing and understanding of environments and audiences, which must be common across government and with allies._
+
+- In MDI, the sense, understand, orchestrate functions are enabled and expressed through a C4ISTAR system.
+
+_Tenet 2: Strategically postured. The global, domain-centric arrangement of capabilities._
+
+- Successful MDI is only possible if the right capabilities are in the right places to integrate with others. This comes through setting the strategic stage: posturing.
+
+- Posturing should make use of domain balance arrangements.
+
+_Tenet 3: Configured for the environments. Readiness for multi-domain activity in operating areas and environments to influence the behaviour of selected audiences._
+
+- The operational level will help to integrate multi-domain capabilities that may be controlled at the strategic level, such as space and offensive cyber, with the tactical.
+
+- Operating environments represent the composite of local conditions and circumstances, including the physical surroundings and the A3E they host.
+
+_Tenet 4: Creating and exploiting synergy. Generating, timing and exploiting windows of opportunity for relative advantage through the creation of synergy._
+
+- Tempo in MDI should be calibrated to be optimal rather than as high as possible.
+
+- Cross-domain synergy will be most exploitable in windows of opportunity. They are identified or engineered within the combination of human, physical and information sub-environments according to relative domain strengths.
+
+- Planning should identify sequences of windows of opportunity, timed for most advantageous effect.
+
+
+## Force development implications
+
+> #### `General Sir Patrick Sanders, Commander Strategic Command, July 2020`
+
+> _`... we must inculcate an instinctive inclination to survey all the domains, intervene and command as necessary in pursuance of the overall multi-domain force objective.`_
+
+#### The joint functions
+
+4.1. The joint functions are related capabilities and activities that assist commanders to integrate, synchronise and direct joint operations. They are normally used as a planning checklist in tactical and joint headquarters; however, this multi-domain integration (MDI) concept proposes a more fundamental adoption of these functions. As they have no boundaries, they are applicable to MDI and can be extrapolated to the strategic level – becoming integrating functions. Headquarters structures organised in this way facilitate an understanding of the full range of multi-domain capabilities that are available. As well as being recast as ‘integrating functions’, force protection is cast as resilience and sustainment as support. The integrating functions are used below to explore force development implications and represent the priorities for experimentation. They are shown in Figure 4.1.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 4.1 – The integrating functions_
+
+
+### Section 1 – Command and control
+
+4.2. __Interdependencies.__ A command and control system is a socio-technical enterprise owing to the complex interactions between people, structures, technology and processes, as illustrated in Figure 4.2. MDI will necessitate significant advances in each of these individual areas as they are fundamental to successfully realising the conceptual vision; it is therefore necessary to consider each in turn.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 4.2 – Multi-domain command and control_
+
+#### People
+
+4.3. __Cultural challenge.__ The current generation of Defence personnel has brought a trajectory of incremental gains in jointery, but this concept envisages a reframing. This reframing brings a need for a much deeper multi-domain competence than is currently present across Defence. Where there is awareness and some understanding of activity in other domains today, there will need to be an ability to visualise, stimulate and act across other domains; where necessary, an ability to command in them too. There needs to be an early and substantial improvement in understanding of the cyber and electromagnetic and space domains and how to integrate them. The educational foundation for this must be developed. This presents a much-increased demand on professional military education and is at least as important as any other capability requirement described.
+
+4.4. __People management.__ The traditional models for recruiting, managing and retaining personnel are already being challenged by the Information Age. MDI will amplify this need for change. The necessity for integration across the domains, and hence those skill sets that enable this, will require Defence to be able to recruit those with the right skills, or the potential to have the right skills, at speed. Lateral entry mechanisms are one such means for this, as are joint career management structures that serve to improve retention through greater recognition of talent and expertise.
+
+4.5. __A wider outlook.__ MDI will require Defence personnel to be as familiar working across government and with the private sector as they are across domains. An understanding of other governmental departments and a culture that allows successful relationships to be developed is necessary to ensure a genuinely enduring contribution to fusion doctrine. In the private sector, particularly so in the space and cyber and electromagnetic domain, Defence people have to be equipped and managed, such that retention and individual ambition are balanced. This is likely to be necessary to achieve an integrated force.
+
+#### Structures
+
+4.6. __Designing pathways.__ The scale to which MDI must be practiced if it is to benefit the UK will necessitate fundamental change in command and control structures. The operational art of exploiting windows of opportunity through cross-domain synergy, with all the attendant permissions, authorities and contextualised pictures, may well be a sufficiently demanding function in itself to demand new structures. It may also require us to re-evaluate how our single Services support these structures. United States experimentation in the Doolittle Series of war games found that multi-domain operations centres were needed at global and local levels and mission control teams were needed to control tactical missions. This resulted in a new specialisation – the United States Air Force has developed a new officer career field for planning multi-domain operations within the joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) system. Annex A provides more detail about how new structures and a new specialisation could help to meet the orchestration challenge.
+
+4.7. __Componency.__ Existing component command structures may not be suitable for MDI because of their hierarchical lines of command that involve sequential and time-consuming communications channels. Experimentation should be focused in this area to understand the longer-term solution to achieving MDI.
+
+#### Processes
+
+4.8. __Domain ownership.__ Due to the way in which the domains interplay in environments, they cannot be owned. MDI may need a looser sense of ownership between the traditional commands and the domains they most commonly operate in. This will demand new processes. Commanders will need to be able to discern opportunities for advantage across domains and the levels of warfare in a culture that encourages cross-domain manoeuvre and intervention, rather than maybe seeing it as trespassing. Instead of looking at the domain in front of them and seeking support from the others, it will be necessary to look across the domains and converge in an agile and assertive way. For example, maritime, land or air forces in a supporting role to electromagnetic activity could be a normal situation. Space domain planning must be integrated in a way that accounts for military, civil and especially commercial linkages, as well as allies.
+
+#### Technology
+
+4.9. __Humans in command.__ Chapter 3 outlines the ambitious command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (C4ISTAR) system that will be needed for MDI, but the vision is not one of machines in command. The machine will bring advantages of automation and augmentation by artificial intelligence for bounded less-complex data-centric tasks. They will allow analysis that covers descriptive, diagnostic, predictive and ultimately prescriptive capabilities. However, as well as conveying data, the system will need to connect the right people at the right moments for decision-making, delegation of authorities, and legal/ethical assurance. These interventions and inputs of guile, judgement, emotional intelligence and understanding of subtle complexities will remain the basis for military success – and means the human input will endure.
+
+4.10. __Commanding with machines.__ Commanders will nevertheless have to be comfortable with having options generated by machines and understand why they offer the solutions they do or make the ‘mistakes’ they make. Robotics, intelligent and autonomous systems will need to be complemented with carefully calibrated levels of appropriate human control according to the complexity of the task. To command effectively within a multi-domain system, the human operator must be involved.
+
+
+### Section 2 – Intelligence
+
+4.11. __Outcome based.__ In an outcome-based approach, commanders and staff extrapolate from the orchestration of military strategic effects (OMSE) process what effects need to be imparted on audiences, actors, adversaries and enemies (A3E) to achieve the desired outcome. Intelligence then needs to develop an understanding of the conditions, predispositions, biases and behaviour of the audiences that need to be influenced. In MDI, sensing and understanding the A3E is the fuel mix for orchestration; therefore, consistent with the findings of the OMSE project, a much greater capacity for human factors analysis, audience analysis and understanding non-munitions based targeting is needed than is currently possessed. This capacity will likely be drawn from open-source as well as intelligence agency sources and must be capable of being sustained over time to understand the effects that are actually being realised upon A3E, compared to the effects intended and hoped for.
+
+4.12. __Identifying windows of opportunity.__ Identifying windows of opportunity for cross-domain synergy will be a form of intelligence support to targeting. It will identify domain-centric mismatches with our adversaries and windows of opportunity within the human, physical and information sub-environments. To fully support MDI, intelligence analysis will need to be able to achieve this between related operational environments at a global level.
+
+4.13. __Single intelligence environment.__ Intelligence and intelligence mission data will need to be available in a way that is contextualised to the user. Contextualised in this sense means already integrated with allies and across government, at the right classification rather than limited to the lowest classification, capable of permitting further interrogation, probably through a cloud-based system, and tailored to the user. It will also need to be integrated across the levels of warfare to be able to realise windows of opportunity at all levels. The single intelligence environment must be a subset of the single information environment to enable unified decision support and operations support.
+
+
+### Section 3 – Fires, information, manoeuvre and outreach
+
+4.14. The capabilities and activities of fires, information, manoeuvre and outreach should be orchestrated to achieve A3E influence in support of the desired outcome. These functions represent the primary military effecters, but in MDI they are integrated with allies, across government and with private sector elements; they are also to be capable of operating cross-domain. These effecters can be extended beyond the operational level as described below.
+
+- __Fires.__ Fires to be munitions and non-munitions effecters employed within and across operating environments. They include cyber, electronic attack, space and those from other instruments of national power.
+
+- __Information.__ Information to include actions designed to affect information systems, as well as those activities directly seeking a direct cognitive influence. As a recognised instrument of national power which all government departments have a role in, it is both a challenge and an opportunity for integration, both in terms of the narrative and maintaining intra-governmental situational awareness. The existence of a persistent competitive global information environment in addition to any operationally localised A3E is a reality that demands this function to be seen as a daily item of MDI.
+
+- __Manoeuvre.__ Manoeuvre is possible through other instruments of national power, strategic-level global offset actions, space activities, regional and global domain-related burden-sharing arrangements. Strategic domain manoeuvre includes efforts to unbalance adversary domain balance by engineering regional and global overmatches and stresses.
+
+- __Outreach.__ Outreach includes civil-military interactions and assumes that Defence activity will be part of a broader cross-governmental approach. It includes stabilisation, support to governance, Defence-level and military capacity building, engagement activity plus an audience-focused approach towards alliances, host nation activity, diplomacy, global organisations and institutions. It is essential to ensuring that the right outcomes are achieved and, in the event of armed conflict, in ensuring that a state of normal, if not more favourable, competition is achieved afterwards. Outreach is a form of information effecter due to its influence effect.
+
+
+### Section 4 – Resilience
+
+4.15. Previously labelled as force protection, but in the context of MDI, now recast as resilience. MDI is as much, if not more, about systems and networks as it is about formations and firepower and this colours interpretation of force protection from an MDI perspective. It is about minimising the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment, materiel, operations and activities from threats and hazards. Bearing in mind the intention to integrate with non-military elements, the resilience and protective function needs to consider the private sector.
+
+4.16. __Vulnerabilities.__ MDI envisages an advantage in information, technology, automation and autonomy, but in so doing, MDI carries a corresponding and equal vulnerability because systems will sometimes fail or not work as intended. Systems and networks will be limited by degraded or denied electromagnetic environment conditions, be physically damaged, might be prone to being fooled by adversary spoofing, or even unable to cope with our own acts of deception. The relative importance of electronic force protection is therefore increased. Passive measures, such as hardened and secure systems alongside good, secure data protocols and disciplined procedures will complement active measures such as distributed operations.
+
+4.17. __Understanding machines.__ Our systems might make unexpectedly bad decisions based on unrealistic rules and algorithms that were only exposed in the full complexity of real conditions. Adversary augmented intelligence might be equivalent to ours and able to predict it in real time. The consequences for resilience are that humans must be capable of knowing when technology is not functioning as hoped and taking the necessary response.
+
+4.18. __Adapting to threats.__ The human-machine systems must be capable of adapting to the threats through alternative modes. The mantra is ‘preserve the capacity to act’. This should be made a virtue by planning and assuming a level of working technology below the maximum, and below that enjoyed in exercises and synthetic environments. This will provide a more sustainable condition with headroom to press harder if it works well and when it matters most.
+
+4.19. __Command and control modes.__ As well as having sufficient information systems capabilities to equip the force, reactive adjustments to current or future contests will demand dynamic approaches to command, control, communications and computers resilience. Joint Concept Note 2/17, Future of Command and Control describes adaptive and agile headquarters responding to changes in network connectivity and performance and learning in real time – this is the vision. MDI should exploit diverse and fluctuating command and control styles according to the specific cyber and electromagnetic conditions prevalent within the environments. An ability to pre-select or reactively adopt different styles should be developed: at one end, a decentralised/automated style where complexity and the need for situational awareness is lower; at the other end a centralised/tight style where complexity and the need for situational awareness is higher; and alternative/reversionary styles where forced. These variations could equally be used as part of deliberate security/deception plans.
+
+4.20. __Decentralised and automated command and control.__ MDI will be most effective where the C4ISTAR systems and networks are augmented by artificial intelligence and autonomy to support decision-making. This most highly automated, decentralised style will require higher levels of assured communication and information systems resilience and security because it will be handing over a part of the job to machines, albeit with ‘human-in-the-loop’ oversight. Augmentation by machines is high risk, high reward. The high risks are that an adversary is able to penetrate our systems and either observe or disrupt them; or the adversary has equal artificial intelligence systems using similar programmes and is therefore capable of predicting what ours do; or that the situation is either too complex and changeable to allow automation to proceed at high speed according to algorithms.
+
+4.21. __Centralised and tight command and control.__ Scenarios involving emotional, legal, ethical and complex informational dilemmas, particularly where judgements of timing are involved and the human factor is most pronounced, are likely to tilt the calculation in favour of tighter command and control. The adage ‘if you don’t understand the problem, neither will artificial intelligence’ should apply. Sub-threshold scenarios of escalatory tensions where the effect of messaging is not yet understood, or de-escalatory stand-off situations may make artificial intelligence relatively risky.
+
+4.22. __Alternative and reversionary.__ Where the cyber and electromagnetic domain is highly contested or denied, or for other reasons such as planned deception, alternative or reversionary modes must still be a practiced option. These modes will be ‘decentralised’, but not in the same respect as the decentralised and automated mode which gives more rein to automation in straightforward situations.
+
+
+### Section 5 – Support
+
+4.23. Support encompasses logistics support and engineering support and equipment support. In the same way that sense and understand needs to be matched to desired orchestration capacity, supporting capacity must also be commensurate. Exploiting cross-domain synergy in windows of opportunity at varying tempos using cross-domain manoeuvre across geographically non-contiguous operating environments demands equivalent competitive and enduring support advantage as it does information advantage. This will require a paradigm shift in platform and equipment availability; developing superior, assured, environmentally sustainable and cost-effective logistic services; exploiting data and technology; and a culture of interoperability.
+
+4.24. In MDI, there should be broader interpretations of support, in terms of how it is enabled to account for the assumption of working as a Whole Force and for specific domain considerations. For example, the space domain provides essential enabling services including positioning, navigation and timing without which the integrated multi-domain force will be severely hampered in achieving its aims. The maintenance of enabling space-based services is critical not just for MDI, but also for other instruments of national power.
+
+4.25. This concept envisages domain balance and domain burden-sharing arrangements with allies. In consequence, the need for full interoperability with allies, including modularisation and standardisation of items and spares, commonality of processes, procedures and standards is clear. This should recognise and embrace UK Defence’s dependencies on industry and contractors (such as non-organic elements of the balanced Whole Force) as key contributors to the MDI support solution.
+
+4.26. The support advantages coming from cross-domain synergy and from integrating with others flow from foresight. That is exhibited in preparedness, and the ability to react at the speed of relevance through a blend of options including pre-positioning and technology exploitation, and is underpinned by agile supporting systems (posturing and configuration). An operational/tactical multi-domain sustainment system will involve domain capabilities conducting cross-domain activity and manoeuvre to support other domains, not just for UK force elements but for allies and partners as well. An operational system capable of reacting and manoeuvring across environments according to the multi-domain demands of the moment will need a Defence support intelligence capability. Such a dynamic system will need to have depth, redundancy and conduct contingent and predictive activities that will service both peacetime and warfighting activity and be force multiplying when it matters.
+
+4.27. Resilience will be required to operate in degraded environments. Cyber and electromagnetic threats will be a major challenge as considerable aspects of the support enterprise will be information-led, technology-enabled, predictive, integrated and interoperable and involve private sector partnerships both at home and in overseas operating areas. The dilemma will be setting a balance between seeking maximised automation and efficiency on one side and security and resilience on the other.
+
+
+### Section 6 – Risks
+
+4.28. __Balancing ambition and vulnerability.__ This concept describes an optimal, or optimistic vision for very high and hitherto unachieved levels of integration and capability. However, MDI is not a binary condition that exists or not. It is a spectrum, at one end omniscience with the ability to integrate every friendly entity seamlessly according to the plan with faultless targeted effect; in the middle is a workable ability to cooperate and support each other in a joint fashion; and at the lower end is single Service-centric, possibly deconflicted action.
+
+4.29. __Building collective multi-domain integration.__ Real world situations involve adversarial action where relative advantage will apply. The ability to work at lesser, partial and degraded levels of MDI must be regarded as the norm; the core tenets of the Five Eyes Command and Control Concept Note offer a potential framework for developing this ability. The likely trajectory is of MDI growth over time, unevenly matched with allies, aiming to integrate the best out of partial, developing and degraded capabilities. Somewhat counter-intuitively, while the greatest level of MDI potential is through all our allies and partners designing in and nurturing a collective multi-domain capability, a degree of variegation rather than a one-size-fits-all system might be helpful for resilience. Experimentation is vital to understanding this way forward.
+
+4.30. __Inherent risks of complex systems.__ In looking to exploit information technology, ambition and vulnerability are two sides of the same coin. The higher the ambition and the more complex the overall system, the higher the risk. Noting Chinese and Russian emphasis on systems thinking, the more integrated our system is, the more it becomes a target for systems attack. In a complex system, there is simply more to go wrong, more scope for security breaches and greater potential for unexpected outputs. With more allies, partners and departments, there is more scope for mistakes, leaks, breaches, differences of understanding, intention and goals.
+
+4.31. __Advantage paradox.__ Apart from these risks, there is also a paradox that the greater the capability of our information technology in relation to the adversary, the greater our potential advantage to act quickly and decisively. If the adversary perceives this risk, there is a more urgent incentive to either find ways to counter our advantage, or to strike first. As described in Chapter 1, identifying the Western advantage in precision weapons and ways of war is what has driven the advancement of Chinese and Russian capabilities to the need for another offset. To guard against this, the ideal is to have capable, resilient information systems, and to be good at sensing and understanding adversary perceptions.
+
+
+### Key points
+
+- MDI envisages an agile command and control capability, augmented by autonomy and automation.
+
+- MDI requires efficient levels of processes, permissions and information exchange capacities to orchestrate cross-domain thinking and manoeuvre. The C4ISTAR system envisaged will require technical, procedural, cultural and educational leaps.
+
+- An ability and cultural inclination to survey the domains, intervene and command as necessary as part of the overall multi-domain force objective will be a force multiplier.
+
+- Component command structures may not be the ultimate solution for dynamic MDI.
+
+- Understanding A3E is a first, foremost and sustained task. A greater capacity for human factors analysis, audience and systems analysis is needed than is currently possessed.
+
+- The functions of fires, information, manoeuvre and outreach are suited to domain thinking and should be integrated and synchronised across the levels of warfare.
+
+- In MDI, the function of force protection should be interpreted as resilience and sustainment should be broadened to support.
+
+- The higher the ambition and the more complex the overall system, the higher the risk.
+
+- The greatest level of national capability will come through investing in highly technical information technology matched by required changes to military culture, education and training.
+
+
+## MDI specialisation
+
+A.1. The level of orchestration needed in multi-domain integration (MDI) demands a review of how integration is functionally delivered. One such option is a coordinating function capable of taking a hub and spoke form. This model would support integration across the domains and levels of warfare through command and control migration around the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (C4ISTAR) network to coordinate the integration needs of the moment. The main hub, or hubs, would support planning, particularly linking with allies and partners across government, while spokes would support ‘forward’ parts and be able to collapse and deploy somewhere else in the network almost instantaneously to support higher integration demands. Hubs would have maximum connectivity, including through high capacity cloud-based systems and support principal operational and tactical command and control nodes. Hubs would continuously deploy and redeploy an architecture of spoke teams, also with enhanced connectivity.
+
+A.2. Headquarters would be reinforced with hubs and spokes according to the dynamic integration needs of the situation. Standing headquarters would have an appropriately scaled set of multi-domain operator specialists covering the diverse demands of the domains: they would either be the hubs themselves or connect to hubs. Headquarters will identify opportunities and potential vulnerabilities in the domains and be capable of cross-domain manoeuvre and controlling battlespace across domains. Major integration episodes will incur dynamic reinforcement of MDI spokes.
+
+#### Multi-domain designers and coordinators
+
+A.3. A specialisation of multi-domain designers and coordinators could provide the expertise to integrate systems and networks. Multi-domain designers would integrate capabilities through planning full spectrum targeting (FSpecT), identifying windows and designing pathways, with a specialisation of coordinators for managing execution. This specialist function would augment or replace traditional J3/5 and J3 respectively. Hubs and spoke teams would have expertise in both multi-domain design and coordination. The spoke teams would augment existing command and control with additional designer and coordinator capacity. The designers and coordinators would not necessarily need to be together in a forward-based tent, compartment or hangar, but they would need to be able to gain near real time command intent and decision-making, and connect with higher levels of command.
+
+A.4. The designers would have expertise in planning FSpecT through access to sensing and understanding; would be connected to audience analysis systems; and would help to plan the convergence of capabilities for cross-domain synergy. They could act as brokers between force elements effectively trading capability, with multi-domain coordinators looking to ‘buy’ actions and effects.
+
+A.5. Multi-domain coordinators would be skilled in connecting systems and networks. They would apply the right levels of authority, delegation and calibrate automation and autonomy levels according to command and control complexity and resilience conditions to facilitate timely command interventions. They would ensure connection of the right sensors to the best effecters under control of the best command and control node with the requisite authorities and permissions. They could act as the ‘human-in-the-loop’ where artificial intelligence and automation is used and connect with command intent. This would be the J3 operations function of today. The issue of authorities and permissions is crucial, as this way of war will necessitate the ability to task any effecter agnostic of the domain from which it came.
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Strategic Command Strategy
+author: UK Strategic Command
+date : 2021-11-22 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/pNNXGOZ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "This policy paper sets out how the organisation will change the way defence works and the plans for integration in the future."
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+#### The modern world is becoming increasingly complex, competitive and challenging for Defence
+
+
+
+The distinction between war and peace no longer applies. We face authoritarian rivals who oppose and challenge the international order through coercion, disinformation and violent strategies, aiming to win without fighting in the Grey Zone. They are increasingly gaining technological advantage, expanding warfare into the new domains of space and cyber. We must regain the strategic initiative by furthering integration and securing advantage through Science and Technology (S&T).
+
+#### In a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous world, the only certainty we have is that there will be further change
+
+To meet that challenge, we need to be better at responding to the unpredictable. Defence must become agile, responsive and able to act in an integrated way. This means ensuring that every part of Defence can work seamlessly together with other Government departments and our allies and partners overseas. It also means embracing the opportunities presented by our world-leading S&T sectors. It means experimenting with new technology and becoming experts in data exploitation. We need to join up our people, equipment and information through integration.
+
+It’s through this integrated approach, which places the use of technology and data at its heart, that we will become more agile and more able to respond to the unknown. But to get there, Defence must change.
+
+#### Strategic Command leads Defence in making that change
+
+Strategic Command deals with the strategic and military realities of the threat every day – from UK operations and special forces, to defending our digital networks and our bases around the world. We also lead on critical support functions: medical; intelligence; digital capabilities; and logistic, engineering and equipment support. That experience makes Strategic Command unique in Defence and is the reason we have been charged with leading the shift to the new way of operating.
+
+#### Our strategy directs and guides that transformation, linking the actions of all the organisations which make up Strategic Command
+
+It sets out the Command’s intent, but it is not a plan. It recognises that the future is uncertain and therefore sets out what we will need the Integrated Force 2030 to do, rather than defining exactly how we get there. Its delivery is the responsibility of the Command’s Executive Committee. There will be an implementation roadmap, updated annually to take account of changes in the world, our adversaries’ intent and capabilities, advances in technology and our progress in delivering our strategy. This will ensure we remain flexible as an organisation, able to seize opportunities and mitigate risks to achieving our strategy.
+
+
+### Our Vision
+
+The purpose of this strategy is to direct the transformation of Strategic Command to truly deliver as Defence’s integrator. Our competitors are pursuing, aggressively, the opportunities presented by the information age; if we don’t transform then Defence will fail.
+
+#### Vision
+
+Strategic Command is the transformative command. We are the driving force behind integration and the enabling foundation for Defence’s enhanced global posture.
+
+#### Critical Capabilities
+
+These are the elements of the Command we must transform to accelerate Defence’s ability to respond to the changing threats we face.
+
+- Authority
+
+- People
+
+- Data
+
+- Technology
+
+#### Strategic Outcomes
+
+These are the essential tasks that will collectively equip an integrated Defence to act with an agility and precision that our adversaries cannot match.
+
+- Integrated Capabilities
+
+- Orchestrated Activity and Effects
+
+- Improved Understanding
+
+- Enhanced Global Reach
+
+- Disruptive Capabilities
+
+By 2025 we will have embedded integration and accelerated transformation to deliver benefits across Defence:
+
+- The command will be transformed, with optimised structures and people with the right – increasingly digital – skills Defence requires.
+
+- The whole force will be educated, trained and inspired to think and operate in an integrated, multi-domain context.
+
+- Our reach and effectiveness will be enhanced by increasingly adaptable support and medical services, an optimised strategic base and resilient overseas basing.
+
+- Our decision-makers will be supported by more timely and relevant information and intelligence.
+
+- The digital backbone will be revolutionising the way we work, from support to front-line operations.
+
+- Integrated operations will be the default: all military activity conducted within a coordinated national approach that includes non-lethal effects (e.g., cyber and information).
+
+By 2030 we will be contributing significantly to national strategic advantage and will have unlocked the pan-Defence agility necessary to respond to changes in the threat:
+
+- We will sense and understand through enduring forward presence, improved networks and enhanced Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).
+
+- We will orchestrate, communicate and command via robust, secure strategic communications, using greatly improved space and cyber capabilities.
+
+- We will operate and influence at range from enhanced global hubs, delivering effect seamlessly alongside other elements of national power.
+
+- We will increasingly constrain our adversaries by presenting multiple dilemmas in an agile way through integrated action.
+
+- We will continually innovate and experiment to cement our strategic advantage, applying agile procurement, support and delivery processes in support of operations.
+
+- We will have transformed Defence culture so the whole force instinctively thinks, acts and delivers in an integrated way.
+
+
+### The Threat
+
+#### The global security environment is deteriorating…
+
+- The whole of the UK, its people and interests face a wider range of state and non-state threats enabled by increasingly rapid advances in technology that are accessible to more of our adversaries.
+
+- Russia continues to pose the greatest nuclear, conventional military and sub-threshold threat to European security. It’s a capable and unpredictable actor that is modernising its armed forces, integrating whole of state activity, and demonstrating a considerable appetite for risk.
+
+- China is by far the most significant geopolitical factor in the world today. It poses a complex, systemic, challenge to the UK that we need to protect our values and global interests against.
+
+- Iran and North Korea continue to pose regional challenges and their nuclear programmes threaten global stability.
+
+- Terrorism will continue to pose a dynamic and evolving threat to the UK and its interests but increasingly through cyberspace and other advanced weapons.
+
+- Climate change and biodiversity loss represents a global challenge, driving instability, migration, desertification, competition for natural resources and conflict.
+
+#### The battlefield is changing…
+
+- We are now competing constantly with adversaries across the physical, virtual and cognitive dimensions and all five domains at a speed, scale and degree of persistence not seen before.
+
+- Our historic technological advantage is being eroded by targeted investment in capabilities designed to counter our strengths and challenge strategic stability.
+
+- The imaginative employment of relatively low-cost capabilities is challenging highly capable air defence, electronic warfare systems and heavily armoured forces alike.
+
+- Advanced technologies are being developed but with limited international agreement on norms and conventions, and a lack of ethical or moral standards to encourage their responsible use.
+
+- States are increasingly integrating the traditional domains of land, maritime and air with the newer domains of cyberspace and space.
+
+- Adversaries will continue to test us where they perceive us to be weak, but in ways that extend well beyond the traditional battlefield by exploiting technology and the virtual dimension to control the narrative and influence opinion.
+
+
+### Our Response
+
+#### We can capitalise on our traditional strengths…
+
+- Well supported and equipped conventional forces
+
+- World-leading cyber capabilities and Special Forces
+
+- A comprehensive ability to understand and assess our adversaries and environments
+
+- The UK’s Science & Technology base
+
+- Our allies and partners
+
+- Our people
+
+#### …but we must change for the better…
+
+- Using our authority as Defence’s integrator to ensure we go beyond the traditional concept of ‘joint’ to a depth of Multi-Domain Integration
+
+- Educating, equipping and inspiring our people to embrace integration and help us deliver change across Defence
+
+- Embracing the power of data: gathering, processing and evaluating it at speed
+
+- Creating more agile ways to identify, acquire and adopt new technologies that counter threats in innovative ways
+
+#### …in order to…
+
+- Integrate capabilities across domains, with industry, government, allies and partners
+
+- Improve our understanding to enable decision-making at the speed of relevance
+
+- Orchestrate activity and effects with all national levers of influence
+
+- Enhance our global reach by deploying for longer, to greater effect
+
+- Operate, and compete, effectively ‘sub-threshold’ using cutting-edge disruptive capabilities
+
+- All as part of a continuous campaigning approach within an overall operational design that drives the tempo of strategic activity rather than responding to others
+
+
+### Critical Capabilities
+
+Strategic Command’s critical capabilities are the elements of the Command we must transform to accelerate Defence’s ability to respond to the changing threats we face. This will increase our agility, allowing us to respond to the threat and take advantage of technology or other opportunities. Transforming our critical capabilities will speed up delivery of our strategic outcomes, ensuring that Defence makes a significant contribution to restoring the UK’s national strategic advantage over our adversaries.
+
+#### Authority
+
+The Command has unique roles in Defence that give us influence beyond our organisation. Our authorities will be used pro-actively, consistently and coherently to ensure that we help Defence become more agile, capable and integrated. It will require the support of the whole Defence enterprise and will be done in partnership with other Government organisations.
+
+__We will succeed when:__
+
+Defence’s senior leadership is championing integration and agility as a matter of routine, making best use of optimised evidence, analysis, structures and processes to deliver our authorities to effect positive change across the organisation. Our functional owners are optimally configured and resourced to make their function more efficient and effective across Defence.
+
+__Key activities:__
+
+- Deliver the Multi-Domain Integration Change Programme;
+
+- Enhance industry partnerships;
+
+- Utilise existing authorities to prioritise and inform strategic investment decisions;
+
+- Harness functional leadership across the Command; and
+
+- Identify and deliver the Command’s Target Operating Model.
+
+#### People
+
+Our people will make change happen, managing and utilising our capabilities towards realising the goals of Defence. If we are to reach the Strategic Outcomes, we need a diverse, inclusive, and skilled workforce educated, equipped and inspired to deliver at pace in an integrated way.
+
+__We will succeed when:__
+
+We have implemented a culture of integration by default, supported by an increased ability to recruit, retain and talent manage specialist cadres across domains, using Unified Career Management (UCM) to ensure increased integration; all supported by improved infrastructure and a workforce plan. We will have identified the future – increasingly digital and cyber – skills Defence requires and have trained and reshaped our workforce accordingly.
+
+__Key activities:__
+
+- Deliver Strategic Command People strategy;
+
+- Advance Cyber and Medical UCM;
+
+- Deliver MDICP culture work strand;
+
+- Enact new Defence Academy syllabus;
+
+- Deliver Empowerment Programme;
+
+- Achieve our Diversity and Inclusion Plan; and
+
+- Implement Reserve Forces 2030.
+
+#### Data
+
+The modern world has made data ubiquitous, and Defence is no different. We will train specialists to manage the data we collect and use secure networks to transfer it to those who need it when they need it. This will improve our ability to gather, process, evaluate and transmit data at speed and empower our people to make faster, better decisions. We will ensure all areas of the Command are maximising the benefits of data and help develop the structures that will allow all of Defence to do the same.
+
+__We will succeed when:__
+
+Timely, accurate and trustworthy data is acquired, utilised and managed by subject matter experts. Data is accessible to relevant partners through established authoritative data sources, and it is owned and managed by organisations capable of producing and maintaining data management needs.
+
+__Key activities:__
+
+- Deliver Defence Digital Strategy;
+
+- Implement Defence Data Strategy;
+
+- Build the Digital Academy;
+
+- Exploit the Digital Foundry across the Command; and
+
+- Improve Data, Digital and Automation skills and capabilities across the Command.
+
+#### Technology
+
+The Integrated Review set out the Government’s ambition to sustain strategic advantage through S&T to keep pace with the rapid advancement of technology. We need to identify, develop, and adopt emerging technologies alongside a system to facilitate agile thinking and delivery, including widespread use of synthetic environments to support the development and design of integrated operations. We will connect with cross-Government partners to identify and utilise technologies that can help achieve our aims and become a global S&T leader with high-level digital capabilities and skills.
+
+__We will succeed when:__
+
+Our workforce understands technology as a theatre of strategic competition. We are using effective horizon scanning and futures analysis to identify emerging technologies and we have facilitated an improved relationship with industry which leverages the most relevant private sector technologies, allowing the Command to adopt new technologies at pace. This will be supported by an enhanced commercial capability.
+
+__Key activities:__
+
+- Establish Defence AI centre;
+
+- Use Defence Exercise Programme to exploit experimentation;
+
+- Support realisation of MOD S&T Strategy 2020;
+
+- Increased use of alternative development and acquisition approaches (e.g., spearheads);
+
+- Increased use of synthetics for experimentation and training;
+
+- Continue investment in R&D targeted towards resolving the Command’s S&T problem sets; and
+
+- Complete jHub expansion.
+
+
+### Strategic Outcomes
+
+Our strategic outcomes are the most important tasks for the Command, as set out in the Defence in a Competitive Age Command Paper ones that we cannot fail to deliver. Taken together, the strategic outcomes provide a path to an integrated force that understands its environment in real time, works instinctively with partners and allies, and is equipped to decide and act with agility and precision.
+
+#### Integrated Capabilities
+
+To build and equip the Integrated Force 2030 described in the Defence in a Competitive Age Command Paper, integration must become the guiding principle in everything we do. Strategic Command will be instrumental in leading the necessary Defence-wide focus on and investment in data and standards that ensure we realise the benefits of open architecture; connecting our current systems more effectively, and integrating new platforms from the outset. Our concepts, doctrine, training and exercise activity will shape how we prepare ourselves and how we engage with those supporting our work, including industry, partners and allies.
+
+__We will succeed when:__
+
+The focus on integration is embedded across Defence; when new and existing capabilities are integrated by default, and a new military-industrial partnership identifies and pursues technologies and capabilities which benefit the integrated force; and when targeted experimentation and exercise activity in real-world and synthetic environments can turn innovative ideas rapidly into integrated operational capability.
+
+__Key activities:__
+
+- Delivery of the Digital Backbone;
+
+- Delivery of MDICP (input into Joint Requirements Oversight Committee and balance of investment decisions on ‘integration-friendly’ capabilities);
+
+- An enhanced relationship with industry; and
+
+- Focused elements of the Defence’s exercise programme.
+
+#### Orchestrated Activity and Effects
+
+In the face of systemic competition, our success may depend upon creating multiple concurrent dilemmas for our adversaries, reducing their freedom of action. To do this, military effects must be employed seamlessly and simultaneously alongside other levers of influence. Strategic Command will enable this coordination through improved, resilient and agile Command & Control (C2) which will improve our ability to decide and act more quickly than our adversaries. Our ability to predict and understand the cognitive effects of our virtual and physical activities must improve.
+
+__We will succeed when:__
+
+The orchestration of military strategic effects across all domains is instinctive and continually aligned with wider cross-government and international outcomes. Our tactical, operational and strategic C2 has evolved to become more dispersed, federated and resilient; audiences and cognitive effects can be tested synthetically to allow for more sophisticated and better understood outcomes.
+
+__Key activities:__
+
+- Development, Concepts & Doctrine Centre (DCDC) and Defence Academy outputs (including orchestration of military strategic effects guidance);
+
+- Agile C2;
+
+- Defence Targeting Enterprise; and
+
+- Empowerment of the PJHQ.
+
+#### Improved Understanding
+
+To gain and maintain Information Advantage and outcompete our adversaries, our decision-makers at all levels must be better informed with more relevant and timely information and intelligence. Strategic Command, principally through Defence Intelligence and Defence Digital, will lead in improving our ability to sense and understand our adversaries and environment ensuring that information is available when and where it is needed.
+
+__We will succeed when:__
+
+The production and use of intelligence is transformed by the application of new technology to collection, processing, data storage, analysis and distribution; our relationships across government and with allies enhance our strategic awareness; and when a growing sovereign space capability contributes to a greatly improved C4ISR ecosystem.
+
+__Key activities:__
+
+- Delivery of the ISR Strategy and DI Transformation;
+
+- Deepened ‘Five-Eyes’ and cross-government partnerships;
+
+- Creation of the Defence Synthetic Environment; and
+
+- Realisation of the Space ISR Enterprise Plans.
+
+#### Enhanced Global Reach
+
+The Defence in a Competitive Age Command Paper identifies the need for increased forward presence. As such, our forces must deploy for longer and to greater effect, maintaining influence with allies and partners and constraining our adversaries. Strategic Command will develop the capacity and utility of our overseas bases and the support for deployed forces, focusing on Cyprus, Gibraltar and Oman and supporting a deepening defence footprint in Kenya and Germany. Support will include provision of robust, sustainable logistic, medical and welfare services at home and overseas.
+
+__We will succeed when:__
+
+The integrated force is configured for persistent engagement by default, based in and deploying from well-resourced global hubs and able to re-aggregate quickly in response to changing circumstances; when forward support (e.g., logistics and medical) is enhanced, allowing us to maintain a more extensive and effective influence and awareness network.
+
+__Key activities:__
+
+- Focused investment in the UK strategic Base and overseas bases;
+
+- Enhance network connectivity; and
+
+- Delivery of the Defence Support Strategy and Defence Medical Services transformation.
+
+#### Disruptive Capabilities
+
+Our concepts and doctrine, developed in response to the global trend towards systemic competition, emphasise the non-lethal and information capabilities which will allow us to achieve the disruptive effects we seek without recourse to war-fighting. In the Information Age, those effects are likely to be cognitive; the battle to control the narrative will be as vital as any physical objective. Strategic Command is responsible for many of these multi-domain capabilities, from special forces to cyber, information and electro-magnetic effects. Harnessing emergent technologies such as AI and quantum computing will be essential to realising this strategic outcome.
+
+__We will succeed when:__
+
+PJHQ and increasingly agile and covert special forces lead in planning and employing disruptive effects - including an enhanced suite of ‘sub-threshold’ capabilities embedded by default in defence planning - improving our ability to operate and respond above and below the threshold of conventional warfare; and we maintain Decision Advantage relative to adversaries through resilient defence of our networks and agile, precise and effective Information Activities.
+
+__Key activities:__
+
+- Delivery of the Special Operations Transformation Programme and the Information Advantage Change Campaign;
+
+- Develop and exploit Special Access Programmes on operations;
+
+- Enhancement of the National Cyber Force; and
+
+- Establishment of the Electro-Magnetic Activity Joint User.
+
+
+### Our Values
+
+Change will not be quick or easy; there will be setbacks to overcome and tensions to resolve as we make progress towards realising our strategic outcomes. Throughout this process, Strategic Command’s values - described more fully in the Command Charter - will be a core strength that we can all draw upon.
+
+They give us the principles that will guide our work with colleagues and the wider Defence community, providing the foundation that makes Strategic Command a progressive, innovative and inclusive organisation, and a place that anyone in Defence would be proud to be part of.
+
+#### Progressive
+
+We think progressively and act in the best interests of Defence. We will take responsibility, as individuals and collectively, for the changes that will make the strategy succeed, working with others and sharing knowledge and lessons in pursuit of our common goal.
+
+#### Innovative
+
+We are not afraid to challenge assumptions and suggest alternative approaches. Sharing good ideas and creating new and agile ways of working will be the norm, as we empower our people to balance risk as they imagine new solutions to emerging problems.
+
+#### Inclusive
+
+We create an inclusive environment in which everyone feels able to contribute. Fairness and respect will characterise our relationships with colleagues, in a rich and empowering professional environment which has no tolerance for bullying or harassment.
+
+
+### Themes
+
+All of Defence must contribute to broader Government objectives. Strategic Command will ensure it plays a significant part by ensuring that the transformation delivered by our strategy considers how to support, and derive benefits from, three themes: partnerships; prosperity and sustainability.
+
+#### Partnerships
+
+Delivering integration is a team-game, requiring us to co-ordinate our actions across Government and internationally. Strategic Command will enhance existing strengths: internationally with the United States and the other Five-Eyes partners, the rest of NATO, the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, and the Joint Expeditionary Force; and across Government with the intelligence community. We will look to establish and improve other partnerships in accordance with the priorities stated in the Defence in a Competitive Age Command Paper.
+
+#### Prosperity
+
+Strategic Command already makes an important contribution to the UK’s economic security and prosperity, but we can do more. This is because the Command is responsible for many of Defence’s capabilities – including AI, cryptography, cyber and intelligence – that are most relevant to achieving the Government’s objective of securing strategic advantage through S&T. By implementing the Defence & Security Industrial Strategy and making strategic investments in our R&D, we will be able to enhance our capabilities, contribute to the broader economy and help create or sustain sovereign industries that are essential to the UK’s long-term strategic advantage.
+
+#### Sustainability
+
+Improving our sustainability will make us more likely to achieve the ambition set out in the Defence in a Competitive Age Command Paper, and do so at a faster pace. Rationalising data centres decreases energy consumption but also increases the capability of the Digital Backbone; building and/or renovating offices and accommodation increases energy efficiency but also improves the health and wellbeing of our personnel and their families; reducing our ‘deployed footprint’ in terms of fuel, water and other supplies will improve our ability to sustain ourselves for longer in more austere environments; and reducing our deployed power consumption also reduces our electro-magnetic emissions, reducing the effectiveness of our adversaries targeting.
+
+
+### Multi-Domain Integration Operational Scenario
+
+#### Introduction
+
+The strategy will ensure that the Command’s priorities drive towards a capability that is integrated across all five domains – land, sea, air, cyber and space. Our adversaries already have multi-domain approaches, but we need to be able to compete:
+
+#### In 2015…
+
+We saw the Russian incursion into Syria in support of the Assad regime; a range of strategic, operational and tactical activity across multiple domains as part of an overall campaign design:
+
+- Simultaneous cruise missile strikes into Northern Syria, from the Caspian Sea.
+
+- Posturing of Russian missile capable submarines in the Eastern Mediterranean.
+
+- A sophisticated, modernised, integrated air defence system established across Syria.
+
+- Strong and enduring sustainment chains to support forces in Syria through Tartus Port on the maritime side, and through the Bassel al Assad airbase into Syria.
+
+- An information and influence campaign which allowed President Putin to establish a strategic-level relationship with the Assad regime.
+
+- State of the art unmanned aerial systems tested.
+
+- Space and cyber and electro-magnetic domain capabilities were also likely to have been incorporated throughout their campaign, including the provision of intelligence from space.
+
+#### In the future….
+
+We need to be able to compete with, deter and, if necessary, defeat the approaches of our adversaries. We will do this through Multi-Domain Integration:
+
+- Moving beyond the traditional three domains of maritime, air and land to the five domains of maritime, air, land, space and cyber & electro-magnetic activity.
+
+- Operating with partners across government and beyond to our allies, especially in NATO.
+
+- Exploiting the wealth of classified and open-source information and applying it on operations globally more rapidly through advanced techniques and technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning.
+
+- Conducting information operations routinely, based on a detailed understanding of the audiences we need to influence.
+
+- Being persistently engaged globally as a nation, with our partners, in a much more enduring way than we have been in the past.
+
+- Using the improved capacity and covert ability of our special forces to best effect.
+
+- Analysing adversary supply chains to identify weaknesses, and using a range of skills, soft and hard offensive cyber operations, to ensure that we can target those vulnerabilities.
+
+- Invoking social reaction in adversarial states to our advantage.
+
+- Owning the narrative in a much more proactive way than we currently do.
+
+
+### Implementing Multi-Domain Integration…
+
+Bringing all this activity together into an enduring campaign approach is what Multi-Domain Integration is about. We’re achieving it on operations today, such as with the Carrier Strike Group on Op FORTIS, as part of the UK’s response to systemic competition. However if we want to be able to defeat our adversaries and compete more effectively sub-threshold we need to do better.
+
+Strategic Command is determined to achieve this. We’ve established the Multi-Domain Integration Change Programme to oversee the key elements of the change required across Defence. Our strategy will ensure all the Command’s capacity and resources are prioritised and galvanised towards its delivery.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-06-29-china-russia-relations.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-06-29-china-russia-relations.md
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+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-06-29-china-russia-relations.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : China-Russia Relations
+author: CSIS China Power Team
+date : 2022-06-29 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/ZzxnmOf.jpg
+#image_caption:
+description: Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine has cast a spotlight on China’s close ties with Russia.
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_This series consists of a historical backgrounder and three features examining the China-Russia relationship and assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the relationship, and it also includes a deep-dive on military cooperation between the two countries._
+
+
+
+### Backgrounder: How Has the China-Russia Relationship Evolved?
+
+> #### Major Milestones in the China-Russia Relationship
+
+
+▲ __October 1949. Establishment of Diplomatic Relations.__ _Shortly after the founding of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949, China establishes formal diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union._
+
+
+▲ __February 14, 1950. Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance.__ _The two countries sign the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, which returned certain Soviet-occupied territory back to China and set the stage for the Soviets to provide China with significant economic, technological, and military aid._
+
+
+▲ __1960 – 1989. Sino-Soviet Split.__ _In the mid-1950s, an ideological rift emerges between Chinese leader Mao Zedong and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. Growing tensions lead to the Sino-Soviet split, which lasts into the 1980s._
+
+
+▲ __May 15, 1989 – May 18, 1989. 1989 Sino-Soviet Summit.__ _Mikhail Gorbachev visits Beijing and holds meetings with Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese officials, marking the first visit by a Soviet leader since 1959. At the summit, the two sides agree to establish normal government-to-government and party-to-party relations._
+
+
+▲ __May 15, 1991 – May 19, 1991. Jiang Zemin Visits Moscow.__ _During a visit by Chinese leader Jiang Zemin to Moscow, the two countries sign an agreement that partially settles their border disputes._
+
+
+▲ __April 25, 1996. Upgrading of Relationship to a “Partnership of Strategic Coordination”.__ _Russian President Boris Yeltsin visits China and the two sides issue a joint statement establishing a “Sino-Russian partnership of strategic coordination.”_
+
+
+▲ __July 16, 2001. Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation.__ _China and Russia sign the Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, which sets the foundation for the relationship in the 21st century._
+
+
+▲ __October 15, 2004. Settlement of the China-Russia Border.__ _Hu Jintao and Vladimir Putin sign 13 agreements, including an agreement that fixes their border and finally resolves their border disputes._
+
+
+▲ __August 15, 2005 – August 25, 2005. First Joint Military Exercise.__ _China and Russia hold their first bilateral military exercise, known as “Peace Mission 2005.” The exercise involves around 10,000 troops from both countries._
+
+
+▲ __June 6, 2011. Upgrading Relations.__ _On the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, China and Russia agree to establish a “comprehensive strategic partnership.”_
+
+
+▲ __June 5, 2019. Upgrading Relations for a “New Era”.__ _Chinese President Xi Jinping visits Moscow to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The two leaders announce the upgrading of the relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era.”_
+
+
+▲ __February 4, 2022. Joint Statement on the Sidelines of the 2022 Olympic Games.__ _Vladimir Putin visits China and meets with Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympic Games. The two sides release a joint statement signaling the strength of the relationship just weeks before Russia invades Ukraine._
+
+
+### Feature 1: What Are the Key Strengths of the China-Russia Relationship?
+
+This feature explores how the China-Russia relationship came to be so close, up until the time of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The analysis centers on five key ways in which China benefits from the relationship, each of which is examined in detail.
+
+One of the key strengths highlighted in this feature is the strong personal relationship between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Since he became China’s president in 2013, Xi has met with Vladimir Putin 39 times, which is more than double the number of times Xi has met with leaders of any other major power.
+
+
+▲ _Xi Jinping’s Meetings with Select Foreign Leaders (2013-2022)_
+
+
+### Feature 2: What Are the Weaknesses of the China-Russia Relationship?
+
+This feature explores key areas of uncertainty and weak points within the China-Russia relationship. While ties between Beijing and Moscow are currently close, there are areas of tension and uncertainty within the relationship. One potential long-term stressor on the relationship is the growing power disparity between the two countries, as China solidifies its position as the more “senior” partner.
+
+This is most visible with respect to economic power. China’s GDP has already far outpaced Russia’s, and the gap between the two is set to widen as China’s GDP is expected to climb toward nearly $30 trillion in the coming years, while Russia’s is forecasted to stagnate at well under $2 trillion.
+
+
+▲ _GDP of China and Russia_
+
+
+### Feature 3: How Does China Benefit from Military Cooperation with Russia?
+
+This forthcoming feature will assess Chinese and Russian military cooperation, a crucial element of the broader bilateral relationship. One key area of China-Russia military cooperation that will be examined in this feature is military exercises.
+
+The two countries conducted their first joint military exercise in 2005, with another four exercises between 2007 and 2012. Starting in 2013, however, China and Russia significantly ramped up their participation in bilateral and multilateral exercises with each other. Through 2021, they have held a total of 53 military exercises.
+
+Keep an eye out for this feature to learn more about how China and Russia benefit from these military exercises, as well as other forms of military cooperation, such as arms sales.
+
+
+▲ _China-Russia Joint Military Exercises_
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-07-04-from-survival-to-victory.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-07-04-from-survival-to-victory.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : From Survival To Victory
+author: Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds
+date : 2022-07-04 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/uLWTIJz.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Ukraine at War: Paving the Road from Survival to Victory"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Ukraine has the will to achieve the operational defeat of the Russian military. At present, however, several Russian advantages and Ukrainian weaknesses are leading to an attritional conflict that risks a protracted war, eventually favouring Russia._
+
+
+
+- Russian electronic warfare (EW) is denying Ukraine a sufficiently fast kill chain to destroy Russia’s artillery.
+
+- Russian artillery is fixing the Ukrainian military and preventing the Ukrainians from concentrating to undertake offensive manoeuvre.
+
+- Russian cruise missiles are imposing a high economic and political cost on Ukraine.
+
+- A shortage of skilled infantry and armoured operators is limiting Ukraine’s offensive combat power.
+
+- Limited staff capacity is limiting Ukraine’s ability to plan and execute combined operations at scale.
+
+Ukraine’s international partners have the ability to reverse these dynamics to enable Ukraine to retake its lost territory. This cannot be achieved through the piecemeal delivery of a large number of different fleets of equipment, each with separate training, maintenance and logistical needs. Instead, Ukraine’s partners should rationalise the support they provide around a small number of platforms. Ukraine’s key capability requirements are:
+
+- Anti-radiation seekers for loitering munitions to suppress or destroy Russian EW complexes.
+
+- Multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to target and destroy Russian logistics and ammunition stockpiles to starve Russian artillery of ammunition.
+
+- 155-mm howitzers and ammunition to prevent Russian troop concentration and support Ukrainian troop concentrations.
+
+- Secure communications systems.
+
+- Anti-tank guided weapons and man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS).
+
+- Protected mobility to enable Ukrainian troops to manoeuvre under artillery threat.
+
+- Point defences to protect critical infrastructure.
+
+It is also necessary for Ukraine to receive training at scale to form new units able to undertake offensive operations and to receive staff and junior leadership training to support the orchestration of combined arms offensive manoeuvre.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+Four months of intense fighting in Ukraine have seen Russia’s grand offensive strokes descend into a grinding attritional struggle. Ukraine’s determination to resist, flawed Russian planning and execution, and the rapid delivery of arms to the Ukrainian armed forces have ensured Kyiv’s survival. The support that has enabled Ukraine to survive, however, will not deliver an end to the conflict. Russia could still wear down Ukrainian ammunition stockpiles, its reserve of skilled troops and the patience of the international community to slowly claw back a path towards meeting its aims. Ensuring Ukrainian survival in the longer term means enabling Ukrainian victory, and this requires a different kind of support to its forces.
+
+International support to Ukraine over the first four months of the war has been driven by two imperatives: what Ukraine’s partners have had immediately available; and what can be brought into Ukrainian service with the minimum necessary training and enablement. Given the magnitude and acuteness of the threat, this approach was justified. As the war protracts, however, there is a need to ensure that Ukraine’s war effort can be sustained, and that Ukraine is armed to deconstruct Russia’s system of systems, rather than produce a symmetrical stalemate that can only bring about an attritional conflict, risking Ukraine’s exhaustion. Whatever capabilities are provided, it is also necessary for standardisation and for them to be provided at scale. Given that this will require orders from Western industry, it is essential that the right capabilities are prioritised.
+
+This report seeks to outline how Russian forces are conducting their war against Ukraine through the examination of their technical capabilities and how they are being employed against the Ukrainian armed forces. By examining the tactical performance of the Russian system of warfare, the report reaches conclusions as to what international support is best placed to achieve disproportionate effect against it. The report is based on fieldwork in Ukraine both prior to and during the conflict, extensive interviews with Ukrainian military, scientific, security and intelligence personnel in both leadership and tactical positions, physical examination of captured Russian military equipment, observation of the armed forces of Ukraine on operations, interviews with Western security and military personnel, interviews with fighters in Ukraine’s foreign legion, examination of Russian military documents assessing their own operations and tactics in Ukraine, and the scraping of videos, images and accounts of fighting from open sources alongside a literature review of press coverage and academic writing about the war. The report takes into consideration, but largely discounts, Russian military performance and especially tactics, techniques and procedures documented during the first three weeks of fighting because the operational context makes these anomalous. To avoid similar contextual factors leading to overly broad conclusions, the report seeks to document consistent Russian behaviours and proficiencies observed between multiple fronts, such as in Donbas, Kherson and in some areas around Kyiv. It neglects a detailed examination of Russian unconventional operations and Ukraine’s maritime flank. These are important topics that should be examined separately. Instead, this report focuses on the dynamics of ground operations.
+
+Structurally, the report focuses on four elements of Russian operations: artillery; EW and reconnaissance; ground manoeuvre; and the air war. It ends with an overview of the conclusions as to what support should be prioritised for Ukraine. Although the report is heavily based on assessments of Ukrainian military performance and deficiencies in the Ukrainian armed forces, these are detailed sparingly to avoid providing Russia with useful insight into Ukrainian capabilities and vulnerabilities.
+
+
+### Beneath the Iron Rain
+
+Artillery is one of the most important components of Russian operations, and in terms of lethal capabilities it has become Russia’s mission-critical force multiplier. The generally mediocre performance of Russia’s ground forces has been increasingly offset by their leveraging of massed artillery fires to facilitate a slow and methodical advance. Sustained bombardment has progressively displaced the local population and levelled the settlements and infrastructure that were being defended, forcing the Ukrainian military to abandon territory after it is devastated. Furthermore, by preventing Ukrainian forces from massing to counterattack and causing considerable attrition to those units holding the line, particularly in Sievierodonetsk, Russian artillery was the key to preventing Ukrainian forces from turning the tables in the close fight as they did in the Battle for Kyiv prior to the Russian withdrawal from that axis.
+
+In the early stages of the Battle for Kyiv, the battlefield geometry prevented Russian artillery from being employed effectively. Russian forces were trapped on two main supply routes, leaving their lead elements in range of Ukrainian artillery positions while their own artillery and its ammunition were trapped behind congested friendly forces. In the south and in Donbas, by contrast, Russian forces have been able to deploy their artillery units more effectively and in a manner more consistent with Russian doctrine. Despite this, Russian artillery use reflects the Russian military being in a transitionary state. It had yet to widely implement many of the doctrinal and technical innovations that it had experimented with in recent years and intended to employ at scale. While battalion tactical groups (BTGs) have their own organic artillery, mostly mortars and limited numbers of field howitzers, many units lacked full complements of modernised guns, with most commanders unwilling to release artillery from the artillery tactical groups generated at the brigade and divisional level. This problem has been exacerbated by equipment losses early in the conflict, and has meant that Russian artillery has largely operated independently from – rather than in close support of – its manoeuvre elements, with supportive fire missions having long delays.
+
+A further challenge resulting from the disorganisation of the first phase of the war is that as Russian casualties have been replaced by conscripts, new short-term volunteer contractors, and mobilised citizens with prior military experience, there are fewer personnel trained to use Russia’s latest fire-control and battlespace management systems. In theory, Russian fires are mediated by the AKATSIA and AQUEDUCT systems. Russian forces were moving towards a common information environment as trialled at smaller scale in Syria. Under this concept of operations, which borrowed heavily from US and NATO concepts and doctrine and has been referred to as the Reconnaissance Fires Complex, artillery tactical groups could, through secure channels, receive targeting information in real time from ISTAR systems and units, be flexibly tasked to provide fire support to different units, and coordinate fires from multiple gunlines and groups to provide effect on targets. However, shortages of the required secure communications systems, alongside weaknesses in the training of both new recruits and older veterans called up to replace casualties and who are not familiar with the latest modernised systems, have resulted in failures to use it correctly. Russian artillery organic to BTGs have often communicated via unencrypted communications, or have followed up signals on their fire control systems with communications via cell phone or commercially procured devices. This has caused a centralisation of the artillery system into the artillery tactical groups under the command of more senior officers and staffs with experience of the appropriate battlespace management tools and in a slowing of the kill chain and resultant reduction in effectiveness.
+
+Despite these frictions, Russia has achieved fires dominance through the sheer volume of tactical artillery and munitions that it can bring to bear. In addition to vast stockpiles that the Soviet Union accumulated, and which have yet to be depleted – by some estimates, several years’ worth still remains – the Russian defence industry has a significant capacity for producing artillery shells. For example, Soviet-era armaments factories based in Ukraine were fulfilling orders for Russian forces up until 2014 with the capacity to assemble 2,000,000 152-mm howitzer shells per year in contracts that had been continued since the 1980s. Many similar large-scale plants remain in operation inside Russia. Although the Ukrainian factory had the capacity to assemble this many shells, actual outputs were often slightly below this figure, largely because of a bottleneck in the production of explosive material for the propellant and warhead. Nevertheless, the result of this stockpile is that, at present, Russia is firing approximately 20,000 152-mm artillery shells per day compared with Ukraine’s 6,000, with an even greater proportional disparity in multiple rocket launchers and missiles fired. Despite the prevalence of examples in the social media narrative of precision fires being delivered, the majority of artillery fires in Ukraine are conducted by traditional unguided mortars, field howitzers and MLRS. Although guided artillery ammunition has been produced and made available to Russian units, personnel and training problems have hampered implementation. This has often resulted in guided munitions being used as dumb shells. Ukrainian troops have observed Russian forces firing laser-guided artillery ammunition, for example, without using a laser designator to mark targets. Similar to previous conflicts, area-effect artillery reliant on blast and fragmentation as the principal mechanisms for causing damage to targets is devastating against soft targets such as dismounted personnel and light vehicles but is of limited effectiveness against armour. Against armoured vehicles and hard targets or structures, the use of these fires tends to be to fix the defenders, which can make them susceptible to either bypass, or destruction through the employment of thermobaric artillery such as the TOS-1A MLRS. Due to poor ISTAR capability and long response times, Ukrainian artillery units have reported being able to consistently evade being subjected to effective Russian targeting and counterbattery fire. However, when employed en masse against fixed targets, such as defended positions and urban areas, the cumulative effect of Russian artillery has proven potent.
+
+The way that tactical artillery has been employed is roughly consistent with established doctrine, albeit lacking much of the C4ISTAR coordination as envisioned by the Reconnaissance Fire Complex and exhibiting a considerable degree of systemic friction and slowed responsiveness. Where the Reconnaissance Fire Complex has been successfully established in Ukraine – which has occurred periodically – it has been through the adoption and integration of UAV and EW ISTAR to identify targets and coordinate fires. In terms of physical deployment, Ukrainian forces have observed that the Russians deploy their artillery systems set back from the frontline by one third of their maximum range as a protection measure; mortars are largely positioned 1.5 km back from the forward line of own troops, artillery tactical groups subordinated to brigades 8 km back, and artillery tactical groups armed with longer-ranged systems dedicated to deep fires at 10–15 km back. There is significant variation from these distances, with artillery units often moving forward to extend their reach. Nevertheless, the principle is generally adhered to. Batteries are deployed across an area of up to 100 by 300 metres, with between 20 and 40 metres between each gun. MLRS are generally deployed in a linear gunline, with up to 150 metres between each launcher. However, some artillery batteries have been detected as being split up into dispersed subunits. This is partly due to artillery shortages at the BTG and brigade level, with pairs of, or individual, guns fulfilling a support function that should be the task of a full battery. However, some of this dispersion is due to the use of mobile fire units supported by UAVs to attack key Ukrainian targets. While limited in scale, these instances show where the Russian Army’s aspirations to modernise have begun to be realised. Where they have been realised, Russian fires have been responsive, accurate and highly lethal. Russian artillery units have also set up dummy positions using one artillery piece with the remainder made up of damaged or destroyed Russian artillery, to draw Ukrainian fire. Russian MLRS are used primarily for area denial, often to constrain the movement of Ukrainian units, while field howitzers are used against specific targets, though this is not a universal rule. For counterbattery fire against artillery, Russian forces will generally task those artillery tactical groups armed with heavier,
+longer-ranged weapons, or Tochka-U.
+
+According to Ukrainian artillery crews, Russian artillery is generally able to bring accurate artillery fire down on targets 3 to 5 minutes after UAV reconnaissance has identified them, but if a target is identified with EW direction finding, acoustic reconnaissance or counterbattery artillery radar, it will take Russian artillery approximately half an hour to bring inaccurate artillery fire to bear. The importance of UAVs to Russia’s artillery precision and responsiveness has forced Ukraine to maintain organic MANPADS teams with their artillery, preferably armed with visually guided systems such as Starstreak and Martlet, which have proven much more effective against UAVs and helicopters. If Russian forces are able to maintain UAV reconnaissance over a target, they are able to adjust fire in near-real time even if the target is moving. When subjected to counterbattery fire themselves, Russian MLRS units will tend to relocate, whereas howitzers, whether towed or self-propelled, will usually be left in position while the crews seek cover or position themselves at a distance from their guns until incoming fire has subsided. Russian batteries often do not relocate after fire missions, but will relocate to a new position or gunline within the same approximate area if they come under attack. It was noted that when plugged into the AKATSIA fire-control architecture, Russian counterbattery fire was assigned to unengaged batteries, and was not conducted by batteries that were themselves being targeted.
+
+One significant deviation from doctrine is that Russian forces have made extensive tactical use of the Tochka-U ballistic missile for counterbattery and tactical strikes. Although almost entirely retired from frontline service by 2019, as they were officially replaced by Iskander-M, the reliance of Russian forces on indirect fires resulted in the Tochka-U’s restoration to active service and its repurposing from a long-range precision-strike system to part of the tactical artillery system. Although Tochka-U is often used by Russian forces to target EW units and command posts located in the enemy rear, it has become valued for its large high-explosive warhead, which Russian forces seem to view as effective against a wide variety of targets for which it was not originally intended. This has sometimes manifested in acutely inefficient targeting. In one engagement, a single Ukrainian M109 howitzer was targeted by three Tochka-U strikes. The crew were forced to temporarily abandon the howitzer in order to seek hard cover, but it survived with light damage that could be repaired in a few hours with some basic spare parts.
+
+Overall, despite the deficiencies and inefficiencies of the Russian Army’s artillery forces, in their present form they remain a major obstacle to Ukrainian forces, enabling continued Russian offensive operations and impeding Ukrainian counterattacks. Breaking down Russia’s fires dominance is critical if Ukrainian forces are to be able to retake ground and stem their current high rate of attrition. The main weakness of the Russian artillery system is the logistics burden posed by the transportation and stockpiling of the vast quantity of shells that allows Russia to continue to manoeuvre by fire. Russian dependence on the railway network as the primary means of transporting war stocks was well understood before the war. Due to a lack of planning time for lower echelons, Russia struggled to move materiel from rail heads to its frontline positions in the opening phase of the conflict. During April, however, a system of contractorisation for moving materiel from railheads to the divisional rear was developed, with military units then shifting ammunition to large ammunition depots behind the main artillery concentrations. From there, the ammunition is shuttled to the guns. The reliance on railheads and civilian vehicles, which are largely restricted to road movement, makes key bottlenecks in Russian artillery highly predictable. Moreover, the ammunitions dumps at the divisional and brigade level are large, distinct, hard to conceal or defend, and slow to relocate. Given Ukraine’s limited capacity to strike at the Russian military’s rear echelons and fight a deep battle, this is a weakness that is yet to be widely capitalised upon. Isolated strikes on ammunition dumps show what is possible but given the disparity in guns and the shortage of Russian precision fires, the fastest way to level the playing field is to enable Ukraine to strike Russian artillery logistics. The critical factor in this is precision, range and payload. Ukraine needs strike systems with a sufficiently powerful warhead to ignite stored ammunition or damage key logistical infrastructure, accurate enough to hit these targets precisely, and with the range to do so from beyond Russian howitzer fire. The best system for this is MLRS, although with a more powerful munition than the UK’s reduced lethality unitary warhead GMLRS. These capabilities need to be provided at scale.
+
+In breaking up the Russian fires complex, targeting ammunition would significantly reduce the volume of fire that Russia could bring to bear and thereby offer advantage to the force able to strike with greater precision. Although Ukrainian ammunition consumption may not rise to Russian levels, the destruction of Russian guns and the provision of close support to Ukrainian units will necessitate a significant number of both howitzers and shells. Given that 152-mm ammunition is in limited supply and NATO countries lack production lines for this nature, it will be necessary to provide Ukraine with a large number of 155-mm howitzers and a consistent supply of ammunition. One challenge here is that NATO standardisation is not very standardised, with different countries’ howitzers not only having completely different maintenance requirements but also using different charges, fuses and sometimes shells. The current approach by which each country donates a battery of guns in a piecemeal way is rapidly turning into a logistical nightmare for Ukrainian forces with each battery requiring a separate training, maintenance and logistics pipeline. Making support to Ukraine sustainable requires the provision of one or two kinds of gun and for countries to step up production of the appropriate ammunition. It will also necessitate the establishment of second-line maintenance for these systems. Of course, these efforts will be of limited value if Ukrainian forces cannot find their targets in a timely manner, and so we must turn to the electromagnetic spectrum.
+
+
+### Contesting the Spectrum
+
+If Ukraine is to defeat Russian fires through a combination of range and precision, its armed forces need a kill chain that can identify and communicate the location of Russian targets. This can either be delivered by UAVs, reconnaissance teams or electronic direction finding. All these methods, however, are hindered by Russia’s EW complexes which are integral to Russian concepts of operation. It is therefore necessary to assess how these are being employed in Ukraine, their limitations and where they present tactical challenges that must be overcome.
+
+The initial phase of the war in Ukraine is not indicative of Russian EW capabilities because the confusion caused by a lack of planning time led to fratricide, poor command coordination and thus many Russian EW systems being kept off. Subsequently, the Russian armed forces have started to use their EW capabilities more systematically. On 6 June 2022, for example, a field assessment of the Russian armed forces concluded that ‘the enemy’s UAVs, high-precision loitering and artillery ammunition and communications equipment rely on positioning through the reception of signals from satellite radio navigation systems’. To protect Russian forces from these capabilities, it was recommended that they continuously suppress access to satellite navigation through the constant operation of the Pole-21 system and the constant employment of the R330Zh, both on maximum power using omnidirectional jamming. The advice noted that these systems could be deconflicted with the employment of Orlan-10 UAVs by the Russian forces. The effect on Russian command and control was limited by the linking of command posts by ground-laid field cable, which Ukrainian forces have noted is now always emplaced within hours of the Russians setting up a position. Both Pole-21 and R330Zh are turned off prior to the commencement of Russian artillery strikes that may need to rely on accurate satellite-based positioning. In practice, while widespread, coverage is not constant because the R330Zh requires a significant supply of fuel to operate.
+
+A more active layer in the Russian EW defence architecture is provided by Shipovnik-Aero, a truck-mounted jamming system optimised for targeting UAVs but also capable of suppressing a range of communications networks. The system has a range of 15 km and detects UAVs through their control frequency. The system takes approximately 25 seconds to analyse the control frequencies of newly encountered UAVs, and around 2 seconds to reconfirm the control frequencies of previously encountered UAVs. It then jams the command frequency. In addition, the system overrides the positioning of the UAV so that ‘return to base’ protocols lead the UAV to land in a location designated by the Russians. The Shipovnik-Aero has two workstations and is able to engage two UAVs at a time. Its jamming effect is delivered on a bearing with a width of approximately 3 degrees, suppressing friendly and civilian signals in the targeted bands within this area. Although these systems are not universally available to Russian formations, their presence has become widespread, limiting the airspace that Ukrainian UAVs are able to penetrate and monitor. The Shipovnik-Aero can take up to 40 minutes to set up and, like many other Russian EW systems, is therefore vulnerable to suppression through forced displacement or strike if its position can be determined.
+
+Another challenge faced by Ukrainian troops is that Russian direction finding is highly capable and where it is not possible to suppress UAVs, it is often possible to target the ground control station. The means by which ground control stations have been targeted depends on the type of UAV and its range, but has included the dedicated firing of 152-mm howitzers, 300-mm MLRS and Tochka-U at UAV operators. Between these threats and those of EW causing UAVs to crash, or interception by air-defence systems, the lifespan of Ukrainian UAVs is roughly 7 days with some variation by system. In consequence, many Ukrainian units are forced to choose between having a live feed from their UAVs and thereby risking a high likelihood of losing the platform or sending UAVs out on pre-set flight plans and analysing the images they take on their return to a pre-set location. The use of jamming detection and inertial navigation can mitigate against the jamming of satellite navigation for a UAV following a pre-set flight plan. However, this method imposes a significant time delay between a target being identified in a location and the capacity of Ukrainian forces to bring fires to bear. This is either because the enemy is not in the location that the UAV was pre-programmed to examine requiring subsequent UAV launches, or because of the time required to conduct the analysis and confirmation of images after the UAV has completed its flight, compounded by the analytical challenge of confirming the coordinates of targets observed when accurate satellite navigation over the target area is denied. During fieldwork, the authors observed that a UAV launched to observe Russian positions in the latter manner did not face serious interference from EW, but that a subsequent UAV flying with a command link came under electronic attack as soon as it approached Russian forces. At present, it is widely observed that the Russians rarely displace from favourable positions once established. This, however, is likely a consequence of Ukraine having so few means to strike these targets, and it must be assumed that if Ukraine were to gain the means to strike – as outlined in the previous section – Russian units would begin to displace at intervals.
+
+The Russians have had very limited success in denying Ukrainian communications. Despite Russian forces fielding EW complexes dedicated to the suppression of satellites, such as the 1RL257 Krasukha-4, the density of the Starlink satellite architecture means that Ukrainian forces are able to maintain reliable satellite connections across tactical formations. Cyber attacks against satellite architectures have been disruptive, but periodic, and the effect has not been something that the Russians can synchronise with other actions. Where 1RL257 has proven more effective is in the preparatory jamming of radar and other defensive systems in preparation of large-scale artillery or air strikes. Another element of the use of EW in an offensive role is the TORN-MDM signals intelligence vehicle, capable of direction finding and triangulating tactical communications within a radius of between 30 and 70 km depending on frequency. This system can also record and analyse communications, with the organic capacity to attempt decryption. Although Harris radios have been found to function despite Russian EW and to have robust encryption, Motorola radios used extensively by Ukrainian forces are more suspectable to jamming and technical examination suggests the signals are decrypted, although it takes around two hours. Training, tactics and procedures can mitigate the risk to operational security as a result of this penetration for tactical actions but it severely limits the Ukrainian capacity to disseminate operationally relevant orders and instructions in a secure manner and is therefore a constraining factor in the scale at which Ukrainian forces can coordinate. A further complication is the Russian employment of Leer-3 EW payloads mounted on Orlan-10 UAVs to target cell phone networks. While widely employed, the effect of these systems has been limited by their protracted employment over the past 8 years in Donbas so that Ukrainian forces are familiar with the risks posed by the system and effective countermeasures to them.
+
+In sum, Russian EW employment is not preventing Ukrainian communications and denying access to the electromagnetic spectrum. However, it is disrupting, limiting the accuracy of positioning, and slowing down vital kill chains and imposing significant limitations on Ukrainian reconnaissance in depth. Because long-range strike depends on precision systems, which are only available in limited numbers, Russian EW is a critical barrier to Ukrainian forces effectively employing the highly capable Western systems that could enable them to win the firefight and undermine Russia’s most important advantage. A means of countering Russian EW is thus necessary to enable Ukraine to conduct timely and accurate reconnaissance. The best method of delivering this effect is a radar-homing seeker payload for explosive-laden UAVs. Ukraine has the industrial capacity to manufacture airframes at scale, and there is a significant advantage in allowing Ukraine to develop multiple wing-forms for this mission because it makes the detection, classification and destruction of the UAVs much harder for Russian forces. However, a robust, cheap and reliable seeker that can be provided at scale is the critical component to enable this capability. Even if such a system did not account for a large number of destroyed Russian EW systems, because all EW complexes must emit – save for collection systems such as the TORN-MDM – they are readily targeted in this manner. Russian forces can avoid the destruction of their systems by leaving them off or displacing. Given that most EW complexes take between 25–40 minutes to set up, however, forcing displacement is an effective means of suppression that, in turn, would create many windows of opportunity for Ukrainian UAVs and reconnaissance teams to communicate the position of Russian systems in real time and determine the exact coordinates of positively identified high-value targets. The development of a cheap seeker that can be provided to Ukraine at scale is therefore a critical capability that Ukraine’s partners should immediately prioritise. If Ukraine can counter Russian EW, it becomes possible to apply accurate fires to counteract the shaping by massed Russian artillery and thereby bring about the favourable conditions for Ukrainian ground manoeuvre that are a pre-condition to the liberation of occupied Ukrainian territory.
+
+
+### Hectares Lost and Liberated
+
+Ground manoeuvre is an area in which Ukraine holds significant advantages, but as these advantages are primarily related to the defence there will need to be significant support to enable Ukraine to retake lost ground. To begin with the Russian ground forces, at the beginning of the invasion, Russian units were organised into BTGs that were often understrength in their infantry component but nevertheless predominantly made up of contract soldiers. Poor tactical employment combined with a shortage of infantry to support armour saw the Russians take exceedingly heavy equipment and personnel losses. In the aftermath of the withdrawal from Kyiv, Russian forces have sought to reconstitute their forces in two ways. First, they have offered short-term contracts for service in Ukraine with inflated salaries. Second, the Russian government has been conducting a stealthy mobilisation of older citizens with prior military experience and with technical competences in order to reduce the training time for their integration into the force. Having raised the age for eligible service, the Russian government assesses that it has 1.6 million people within its current target group for mobilisation. Ukrainian officials are predicting that 9 million Russians will be unemployed by the end of the year, potentially increasing those volunteering for service. Nevertheless, the draft appears extremely unpopular and even among hard Russian nationalists is seen as a signal that the government has conducted the war incompetently. Furthermore, bottlenecks in government records, training capacity and equipment serviceability mean that the Russian government cannot pull all these individuals into uniform in a short space of time. Instead, the process of mobilisation is anticipated to be an ongoing one.
+
+The dynamics outlined above have created several problems for Russian ground forces. First, their units are now amalgamations of troops with variable levels of training, experience and equipment and with little time spent working together. The lack of a professional non-commissioned officer corps in the Russian Army has inhibited the cohesion of these composite units. Furthermore, the massive casualties among Russia’s contract soldiers – disproportionately concentrated among the airborne and special forces – in the first month of the war has left many soldiers who survived to be very reluctant to embark on offensive operations. Thus, the most experienced troops who ought to be critical to leading newly mobilised personnel are, in many cases, the most reluctant to prosecute attacks. The result is that Russian forces on the offensive lack momentum, and demand massive artillery preparation of their objectives as well as overwhelming numerical superiority.
+
+Despite these deficiencies, the Russians continue to seize ground and are inflicting casualties on the Ukrainian military at an average rate of 100 per day. There are several reasons for this. First, the artillery dominance of the Russian forces prevents Ukrainian troops from concentrating much above the size of the company group. Russian forces, which are not under a comparable artillery threat, can concentrate at the decisive point and are therefore achieving localised force ratios upwards of 7:1 on their main effort. Furthermore, by operating across a broader front, Russian forces are better able to exploit their considerable firepower and resilience than during their attempts at a coup de main against Kyiv. Furthermore, after taking massive casualties, the Russians have once again taken up their lessons from Chechnya and Syria and begun to employ mobile storm groups to spearhead offensive operations in urban areas, built around 20-person assault teams supported by armour. This tactical adaptation has enabled Russian forces to make greater progress in urban fighting, with casualty rates among Russian and Ukrainian units currently approaching parity, despite the Russians usually being on the offensive. Although Ukrainian troops are much better motivated, Russian numerical superiority and the ability to kill Ukrainian forces with artillery as they manoeuvre mean that Ukrainian units continue to cede ground and to pay disproportionately on the offensive.
+
+Enabling Ukraine to defeat Russian ground manoeuvre forces is not just a matter of winning the artillery war. Ukrainian troops must be able to take the offensive, and here it is necessary to address some serious misconceptions about the structure and capabilities of the Ukrainian Army. US commentators have applauded excellent Ukrainian tactical proficiency and often ascribed this to Ukraine adopting a professional non-commissioned officer corps. This is an impression produced by disproportionate interaction with a small number of highly capable Ukrainian units that have had long exposure to NATO. To step into the headquarters of the 95th Air Assault Brigade, for example, would be a very familiar experience for any NATO officer. The layout of the room, range of specialisms present, orders process and culture, with briefings delivered by junior officers and soldiers under the supervision of their superiors, is similar to what prevails in the most proficient NATO command posts. The 95th Brigade – and several others – also have non-commissioned officers who have interacted extensively with NATO counterparts. Speak to them about their role, however, and they are the first to admit that there is little standardisation of how non-commissioned officer posts are used by commanders across the Ukrainian Army, that professional military education for the corps was nascent before the war and that their units are not representative.
+
+Most units of the Ukrainian armed forces today contain a significant proportion of civilians with limited military experience, mobilised technical specialists with considerable expertise but without rank, and small numbers of professional soldiers who have rarely operated at scale. The culture is highly egalitarian. Orders groups are more akin to debates in which the commander’s statement of the mission objective results in a chaotic discussion enabling all participants to raise questions, concerns and ideas. The result is often an innovative and technically complex tactical scheme and is a large cause for Ukraine’s widespread tactical successes. It is an approach that maximises the contribution of motivated soldiers with a wealth of creativity and a wide range of competences. However, such a process, while viable in platoon and company groups, is not replicable at scale. In battalion- and brigade-sized actions, which is the minimum level at which full combined arms capabilities come together and is therefore the level at which offensive actions are most successfully undertaken, commanders must often make decisions that trade risk against a part of their force in exchange for advantage in another. This is a process that is not best reached by consensus but by unity of command, a clear orders process and mechanisms to oversee the implementation of orders. In many Ukrainian units, the lack of planning staffs and non-commissioned officers to manage execution of rapidly transmitted orders make the transition from defence to offence challenging.
+
+Furthermore, because of poor pay prior to the conflict, the Ukrainian armed forces had trained vastly more technical specialists – such as mechanics, drivers and pilots – than it required to fill its order of battle. This was because of chronic retention problems. Now that Ukrainian society has been fully mobilised, the force has an abundance of technical specialists, and this is supplemented by civilian engineers, programmers and skilled professionals who make the Ukrainian military creative and able to build and employ a wide range of innovative capabilities. However, while this is exceedingly useful for communications, technical surveillance and reconnaissance, EW and other functions, the core of effective offensive operations relies on not only the much-needed uplift in military equipment but also the infantry fieldcraft, tankmanship, tactical proficiency and the well-practised coordination of these elements into true combined arms manoeuvre. Troops and commanders who are highly proficient in this are in far shorter supply. To compensate for the dearth of field experience in many Territorial Defence Battalions, the Ukrainian armed forces broke up some of their best units to push experienced infanteers into newly formed units. In the defence, this has led to reasonable combat performance by these troops. For the attack, however, the Ukrainian armed forces have found it necessary to bring their best units back together and have them spearhead attacks. The combination of distributing a limited supply of highly proficient professional soldiers across frontline units, and then their concentration for offensive operations, has seen disproportionate casualties among Ukraine’s most-capable troops. If Ukraine is to effectively fight a manoeuvrist war, able to withdraw from enemy concentrations and punish the Russians with fires, while setting up counterattacks to break up Russian formations, it will be necessary to improve the tactical soldiering skills across a significant number of Ukrainian troops from the various combat arms and to ensure that the staffs at brigade level are able to effectively employ these units. UK training of 10,000 infantry will help, but will be insufficient without staff and junior leadership training. The survivability of Ukrainian forces while manoeuvring also requires protected mobility able to survive Russian fires. It is also important that newly trained Ukrainian troops are not filtered into units piecemeal to simply maintain troop levels but are instead held in formed units that can offer higher Ukrainian echelons available units of action to execute manoeuvre and thereby unhinge Russia’s operations. If Ukraine can execute offensive manoeuvre, it will quickly take the initiative away from the Russians and thereby reduce the current massing of unfavourable force ratios at key points.
+
+For Ukraine’s international partners, enabling Ukraine to shift on to the offensive to retake its lost territories requires three lines of effort. First, there is a need to deliver infantry training to newly raised Ukrainian units at scale. Second, there is a need to deliver staff training at the brigade and divisional level to help expand the scale at which Ukraine can orchestrate operations. Third, there is a need to provide a standardised protected mobility platform with first- and second-line maintenance to give newly formed brigades the equipment to remain survivable while they concentrate. All of these are tasks that Ukraine’s international partners have the capability to deliver. The US has managed to gift armoured vehicles by the acre to allies in the Middle East. Even large numbers of armoured HMMWVs would be preferable to a smorgasbord of antiquated vehicle fleets. In the Balkans, MPRI’s support to Croatian forces during Operation Storm is a demonstration of how staff capacity can be rapidly expanded. Large-scale infantry training is something that has been conducted multiple times over the past 30 years. The question is how Ukraine’s partners plan to share the burden of these tasks.
+
+
+### A Land Without Safety
+
+After the initial phase of operations, both the Russian Air Force and the Ukrainian Air Force have found that much of the air over enemy territory is denied to them. For Russia, a lack of pilot training for large-formation flying, limited capabilities for the suppression of air defences and the lack of unified command of air operations led to a significant number of aircraft losses and poor effects on Ukrainian territory. For Ukraine, the density and lethality of Russian air defences have meant that its air force cannot routinely approach areas of active operations, while helicopters are employed sparingly, only to areas confirmed to lack coverage from air defences.
+
+Because the longer-ranged Russian air-defence systems provide protection over the frontlines, the Russians have been able to maintain a significant tempo of close air support strikes in Mariupol and Donbas. However, the density of Ukrainian MANPADS forces Russian aircraft to fly at dusk and dawn, and at higher altitudes, limiting accuracy with unguided munitions. Against helicopters, Ukrainian forces report that Igla and Stinger MANPADS are routinely defeated by Russian countermeasures.
+
+Unfortunately, Russia’s ability to strike targets deep inside Ukraine is not removed by the denial of airspace to the VKS. From the first days of the war, Russia has struck across Ukraine with cruise and ballistic missiles. The initial failure by Russia to mass these fires against Ukrainian logistics and key infrastructure enabled Ukrainian forces to reposition in the opening stages of the war and is a partial cause of the failure of Russia’s attempt to seize Kyiv. Nevertheless, as the conflict protracts, Russia’s ability to strike wherever it wishes has a number of effects that are detrimental to Ukraine’s war effort.
+
+First, these strikes minimise Ukraine’s capacity to domestically produce defence materiel, to conduct large-scale maintenance of its combat systems, exercise new formations of troops or maintain significant fixed infrastructure. From the destruction of Yavoriv Training Base with a salvo of 30 missiles near Lviv on 13 March, to the concentration of a salvo of missiles against Kyiv on 26 June, Russia is capable of conducting large-scale strikes on selected targets. The persistent strikes on Ukrainian cities have an attritional effect on the confidence of the Ukrainian public in its security, the prospects for reconstruction and economic recovery, and the management of internally displaced people.
+
+It also appears that Russia is striking targets in civilian areas to send political messages, and to hold civilian areas at risk. There is a persistent concern that Russian missile systems positioned in Belarus may move south to conduct a mass strike on the capital at short notice.
+
+It has been widely reported that Russia is running out of these munitions. It is certainly true that all these long-range strike systems rely on foreign components that Western sanctions are limiting Russia’s access to. It is also clear that Russia has a limited stockpile. Nevertheless, at current rates of expenditure, strikes can continue for months. So long as the capacity to deliver these effects remains, they also have a shaping function on Ukrainian forces, the economy and society.
+
+The most destructive system employed against Ukraine is the Iskander-M quasi-ballistic missile, which is also the hardest to intercept. As it is manoeuvrable, the Iskander-M is exceedingly difficult for ballistic missile defence to plot an interception. Furthermore, it dispenses decoy emitters in its terminal phase, each approximately the size of a drinks can, which collectively expand and distort the contours and apparent trajectory of the missile when interrogated by radar. Despite being highly effective, Iskander-M is both one of Russia’s scarcer weapons systems and central to its concepts for defence against NATO, limiting the number of munitions that are used. The vast majority of strikes against Ukraine are conducted using cruise missiles, including: the 9M727 launched from the Iskander transporter erector launcher; the Kh-101 mainly launched from bombers from the north of Ukraine; the Kh-59 air- and ground-launched cruise missile; and the 3M-54 Kalibr launched in large numbers from Russian vessels in the Black Sea. The launch method, range and payload of these munitions varies, but they also have a large number of common characteristics and components. For example, some computers for processing sensor data are common in both the 9M727 and Kalibr missiles.
+
+The similarities between these missiles mean that they have comparable advantages and vulnerabilities. They are subsonic (though some variants can go supersonic in their terminal dive), low flying and manoeuvrable. The selection of waypoints en route to target allows these missiles to avoid detection by defensive radar if the locations of these defences have been established. Russian forces have been observed to use E95M air targets to encourage the illumination and thereby mapping of defensive radar. In any case, these missiles give little warning to missile defence systems and can often approach targets from poorly defended or even undefended trajectories.
+
+Another consequence of the manoeuvrability of these missiles is that, when they enter Ukrainian air space, their eventual destination cannot be determined – even if they are observed on a particular trajectory, they can turn to fly in a completely different direction. As a result, the Ukrainians must initiate their air raid warnings across a very wide area. However, multiple such alerts a day lead to many people ignoring the air raid warning, placing them at risk when the missiles eventually reach their targets.
+
+The missiles rely on a range of sensors to guide their flight. Several have imaging capabilities and can compare the footage to pre-loaded mapping. Others use radar for a similar purpose. They also tend to have an aerial mounted on the top of the missile for receiving satellite signals and have fibre-optic gyroscopes for inertial navigation in case weather, enemy countermeasures or damage denies access to their primary sensors. Interestingly, the Iskander 9M727 cruise missile – and this may be true of the others also – relies on GPS and GLONAS for its satellite navigation and is unable to receive BeiDou signals. The GPS is the primary navigation tool for the missile, probably because Russian satellite coverage over target countries is intermittent and because it is assumed that the enemy will not deny GPS signals over territory that they control. Briefings by the Pentagon have reported that a large number of Russian cruise missiles fail to either find their targets or malfunction and crash in flight. As far as Ukrainian military scientists can determine, this is actually quite rare. Because of their subsonic flight, Ukrainian troops can indicate to nearby units when these cruise missiles overfly them, and this has enabled Ukrainian Zu-23 gunners to prepare to engage munitions in flight. Other cruise missiles have been shot down by Ukrainian air-defence systems, including SA-11 and by fast air interceptors. Many of the downed missiles exhibit signs of having been hit in the fuselage and wing by cannon fire or fragmentation blasts, suffering damage to either their sensors or control surfaces and therefore having their stability in flight compromised.
+
+Given that ground-based anti-aircraft artillery, ground-to-air and air-to-air missiles are able to knock out the majority of Russia’s long-range precision-strike capabilities, it is evident that Ukraine needs two kinds of support. First, there is the need for a means to disseminate cruise missile track data more effectively. For a warning system inside Ukraine, this could be app based, with civilians encouraged to tap to indicate when a cruise missile is overflying them. The cyber security of this architecture would be critical. More importantly, however, the provision of point defences for Ukrainian critical military infrastructure would be highly beneficial. Although Ukrainian air defences have proven capable of intercepting Russian missiles, there are too few of these platforms to provide adequate coverage given that the low flight profile of cruise missiles makes the area that a given air defence battery can cover very small. Instead, capabilities such as C-RAM and some EW systems could enable Ukraine to significantly harden critical areas in its rear to expand its ability to sustain domestic war production and to secure training sites that will be critical to the ongoing reconstitution of Ukrainian ground elements. Additional stocks of air-to-air missiles also offer the prospects of the continued interception of cruise missiles by the Ukrainian Air Force.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+Ukrainian victory is possible, but only with international support. In the absence of that support Ukraine may either be worn down through attrition and economically strangled, or else fight a protracted and bloody war over several years. International support so far has been hugely consequential in enabling Ukraine to survive but has also been piecemeal and is introducing significant logistical frictions into the Ukrainian military. The first step in delivering effective support to Ukraine is the rationalisation of the equipment being provided with standardisation of platforms and munitions supported by appropriate maintenance. Burden-sharing between Western defence industry and governments will be important. For this purpose, a committee to agree a process for rationalisation of support should be established to ensure its sustainability, where allies agree to each provide specific kinds of capability at scale, rather than each state offer small numbers of a wide range of capabilities.
+
+This report has sought to outline Ukraine’s foremost tactical requirements if it is to be able to retake the ground lost to Russia and thereby achieve the operational defeat of the Russian Army. First, Ukraine must suppress Russia’s artillery advantage by destroying the logistical enablement of Russia’s massed fires. Second, Ukraine must employ its own fires to prevent Russia concentrating to achieve positive force ratios. Third, the Ukrainian military must be able to strike Russia’s EW architecture to enable the kill chains to win the fire fight. Fourth, this should enable Ukrainian offensive ground manoeuvre, but will require large-scale training in infantry skills, support to Ukrainian brigade and divisional planning, and the provision of protected mobility. Finally, Ukrainian training bases, critical national infrastructure and population centres need greater protection from Russian long-range precision strikes, which demands the provision of support in tracking cruise missiles and point defences.
+
+The priorities for equipment support to Ukraine may be defined as follows:
+
+- MLRS.
+- 52-calibre 155-mm howitzers and a consistent supply of ammunition.
+- Anti-radiation seekers for loitering munitions.
+- Harris radios or comparably secure tactical communications.
+- Anti-tank guided weapons capable of overflight or top attack, most notably NLAW, Javelin and Brimstone.
+- Visually guided MANPADS such as Starstreak and Martlet.
+- Protected mobility platforms.
+- Point defence systems.
+- Second-line maintenance support.
+
+The scale and longevity of support that Ukraine requires is significant and will stretch many Western allies. These requirements cannot be met through the donation of existing stocks but will instead require the production of new munitions. The cost may lead Western states to slow-roll the provision of support. In practice, however, a slow attritional conflict will be much more costly in the long term. Rationalising support to Ukraine today and delivering capability at scale is essential.
+
+If Russia is to be convinced that stopping its invasion is the best line of policy – just as the Russian military determined that it had to withdraw from Kyiv – then the Kremlin must be convinced that it cannot win through a protracted conflict that exhausts Ukrainian stockpiles and Western resolve.
+
+---
+
+__Jack Watling__ is Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare. Jack has recently conducted studies of deterrence against Russia, force modernisation, partner force capacity building, the future of corps operations, the future of fires, and Iranian strategic culture.
+
+__Nick Reynolds__ is the Research Analyst for Land Warfare at RUSI. His research interests include land power, wargaming and simulation. Prior to joining RUSI he worked for Constellis.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-07-18-say-less-do-more-on-taiwan.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-07-18-say-less-do-more-on-taiwan.md
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+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-07-18-say-less-do-more-on-taiwan.md
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Say Less Do More On Taiwan
+author: Paul Haenle and Evan Medeiros
+date : 2022-07-18 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/16ssK9G.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "A China expert sees hardening positions and growing capabilities as destabilizing forces in the Washington-Beijing relationship."
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The U.S. President Joe Biden recently traveled to the region to visit Japan and Korea and to meet the Quad leaders, and to announce the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF)._
+
+
+
+__Paul Haenle:__ _`In your view, what are the main policy continuities from the last administration? What do you think are the strengths of Biden’s China policy and Asia policy, and where do you think the administration needs to step up its game?`_
+
+__Evan Medeiros:__ We can start with comparisons between this administration and the last administration. I think the [current] administration gets a bad rap as “Trump lite.” I just think that is an unfair criticism because, sure there are similarities and differences, but the differences, to me, are big, important, sort of chunky differences between the Biden approach and the Trump approach.
+
+In particular, it is important to remember that Biden, from day one, basically said that they are not interested in changing China. So they took regime-change off the table, which is something the Trump administration very specifically embraced.
+
+Number two, the Trump administration wasn’t really interested in working with allies and partners. That literally is the centerpiece of what Biden is doing in terms of his China strategy.
+
+Number three, the Trump team, through their tariffs and other economic measures, was pretty committed to a very robust economic decoupling. That’s not where the Biden administration is. I think the Biden administration realizes there needs to be a judicious and smart approach to economic interdependence to reduce those areas of national security risk and vulnerability, but that trade and investment serves the interests of American businesses, workers, and consumers. The Trump administration didn’t really believe in dialogue. They said dialogue was just a waste of time, and they didn’t really believe in cooperation.
+
+__Paul Haenle:__ _`Only in the trade space, the negotiations on trade, that was the only dialogue the Trump administration had up and running.`_
+
+__Evan Medeiros:__ That’s right. And I think the Biden team has shown they’re pretty different. They believe in high-level dialogue. My favorite fun fact of the day is that the administration has been in place for sixteen months, and Biden and [Chinese President] Xi [Jinping] have now talked with each other four times. So that’s basically a high-level meeting every four months. That’s pretty good. Of course, [National Security Adviser] Jake Sullivan met with [China’s senior diplomat] Yang Jiechi in Luxemburg just this week. So clearly, they believe in high-level dialogue, and they’re doing good things with it.
+
+In March, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Jake Sullivan met with Yang Jiechi in Rome, and then three days later, President Biden met with President Xi. These high-level dialogues helped the administration succeed in effectively putting a cap on the Russia-China relationship: no military cooperation and sanctions compliance. That is a really serious piece of business.
+
+So, they believe in dialogue, they have demonstrated they can achieve strategic results with that dialogue. The other piece is: they don’t like to talk about this dialogue and the successes from it. They should talk more about it. There is actually limited and episodic cooperation: students are flowing back and forth, the administration last year used very high-level diplomacy to get the Chinese to participate in a coordinated release of the strategic petroleum reserve, the Chinese are still playing ball with the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] on Iran. I don’t want to overdo the cooperation point, because the Chinese are not really in the mood to cooperate, but the Biden administration basically said, “Theoretically, when it’s in our interest, we are ready to do that.”
+
+And I give [Secretary of State] Tony Blinken very substantial credit for laying out four baskets in his speech where he could cooperate. And look, those are all politically sensitive issues where he is subject to vulnerability. But my broader point is, where there are differences between Biden and Trump, there are pretty fundamental, chunky, important differences. That’s why I think Biden’s policy is not Trump lite — it’s Biden plus.
+
+__Paul Haenle:__ _`Given China’s latest declarations and pronouncements regarding territorial waters and military activities outside of Chinese territory and recent actions to intercept Australian aviation activity, is it not inevitable that some form of military conflict will occur between the United States and China?`_
+
+__Evan Medeiros:__ I am very concerned about the Taiwan issue. I see a lot of loose talk, including on the U.S. side. I think the United States needs to say less and do more, with a greater focus on deterrence and less commentary and discussion about actual U.S. policy, which is muddying the waters. I see hardening positions on all sides, especially in mainland China. I see growing military capabilities.
+
+We’re about to enter into a transition period as Taiwan prepares for its January 2024 election. . . . I worry less about the outbreak of armed conflict — an actual amphibious assault on the part of the People’s Republic of China. What I worry about is a convergence of trends that could precipitate a fourth Taiwan Strait crisis. I am concerned that if Beijing becomes sufficiently frustrated [or] anxious that it [will] decide to throw the equivalent of a strategic brushback pitch against Taiwan. It could do something that tries to convince Taiwan and the United States to stop changing the status quo according to Beijing. We could be on a dangerous trajectory because of growing anxieties, concerns, [and] changes in intentions and capabilities.
+
+The announcement a few weeks ago that Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi was going to travel to Taiwan created a lot of concern. If that trip had gone forward, it could have been very destabilizing. We need to be aware of actions like that.
+
+__Paul Haenle:__ _`There’s a lot of interest in Biden’s statements on Taiwan. Three times, in response to questions, he said the United States would get involved militarily to defend Taiwan. The White House then has to roll that back and say that U.S. policy has not changed. Politicians on both sides of the aisle are coming out saying that this is a great development because we need strategic clarity. We need Beijing to know what we will do should something happen. In your view, would a less ambiguous Taiwan policy exacerbate tensions?`_
+
+__Evan Medeiros:__ We are where we are today [because] the president of the United States has made these statements three or four times, depending on how you count. And I think that’s created an environment of some confusion about the nature of U.S. policy.
+
+We need to tread really, really carefully. Doing things like monkeying around with the components of our One China policy on the State Department website creates all sorts of confusion, increases anxieties, and makes it harder to deter mainland China. The focus needs to be on deterring Beijing. It is going to be really hard to deter mainland China if they think we’re trying to move from a One China policy to a One China, One Taiwan policy.
+
+People forget that our One China policy has many components to it. A big one is the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) . . . . The preamble of the TRA says very clearly that an action to try to coerce Taiwan militarily will be seen as a grave threat to peace and stability in the western Pacific. That’s pretty explicit. We should just use that language in the TRA and remind Chinese officials about that.
+
+---
+
+__Paul Haenle__ holds the Maurice R. Greenberg Director’s Chair at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is a visiting senior research fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. He served as the White House China director on the National Security Council staffs of former presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama.
+
+__Evan Medeiros__ is a nonresident senior fellow in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-07-21-pla-learning-ukraine-war.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-07-21-pla-learning-ukraine-war.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-07-21-pla-learning-ukraine-war.md
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : PLA Learning Ukraine War
+author: Evan A. Feigenbaum and Charles Hooper
+date : 2022-07-21 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/5q7pz3F.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "A retired Army lieutenant general discusses why a tenet of PLA modernization has been validated by the conflict — but is also paradoxical."
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The 1990s ushered in a revolution in military affairs in China. Planners for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) started to talk about integrating digital technologies and to debate strategy, tactics, and operations in ways that drew on lessons from the Gulf War. PLA learning, debate, assimilation, and adaptation has continued over these subsequent decades — up to the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine._
+
+
+
+__Evan Feigenbaum:__ _`Talk to us a little bit about how we should think about the role of learning in the Chinese armed forces. How important are foreign military engagements, doctrines, conflicts for them?`_
+
+__Charles Hooper:__ The PLA are careful and meticulous students of modern warfare, particularly the U.S. way of war. They are voracious consumers of publicly available information, as well as all of the information that their very aggressive intelligence efforts provide them. When I was the defense attaché at [Pacific Command] and in the Office of [the] Secretary of Defense, I used to say, “If it’s online, they’ve read it.” And I remember being in meetings where they would quote word for word any doctrine that we had posted online, or revisions to our doctrine, as well as the performance capabilities of U.S. weapon systems. . . .
+
+But despite recent organizational reform efforts, the PLA remains essentially a political entity with a war-fighting mission. It is a party army, not a national army. And its approach to learning and leadership is heavily influenced by its own organization, as well as traditional Chinese culture and education. For example, one of the principal elements of the initial Russian military failures in Ukraine is a function of command and control, poor leadership development, internal corruption, inadequate training, and poor troop motivations. In the PLA system, development of these key capabilities is a Communist Party — not a strictly military — responsibility. And [Chinese President] Xi Jinping himself has acknowledged this. So the question becomes, and this is a historical issue with the PLA, how will the party address these military shortcomings?
+
+__Evan Feigenbaum:__ _`China is a Leninist system. Decisionmaking is centralized, but there is debate in the system. And historically within the PLA, there’s been debate in which some views prevail, and some views end up getting eclipsed, sometimes for political reasons, sometimes for operational reasons. . . . Are there views in the PLA that have basically become obsolete in the last five to ten years because of things that they have observed in foreign military situations?`_
+
+__Charles Hooper:__ There are two things that have fundamentally changed over the past forty years. The first of those is this concept among the PLA leadership that they had the advantage of defense in depth, and as a result, they didn’t necessarily need to develop even a limited power projection capability. I can remember years ago PLA generals telling me, “Well, if you attack Tianjin, we’ll fall back to Beijing. And if you attack Beijing, we’ll fall back to Chengdu.” And I remember thinking, “Why in the world would we do that?” That’s fundamentally changed. We see their defense modernization focused on giving them the ability to have a limited power projection capability, if only for anti-access area denial.
+
+The second [fundamental change] is the concept that they have an overwhelming advantage in mass. But qualitative quantity has an even higher quality all its own. So there’s been an abandonment of this perception that [the PLA] have this overwhelming advantage in mass that’s sufficient to deter an enemy from attacking, and more of an emphasis on reducing the size of the PLA ground forces and increasing the quality of the strategic rocket forces and the support forces in the Navy, in an effort to ensure that their quality matches the qualitative advantage that the United States has always enjoyed.
+
+__Evan Feigenbaum:__ _`[Russian President] Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine on February 24. China, as we all know, has spent a couple of decades thinking about ways to coerce Taiwan. What’s happened since the 24th that might be relevant to Taiwan?`_
+
+__Charles Hooper:__ I think at the very strategic military level, one of the most fundamental tenets of PLA modernization has actually been validated by the Ukraine conflict, but it’s also paradoxical.
+
+The nature of warfare never changes — the applications and violence to achieve a political end — but the character of warfare is constantly evolving. And that’s what we’re seeing now: an evolution of the character of warfare toward the defense, as opposed to the offense. The defense or the defending nation has an advantage here.
+
+Russia clearly possessed an overwhelming advantage in combat power and just sheer throw weight when compared to Ukraine. But despite this, Ukraine has been able to offset this advantage by a skillful application of asymmetric military capabilities that have been supplied by its allies and partners. Now, what we need to understand is the PLA has always perceived themselves to be the defender and the United States to be the aggressor. We tend to look at it [through] the Taiwan element of it — as China being the aggressor and us being the defender — but that’s not how they see it. And indeed, their entire defense modernization emphasis . . . has been specifically focused on denying the United States the ability to project power into the Western Pacific and to prevent [it] from building “mountains of iron.”
+
+Before we go to war anywhere in the world, we build a mountain of iron — in Kuwait, in Iraq, and in other places. And then we unleash this mountain of iron on whoever our foe is far from our shores.
+
+The paradox here is that while the United States is clearly the aggressor and attacker, within this paradigm, Taiwan is clearly the defender. And the Ukraine conflict has demonstrated that a well-supplied, well-motivated defender can effectively disrupt or even defeat a clearly superior adversary. If nothing else, this defender can significantly increase the cost and length and duration of a military conflict to the detriment of the attacker. So, when you look at the overall lesson here, it’s the fact that this is far more complex than they might have imagined.
+
+__Evan Feigenbaum:__ _`Is there anything [the PLA has] done that they should feel better about as a result of what’s happened to the Russians in Ukraine?`_
+
+__Charles Hooper:__ Let me talk first about noncommissioned officer [NCO] corps — the issue of cultural evolution of a military force. Because what a lot of people don’t understand about leadership, battle command, and NCO corps is that the essence of the strength of these capabilities is cultural, not technical. It is the willingness of the senior officer to delegate authority and to accept the counsel of a subordinate in their command over their own judgment.
+
+For example, as a general, I had a sergeant major. If I propose to do something and he says, “Sir, that’s the dumbest thing I’ve ever heard,” I have two choices. I can get angry about it or feel as if I’ve lost face, or I can modify my plans based upon the wise counsel that he’s given. In the U.S. system, I gain in stature with my forces by doing that. In some other cultures, that would produce a loss of face and a challenge to authority that could not be countenanced. That’s why you can form an NCO corps, but it may not be as effective in a Russian or a Chinese cultural context as it is in the U.S. context.
+
+The second thing I’d raise is this issue of battle command. Russian officers keep getting killed because they don’t trust their junior subordinates to give them an accurate picture of the battlefield. They’re being hounded by Moscow to [share] what’s going on, and they only trust their own judgment. The success of [breaking up larger formations into smaller ones] is predicated on active, adaptive combat leaders who are willing to use their own initiative during the rapid evolution of combat operations. To illustrate that, we have a saying in the U.S. military that fundamentally describes the cultural difference between the Chinese and Russian militaries and the U.S. military. And every military officer learns it from the very beginning of his training: It’s easier to beg for forgiveness than ask for permission.
+
+[U.S. military officers] learn to use and trust their own judgment in a rapidly evolving combat situation and explain their actions later on. And they anticipate that their leadership will support their actions, particularly if there’s a favorable outcome. And these types of cultural tenets are not necessarily common to either Russian military culture or Chinese culture. Those types of capabilities are absolutely essential to the success in information warfare– and hybrid warfare–based environments. And as we see in the Russian military, they simply don’t exist.
+
+__Evan Feigenbaum:__ _`There are two questions from audience members that get at that question of false conclusions and false analogies: What are the risks attached to over-comparing Ukraine to Taiwan? Given that the Chinese Communist Party and the PLA have their own perspectives, what are the wrong or inaccurate lessons they may be drawing from the Ukraine conflict?`_
+
+__Charles Hooper:__ Two quick points. Number one: I think one of the flawed analogies here is if we do all of the things that the Russians didn’t do, we will be successful.
+
+The second is something that I’ve not seen a lot of people talk about: the complete failure of strategic deterrent signaling and the reading of deterrence signaling on the part of both Russia and the United States as a prelude to the Ukrainian conflict. I was rereading John Toland’s The Rising Sun about the rise and fall of the Japanese Empire, and I was struck by the failure of strategic deterrence signaling between the United States and Japan before Pearl Harbor.
+
+We saw a similar failure of strategic deterrent signaling between the United States and Russia and between NATO and Russia. Prior to the Ukrainian conflict, both sides seemed to misread signals. And I think that there should be some study given to the strategic signaling that could take place prior to Chinese military operations against Taiwan or against the United States, so that we have a much clearer understanding of what they are saying, which might both precede the conflict and hopefully help to avoid the conflict.
+
+__Evan Feigenbaum:__ _`Does that mean we’re headed for trouble?`_
+
+__Charles Hooper:__ That’s exactly what I mean by a failure of deterrent communication. We are talking past each other. We’re not really listening to each other, and we’re not considering the messages that are being sent in the context of our opposite number, as opposed to our own context.
+
+__Evan Feigenbaum:__ _`[What are your] headline takeaways from what you’ve observed since February?`_
+
+__Charles Hooper:__ There are no regional conflicts in the twenty-first century involving great powers. The Ukraine-Russia conflict has caused food shortages in Tunisia and vegetable oil shortages in Indonesia, and rising oil prices. If we think the global implications of a Russia-Ukraine conflict are significant, wait until you see the global implications of a China-U.S. conflict.
+
+---
+
+__Evan A. Feigenbaum__ is vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he oversees research in Washington, Beijing, and New Delhi on a dynamic region encompassing both East Asia and South Asia.
+
+__Charles Hooper__ is a nonresident scholar in the Asia Program.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-07-27-aiming-for-a-quasi-alliance.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-07-27-aiming-for-a-quasi-alliance.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..38ed6aee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-07-27-aiming-for-a-quasi-alliance.md
@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Aiming For A Quasi-Alliance
+author: Kojiro Tonosaki
+date : 2022-07-27 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/pcQqpy5.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Building a More Robust Japan-Philippines Security Partnership"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_As Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan has frequently stated, “Ukraine may be East Asia tomorrow.” Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has sent shockwaves around the world, causing a rethinking of security, not only in the United States and Europe but also in East Asia._ _In particular, security in the Taiwan Strait is now frequently discussed in the media, and countries are considering the potential implications of the war in Ukraine for regional security. This includes the Philippines, which is vulnerable to external threats and aiming to modernize its military by the end of 2027. Japan has developed a close relationship with the Philippines and supported capacity building to help Manila manage an increasingly complex security environment, including concerns about a potential crisis in the Taiwan Strait._
+
+Among Japan’s relationships with Southeast Asian countries, its relationship with the Philippines is particularly close. The Fukuda Doctrine, which later became the cornerstone of Japan’s diplomacy with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), was announced by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda in Manila in August 1977 and focused mainly on economic cooperation. However, security cooperation between the two countries has also developed in recent years. More recently, Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept, introduced by former prime minister Shinzo Abe in 2016, accelerated these trends.
+
+The rapid development of defense cooperation between Japan and the Philippines is due to a shared sense of urgency after China actively pursued maritime expansion in the 2010s. A collision between two Chinese patrol vessels and a Philippine survey vessel at Reed Bank in March 2011 and a standoff at Scarborough Reef in 2012 shocked the Benigno Aquino III administration and caused it to seek defense cooperation with Japan and Australia in addition to its only ally, the United States. Meanwhile, Chinese coercion around the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea began straining Japan-China relations in 2009 and prompted Japan to network more closely with countries around the region to counter Chinese assertiveness throughout the First Island Chain. In a veiled reference to China, Japan’s first national security strategy, unveiled in 2013, states that Japan will strengthen diplomatic and security cooperation with ASEAN countries, which prefer to resolve the South China Sea issue according to the rule of law rather than by force. Thus, defense cooperation between Japan and the Philippines has progressed in countering China’s maritime expansion in the region.
+
+Capacity building for Southeast Asian nations, including the Philippines, is critical to addressing the challenges posed by Chinese assertiveness. As David B. Shear, former assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs, noted with regard to U.S. force posture in the region, “In Northeast Asia we have a clear forward line of defense, numerous forward deployed forces, and strong, capable allies. It’s just the opposite in Southeast Asia, where we have a more ambiguous line defense, many fewer forces, and far less capable allies.” Japan has embraced this cause and is working to strengthen the defense capabilities of the Philippines. This paper examines recent developments in defense cooperation between Japan and the Philippines, reviews the security policies of the Benigno Aquino III (2010–2016) and Rodrigo Duterte (2016–2022) administrations, and proposes measures to strengthen the security partnership between the two countries.
+
+
+### Progress in Security Cooperation between Japan and the Philippines
+
+The security partnership between Japan and the Philippines has grown closer in recent years, as evidenced by Japan’s decision in August 2020 to transfer air surveillance radar systems to the Philippines. In June 2021, Japanese minister of defense Nobuo Kishi and Philippine secretary of national defense Delfin Lorenzana held a video teleconference in which they agreed to: (1) strongly oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or any act that would increase tensions, (2) continue to promote bilateral defense cooperation and exchange, and (3) maintain and strengthen the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept.
+
+Japan and the Philippines have long had active economic relations and cultural exchanges, but the two countries have made remarkable progress in defense cooperation since the 2010s. In contrast, the relationship between the United States and the Philippines, both treaty allies, has appeared relatively distant in recent years. In February 2020, President Rodrigo Duterte’s entourage was refused entry visas by the United States due to human rights violations, and the Philippines unilaterally notified the United States that it was breaking the Visiting Forces Agreement governing the U.S military presence in the country. In July 2021, U.S. secretary of defense Lloyd Austin visited the Philippines, and the Visiting Forces Agreement was kept in place, but the relationship between the two countries is still in the process of repair. In August 2021, in an address to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Defense Minister Lorenzana stressed that “U.S. support for the modernization of the Philippine Armed Forces would make the Philippines a more reliable ally and would be beneficial to the United States.” However, it is difficult to determine whether concrete progress has been made in security cooperation between the United States and the Philippines.
+
+#### Japan-Philippines Security Partnership before Aquino
+
+Until the 2010s, the bilateral relationship between Japan and the Philippines was particularly pronounced on the economic front. Figure 1 summarizes the trends of the Philippines’ major trading partners and shows that while China’s advance in 2020 was remarkable, Japan’s presence has been significant since the 1990s. Figure 2 shows the number of foreign visits of Philippine presidents to select major countries, which reveals emphasis on relations with Japan. Japan also has historically been the largest provider of official development assistance (ODA) to the Philippines.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 1: Major Trading Countries of the Philippines_
+
+
+_▲ Figure 2: Aquino and Duterte Visits to Select Major Partners_
+
+Japan-Philippines security cooperation started to develop from the early 2000s. During the summit meeting between Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi and Philippine president Gloria Arroyo held on September 15, 2001, immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the two leaders agreed to elevate their relationship to a higher partnership level, including discussions on bilateral, regional, and global security. In addition, they affirmed the need to hold an annual political dialogue on security. Also, in December 2006, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Arroyo met in Manila to discuss a wide range of security issues and signed the “Philippines-Japan Joint Statement on the Partnership of Two Neighboring Countries in Proximity for Comprehensive Cooperation.” The statement pledged that the two countries would promote policy dialogue on security, maritime and consular issues and strengthen joint efforts to prevent and combat human trafficking.
+
+Japan has also strengthened ties with the Philippines through diplomatic engagement with ASEAN leaders in many international forums, including the Japan-ASEAN Summit (established in 1977), the Japan-ASEAN Forum (established in 1977), the International Conference on the Future of Asia (established in 1995), ASEAN Plus Three (established in 1997), and the East Asia Summit (established in 2005). In addition, the ASEAN Regional Forum (established in 1994) and, more recently, the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (established in 2010), where ministers in charge of foreign affairs and defense participate in ASEAN-related meetings to discuss regional security issues, naturally led to an increase in high-level bilateral exchanges between Japan and the Philippines. Prior to 2012, Tokyo and Manila did not pursue formal agreements on defense cooperation. However, in the face of China’s aggressive behavior in the South and East China Seas, Japan and the Philippines were forced to change this thinking.
+
+#### Evolving the Japan-Philippines Security Partnership during Aquino
+
+The March 2011 collision between two Chinese patrol boats and a Philippine survey ship on the Reed Bank and the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff gave the Aquino administration a great sense of urgency and prompted it to seek military assistance from Japan and Australia in addition to assistance from its only ally, the United States. At the same time, Japan had its own reasons for approaching the Philippines.
+
+Relations between Japan and China have been strained since a Chinese fishing trawler collided with a Japanese coast guard vessel in the East China Sea in 2010, which was followed by a persistent campaign of Chinese coercion to support its sovereignty claims over the Senkaku Islands, which Japan rejects. Soon after returning to power at the end of 2012, Prime Minister Abe declared, “The islands are Japan’s inherent territory, and we own it, we have effective control over it, and there is no room for negotiation,” and he refused to acknowledge the existence of a dispute over the Senkaku Islands. China responded by increasing the number and frequency of its civilian vessel deployments. Abe then signaled his tough stance on Chinese coercion to support its maritime sovereignty claims in the South China Sea by noting in the country’s first National Security Strategy (released in 2013) that Japan would enhance diplomatic and security cooperation with ASEAN countries that prefer settling South China Sea disputes not by force but by following the rule of law. Thus, in response to China’s maritime aggression, defense cooperation between Japan and the Philippines, which faces similar challenges in the Scarborough Shoal, started to gain momentum.
+
+In July 2012, Japanese minister of defense Satoshi Morimoto and Philippine minister of defense Voltaire Gazmin signed the Japan-Philippines Defense Cooperation Intention Statement, including plans to conduct a wide range of exchanges among defense officials and explore defense cooperation in areas such as capacity building. A few days after this meeting, Philippine foreign secretary Albert del Rosario announced that Japan would provide 10 40-meter-class vessels to the Philippine coast guard (PCG) by the end of the year as part of Japan’s ODA to the Philippines.
+
+In June 2013, Japanese defense minister Itsunori Onodera and defense secretary Gazmin welcomed the deepening of the “strategic partnership” between Japan and the Philippines in the field of defense, especially in the maritime area, and confirmed that steady progress had been made, including mutual visits between Japan’s chief of the maritime staff and the commander of the Philippine navy; consultations between the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the Philippine naval staff; expansion of the JMSDF fleet’s port calls to the Philippines; and implementation of the Pacific Partnership defense exchange in 2012. The two ministers also focused on extending security cooperation between the two countries to the aviation sector, which was emphasized during the visit of the chief of staff of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force to the Philippines. At the same meeting, Secretary Gazmin proposed allowing the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) access to bases in the Philippines.
+
+Japan also conducted humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities in the Philippines, which was severely damaged by Typhoon Haiyan in mid-November 2013. Japan dispatched three JMSDF destroyers (the transport ship Osumi, the large destroyer Ise, and the supply ship Towada), three CH-47 transport helicopters, three UH-1 transport helicopters, two KC-767 air tankers, seven C-130 transport aircraft, one U-4 support aircraft, and a maximum of about 1,180 personnel to conduct medical and epidemic prevention activities, rescue operations, and the transport of relief supplies.
+
+In December 2013, President Aquino and Prime Minister Abe also exchanged views on the regional and international situation, including issues surrounding the South China Sea and China’s establishment of an air defense identification zone, and confirmed that they would work even more closely together to address regional and international challenges as the regional security environment becomes increasingly severe. After the meeting, Japanese foreign minister Fumio Kishida and Philippine foreign minister del Rosario signed a letter regarding the “provision of patrol boats to the Philippine Coast Guard.” In June 2014, Abe and Aquino met again and exchanged views on the role of the United States in the region. Prime Minister Abe welcomed the recently agreed Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between the Philippines and the United States, as it would contribute to regional peace and stability by strengthening U.S. presence in the region, including improving disaster response capabilities.
+
+During his official visit to Japan in June 2015, President Aquino held in-depth discussions with Prime Minister Abe on regional peace and stability. The two leaders issued two documents, a joint declaration on “A Strengthened Strategic Partnership for Advancing the Shared Principles and Goals for Peace, Security and Growth in the Region and Beyond” and an accompanying action plan. The joint declaration stated that the relationship between the two countries reflects common ideals and goals to ensure regional peace and stability and referenced Chinese behavior by expressing serious concerns about unilateral actions to change the status quo in the South China Sea. In the action plan, the two governments committed to promoting security cooperation in various areas, including intelligence protection, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, maritime security, the provision of defense equipment, technical cooperation, and capacity-building support. The two leaders also welcomed the signing of a contract for the construction and acquisition of 10 patrol vessels and expressed their intention to continue and accelerate talks on strengthening maritime domain awareness (MDA).
+
+#### Deepening the Japan-Philippines Security Partnership during the Duterte Administration
+
+The security partnership between Japan and the Philippines, promoted under the Aquino administration, was intended to counter China’s advances in the South China Sea. However, Philippine foreign policy under President Duterte took a different direction. Duterte prioritized economic engagement with China, downplayed territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea and the challenges posed by Chinese coercion, and seemed to distance the Philippines from the United States, as evidenced by his declared intent to nullify the Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States. Despite apparent tensions in Philippine-U.S. security relations, the two countries confirmed in 2019 that the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty will be invoked in the event of an attack on the Philippines in the South China Sea. Furthermore, the Philippines was one of the first ASEAN countries to announce its support for the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) trilateral security partnership announced in 2020. These Philippine actions are understandable given the Philippines’ strategic location along the First Island Chain and the importance of cooperation with the United States and other regional players to counter Chinese assertiveness across the region.
+
+During this complicated period in U.S.-Philippines relations, Japan facilitated regular consultations with the Duterte administration to strengthen security ties. In September 2016, Prime Minister Abe held his first summit meeting with President Duterte in Laos. The two leaders agreed to cooperate in the field of maritime security by transferring a JMSDF training aircraft (TC-90) to the Philippine navy and continuing to promote security and defense cooperation by improving the MDA capabilities of the Philippines, supporting pilot training, strengthening the maintenance infrastructure of the Philippine navy, and delivering the first 40-meter-class large patrol boat to the Philippines. During a visit to Japan in October of the same year, President Duterte witnessed the signing of a letter regarding the lease of five JSDF TC-90 maritime reconnaissance aircraft to the Philippines to monitor Chinese activities in the South China Sea and a document to strengthen the PCG by granting the construction of two ships. President Duterte also referenced the prospect of military exercises between the Philippines and Japan in the future.
+
+In January 2017, Prime Minister Abe paid a two-day official visit to Manila for a summit meeting with Duterte, stating that Japan would further enhance the maritime capabilities of the Philippines through the provision of patrol vessels and training and that the JSDF would participate in that year’s joint U.S.-Philippines Balikatan exercise. President Duterte thanked Japan for its assistance in enhancing capabilities in the field of maritime security and counterterrorism, particularly the provision of patrol vessels and small speed boats and the loan of the TC-90. One U.S. analyst observed that Abe’s visit reflected “Tokyo’s ambition to keep up with growing Chinese influence in the geopolitically strategic Southeast Asian country by ensuring steady flows of aid and investment.”
+
+By March 2018, Japan had completed the delivery of all five TC-90s to the Philippine navy, which are expected to boost its capabilities in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; humanitarian assistance; disaster relief; and maritime air surveillance. Additionally, Japan completed the delivery of 10 multi-role capable vessels to the PCG in August 2018. These vessels are used for search and rescue, marine environmental protection, pollution control, humanitarian and disaster relief, and enforcement of maritime laws. In June 2018, the Japan Ministry of Defense announced that it had decided to transfer parts and other items from UH-1 multi-purpose helicopters retired from the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force to the Philippines at no cost. The free transfer of UH-1 parts to the Philippines was the second military equipment transfer to the Philippines since May 2016, when the free transfer of used Japanese patrol aircraft, ships, and other JSDF equipment became possible.
+
+It should be noted that the momentum for strengthening Japan-Philippines defense cooperation was not lost during the Covid-19 pandemic, even though face-to-face personnel exchanges were temporarily suspended. In August 2020, the Japan Ministry of Defense announced that a contract had been signed between Mitsubishi Electric and the Philippine Department of National Defense regarding air surveillance radars. In July 2021, the first air-to-air bilateral training was conducted between the Japan Air Self-Defense Force and the Philippine air force at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines, and in June 2022, General Izutsu Shunji, chief of staff of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force, and Lieutenant General Connor Anthony D. Canlas Sr., commanding general of the Philippine air force, were present in the second joint training. During his stay in the Philippines, General Izutsu stated “both nations, the Philippines and Japan, are engaging in increasing surveillance capability (and have) interest in engaging in the space situation awareness.” He also mentioned the possibility of cooperation on air surveillance radars, in terms of software to control the radars, as well as operational training for the Philippine air force.
+
+
+### Security Policy of the Aquino Administration: 2010–2016
+
+As demonstrated by the preceding chapter, security cooperation between Japan and the Philippines increased dramatically in both quantity and quality in the 2010s, especially during Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s tenure. Japan’s deepening of defense cooperation with the Philippines is aimed at enhancing the presence of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) in Southeast Asia and improving deterrence in the region as a whole by supporting defense capacity building. Japan should seek to further strengthen its security partnerships, particularly interoperability. In order to consider how best to build a more robust security partnership between Japan and the Philippines, it is important to understand the evolution of Philippine defense policy in response to drastic changes in the regional security environment since the 2010s, when China became more assertive with respect to its maritime sovereignty claims.
+
+When Benigno Aquino took office in June 2010, he promised to eradicate poverty and combat corruption and announced a policy to promote stable economic development and peaceful conflict resolution with domestic rebel groups. The content of this inaugural speech clearly shows that the initial threat perception of the Philippines at that time was directed toward domestic threats such as the rebels in Mindanao. The island of Mindanao, located in the south of the Philippines, has long been a predominantly Muslim area, but many Christians settled there under immigration policies dating back to the colonial era. The region has long been beset by conflicts as a result. Aquino pursued peace negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and in 2014, the government of the Philippines signed the Bangsamoro Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the MILF. However, Aquino’s perceptions of the regional security environment shifted after a Philippine oil exploration vessel was intercepted by a Chinese ship near Reed Bank in March 2011 and after a standoff between the Philippines and China over Scarborough Shoal that lasted about two months, starting in April 2012.
+
+President Aquino took the two incidents as an opportunity to review the military posture of the country, which had been focused on domestic governance, and began a full-scale modernization effort to make the military more capable of defending the region against external threats. Under a long-term plan, the Aquino administration slowly but steadily built a defense posture capable of dealing with maritime and air threats, despite tight finances, by acquiring two major pieces of equipment: two U.S. Coast Guard Hamilton-class cutters for the Philippine navy and 12 South Korean FA-50 fighter planes for the Philippine air force. In response to China’s violations of Philippine sovereignty, Aquino developed a new defense strategy with four pillars: (1) formulating the Revised National Armed Forces Modernization Act; (2) building maritime domain awareness; (3) rebuilding air defense posture; and (4) seeking cooperation with other countries.
+
+#### Formulating the Revised National Armed Forces Modernization Act
+
+As early as July 2010, Aquino had ordered a comprehensive review of the defense system and announced his intention to push for the modernization of the air force for territorial defense. However, in response to the two incidents mentioned above and with external threats in mind, he embarked on a full-scale effort to modernize the military. In December 2012, six months after the impasse at the Scarborough Shoal, he signed Republic Act No. 10349. The act revised Republic Act No. 7898, otherwise known as the AFP Modernization Act, which expired in December 2011 without any significant pieces of equipment acquired for the military. The revised act extended the military modernization program to December 2027. The first phase of the plan under this act was from 2013 to 2017, the second phase is from 2018 to 2022, and the third phase will be from 2023 to 2027. The total funding amount for the first five years is at least 75 billion Philippine pesos ($1.5 billion). Under this long-term plan, the Aquino administration was able to acquire big-ticket assets, such as two former U.S. Coast Guard cutters for the Philippine navy and 12 South Korean FA-50 fighter jets for the Philippine air force.
+
+#### Building Maritime Domain Awareness
+
+For the Philippines, a country with 7,641 islands and a coastline longer than that of the United States, the importance of establishing maritime domain awareness (MDA) has long been a necessity. MDA is defined as “the effective understanding of any activity associated with the maritime environment that could impact the security, safety, economy or environment.” The Philippine coastal monitoring system was originally based on a human intelligence network, which lacked the means to verify, confirm, or establish patterns of reported sightings and prevented timely and effective monitoring.
+
+In 2009, at the end of the Arroyo administration, Republic Act No. 9993 was passed, separating the coast guard from the navy. In September 2011, a little more than a year after taking office, the Aquino administration organized the National Coast Watch System by Executive Order No. 57. The objectives of these two movements were to enhance maritime situational awareness from Philippine territorial waters, including the South China Sea, to its exclusive economic zone. The Aquino administration decided that the mainstay of the National Coast Watch System would be the coast guard and established the headquarters of the National Coastal Watch Center in the coast guard headquarters compound.
+
+#### Rebuilding Air Defense Posture
+
+The Philippine air force retired all of its mainstay F-5 fighter jets in 2005. From then until the arrival of the first FA-50 fighter jets from South Korea in 2015, the Philippines did not operate fighter jets, and the Aquino administration had to rebuild its air defense posture from scratch. In addition, based on available public information, the radar coverage of the air force at the time was probably limited. For this reason, the Philippines had to urgently introduce fighter jets and air surveillance radar systems to reestablish the Philippines’ air defense posture. In 2014, following the modernization act passed at the end of 2012, the Philippine air force developed a long-term blueprint for rebuilding the Philippines’ air defense posture, known as “Flight Plan 2028.” In the same year, a contract was signed with South Korea for the introduction of FA-50 fighter jets, with flight training conducted in parallel in South Korea. In addition, the government decided at the end of 2014 to introduce three sets of air surveillance radar systems from Israel.
+
+#### Seeking Cooperation with Other Countries
+
+Despite the formulation of the Revised National Armed Forces Modernization Act at the end of 2012, budgetary constraints and a lack of human resources to operate the equipment limited the Philippines’ efforts to develop the naval and air force capabilities necessary for territorial defense. Therefore, it was natural for the Philippines to compensate for those limitations by seeking defense cooperation with the United States, its ally, and Australia.
+
+However, the security relationship between the Philippines and the United States after the Cold War was not stable. In September 1991, the Philippine Senate refused to renew the Philippines-U.S. Military Base Agreement, the legal basis for stationing U.S. troops in the Philippines, which resulted in the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the country and the loss of the U.S. military presence in the region. But the Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef in 1994 caused the Philippines to reaffirm the importance of the U.S. presence, leading to the signing of the Visiting Forces Agreement in 1999.
+
+After 2000, security cooperation between the United States and the Philippines began in earnest as part of the war on terrorism, especially operations against the Abu Sayyaf. Unlike groups such as the MILF, which aimed to gain independence from the government, Abu Sayyaf was increasingly associated with al Qaeda, which was committed to global jihad, and Jemaah Islamiyah, which aimed to create an Islamic state in Southeast Asia. In January 2002, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines, and until the end of the operation in 2014, an average of 500 to 600 U.S. special forces personnel were stationed in the Philippines annually.
+
+Changes in U.S. diplomacy in the early 2010s were also a factor that allowed the Aquino administration to deepen security cooperation with Washington. In 2011, the Obama administration announced a “rebalancing policy” to allocate more military and economic resources to the Asia-Pacific region. In response, the Aquino administration deepened security cooperation with the United States. Then, in 2014, the two countries signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which institutionalized the bilateral alliance by allowing the United States to rotate troops into the Philippines for extended periods of time and to build and operate both U.S. and Philippine military facilities at bases in the Philippines.
+
+The Aquino administration also deepened security ties with Australia. The two countries had already signed a Status of Forces Agreement in 2007 similar to the Visiting Forces Agreement signed by the United States and the Philippines. The agreement allowed Australian troops to stay in the Philippines, guaranteed their legal status, and facilitated joint Australia-Philippines counterinsurgency training. But the Philippine Senate did not ratify the agreement until 2012, likely in response to China’s increased assertiveness. In 2013, the Australian government’s White Paper on Defence devoted an entire chapter to international defense engagement and proposed greater involvement in Southeast Asia. As a result, security cooperation between Australia and the Philippines has deepened partly because of Australia’s proactive stance on regional diplomacy.
+
+
+### Security Policy of the Duterte Administration: 2016–2022
+
+Rodrigo Duterte was inaugurated as the 16th president of the Philippines in June 2016 and had gained popularity during the campaign for his blunt statements on policy matters. His approach to foreign policy upon taking office also attracted attention. Duterte announced that he would take a tough stance on drug eradication, stating in his policy speech, “We will not stop until the last drug lord, the last financier and the last pusher have surrendered or been put behind bars. Or below the ground if they so wish.” He did not get along well with the United States after President Obama called for an end to human rights abuses related to the drug war. Duterte distanced himself from the United States and also played down a ruling by an international tribunal that dismissed China’s claims to much of the South China Sea, a case which had been brought to the Permanent Court of International Justice by the Aquino administration. And Duterte asked former president Fidel V. Ramos to make an unofficial visit to China to start informal bilateral talks, in stark contrast to Aquino’s firm stance against China.
+
+During the election period in April 2016, Duterte criticized Aquino’s acquisition of FA-50 fighter jets as a waste of money because they were inadequate to deter China, could not be used to fight insurgents, and could at best only be used for ceremonial flights. This appeared to place the Philippine military’s modernization program in jeopardy. However, a close look at security policy up to the end of 2021 shows no evidence that the Duterte administration significantly altered Aquino-era policies. Rather, there appears to have been a certain degree of continuity under the Revised National Armed Forces Modernization Act. From this perspective, the security policy of the Duterte administration will be reviewed in four areas: (1) continuing implementation of the Revised National Armed Forces Modernization Act; (2) enhancing maritime situational awareness; (3) enhancing air defense posture; and (4) deepening security cooperation with countries other than the United States.
+
+#### Continuing Implementation of the Revised National Armed Forces Modernization Act
+
+It was initially believed that President Duterte’s security policy would prioritize domestic security to strengthen counterterrorism capabilities. Lieutenant General Ricardo Visaya, incoming chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), confirmed, “Duterte wants night fighting capabilities, so we will prioritize this.” However, immediately after Duterte’s inauguration, Defense Minister Delfin Lorenzana declared, “Territorial defense is one of the priorities of the Duterte administration. It is very important as we need to protect our territories against encroachment by other parties.” He also noted that the 15-year modernization program of the AFP would continue as scheduled, a sign that the Duterte administration would not abandon the modernization plan enacted by the previous administration.
+
+The Philippine National Defense Strategy published in November 2018 clarified that the Department of National Defense would sustain its effort to improve territorial defense capabilities through continued implementation of the AFP Capability Upgrade Program and the AFP Modernization Program. It is evident that the security policy of the Duterte administration, which in the early years of the administration was thought to be focused on fighting insurgents, did not did not deviate much from that of the Aquino administration and ensured a certain degree of continuity and consistency thanks to the Revised National Armed Forces Modernization Act. Toward the end of his administration, Duterte strongly promoted the modernization of the AFP, so much so that an active-duty general assessed that “the AFP has always been grateful for the direction and support of the Commander-in-Chief [President Duterte] in continuously improving its capabilities.”
+
+#### Enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness
+
+In March 2021, the Philippine government discovered a Chinese “fishing fleet” consisting of 220 vessels around Julian Felipe Reef in the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone. Defense Minister Lorenzana said, “We call on the Chinese to stop this incursion and immediately recall these boats violating our maritime rights and encroaching into our sovereign territory.” Further calls for action ensued on social media, with Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin protesting on Twitter. Images released by the Philippine coast guard (PCG) in April 2021 showed six Chinese-registered vessels around the reef and the PCG patrolling the area by boat. In September 2021, when asked about Julian Felipe Reef, Vice Admiral Leopoldo Laroya, the PCG commander, stated, “At present, we have been maintaining a continuous patrol of the West Philippine Sea. As far as Chinese fishing vessels are concerned, we have been in contact with some of them, and after due warning given to them, they leave the area.”
+
+Although it is difficult to determine whether the Chinese ships that had gathered on the reef were dispersed as a result of the PCG patrols, it is clear that Philippine maritime domain awareness (MDA) capabilities have improved to some extent, as evidenced by the protests of government officials and the PCG response to the incident outlined above. From 2013 to 2017, U.S. defense industry giant Raytheon was responsible for building the coastal surveillance system and designing the Philippines’ National Coastal Surveillance Center, with headquarters in Manila and two branches in Cebu in the central Philippines and on Palawan Island bordering the South China Sea. In addition, in 2016, at the end of the Aquino administration, the National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea, chaired by the president’s national security adviser, was established as an interagency organization between the Office of the President, the Department of National Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the AFP, and the PCG. The task force remained intact during the Duterte administration and furthered efforts to enhance MDA. Presidents Aquino and Duterte adopted different approaches to China, but that did not affect the activities of the PCG, as shown in Table 1. In particular, the PCG has added 15 patrol boats to its fleet over the 10-year period from 2011 to 2021, including 10 multi-role response vessels from Japan. In addition, since 2017, the country has conducted trilateral patrols in the Sulu and Celebes Seas with Indonesia and Malaysia.
+
+
+_▲ Table 1: PCG Personnel and Equipment from Aquino to Duterte_
+
+In January 2022, the Philippines announced its intention to introduce supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles from India to improve naval defense in the South China Sea. “As head of procuring entity (HOPE), I recently signed the Notice of Award for the Philippine Navy Shore-Based Anti-Ship Missile Acquisition Project,” Defense Secretary Lorenzana wrote in a Facebook post. Gregory Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, praised this decision as the “most strategic purchase the AFP has made in years.” On the other hand, a weakness is the lack of the “kill chain” between sensors and shooters for targeting moving maritime targets, which is required for robust technical and procedural capability. However, through training and expected future cooperation with partner countries, the AFP will strengthen its deterrent capabilities over time.
+
+#### Enhancing Air Defense Posture
+
+In September 2021, two FA-50PH fighter jets of the Philippine air force scrambled against an unidentified aircraft that had violated its airspace. In military aviation parlance, “scramble” refers to the immediate deployment of fighter aircraft to intercept an unknown or hostile aircraft. “The Philippine Air Defense Control Center (PADCC), through its radars, detected an unidentified inbound aircraft in the Philippine Air Defense Identification Zone (PADIZ), approximately 120 nautical miles northwest of Bolinao, Pangasinan,” Philippine air force (PAF) spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Maynard Mariano said in a statement. “In the past decades, aircraft flying without clearance would willfully violate the Philippine airspace knowing that they will not be challenged. Today, our airspace is being closely monitored jointly by the PAF and the CAAP [Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines],” he said. However, since there are no reports of similar scrambles since that incident, it is difficult to assess the air defense posture of the Philippines. But since the first 2 of the 12 FA-50 fighter jets from South Korea were acquired in 2015, this capability has steadily strengthened.
+
+Just as the construction of the MDA progressed under the Duterte administration, the restructuring of the air defense posture, which was initially feared because of Duterte’s statement that “fighter jets are a waste of money,” also advanced without major impediments. The acquisition plan for Israeli-made air defense radars established under the Aquino administration appears to have been executed, with radars installed in the Gozar Air Station near Mindoro Island, the Paredes Air Station located in the northern part of Luzon, and Mt. Salakot located in Palawan. In addition, a Japanese radar manufactured by Mitsubishi Electric will be installed in the near future, although the timing is unknown, and steady progress is being made in building a Philippine Air Defense Identification Zone.
+
+#### Deepening Security Cooperation with Countries other than the United States
+
+Although the 2018 Philippine National Defense Strategy defines the United States as “the only treaty ally of the Philippines,” bilateral security cooperation did not progress under the Duterte administration and arguably regressed compared to the Aquino administration. During his first visit to China, Duterte said, “I announce my separation from the United States,” and his foreign policy was dubbed “Duterte’s Dalliance with China.” Duterte’s approach did not change after the transition to the Trump administration in the United States. Although Duterte expressed thanks to Trump for the support of U.S. special forces during the battle for Marawi against Islamic State militants in 2017, the regular U.S.-Philippines military exercise known as Balikatan was scaled back to about 5,500 participants from more than 10,000 the previous year, and the emphasis of the exercise was shifted from military training to disaster response. Duterte’s decision to renounce the Visiting Forces Agreement also weakened momentum for bilateral security cooperation, and Japan and Australia tried to fill the void during this period.
+
+While relations with the United States soured under the Duterte administration, the security partnership between the Philippines and Australia deepened through counterterrorism operations and joint exercises under Balikatan. During the Marawi City siege in 2017, Australia sent Orion aircraft to support intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions and sent military personnel to advise and support counterinsurgency operations. In addition, in October 2017, after the operation, the Philippines and Australia signed a security agreement on capacity building and counterterrorism. This enabled the Philippine navy to conduct capacity-building activities through Royal Australian Navy port visits. When Australian naval vessels visited the Philippines in November 2017, the two navies conducted a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise in Subic Bay for demonstration purposes while President Duterte was onboard the Australian vessel HMAS Adelaide, and he expressed his appreciation for their cooperation against terrorism. Describing why security cooperation between the Philippines and Australia deepened during this period, Professor Renato Cruz De Castro of De La Salle University said it was “the best way for the Philippines to avoid succumbing headlong to China’s interests.” De Castro has further argued that the two middle powers of Japan and Australia played an important role in the modernization of the Philippine military.
+
+
+### Recommendations
+
+The Philippines was not prepared to adequately defend against external threats when China began to pursue maritime expansion in the 2010s. Both Aquino and Duterte emphasized the need for infrastructure development in the Philippines while recognizing budgetary constraints regarding the acquisition, maintenance, and improvement of defense equipment. As the Philippines continues to develop its maritime security and air power capabilities, it will need not only hardware in the form of defense equipment but also education, training, and communication networks that are critical to the success of any military modernization project. Japan has actively supported the Philippines by promoting defense exchanges and capacity building, but in order to take the Japan-Philippines security relationship to the next level, it will be necessary to conclude agreements that facilitate information sharing and joint training. Japan can also play an important role in encouraging security cooperation between the Philippines and the United States while sustaining its own efforts to enhance the capacity of the Philippine air force to strengthen preparedness and deterrence in an increasingly complex regional security environment.
+
+In this context, the security partnership between Japan and the Philippines could be strengthened through several actions:
+
+__1. Hold regular foreign and defense ministerial meetings.__
+
+In April 2022, the first foreign and defense ministerial meeting (2+2) between Japan and the Philippines was held. The joint statement issued by the two countries declares that they will consider concluding a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) for facilitating reciprocal visits and an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) for exchanging goods and services. The two governments also agreed to meet on a regular basis to align their strategic perspectives on developments in the region.
+
+Convening the 2+2 regularly is essential for the development of a strong bilateral security relationship and networking with other countries in the region. Australia was the first country other than the United States with which Japan established a 2+2 framework, and the number of such engagements with other countries has grown, as shown in Table 2. While Japan does not necessarily maintain strong security relationships with all the countries it has engaged under the 2+2 framework, regular meetings are a prerequisite for building strong security partnerships.
+
+
+_▲ Table 2: Japan’s 2+2 Meetings (Excluding the United States)_
+
+The history of the U.S.-Japan 2+2 shows that since the first meeting in September 1960, it has functioned as an important consultative body to consider a variety of issues related to consultations under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and bilateral cooperation in the security field. Just as former U.S. secretary of state James Baker proposed in 1990 to upgrade the U.S.-Japan 2+2 to its current ministerial level, it is a natural step to encourage consultations between Japan and the Philippines above the vice-ministerial-level meetings between the foreign and defense authorities of Japan and the Philippines that have already taken place nine times. The Japan-Australia security relationship has developed remarkably in recent years, with the signing of a Japan-Australia RAA in January 2022 to facilitate joint training and the Australian Department of Defence announcing in April 2022 that an Australian KC-30A aerial refueling aircraft had successfully tested aerial refueling on a Japanese F-2 fighter jet. Additionally, both countries coordinate closely with the United States under the Trilateral Security Dialogue. The three countries should coordinate their respective approaches to defense cooperation with the Philippines and make effective use of each country’s limited resources to enhance the role of the Philippines as a regional defense partner. Japan reflects the outcome of those discussions in the agenda for the Japan-Philippines 2+2 to establish and implement common strategic objectives for defense cooperation in the region.
+
+__2. Establish a formal agreement or de facto framework for information sharing.__
+
+Japan and the Philippines should conclude an information security agreement or an equivalent de facto framework for information sharing to enhance their capacity to jointly assess regional security dynamics. Such an agreement is the foundation (“infrastructure”) of security cooperation and is essential if Japan-Philippines defense cooperation is to deepen in the future. Such an agreement would also enable the two countries to share information on defense equipment and military operations and would facilitate defense equipment exports and joint training. Since Japan first signed a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with the United States in 2007, it has added eight other GSOMIA partners in the following order: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), France, Australia, the United Kingdom, India, Italy, South Korea, and Germany.
+
+In July 2020, the Sankei Shimbun reported that the government of Japan was considering sharing information with the Philippines on air defense radar exports. According to the article, several Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) officials stated that “information on the Bashi Strait is becoming indispensable for Japan’s defense.” Since 2016, China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force has conspicuously dispatched aircraft to the Pacific Ocean through the Miyako Strait between Miyako Island and Okinawa as well as the Bashi Strait between Luzon Island in the Philippines and Taiwan. Experts have suggested that if Japan and the Philippines can share information on the locations of Chinese military aircraft, it will be possible to facilitate countermeasures against China’s attempts to project air power beyond the First Island Chain.
+
+When sharing sensitive information, it is essential to introduce strict penalties in case of leakage. The government of Japan enacted the Specially Designated Secrets Act in December 2013 and will have to initiate in-depth discussions with the Philippines on how the country can introduce similar measures. If that process takes time, both governments should consider establishing a de facto information-sharing framework, to the extent possible under domestic laws, until the agreement is concluded and aim to effectively enhance the situational awareness capacity of the Philippines as soon as possible. Although the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness is a multilateral initiative, it is a good example of a de facto framework because it allows unclassified information sharing by using existing technologies and institutions without concluding a de jure specific security protection agreement.
+
+Of course, the mere existence of such agreements does not automatically facilitate bilateral security cooperation. For example, the Moon Jae-in administration of South Korea announced in 2019 its intention to abrogate the GSOMIA with Japan, but under pressure from the United States, the notification was suspended just before it expired. The Moon administration took the position that the GSOMIA could be abrogated at any time, depending on South Korea’s decision. However, NBC News points out that during the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States provided Ukraine with real-time intelligence such as geospatial data, intercepted communications, and targeting information. Establishing such a framework for sharing classified information in peacetime rather than in wartime will greatly improve regional deterrence and capabilities to cope with urgent situations.
+
+__3. Conclude a Reciprocal Access Agreement.__
+
+Institutional arrangements such as the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) Japan recently concluded with Australia are needed to facilitate joint training and exercises between the JSDF and Philippine armed forces (AFP). In June 2015, President Aquino expressed interest in signing a similar Visiting Forces Agreement with Japan and suggested that both governments recognize the need for such a framework. Professor Ken Jimbo of Keio University said, “The role of the SDF under the Indo-Pacific Initiative should be expanded,” and “to this end, it is necessary to conclude the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) with India, the Philippines, and Singapore.”
+
+The Philippines has a Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States and a Status of Forces Agreement with Australia. The April 2022 Japan-Philippines 2+2 joint statement noted that Japan and the Philippines should start
+
+> . . . to consider frameworks to facilitate reciprocal visits as well as reciprocal provision of supplies and services in order to further enhance and facilitate cooperation such as exercises between Japan Self-Defense Forces and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Going forward, the Japanese side will proceed with deliberations, including on the possibilities of concluding a reciprocal access agreement and an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement.
+
+Currently, the government of Japan is initiating or considering negotiations with the United Kingdom and France regarding RAAs, similar to its agreements with Australia, in order to maintain peace and stability in the region. However, it took about seven and a half years to conclude the Japan-Australia RAA due to concerns such as Japan’s use of the death penalty. Therefore, it may be difficult for a Japan-Philippines RAA to be signed soon, but such a de jure framework will be necessary to make training and exercises between the Philippines and Japan smoother, which will deepen the Japan-Philippines security partnership.
+
+__4. Promote further transfer of defense equipment.__
+
+Japan should promote more exports of defense equipment to improve interoperability between the JSDF and AFP. As noted above, radars made by Mitsubishi Electric Corporation will be transferred from Japan to the Philippines. Since the easing of Japan’s Three Principles on the Transfer of Defense Equipment in 2014, Japan tried to secure agreements to export submarines to Australia and surveillance radars to Thailand but failed in both cases. However, there have already been several successful cases between Japan and the Philippines, such as the provision of TC-90s and UH-1 parts. There are also reports that the Japan Air Self-Defense Force is considering human resource development projects with the Philippines connected to radar exports. Packaging defense equipment exports with training initiatives would serve as a foundation for deepening Japan-Philippines defense cooperation.
+
+Japan’s Medium Term Defense Program states: “The government as a whole will promote the appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment under the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.” Based on Japan’s policy, Japan’s Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Agency (ATLA) launched a feasibility study for the overseas transfer of defense equipment in April 2020 as a “new initiative for promoting equipment transfer” (Figure 3). In this new initiative, a contract is signed with a trading company at the start of the survey, the public and private sectors collaborate in the process of narrowing down the scope of equipment to be covered, and the project concept is eventually materialized through discussions between the public and private sectors. Initially, surveys will be conducted in India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam, and it is hoped that these efforts will be carried out in the Philippines as well.
+
+Rui Matsukawa, a member of Upper House of the Diet representing the Liberal Democratic Party, expressed her concern that the private sector in Japan is assuming all the risks involved in defense equipment contracts and said:
+
+> We will actively promote the overseas transfer of defense equipment as a defense policy. To this end, the government of Japan should take responsibility for establishing an adequate system centered on Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Agency. In addition, it is important to appropriately ease the strict application of the three principles of defense equipment transfer to the corners of the world.
+
+She further insists that this point should be included in the National Security Strategy and other related documents to be revised later this year. She also suggests that “businesspeople working for trading companies should be hired as defense attachés in charge of equipment transfer for a limited period of time, and they should work in Japanese embassies in countries where there are likely to be prospects for development.” Overlapping with ATLA’s efforts, if the Japanese embassies in the Philippines, in addition to the above four countries, were to appoint such personnel, it could be a breakthrough in promoting the transfer of defense equipment.
+
+
+_▲ Figure 3: Image Feasibility Study Launched by ATLA_
+
+__5. Implement more proactive and strategic overseas development assistance.__
+
+Japan should utilize overseas development assistance (ODA) proactively and strategically to reduce the budgetary burden of defense purchases on the Philippines. Under the “Non-Project Grant Aid for Provision of Japanese Disaster Reduction Equipment” agreement signed in March 2015, Japan provided the “Life-Saving System” in October 2021 to the AFP, which includes the JSDF’s electro-hydraulic equipment, cutters, spreaders, electric pumps, acoustic probes, lighting equipment with generators, boats for use in situations such as tsunamis and guerrilla rains, life jackets, life-saving belts, and other equipment and materials necessary for saving lives during disasters. In November 2021, the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force conducted a briefing for the AFP on the handling of life-saving equipment to efficiently utilize the equipment during disaster response. Japan’s 2020 White Paper on Development Cooperation states that Japan will continue to leverage its various forms of support, including ODA, in its efforts to realize a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. The white paper also outlines a policy of working with the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the European Union to help developing countries in various fields such as maritime safety and disaster management, in which ODA is playing an important role.
+
+In May 2014, at the Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore, Prime Minister Abe said that Japan would combine various options to support developing countries in the region, including strategic use of ODA (e.g., provision of patrol vessels, dispatch of experts), support for capacity building by the JSDF, and defense equipment and technology cooperation. In 2015, the government of Japan revised the ODA Charter and established the Development Cooperation Charter, which clearly states the philosophy that ODA can be used to support the military forces of other countries for “non-military purposes such as public welfare or disaster-relief purposes” and that “such cases will be considered on a case-by-case basis in light of their substantive relevance.” The capacity-building projects by the JSDF cover 15 countries mainly in Southeast Asia and are conducted annually for the AFP in a wide range of areas, as shown below in Table 3.
+
+
+_▲ Table 3: Japanese Capacity-Building Assistance to the Philippines_
+
+In addition, as mentioned above, opportunities for defense equipment transfers between Japan and the Philippines are gradually increasing. Furthermore, if goods are provided to the Philippines through ODA, education to become proficient in operations and maintenance will prove essential to help the Philippines improve its capabilities. One of the greatest advantages of ODA is that, in the case of grants, funds can be given without any obligation to repay. Even in the case of ODA loans, the repayment period is long and interest rates are as close to interest-free as possible. Through such schemes, development cooperation for non-military purposes such as public welfare and disaster relief can be actively pursued, saving the limited budget of the Philippine government while contributing to improving the humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and maritime security capabilities of the AFP and Philippine coast guard.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+In May 2022, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. won the presidential election in the Philippines. Like his recent predecessors, Marcos will need to define the relationship with the United States, a treaty ally, and develop a strategy to manage China, which continues to challenge the status quo in the maritime domain. According to a survey of ASEAN countries published by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore in February 2022, 83.5 percent of Filipino respondents answered that they would choose the United States if the Philippines were forced to align with either the United States or China. This suggests an interest in furthering alliance ties with Washington, but in reality, for the Philippines and other countries in the region, this involves the maintenance of a delicate balancing act between the two great powers. It is also possible that Marcos could pursue outreach with China just as Duterte did at the onset of his administration.
+
+Japan and the United States have introduced strategies to maintain regional stability and prosperity by realizing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and enhancing cooperation with Southeast Asian partners such as the Philippines is critically important to those efforts. Japan has a long history of engagement with the Philippines rooted in economic cooperation, but gradually expanding to include defense cooperation and capacity building is critical to managing an increasingly complex regional security environment marked by increased Chinese assertiveness in the maritime domain. Japan should further develop its security partnership with the Philippines to reflect its geopolitical importance and address its security vulnerabilities in coordination with the United States and other regional partners. Experts in Japan and the United States have addressed the importance of engagement with the Philippines in geostrategic terms but with less consideration of what exactly should be done. This paper details ways to sustain momentum for bilateral security cooperation between Japan and the Philippines as a step toward multilateral security cooperation with the United States or Australia in the future. There should be no doubt that strengthening security cooperation between Japan and the Philippines, a process over 10 years in the making, will enhance deterrence in the region and contribute to the future development and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific.
+
+---
+
+__Kojiro Tonosaki__ is a former visiting fellow with the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic International Studies in Washington, D.C., from the Japan Air Self-Defense Force, Japan Ministry of Defense (July 2021–June 2022). He holds the rank of lieutenant colonel and is a transportation pilot. He is the author of, among other works, “‘Integrated Deterrence’ in the PH: Advice to prepare for the worst-case scenario,” “US-Asean relations: the important things are simple,” and “Brahmos in the Philippines and Quad Potential.”
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-07-27-putins-new-police-state.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-07-27-putins-new-police-state.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..db37df11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-07-27-putins-new-police-state.md
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Putin’s New Police State
+author: Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan
+date : 2022-07-27 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/557lRnN.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "In the Shadow of War, the FSB Embraces Stalin’s Methods"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Since the spring of 2022, a terrifying new force has coursed through Russian society._ _Activists who have protested the “special operation” in Ukraine are being rounded up. Opponents of the regime and even ordinary citizens who have had unauthorized foreign contacts are being thrown into Moscow’s Lefortovo Prison, where in Stalinist times, political prisoners were tortured and executed. Special border agents have been interrogating and intimidating Russians who are trying to leave or return. But even those who have made it out are not safe; exiles who have spoken out are being investigated, and their relatives in Russia are being harassed by the regime. And security police are cracking down on Russian companies that buy foreign rather than Russian raw materials and hardware._
+
+As Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine enters its sixth month, a dramatic shift has occurred in the Kremlin’s security bureaucracy, and it has centered on the agency closest to Putin himself: the Federal Security Service, or FSB. When the war began, the Kremlin planned to use the FSB mainly in Ukraine, as a special operations force that would consolidate a rapid Russian conquest. According to the plan, the Russian tanks rolling into Ukraine would trigger regime change in Kyiv, and a new pro-Moscow leadership, sponsored by FSB spymasters, would take control of the country. At the time, it was the FSB’s foreign intelligence branch — the Fifth Service — that was to carry out this task. It was the only major FSB department, out of a dozen, that was directly involved in preparing for the war.
+
+As those plans faltered, however, Putin crafted a different, far more comprehensive mission for the FSB: it would be at the forefront of Russia’s total war effort at home as well as its intelligence operations in Ukraine. And every branch of the service would now be involved. Running the new crackdowns in Russia are the FSB’s counterterrorism unit, its counterintelligence service, and its investigative department. Meanwhile, FSB special forces and the military counterintelligence branch are running operations targeting Ukrainian service people in occupied territories and beyond, recruiting Ukrainian agents, and processing those whom the FSB hopes to see prosecuted in show trials. FSB agents are stationed at Russia’s borders, and the Economic Security Service, which is often considered the most corrupt department of the FSB, has been vigorously enforcing Russia’s economic policies. At FSB headquarters at Lubyanka Square in Moscow, the agency’s rank and file have been told to prepare for three-month tours of duty in the occupied territories.
+
+As the FSB spearheads a transformed, increasingly paranoid, and heavily securitized state bureaucracy, the shift has profound implications for the nature of Putin’s rule. In contrast to the largely surveillance-oriented agency of previous years, the FSB has become a far more expansive arm of an increasingly ruthless state. In its sweeping reach into domestic society, foreign affairs, and the military, the FSB has begun to look less like its late-Soviet predecessor, the KGB. It now resembles something much scarier: the NKVD, Stalin’s notorious secret police, which conducted the great purges of the 1930s and maintained an iron lock on Russian society into the early years of the Cold War.
+
+#### The Long Reach of Lubyanka
+
+It is not hard to find signs of the FSB’s evolving strategy. Consider its tactics toward journalists and members of the political opposition. In the past, when it came to the press, the FSB limited itself to spying on journalists critical of the government and encouraging them to leave the country. Even when Ivan Safronov, a former journalist who covered the military for the Russian daily newspaper Kommersant, was arrested on treason charges in the summer of 2020, it was understood as a message to the others: stop writing about sensitive issues or leave the country. In fact, the following year, many Russian journalists were placed on a government list of foreign agents but not arrested, and many went into exile. This exodus continued in the opening phase of the war in Ukraine, when hundreds of Russian journalists and activists fled abroad.
+
+Since the spring, however, the FSB has set out to reverse the flow. Two months after the war started, for example, it let in the prominent opposition politician Vladimir Kara-Murza. For years, Kara-Murza has shuttled between the United States, Europe, and Russia, promoting sanctions against Putin’s cronies; since the war started, he has feared that the Kremlin would ban him from entering Russia. But in April, Kara-Murza flew to Moscow and was let in — only to be swiftly thrown in jail, where he has remained ever since, on charges of spreading fake news about the war. In July, another opposition politician, Ilya Yashin, was arrested on identical charges. After Alexei Navalny was arrested and imprisoned — following his own return to Russia in August 2021 — Yashin was the most prominent opposition figure; now, like Navalny and Kara-Murza, he has been locked up and silenced.
+
+This is no accident. Starting in May 2022, the FSB has been visiting the families of Russian exiles to convey the message that the Russian government is ready to welcome the exiles back. There are also reports that Russian IT specialists who left Russia at the start of the war but returned have been summoned to FSB headquarters and interrogated: the agency was seeking information in particular about Russian exiles who have stayed abroad. Rather than forcing Russians out, where they may be able to encourage opposition movements, the regime has decided that it would be better to keep them under close watch in Russia — an approach last used by the Kremlin during the early stages of the Cold War.
+
+`Shifting tactics, the FSB is luring opposition figures back to Russia and arresting them.`
+
+At the same time, the FSB has become bolder in its pursuit of journalists and others who have long been in exile. Here, we can cite our own experience: in March, the internal security department of the FSB initiated a criminal case against one of us, Andrei Soldatov, on charges of spreading fake news about the war, charges that carry a sentence of up to ten years in prison. Soldatov’s bank accounts in Russia have been frozen, and the Russian government has issued formal international warrants to arrest him and extradite him to Russia. The number of Russian journalists who have been threatened with similar charges has only grown. And since most already live in exile, the criminal cases are meant to put further pressure on their relatives back in Russia.
+
+Equally dramatic has been the agency’s growing crackdown on scientists, lawyers, and other Russians who have been involved in activities the regime now regards as suspect. The FSB’s efforts to harass and intimidate Russian scientists who collaborate with foreign research institutions are not new. But since the war began, the FSB has become far more aggressive. On June 30, the agency took extreme action against Dmitry Kolker, the director of the Laboratory of Quantum Optics at Novosibirsk State University, accusing him of treason for purportedly sharing state secrets with China. (He gave a series of lectures in China as part of an exchange program.) Even though Kolker was in a hospital with stage 4 pancreatic cancer, the FSB arrested him and sent him to Lefortovo Prison, where he died three days later. Many Russians were shocked, but this was hardly an isolated incident. A day before Kolker’s arrest, the FSB jailed Dmitry Talantov, a prominent human rights lawyer, who had defended Safronov, the journalist accused of treason by the FSB. Talantov now found himself charged with spreading fake news about the war.
+
+Even mainstream sectors of the Russian economy have come under FSB pressure. Consider Russia’s national health-care system. Since June, the Russian financial monitoring agency, together with the FSB, has investigated medical clinics across the country for prescribing Western drugs rather than Russian ones. The campaign was presented to the public as “cracking down on schemes by foreign pharmaceutical companies that sell their drugs through Russian doctors.” The Kremlin has also asked the FSB to investigate bureaucrats who “failed” to substitute Russian products, like IT technologies, for foreign ones.
+
+The FSB purges have also begun to reach the Russian elite, including senior security officials themselves. In July, three top generals in the Interior Ministry were arrested on embezzlement charges; the operation has been regarded as a message to the interior minister to watch himself — nobody is completely safe in this new security state. This is only the latest in a series of purges that have targeted Oleg Mitvol, a well-connected former prefect of Moscow Precinct, and Vladimir Mau, a leading Russian economist, who is close to the liberal bloc of the government and head of the Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, the major training facility for Russian bureaucrats. Mitvol was thrown into jail; Mau was put under house arrest — events that have unnerved the Moscow financial elites.
+
+But the most striking change concerns the FSB’s tactics in Ukraine. Before the war, the FSB’s role was mostly to recruit Ukrainian politicians. Now, the agency is running a massive operation to detain large numbers of Ukrainians in Russia and in the occupied territories of Ukraine. The main task of this operation is not to expose Ukrainian terrorists, as the FSB officially claims; rather, it is to process large numbers of Ukrainians in order to recruit assets and send them back to Ukraine, on FSB orders. Nor has the FSB neglected a ruthless pursuit of Ukrainian intelligence agents, as well as the units that defended the Azovstal steel works against an 82-day siege by Russian forces this spring. Along with Russians who are accused of state treason, these high-value Ukrainians have been sent to Lefortovo Prison.
+
+#### Back in the USSR
+
+The FSB’s sweeping new role raises larger questions about Putin’s regime. For years, it has been well known that Putin has modeled his security services in part on Soviet practices, including those of the KGB, where he spent almost 16 years. For much of Putin’s time in office — and especially over the past five years, as he sought to shore up his regime — the KGB model made sense. For one thing, in the later decades of the Soviet era, the KGB, although it was powerful, remained a comparatively small organization and preferred a light approach to control. It watched and spied on everyone, from factory workers to ballerinas, but the KGB didn’t seek to carry out large-scale arrests or purges. Instead, it relied on sophisticated forms of intimidation that could make people fall in line without mass repression.
+
+In other respects, the KGB was also shaped by the politics of the post-Stalin era. Rather than controlled by a single all-powerful leader, it was a bureaucracy that answered to the Communist Party. And although the agency was omnipresent, it was largely invisible: KGB officers hated military uniforms, preferring gray suits instead. The KGB also invested hugely in public relations, sponsoring books and movies promoting the image of the agency as the most intellectual government entity in the country — the only one that could effectively fight corruption.
+
+During his first 15 years in power, Putin relied on the FSB but tried to distance it somewhat from the KGB. He wanted the FSB to be his rapid-response team, rushing to him with solutions to his political problems, inside and outside Russia. But after the FSB repeatedly let him down — failing to warn him of color revolutions, Moscow protests, and finally, the Maidan revolution in Kyiv in 2014 — Putin changed the rules. Instead of having the FSB serve as a rapid-response force, he revised its mandate to something much closer to that of the KGB. He made it an instrument for providing political stability through the intimidation of the Russian people, including elites. But the recent moves suggest that Putin is once again shifting course. Instead of the KGB of the 1970s and 1980s, the FSB increasingly resembles Stalin’s secret services, the NKVD, which aimed to a much greater degree at total control of the Russian population.
+
+#### Putin’s Monster
+
+Stalin’s NKVD — the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs — was a true monstrosity. Stalin purposely designed the ministry to oversee vast and widely disparate parts of the Soviet state, including the national railway system, Russia’s nuclear program, and the assassination of Stalin’s enemies abroad. The NKVD oversaw police, espionage operations, political repressions, and the Gulag (the Soviet Union’s extensive system of forced labor camps), as well as the construction industry and even public utilities. To conduct internal repressions, the NKVD built up a network of directorates all over the country: to process such large numbers required an enormous security bureaucracy.
+
+The NKVD was also heavily militarized. Not only did NKVD officers wear military uniforms and carry military ranks but the agency also had its own military units equipped with heavy weaponry such as tanks and aircraft. At the end of the 1930s, as war in Europe looked increasingly likely, Stalin put the country on a military footing, beginning with his security bureaucracy. Once the war started, NKVD troops set up camps in the occupied territories of Poland and the Baltics to identify troublemakers and recruit agents. The NKVD was also put in charge of a campaign to get Russian exiles to return to Russia at the end of the war. These were people who had fled Soviet Russia, and many of them were persuaded to return — only to end up in Stalin’s camps. In these and other ways, the NKVD was designed for a regime that was constantly at war: with its own political enemies, with former comrades in the country and abroad, and with the West. And what made the NKVD so powerful — and so feared — was that it answered only to Stalin, not to the Communist Party or the Soviet government.
+
+Since the war in Ukraine began, Putin’s rapidly growing security state seems to be inching closer to its Stalinist predecessor. The militarization of the FSB, its new recruitment camps, its increasingly open and brutal tactics all suggest that Putin is looking more closely at the approach of the NKVD — an agency that was forged by a totalitarian state in wartime. And the long war is what the Kremlin is priming the country for.
+
+---
+
+__Andrei Soldatov__ is an investigative journalist and Co-Founder and Editor of Agentura.ru, a watchdog of the Russian secret services’ activities.
+
+__Irina Borogan__ is an investigative journalist and Co-Founder and Deputy Editor of Agentura.ru.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-02-assured-sovereignty-concept.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-02-assured-sovereignty-concept.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..10346d9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-02-assured-sovereignty-concept.md
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Assured Sovereignty Concept
+author: Sidharth Kaushal and Kevin Rowlands
+date : 2022-08-02 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/hidvkiu.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "A Concept for Naval Partnership and Persistent Engagement"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_The concept of assured sovereignty could provide the missing link between persistent engagement and desired ends as the Royal Navy looks to build on its presence in the Indo-Pacific._
+
+
+
+The sinking of the Russian Slava-class cruiser Moskva in April this year by a Ukrainian Neptune anti-ship cruise missile may well have been a watershed moment. This is not because it illustrated the risks posed to warships by anti-access capabilities – something already well understood and accounted for in naval circles – but rather because it signposted the potential for smaller states to assure their own maritime sovereignty with little or limited support from larger partners. This, of course, is not just a matter of importance to Ukraine and Russia – it is increasingly a factor in the strategic competition underway in the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere.
+
+Though anti-ship cruise missiles are not themselves a gamechanger, they could in future form part of a package of measures including weaponised uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs), uncrewed aerial vehicles, and a range of other increasingly affordable capabilities that can enable defenders to impose an exacting, unacceptable cost on potential aggressors. Coupled with options such as containerised missiles on nondescript vessels such as cargo ships, they could significantly limit the ability of revisionist actors to challenge the maritime status quo.
+
+However, despite the lowering of the unit costs, there is more to anti-access/area denial than just buying the latest equipment. To be effective, the defender must be able to combine capabilities into a system of systems, to have real-time local maritime domain awareness, and to exercise slick command and control, all in a bespoke manner to suit particular circumstances. The process of designing and building these system architectures and training people to operate and maintain them may still benefit from partnership. It is here that we see a point of synergy between the stated ambitions of countries such as the UK with a persistently engaged – albeit small – naval force, and the aspirations of coastal states who, in many cases, may seek strategic partnerships with third parties rather than explicit alignments with regional or global hegemons.
+
+#### The Lessons from Ukraine and the Concept of Assured Sovereignty
+
+We must not read too much into the sinking of the Moskva. The vessel was in many ways decrepit, and its crew may not have been vigilant to the Ukrainian anti-ship cruise missile threat. Well-equipped warships with alert crews should hardly be sitting ducks for missiles, and the engagement could have ended very differently.
+
+`Trends in areas such as electronic miniaturisation are enabling sophisticated guidance and targeting payloads to be incorporated into relatively small effectors`
+
+That being said, we might also consider that the Ukrainian capacity to erect a localised anti-access bubble was less robust than it might have been given more time and greater partner support. For example, the number of anti-ship cruise missiles at Ukraine’s disposal was minimal, and the Neptune (a variant of the Soviet-era KH-35) does not benefit from the characteristics of more modern missiles such as low observability or very high speed. Moreover, Ukraine had little chance to bring its vision of a mosquito fleet – something it intended to build with UK support – into existence before the war began.
+
+To consider what such a mosquito fleet might look like, or how assured sovereignty in the maritime domain might work, we could look to countries such as Iran, which combines ground-based missiles with missile-equipped fast-attack craft operating in swarms, midget submarines and weaponised UUVs. The threat the Iranian navy poses is not driven by any one capability, but by its ability to deploy many simultaneously, confusing its adversary’s picture and operating well inside its observe-orient-decide-act loop. This threat would not be insurmountable for a Western navy in a high-intensity fight, but the very costs it could impose serves as an important part of the Iranian maritime deterrent during conditions of constant competition. Harass rather than defeat may often be good enough.
+
+The same suite of capabilities that enables offensive action can also enable more defensive purposes with growing potency. Trends in areas such as electronic miniaturisation are enabling sophisticated guidance and targeting payloads to be incorporated into relatively small effectors – something that the UK’s own capabilities like Spear-3 illustrate. This extends to a range of other relatively low-cost, small effectors such as loitering munitions. Consider, for example, the Israeli Harpy – a 500km range munition with a unit cost of $70,000 – or the US Navy’s SLOCUM glider – a low-cost automated surveillance asset which could easily be utilised as a smart mine, capable of designating its own targets. Trends in areas such as additive manufacturing will likely drive the costs of these capabilities down even further. Finally, as North Korea’s testing of a hypersonic glide vehicle shows, with partner support, even states with very limited capabilities can field a small number of more exquisite assets, which – if deployed judiciously – can act as effective deterrents. Combined with traditional green water assets such as frigates, corvettes and diesel electric submarines, they could pose a substantial challenge in areas that a larger adversary might previously have considered permissive sea space.
+
+However, though effectors are increasingly low-cost, the underpinnings that make them an effective, reliable system are not. For example, the ability to operate effectively against hostile vessels – especially in congested waterways where a substantial amount of neutral shipping may be present – requires a robust and high-fidelity C4ISR capability that can withstand disruption. Consider, for example, the way in which Ukraine’s early warning network was destroyed in the early days of the war. Not only does this require resilient networks and the information architecture needed to fuse data from multiple sources, but it also imposes exacting demands on operators. Skilled operators capable of making decisions with only partial information and a network architecture capable of drawing data from other sources, including proliferating commercial networks, will be critical.
+
+`Assured sovereignty aligns the Royal Navy’s ends with its regional means and dovetails with the objectives of partner states who seek to deter unwanted interference without joining formal military alliances`
+
+This is why relatively affordable capabilities, such as air defence systems, have typically required substantial advisory missions to enable the creation and operation of a systems architecture. The utilisation of area denial capabilities also requires other organisational competencies. As examples from the Iran–Iraq tanker war – including the attack on the USS Stark and the mine damage to the USS Samuel Roberts – show, damaging the wrong target – even inadvertently – can have international repercussions. The need to classify targets under conditions of limited information demands a sophisticated organisational capacity for information processing, which will become all the more acute when making decisions about when to release weapons capable of self-designation. Finally, though the unit costs of emerging effectors may be cheap, the human capital and infrastructure needed for their manufacture is not. This is likely to be true in other areas, such as the use of automation for data fusion and command and control.
+
+#### Persistent Engagement and Assured Sovereignty
+
+It is here that partners can offer choice and value. The development of resilient ISR and the capacity to operate under contested conditions, which navies including the Royal Navy are working to achieve, can be co-developed with partners. Partners from more established forces can add expertise in a number of key areas, from niche capabilities such as the connectors and procedures needed to manoeuvre in littoral spaces, to organisational competencies such as planning and staffing campaigns. In return, the less developed force contributes local area expertise, skilled labour and the determination to maintain its independence. There are opportunities in the process of knowledge exchange which can lead to valuable synergies for all partners.
+
+As the Royal Navy looks to build on its presence in the Indo-Pacific, a two-ocean mega-region where it has limited mass and competes with a systemic challenger with the world’s largest navy, it will require a concept that links persistent engagement to desired ends. Assured sovereignty could be precisely such a concept. Not only does it align the Royal Navy’s ends with its regional means but, crucially, it also dovetails with the national political objectives of partner states who seek to deter unwanted interference without joining formal military alliances. The concept could also support the evolution of frameworks such as the Five Power Defence Arrangements or even AUKUS – which, as it evolves beyond an initial focus on delivering submarines to Australia, could emphasise the co-development of capabilities for export to other partners.
+
+In many ways, this is a modern variant of the active defence described by figures such as Sir Julian Corbett as the optimal choice for a weaker maritime power, or of the naval strategy developed by la Jeune Ecole, combining shore-based defence with active hit-and-run attacks by light flotillas. The very tactics and techniques used by China to safeguard its own (and its illegally claimed) maritime territory can now help to safeguard at affordable cost the coasts, territorial waters, maritime infrastructure, and exclusive economic zones of states unwilling to pay tribute to Beijing, without them becoming wholly dependent on Washington. In short, they represent an opportunity to achieve the paramount goal of all small, independent states: assured sovereignty, on their terms.
+
+---
+
+__Sidharth Kaushal__ is a Research Fellow at RUSI. His research covers the impact of technology on maritime doctrine in the 21st century and the role of sea power in a state’s grand strategy. Sidharth holds a doctorate in International Relations from the London School of Economics, where his research examined the ways in which strategic culture shapes the contours of a nation’s grand strategy.
+
+__Kevin Rowlands__ is the Head of the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-02-securing-semicon-supply.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-02-securing-semicon-supply.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..56344c96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-02-securing-semicon-supply.md
@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Securing Semicon. Supply
+author: William A. Reinsch, et al.
+date : 2022-08-02 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/AAIk4xm.jpg
+#image_caption:
+description: "Affirmative Agenda for International Cooperation"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Technological innovation has been a driving force for U.S. global leadership and economic prosperity for over a century. This legacy of innovation largely stands on the foundation of a key component: semiconductor chips, found today in almost all electronic products._ _Semiconductors are an integral component of various consumer products across industries, including cars, smartphones, and household appliances. But semiconductors can also be used in dual-use goods — products that have both military and civilian applications — such as air guidance systems for both civilian and military aircraft. The tension between economic gain and security risk inherent within dual-use semiconductor goods is heightened in fields with national security implications, such as supercomputing and artificial intelligence (AI). How the government and private sector manage the global value chains (GVCs) of chips will directly affect U.S. global competitiveness and national security going forward._
+
+The past two years have underscored the importance of semiconductors to the U.S. economy and its national security interests. Pandemic-induced spikes in consumer demand boosted semiconductor demand by 17 percent between 2019 and 2021. Global sales reached $555.9 billion in 2021, 26.2 percent more than the year before. Although China remains the largest market in the world for semiconductors, sales in the Americas represented the largest region for industry growth in 2021. However, this spike in demand, along with stagnating investment, inadequate input supplies, and logistics breakdowns, has led to an unprecedented shortage of semiconductors that has reverberated throughout the roughly 200 downstream industries that depend on chips. In the automotive industry alone, it was projected that global semiconductor shortages were responsible for $210 billion in lost revenue as of September 2021. Short-term supply chain disruptions for the semiconductor industry are compounded by long-term geopolitical challenges and the need to rethink what constitutes both secure and resilient supply chains. While China is a top customer for the semiconductor industry, the perception of China has shifted in recent years from potential partner to existential threat. This shift has led companies and countries alike to rethink their dependency on China as both partner and customer. In particular, the Biden administration has sought policies that attempt to accelerate progress and prolong the United States’ innovative edge, while simultaneously dampening China’s influence throughout the semiconductor marketplace. Countries around the world have begun thinking about ways to reduce dependencies on China, enhance supply chain resiliency, and keep costs down.
+
+In the United States, this confluence has manifested in calls for nearshoring and “friend-shoring.” As Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said in April 2022 remarks, “friend-shoring means . . . that we have a group of countries that have strong adherence to a set of norms and values about how to operate in the global economy and about how to run the global economic system, and we need to deepen our ties with those partners and to work together to make sure that we can supply our needs of critical materials.” The key difference between onshoring and friend-shoring is that friend-shoring is not restricted to domestic production, but rather seeks to move production to allied partners.
+
+While moving supply chains away from East Asia could increase security in the long run, an ill-conceived implementation of this friend-shoring strategy could result in price hikes and a stronger China over time. In its 2022 capstone report on supply chains, the Biden administration explicitly stated that “the United States cannot make, mine, or manufacture everything ourselves. We must cooperate with our allies and partners to foster and promote collective supply chain resilience.” Thus emerges the need for the United States to choose its partners wisely when it comes to semiconductor supply chains.
+
+As the United States considers how to build more secure and resilient supply chains, it should seek closer collaboration with countries demonstrating the following characteristics: (1) the bloc should maintain robust support for technology development, whether through a conducive regulatory environment or significant government investment in research; and (2) as a matter of national security, the United States should enhance cooperation only with those parties whose export controls are consistent with its own, including compliance with the Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR).
+
+The United States is already leveraging relationships with foreign partners to enhance semiconductor supply chain resiliency; increase collaboration on distortive trade practices, investment screening, and export controls; and enhance transatlantic cooperation regarding secure internet and communication technology (ICT) supply chains. In its first year, the Biden administration pursued closer security relationships with both selected Asian countries and the European Union. In May 2022, the United States and the European Union held the second ministerial of the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC). The TTC seeks to promote closer transatlantic collaboration through 10 specific working groups, including rebalancing transatlantic semiconductor supply chains. The joint statement from the second ministerial underscores the need to build more geographically and commercially diversified supply chains and directly highlights an overdependence on China for the production and processing of certain inputs. In the supply chain annex, the parties agreed to develop an early warning and monitoring mechanism on semiconductor value chains, monitor and prepare for supply chain disruptions, and enhance transparency and commit to exchange information to avoid a subsidy race. These types of generalized commitments are relatively easy to put forth, but much more difficult to achieve in practice.
+
+Dealing with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also become a major focus of TTC activity, particularly regarding cooperation on sanctions and export controls. The united export control response is intended to cripple Russia’s war machine by cutting the country’s military off from advanced technologies like semiconductors, which are used in military goods like aircraft and tanks. Continued close coordination on sanctions is expected, but whether that will translate into the same level of cooperation outside the Ukraine context remains to be seen. Furthermore, the U.S. focus on export controls in the sector, coupled with the Russian invasion of Ukraine and mounting Chinese pressure on Taiwan, has injected a new level of national security discourse into the trade policy debate.
+
+In addition to closer collaboration with the European Union, the Biden administration has accelerated its engagement with Asian partners. In September 2021, the United States, Japan, India, and Australia launched a “joint initiative to map capacity, identify vulnerabilities, and bolster supply-chain security for semiconductors and their vital components” as part of their Quad alliance. Quad leaders also convened in May 2022, though the meeting largely centered on security issues. It is unclear how these EU and Quad semiconductor supply chain efforts will progress, but each comes with different economic and national security implications.
+
+Another evolving initiative is the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). All of the Quad countries have indicated their intent to participate in the IPEF, though they have not yet announced which specific pillar negotiations they will join. While details of the framework remain elusive, the IPEF launch in May 2022 confirmed that the framework will consist of four primary policy pillars: (1) trade; (2) supply chain resiliency; (3) infrastructure, clean energy, and decarbonization; and (4) tax and anti-corruption. The United States Department of Commerce will lead supply chain resiliency, infrastructure and decarbonization, and tax and anti-corruption. The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) will head the fair and resilient trade component. It is likely that the Commerce Department will leverage the supply chain resiliency pillar to collaborate more closely with Indo-Pacific partners on semiconductor supply chains, including early warning systems for shortages and information sharing on how to avert future supply chain crunches. That Australia and Japan are likely participants in the USTR’s trade pillar provides the United States with a forum for governments to redouble efforts toward strengthening semiconductor GVCs and cooperation, though Indian participation in the trade pillar remains highly unlikely. Export controls will not be one of the topics covered in the IPEF.
+
+Given the evolving security relationship between the United States, the Quad, and the European Union, this paper focuses on both Quad and EU countries and the possibilities for friend-shoring in both. It assesses how the EU and U.S. governments can collaborate to avoid duplicative policies that fail to enhance the overall resiliency of transatlantic semiconductor supply chains. In addition to analyzing opportunities for closer cooperation across governments, this paper also evaluates policies the U.S. government should pursue to support the private sector and ensure the long-term competitiveness of the U.S. semiconductor industry. The paper also looks at another emerging security partnership among the Quad countries to assess their viability in terms of semiconductor friend-shoring. This project looks at the current landscape of semiconductor research and development (R&D), fabrication, and packaging capacity in these case study countries; evaluates export control regimes in each country; and assesses which countries are best positioned to partner with the United States to build more resilient semiconductor supply chains based on economic and national security considerations.
+
+This paper finds that, given the inherent and increasing complexity of global semiconductor supply chains, self-sufficiency in semiconductor production is probably unattainable and, in any event, would be counterproductive in the short term and would contravene long-term geostrategic interests that depend on continued innovation and competitiveness. China’s persistent pursuit of intellectual property theft and subsidization of domestic production underscores how important it is for the United States to engage more closely with like-minded allies to bolster the security of analog and next-generation chips. What emerges is the need for an affirmative agenda for semiconductor supply chains among allies. Key recommendations emerged from interviews conducted for this research, including the need to
+
+- identify policy goals that would help bolster semiconductor supply chain resiliency;
+
+- promulgate consistent, predictable policies, particularly related to trade;
+
+- avoid blanket export controls that risk dampening investment in allied semiconductor industries; and
+
+- consider the creation of a new mini-export control regime that could function similarly to the Wassenaar Arrangement.
+
+Using these key themes, this paper assesses specific case study countries to evaluate how governments can better support the semiconductor industry.
+
+
+### Global Semiconductor Value Chain
+
+The global semiconductor value chain is dominated by the United States, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Europe, and China. The semiconductor GVC consists of three main stages: R&D (chip design), fabrication (chip production), and advanced testing and packaging (back-end manufacturing). R&D and chip design require substantial funding and human capital input; consequently, the industry has one of the highest R&D margins across all industries. Semiconductor companies spend more than 18 percent of their revenue on R&D. Fabrication (fab) involves the production of chips, a deeply technical and precise six-step process. Front-end manufacturing requires significant capital expenditures. For example, a standard semiconductor fab requires roughly $5 billion of investment, while an advanced fab can cost over $20 billion.
+
+
+_▲ Semiconductor Value Chain_
+
+The fabless foundry model allows firms to specialize in one primary aspect of the semiconductor GVC and to outsource manufacturing. For example, chips might be designed in Silicon Valley, manufactured in East Asia with Dutch machine tools, and then packaged in Malaysia. U.S.-based Qualcomm specializes in the design of semiconductors and does not have production facilities, while companies like Global Foundries specialize in manufacturing and do not do their own design. Meanwhile, companies such as Amkor specialize in assembly, testing, and packaging (ATP), also known as back-end manufacturing.
+
+
+_▲ A large web of global trade flows supports the geographic specialization in the semiconductor value chain_
+
+Back-end manufacturing is typically handled by outsourced semiconductor assembly and test (OSAT) companies. Taiwanese companies maintain 53 percent of the back-end market share, though the United States International Trade Commission finds there is a “notable concentration” of ATP service providers in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam. In 2019, Taiwan maintained 53 percent of the OSAT market, and a single Taiwanese firm, ASE Group, maintained 26 percent of the global back-end market. The largest OSAT firm in the United States is Amkor Technologies, which accounted for 13 percent of the market in 2019. While ATP services account for only 10 percent of a chip’s value, they are the important last step in the production process. On the other hand, the integrated device model (IDM) represents the vertical integration of semiconductor GVCs. Few firms follow the IDM. However, IDM sales reached $257.4 billion, while fabless chip sales reached $127.9 billion, underscoring the profitability derived from the efficiency of vertical integration models. Examples of these vertically integrated firms include Intel, Samsung, and Texas Instruments.
+
+
+_▲ Technology complexity and need for scale have led to emergence of business models focused on a specific layer of the value chain_
+
+
+### Semiconductor Policy in the United States
+
+While semiconductor GVCs are distributed around the world, diversification of GVCs helps keep costs down and reduces the likelihood of a major disruption. One month into office (in February 2021), President Biden signed an Executive Order on America’s Supply Chains. The order mandated that relevant agencies undertake a comprehensive review U.S. supply chain security in the following key areas: semiconductor manufacturing and advanced packaging, batteries, critical minerals and materials, and pharmaceuticals. With respect to semiconductors, the 100-Day Review found that while the United States remains a leader in design, lack of production capacity and continued reliance on foreign manufacturers continue to restrain industry growth.
+
+The Commerce Department, which oversaw the review of semiconductor supply chains, found in its one-year review that chip shortages were particularly acute in certain types of semiconductors. These include legacy logic chips, such as those used in medical devices and automobiles, analog chips used in power management and image sensors, and optoelectronic chips used in sensors and switches. These categories of chips are relatively large in nanometer size, meaning increasing supply is relatively easier to achieve than with other, more advanced chips.
+
+A combination of factors in the United States, such as high labor costs and insufficient government-supported R&D, has led to a decrease in the U.S. share of semiconductor manufacturing capabilities, from 37 percent in 1990 to 12 percent in 2019. In light of ongoing disruptions to semiconductor supply chains and a decreasing U.S. market share, the Biden administration has deemed this a national security priority. As directed by the February 2021 executive order, the Commerce Department released its 100-day critical supply chain report the following June, providing a comprehensive overview of risks, vulnerabilities, and opportunities to strengthen and secure U.S. semiconductor supply chains. Also in June 2021, the United States Senate passed the United States Innovation and Competition Act (USICA), followed by the House version — the America Creating Opportunities for Manufacturing, Pre-Eminence in Technology, and Economic Strength Act of 2022 (the America COMPETES Act). These bills, currently in conference, both contain the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors for America Act (the CHIPS for America Act), which would provide substantial investments to boost domestic semiconductor production — to the tune of over $52 billion. In the backdrop of geostrategic competition with China, the Biden administration’s approach to semiconductor investment represents a desire to scale up U.S. industry and maintain a competitive edge for U.S. semiconductor manufacturing.
+
+The CHIPS for America Act would allocate $39 billion to the Commerce Department’s semiconductor incentive program, providing up to $3 billion per firm for the construction of new fabs. It would allocate roughly $11 billion for R&D. Additionally, the act would create a new Multilateral Semiconductors Security Fund to promote the development of a secure semiconductor supply chain. The act would also establish new supply chain programs within the Commerce Department. CSIS outlines additional contours of the CHIPS for America Act in [this piece](https://www.csis.org/blogs/perspectives-innovation/chips-america-act-why-it-necessary-and-what-it-does).
+
+According to the act, U.S. government spending on semiconductors would complement existing industry efforts to bolster the resiliency and security of semiconductor supply chains. As of 2020, the United States accounted for the largest portion of the semiconductor market share, at 47 percent, equaling $207.9 billion in sales. Major private players are making sizable investments in the domestic semiconductor industry, including to increase domestic production capacity. In 2022, Intel announced it would invest $20 billion in building two Ohio factories. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) concluded a deal to spend $12 billion in Arizona to develop a new plant. Texas Instruments plans to invest $3.5 billion annually for chip manufacturing in the United States through 2025.
+
+#### INVESTMENT SCREENING, EXPORT CONTROLS, AND TRADE INITIATIVES
+
+Trade policy is an important part of facilitating the development of a resilient semiconductor industry. Trade policies can be tools that enhance innovation and growth, while at the same time restraining the ability of adversaries to develop cutting-edge technologies. The task for policymakers is to ensure that policies to promote industry growth do not conflict with ones to protect national security. Trade policy can play an important role in helping domestic industry “run faster” against competition, but excessive technology controls in the name of national security can have the unintended effect of denying U.S. high-tech companies the revenue they need to innovate and grow.
+
+The United States has a robust policy tool kit for building more resilient semiconductor supply chains while advancing national security measures. In 2018, Congress passed legislation that enhanced government capabilities to review both foreign investments and domestic outflows. The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) provides the president with the authority to establish new export controls on “emerging” and “foundational” technology — though ECRA did not explicitly define either of those terms, leading to significant uncertainty throughout the private sector. The designation of semiconductors as foundational could result in wide-ranging license requirements for standard chips used in everyday items. However, the Bureau of Industry and Security recently announced in a proposed rule that it was no longer going to distinguish between emerging and foundational designations. Designating semiconductors as foundational could potentially dampen U.S. private-sector profits, thereby restraining the industry’s ability to invest in next-generation R&D.
+
+> Trade policy can play an important role in helping domestic industry “run faster” against competition, but excessive technology controls in the name of national security can have the unintended effect of denying U.S. high-tech companies the revenue they need to innovate and grow.
+
+Another trade tool the United States has implemented administratively is the FDPR. The FDPR is an extraterritorial application of U.S. law that permits the government to curb foreign-produced exports containing U.S. equipment or technology, including design, to those on the Entity List. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Biden administration announced it would apply the rule to Russia. The FDPR imposes new license requirements on exports to Russia and applies a policy of denial to license applications for exports or reexports to Russia or for transfers within the country. Overall, the application of the rule significantly restricts Russia’s ability to acquire critical goods like microelectronics, telecommunications items, and aircraft components. Key to compliance is whether foreign trading partners, such as China, will adhere to secondary sanctions — such as the FDPR — that will affect the production, thereby restricting foreign availability of covered products. The European Union and Japan have adopted restrictive measures similar to those of the United States. South Korea has agreed to comply with Western sanctions but has indicated it will not implement its own. In February 2022, Taiwan announced it would also join Western sanctions, and in April 2022, Taiwan initiated its own export curbs on products to Russia, adding 57 products to a new export control list. Nevertheless, it is uncertain whether other trading partners — namely, China and India — will comply with Western export controls, thereby restricting the outflow of semiconductors made with U.S. inputs or design. Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether Western agreement on Russia sanctions will extend beyond the Ukraine conflict — for example, in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
+
+Another policy tool that could affect collaboration on semiconductor supply chains between the United States and foreign partners is a new outbound investment-screening tool that has been proposed by Senators Casey (D-PA) and Cornyn (R-TX). The Senators’ bill would establish an interagency process to review outbound investment in areas of “national critical capabilities” to entities “of concern.” A similar proposal exists in the House’s America COMPETES Act as well. Proponents of outbound investment screening argue that the outflow of U.S. investment to China bolsters Chinese critical industries, threatening U.S. national security interests. Although critics of the proposal argue it would duplicate the Department of the Treasury’s remit to screen investments, proponents believe this could be a useful mechanism for ensuring that U.S. funds are not used to enhance technological capabilities of foreign adversaries, including bolstering advanced semiconductor manufacturing.
+
+Trade and investment policy affects where firms decide to locate and plays a key role in determining which countries can acquire sensitive technologies, and in turn, which types of sensitive technologies are permitted to leave those countries. For trade policy to succeed in achieving desired geopolitical outcomes, it needs to be based on determined end goals and on a calculation of how best to achieve those goals. Part of this consideration requires governments and firms to take into account foreign availability of equivalent products. If most, but not all, countries converge to reduce the export of sensitive chips to adversaries, it remains likely that the adversarial countries will be able to acquire chips from nonparticipating third countries. It is therefore crucial for the United States to work in concert with like-minded countries as it decides whether to encourage or require restrictions on technologies such as semiconductors. Building secure semiconductor GVCs thus requires multilateral cooperation among governments of foreign semiconductor producers, whether specializing in R&D, production, or back-end packaging. It is also incumbent on companies to be familiar with policy developments in this area and make location and investment decisions consistent with them.
+
+> For trade policy to succeed in achieving desired geopolitical outcomes, it needs to be based on determined end goals and on a calculation of how best to achieve those goals.
+
+#### MULTILATERAL INITIATIVES
+
+In addition to U.S. policies that affect the trade and security of semiconductors, there are multilateral trade arrangements that create governance structures for chips and other dual-use goods. The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies is a multilateral export control regime formally established in the Netherlands in 1996. Currently, 42 states participate in this regime, which aims to promote transparency and responsibility in transfers of arms and dual-use goods and technologies, including semiconductors. All Quad countries are members of the Wassenaar Arrangement. There are significant limitations to the Wassenaar Arrangement — namely, the slow pace of its decisionmaking and its role to advise and notify, rather than constrain, trade. Furthermore, Russia’s membership in the arrangement is a factor that makes it difficult for the framework to function effectively.
+
+With executive branch efforts to build more resilient and secure semiconductor supply chains, along with proposed legislation that would provide historic amounts of semiconductor funding, the U.S. government has made the production of chips a top priority that intersects with both economic and national security strategic objectives. As the United States builds the foundation for the next generation of its technological sovereignty, it is confronted with the inherently global nature of semiconductor GVCs and must reconcile the need to promote U.S. industry while protecting national security interests. R&D often occurs in the United States and in Taiwan, while the Netherlands is a key exporter of the machine tools to produce chips. Packaging, meanwhile, occurs primarily in East Asian countries. Recognizing that total onshoring is neither feasible nor desirable, it is important to evaluate which countries could help the United States build more secure semiconductor supply chains.
+
+
+### Semiconductor Policy in EU Member States
+
+Coinciding with the United States’ review of its critical semiconductor supply chains, the European Union has also had a reckoning with its own dependency on foreign producers in critical areas and has reassessed how to enhance its technological sovereignty. In 1990, Europe produced nearly 35 percent of semiconductors globally, but that number has dropped to roughly 9 percent as of 2020. In general, the European Union lags in the final step of the semiconductor value chain — back-end manufacturing — which involves the assembly, testing, and packaging of chips. Globally, only 5 percent of that capability is located in Europe. Even if an increased number of semiconductor wafers are made in Europe, they would still be sent elsewhere, such as China, for packaging.
+
+In September 2021, the European Union announced a legislative package parallel to that of the United States — the European Chips Act — which it formally introduced in February 2022. The European Chips Act intends to reinforce European commitment to significant investments in semiconductors through R&D, fabrication, production, and support to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The act consists of three main policy pillars: (1) the “Chips for Europe Initiative,” which supports capacity building through increased investment; (2) “security of supply” through the creation of first-of-a-kind advanced facilities; and (3) preparedness and monitoring to avert supply chain crunches.
+
+The act will also work to build stronger supply chains with the United States and with Japan. Given the semiconductor shortage of the past two years, the European Commission intends to strengthen European R&D leadership, improve upon its capacity to innovate in design and manufacturing, and significantly increase its production capacity by 2030. The act also bolsters the Alliance on Processors and Semiconductor Technologies, which seeks to identify gaps in microchip production by reinforcing the European electronics design ecosystem and increasing manufacturing capacity, including testing and advanced packaging. These efforts complement the European Union’s Digital Decade strategy, which establishes an agenda for European digital transformation by 2030.
+
+European investment in semiconductor production has raised questions about subsidies — known as “state aid” in the European Union — particularly related to Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEIs). IPCEIs are cross-border initiatives led by member states that can contribute to EU strategies. Since this constitutes state aid, these initiatives must seek approval from the commission. In November 2021, the European Commission adopted revised state aid rules for these projects, which establish criteria for the commission to assess “member state support to cross-border IPCEIs that overcome market failures and enable breakthrough innovation in key sectors and technologies and infrastructure investments, with positive spillover effects for the EU economy at large.”
+
+These revised guidelines state that IPCEIs must meet the following criteria: (1) involve at least four member states, (2) be designed in a transparent and inclusive manner, (3) facilitate SME participation, and (4) align their objectives with current EU priorities, such as the green transition. The guidelines also include safeguards to ensure that the aid is proportional and prevents any undue market distortions. These subsidies would generally fall under the ambit of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures under World Trade Organization rules. If the effects of such subsidies are determined to be injurious, they can be countervailed by other countries, which could have the net effect of restricting semiconductor trade and driving up costs. There are six requirements for IPCEIs and none of the requirements prohibit the inclusion of non-European companies in such projects. Thus, nominally, a U.S. company could benefit from IPCEI funds. Only four IPCEIs have ever been notified and assessed by the commission. Two were infrastructure projects that did not include non-European companies. The other two IPCEIs involved strategic value chains and did include non-European companies. Murata (in Japan) and Cortec (in the United States) took part in the microelectronic IPCEI, and Endurance Technologies (in India) participated in the battery IPCEI. However, the vast majority of companies that participated in these two IPCEIs were still European.
+
+Overall, the existence of IPCEIs presents companies with added benefits when partnering with the European Union on semiconductor supply chains. First, IPCEIs offer additional funding revenues. Second, they leverage the European Union’s integrated single market, which makes it relatively easier to build a semiconductor ecosystem, with parts of the supply chain split among countries to leverage the capabilities of specific member states. Although IPCEIs are projects led and funded by the government, multinational private firms are not restricted from obtaining that funding.
+
+The next section of this paper evaluates which EU member states are best positioned for increased semiconductor collaboration with the United States. While some degree of redundancy in semiconductor supply chains can help increase overall resiliency, the transatlantic alliance should attempt to avoid duplicative spending on chips where possible. The member states assessed below possess existing semiconductor infrastructure and are poised to expand domestic capabilities.
+
+> While some degree of redundancy in semiconductor supply chains can help increase overall resiliency, the transatlantic alliance should attempt to avoid duplicative spending on chips where possible.
+
+#### BELGIUM
+
+Belgium’s central location between Europe’s major economic powers makes it a natural crossroads for the semiconductor industry and European diplomacy. Most economic activity is concentrated in Flanders, the Dutch-speaking northern region of Belgium, where many Belgian high-technology and services firms are based.
+
+__R&D Capacity:__ Belgium is a top player in the global semiconductor R&D supply chain. Belgium ranks fifth on the European Innovation Scoreboard. Flanders is home to five research universities and four strategic research centers. Specific to semiconductor R&D, Belgium had the fifth-highest accumulated number of paper contributions to semiconductor research between 1995 and 2020.
+
+The crown jewel of Belgium’s semiconductor R&D industry is the Interuniversity Microelectronics Center (Imec) in Leuven, one of the world’s top semiconductor R&D institutes. Imec boasts 12,000 square meters of cleanroom and lab capacity and a workforce of over 5,000 researchers from 95 countries across its facilities. Imec’s $3 billion experimental pilot line is one of its top attractions, allowing researchers to develop limited quantities of leading-edge chips two or three generations ahead of current leading-edge manufacturing with a new 2D graphene-based process. Imec often refers to itself as “the Switzerland of semiconductors” to highlight its corporate and geopolitical neutrality. Although the Belgian government funds 16 percent of its $773 million budget, no single firm or state has a controlling stake. As a result, Imec holds a unique place as a convener in the global semiconductor industry and a nexus of basic and applied research.
+
+The Biden administration has taken note of Imec’s industry centrality, noting its geopolitical importance in its supply chain 100-day review. Under the European Chips Act, Imec would receive over €1 billion ($1.1 billion) in public funding to create new test line facilities to speed the transition from the R&D of leading-edge chip technology to its commercialization. The United States Department of Commerce and the National Institute of Standards and Technology have also identified Imec as a potential partner for overlapping with or complementing U.S. efforts to build a stronger domestic semiconductor industry.
+
+__Fab Capacity:__ Belgium is home to only one fab, U.S.-based Onsemi’s Oudenaarde manufacturing facility. The 40,000 square foot fab produces six-inch wafers at the 350–2000nm level for mostly automotive and industrial application, but no leading-edge chips. In February 2022, Belgian firm BelGaN Group BV acquired the Oudenaarde manufacturing facility.
+
+__Benefits and Risks:__ Belgium’s central location and role in the European Union, along with its robust R&D ecosystem and transportation linkages to major European markets, make the country an attractive location for semiconductor investment. However, the United States International Trade Administration warns that Belgium’s shortage of STEM labor limits the country’s R&D and high-tech manufacturing potential. Compared to other case study countries in this report, Belgium has the lowest percentage of tertiary graduates from STEM programs, roughly equal to only 17 percent of total graduates, according to data from the European Commission. In Belgium, 72 percent of young adults enroll in a bachelor’s program or equivalent by the age of 25, the highest rate among member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Nevertheless, only 0.8 percent of working-age Belgians have a doctoral degree, which ranks below the OECD average. While Belgium’s streamlined policies for high-skill immigration partially offset this relative shortcoming, the country’s more limited number of STEM graduates is a factor that could affect its ability to compete against other countries with a larger talent pool.
+
+#### THE NETHERLANDS
+
+The Netherlands is a semiconductor powerhouse, one of the few countries in the world with a fully integrated vertical semiconductor supply chain. This includes applied research, chip design, chip architecture, chip production, and system integration and applications. The Dutch have also effectively dominated the machine tool portion of the semiconductor supply chain in Europe. Businesses in the Netherlands generate the highest average sales in the semiconductor industry, accounting for €4.4 billion ($4.8 billion) annually. The four companies that predominantly make up the industry are ASM International, ASML, BE Semiconductor Industries (Besi), and NXP Semiconductors (NXP). The Netherlands is also home to several companies that provide equipment to the semiconductor manufacturing industry. For instance, ASML is the largest supplier of photolithography systems for the semiconductor industry worldwide and is also involved in the production of 5 nm chip technology.
+
+__R&D Capacity:__ ASML is the world’s largest supplier of lithography equipment, which is integral in transferring circuit patterns onto wafers. ASML’s sales reached $6.5 billion in 2020, and it is the sole supplier of extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machines, which it unveiled in 2019. EUV machines use extreme ultraviolet wavelengths to print the most intricate layers of chips, creating advanced and highly complex semiconductors to achieve “big things on a tiny scale.” ASML’s control of EUV has led some competitors to claim that ASML maintains monopolistic control over the lithography industry. While ASML largely controls the lithography machine side of the supply chain, Intel, Samsung, and TSMC also produce high-grade chips. ASML’s position as the sole provider of EUV machines makes them an ideal partner for companies like Intel and TSMC. In a 2012 deal, Intel acquired a 15 percent ownership stake in ASML.
+
+__Fab Capacity:__ The Netherlands is also home to ASM International (ASMi), which was founded in 1968. ASM pioneered technologies such as lithography, deposition, ion implant and single-wafer epitaxy. ASMi also holds a 25 percent stake in ASM Pacific Technology (ASMPT), which was founded in Hong Kong in 1975 and, at the time, was the most productive vertical furnace in the semiconductor industry. Vertical furnaces are key to productivity because they allow a stack of wafers to be loaded into a furnace for simultaneous processing. ASMi’s subsidiary, ASMPT, focuses mostly on assembly and packaging. ASMi was involved throughout the chip-making process, from unprocessed silicon wafers to packaged chips. Recently, they have made breakthroughs in atomic layer deposition and plasma-enhanced atomic layer deposition, developing the concept from R&D through production. Their primary focus today is on front-end wafer processing.
+
+Besides, another prominent Dutch semiconductor company, is engaged in the development, manufacturing, marketing, sales, and service of semiconductor assembly equipment. It operates seven facilities in Asia and Europe for production and development. Besi is involved in the development and supply of die attach equipment, packaging equipment, plating equipment, and service equipment. R&D is spread across Europe, North America, and Asia, while manufacturing occurs largely in Singapore, South Korea, and the Netherlands.
+
+__Benefits and Risks:__ The Netherlands is an attractive partner for closer U.S. collaboration for several reasons. In the 2021 International Institute for Management Development (IMD) World Competitiveness Ranking, the Netherlands ranked fourth overall, surpassed by Switzerland, Sweden, and Denmark. The Netherlands placed second for overall economic performance, fourth for business efficiency, and seventh for infrastructure. The country also scored well on international trade, international investment, and technology infrastructure. The most recent edition of the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index, in 2019, also ranked the Netherlands as the most competitive country in Europe.
+
+The Netherlands also excels in education. Dutch expenditures on higher education are 30 percent higher than the OECD average and its expenditures on R&D are the sixth highest in the OECD. Furthermore, the Netherlands has a comparatively internationalized higher education system, meaning it succeeds in attracting foreign talent to complement its domestic workforce. Among doctoral students, 43 percent are international, the majority of which come from other European countries.
+
+Other attractive features of the Netherlands are its geographic location and its top-tier infrastructure. Its location affords the country easy access to other European capitals and to an extensive international trade network that facilitates cross-channel flows to the United Kingdom and transatlantic flows to its North American partners. The Port of Rotterdam, Europe’s largest port, is a key facilitator of the country’s robust international trade profile.
+
+The Netherlands has also recently acquiesced to U.S. demands for cooperation on export control issues. In 2018, the Dutch government provided ASML with an export license to send advanced lithography equipment to China, thereby enabling China to produce its own chips. The Trump administration, fearful about Chinese acquisition of these advanced machine tools, sought to outright ban the transfer of lithography equipment from the Netherlands to China. Pressure from the Trump administration ultimately prevailed, and the Netherlands reversed the license. While transatlantic cooperation ultimately prevailed in this case, Dutch cooperation on export controls was reluctant and only followed significant pressure from the U.S. government.
+
+NXP, in particular, has had to placate both U.S. and Chinese regulatory authorities in recent years. In 2015, the United States Federal Trade Commission required that NXP divest its radio-frequency power amplifier before it approved NXP’s acquisition of Freescale, a U.S. semiconductor company. NXP acquiesced and sold the unit to a Chinese state-owned investment management firm. After the merger with Freescale, NXP further divested and sold its standard products business to the same Chinese firm in 2016. Finally, in 2018, Qualcomm attempted to acquire NXP, and NXP sold its stake in a Chinese chip-design joint venture in an attempt to appease Chinese regulatory authorities, who ultimately failed to approve the Qualcomm-NXP merger. These actions suggest that NXP and the Dutch have worked to placate Chinese authorities and have sought to play the middle ground in order to maintain access to both the Chinese and U.S. markets. Overall, the ASML and NXP cases underscore that the Netherlands will continue to contend with not only political pressure from the U.S. government, but also the continued attractiveness of the Chinese market.
+
+While the Netherlands and the European Union have demonstrated a willingness to comply with the extraterritorial application of U.S. export controls, the case with ASML demonstrates the importance of allied collaboration regarding long-term geopolitical goals, since restricting which countries can access advanced manufacturing tools can help or hinder their bid for technological superiority. Overall, given the Netherlands’ abundance of water, highly trained workforce, and closer cooperation with the U.S. government on export controls, it continues to remain one of the best options for U.S. foreign collaboration on semiconductor GVCs.
+
+#### FRANCE
+
+France is the second-largest economy in the European Union and maintains a significant presence in the European semiconductor industry, with centers for R&D, manufacturing, and packaging. In 2019, France exported €1.05 billion ($1.15 billion) in semiconductor devices, primarily to Singapore, Germany, China, and the Netherlands. The French semiconductor industry will receive not only support from the EU initiatives on semiconductors, but also funding from the France 2030 initiative. As part of the €30 billion ($30.7 billion) France 2030 investment initiative, France is committing nearly €6 billion ($6.5 billion) to the semiconductor industry, focusing primarily on the physical and electronics components to double the country’s electronics production by 2030. This investment will go toward the creation of smaller chips, with the goal of reasserting France as a “leader in the field.”
+
+__R&D Capacity:__ CEA-Leti is a government research center based in Grenoble and a major player in the international nanoelectronics sector. It has partnerships with various companies such as III-V Lab, Intel, Mapper, Soitec, and STMicroelectronics (ST) on a range of issues regarding the development and research of semiconductor technologies. The first-stage resources from the European Chips Act will go to major European research institutions. ST has an office in Tours that also works on R&D, engineering, processes, applications, and other business operations.
+
+__Fab Capacity:__ STMicroelectronics is the preeminent semiconductor vendor in France. The company operates two wafer fabs and the largest R&D center and produces up to 16 nm chips, providing notable production capacity. Its location in Grenoble has over 10,000 staff, and a manufacturing facility for automotive-grade chips in Rousset has over 4,000 staff. The company has a strong presence in automotive integrated circuits. ST is a key supplier to the German automotive industry. Besides fab capacity, France does have some back-end manufacturing capabilities. In 2017, UnitySC opened its operations in Grenoble, where it has approximately 10,000 square feet in cleanroom space and carries out its packaging operations.
+
+__Benefits and Risks:__ France benefits from robust macroeconomic stability and a well-developed financial system. Moreover, it is regarded as a prominent innovation hub. The 2021 IMD World Competitiveness Ranking places it at 29th overall; it is surpassed by its neighbors, the Netherlands and Germany. Regardless, it is the seventh-largest economy in the world in terms of GDP and eighth in total exports. France boasts the highest rate of public support for R&D among OECD countries. It is the top destination for international investment in Europe. Its well-educated population and renowned universities help generate a talented, well-equipped workforce.
+
+Mainland France is close to the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany. With its well-established infrastructure links, it is a key player in continental trade. Paris’s Charles de Gaulle Airport processes the second-highest amount of airfreight in Europe, second only to the Frankfurt Airport. France is one of Europe’s only silicon metal producers. Its overseas territories, stretching from French Polynesia to French Guiana, hold substantial amounts of mineral wealth. France stands to benefit from bauxite refining in French Guiana, which is crucial to extracting gallium. In addition, yet-untapped mineral reserves on the ocean floor of its maritime possessions in the Indo-Pacific would allow France to present itself as an alternative to China in supplying rare-earth minerals.
+
+While France, along with Belgium and Germany, already has robust R&D infrastructure for next-generation semiconductors, it is creating plans to accelerate production. However, the United States Department of Commerce notes that France’s regulations and government bureaucracy can sometimes restrain the French market.
+
+#### ITALY
+
+Italy has the third-largest economy in the European Union, with several large manufacturing sites for a diverse set of semiconductor components. In Italy, the automotive industry accounts for 6 percent of the GDP and employs 300,000 people, meaning the effects of semiconductor supply chain crunches are particularly pronounced for the country.
+
+__R&D Capacity:__ In June 2021, STMicroelectronics (ST) announced an agreement with the technological university, Politecnico di Milano, to create a research center on advanced materials for sensors. ST hopes to enable researchers and university faculty to collaborate on microelectromechanical systems technology and attract new academic talent. The company signed an agreement with the University of Catania in late 2021 to create a framework for enhanced education and research activities in power electronics. Italy is also the headquarters of Technoprobe, which has three research centers and 2,200 employees worldwide. Technoprobe specializes in testing solutions for chips, as well as the design, development, and production of probe cards. These allow for the testing of chips before they are individually packaged.
+
+__Fab Capacity:__ Italy is the second home of multinational STMicroelectronics, which has over 9,000 employees in the country. ST focuses on sensory and power technologies, automotive products, embedded processing solutions, and a broad range of segments. In reaction to high demand, ST plans to double its investments in 2022 to up to $3.6 billion. In Milan, ST has facilities with several fabrication lines, including a 300 mm fab. The company’s Catania in Sicily site hosts two 200 mm fabrication facilities. In March 2022, the European Investment Bank announced it would provide ST a loan of €600 million ($628.7 million), which the firm will use for R&D and pilot production lines for advanced semiconductors. ST will use this investment primarily at two existing facilities in Italy and one in France. Following the announcement of this funding, French minister for the Economy, Finance, and Recovery Bruno Le Maire underscored that the primary goal of the funding is to accelerate French and Italian production of semiconductors, adding that “it is only by mastering this technology, that we will be able to safeguard the European Union’s strategic independence.”
+
+Another significant player in the Italian semiconductor industry is Lfoundry, which runs an advanced 200 mm manufacturing fabrication site and proprietary technologies at 150 nm and 110 nm nodes. Lfoundry provides complementary metal-oxide semiconductor (CMOS) image sensors, or CIS, through CIS processes to 90 nm and backside illumination technology. In 2016, Lfoundry was acquired by Chinese Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation. PVA Italy is also a player, specializing in wafer plasma treatment systems and in crystal production plants for the photovoltaic industry and the semiconductor industry. NXP Italy in Milan manufactures devices for the automotive, industrial, and consumer and transaction/access segments.
+
+Intel has been planning to expand into Italy with a facility for assembly, testing, and packaging, which would complement Intel investments in France and Germany. The Italian government has encouraged Intel to invest in the country. Turin and Catania are potential sites that Intel has considered for expansion.
+
+__Benefits and Risks:__ In some ways, Italy may not be an ideal partner for closer engagement on semiconductors with the United States. Among the identified potential European partners, Italy ranked last in both economic performance and government efficiency according to the 2021 IMD World Competitiveness Ranking, as well as in the World Economic Forum’s competitiveness ranking. As a percentage of GDP, Italy also spends less on R&D than Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and France. Additionally, Italy has a less educated workforce than most of the European Union, with the second-lowest percentage of a tertiary-educated population among EU countries. Italy’s political system is also relatively unstable compared to other western European nations, with coalition governments that are often short-lived.
+
+Prime Minister Mario Draghi has taken steps to protect Italy’s domestic semiconductor industry from Chinese competition. In April 2021, Draghi blocked a Chinese company from taking over an Italian semiconductor firm. This decision blocked Chinese company Shenzhen Investment Holdings from acquiring a 70 percent stake in Milan-based LPE. LPE produces components for power electronics applications. Draghi cited the ongoing semiconductor shortage as leading to slowdowns in the Italian automotive sector and said that semiconductors had thus become “a strategic sector” for the country. An actual or attempted Chinese acquisition of domestic industries is not inherently problematic, but the decision to allow a foreign takeover of a domestic business that is deemed to have strategic importance from both an economic and security perspective can change a government’s calculation of risk.
+
+Italy also has a complicated relationship with China, which affects its reliability as a partner in this strategic space. In 2019, Italy signed a memorandum of understanding supporting China’s Belt and Road Initiative, against the warnings of European and U.S. leaders. Since the Draghi government took over in 2021, Italy has begun to reverse course and has reemphasized transatlantic relations while distancing itself from China. The Draghi government has vetoed bids by Chinese companies to acquire Italian firms on three different occasions, including once in the semiconductor industry as discussed above. Nonetheless, the back-and-forth nature of Italy’s relationship with China causes concern when identifying potential long-term strategic partners.
+
+However, there are benefits to partnering with Italy. A major benefit to closer collaboration with the country is the recent Intel investment. As mentioned above, the project intends primarily to build a large, state-of-the-art packaging facility, which has historically been the weak point in the European semiconductor supply chain. Thus, Italy may have to be included in any strategic planning out of necessity.
+
+Draghi has been behind new momentum in Italy for European semiconductor production, saying in October 2021 that “governments need to fully commit to a European Union plan to increase the bloc’s share of global semiconductor production to 20 percent by 2030.” In March 2022, Draghi announced that Italy would spend €4 billion ($4.4 billion) to develop its domestic semiconductor industry. The Italian government has approved a new fund to allocate €150 million ($157.1 million) in 2022 and €500 million ($523.7 million) annually until 2030. The government is also in talks with Intel to nearshore part of its semiconductor supply chain to the country. It is estimated that Italian incentives for Intel, including favorable terms and public financing, will be worth €8 billion ($9 billion) over the next decade.
+
+#### GERMANY
+
+In 2020, Germany exported $6.5 billion in semiconductor devices, making it the fourth-largest exporter in the world. On the other hand, Germany is also the fourth-largest importer of semiconductor devices. Imports of semiconductors reached €5.7 billion ($6.3 billion) in 2019. In total, Germany accounts for €10.8 billion ($11.8 billion) of Europe’s €33 billion ($36 billion) semiconductor market. Germany is key to semiconductor production due to its production of gases, specialty chemicals, and other consumables that play direct roles in fabrication and facility-cleaning materials. For example, Merck KGaA in Darmstadt produces specialty gases that are critical to chip production. Germany, like the rest of Europe, is challenged by the final step of the semiconductor value chain, back-end manufacturing. Germany’s use of semiconductors is concentrated in consumer goods, such as automobiles and other high-end manufactured household goods. These include digital devices like cameras and household appliances such as dishwashers, which use standard rather than cutting-edge chips.
+
+__R&D Capacity:__ Intel has recently agreed to invest nearly €80 billion ($88 billion) in semiconductor production in the European Union, of which €17 billion ($18.6 billion) is slated for Germany, where the company plans to build a “leading-edge semiconductor fab mega-site.” Companies such as Infineon, Carl Zeiss, and Zollner all have R&D operations in Germany. In 2020, Carl Zeiss employed approximately 1,300 people in R&D roles across Germany. The Fraunhofer Group for Microelectronics and the Leibniz Association are major players in international microelectronic R&D. Between the two groups, they have the largest cooperation for microelectronic R&D in Europe, over 2,000 research staff, and 12,000 square meters of cleanroom space.
+
+__Fab Capacity:__ Bosch has also been a major manufacturer of German semiconductor chips, including application-specific integrated circuits and power conductors. In December 2021, Bosch started large-scale production of silicon carbide semiconductors in its Reutlingen factory, where Bosch will manufacture the chips on 200 mm wafers to achieve “important economies of scale.” This facility will enable Bosch to meet growing demand for chips used in both internet of things (IoT) and mobility applications. This new factory follows Bosch’s 2021 expansion in Dresden. The semiconductor facility in Dresden is Bosch’s first aIoT (AI with the internet of things), providing specialized chips for the automotive sector. Despite the expansion in semiconductor building capacity, it will likely not be sufficient to address supply chain issues in Europe, particularly amid sustained demand. Infineon is by far the largest semiconductor company in Germany. Originally part of Siemens, it spun off in 1999 and is now an independent company with revenues of over €11 billion ($13.2 billion) in 2021. Lantiq, a spin-off from Infineon Technologies, was a key supplier of broadband access and home networks technology, but it was acquired by Intel in 2015.
+
+__Benefits and Risks:__ Germany is an attractive partner for U.S. collaboration given its robust economy and stable political position in the European Union. Germany is the fourth-largest economy in the world and accounted for nearly a quarter of the EU GDP in 2020. Furthermore, Germany is an important global exporter, the third-largest after China and the United States. The United States imports many German goods and Germany is the United States’ largest European trading partner. Germany is also the sixth-largest market for U.S. exports. According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index, in 2019, Germany ranked seventh in global competitiveness. Germany is advanced in research and innovation and has a pro-business climate. Germany has many established supply chain linkages and the policy to enforce due diligence. Furthermore, Germany has a strong industrial base, including its global leadership in the automotive industry.
+
+Germany maintains a stable domestic government and historically has been one of the most politically influential countries in the European Union. The previous chancellor, Angela Merkel, established a leading role in the European Union for many years, but it is yet to be seen if the new chancellor, Olaf Scholz, will take on a similar role. Although it remains unclear as to what extent the new chancellor will continue Merkel’s foreign policy approach to China or whether he will join Brussels in taking a harder line against Beijing, Germany’s stable government makes it an attractive partner for continued U.S. partnership on semiconductors.
+
+Germany is aiming to phase out coal and nuclear energy in favor of renewable sources. While this energy transition is desirable for the future, it could cause an increase in energy prices in the short term, affecting economic competitiveness.
+
+Microelectronics was deemed an IPCEI by Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The article allowed five EU member states, including Germany, to allocate state aid to projects in microelectronics. This provided Germany with €1 billion ($1.01 billion) in funding for microelectronic industries. In December 2021, Germany formally notified the European Commission of a new IPCEI through which Germany will support transnational cooperation on microelectronics, such as semiconductors. With the new IPCEI for Microelectronics and Communication Technologies underway, Germany will benefit from €4.5 billion ($4.9 billion) in state aid and total investments of €15 billion ($16.5 billion). This is in addition to forthcoming funds from the European Chips Act, which will further enhance member state production capabilities. Other initiatives include Germany’s Microelectronics Framework Program, launched by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research last year, which emphasizes the importance of trustworthiness and sustainability in the supply chain. In addition, the EUREKA Clusters Program supports important research, development, and innovation topics with national authorities.
+
+#### THE EUROPEAN UNION
+
+Overall, the European Union is an attractive partner for closer collaboration with the United States on securing semiconductor GVCs. A particularly appealing and unique factor to investing in the European Union is its single market, which facilitates the free movement of goods, services, capital, and people. This makes it relatively easy for companies to invest across member states and to capitalize on local incentives and favorable business conditions. That Intel has deployed investments in France for R&D, Germany for production, and Italy for back-end manufacturing underscores the appeal of cooperating with the bloc on semiconductor GVCs. Furthermore, funding made available through both Brussels and member state governments helps increase the cohesion and resilience of semiconductor GVCs throughout the bloc. Other benefits the European Union offers in terms of supply chain resilience include geographic proximity to the United States and an existing close security relationship, including deepening cooperation on trade policies such as export controls.
+
+When it comes to transatlantic cooperation regarding China — a strategic adversary to both parties, as well as a large and consistent customer — the relationship becomes more complicated. Overall, the European Union has taken a more moderate approach to China, seeking to increase market access for EU firms, while simultaneously adopting new trade defense and investment-screening tools, such as the EU anti-coercion instrument, intended to stem Chinese influence throughout Europe. Large European economies have an interest in maintaining positive relationships with Beijing due to its large consumer base, which maintains high demand for Germany’s automobile industry, for example. In 2020, one in three German cars were sold in China. It remains to be seen whether China will continue to comply with international sanctions against Russia or whether a decision not to comply would force Brussels closer to Washington, D.C., in its approach to China.
+
+Like the United States, the European Union has recently made significant changes to its export control and foreign investment policy. In September 2021, the European Union announced its new Export Control Regulation, which tightens control of dual-use items, strengthens critical supply chains, and protects human rights. It also seeks to enhance cohesion among member states regarding export control policy, including by providing capacity-building and training services for licensing and enforcement programs.
+
+Outside of the Wassenaar Arrangement, the TTC has bolstered EU-U.S. collaboration on export controls following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The TTC has provided diplomats with clear communication channels through which to consult on urgent trade and security matters, including semiconductor supply chains. In the European Union, export controls have historically been a competency of member states, which vary by country. For example, Belgium delegates export licensing responsibility to its three regional states, adding complexity to an export control regime closely intertwined with — though distinct from — the European Commission. The joint statement released following the May 2022 ministerial lays out the transatlantic plan to cooperate more closely on semiconductor R&D, including increasing transparency on subsidies and developing an early warning system for semiconductor supply chain disruptions.
+
+The Group of Seven (G7), currently under German leadership, has also proven adroit at navigating security and supply chain issues. The G7 responded swiftly to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, revoking Russia’s most favored nation status and initiating sweeping sanctions on key Russian officials and business elites. Given the near impossibility of expelling Russia from the Wassenaar Arrangement and the improbability of Russia removing itself, multilateral cooperation on export controls is likely to occur through other frameworks, such as the G7, the TTC, and smaller plurilateral agreements. There is growing discussion about the need to capitalize on current momentum behind the international response to Russia by creating a new plurilateral arrangement for advanced technologies among allied countries. Possible participants include specific EU member states (such as France, Germany, and the Netherlands), Japan, South Korea, and potentially Taiwan. Such an architecture could either complement the Wassenaar Arrangement or potentially replace it.
+
+> There is growing discussion about the need to capitalize on current momentum behind the international response to Russia by creating a new plurilateral arrangement for advanced technologies among allied countries.
+
+
+### Quad Cooperation
+
+#### INDIA
+
+India, slated to become the world’s most populous nation, is a major growth market for the semiconductor industry. In 2020, semiconductor consumption in India was worth 1.1 trillion rupees ($13.87 billion), significantly less than the €44 billion ($47.8 billion) consumed in Europe in 2020. However, consumption of semiconductors in India is expected to grow to $80–90 billion by 2030. Despite a large population and growing manufacturing base, India imports nearly 100 percent of its commercial semiconductor products. Most large multinational semiconductor companies such as Intel, Samsung, TSMC, NXP, Broadcom, and Micron have offices in India.
+
+__R&D Capacity:__ India has thus far specialized in the R&D and design phases of the semiconductor supply chain. A deep bench of highly skilled information technology and engineering workers, coupled with world-renowned public institutes of technology, enables India to specialize in R&D. This has led to several important public and private semiconductor R&D facilities in India. Since 2006, the Indian government has supported two Centers of Excellence in Nanoelectronics (CENs) at the Indian Institute of Science (IISc) in Bangalore and at the Indian Institute of Technology Bombay (IITB) in Mumbai. IISc’s CEN hosts over 150 researchers across 14,000 square feet of cleanroom space, with the capacity to conduct leading-edge R&D at the 10 nm level. IITB’s CEN hosts a nanofabrication facility that has limited fab capabilities for two-inch, four-inch, and eight-inch silicon wafers, though only for R&D purposes. In the private sector, several major semiconductor companies, such as Micron, Intel, Samsung, Texas Instruments, and Huawei, have R&D facilities in Bangalore, “India’s Silicon Valley.” For both Intel and Samsung, their facilities in Bangalore represent their largest R&D operations outside of their home countries.
+
+According to the Indian Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, over 500,000 Indian engineers are involved in designing 2,000 chips each year. This is the largest number of leading-edge chip designers outside of the United States. In India, most design output comes from very large-scale integration and electronic design automation (EDA). However, the United States continues to dominate by far in EDA scale and efficiency.
+
+__Fab Capacity:__ Despite its relatively strong R&D capabilities, India lags in semiconductor fabrication. India attempted to incentivize private fab construction in the late 2000s and 2010s, but it currently has only two fabs: the Society for Integrated Circuit Technology and Applied Research (SITAR) in Bengaluru and the Semi-Conductor Laboratory (SCL) outside of Chandigarh. SITAR can produce six-inch wafers, but not advanced nodes. SCL can fabricate 180 nm six-inch and eight-inch wafers. However, both facilities are government-run and primarily produce semiconductor products for defense and space uses, not for the Indian commercial market, though they do have onsite packaging and testing capacity. As a result, India produces no legacy or next-generation chips for export or domestic consumption, instead relying on imports of many of the products it researches and designs.
+
+__Benefits and Risks:__ The Indian government has taken several initiatives since December 2021 under its Semicon India Program, with an outlay of $10 billion to increase production of semiconductors. These include (a) a scheme for setting up semiconductor fabs, with financial support subject to fulfillment of certain conditions, infrastructure support, and a designation of a nodal agency for faster regulatory approvals; (b) a scheme for setting up display fabs, with similar fiscal and infrastructure support, and establishment of the nodal agency; (c) a scheme for setting up compound semiconductors and semiconductor assembly, testing, marking, and packaging, with a percentage of capital expenditure fiscally supported by the government on fulfillment of relevant criteria; and (d) the Design Linked Incentive Scheme composed of chip design infrastructure support, product design linked incentive, and deployment linked incentive. Through these incentives, the government is also looking to increase foreign investment in the sector. In February 2022, the government confirmed that it received applications from three companies for semiconductor fabs, two companies for display fabs, four companies for compound semiconductors and assembly, and three companies for design.
+
+Unfortunately, systemic issues continue to restrain enthusiasm for closer collaboration with India. Ongoing water shortages, power outages, and transportation disincentivize new investment, particularly the construction of new production facilities. Furthermore, India has historically been reluctant to join the Western sanctions and export control regimes, aside from the Wassenaar Arrangement. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, India opted against joining the Western sanctions effort and abstained from a vote at the United Nations to condemn Russia’s invasion, making India an outlier among the major powers. India’s decision to maintain a middle line in global relations with China and Russia dilutes its attractiveness as a trusted partner for friend-shoring secure semiconductor supply chains.
+
+#### JAPAN
+
+Japan is the world’s fourth-largest market for semiconductor manufacturing and equipment sales. The United States Department of Commerce estimates that Japan’s semiconductor industry will grow to over $47 billion in 2022 after having grown more than 19 percent in 2021. In terms of global monthly wafer capacity, Japan accounts for roughly 15.8 percent of global supply. The effects of the ongoing semiconductor shortage have been particularly acute in Japan’s automobile sector. In October 2021, for example, domestic automobile sales declined 31.3 percent due to the chip shortage.
+
+Although Japan still has the most semiconductor factories in the world, these factories largely lag behind other more high-tech factories abroad and, thus, do not produce the type of cutting-edge semiconductor chips that are needed around the world. Japan’s strength lies in its deep industrial expertise in semiconductor materials. For instance, in 2019, Sony semiconductors became a top global supplier through the production of camera image sensors. Other examples include Lasertech Corp., the world’s sole manufacturer of equipment that tests stencils for the most advanced chip designs.
+
+While Japan specializes in power semiconductors and NAND flash memory chips, it lags behind other Asian competitors — namely, South Korea and Taiwan — when it comes to the manufacture of next-generation, highly specialized chips. Furthermore, despite being home to 84 chip factories, Japan imports 64 percent of its chips, making it reliant on foreign producers and vulnerable to semiconductor supply chain disruptions.
+
+One reason for this reliance is Japan’s failure to embrace a horizontal production model of chips that gained favor in the early 2000s. The Japanese model instead focused on vertical integration, whereby companies like Toshiba, Fujitsu, and Hitachi produced chips solely for their own products. This model ultimately lost out to companies like TSMC, which focuses on producing chips for a wide range of uses and companies. Other reasons for the decline in Japanese chip making include the industry’s delay in embracing digitalization and a lack of public investment.
+
+__R&D Capacity:__ Although Japanese R&D expenditure remains relatively high at roughly 3 percent of the GDP, it continues to lag behind competitors when it comes to industrial innovation. In May 2021, TSMC announced it would open an R&D facility in Japan to develop cutting-edge semiconductor technology. The cost of the new project is anticipated to be roughly $338 million, of which the Japanese government will subsidize about half.
+
+__Fab Capacity:__ The 1980s were marked by lithography asymmetry between the United States and Japan, though Japan became dominant as the country’s indigenous semiconductor market expanded. Japanese manufacturing is not as strong as it was in the 1980s and 1990s. Statistics from Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) show that the Japanese share of the world’s semiconductor market shrank from 50 percent in 1990 to 10 percent today. One factor that affected Japan’s domestic semiconductor market was the entry into the U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Agreement in 1986. The agreement called for antidumping guarantees, along with a 20 percent market share provision meant to open the Japanese market to foreign producers over a five-year time frame.
+
+Another factor that restrained Japanese growth of the indigenous semiconductor industry is that Japanese companies invested in dynamic random access memory (DRAM), rather than advanced logic chips. Intense competition from Korean firms in DRAM memory led Japanese companies to double down on DRAM-related skills and accelerate production of DRAM memory chips, moving the Japanese market further away from a focus on computing power. Around the time this decision was made, U.S. markets shifted their focus to computing power rather than memory. Advanced computation capabilities have national security implications, including applications in quantum computing efforts and military advancements, meaning that investments in advanced computing — rather than memory chips — can facilitate increased strategic independence over time and reduce reliance on foreign producers for critical technologies.
+
+__Benefits and Risks:__ In June 2021, METI announced the creation of its “Strategy for Semiconductors and the Digital Industry.” A core goal of the new strategy is to maintain Japan’s modest 10 percent of the global market share of semiconductors by 2030. Maintaining that 10 percent market share will cost an estimated $38 billion. In recognizing the weaknesses in its semiconductor supply chain, the government is working to help companies enhance production of chips, large-capacity batteries, and other key materials through subsidy programs. In addition to the public funding boost for Japan’s semiconductor industry, TSMC has announced it will spend $7 billion to open a new production facility in southern Japan, expected to be completed in 2024.
+
+In May 2022, the United States and Japan held the first ministerial meeting of the Japan-U.S. Commercial and Industrial Partnership, at which the parties agreed to develop “Basic Principles on Semiconductor Cooperation” to be coordinated by the United States Department of Commerce and METI. At the leadership summit of the two heads of state in late May, the parties announced efforts “to cooperate on diversifying semiconductor production capacity, increasing transparency, coordinating emergency response on shortages, and strengthening semiconductor R&D and workforce development.” The United States and Japan are also working toward creating a working group to facilitate joint research into state-of-the-art semiconductors. They also agreed to establish a “Work Plan on Export Control Cooperation.” These joint initiatives seek to enhance semiconductor supply chain resiliency while limiting the proliferation of sensitive dual-use technologies.
+
+#### AUSTRALIA
+
+Aside from producing some chips used in Wi-Fi and the Mars Rover, Australia is largely a consumer of chips and lacks the direction and commercial will to reenter the strategic semiconductor sector.
+
+__R&D Capacity:__ Australia does have potential strengths based on its history and market dynamics. It has world-class design capability in radio frequency, millimeter wave, photonics, and radar. Australia is also fortunate to have abundant and underdeveloped silica deposits, a critical compound for wafers. Its history of successful mineral exploration and extraction could accelerate the development of domestic silica mines. Alternatively, Australia’s robust materials science, academic, and R&D capabilities are also well positioned to explore silica substitutes.
+
+__Fab Capacity:__ Australian companies involved in the semiconductor industry are small and scattered, and have different technological requirements for semiconductor development. Some of the biggest challenges involved in growing the industry are deciding where to build a foundry and figuring out how to grow the ecosystem. A manufacturing plant will not automatically turn the switch on for the industry. There are currently no large Australian companies whose core business activity is participation in the semiconductor design, development, and production value chain.
+
+__Benefits and Risks:__ There are several downside risks for large Australian semiconductor producers. Risks include a lack of historical experience in the sector and a lack of incentives for capital investors, which lack the impetus to launch the typical 5–10-year investment cycle needed to establish the industry. Australian investors are also reluctant to accelerate investments due to the regional competition from Taiwan, as well as a crowded global market.
+
+#### THE QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE
+
+When Quad countries convened in person for the first time in September 2021, the joint statement highlighted that the partners are working together to map semiconductor supply chains. The parties affirmed “positive commitment to resilient, diverse, and secure supply chains of critical technologies, recognizing the importance of government support measures and policies that are transparent and market-oriented.” Joint efforts to build more resilient supply chains and combat nonmarket economic practices represent an enhanced level of coordination against China. Australia and Japan have joined efforts to restrict trade with Russia, but India’s reluctance to join the coordinated response weakens the Quad’s general position vis-à-vis Europe when it comes to friend-shoring semiconductor supply chains. Overall, it remains to be seen which tangible results will materialize from Quad partnerships.
+
+
+### Recommendations and Conclusion
+
+Semiconductor GVCs are inherently complex in nature, meaning there are distinct limitations to what the United States can accomplish unilaterally. Onshoring of semiconductor supply chains is not feasible in the short term. In the long term, onshoring would raise prices, reduce efficiency, and dampen long-term U.S. competitiveness. Thus emerges the need for an affirmative agenda for semiconductor supply chains among allies.
+
+One fundamental recommendation from interviews conducted for this research project centered around the need to identify tangible goals that will enable governments and the private sector to bolster semiconductor supply chain resiliency. Another recommendation that emerged from this research is the need for the U.S. government to promulgate consistent, predictable policies — particularly related to trade — including collaborating to create a new Information Technology Agreement (ITA) to reduce tariffs on additional ICT goods. Overall, interviewees stressed that the government should avoid blanket export controls that risk dampening investment in allied semiconductor industries and should consider the creation of a new mini-export control regime that could function similarly to the Wassenaar Arrangement. These findings, coupled with an evaluation of the benefits and drawbacks of working with specific countries, make closer cooperation particularly enticing with Belgium, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands.
+
+First, the United States, in concert with close allies, must identify the goals it seeks to achieve by bolstering efforts to friend-shore supply chains, while simultaneously seeking to dampen the ability of foreign adversaries to gain a competitive edge over next-generation chips. Allied countries need to determine whether their policies are primarily motivated by pandemic-induced supply chain crunches or whether these policies constitute an inherently negative agenda that is reactionary to adversaries’ technological advancements. Once allies have an affirmative agenda, it will fall on countries to collaborate on smart, targeted investments that bolster innovation. These investments should seek to mitigate “small batch” problems that restrain the ability of startups to obtain prototypes of new semiconductors. These policies should also seek to avoid a subsidy war in which multi-government spending results in significant overcapacity.
+
+In addition to leading efforts in building an affirmative semiconductor supply chain agenda, the United States should work with close allies to promulgate consistent, predictable policies. These include increased certainty about the application of tariffs that affect the semiconductor industry. For example, the USTR finding that Vietnam’s currency manipulation was actionable under Section 301, coupled with labor shortages and Covid-19 regulations, created an environment that led to Samsung relocating some of its production to Indonesia and India. Such a move was costly for the company and an option only available to large firms with adequate agility.
+
+The United States should also work with allies to create a new ITA with the goal of reducing tariffs on additional ICT goods. Technology changes quickly in this sector, and the first two ITA iterations do not cover newly developed products and technologies. A new ITA would represent a step forward in continuing liberalization throughout the ICT sector.
+
+Promulgating consistent trade policy with allies is also crucial. Moreover, the United States should avoid blanket export controls that risk dampening investment in allied semiconductor industries, as well as restraining the ability of U.S. firms to invest in next-generation R&D efforts. If the United States chooses to pursue a more integrated approach to semiconductor supply chains with the European Union and Japan, this decision is likely to have a fundamental impact on existing international export control architecture, potentially leading to the creation of a new framework. The United States should therefore also more seriously consider the creation of a mini-regime, which could function more similarly to the Wassenaar Arrangement. A new mini-regime could also enhance information sharing among allies and increase transparency related to government spending on semiconductors.
+
+It is very unlikely that even a highly coordinated mini-regime will prevent China from obtaining critical semiconductor technology in the long run. However, an effective regime can delay that inevitability and buy time for like-minded countries to invest in and create the next generation of semiconductors, increasing tech sector independence and resiliency. Furthermore, a new mini-regime could capitalize on current momentum among a group of 38 countries to coordinate and codify new technology controls.
+
+Given plans in the European Union to fortify and expand its semiconductor capabilities, the United States should work with Brussels in the TTC to institutionalize closer collaboration. The parties should work together to implement frameworks that would facilitate surge capacity for production, including an assistance agreement to ramp up production in cases of supply chain disruptions. While redundancy in production can be helpful in certain instances — for example to ensure an adequate supply of chips used in automobiles — with limited financial resources, the parties should seek to avoid duplicative efforts on next-generation R&D. Overall, increased semiconductor cooperation presents the United States and the European Union with a unique opportunity to build a positive agenda that cements its leadership in critical technologies.
+
+While the United States has long maintained export controls in the semiconductors sector, particularly on chip manufacturing equipment, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and deteriorating relations with China have made national security a much more important part of the trade policy debate. The result is that companies are forced to rethink how they make location decisions. Supply chain management historically has centered around price, quality, and delivery. Now, in this sector in particular, governments have effectively added security and compliance with government policies and regulations as an important additional variable that affects companies’ supply chain location strategies. In an already complex industry operating in an environment of growing geopolitical tensions, cooperation with allies becomes even more important for the private sector and governments alike.
+
+> While the United States has long maintained export controls in the semiconductors sector, particularly on chip manufacturing equipment, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and deteriorating relations with China have made national security a much more important part of the trade policy debate.
+
+For both the United States and foreign partners, governments need to identify — and then implement policy based on — where they want to lead and where they can afford to follow. Thus emerges an inherent need to develop an affirmative strategy that identifies end goals and leverages multilateral frameworks as an avenue for achieving those goals. Creating a stronghold over chokepoints throughout semiconductor GVCs affects consumer markets and national security capabilities, thus amounting to geopolitical power.
+
+Based on an assessment of what EU and Quad countries are currently producing, as well as their alignment with U.S. export control policy, the best candidates for friend-shoring U.S. semiconductor supply chains are EU member states and Japan. Within the European Union, the best candidates from a supply chain security perspective, both in terms of national security considerations and overall supply chain resiliency, are Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands. Each has an educated population, a relatively open immigration system that can attract foreign talent, and an existing close relationship with the United States on issues of national security.
+
+> For both the United States and foreign partners, governments need to identify — and then implement policy based on — where they want to lead and where they can afford to follow.
+
+Overall, disruptions throughout the semiconductor GVC are likely to persist, making it a more urgent matter for governments and the private sector to minimize ongoing disruptions. The Russian invasion of Ukraine could prolong these trade disturbances and could also usher in a more fractured global trading system in which China and Russia become closer and liberal democracies band together, leaving countries like India awkwardly in the middle. Mounting tension between authoritarian and democratic states, coupled with an injection of social policy into trade agendas, is likely to reshuffle semiconductor GVCs, particularly as the United States reconsiders what qualifies countries to maintain trusted trading partner status.
+
+---
+
+__William A. Reinsch__ holds the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
+
+__Emily Benson__ is a fellow with the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.
+
+__Aidan Arasasingham__ is a program coordinator and research assistant with the Economics Program at CSIS. The Scholl Chair thanks interns Elizabeth Duncan, Sparsha Janardhan, and Grant Reynolds for their valuable research.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-08-silicon-lifeline-in-ukraine-war.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-08-silicon-lifeline-in-ukraine-war.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-08-silicon-lifeline-in-ukraine-war.md
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Silicon Lifeline In Ukraine War
+author: James Byrne, et al.
+date : 2022-08-08 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/tNWSFUb.jpg
+image_caption: "Russia’s invasion has relied on Western electronics."
+description: "A Reuters Report: As Russian missiles struck Ukraine, Western tech still flowed"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_An examination of the components and functioning of 27 of Russia’s most modern military systems – including cruise missiles, communications systems and electronic warfare complexes – supports that the degradation in Russian military capability could be made permanent if appropriate policies are implemented._
+
+
+
+After Russia invaded Ukraine, the West announced tough new sanctions and tech companies said they had halted all exports to Russia. Yet supplies of Western computer parts continued, a joint investigation finds.
+
+With the tip of a hunting knife, a senior Ukrainian security official removed 18 screws and lifted off the lid of a small black metal box. Inside were four sliding panels packed with scores of computer chips.
+
+This was the electronic brain of an unexploded Russian 9M727 cruise missile — one of the devastating weapons Russia has used to strike Ukraine since it invaded the country on Feb. 24. Russian troops have fired more than 3,650 missiles and guided rockets in the first five months of the war, according to Ukrainian authorities, destroying military targets as well as apartment buildings, shopping centers, and killing hundreds of civilians. On July 14, three cruise missiles struck the city of Vinnytsia, killing 27 people, including a four-year-old girl, Ukrainian authorities say. Russia says it only fires at military targets.
+
+The black metal box, as well as other Russian weaponry shown to Reuters, were collected on the battlefield by Ukraine’s military. They contain Russian electronics bearing Cyrillic markings, sometimes handwritten.
+
+But many of the most important electronic components inside are microcontrollers, programmable chips and signal processors stamped with the names of American chip-makers, including Texas Instruments Inc; Altera, owned by Intel Corp; Xilinx, owned by Advanced Micro Devices Inc (AMD); and Maxim Integrated Products Inc, acquired last year by Analog Devices Inc. Chips made by Cypress Semiconductor, now owned by Germany’s Infineon AG, were also visible.
+
+
+_▲ A radio altimeter, used in the Kalibr and 9M727 Iskander missiles, enabling them to hug terrain. The altimeter pictured was recovered by Ukraine’s military and contains Altera chips._
+
+“It’s quite simple,” said the senior Ukrainian official, who requested anonymity for security reasons. “Without those U.S. chips, Russian missiles and most Russian weapons would not work.”
+
+The Western components in the Russian weapons were examined as part of an investigation by Reuters in collaboration with the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a London-based defense think tank, and iStories, a Russia-focused investigative news site.
+
+While some of the more sophisticated Western chips in the Russian weapons have been subject to special export licensing requirements for years, the investigation found that many of the armaments also contain run-of-the-mill computer chips and other components found in consumer products. These are easily obtainable and in many cases aren’t subject to export restrictions.
+
+After the invasion, the United States and other countries banned high-tech exports to Russia to try to cripple its defense industry and tech companies announced that they had halted all exports to Russia. Yet the reporting team found that the flow of Western brand-name computer parts to Russia hasn’t stopped, with thousands of shipments since the invasion of Ukraine. The shippers were mainly unauthorized suppliers, but they also included some manufacturers.
+
+Reuters provided to AMD, Analog Devices, Infineon, Intel and Texas Instruments data from Russian customs records on shipments of their products to Russia that arrived after the invasion.
+
+Three of the manufacturers – AMD, Analog Devices and Infineon – said they had launched internal investigations after Reuters provided the customs data showing thousands of recent shipments of their products to Russia by third-party sellers. Infineon and Texas Instruments said products that they had shipped were already in transit at the time of the invasion. Intel said goods it shipped were internal company deliveries before it ceased its Russian operations in early April.
+
+Asked about their chips’ use in Russian weapons systems, the companies said they comply with export controls and trade sanctions. Infineon said it was “deeply concerned should our products be used for purposes for which they were not designed.” Intel said it “does not support or tolerate our products being used to violate human rights.”
+
+Russia’s reliance on Western electronics for its weapon systems has been known for years. Moscow has a long history of acquiring smuggled military-grade parts from the United States, including costly specialized chips for satellites that can withstand radiation in space. On the day of the invasion, the White House announced that the United States and its allies were imposing “Russia-wide restrictions on semiconductors, telecommunication, encryption security, lasers, sensors, navigation, avionics and maritime technologies” that it said would “cut off Russia’s access to cutting edge technology.” Many non-military tech products, however, remain exempt.
+
+Russia characterizes the conflict as a special military operation meant to disarm Ukraine. Moscow has cast the sanctions as a hostile act and has denied targeting civilians.
+
+A spokesman for the U.S. Department of Commerce, which administers export restrictions, said, “The powerful export controls put in place by the U.S. and 37 allies and partners are severely impacting Russia’s access to items and technologies it needs to sustain its military aggression, including semiconductors. As time goes on and their stockpiles continue to diminish, our controls will bite even harder.”
+
+“We will remain vigilant and engaged with our allies and partners in enforcing our controls,” he said.
+
+
+_▲ Where Russian missiles have struck_
+
+
+### Microwave-oven chips
+
+The onboard computer system inside the cruise missile’s black metal box shows that Russia doesn’t just rely on state-of-the-art technology for its precision weaponry. For example, stamps on two of the Texas Instruments chips – which process digital signals – showed they were manufactured more than 30 years ago.
+
+“For the most part, it’s the same chips that you find in your car or your microwave,” said a Ukrainian weapons expert with access to recovered Russian military gear.
+
+Gehan Amaratunga, a professor of electrical engineering at the University of Cambridge, reviewed a list of more than 600 Western components compiled by RUSI and Reuters that were found in Russian weapons and military systems recovered in Ukraine. “They are mostly standard products which are dated and can be found in many industrial electronic systems,” he said. “As such, they are not specialist military specification products.”
+
+Still, he added, “it is the reality that all standard integrated circuits can be used for both civilian and military purposes.”
+
+
+_▲ Banner at the top of the website of the Moscow-based computer retailer Kvantech_
+
+Despite what the West has described as an unprecedented series of strict sanctions against Russia, many commodity electronic components still aren’t subject to export controls. And even if they are, there’s a global galaxy of suppliers and traders in East Asia and other countries that are willing to ship them and are often beyond the control of Western manufacturers.
+
+A review by Reuters of Russian customs records identified more than 15,000 shipments of Western electronic components that reached Russia after its Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine through the end of May. The manufacturers included AMD, Analog Devices, Infineon, Intel and Texas Instruments.
+
+The parts included microprocessors, programmable chips, storage devices and other items, according to the Russian customs data.
+
+Russia itself has made no secret of its desire to continue the flow of imported Western tech products. In June, President Vladimir Putin signed a law to permit Russian companies to import electrical goods and their components without the patent owners’ permission.
+
+One Moscow-based computer retailer, Kvantech, now proclaims at the top of its website in Russian: “Attention! We are working normally. Our warehouses are ready to supply equipment to customers from the Russian Federation despite EU and U.S. sanctions.”
+
+The U.S. Department of Commerce declined to comment. The EU didn’t respond to a request for comment.
+
+
+_▲ A screenshot from the website of Moscow-based computer retailer Kvantech shows Western brands it says it is still selling, even though the firms have stopped doing business in Russia._
+
+The Russian website features the logos of more than a half-dozen top U.S. technology companies. Asked how Kvantech manages to continue procuring Western computer equipment, a company official who gave his name only as Viktor said it was “a commercial secret.”
+
+Reuters obtained the Russian customs records from three commercial providers, including one that had 2022 data. To verify the most recent data, the news agency cross-checked a sample of that provider’s earlier records – including the date, buyer, seller, international product code and other information – with the two other sources and found that they matched.
+
+Andre Tauber, a spokesman for Infineon, said the German company had launched an internal investigation based on Reuters findings, which identified more than 450 shipments to Russia between Feb. 25 and May 30 of products made by Infineon-owned Cypress Semiconductor. Reuters also found nearly 2,500 shipments of Infineon products that arrived in Russia after the invasion.
+
+“We are in the process of reviewing and verifying the information you provided and will take appropriate actions as needed,” Tauber said. “Infineon takes this matter very seriously.”
+
+He added that “Infineon instructed all distribution partners globally to prevent deliveries of Infineon products or services contrary to the sanctions and their spirit.” He said, “Compliance with applicable laws is of utmost importance for Infineon, and we have established robust policies and processes to comply with these laws. It proves difficult to control ongoing sales throughout the entire supply chain.”
+
+A spokesperson for AMD said the firm is investigating Russian customs data shared by Reuters showing that between March 2 and May 31, there were about 200 shipments of AMD components and nearly 700 shipments of Xilinx components to Russia.
+
+“The information shared is concerning,” a spokesperson said. While the company has “not seen any diversion of AMD products into Russia … AMD takes these matters very seriously and we have commenced a thorough review of the data to identify potential issues.”
+
+Reuters shared with Analog Devices Russian customs data showing that since the invasion, there have been more than 7,700 shipments to Russia of its components through the end of May. There have also been nearly 900 shipments of parts made by Maxim Integrated, which Analog Devices owns, the data showed.
+
+
+_▲ Russian missile components recovered by Ukraine’s military. Above, a Texas Instruments chip dated 1988 in the on-board computer of a Russian 9M727 missile._
+
+
+_▲ A Maxim Integrated Products chip in the on-board computer of the same 9M727 missile._
+
+
+_▲ The on-board computer also contains Cypress Semiconductor chips._
+
+A spokesman for Analog Devices said, “Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and in compliance with U.S. and EU sanctions, Analog Devices ceased business activities in Russia and promptly instructed all of its distributors to halt shipments of our products into Russia.”
+
+The spokesman added, “We take this seriously and are investigating the veracity of the” Russian customs data “and whether any of our distributors violated our express instructions. Any post-sanctions shipment to Russia would be in direct violation of ADI’s express instructions.”
+
+A spokeswoman for Texas Instruments said it had conducted “an in-depth review” and found that 36 shipments by the company and six by one of its authorized distributors that arrived in Russia in late February and early March “were in transit before the invasion began.” Reuters found nearly 1,300 additional shipments of Texas Instruments parts to Russia by third-party sellers.
+
+“We stand behind our earlier statement that we are not selling into Russia … and comply with applicable laws and regulations in the countries where we operate,” the spokeswoman said.
+
+Asked about more than 80 shipments of Intel products that arrived in Russia in March, a spokesman for Intel said, “In certain cases, these are internal Intel shipments to our offices in Russia, which supported software development work until our cessation of operations on April 5th.”
+
+In addition, more than 1,300 shipments of Intel components and 800 shipments of Altera parts from other companies “in most cases … appear to be shipments from third-party suppliers who may have obtained their inventory from various sources,” he said.
+
+“Intel has a clear policy that our distributors and customers must comply with all export requirements and local and international laws,” the spokesman said.
+
+
+### Back doors
+
+Russia relies on Western technology for some of its weapons systems because it doesn’t produce many of the required electronics parts itself. But Russian defense companies don’t just use any available components. Even the most ordinary chips must pass through a strict bureaucratic procurement process designed to test and certify them and make sure they don’t contain “back doors” that could enable Western spying or sabotage.
+
+The use of foreign-made chips in U.S. military equipment is a top concern in Washington as well, “because there can be vulnerabilities that are manufactured into them,” said Ian Williams, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “The Russians are very aware of this, too.”
+
+In a measure of how seriously Russian authorities view infiltration risks, a Ukrainian expert with access to Russian weapons showed Reuters photographs of three small holographic stickers bearing the sword-and-shield logo of Russia’s Federal Security Service, or FSB, its main intelligence agency.
+
+The stickers appeared on electronic components recovered from Russian missiles, combat helicopters and fighter aircraft, the expert said. The FSB didn’t respond to a message seeking comment.
+
+
+_▲ This photo, provided to Reuters by a Ukrainian weapons expert, shows the signature logo of Russia’s FSB on a component of a Russian missile._
+
+To prevent compromised components from making their way into Russian weapons, the Kremlin relies on a scientific institute located near Moscow. Recently renamed the All-Russian Research Institute of Radio Electronics, the body acts as a central certifier of all electronic parts used by the defense industry, including manufacturing, as well as repairs, upgrades and even experiments, said two people familiar with the process.
+
+The institute’s central role was bolstered last year when Putin issued a decree elevating it to the rank of strategic enterprise. The institute cooperates with a large network of labs and certification centers to fulfill its task of cataloging, testing and validating tens of thousands of components.
+
+The master list of authorized domestic and imported electronic components curated by the institute can be accessed online by accredited Russian companies. In addition, research and production companies from Russia’s defense industry can submit lists of electronic parts they wish to use for a new project, and the institute tries to make sure they don’t include any unauthorized components.
+
+One of the institute’s mandates is to encourage Russian manufacturers to use domestically produced electronics, if possible.
+
+But an institute document seen by Reuters suggests that many Western components have no Russian equivalents. In 2017, the institute reviewed a proposed helicopter-mounted radio-jamming station – designed to disrupt enemy communications – and determined that of the 921 foreign components the design called for, only 242 could be procured from Russian manufacturers at the time, the document showed. The Kremlin and the institute didn’t respond to messages seeking comment.
+
+
+_▲ Missiles Russia has employed_
+
+
+### Defense ties
+
+Reuters was unable to trace how specific Western chips found inside Russian weapons in Ukraine got there.
+
+However, a review of the Russian customs records shows that some of the same parts were shipped before the invasion by third-party suppliers to several Russian military companies or to other firms with links to the defense industry.
+
+Among the importers named on the customs records as having received some of the same types of Western chips found in Russian weapons are AO VOMZ, AO NPK Uralvagonzavod and AO Radiopriborsnab. According to Russian corporate records, Rostec – a state-owned defense giant – has an indirect ownership stake in all three companies.
+
+In June, the U.S. Department of the Treasury called Rostec “the cornerstone of Russia’s defense, industrial, technology, and manufacturing sectors.” It is headed by Sergey Chemezov, a former intelligence officer who once worked with Putin in the KGB.
+
+
+_▲ Russian President Vladimir Putin and Rostec CEO Sergey Chemezov are pictured in Moscow in May._
+
+Rostec and Chemezov have been targeted with sanctions by Washington, the European Union and other countries. Rostec and Chemezov did not respond to a request for comment.
+
+Radiopriborsnab describes itself on its website as a supplier of electronic components. According to Russian customs records, it has imported Altera and Xilinx chips, the same kind found in Russian radio and electronic-warfare equipment recovered in Ukraine.
+
+Another five Russian importers have participated in tenders to supply Russian weapons manufacturers, according to data from Goszakupki, Russia’s official public procurement platform.
+
+Two of those five importers – OOO Trade-Component and AO GK Radiant – were sanctioned last year by the U.S. government, which accused them of trying to procure American components “likely” for use in Russian military programs.
+
+The Russian importers didn’t respond to requests for comment.
+
+Russia has become adept at converting consumer-grade chips for military use. For example, Western weapons manufacturers often rely on special military-grade versions of chips to ensure they can withstand very high temperatures. Since such chips are subject to export controls and harder to procure, Russian weapons companies have found alternatives, according to one of three Ukrainian weapons experts interviewed by Reuters.
+
+Holding the rugged black metal box containing a missile’s on-board computer, the expert pointed to a heat sink designed to cool the electronic components inside, as well as a thick insulation seal.
+
+
+_▲ This circuit board found inside a Russian 9M727 missile includes a vintage Texas Instruments DSP chip and is surrounded by a heat sink to cool its components._
+
+“In Russia, they take the consumer version and put some protection around it,” he said.
+
+That doesn’t mean Russian weaponry is outdated, another Ukrainian expert said, noting that the designs of many Russian weapons feature pioneering concepts. Examining the innards of a Russian cruise missile, he found what he said was true technological prowess: a satellite-navigation antenna engraved on a piece of ceramic the size of a postage stamp.
+
+“This is quite something,” the expert said. “A lot of people would be interested in seeing this, even the Americans.”
+
+
+### Flexibility
+
+Among the Western electronics found in Russian weapons, one particular type of integrated circuit stands out, according to Western microelectronics experts: programmable chips, known as Field Programmable Gate Arrays, or FPGAs.
+
+One FPGA – a shiny black Altera Cyclone II chip – was mounted between the gyroscopes of a navigation system recovered in Ukraine from a Russian precision-artillery rocket known as a 9M544.
+
+The programmable chips, which have been available for decades, give electronic-equipment manufacturers enormous flexibility because they quickly can be reprogrammed to perform whatever new task is necessary, said Daniel Nenni, a veteran semiconductor professional and co-author of a book on FPGAs.
+
+This is particularly useful for weapons manufacturers whose products require upgrades and modifications through their typically long life cycles, Nenni said.
+
+At a time when many industries are starved for chips because of global supply-chain shortages, another advantage of FPGAs is that they can be recycled.
+
+“The key about the FPGAs is that you can reuse them,” Nenni said. “You can buy a washing machine, take an FPGA out and put it in a missile. It’s that simple because you can reprogram it to do whatever you want.”
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-11-fourth-taiwan-strait-crisis.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-11-fourth-taiwan-strait-crisis.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..fd345a3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-11-fourth-taiwan-strait-crisis.md
@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis
+author: Bonny Lin, et al.
+date : 2022-08-11 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/caylwb3.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "This page was updated on August 11 to reflect new data and developments."
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_As U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi traveled to Taiwan on August 2-3, China responded with forceful and coercive military, economic, and diplomatic measures._ _Developments are still unfolding, but the large-scale and unprecedented military exercises taken by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) far exceed the operations China engaged in during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis that took place in 1995-1996. Chinese escalation has precipitated the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis, leading to international calls for China to immediately halt its military activities._
+
+
+### Timeline of Key Chinese Military Activities
+
+#### Prior to Speaker Pelosi’s Arrival
+
+In the leadup to Speaker Pelosi’s travel to Taiwan on August 2, the PLA took a series of actions to demonstrate its resolve and willingness to escalate, with the hope of deterring Speaker Pelosi from setting foot on the island and backing up China’s increasingly stern public warnings with action. This included military drills and operations across multiple theater commands, including to the north, west, east, and south of Taiwan.
+
+- On July 28, China began testing Taiwan’s defenses by sending unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over Taiwan’s Dongyin Island, a well-defended Taiwan outpost that is part of its Matsu Islands located close to mainland China. This marked the first time that China has sent drones over Taiwan’s airspace.
+
+- By August 1, China placed the PLA Eastern Theater Command (ETC), which leads military operations against Taiwan, on high alert. There was significant movement of troops and equipment within the ETC in the regions closest to Taiwan.
+
+- The PLA further repositioned key military assets from other regions to the Eastern Theater Command. The PLA Navy’s two operational aircraft carriers, the Liaoning and Shandong, had previously deployed from their respective home ports of Qingdao and Sanya, and were moving in the waters around China. Large Chinese towboats were also spotted en route towards Taiwan.
+
+- China announced military exercises and live fire drills in the South China Sea from August 2–6. The PLA’s Southern Theater Command (STC) — which is responsible for operations in the South China Sea and some operations around Taiwan — was placed on high alert.
+
+- On August 2, PLA aircraft flew close to the Taiwan Strait centerline. A number of civilian flights at multiple airports in Fujian Province were canceled, suggesting that China was clearing the airspace in the Taiwan Strait to engage in military operations.
+
+All these activities caused speculation among Chinese netizens that the PLA may have been ready to engage in some military operation against Pelosi’s entourage if her plane flew the typical route to Taipei, traveling through the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait to reach Taipei. Although it is unlikely that China considered shooting down her plane or engaging in aggressive intercepts of her airplane — which could risk a deadly accident or miscalculation — it is possible that China may have wanted to send planes to “escort” her flight. The PLA may have also considered limited operations against U.S. or Taiwan planes accompanying her plane.
+
+Instead, her aircraft (and accompanying escorts) took a detour that avoided the PLA exercise in the SCS and flew to Taipei via the east of Taiwan. It would have been significantly more risky for China to engage in military operations to the east of Taiwan given the prepositioning of multiple U.S. military assets in the vicinity and the difficulty of supporting PLA operations at longer distances and during nighttime.
+
+#### After Speaker Pelosi Landed in Taipei
+
+After China failed to deter Speaker Pelosi from landing in Taiwan, the PLA rapidly transitioned to punishing Taiwan and exercising China’s capabilities to engage in a range of military operations against the island. This involved PLA live-fire rocket and missile launches on August 4 as well as significant joint military operations from August 4 to August 7. At the same time, China stepped up air intrusions against Taiwan’s offshore islands located close to China, namely Kinmen and Matsu. These actions were accompanied by an aggressive disinformation operation to exaggerate the extent and scale of China’s capabilities. Despite these efforts, and up until August 8, PLA aircraft have not intruded into the airspace of Taiwan’s main island and Chinese military vessels have stayed outside of the main island’s territorial waters.
+
+The timeline below lists key Chinese actions starting after Speaker Pelosi’s arrival. The timeline reflects publicly available information as of 12 PM EDT on August 11.
+
+> #### Tuesday, August 2
+
+- Shortly after Speaker Pelosi landed, China’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) said that it is on “high alert” and will launch a “series of targeted military operations as countermeasures.”
+
+- Chinese state media announced that the PLA would conduct military exercises from August 4-7 in six zones throughout the Taiwan Strait and around the island of Taiwan. State media detailed that the exercises would include: a series of joint military operations around Taiwan; joint air and sea exercises in the sea and airspace of the northern, southwestern, and southeastern Taiwan Islands; long-range live ammunition firing in the Taiwan Strait; and test firing of conventional missiles in the waters east of Taiwan. Notices warned civilian and commercial traffic to avoid exercise areas.
+
+- At the same time, Taiwan’s MND refuted false Chinese rumors that Su-35 fighter jets crossed the Taiwan Strait when Pelosi’s plane entered Taiwan’s airspace. Instead, for August 2, the PLA flew 21 aircraft into the southwest portion of Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), including 10 J-16 fighters, eight J-11 fighters, one KJ-500 airborne early warning and command (AEW&C) aircraft, one Y-9 electronic warfare (EW) aircraft, and one Y-8 electronic intelligence (ELINT) aircraft.
+
+#### Number of PLA Incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ by Aircraft
+
+
+_▲ Number of PLA Incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ by Aircraft_
+
+> #### Wednesday, August 3
+
+- By Wednesday, the PLA began exercising in regions around Taiwan. The ETC announced that China had “organized joint combat training exercises in the northern, southwestern and southeastern waters and airspace” near Taiwan and the exercises involved most PLA elements under the ETC. The PLA focused on training for “joint blockade, sea target assault, strike on ground targets, and airspace control operation, and the joint combat capabilities of troops.” The actual extent of China’s operations remain unclear: for example, Chinese media shared alleged videos of J-20 fighter jets taking off, but Taiwan’s MND clarified that no J-20s had operated in Taiwan’s ADIZ on August 3.
+
+- Reports emerged that China had established a seventh zone for the exercises, located east of the island. It was set to last from August 4–8, meaning it would go one day longer than the six other zones.
+
+- The PLA flew 27 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ. Six J-11 fighters and 16 Su-30 fighters crossed the Taiwan Strait median line and six J-11 fighters flew into the southwest corner of Taiwan’s ADIZ.
+
+- Two Chinese UAVs penetrated the airspace over Taiwan’s Kinmen Islands, located just off the coast of mainland China. This marked the first time PLA drones have done so. Taiwan’s Kinmen Defense Command responded by firing flares to warn the drones to leave Taiwan’s airspace.
+
+> #### Thursday, August 4
+
+- The PLA began exercises in the six designated zones. China launched long-range rockets and conventional ballistic missiles from four main regions within China into multiple exercise zones to the north, east, and south of Taiwan. Japan’s MND reported nine missiles were fired by China into four exercise zones, while China and Taiwan reported 11 missiles, with some Chinese reports suggesting only three zones were hit. Video footage posted by official Chinese media suggested that at least some of the missiles were DF-15B short-range missiles. At least five missiles splashed down in Zone 4, on Taiwan’s east coast within Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Japan’s MND estimated that at least four of the missiles flew over the island of Taiwan — an unprecedented move by China. However, Taiwan downplayed the danger noting that the ballistic missiles flew in a high path more than 100 km and were therefore not within Taiwan’s airspace.
+
+- The PLA fired missiles from Zone 1, near Taiwan’s Matsu islands, and fired long-range rockets near Matsu, Wuqiu, Dongyin, and other outlying islands, contributing to concerns in Taiwan of China’s intent around the islands.
+
+- China’s Eastern Theater Command said that it was mobilizing more than 100 fighter planes, bombers and other aircraft, as well as more than 10 destroyers and frigates, to “carry out joint closure and control operations.” Images showed military helicopters flying past Pingtan island, one of Taiwan’s closest points to mainland China. China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, joined the exercises around Taiwan accompanied by at least one nuclear-powered attack submarine.
+
+- The PLA flew 22 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ. This included 12 Su-30 fighters crossing the median line northwest of Taiwan and eight J-11 and two J-16 fighters crossing the median line southwest of Taiwan.
+
+- Taiwan reported that drones flew over the waters surrounding the Kinmen, Dongyin, and Matsu Islands on Thursday. UAVs were also spotted in the waters near Japan. During the morning and night, a Chinese reconnaissance drone and another reconnaissance/attack drone flew into the East China Sea, passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima and into the Pacific Ocean, and then turned to head south of the Sakishima Islands. They then turned and traced the same path in the opposite direction. Another presumed Chinese drone flew in from the East China Sea and flew circles over the area. The Japan Air Self-Defense Force scrambled fighters.
+
+
+_▲ The PLA’s August 4 Ballistic Missile Launches_
+
+> #### Friday, August 5
+
+- The PLA ETC announced it conducted air and sea combat drills to the north, east, and southwest of Taiwan to test troops’ joint combat capabilities. According to the Taiwan MND, the PLA dispatched 68 aircraft and 13 vessels as part of military activities around the Taiwan Strait. This included PLA assets crossing the median line that divides the Taiwan Strait.
+
+- The PLA flew 49 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ and across the median line. This included 24 Su-30 fighters and six J-11 fighters crossing the median line northwest of Taiwan and 10 J-16 fighters, seven J-10 fighters, one Y-8 EW aircraft, and one Y-8 ASW aircraft crossing the median line southwest of Taiwan. This was the second-highest number of aircraft ever recorded entering Taiwan’s ADIZ in a single day, superseded only by 56 aircraft on October 4, 2021. More broadly, PLA ADIZ incursions averaged nearly 26 aircraft per day between August 2–8, a major uptick from an average of roughly three aircraft per day from January 1–August 1, 2022.
+
+- Four PLA drones flew over the waters around Kinmen Island and nearby Lieyu Island and Beiding Islet. In response, the Kinmen Defense Command fired warning flares to repel the drones. Around the same time, similar aircraft were detected flying over Liang Island and Dongyin Island, which are part of Taiwan’s Matsu Islands.
+
+
+_▲ Seven-day Running Average of PLA Air Incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ_
+
+> #### Saturday, August 6
+
+- On the third day of exercises, the PLA focused on testing troops’ land attack and sea assault capabilities with joint air and naval operations in the sea and airspace to the north, east, and southwest of Taiwan. These missions aimed at clearing paths for amphibious landing forces to launch beach assaults against Taiwan. PLA ETC naval forces deployed warships, warplanes, and coast-based anti-ship missiles. Taiwan’s MND reported multiple PLA vessels (later numbered at 14 ships) around the Taiwan Strait, with some having crossed the median line and some possibly simulating attacks against “HVA” (high-value assets).
+
+- China’s Maritime Safety Administration announced zones in the Yellow Sea where exercises would take place from August 5–15. China also announced exercises in the Bohai Sea set to start Monday, August 8, and last until September 8.
+
+- The PLA flew 20 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ. This included 10 Su-30 fighters and four J-11 fighters crossing the median line northwest of Taiwan and four J-16 fighters, one Y-8 ASW aircraft, and one Y-20U aerial refueling aircraft flying into the southwest portion of Taiwan’s ADIZ.
+
+- Six PLA drones flew over waters around Kinmen and Beiding Islet.
+
+> #### Sunday, August 7
+
+- On the scheduled final day of the exercises, Taiwan’s MND reported 14 PLA Navy vessels and 66 PLA aircraft in the area. The PLA ETC said it conducted live-fire drills in the waters and airspace around Taiwan “as planned.”
+
+- While exercises in the initial six zones were set to end, the seventh zone (later added and reported by Taiwan’s government) would continue until Monday.
+
+- A commentator on Chinese state television said the Chinese military would now conduct “regular” drills on the Taiwan side of the line, largely confirming fears that China was aiming to use the exercises to shift the status quo and make recent unprecedented moves the norm.
+
+- The PLA flew 22 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ. This included 10 Su-30 and four J-11 fighters crossing the median line northwest of Taiwan and six J-16 fighter, three H-6 bombers, and one Y-8 ASW aircraft entering the southwest area of Taiwan’s ADIZ.
+
+- During the morning, the PLA flew multiple drones in areas around the Taiwan Strait. In the evening, there was one batch of drones found around the Kinmen area.
+
+
+_▲ Number of PLA Aircraft and Navy Vessels Reported around Taiwan_
+
+> #### Monday, August 8
+
+- China extended military operations around Taiwan by announcing new military exercises to engage in “joint anti-submarine and sea assault operations.” There was no publicly announced exercise restriction zone and no live-fire. Taiwan’s MND reported 13 PLA Navy vessels and 39 PLA aircraft were detected in the areas around Taiwan.
+
+- Taiwan’s MND shared that between August 1 and August 8, China engaged in multiple cyberattacks against Taiwan political and military targets and 272 attempts at political warfare and disinformation. Chinese disinformation attempts peaked on August 4 and 5.
+
+- The PLA flew 21 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ. This included eight Su-30 fighters, six J-11 fighters, two JH-7 fighter-bombers, four J-16 fighters, and one KA-228 ASW aircraft.
+
+- Matsu Defense Command reported spotting nine “unidentified light spots” presumed to be UAVs that passed over the Matsu area. The Matsu Defense Command fired flares as a warning signal. The PLA also flew one drone around Kinmen.
+
+> #### Tuesday, August 9
+
+- China continued exercises that focused on joint containment and joint support operations, such as aerial refueling and sea support. Taiwan’s MND reported a total of 45 PLA aircraft and 10 ships detected around the Taiwan Strait, as joint air and sea operations continued.
+
+- The PLA flew 16 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ, all of which flew over the median line of the Taiwan Strait. Eight Su-30 fighters and four J-16 fighters flew across the northern portion of the median line. Four J-11 fighters flew across the central part of the median line, approximately due west of Taipei — the first time ADIZ incursions have taken place there.
+
+- In response to China’s continuous exercises, Taiwan kicked off a two-day military exercise, known as Tianlei. It featured more than 700 troops and included live-firing of 114 artillery shells into the water.
+
+
+_▲ Reported Crossings of the Taiwan Strait Median Line by PLA Aircraft_
+
+> #### Wednesday, August 10
+
+- The PLA ETC announced that operations around the island had concluded. Senior Colonel Shi Yi, a spokesman for the ETC, regarded the recent exercises around Taiwan as successful, “with all tasks accomplished and the troops’ combat capabilities in integrated joint operations effectively verified.” However, the PLA will continue to monitor the region, conduct military training and preparations, and regularly organize combat patrols in the Taiwan Strait, as China intends to maintain its presence in the region.
+
+- As part of the PLA’s operations, the Taiwan MND reported 10 PLA Navy vessels and 36 PLA aircraft around the area of Taiwan.
+
+- The PLA flew 17 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ, all of which crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait. This included nine SU-30 fighters crossing near the center of the line (but further north than the preceding day’s incursion) and eight J-11 fighters crossing toward the southern portion.
+
+> #### Thursday, August 11
+
+- Despite China’s official conclusion of the exercises around the island, Taiwan’s MND reported 6 PLA Navy vessels and 21 PLA aircraft around the island.
+
+- The PLA flew 11 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ. One JH-7 and six Su-30 flew over the northern portion of the median line and 11 J-4 aircraft flew over the median line to the southwest of Taiwan.
+
+
+### Mapping the PLA’s Unprecedented Six Exercise Zones around Taiwan
+
+Of the various Chinese activities detailed above, the most significant to date is a series of large military exercises and live-fire drills that took place from August 4-7. As a whole, these exercises are much closer to the main island of Taiwan than prior ones, showcasing the PLA’s increased confidence in its capabilities to operate near Taiwan. The six exercise zones are within Taiwan’s ADIZ and encircle Taiwan from multiple directions. Several exercise zones are far from the Chinese mainland and beyond the Taiwan Strait, venturing into Japan’s and the Philippine’s EEZ. Three of the exercise zones intrude into Taiwan’s territorial waters and lie dangerously close to Taiwan’s capital and key cities. It is also worth noting that these exercises were rolled out at once, while the exercises during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis took place in multiple stages from July 1995 to March 1996.
+
+
+_▲ Chinese Military Exercises around Taiwan_
+
+Statements by Chinese military analysts have made clear that the PLA chose the location of each exercise zone for specific purposes. Below are details on the importance of each zone to PLA operations and to Taiwan’s security.
+
+__Zone 1:__ This zone is positioned off the coast of mainland China’s Pingtan Island at the narrowest part of the Taiwan Strait. It is also close to the Taiwan-controlled Matsu Islands that sit immediately off the coast of mainland China’s Fujian Province. PLA operations there could signal Chinese threats to seize the offshore islands. PLA analysts have noted that operations by this narrow neck could position China to close off the northern entrance to the Taiwan Strait. This zone was also chosen to intentionally breach and undermine the legitimacy of the “median line” running through the Taiwan Strait, where PLA forces typically operate to the west of the line.
+
+__Zone 2:__ Located north of Taiwan, this zone intrudes into Taiwan’s territorial waters and is 22.5 kilometers (km) away from the tip of the island and approximately 50 km from Taipei, Taiwan’s capital. It is near both the Port of Taipei and Keelung Harbor, a key port for both military and commercial activity. Both ports are critical to Taiwan’s economy and together handle approximately 20 percent of total cargo to the island. Zone 2 is also located near Taipei’s Taoyuan International Airport, the island’s busiest airport, as well as Taipei Songshan Airport, which serves as a military airbase and saw over six million passengers in 2019. This zone is located close to beaches and coastal areas to the northwest and west of Taipei that military planners believe to be suitable for a potential PLA amphibious landing on Taiwan.
+
+__Zone 3:__ Located 18.5 km northeast of Taiwan, this zone is near the only beaches on the east coast of Taiwan that may be suitable for a PLA amphibious invasion. The southeast corner of Zone 3 intrudes into Japan’s EEZ and is a short distance from the hotly contested Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which are administered by Japan and claimed by China and Taiwan. Zone 3 thus further positions the PLA to conduct operations against both Taiwan and Japan. Similar to Zone 2, this zone is close to Taipei and Keelung Harbor. Control of both zones could make it difficult for the United States or Japan to flow forces into Taipei from the northeast side and could enable the PLA to blockade Keelung Harbor. Operating from Zones 1, 2, and 3 could allow the PLA to move quickly to seize Taipei from three different directions and may be particularly important if the PLA seeks to engage in a decapitation attack against Taiwan’s leadership.
+
+__Zone 4:__ This zone rests approximately 130 km from Taiwan’s eastern shores in the Pacific Ocean. Because of the distance to China and relatively mountainous terrain on Taiwan’s east coast, the PLA has historically engaged in fewer operations and exercises in this region than on the western side of Taiwan. This zone directly faces two air force bases at Hualien and Taitung, which are among Taiwan’s most important military bases. Placing forces there would enable the PLA to launch attacks on Taiwan’s eastern shores and bases and help deny the United States and other countries from flowing forces into Taiwan from the east. This zone also overlaps with Japan’s EEZ. Sandwiched between this zone and Zone 3 is Japan’s Yonaguni Island, which hosts a military base, radar, and other equipment and serves as a critical outpost near Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands.
+
+__Zone 5:__ This zone is positioned southeast of the southern tip of Taiwan. It sits between Taiwan’s Orchid Island and the islands comprising the Philippine Province of Batanes and intrudes into the Philippine EEZ. This stretch of seas, known as the Bashi Channel, is a critical choke point separating waters within the First Island Chain from the Philippines Sea and the broader Pacific Ocean. The Bashi Channel is also home to several undersea cables, which could be severed to severely disrupt internet access and communications in the region.
+
+__Zone 6:__ This zone is located at the southwest corner of Taiwan and is the largest of the six. It is close to a region that has been a stronghold of the Democratic Progress Party (DPP), the party that President Tsai Ing-wen leads and Beijing views as pushing for Taiwan independence. The southwest corner of Taiwan’s ADIZ is where the PLA has engaged in the most air intrusions, but typically at a distance much farther from the main island of Taiwan than the exercise zone. This zone reaches into Taiwan’s territorial waters, near the large cities of Kaohsiung and Zuoying, which are both home to key military bases. Kaohsiung also boasts Taiwan’s most important commercial port — which handled nearly 59 percent of Taiwan’s total shipping throughput in 2021 — and Taiwan’s second-busiest airport. Similar to the zones in northern Taiwan, this zone is close to beaches and coastal areas suitable for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. Military operations from Zone 6 could target DPP supporters, significantly undermine Taiwan’s economy (as part of a blockade), and support a potential invasion of the island.
+
+
+### The Significance of the PLA’s Exercises
+
+These unprecedented exercises serve at least four main objectives. First, they are intended to impose political costs on Taipei and undermine morale and support for Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen among Taiwan’s public. Part of this involves making clear that Taiwan will bear the brunt of Chinese punishment for closer relations with the United States. Beijing hopes that this will drive a wedge between Taipei and Washington.
+
+Second, these exercises are part of larger Chinese deterrence and signaling efforts toward the United States, Taiwan, U.S. regional allies, and the broader international community to demonstrate how capable and determined China is to exert control over Taiwan and enforce its One China Principle. The exercises involve direct costs for Japan, and to some extent the Philippines, because of PLA operations (and firing of missiles) within both countries’ claimed waters. PLA activities are also meant to deter countries from supporting Taiwan by showcasing how much China is willing to escalate. More broadly, the PLA exercise led to rerouting of commercial air and maritime traffic around Taiwan to avoid the exercise zones, demonstrating China’s ability to “control” activities near and around Taiwan.
+
+The PLA’s decision to ambiguously extend (and then end) parts of the exercises also fit into China’s playbook for using military exercises for deterrence signaling. Science of Military Strategy, a relatively authoritative textbook published by China’s National Defense University, highlights PLA strategic thinking on the role of exercises in creating confusion and uncertainty. It states exercises can be directed at adversaries with the goal of “making them uncertain about our intentions and making it difficult to determine whether we are conducting routine training, maintaining close diplomatic relations, or taking the opportunity to move into actual combat operations, thereby causing psychological panic and conduct a deterrent effect.”
+
+Third, these exercises allow the PLA to rehearse how to conduct a variety of military operations that could form part of a larger-scale military operation - such as seizing one of Taiwan’s offshore islands or PLA blockade or invasion of the main Taiwan island - or a standalone operation by itself. This includes not only activities directed at Taiwan, but operations to prevent potential third country intervention in a China-Taiwan conflict.
+
+Fourth, and longer term, Beijing aims to use the exercises to establish a new status quo in the Taiwan Strait. China is specifically seeking to erase the notion of the median line that divides the strait and aims to constrain PLA operations west of the line. China also seeks to establish a new normal in which the PLA no longer respects Taiwan’s claims to a separate airspace and territorial waters. These exercises are likely only the beginning of PLA operations close to and above Taiwan.
+
+
+### China’s 2022 White Paper on Taiwan
+
+On August 10, 2022, the Chinese government published a white paper titled “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era.” The white paper has been under development for some time, and it was released to coincide with and mark the ending of China’s unprecedented August 2022 military exercises. As a result, it serves as a powerful Chinese messaging tool to explain why China escalated with military force and what to expect from China’s policy toward Taiwan moving forward, including further changes to come after China’s 20th Party Congress, which is set to be held this fall.
+
+The white paper sought to convey that China’s overall policy toward Taiwan has not changed — that China remains committed to peaceful unification and “one country, two systems” despite the escalation of military force against Taiwan. Even as the PLA seeks to establish a “new normal” of military operations closer to Taiwan, Beijing is trying to signal that China would prefer to resolve the Taiwan question without use of significant military force. In other words, the August 2022 exercises is an example of China having no choice but to use military force to fight Taiwan separatism and external interference.
+
+A detailed reading of this new white paper, however, shows mixed messages about China’s willingness to use force. The white paper also reflects Beijing’s toughened positions against Taiwan, and it no longer contains guarantees that Taiwan can maintain its democracy or military post-unification.
+
+#### What Is New in the White Paper
+
+The white paper represents authoritative and official Chinese policy toward Taiwan under President Xi Jinping. It is the latest Chinese white paper on Taiwan that follows two prior white papers in 1993 and 2000. There are significant differences between the 2022 and 2000 white papers that reflect the influence of three Chinese leaders — Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping — on China’s Taiwan policy. The new white paper also demonstrates that cross-Strait dynamics and the balance of power have shifted drastically in the last two decades.
+
+The 2022 white paper defines resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China’s “complete unification” as a “historic mission.” Although Jiang and Hu have used the term complete unification to characterize the desired end state for Taiwan, both leaders generally placed more emphasis on peaceful or national unification in their speeches and white papers. Under Xi Jinping, there are increased references to complete unification. The 2000 white paper did not use the term historic mission and this term suggests Xi’s elevation of the importance of unification, the importance of making progress on unification, and linking of unification with “national rejuvenation,” which was also absent from the 2000 white paper.
+
+The 2022 white paper clarifies that China’s national development and progress set the direction of cross-Strait relations (and unification). Broadly increasing people-to-people contacts and economic and cultural exchanges between the two sides is no longer sufficient to drive cross-Strait relations in the direction that Beijing wants. China must rely on its growing political, economic, technological, and military power to shape and coerce Taiwan’s trajectory. To some extent, this also suggests that China is not in a hurry or rush to achieve unification because its growing power could give China even more advantage in the future.
+
+The new white paper specifies “use of force would be the last resort taken under compelling circumstances.” This sentence was an addition that was not in the 2000 Taiwan white paper or the 2005 Anti-Secession Law. Because China already engages in near daily military operations against Taiwan, this sentence likely refers to either kinetic or larger-scale use of military force, which Beijing demonstrated with its August 2022 exercises. Although this sentence suggests that China should be less willing to use significant military force, it must be paired with other portions of the white paper that warn of the dangers posed by active separatist forces on Taiwan and prominent external interference (namely, the United States). The document urges China to have the courage, skill, extensive unity, and solidarity “to mobilize all factors to fight,” with “fight” referring to leveraging the range of Chinese capabilities, including military means. In other words, there are likely to be more instances of “compelling circumstances” and, if diplomacy does not work, China may have to use military force.
+
+In terms of what Taiwan can expect after unification, the new white paper writes that China’s principles of peaceful unification and One Country, Two Systems “take full account of Taiwan’s realities and are conducive to long-term stability in Taiwan after unification.” The addition of long-term stability suggests that Beijing wants to avoid the “instability” it suffered from the massive protests in Hong Kong. Beijing must be able to impose a sufficient degree of control over Taiwan to ensure there is no repeat of Hong Kong in Taiwan. The document offers that, “Provided that China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests are guaranteed, after unification Taiwan will enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region.” This means that Taiwan’s autonomy is highly conditioned. This is a far cry from the 2000 white paper that laid out what Taiwan could enjoy after unification without stipulating the conditions under which Beijing might revoke such offers.
+
+#### What Is Missing from the White Paper
+
+The 2022 white paper is missing a host of key items that illustrate China’s toughening position against Taiwan and the degree of control Beijing will need to exert over the island:
+
+- Most tellingly, the English version of the document does not mention the word “negotiate” when describing how the two sides can proceed to unification. It notes that there will be “consultations and discussions as equals.” The Chinese version of the white paper still uses “谈判” (negotiate) — but only in three areas — and there is no mention of “平等谈判” (negotiations as equals). The lack of explanation of what “as equals” means, and the refusal to link that term with negotiation, raise serious questions of how Beijing views Taipei and whether Taipei — or perhaps the specific DPP leadership — will be allowed any room for bargaining.
+
+- Indeed, the 2022 white paper is missing this key passage from the 2000 white paper: “[N]egotiations should be held between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chinese KMT on a reciprocal basis and… talks between the two parties may include representatives from all parties and mass organizations of Taiwan.” The 2000 white paper also noted that “we [Beijing] have never spoken of negotiations between the ‘central and local authorities.’” The exclusion of that statement in the 2022 text raises key questions about whether Beijing will view the DPP (or any Taiwan party) as an equal or subordinate for unification talks. If it is the latter, Beijing may seek to impose its will on Taipei than allow for genuine negotiations.
+
+The white paper only guarantees that Taiwan can maintain its own social and economic system under the One Country, Two Systems formula. Gone are assurances in the 1993 and 2000 white papers about a host of other rights that Taiwan could enjoy after unification that would allow the island to continue functioning as a vibrant democracy:
+
+- Missing: Taiwan “will have its own administrative and legislative powers”
+
+- Missing: Taiwan will maintain “an independent judiciary and the right of adjudication on the island”
+
+- Missing: Taiwan “will run its own party, political, military, economic, and financial affairs”
+
+- Missing: Taiwan “may keep its military forces and the mainland will not dispatch troops or administrative personnel to the island”
+
+- Missing: “Representatives of the government of the special administrative region and those from different circles of Taiwan may be appointed to senior posts in the central government and participate in the running of national affairs.”
+
+Instead, in Beijing’s ideal world, Taiwan would be governed by patriots who are loyal and subordinate to Beijing. The white paper makes this clear, concluding: “All Taiwan compatriots who support reunification of the country and rejuvenation of the nation will be the masters of the region, contributing to and benefitting from China’s development.”
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-11-russia-and-iran-double-down.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-11-russia-and-iran-double-down.md
new file mode 100644
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+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-11-russia-and-iran-double-down.md
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Russia And Iran Double Down
+author: Nicholas Carl, et al.
+date : 2022-08-11 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/n171LDg.jpg
+#image_caption:
+description: Coproduced by the Institute for the Study of War and the Critical Threats Project
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Russia and Iran have expanded their strategic partnership since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Senior Russian and Iranian officials have met frequently in recent months to boost cooperation and sign economic and military agreements._ _Moscow and Tehran have long cooperated when their interests have aligned, especially in opposing the US in the Middle East, but their recent engagements highlight more concerted efforts to strengthen their partnership. Presidents Vladimir Putin and Ebrahim Raisi have spoken at least four times since the invasion began — more than either individual has engaged most other world leaders. Putin visited Tehran in July 2022, marking his first foreign travel outside the territory of the former Soviet Union since the war began. These interactions reflect a deepening and potentially more balanced relationship wherein Russia is no longer the dominant party. This partnership will likely challenge US and allied interests in Europe, the Middle East, and around the globe._
+
+
+### Economic Cooperation
+
+Russia and Iran are working to increase bilateral commerce, trade, and use of non-dollar currencies. Russian and Iranian officials have agreed to the following in recent months:
+
+- Establishing Iranian trade centers in Moscow and joint economic zones;
+
+- Increasing passenger flights between Russia and Iran and other aviation cooperation;
+
+- Increasing food exports to Russia; and
+
+- Increasing the use of the Kremlin’s Mir electronic payment system to replace the SWIFT financial transaction service, from which Russian banks were banned in response to the invasion.
+
+Iranian officials also announced that they were transferring goods from Russia to India via an Iranian transit corridor for the first time in July 2022.
+
+Expanding bilateral trade and doing it without the US dollar are long-standing Russian and Iranian goals. One could easily overstate the significance of these agreements before they materialize. Nevertheless, Moscow is seemingly pursuing these efforts more urgently, likely in response to growing global isolation and international sanctions.
+
+Iran is pursuing greater economic engagement with Belarus as well. The Iranian industry minister signed agreements on automobile manufacturing, medicine, and transportation in Minsk on July 29. The agreements between Iran and Belarus underscore Tehran’s willingness to support Minsk despite international sanctions. The West has sanctioned both the Russian and Belarussian automobile industries.
+
+Iran — likely with Russian support — may be trying to enhance its cooperation with the Union State, which is a supranational organization through which the Kremlin has sought to integrate Belarus with Russia, particularly their economies and militaries, with mixed results. The Iranian industry minister announced in Minsk that Iran would finalize a comprehensive cooperation agreement with Belarus in the next year. Iran has pursued similar agreements with China, Russia, and Venezuela in recent years, reflecting its strategic alignment with revisionist powers against the US and its allies.
+
+
+### Military Cooperation
+
+Russia and Iran have increased their military cooperation in Ukraine, Syria, and Venezuela in recent months.
+
+__Ukraine.__ Iran is providing weapons and possibly conducting cyberattacks to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Iran agreed to provide some its most sophisticated military drones, such as the Shahed-129 and Shahed-191, to Russia for use in Ukraine. A senior Ukrainian official claimed on August 5 that the Kremlin had received 46 drones thus far, and Western media has indicated that Iran could provide up to 300 total. An unidentified US official claimed on August 9 that Russian personnel are currently in Iran training to use the drones.
+
+Putin is likely providing Iran sophisticated military platforms in exchange for the drones. Russia launched a Kanopus-V satellite on behalf of Iran on August 9. The satellite allows Tehran to collect high resolution satellite imagery to support its external military operations and attacks on US and partner forces in the Middle East. The Kremlin may also provide Iran fourth-generation fighter jets, such as the Su-35, allowing the Iranian armed forces to operate a modern air force. Unconfirmed social media reports suggest that Russia is training Iranian pilots and technicians on operating Su-35s. It is unclear whether Moscow has functional military aircraft to spare, but part of the recent Russia-Iran aviation agreement includes sending Russian aircraft to Iran for maintenance, repairs, and technical support.
+
+Iran may have also organized a cyberattack to support Russia against NATO. A hacking group, Farigh al Tahereh, conducted a denial-of-service attack against Romanian websites, including the Romanian border guards’ website, on July 15. Iranian state media has described Farigh al Tahereh as an “Iraqi resistance group” — terminology usually reserved for Iranian proxies. Farigh al Tahereh is likely either the cyber wing of an Iranian proxy in Iraq or a front group for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Iran may have targeted the Romanian border guards to threaten Europe with an overwhelming influx of migrants or refugees driven by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and consequent global food shortages.
+
+Iran could provide additional military or cyber assistance to Russia, particularly ballistic and cruise missiles, in exchange for further economic and military benefits. Tehran maintains a large and rapidly advancing missile program and could help Russian forces replenish their dwindling missile stockpiles with Iranian variants.
+
+__Syria.__ Moscow and Tehran may be coordinating to replace Russian units with Iranian and Iranian-backed forces in Syria. The Kremlin has reportedly drawn down its forces in Syria in recent months to send reinforcements to Ukraine, leaving a security vacuum for the IRGC to fill. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei met with Syrian President Bashar al Assad on May 8, reportedly to discuss transferring Russian positions to Iran and its proxies. IRGC Commander Hossein Salami paid his first known visit to Syria sometime in July 2022, likely to coordinate and oversee these transfers.
+
+__Venezuela.__ Russia has organized military exercises with Iran, China, and other countries to take place in Venezuela from August 13 to 27, likely as a show of force to the United States. China, Iran, and Russia have increased their joint military exercises in recent years, but this upcoming exercise will be the first in the western hemisphere, demonstrating these countries’ ability to strike the American homeland in the event of a larger conflict.
+
+
+### Changing Power Dynamics
+
+Iran enjoys a stronger position than it had previously in this partnership. Russia has historically been the dominant party, but Iranian leaders have extracted military concessions from the Kremlin in recent months. Tehran has traditionally sought to purchase military technologies from Moscow rather than the inverse. The Kremlin fielding Iranian drones in Ukraine will showcase these platforms to other potential international buyers, further benefitting Iran. Furthermore, Russia has previously tried to limit Iranian influence in Syria but is now enabling its expansion.
+
+These Russian concessions indicate a shifting power dynamic as Putin seeks economic and military support from a position of growing need. Mounting global isolation and the war in Ukraine are weakening Putin and forcing him to lean on Iran (and other revisionist powers) more heavily. Putin may seek to benefit from Iranian leaders’ experience operating under heavy international sanctions and building military systems with devalued currencies and limited access to foreign parts.
+
+
+### US Policy Implications
+
+Deepening Russo-Iranian ties will almost certainly threaten US and allied interests in Europe, the Middle East, and around the globe. Iranian material support to Russia may help the Kremlin achieve some of its military objectives in Ukraine and eastern Europe. Russian support to Iran’s nascent military space program and air force could improve Iranian targeting and increase the threat it poses to the US and its partners in the Middle East. Growing Iranian control and influence in Syria will enable the IRGC from Syria to threaten US military bases in the Middle East and our regional partners, such as Israel and Turkey, more effectively. Finally, Moscow and Tehran will likely leverage their deepening economic ties to mitigate US sanctions.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-15-russia-and-china-in-italy.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-15-russia-and-china-in-italy.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ddf9cc50
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-15-russia-and-china-in-italy.md
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Russia And China In Italy
+author: Raffaello Pantucci and Eleonora T. Ambrosetti
+date : 2022-08-15 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/kHM7PrY.jpg
+#image_caption:
+description:
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Italy has been one of the leading advocates in the EU of dialogue and cooperation with both Russia and China, and its longstanding political tradition of ‘trying to sit in the middle’ sometimes faces other EU states’ criticism._ _This paper seeks to explore the dynamics between Italy and Russia, and Italy and China, through an examination of political, security, economic and cultural ties. It also attempts to understand the degree to which Rome’s policy positions are shaped by external influences or internal choices._
+
+While it is inherently difficult to demonstrate influence, this paper stresses Italy’s agency in driving the relationships forwards, though it is clear that interference attempts and the economic connections that exist between the three powers play a role in influencing Italian planning. Even if Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is heavily impacting the relationship between Rome and Moscow, how this will play out in the longer term is hard to predict.
+
+
+### INTRODUCTION
+
+Italy has been one of the leading advocates in the EU of dialogue and cooperation with Russia, to the point that it has been accused of being Russia’s trojan horse in Europe. Rome has faced similar accusations about China, especially after it became the first G7 and major EU power to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2019. Yet, these perceptions miss the underlying dynamics in Italy’s choices, which draw on a long history of trying to sit in the middle – a consistent practice no matter which of the many political parties have taken power in Rome. From Beijing’s and Moscow’s perspectives, these internal dynamics are par for the course for Rome, where governmental instability has been the norm since the end of the Second World War.
+
+Italy has consistently sought to hedge between its close transatlantic ties and its longstanding connections with Moscow and Beijing. Both see Italy as a useful power to support them, given its prominent role in the G7 and as a central member of NATO and the EU. As President Xi Jinping wrote on the eve of his 2019 visit to Italy, ‘China hopes to strengthen coordination with Italy in international affairs and multilateral organisations’. President Vladimir Putin took this further, often expressing the view that Italy could act as a bridge for Russia and even calling for Italy to ‘play its role in normalising Russia-EU relations’, shortly before launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Although this paper was initially drafted before the invasion, it has tried to incorporate what has been seen in Rome’s approach under Prime Minister Mario Draghi towards Russia in the wake of the war in Ukraine (though is unable to speculate about what might come next). During Draghi’s brief reign, Italy had for the most part consolidated its transatlantic and European bonds in Russia policy. While Rome harshly condemned the invasion, Italy’s subsequent push to support NATO, US and European positions backing Ukraine have highlighted the importance of transatlantic relations to Rome and have undermined the narrative that Italy is in Russia’s thrall. Of course, it remains to be seen how Italy (like other powers) approaches the war and Russia in the longer term.
+
+This paper seeks to explore the dynamics between Italy and Russia, and Italy and China. It does this through an examination of political, security, economic and cultural ties to understand the degree to which Rome’s policy positions are shaped by external influence or internal choices. It is inherently difficult to demonstrate influence, but from what is observable this paper concludes that Italy is driving the relationship forwards. Nevertheless, it is clear that the economic connections that exist between the three powers play a role in influencing Italian planning and there have been efforts by both Moscow and Beijing to influence Rome’s thinking.
+
+The paper first outlines the historical background to Italy’s deep bilateral ties with both Russia and China. It then explores Rome’s complex and multifaceted relationship with Beijing and Moscow in the political, economic, military and cultural spheres, focusing on developments since 2010. The research draws on secondary literature and is informed by the authors’ longstanding engagement with officials and experts in Italy, China and Russia.
+
+
+### INFLUENCE AND INTERFERENCE
+
+It is difficult to define and demonstrate influence, which in its attempt to advance national interests can be malign, benign or a complex mix. For example, the causal links between a business transaction and a subsequent government decision can only be proven if a specific trail of evidence has been left, especially as countries wish to maintain good relations with significant trading partners and will take actions to preserve those ties. While a correlation may be clear, it is hard to prove causality or demonstrate the existence of a deliberate ‘influence’ operation (unless, for example, some formal engagement between governments was also involved). Furthermore, the motivations of different actors and the relationships between them are difficult to assess objectively in the absence of detailed inside information. However, it is clearer when influence becomes interference, which includes meddling in governance processes, actively bribing or recruiting officials, or conducting espionage operations against them. This paper examines suggestions that Italian strategic thinking is being influenced by Russia and China, and highlights evidence of specific interference episodes.
+
+#### A LONG HISTORY OF ENGAGEMENT
+
+Beijing and Moscow have frequently cited Italy as a significant middle power with which they have deep historical links. Both governments regularly invoke their links to Italy’s rich history, from the deep cultural ties forged during the various stages of Russian imperial history, to Marco Polo or Matteo Ricci’s travels across Eurasia or contacts between the Chinese Han dynasty and Ancient Rome. The history of cultural cooperation is also cited as a key factor shaping relations by both countries’ leadership.
+
+China and Russia were part of the Communist sphere during the Cold War, while Italy, despite its membership in NATO and role as a close US ally, retained a strong Communist party which sought to preserve relations with Moscow and Beijing during the second half of the 20th century. While these links were fraught with tension, Italian financiers and investors saw China and Russia as economic opportunities to be explored throughout the post-Second World War period. This history has provided the foundations for contemporary Italian relations as many of the firms, and some of the individuals, involved in developing ties during the Cold War have continued to play a role in relations between the countries.
+
+Russia has historically seen Italy as one of the friendliest countries in Western Europe. As Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated in 2020, ‘relations with Italy have always been based on continuity, mutual respect and regard for the sides’ interests’. Indeed, Italy was the first destination (outside the former Soviet states) of newly-elected Putin in 2000. Putin has continued to visit regularly, even after the EU imposed sanctions on Russia for its annexation of Crimea in 2014. Contacts with Draghi did not stop in the wake of the 2022 invasion – in a call on 30 March, the two leaders discussed the progress of peace negotiations and energy issues. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has strained relations with Italy, with Rome vocally condemning the invasion, openly supporting Ukraine, and forced to look for alternative energy sources to reduce its dependence on Russia.
+
+In 1978, China and Italy signed an intergovernmental agreement on science and technology, which laid the foundation for repeated engagements between the two countries – this was the general pattern of their bilateral engagements until the signing of the BRI MoU in 2019. In 2004, as Premier Wen Jiabao made his maiden foreign tour to Europe, he stopped in Germany, Italy, the UK, Ireland and Belgium. He signed ‘Strategic Comprehensive Partnership’ agreements in the UK, Germany and Italy, elevating relations between China and these powers to new heights. Distinguishing Italy’s agreement from the others was the creation of a high-level intergovernmental committee to help with implementation, ‘the first time for China to set up such a high-level coordination body with a foreign government’. While this was intended to show the special nature of China–Italy relations, China regularly engages in this kind of rhetoric when undertaking bilateral engagements, seeking to highlight the ‘special’ nature of the particular interlocutor. At the same time, Italy’s embrace of the narrative highlights Rome’s desire to show it has positive relations with China.
+
+#### ITALY AS A MIDDLE-POWER BRIDGE
+
+Russia and China have maintained relationships with Italy which seek to take advantage of its consistent desire to reap the international prestige and favourable business deals that come from acting as a bridge between the two countries and the West. This balance with Russia may have changed in the wake of the current war in Ukraine, which may lead to a reassessment of Italy’s ties with Russian companies and institutions for some time.
+
+According to a senior Italian MP from the Democratic Party (PD) speaking before recent events, ‘Italy’s view on Russia does not change according to the political colour of the government in charge; what changes is the narrative’. Over the last decade, Italy has had seven governments, all of which have tried to act as a bridge to Russia, putting forward an image of ‘mediators’ – a common narrative in Italian foreign policy and even more critical in the case of the relationship with Moscow. The latter actively encourages this narrative in its public discourse towards Rome. For instance, the Russian ambassador to Italy declared in a 2018 interview: ‘Russia is counting on the fact that Italy, based on our historical friendly relations, will play that role as a bridge with Europe to overcome current tensions ... We expect this mediating role to feature during the [next] European Council’. Relations with China are not dissimilar, with Italy sometimes presenting itself as a possible bridge between China and Europe. While it is not entirely clear that Rome has served this role, it suits Russia and China to be seen to engage with an influential European state, given their hostile relations with other Western countries.
+
+The ‘special relationship’ between Russia and Italy became more evident during the two governments led by Giuseppe Conte, a member of the Five Star Movement (5SM), between 2018 and 2021. The first government was a coalition with Lega, a right-wing party that until the invasion of Ukraine has openly promoted a strong pro-Russian agenda. Their agenda reflected the economic interests of northern Italy (where most of the companies doing business with Russia are located, and where Lega’s powerbase is strongest), as well as an instrumental alignment with Russia’s conservative values that was functional to his political use of religion, and – according to allegations under investigation by Italian prosecutors – Russian financial support.
+
+The economic element features strongly in the Lega–5SM alliance government’s anti-sanctions lobby. Both parties agreed on a _contratto di governo_ (contract of governance, a codification of their agreed points of policy) that, among other things, recognised the crucial role of Russia as ‘an increasingly important economic and trade partner’ and ‘potential partner for NATO and the EU’ and advocated the lifting of EU sanctions. In October, Salvini attended a gathering of the Russo-Italian business community organised by Confindustria (the Italian Industrial Federation); he denounced the ‘madness’ of Western sanctions against Russia and said that he felt ‘at home’ in Moscow, launching a fierce attack on the EU. Salvini knew he could count on broad anti-sanctions support among the Italian business community and continued to criticise sanctions until shortly before the invasion. Despite Russia’s obvious support for the goal of eliminating sanctions, the policy circles close to Moscow’s officialdom showed some constraint towards Salvini’s blunt declarations, which did not lead to any tangible results.
+
+China–Italy relations also show a roughly consistent pattern. An example is provided in the decision to sign an MoU on the BRI in 2019 – essentially, an agreement to do things together under the rubric of the BRI. Beijing had been keen to sign such a document with a major European country for some time as it provided an endorsement of Xi’s keynote foreign policy vision. In 2017, then Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni (a centre-left politician who is currently Italy’s representative to the European Commission) attended the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing as the most senior European representative. He described the initiative as ‘perhaps the most important infrastructure modernisation project underway in the world today’. He echoed views expressed by President Sergio Mattarella who had visited Beijing in February 2017 when he met with Xi. They discussed cooperation on a new Silk Road and Italy’s ability to help China get into the heart of Europe. Xi specifically referred to Italy as a power that could bridge China and the EU. The implicit trade-off suggested here was Italian assistance with Chinese efforts in Europe in exchange for trade, prosperity and investment offered under the BRI rubric. Consequently, it was of little surprise that two years later, Italy was at the front of the queue in Europe to sign an MoU for the BRI. Under Draghi, the narrative towards the BRI shifted with greater hesitancy and a push to engage with Western alternatives like the US’s Build Back Better World initiative.
+
+However, the actual signing of the BRI MoU reflects the confusing complexity of Italian politics in regard to China. Signed under a government whose general orientation was to engage with China, the document was pushed through at the behest of a senior minister within the coalition from the traditionally more Sinosceptic Lega, with Salvini’s approval. Italian leaders have consistently shown similar ambivalence towards China. For example, recently, Gentiloni echoed allies’ concerns about the signing of the BRI MoU, notably the security worries expressed by others and the damage it might do to Italy’s standing in Europe and with the US. This contrasted with his appearance as the most senior Western leader at the first Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, and the ‘road-to-50’ vision for China–Italy relations as they approached their 50th anniversary. When out of government in 2019, former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, who famously tried to sell his beloved Milan football team to Chinese owners and when in power signed the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement between Italy and China, had made fighting China a key plank in his push into Brussels politics. Even the consistently antagonistic Salvini, once out of office, appears to have had an additional about-face on China and engaged prominently with the Embassy.
+
+So far, the critical factor across Rome’s relations with both Moscow and Beijing is that the underlying political orientation will largely be towards engagement. However, there are rhetorical oscillations depending on the political context, related both to the Italian leadership’s Atlantic orientation and the wider international environment – namely, severed ties with Russia due to the invasion of Ukraine. Italy has sometimes become a useful tool for Russia and China when trying to show cracks in the Western alliance. It can appear to be more cautious towards China than Russia, though this is likely a product of a less direct link to Beijing than to Moscow (for example, Italy is very dependent on Russian gas – something that may now change – and lacks such critical dependencies with China whose geographical distance means it has always been a more remote partner). Furthermore, individual politicians have shown more consistently positive attitudes towards Russia than to China. It remains to be seen how permanent the fissure with Moscow will be in the wake of the Russia–Ukraine war. Italy has not seemed to lead European conversations about China (though has steered a line that matches European and US partners), but it has been robust in its condemnations of Russia from the very beginning of the invasion, likely a reflection of the more Atlanticist orientation of the just defenestrated Draghi government.
+
+
+### DEFENCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION
+
+Italy, Russia and China share some mutual security and strategic aims in key regions. This applies especially to Russia, which has stepped into an increasingly prominent role in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region since its military intervention in the Syrian conflict in 2015. While, for the most part, Italian interests tend to be aligned with those of NATO or the EU, there are divergences in certain areas, particularly North Africa, and Russia’s military and defence diplomacy in the MENA region have made the country an essential regional player. As a result, Russia has gained considerable leverage among Italian diplomats, for whom Russia’s diplomacy in the Middle East became ‘if not a model, at least a point of reference, thanks to its ability to have relations with all opposing parties’.
+
+Libya is probably the regional crisis where Italy has the biggest stake, in light of its colonial past, current energy interests and migration concerns. In recognition of Russia’s role in the Libyan crisis, Rome has tried to involve Moscow in its diplomatic initiatives, chiefly the Palermo conference in November 2018, despite the countries backing opposing sides. According to a politician from the PD, Rome relied heavily on Moscow to make Libyan General Khalifa Haftar participate in the conference, which legitimised Russia’s role in the eyes of other regional actors, granting a sort of ‘Italian pass’ to Russia.
+
+When it comes to defence, there is unsurprisingly little engagement between Italy and the two countries given Italy’s alliances and treaties with the US, the EU and NATO. An arms embargo with China is still in force due to the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, while sanctions and the invasion of Ukraine have further limited defence cooperation with Moscow.
+
+There is a certain level of diplomatic and technical engagement, but defence diplomacy is not a major feature of the relationships. A significant moment in Italy–Russia defence relations came in 2002 during the Berlusconi government when Italy hosted a NATO–Russia Summit, which was used to re-establish ties between the two adversaries. More recently, Italy–Russia defence relations were dealt a blow when it was revealed that an Italian navy captain was recruited by Russian intelligence and sold classified national and NATO documents, with Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio speaking of ‘an act of hostility’ and immediately expelling the two Russian officials based at the Embassy linked to the case. Contrary to other espionage events in which Russia has been caught out, the Kremlin did not immediately reciprocate and instead tried to downplay the event, with Russia’s Ambassador Sergey Razov remarking that ‘we hope that this incident will not negatively affect the overall constructive relations between our countries’. Eventually, the Kremlin expelled one Italian diplomat roughly a month after Italy expelled two Russian diplomats linked with the spy scandal.
+
+Major engagements or clashes linked to espionage do not play a similarly big role when it comes to China. High-profile security engagement has come in the form of Chinese police joining their Italian counterparts on patrol in Rome and Milan – ostensibly to provide support for the many Chinese tourists that come to Italy every year. It may also be to help Italian authorities develop their capabilities to police the growing Chinese communities in places like Prato. Serious organised crime within the wealthy Chinese community in Italy’s north has been identified as a problem, with links to state insitutions identified in the ‘River of Money’ (_Fiume di denaro_) investigation, which revealed that around €4.5 billion had been siphoned out of the country in tax evasion in a system that used the Bank of China’s Florence branch. More recently, police uncovered €200 million being sent from Padova to China, part of a much bigger investigation in which Chinese firms were openly flouting tax laws and using the Bank of China to send money back to China. These scandals were a source of some limited embarrassment to China.
+
+Where defence relations become more significant is in the case of arms and dual-use technology sectors. A report found that Italy and other EU states exported €346 million worth of arms to Russia between 2015 and 2020, despite the restrictions posed by EU sanctions. In 2021, Italy delivered €21.9 million worth of arms and ammunition to Russia. Italy’s defence industry seems willing to find ways of skirting around sanctions. A 2019 investigation accused Italian defence manufacturer Iveco of supplying light multirole vehicles to the Russian Defence Ministry. In March, Italian journalists spotted Russian forces using Iveco vehicles on the Ukrainian frontlines.
+
+Italy has had a science and technology relationship with China since its 1978 agreement. Since then, numerous agreements in this sector have been signed, including on the successful China Seismo-Electromagnetic Satellite, which aims to improve the capability to monitor natural disasters from space. Reflecting the high-level engagement in the project, Xi and Mattarella exchanged congratulatory notes and hoped for greater future cooperation between Italian and Chinese experts. However, Chinese firms are increasingly targeting Italian defence firms for acquisition. In 2012, Chinese firm SHIG-Weichai purchased 75% of Ferretti, predominantly an Italian luxury yacht maker but also a defence contractor. In October 2020, Conte went to the port of Taranto, where he announced that Ferretti (now 85% owned by SHIG-Weichai) was expanding its presence in the port, which was particularly sensitive given the nearby NATO base. This followed a report by the parliamentary oversight committee of the intelligence and security services, Copasir, which expressed concern about the project.
+
+Italian defence cooperation with China and Russia broadly adheres to the commitments and values of a NATO member. But in the defence industrial space, Italy has been a site for both Chinese and Russian acquisition of high-quality European equipment. While the government has sought to control this flow of technology, it is not clear how firmly this is being implemented, suggesting a relationship that is at least one of tacit acceptance or wilful ignorance in some cases. The recent case of military drone manufacturer Alpi Aviation – which was covertly purchased by a state-linked Chinese consortium – raised questions about oversight. While the deal was eventually reversed, there are concerns that some technology leakage may have taken place. This sort of an aggressive policy by Chinese firms is not surprising and is not necessarily part of an influence campaign, but rather is a reflection of the quality of Italian firms. Whether the sales were missed by oversight institutions on purpose, by accident, or as a result of influence is unknown. It is also the case that this general sort of behaviour and skirting of the rules is not anomalous for European firms, though the Italian case of Alpi Aviation does seem to be a particularly extreme one. It is not clear the degree to which the Russian or Chinese state have sought to exert excessive leverage through defence ties, recognising the clear benefits of pragmatically maintaining the existing wider relationship.
+
+
+### ECONOMICS
+
+Economic considerations play a large role in shaping Rome’s relations with Moscow and Beijing. Powerful and vocal financial lobbies in Italy actively promote their business interests to the Italian government and drive the trade relationship. Both China and Russia enjoy close economic ties with Italy, with China ranking fourth among Italy’s trade partners in 2021 and Russia occupying the 11th position on the same list. Russia has been one of Italy’s primary sources of energy, with around 40% of gas supplies delivered by Russian firm Gazprom. Although EU sanctions have not yet targeted gas at the time of writing, Italy is already looking to reduce its energy dependence on Moscow. Italy is not as dependent on China, though recent commercial deals suggest a growing penetration by Chinese firms into the Italian economy – in 2019, there were some 51,000 Chinese firms in Italy, of which 10,000 were in Lombardy. Since then, at least seven new investment deals have been inked by Chinese firms in Italy, with a known value of at least €270 million.
+
+Italian trade with both countries is complicated by sanctions and broader issues linked to the West’s turn against Moscow and Beijing. In 2013, before EU sanctions, the total trade exchange between Russia and Italy was €31 billion, while in 2019 (before the coronavirus pandemic) it was down to €22 billion (an increase on €8 billion in 2016). According to Italian figures, total trade with China was around €45 billion in 2020 (€12.9 billion export/€32.1 billion import), which was only slightly up from €44.6 billion in 2019 (export/import balance almost identical). These numbers have been on an upward trajectory since 2013, with imports from China, in particular, jumping by almost €10 billion during the same period and exports by a more modest €3 billion. In the overall scheme of Italian trading, imports from China are second only to Germany. While the volumes are substantial in absolute terms, they remain modest compared to Italian trading with European partners such as France or Germany. Italy’s dependence on China seems to be growing (particularly in terms of imports), while its trade with Russia may now decline in the wake of the invasion.
+
+However, Chinese investment into Italy is signficant. By the end of 2019, there were 405 Chinese or Hong Kong-based direct investment entities in Italy. In monetary terms, the flow from China to Italy increased from €573 million in 2015 to €4.9 billion in 2018 (in terms of Italian investment into China, the numbers dropped considerably from €237.7 million in 2016 to €1.4 million in 2020). The most significant goods for both export and investment were machines, while textiles and telecommunications products were the most significant imports. The overwhelming volume of these investments and exports are from Italy’s wealthy northern regions, with Lombardy, Emilia-Romagna, Veneto, Piemonte and Tuscany accounting for around 80% of the total in 2019. Lombardy is the biggest site of Chinese investment and entrepreneurs (around 45% of the overall total). That likely reflects Xi’s decision as vice-president to meet with the president of the Lombardy region on his 2011 visit to Italy, where he specifically highlighted the desire of Chinese investors to come to the region. The strategy of targeting Lombardy (one of the wealthiest parts of Europe) is one that has clearly had an effect, with the local chamber of commerce noting the volume of Chinese firms in the region had jumped by 18% between 2014 and 2019.
+
+#### ECONOMIC INFLUENCE?
+
+When it comes to anti-sanctions lobbying, the most impactful public activities are carried out mainly by Italian business associations such as Confindustria, the Italian–Russian Chamber of Commerce and the Lombardy–Russia Association. Prominent business figures also play a role, including Bank Intesa’s Russia president, Antonio Fallico, and former president of Confindustria and the Italian oil and gas group ENI, Emma Marcegaglia, who have publicly voiced their opposition to sanctions. Events, such as the ‘Eurasian seminars’ organised by the Roscongress Foundation and the St Petersburg International Economic Forum in collaboration with Bank Intesa, represent other substantial lobbying and networking opportunities for key Russian and Italian economic actors. But, according to a participant in the 2019 edition of the seminar, the event was more ‘a meeting between the Russian ambassador and the Italian business community’, organised ‘by Italians for Italians’. The participant even felt like one of the goals was to stress Fallico’s role as a ‘facilitator’ for Italian companies and a valuable partner for Moscow. The bulk of businesses and organisations lobbying for scrapping sanctions are in the north, especially Lombardy and Veneto, where economic ties with Russia are stronger: of the 434 Italian companies with at least one branch in Russia, 143 of them are in Lombardy, while Veneto comes second with 79 companies. In 2016, the ruling coalition in Veneto approved a resolution aiming to ‘promote the establishment of a committee against sanctions against Russia, for the recognition of Crimea’s self-determination right, and the defence of Venetian products’. As of 22 June 2022, only one Italian company (Assicurazioni Generali) has exited Russia completely due to the invasion; other companies have either temporarily suspended their operations (Ferrari, Prada), are holding off on new investments (Barilla, Bank Intesa) or simply continuing business as usual (Benetton, UniCredit).
+
+There is a much greater concern about the threat of China’s economic might in the wider Italian economy. On the one hand, in 2019, Confindustria expressed concerns about the imbalance in trade between China and Italy and the lack of reciprocal access to Chinese markets for Italian firms and products. They have called for greater European cooperation and echoed many of the sentiments visible from other industrial bodies in Europe that are worried about Chinese companies overwhelming their markets. The traditional core of the Italian economy is small to medium-sized enterprises, precisely the sort of firms that struggle to compete against globalisation and Chinese behemoths. Yet, shortly after Confindustria’s statement, the Italian government signed its MoU on the BRI – a decision which goes against the view of one of its main industrial representatives.
+
+The complaints about Chinese market control and sanctions against Russia emanate most strongly from Italy’s northern industrial heartland. For China and Russia, there is a natural interest in focusing on this part of Italy, as it generates most of the country’s economic activity. The critical question for this paper is the degree to which China and Russia see the economic relations here as a lever, which they can use to influence the overall strategic approach towards their respective countries.
+
+As noted above, powerful business figures have always played a significant role in Italian relations with both China and Russia. ENI’s boss Enrico Mattei was carving out deals for his firm in China and the Soviet Union long before the normalisation of relations. Cesare Romiti, the principal shareholder of Fiat, was part of the firm’s push into China in the 1970s, establishing a China–Italy Institute to help develop relations. Fiat-Chrysler has invested over €3.5 billion into China and has enjoyed an uptick in Chinese sales in recent years. Pirelli’s CEO, Marco Tronchetti Provera, allowed 45.5% of the firm to be bought by the Chinese state-owned firm ChemChina and BRI-specific state investment vehicle the Silk Road Fund. Tronchetti Provera is also a key player in the relaunch of the Italian–Russian Business Committee for Economic Cooperation, a joint Italian–Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiative that he has been chairing since 2020 together with Dmitry Konov, chairman of the management board of SIBUR Holding.
+
+This class of business leaders is likely a source of influence and connectivity between Italy, China and Russia and helps shape the political view towards Beijing and Moscow. Tronchetti Provera, for example, has supported projects focused on the Italy–China relationship and features regularly in the press discussing ties with China. When commenting on Draghi’s government and how it might change the Italy–China relationship, he focused on the fact that it seemed to encourage a greater European balance between the relationships with Beijing and Washington and praised the return to multilateralism.
+
+Rome’s proclivity towards engagement with both Beijing and Moscow is actively favoured by Italy’s powerful northern business elite. Yet, this support may stem from their assessments of business interests rather than active external influence campaigns or covert activity. For example, Tronchetti Provera’s sale of Pirelli to Chinese firms caused concerns in Italy at the time. However, it was something that was driven by economic opportunity, with him talking about having sought Japanese or Korean investors as well, but ultimately settling on terms he dictated with Chinese firms.
+
+
+### CULTURE AND THE MEDIA
+
+Italy has long been a significant attraction to Chinese tourists (generating considerable revenue for the country), though their interest is often more focused on shopping than culture. Russian tourists have also long favoured Italy’s resorts but the combination of sanctions and the closure of the EU airspace to Russian airlines and private jets has caused an abrupt decrease in tourist numbers. Moreover, while there are state-sponsored Russian and Chinese cultural institutes in Italy, it is not clear that they have any broader goal than their stated one of helping with culture and language and what soft power might flow from that.
+
+Russia’s more significant soft power tools are narratives focused on anti-American and anti-globalisation sentiment; and separately, conservative and religious values. Anti-Americanism is a powerful narrative used by Russia to influence people from both far-right and far-left backgrounds. In Italy, as with other major European powers, anti-American attitudes are widespread and connected to both the US government’s unpopular actions (such as the invasion of Iraq) and deeply rooted country-specific anti-American traditions in some groups such as Italy’s radical left. Over 17% of Italians surveyed in March/April 2022 blamed NATO for the conflict in Ukraine. Russia’s conservative narratives, on the other hand, attract far-right conservative parties across Europe. Despite its anti-liberal and anti-EU narratives, or perhaps in virtue of them, Russia frames itself as part of the European community, a vital member of a ‘true Europe’ based on a common Christian identity. There may have also been concrete actions in support of conservative groups in Italy. In spring 2019, Italian journalists reported that the World Congress of Families in Verona received financial support from the oligarch Konstantin Malofeev, one of the richest men in Russia, who was also involved in the reports about Russian money going to the Lega. The Congress brought together Russian Orthodox nationalists, American evangelical conservatives and Italian ultra-Catholics with Lega’s political support to advance an anti-abortion, anti-divorce and anti-gay agenda.
+
+In the media space, both China and Russia have sought influence. Russia has appeared to attempt disinformation campaigns, for example, during the 2019 European Parliament elections, though there is limited evidence regarding the scope or impact of the operation. After the invasion of Ukraine, the EU Council suspended RT and Sputnik’s broadcasting in the EU. Sputnik, unlike RT, used to offer dedicated programming in Italian, but its audience was limited – in February 2021, its YouTube page, now taken down, had less than 50,000 followers (three times less than Sputnik Turkey, for example). However, the Italian media landscape remains vulnerable to Russian disinformation. In May 2022, Copasir launched an investigation into Russian commentators who have appeared on Italian TV programmes and are suspected of being on Putin’s payroll. Chinese state broadcasters have a long history of establishing content-sharing relationships with their Italian counterparts – for example, between Ansa (Italy’s largest news agency) and Xinhua (the Chinese state media organ). Still, it is unclear how effective they are in influencing the Italian public.
+
+Both China and Russia used the pandemic as an opportunity to promote their narratives, and Italy was a target. Sputnik V, the only Covid-19 vaccine with its own Facebook page, YouTube channel and Twitter handle (at least at the time of writing), also turned into an ‘unlikely new social media star’ through its bold communication campaigns. The Russian Foreign Ministry’s website highlighted positively San Marino, a microstate completely enclosed by Italy, when it elected to use Sputnik V to mark the difference with the more chaotic vaccine situation in Italy.
+
+China’s efforts were more focused on advancing a positive vision of China, and attempting to capture the social media airwaves of pandemic discourse in Italy and promote China’s supportive role. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in particular, sought to highlight what China was doing to support Italy as the first European power to be hit badly by the coronavirus pandemic, though it later emerged some of the videos being circulated and promoted by officials were fake. Chinese state media’s attempt to deflect blame for the outbreak of the virus saw it suggest Italy was the origin point. This generated an angry tirade from Matteo Salvini, and spoke of a broader growing mistrust towards China.
+
+China has attempted through fairly blunt measures to influence the Italian debate on China. In November 2019, the Chinese Ambassador Li Junhua protested loudly after a bipartisan event was held at the senate in which Hong Kong protest leader Joshua Wong was brought in as a speaker online. The ambassador’s protest drew condemnation from across the board, including the government. Public protests related to Hong Kong at around the same time were plagued by counter-protests in which angry Chinese nationalists chased and threatened pro-Hong Kong supporters in Milan. It was not clear that the embassy or consulate in Milan were involved, though their online profiles were drawn into subsequent online discussions seeking to punish the pro-Hong Kong protesters. More clearly linked to the Chinese embassy was a formal letter sent to the municipality in Brescia calling on them to cancel an exhibit that was being held by Chinese dissident artist Badiucao, which merely ended up promoting the event.
+
+These counterproductive efforts by the embassy to stifle debate have been matched by similarly uninspired attempts to advance pro-China narratives. An example of this emerged in June 2021 when the influential founder of 5SM, Beppe Grillo, posted a report entitled ‘Xinjiang: Understanding Complexity, Building Peace’. The report largely echoed Chinese talking points about what was going on in Xinjiang and loudly pushed back on the genocide narratives and sanctions policies being pushed through by European governments (including Italy) at the time. With no single author, the report relied heavily on Chinese official sources and was instead credited to a list of European experts, Grillo and a 5SM Senator, Vito Petrocelli, who was then president of the Senate’s Foreign Affairs Committee. It was unclear how the report had been funded, or whom it was aimed at influencing, but it was attacked in the Italian press. It was, however, promoted by US alternative news outlet Grayzone, which has regularly disseminated Chinese and Russian disinformation campaigns. Perhaps more influential was an article published by former undersecretary of state at the Ministry of Economic Development, Michele Geraci, who in 2021 went on a Chinese government-sponsored visit to Xinjiang, publishing articles and media afterwards.
+
+China and Russia have been accused of working together in the information domain. China has been learning from Russian disinformation techniques and spreading conflicting conspiracy theories: ‘both China and Russia have worked not to spread a single specific story and convey the idea that the truth is unknowable’. Both states are accused of spreading a narrative on a sloppy and patchy EU coronavirus response. Copasir specifically denounced Russia and China’s ‘infodemic’ during the crisis, highlighting recurrent themes such as disorders in supermarkets, the government’s inefficiency, but also explicit migration references, which often manipulated the truth.
+
+While there seems to be evidence that China’s and Russia’s campaigns have had short-term effects (such as media resonance, or among individual politicians), it is not clear that it has generated the change in national behaviour that Beijing and Moscow wanted (if that is what was sought). It is possible that individual relations have been cultivated of senior figures which could then be manipulated to China’s or Russia’s favour, but it is not clear that the narratives that are being advanced by the individuals are ones that they are promoting out of external influence or their own belief.
+
+
+### CONCLUSION
+
+As a G7, NATO and EU member, Italy is a significant player on the world stage in institutions currently hostile to China and Russia. Yet, Rome has consistently demonstrated a willingness to engage with both countries, act as a bridge and consequently potentially undermine Western cohesion. What is harder to understand is the degree to which this willingness to engage is a product of influence campaigns by Beijing and Moscow or Italian geopolitical pragmatism and strategic hedging. Moreover, although it is hard to assess the long-term impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Italy’s strong condemnation of Russia’s actions so far points to a rethinking regarding its ties with Moscow, despite public attitudes to the war and the continued interest of Italian businesses in maintaining relations. However, the breakup of Draghi’s government coalition in July 2022 exposes the tensions and divergences in Italy’s wider politics, as well as its relationship with Russia in particular. Hence, it remains to be seen whether this is a permanent shift or something which may yet be reversed with a change of political power or economic hardship as a result of the cost of living crisis precipitated by the invasion.
+
+It seems that economic relations, often driven by the interests of large Italian industrial groups, provide a strong underlying basis for the default mode in Italian foreign policy of continued engagement. The web of business contacts brings consistency to relationships that the more variable Italian political system may not. The current government appears more focused on strengthening Italy’s role in Western institutions than its predecessor, leading to greater pushback against China in particular and, more recently, Russia.
+
+However, the key question is how much any of China’s or Russia’s activity in Italy can be characterised as effective influence or interference operations. From the available information, it is difficult to ascribe Rome’s choices to external influence, rather than a longstanding Italian foreign policy approach of trying to take a middle path in its relations; staying friendly with both the US and European allies, while at the same time maintaining positive relations with Moscow and Beijing. In this context, the country’s industrial class – mostly in Italy’s wealthy northern regions – functions as an influential constituency that favours keeping doors open with China and Russia. There is a similar tendency within the political class, with some groups with more dogmatic views on China or Russia (both positive and negative) making these choices for their domestic political calculations rather than direct external influence.
+
+Historically, Russia appears to see Italy as a more significant partner than China does. While Beijing is appreciative of Rome’s useful role in appearing to weaken transatlantic alliances against China, the Politburo seems relatively disinterested in Italy – something that is testified by the limited number of visits by paramount Chinese leaders to Italy. During the early days of the pandemic, there was a focus by China on Italy, but this seemed pragmatic and ultimately did not lead to a major change in perspectives. Economic relations appear driven by industrial interests, which serves broader government goals of improving the Chinese industrial and technological base as part of the Made in China 2025 national economic vision and, more simply, good economic opportunities for cash-rich Chinese firms. In contrast, Putin has frequently and overtly sought to use Rome to prove the lack of uniformity in European (or transatlantic) views towards Russia.
+
+This paper’s key conclusion is that Italy continues to be able to maintain considerable agency in its relations between China and Russia. While it is clear both powers have strong links into the country, and have used Italy as a conduit to acceptance on the wider international level, Rome has seemed a willing partner. This is something that reflects the approach taken both to China and Russia by a number of major European powers. The degree to which these decisions have been shaped by external influence or interference is very difficult to gauge in aggregate, though some individual cases do shine through. However, what is equally clear is that the transatlantic alliance remains a cornerstone in governmental strategic thinking, meaning Italy’s choices are unlikely to ever completely contradict its transatlantic partners. At the same time, it is equally unlikely that Italy will ever seek to completely sever relations with China and Russia – a decision that is driven principally by national strategic thinking as opposed to external influence or interference.
+
+---
+
+__Raffaello Pantucci__ is a Senior Associate Fellow at RUSI and was formerly Director of International Security Studies. He is a Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. His research focuses on terrorism and counterterrorism as well as China’s relations with its Western neighbours. He currently spends his time between London and Singapore.
+
+__Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti__ is a researcher at the Russia, Caucasus and Central Asia Centre at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI). She has previously served as Marie Curie Fellow at the Middle East Technical University (METU) in Ankara, Turkey, where she also obtained a PhD in International Relations. She has lived, studied or carried out research in Brussels, Barcelona, Yerevan, Saint Petersburg and Northern Cyprus.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-16-road-to-war.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-16-road-to-war.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..50bb9160
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-16-road-to-war.md
@@ -0,0 +1,434 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Road To War
+author: Shane Harris, et al.
+date : 2022-08-16 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/bpNCPQX.png
+#image_caption:
+description: "Road to war: U.S. struggled to convince allies, and Zelensky, of risk of invasion"
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_On a sunny October morning, the nation’s top intelligence, military and diplomatic leaders filed into the Oval Office for an urgent meeting with President Biden. They arrived bearing a highly classified intelligence analysis, compiled from newly obtained satellite images, intercepted communications and human sources, that amounted to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war plans for a full-scale invasion of Ukraine._
+
+
+
+For months, Biden administration officials had watched warily as Putin massed tens of thousands of troops and lined up tanks and missiles along Ukraine’s borders. As summer waned, Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser, had focused on the increasing volume of intelligence related to Russia and Ukraine. He had set up the Oval Office meeting after his own thinking had gone from uncertainty about Russia’s intentions, to concern he was being too skeptical about the prospects of military action, to alarm.
+
+The session was one of several meetings that officials had about Ukraine that autumn — sometimes gathering in smaller groups — but was notable for the detailed intelligence picture that was presented. Biden and Vice President Harris took their places in armchairs before the fireplace, while Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, joined the directors of national intelligence and the CIA on sofas around the coffee table.
+
+Tasked by Sullivan with putting together a comprehensive overview of Russia’s intentions, they told Biden that the intelligence on Putin’s operational plans, added to ongoing deployments along the border with Ukraine, showed that all the pieces were now in place for a massive assault.
+
+The U.S. intelligence community had penetrated multiple points of Russia’s political leadership, spying apparatus and military, from senior levels to the front lines, according to U.S. officials.
+
+Much more radical than Moscow’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and instigation of a separatist movement in eastern Ukraine, Putin’s war plans envisioned a takeover of most of the country.
+
+Using mounted maps on easels in front of the Resolute Desk, Milley showed Russian troop positions and the Ukrainian terrain they intended to conquer. It was a plan of staggering audacity, one that could pose a direct threat to NATO’s eastern flank, or even destroy the post-World War II security architecture of Europe.
+
+As he absorbed the briefing, Biden, who had taken office promising to keep the country out of new wars, was determined that Putin must either be deterred or confronted, and that the United States must not act alone. Yet NATO was far from unified on how to deal with Moscow, and U.S. credibility was weak. After a disastrous occupation of Iraq, the chaos that followed the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, and four years of President Donald Trump seeking to undermine the alliance, it was far from certain that Biden could effectively lead a Western response to an expansionist Russia.
+
+Ukraine was a troubled former Soviet republic with a history of corruption, and the U.S. and allied answer to earlier Russian aggression there had been uncertain and divided. When the invasion came, the Ukrainians would need significant new weaponry to defend themselves. Too little could guarantee a Russian victory. But too much might provoke a direct NATO conflict with nuclear-armed Russia.
+
+This account, in previously unreported detail, shines new light on the uphill climb to restore U.S. credibility, the attempt to balance secrecy around intelligence with the need to persuade others of its truth, and the challenge of determining how the world’s most powerful military alliance would help a less-than-perfect democracy on Russia’s border defy an attack without NATO firing a shot.
+
+The first in a series of articles examining the road to war and the military campaign in Ukraine, it is drawn from in-depth interviews with more than three dozen senior U.S., Ukrainian, European and NATO officials about a global crisis whose end is yet to be determined. Some spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive intelligence and internal deliberations.
+
+The Kremlin did not respond to repeated requests for comment.
+
+As Milley laid out the array of forces on that October morning, he and the others summed up Putin’s intentions. “We assess that they plan to conduct a significant strategic attack on Ukraine from multiple directions simultaneously,” Milley told the president. “Their version of ‘shock and awe.’ ”
+
+According to the intelligence, the Russians would come from the north, on either side of Kyiv. One force would move east of the capital through the Ukrainian city of Chernihiv, while the other would flank Kyiv on the west, pushing southward from Belarus through a natural gap between the “exclusion zone” at the abandoned Chernobyl nuclear plant and surrounding marshland. The attack would happen in the winter so that the hard earth would make the terrain easily passable for tanks. Forming a pincer around the capital, Russian troops planned to seize Kyiv in three to four days. The Spetsnaz, their special forces, would find and remove President Volodymyr Zelensky, killing him if necessary, and install a Kremlin-friendly puppet government.
+
+Separately, Russian forces would come from the east and drive through central Ukraine to the Dnieper River, while troops from Crimea took over the southeastern coast. Those actions could take several weeks, the Russian plans predicted.
+
+
+_▲ __Control areas as of July 22.__ Sources: Institute for the Study of War, AEI’s Critical Threats Project, Post reporting_
+
+After pausing to regroup and rearm, they would next push westward, toward a north-south line stretching from Moldova to western Belarus, leaving a rump Ukrainian state in the west — an area that in Putin’s calculus was populated by irredeemable neo-Nazi Russophobes.
+
+The United States had obtained “extraordinary detail” about the Kremlin’s secret plans for a war it continued to deny it intended, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines later explained. They included not only the positioning of troops and weaponry and operational strategy, but also fine points such as Putin’s “unusual and sharp increases in funding for military contingency operations and for building up reserve forces even as other pressing needs, such as pandemic response, were under-resourced,” she said. This was no mere exercise in intimidation, unlike a large-scale Russian deployment in April, when Putin’s forces had menaced Ukraine’s borders but never attacked.
+
+Some in the White House found it hard to wrap their minds around the scale of the Russian leader’s ambitions.
+
+“It did not seem like the kind of thing that a rational country would undertake,” one participant in the meeting later said of the planned occupation of most of a country of 232,000 square miles and nearly 45 million people. Parts of Ukraine were deeply anti-Russian, raising the specter of an insurgency even if Putin toppled the government in Kyiv. And yet the intelligence showed that more and more troops were arriving and settling in for a full campaign. Munitions, food and crucial supplies were being deposited at Russian encampments.
+
+Biden pressed his advisers. Did they really think that this time Putin was likely to strike?
+
+Yes, they affirmed. This is real. Although the administration would publicly insist over the next several months that it did not believe Putin had made a final decision, the only thing his team couldn’t tell the president that autumn day was exactly when the Russian president would pull the trigger.
+
+CIA Director William J. Burns, who had served as U.S. ambassador to Moscow and had had the most direct interactions with Putin of anyone in the Biden administration, described the Russian leader to the others as fixated on Ukraine. Control over the country was synonymous with Putin’s concept of Russian identity and authority. The precision of the war planning, coupled with Putin’s conviction that Ukraine should be reabsorbed by the motherland, left him with no doubts that Putin was prepared to invade.
+
+“I believed he was quite serious,” Burns said months later, recalling the briefing.
+
+
+### II
+
+The intelligence had underscored the promise of Putin’s own words. Three months earlier, in July, he had published a 7,000-word essay, “On the Historical Unity Between Russians and Ukrainians,” suffused with grievance and dubious assertions. Russians and Ukrainians, he argued, were “one people” — an idea rooted in Putin’s claims about “blood ties” — and Moscow had been “robbed” of its own territory by a scheming West.
+
+“I am confident that true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia,” Putin wrote.
+
+Just weeks before the essay appeared, Biden and Putin had held a June 16 summit that both declared was “constructive.” At that point, Ukraine was a concern, but one that White House officials felt could be dealt with. As the White House delegation left the meeting, held in Geneva, a senior Biden aide would later recall, “we didn’t get on the plane and come home and think the world was on the cusp of a major war in Europe.”
+
+But Putin’s subsequent publication “caught our attention in a big way,” Sullivan later said. “We began to look at what’s going on here, what’s his end game? How hard is he going to push?” As a precaution, on Aug. 27, Biden authorized that $60 million in largely defensive weapons be drawn from U.S. inventories and sent to Ukraine.
+
+By late summer, as they pieced together the intelligence from the border and from Moscow, analysts who had spent their careers studying Putin were increasingly convinced the Russian leader — himself a former intelligence officer — saw a window of opportunity closing. Ukrainians had already twice risen up to demand a democratic future, free from corruption and Moscow’s interference, during the 2004-2005 Orange Revolution, and the 2013-2014 Maidan protests that preceded Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
+
+While not a member of NATO or the European Union, Ukraine was now moving steadily into the Western political, economic and cultural orbit. That drift fed Putin’s broader resentment about Russia’s loss of empire.
+
+In a grim actuarial assessment, the analysts concluded that Putin, who was about to turn 69, understood that he was running out of time to cement his legacy as one of Russia’s great leaders — the one who had restored Russian preeminence on the Eurasian continent.
+
+The analysts said Putin calculated that any Western response to an attempt to reclaim Ukraine by force would be big on outrage but limited in actual punishment. The Russian leader, they said, believed that the Biden administration was chastened by the humiliating U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and wanted to avoid new wars. The United States and Europe were still struggling through the coronavirus pandemic. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the de facto European leader, was leaving office and handing power to an untested successor. French President Emmanuel Macron was facing a reelection battle against a resurgent right wing, and Britain was suffering from a post-Brexit economic downturn. Large parts of the continent depended on Russian oil and natural gas, which Putin thought he could use as a wedge to split the Western alliance. He had built up hundreds of billions of dollars in cash reserves and was confident the Russian economy could weather the inevitable sanctions, as it had in the past.
+
+Presented with the new intelligence and analysis at the October briefing, Biden “basically had two reactions,” Sullivan said. First, to try to deter Putin, they “needed to send somebody to Moscow to sit with the Russians at a senior level and tell them: ‘If you do this, these will be the consequences.’ ”
+
+Second, they needed to brief allies on the U.S. intelligence and bring them on board with what the administration believed should be a unified and severe posture of threatened sanctions against Russia, reinforcement and expansion of NATO defenses, and assistance for Ukraine.
+
+Burns was dispatched to Moscow and Haines to NATO headquarters in Brussels.
+
+Months later, Milley still carried in his briefcase note cards encapsulating the U.S. interests and strategic objectives discussed at the October briefing. He could recite them off the top of his head.
+
+Problem: “How do you underwrite and enforce the rules-based international order” against a country with extraordinary nuclear capability, “without going to World War III?”
+
+No. 1: “Don’t have a kinetic conflict between the U.S. military and NATO with Russia.” No. 2: “Contain war inside the geographical boundaries of Ukraine.” No. 3: “Strengthen and maintain NATO unity.” No. 4: “Empower Ukraine and give them the means to fight.”
+
+Biden’s advisers were confident Ukraine would put up a fight. The United States, Britain and other NATO members had spent years training and equipping the Ukrainian military, which was more professional and better organized than before Russia’s assault on Crimea and the eastern region of Donbas seven years earlier. But the training had focused nearly as much on how to mount internal resistance after a Russian occupation as on how to prevent it in the first place. The weapons they had supplied were primarily small-bore and defensive so that they wouldn’t be seen as a Western provocation.
+
+The administration also had grave concerns about Ukraine’s young president, a former television comic who had come into office on a huge wave of popular support and desire for fundamental change but had lost public standing in part because he failed to make good on a promise to make peace with Russia. Zelensky, 44, appeared to be no match for the ruthless Putin.
+
+Math was not in Ukraine’s favor. Russia had more troops, more tanks, more artillery, more fighter jets and guided missiles, and had demonstrated in previous conflicts its willingness to pummel its weaker adversaries into submission, with no regard for the loss of civilian lives.
+
+Kyiv might not fall as quickly as the Russians expected, the Americans concluded, but it would fall.
+
+
+### III
+
+On Nov. 2, Burns was escorted into the Kremlin office of Yuri Ushakov, Putin’s foreign policy adviser and a former ambassador to the United States. Ushakov’s boss was on the other end of a phone line and spoke to Burns from the resort city of Sochi, where he had retreated during another wave of coronavirus infections in Moscow.
+
+The Russian leader recited his usual complaints about NATO expansion, the threat to Russian security, and illegitimate leadership in Ukraine.
+
+“He was very dismissive of President Zelensky as a political leader,” Burns recalled.
+
+Practiced at listening to Putin’s tirades from his years in Moscow, Burns delivered his own forceful message: The United States knows what you’re up to, and if you invade Ukraine, you will pay a huge price. He said he was leaving a letter from Biden, affirming the punishing consequences of any Russian attack on Ukraine.
+
+Putin “was very matter-of-fact,” Burns said. He didn’t deny the intelligence that pointed toward a Russian invasion of Ukraine.
+
+The CIA director also met with another of Putin’s advisers, Nikolai Patrushev, an ex-KGB officer, from Putin’s hometown of St. Petersburg, who ran Russia’s Security Council.
+
+Patrushev had thought Burns flew to Moscow to discuss the next meeting between Putin and Biden and seemed surprised that the CIA chief had come bearing a warning about Ukraine.
+
+He almost exactly echoed Putin’s grievances about history and NATO in his discussions with Burns. There seemed to be no room for meaningful engagement, and it left the CIA director to wonder if Putin and his tight circle of aides had formed their own echo chamber. Putin had not made an irreversible decision to go to war, but his views on Ukraine had hardened, his appetite for risk had grown, and the Russian leader believed his moment of opportunity would soon pass.
+
+“My level of concern has gone up, not down,” the spy chief reported back to Biden.
+
+
+### IV
+
+As Burns was speaking with Putin, Blinken was sitting down with Zelensky, in Glasgow, Scotland, on the sidelines of an international summit on climate change. He laid out the intelligence picture and described the Russian storm that was heading Ukraine’s way.
+
+“It was just the two of us, two feet from each other,” Blinken recalled. It was a “difficult conversation.”
+
+Blinken had met before with the Ukrainian president and thought he knew him well enough to speak candidly, although it seemed surreal to be “telling someone you believe their country is going to be invaded.”
+
+He found Zelensky “serious, deliberate, stoic,” a combination of belief and disbelief. He said he would brief his senior teams. But the Ukrainians had “seen a number of Russian feints in the past,” Blinken knew, and Zelensky was clearly worried about economic collapse if his country panicked.
+
+Blinken’s presentation, and Zelensky’s skepticism, set a pattern that would be repeated both privately and in public over the next several months. The Ukrainians could not afford to reject U.S. intelligence wholesale. But from their perspective, the information was speculative.
+
+Zelensky heard the U.S. warnings, he later recalled, but said the Americans weren’t offering the kinds of weapons Ukraine needed to defend itself.
+
+“You can say a million times, ‘Listen, there may be an invasion.’ Okay, there may be an invasion — will you give us planes?” Zelensky said. “Will you give us air defenses? ‘Well, you’re not a member of NATO.’ Oh, okay, then what are we talking about?”
+
+The Americans offered little specific intelligence to support their warnings “until the last four or five days before the invasion began,” according to Dmytro Kuleba, Zelensky’s foreign minister.
+
+Less than two weeks after the Glasgow meeting, when Kuleba and Andriy Yermak, Zelensky’s chief of staff, visited the State Department in Washington, a senior U.S. official greeted them with a cup of coffee and a smile. “Guys, dig the trenches!” the official began.
+
+“When we smiled back,” Kuleba recalled, the official said, “ ‘I’m serious. Start digging trenches. … You will be attacked. A large-scale attack, and you have to prepare for it.’ We asked for details; there were none.”
+
+If the Americans became frustrated at Ukraine’s skepticism about Russia’s plans, the Ukrainians were no less disconcerted at the increasingly public U.S. warnings that an invasion was coming.
+
+“We had to strike a balance between realistically assessing the risks and preparing the country for the worst … and keeping the country running economically and financially,” Kuleba said. “Every comment coming from the United States about the unavoidability of war was immediately reflected in the [Ukrainian] currency exchange rate.”
+
+A number of U.S. officials have disputed Ukrainian recollections, saying they provided the Kyiv government with specific intelligence early on and throughout the lead-up to the invasion.
+
+Yet when it came to Ukraine, U.S. intelligence was hardly an open book. Official guidance prohibited the spy agencies from sharing tactical information that Ukraine could use to launch offensive attacks on Russian troop locations in Crimea or against Kremlin-backed separatists in the east.
+
+Ukraine’s own intelligence apparatus was also shot through with Russian moles, and U.S. officials were leery of sensitive information ending up in Moscow’s hands. After the war began, the Biden administration changed its policy and shared information on Russian troop movements throughout Ukraine, on the grounds that the country was now defending itself from an invasion.
+
+
+### V
+
+At a side meeting during the Group of 20 conference in Rome at the end of October, Biden shared some of the new intelligence and conclusions with America’s closest allies — the leaders of Britain, France and Germany.
+
+In mid-November, Haines used a previously scheduled trip to Brussels to brief a wider circle of allies: NATO’s North Atlantic Council, the principal decision-making body of the 30-member alliance. Speaking in a large auditorium, she limited her remarks to what the intelligence community believed the evidence showed, and didn’t offer policy recommendations.
+
+“A number of members raised questions and were skeptical of the idea that President Putin was seriously preparing for the possibility of a large-scale invasion,” Haines recalled.
+
+French and German officials couldn’t understand why Putin would try to invade and occupy a large country with just the 80,000 to 90,000 troops believed to be massed on the border. Satellite imagery also showed the troops moving back and forth from the frontier. Others posited that the Russians were performing an exercise, as the Kremlin itself insisted, or playing a shell game designed to conceal a purpose short of invasion.
+
+Most were doubtful, and noted that Zelensky seemed to think Russia would never attack with the ambition and force the Americans were forecasting. Didn’t Ukraine understand Russia’s intentions best?
+
+Only the British and the Baltic states were fully on board. At one point, an official from London stood up and gestured toward Haines. “She’s right,” the official said.
+
+But Paris and Berlin remembered emphatic U.S. claims about intelligence on Iraq. The shadow of that deeply flawed analysis hung over all the discussions before the invasion. Some also felt that Washington, just months earlier, had vastly overestimated the resilience of Afghanistan’s government as the U.S. military was withdrawing. The government had collapsed as soon as the Taliban entered Kabul.
+
+“American intelligence is not considered to be a naturally reliable source,” said François Heisbourg, a security expert and longtime adviser to French officials. “It was considered to be prone to political manipulation.”
+
+The Europeans began to settle into camps that would change little for several months.
+
+“I think there were basically three flavors,” a senior administration official said. To many in Western Europe, what the Russians were doing was “all coercive diplomacy, [Putin] was just building up to see what he could get. He’s not going to invade … it’s crazy.”
+
+Many of NATO’s newer members in eastern and southeastern Europe thought Putin “may do something, but it would be limited in scope,” the official said, “ … another bite at the [Ukrainian] apple,” similar to what happened in 2014.
+
+But Britain and the Baltic states, which were always nervous about Russian intentions, believed a full-scale invasion was coming.
+
+When skeptical member states asked for more intelligence, the Americans provided some, but held back from sharing it all.
+
+Historically, the United States rarely revealed its most sensitive intelligence to an organization as diverse as NATO, primarily for fear that secrets could leak. While the Americans and their British partners did share a significant amount of information, they withheld the raw intercepts or nature of the human sources that were essential to determining Putin’s plans. That especially frustrated French and German officials, who had long suspected that Washington and London sometimes hid the basis of their intelligence to make it seem more definitive than it really was.
+
+Some of the alliance countries provided their own findings, Haines said. The United States also created new mechanisms for sharing information in real time with their foreign partners in Brussels. Austin, Blinken and Milley were on the phone to their counterparts, sharing, listening, cajoling.
+
+Over time, one senior European official at NATO recalled, “the intelligence was narrated repeatedly, consistently, clearly, credibly, in a lot of detail with a very good script and supporting evidence. I don’t remember one key moment where the lightbulb went off” in the months-long effort to convince the allies, the official said. Ultimately, “it was the volume of the lights in the room.”
+
+
+### VI
+
+Macron and Merkel had been dealing with Putin for years and found it hard to believe he was so irrational as to launch a calamitous war. In the weeks after Biden’s Geneva meeting, they had tried to arrange an E.U.-Russia summit, only to be shot down by skeptical members of the bloc who saw it as a dangerous concession to Russia’s aggressive posture.
+
+Months later, despite the new U.S. intelligence, the French and Germans insisted there was a chance for diplomacy. The Americans and the British had little hope that any diplomatic effort would pay off, but were prepared to keep the door open — if the Europeans gave something in return.
+
+“A big part of our focus,” recalled Sullivan, “was basically to say to them, ‘Look, we’ll take the diplomatic track and treat it [as] serious … if you will take the planning for [military] force posture and sanctions seriously.’ ”
+
+Each side was convinced it was right but was willing to proceed as if it might be wrong.
+
+Over the next several months, the Americans strove to show the Western Europeans and others that they were still willing to search for a peaceful resolution, even though in the back of their minds, they were convinced that any Russian efforts at negotiation were a charade. “It basically worked,” Sullivan said of the administration strategy.
+
+On Dec. 7, Putin and Biden spoke on a video call. Putin claimed that the eastward expansion of the Western alliance was a major factor in his decision to send troops to Ukraine’s border. Russia was simply protecting its own interests and territorial integrity, he argued.
+
+Biden responded that Ukraine was unlikely to join NATO any time soon, and that the United States and Russia could come to agreements on other concerns Russia had about the placement of U.S. weapons systems in Europe. In theory, there was room to compromise.
+
+For a while, as Blinken headed the U.S. diplomatic effort with repeated visits to NATO capitals and alliance headquarters in Brussels, the Ukrainians continued their contacts with European governments that still seemed far less convinced of Putin’s intentions than the Americans were.
+
+Kuleba and others in the government believed there would be a war, the Ukrainian foreign minister later said. But until the eve of the invasion, “I could not believe that we would face a war of such scale. The only country in the world that was persistently telling us” with such certainty “that there would be missile strikes was the United States of America. … Every other country was not sharing this analysis and [instead was] saying, yes, war is possible, but it will be rather a localized conflict in the east of Ukraine.”
+
+“Put yourself in our shoes,” Kuleba said. “You have, on the one hand, the U.S. telling you something completely unimaginable, and everyone else blinking an eye to you and saying this is not what we think is going to happen.”
+
+In fact, the British and some Baltic officials believed a full invasion was probable. But Kuleba was far from alone in his skepticism. His president shared it, according to Zelensky’s aides and other officials who briefed him.
+
+“We took all of the information that our Western partners were giving us seriously,” recalled Yermak, Zelensky’s chief of staff. “But let’s be honest: Imagine if all of this panic that so many people were pushing had taken place. Creating panic is a method of the Russians. … Imagine if this panic had started three or four months beforehand. What would’ve happened to the economy? Would we have been able to hold on for five months like we have?”
+
+
+### VII
+
+In early January, Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman led a diplomatic delegation to Geneva and met with Sergei Ryabkov, her Russian counterpart, whom she knew well. He reiterated Moscow’s position on Ukraine, formally offered in mid-December in two proposed treaties — that NATO must end its expansion plans and halt any activity in countries that had joined the alliance after 1997, which included Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic states.
+
+Rejecting the proposal to close NATO’s doors and reduce the status of existing members, the administration instead offered talks and trust-building measures in a number of security areas, including the deployment of troops and the placement of weapons on NATO’s eastern flank along the border with Russia. The offer was conditioned on de-escalation of the military threat to Ukraine. Ryabkov told Sherman that Russia was disappointed in the American attitude.
+
+The White House had envisioned Sherman’s meeting with Ryabkov as “a chance to test whether the Russians were serious about the substance of the concerns … and if there was a way forward for any kind of diplomacy,” said Emily Horne, then the spokesperson for the National Security Council. “I think it became pretty clear, pretty quickly that [the Russians] were performing diplomacy, not actually undertaking diplomacy. They weren’t even doing it with much seriousness.”
+
+“All the Western allies wanted to convey that there was an alternative path involving dialogue and respect for Russia as a great power,” said a senior British government official involved in negotiations. “What became increasingly clear was that Russia was not interested in those.”
+
+As the United States pursued the diplomatic track, it also positioned forces to defend NATO, all of them visible to Moscow and to Europeans and demonstrating American willingness to put skin in the game. While Biden repeatedly said there would be no U.S. troops in Ukraine, the Pentagon increased pre-positioned weapons stocks in Poland and moved a helicopter battalion there from Greece. Paratroops from the 173rd Airborne were deployed to the Baltic states. More troops were sent from Italy to eastern Romania, and others went to Hungary and Bulgaria.
+
+Over the next several months, the U.S. military presence in Europe increased from 74,000 to 100,000 troops. Four airborne fighter squadrons became 12, and the number of surface combatant ships in the region increased from five to 26. Combat air patrols and surveillance were flying 24/7 missions over the alliance’s eastern flank, with visibility deep inside Ukraine.
+
+“We were saying, ‘Look, we’re taking diplomacy seriously, but we’re so worried about this that we’re actually moving men and material,’ ” Sullivan recalled.
+
+With National Security Agency authorization, the United States established a direct communication line from the Ukrainian military to U.S. European Command. The highly secure system would keep the Americans in direct contact with their Ukrainian counterparts as events unfolded.
+
+The administration was also sending arms to Ukraine. In December, Biden authorized an additional $200 million in weapons to be drawn from U.S. inventories — even as the Kyiv government, many in Congress and some within the administration itself argued that if the United States really believed a full-scale invasion was coming, it was not enough.
+
+But every step in the administration campaign was premised on avoiding direct U.S. involvement in a military clash. The overriding White House concern about provocation influenced each decision about how much assistance and what kind of weapons to give the Ukrainians to defend themselves.
+
+“I make no apologies for the fact that one of our objectives here is to avoid direct conflict with Russia,” Sullivan said of the prewar period.
+
+The Russians were going to do what they did regardless of what the allies did, a senior official involved in the decisions said, and the administration found “incredible” the notion, as some later argued in hindsight, that “if only we would have given” the Ukrainians more arms, “none of this would have happened.”
+
+Determining whether Russia would interpret a military exercise or a weapons shipment as provocative or escalatory was “more art than science,” the official said. “There’s not a clear and easy mathematical formula. … There has always been a balance between what is required to effectively defend, and what is going to be seen by Russia as the United States essentially underwriting the killing of huge numbers of Russians.”
+
+Ukrainian officials have expressed unending gratitude to the United States for what it has provided since the start of the war. “No other country in the world did more for Ukraine to get the necessary weapons than the United States since 24 February. No other country in the world,” Kuleba said recently. But from the beginning, he said, he and other Ukrainian officials have believed that the “non-provocation” strategy was the wrong one.
+
+“Where did it take us to?” Kuleba said. “I think this war — with thousands killed and wounded, territories lost, part of the economy destroyed ... is the best answer to those who still advocate the non-provocation of Russia.”
+
+
+### VIII
+
+As part of its ongoing campaign to convince the world of what was coming — and dissuade the Russians — the White House decided toward the end of 2021 to challenge its own reluctance, and that of the intelligence agencies, to make some of their most sensitive information public.
+
+U.S. intelligence had picked up on “false flag” operations planned by the Russians, in which they would stage attacks on their own forces as if they had come from Ukraine. Publicly exposing those plans might deny Putin the opportunity to concoct a pretext for invasion, administration officials reasoned.
+
+As a first step, the White House decided to reveal the scale of the troop buildup that continued on Ukraine’s borders. In early December, the administration released satellite photos, as well a map created by U.S. analysts showing Russian troop positions and an intelligence community analysis of Russian planning.
+
+The analysis said the Russians planned “extensive movement” of 100 battalion tactical groups, involving up to 175,000 troops, along with armor, artillery and equipment. The picture that administration officials had been developing for weeks in secret was now seen around the world.
+
+In anticipation of more selective disclosures of intelligence, Sullivan set up a regular process at the White House in which a team would determine whether a particular piece of information, if made public, could thwart Russian plans or propaganda. If the answer was yes, it would then be submitted to the intelligence community for recommendations on whether and how to release it.
+
+In late January, the British government publicly accused Russia of plotting to install a puppet regime in Kyiv. The allegation, based on U.S. and British intelligence, was revealed in a highly unusual press statement by Foreign Secretary Liz Truss, late in the evening in London but just in time for the Sunday morning papers.
+
+And in early February, the Biden administration disclosed that Moscow was considering filming a fake Ukrainian attack against Russian territory or Russian-speaking people — the false flag that intelligence had detected. The propaganda film would be heavy on spectacle, officials said, with graphic scenes of explosions, accompanied by corpses posed as victims and mourners pretending to grieve for the dead.
+
+“I had watched Putin falsely set the narrative too many times,” another U.S. official said. Now, “you could see him planning quite specifically in [eastern Ukraine] false flags. It was quite precise.”
+
+The intelligence disclosures themselves had an air of theatricality. The initial revelation of satellite pictures could be corroborated by commercial footage, though the analysis was unique to the intelligence community. But whether the public believed the subsequent disclosures depended on the government’s credibility. And Biden administration officials knew they faced a public, at home and abroad, that could be deeply skeptical of “intelligence,” following the Iraq War and the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan.
+
+Broadly speaking, the U.S. public information campaign worked. World attention focused on the Russian troop buildup. The idea that Putin would falsify the reasons for his invasion seemed plausible, perhaps because in 2014 he had denied entirely that his troops were in Crimea, an assertion that led to descriptions of “little green men” in military uniforms without insignia occupying part of Ukraine.
+
+Given how skeptical some allies remained about the intelligence, the most powerful effect of disclosing it was to shape Russian behavior and deprive Putin of the power to use misinformation, U.S. officials said.
+
+
+### IX
+
+On Jan. 12, Burns met in Kyiv with Zelensky and delivered a candid assessment. The intelligence picture had only become clearer that Russia intended to make a lightning strike on Kyiv and decapitate the central government. The United States had also discovered a key piece of battlefield planning: Russia would try to land its forces first at the airport in Hostomel, a suburb of the capital, where the runways could accommodate massive Russian transports carrying troops and weapons. The assault on Kyiv would begin there.
+
+At one point in their conversation, Zelensky asked if he or his family were personally in danger. Burns said Zelensky needed to take his personal security seriously.
+
+The risks to the president were growing. Intelligence at the time indicated that Russian assassination teams might already be in Kyiv, waiting to be activated.
+
+But Zelensky resisted calls to relocate his government and was adamant that he not panic the public. Down that path, he thought, lay defeat.
+
+“You can’t simply say to me, ‘Listen, you should start to prepare people now and tell them they need to put away money, they need to store up food,’ ” Zelensky recalled. “If we had communicated that — and that is what some people wanted, who I will not name — then I would have been losing $7 billion a month since last October, and at the moment when the Russians did attack, they would have taken us in three days. ... Generally, our inner sense was right: If we sow chaos among people before the invasion, the Russians will devour us. Because during chaos, people flee the country.”
+
+For Zelensky, the decision to keep people in the country, where they could fight to defend their homes, was the key to repelling any invasion.
+
+“As cynical as it may sound, those are the people who stopped everything,” he said.
+
+Ukrainian officials remained irritated that the Americans weren’t sharing more about their intelligence sources. “The information that we received was, I would call it, a statement of facts without a disclosure of the origins of those facts or of the background behind those facts,” Kuleba recalled.
+
+But Western intelligence wasn’t alone in thinking Zelensky should prepare for a full-scale invasion. Some of Ukraine’s own intelligence officials, while still skeptical that Putin would strike, were planning for the worst. Kyrylo Budanov, Ukraine’s military intelligence chief, said he moved the archives out of his headquarters three months in advance of the war and prepared reserves of fuel and ammunition.
+
+The American warnings were repeated on Jan. 19 when Blinken made a brief visit to Kyiv for a face-to-face meeting with Zelensky and Kuleba. To the secretary’s dismay, Zelensky continued to argue that any public call for mobilization would bring panic, as well as capital flight that would push Ukraine’s already teetering economy over the edge.
+
+While Blinken stressed, as he had in previous conversations, the importance of keeping Zelensky and his government safe and intact, he was one of several senior U.S. officials who rebuffed reports that the administration had urged them to evacuate the capital. “What we said to Ukraine were two things,” Blinken later recalled. “We will support you whatever you want to do. We recommend you look … at how you can ensure continuity of government operations depending on what happens.” That could mean hunkering down in Kyiv, relocating to western Ukraine or moving the government to neighboring Poland.
+
+Zelensky told Blinken he was staying.
+
+He had begun to suspect that some Western officials wanted him to flee so that Russia could install a puppet government that would come to a negotiated settlement with NATO powers. “The Western partners wanted to — I’m sure someone was really worried about what would happen to me and my family,” Zelensky said. “But someone probably wanted to just end things faster. I think the majority of people who called me — well, almost everyone — did not have faith that Ukraine can stand up to this and persevere.”
+
+Similarly, warning Ukrainians to prepare for war as some partners wanted him to, he said, would have weakened the country economically and made it easier for the Russians to capture. “Let people discuss in the future whether it was right or not right,” the Ukrainian leader recalled, “but I definitely know and intuitively — we discussed this every day at the National Security and Defense Council, et cetera — I had the feeling that [the Russians] wanted to prepare us for a soft surrender of the country. And that’s scary.”
+
+
+### X
+
+In a news conference on Jan. 19, Biden said he thought Russia would invade. Putin had come too far to pull back. “He has to do something,” the president said.
+
+Biden promised that the West would answer Russia’s attack. “Our allies and partners are ready to impose severe costs and significant harm on Russia and the Russian economy,” he said, predicting that if Putin ordered an invasion, it would prove a “disaster” for Russia.
+
+It was one of Biden’s most forceful warnings to that point. But the president also muddied the waters, suggesting that a “minor incursion” by Russian forces, as opposed to a full-scale invasion, might not prompt the severe response that he and allies had threatened.
+
+“It’s one thing if it’s a minor incursion, and then we end up having to fight about what to do and not do, et cetera,” Biden said, signaling that NATO was not unified in its opposition to any Russian use of force. “If there’s something where there’s Russian forces crossing the border, killing Ukrainian fighters, et cetera, I think that changes everything,” Biden said when, later in the news conference, a reporter asked him to clarify what he meant by a “minor incursion.”
+
+“But it depends on what he [Putin] does, actually, what extent we’re going to be able to get total unity on the NATO front.”
+
+Biden’s comments revealed the cracks in his own administration’s planning, as well as in NATO. Blinken was in Kyiv, vowing that the United States would support Ukraine, in every way short of committing its own forces, if the country was attacked. But privately, administration officials had been contemplating for weeks how they would respond to a “hybrid” attack, in which Russia might launch damaging cyber-strikes on Ukraine and a limited assault on the eastern part of the country.
+
+Zelensky and his aides, who still weren’t convinced Putin would go to war, replied to Biden’s comments about a “minor incursion” with a caustic tweet.
+
+“We want to remind the great powers that there are no minor incursions and small nations. Just as there are no minor casualties and little grief from the loss of loved ones. I say this as the President of a great power.”
+
+Biden clarified the next day that if “any assembled Russian units move across the Ukrainian border, that is an invasion” for which Putin will pay. But White House officials quietly fumed that while the administration was trying to rally support for Ukraine, Zelensky was more interested in poking the president in the eye over an awkward comment.
+
+“It was frustrating,” said a former White House official. “We were taking steps that were attempting to help him, and there was a feeling that he was protecting his own political brand by either being in denial or projecting confidence because that’s what was important to him at the time.”
+
+An aide to Zelensky who helped craft the tweet said it was meant to rebut Biden, but also to be light and humorous, a way to defuse the burgeoning tension. Zelensky’s inner circle worried that Washington’s predictions that war was around the corner would have unintended consequences.
+
+As Biden was clarifying, Zelensky’s team tried to assuage Washington with a conciliatory message.
+
+“Thank you @POTUS for the unprecedented [U.S.] diplomatic and military assistance for [Ukraine],” Zelensky tweeted, with emoji of the U.S. and Ukrainian flags.
+
+
+### XI
+
+Jan. 21 was a cold, bleak day in Geneva, with gusty winds whipping the surface of the usually placid lake that shares the Swiss city’s name. As Blinken and his aides sat across from their Russian counterparts at a table set up in the ballroom of a shoreline luxury hotel, the secretary offered the whitecaps as a metaphor. Perhaps, Blinken told Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, they could calm the turbulent waters between their two countries.
+
+They exchanged tense niceties and covered other issues — a spat about the size and activities of their embassies in each other’s capital, the Iran nuclear deal — before turning to Ukraine. Blinken again laid out U.S. positions. If Putin had legitimate security concerns, the United States and its allies were ready to talk about them. But once an invasion of Ukraine began, Western sanctions would be fast and merciless, isolating Russia and crippling its economy, and the alliance would provide Ukraine with massive military assistance. If one Russian soldier or missile touched one inch of NATO territory, the United States would defend its allies.
+
+Blinken found Lavrov’s responses strident and unyielding. After an hour and a half of fruitless back-and-forth, it seemed there was little more to say. But as their aides began to file out of the ballroom, Blinken held back and asked the Russian minister to speak with him alone. The two men entered a small, adjacent conference room and shut the door as the U.S. and Russian teams stood uncomfortably together outside.
+
+During Lavrov’s nearly 18 years as Russia’s foreign minister, a succession of American diplomats had found him blunt and doctrinaire, but occasionally frank and realistic about relations between their two countries. After again going over the Ukraine situation, Blinken stopped and asked, “Sergei, tell me what it is you’re really trying to do?” Was this all really about the security concerns Russia had raised again and again — about NATO’s “encroachment” toward Russia and a perceived military threat? Or was it about Putin’s almost theological belief that Ukraine was and always had been an integral part of Mother Russia?
+
+Without answering, Lavrov opened the door and walked away, his staff trailing behind.
+
+It was the last time top national security officials of Russia and the United States would meet in person before the invasion.
+
+Biden spoke with Putin once more by telephone. On Feb. 12, the White House said, he told the Russian president that “while the United States remains prepared to engage in diplomacy, in full coordination with our allies and partners, we are equally prepared for other scenarios.”
+
+
+### XII
+
+A day earlier, British Defense Minister Ben Wallace had flown to Moscow to meet with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Shoigu, a longtime Kremlin survivor who helped sculpt Putin’s tough-guy persona.
+
+Wallace wanted to ask one more time if there was room for negotiation on Putin’s demands about NATO expansion and alliance activities in Eastern Europe. The Russians, he said, showed no interest in engaging.
+
+Wallace warned Shoigu that Russia would face fierce resistance if it invaded Ukraine. “I know the Ukrainians — I visited Ukraine five times — and they will fight.”
+
+“My mother’s Ukrainian,” Wallace said Shoigu replied, implying that he knew the people better. “It’s all part of our same country.”
+
+Wallace then raised the prospect of sanctions. Shoigu responded: “ ‘We can suffer like no one else.’ And I said, ‘I don’t want anyone to suffer.’ ”
+
+Shoigu aired a long and by now familiar list of complaints and said Russia couldn’t tolerate Ukraine’s Western trajectory. “It was in some respects incomprehensible,” said a British official who attended the meeting. “Everyone wanted to keep negotiations going — we were throwing off-ramps, but they weren’t taking them.”
+
+As the British officials were about to leave, Shoigu spoke directly to Wallace. “He looked me in the eye and said, ‘We have no plans to invade Ukraine’ ” Wallace recalled. “That shows you how much of a lie it was.”
+
+A week later, on Feb. 18, Biden called the leaders of several NATO allies and told them the latest U.S. analysis. Biden told reporters in the Roosevelt Room at the White House later that day, “As of this moment, I’m convinced he’s made the decision” to invade. “We have reason to believe that.”
+
+The French, however, continued to seek a way out of the crisis.
+
+On Feb. 20, Macron called Putin and asked him to agree to a meeting in Geneva with Biden. The conversation led the French president to believe that Putin was finally willing to seek a settlement.
+
+“It’s a proposal that merits to be taken into account,” Putin said, according to a recording of the conversation aired months later in a France TV documentary, “A President, Europe and War.”
+
+Macron pressed the Russian leader. “But can we say, today, at the end of this conversation, that we agree in principle? I would like a clear answer from you on that score. I understand your resistance to setting a date. But are you ready to move forward and say, today, ‘I would like a [face-to-face] meeting with the Americans, then expanded to the Europeans’? Or not?”
+
+Putin didn’t commit and appeared to have more-pressing matters at hand. “To be perfectly frank with you, I wanted to go [play] ice hockey, because right now I’m at the gym. But before starting my workout, let me assure you, I will first call my advisers.”
+
+“Je vous remercie, Monsieur le President,” Putin concluded, thanking him in French.
+
+Macron is heard laughing in delight as he hangs up. The French president and his advisers thought they had a breakthrough. Macron’s diplomatic adviser, Emmanuel Bonne, even danced.
+
+But the following day, in a televised address, Putin officially recognized two separatist Ukrainian provinces in Donbas, including territory controlled by Kyiv, as independent states. It was a stark sign that Putin — his French-language pleasantries aside — intended to dismember Ukraine.
+
+
+### XIII
+
+As Britain and France made last-ditch efforts at diplomacy, world leaders gathered in Munich for an annual security conference. Zelensky attended, prompting concerns among some U.S. officials that his absence might give Russia the perfect moment to strike. Others wondered if the Ukrainian leader believed Russia would attack and had used the opportunity to leave the country before the bombs started falling.
+
+In a speech, Zelensky reminded the audience that his country was already at war with Russia, with Ukrainian troops fighting against the eastern separatists since 2014.
+
+“To really help Ukraine, it is not necessary to constantly talk only about the dates of a probable invasion,” Zelensky said. Instead, the European Union and NATO should welcome Ukraine into their organizations.
+
+Some European officials were still unconvinced that an attack was coming. One told a reporter, “We have no clear evidence ourselves that Putin has made up his mind, and we have not seen anything that would suggest otherwise.”
+
+“It felt otherworldly,” the British official said. In sideline conversations, U.S. and British officials were convinced of an imminent invasion, but “that just wasn’t the mood in the hall.”
+
+Some in London began to doubt themselves, the British official said. “People were saying [we] got it wrong on Afghanistan. We returned and scrubbed the [Ukraine] intelligence again.”
+
+They came up with the same conclusion — Russia would invade. But despite the U.S. diplomatic and intelligence-sharing campaign, it remained a difficult sell.
+
+“If you discover the plans of somebody to attack a country and the plans appear to be completely bonkers, the chances are that you are going to react rationally and consider that it’s so bonkers, it’s not going to happen,” said Heisbourg, the French security expert.
+
+“The Europeans overrated their understanding of Putin,” he said. “The Americans, I assume … rather than try to put themselves in Putin’s head, decided they were going to act on the basis of the data and not worry about whether it makes any sense or not.”
+
+There had been many reasons to be mystified. U.S. intelligence showed that the Kremlin’s war plans were not making their way down to the battlefield commanders who would have to carry them out. Officers didn’t know their orders. Troops were showing up at the border not understanding they were heading into war. Some U.S. government analysts were bewildered by the lack of communication within the Russian military. Things were so screwy, the analysts thought, Russia’s plans might actually fail. But that remained a distinctly minority view.
+
+For Kuleba, the turning point came in the days after the Feb. 18-20 Munich conference, when he traveled again to Washington. “These were the days I received more-specific information,” he recalled. At a specific airport A in Russia, they told him, five transport planes were already on full alert, ready to take paratroops at any given moment and fly them in the direction of a specific airport B in Ukraine.
+
+“That was where you see the sequence of events and the logic of what is happening,” he said.
+
+Western intelligence officials, looking back at what turned out to be the shambolic Russian attack on Kyiv, acknowledge that they overestimated the effectiveness of the Russian military.
+
+“We assumed they would invade a country the way we would have invaded a country,” one British official said.
+
+
+### XIV
+
+Early in the evening of Feb. 23, the White House received an urgent intelligence flash. There was “high probability” that the invasion had begun. Troops were on the move, and the Russians had fired missiles on targets in Ukraine. The president’s top advisers assembled; some met in the Situation Room while others joined on a secure line.
+
+Sullivan spoke with Yermak, Zelensky’s chief of staff. There was “an extremely high level of agitation” in Kyiv, said a person familiar with the call. “They were not spinning out of control. Just extremely emotional, but in a way you’d expect.”
+
+Yermak told Sullivan to hold on — he wanted to bring Zelensky to the phone to speak directly with Biden. Sullivan connected the call to the Treaty Room, part of the second-floor White House residence used as a study, and got the president on the line.
+
+Zelensky implored Biden to immediately contact as many other world leaders and diplomats as possible. He should tell them to speak out publicly and to call Putin directly and tell him to “turn this off.”
+
+“Zelensky was alarmed,” the person recalled. He asked Biden to “ ‘get us all the intelligence you possibly can now. We will fight, we will defend, we can hold, but we need your help.’ ”
+
+---
+
+__Harris__ reported from Washington and London; __DeYoung__ from Washington, Brussels, and Joint Base Ramstein and Stuttgart in Germany; __Khurshudyan__ from Kyiv; __Parker__ from Washington; and __Sly__ from London. __Paul Sonne__ and __Olivier Knox__ in Washington, __Souad Mekhennet__ in Berlin, __Rick Noack__ in Paris and __Serhiy Morgunov__ in Kyiv contributed to this report.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-17-fragility-in-papua-new-guinea.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-17-fragility-in-papua-new-guinea.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..03704b87
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-17-fragility-in-papua-new-guinea.md
@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Fragility In Papua New Guinea
+author: Erol Yayboke, et al.
+date : 2022-08-17 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/04/Un-papua-new-guinea.png
+#image_caption:
+description: Addressing Fragility in Papua New Guinea
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+___Papua New Guinea (PNG) is one of five priority countries under the U.S. Global Fragility Strategy.__ The U.S. government has made a 10-year commitment to addressing fragility in PNG and is currently planning its approach._
+
+
+
+___PNG presents unique operating challenges for the U.S. government’s implementation teams__ due to the complex factors driving fragility in the country and limited U.S. government presence on the ground._
+
+___The key challenge facing policymakers is to generate clarity and consensus__ on what factors of fragility the United States will address, how the United States will develop a bespoke operating model in PNG, and who will be critical to these efforts._
+
+The landmark [Global Fragility Act](https://www.csis.org/analysis/policymakers-guide-global-fragility-act) (GFA) was signed into U.S. law in 2019. In April 2022, the Biden administration identified Papua New Guinea (PNG) as a partner country in a prologue it added to the 2020 U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability, or [Global Fragility Strategy](https://www.csis.org/analysis/global-fragility-strategy-gets-refresh) (GFS). Under the strategy, the United States has committed to at least 10 years of programmatic efforts aimed at lowering violence levels and enhancing conflict-prevention efforts in PNG. U.S. officials have indicated they intend to benefit from “lessons learned from decades of U.S. involvement overseas, to enhance the way the U.S. Government engages in challenging environments and to jointly build resilience against political, economic, and natural shocks.” The distinguishing feature of the GFS is its express intention to expand U.S. focus on preventing fragility, violence, and conflict.
+
+This brief provides policymakers with ideas on how to deploy U.S. conflict-prevention and peacebuilding capabilities in PNG. It outlines the strategic importance of PNG in the broader region, then canvasses four fragility trends to watch before discussing how to leverage U.S. strengths and avoid the pitfalls of those who have long operated in PNG. The brief concludes with recommendations on how to create a bespoke GFA operating model for addressing fragility focused on:
+
+- Cultivating a deliberate and adaptive planning process;
+
+- Embracing a localized and partnership-based implementation approach;
+
+- Fostering the right enabling environment; and
+
+- Leveraging U.S. comparative advantages.
+
+
+### Strategic Importance of Papua New Guinea
+
+PNG is one of the most biodiverse countries on earth. It is as diverse geographically — consisting of mountains, jungles, and valleys — as it is ethnically and linguistically. PNG is rich in gold, copper, silver, natural gas, timber, oil, and fisheries, bringing distinct economic opportunities not always available to the other Pacific Island states.
+
+PNG has shown remarkable resilience despite much international analysis and discourse (including in this brief) focusing on the factors contributing to its fragility. For example, although the 1988–98 Bougainville civil war resulted in an estimated 20,000 deaths, PNG navigated a predominately peaceful independence referendum for the autonomous region of Bougainville in November 2019 (see textbox). Despite extremely high levels of corruption and violence, its civil society discusses, reports on, and circulates instances of corruption and violence with significant energy and freedom — particularly through social media.
+
+
+> #### `Key Statistics`
+
+> __`Demographics`__
+
+- _`One Main Island and 600 Offshore Islands`_
+
+- _`Population of Nine Million`_
+
+- _`Over 800 Languages`_
+
+- _`Over 600 Tribes`_
+
+> __`Development Indicators`__
+
+- _`Australian Development Assistance: US$421 Million in 2019`_
+
+- _`U.S. Development Assistance: US$7 Million in 2019`_
+
+- _`Human Development Index 2019: 0.555, Ranked 155 out of 189 Countries and Territories`_
+
+- _`Gender Inequality Index 2019: 0.72, Ranked 161 out of 162 Countries and Territories`_
+
+- _`Population below National Poverty Line: 37.5%`_
+
+While PNG does not have an extensive breadth or depth of civil society organizations (CSOs), those that exist provide avenues for engagement with the government and, if appropriately empowered, can generate better governance outcomes. Dialogues such as the 2021 forum on gender and human rights bring together government, civil society, and advocacy groups to assess the successes, failures, and opportunities for advancing human development in PNG. Civil society groups also fill in critical gaps in service delivery. Churches, for example, provide around 50 percent of healthcare services and independently operate two universities. Additionally, while PNG’s growing youth population brings significant employment and education challenges, it is also a great opportunity for a new generation to lead the country.
+
+PNG is strategically relevant to the United States and its allies, Australia in particular. Its status as Australia’s closest neighbor and its history as a former colony and site of Allied cooperation against Japanese forces during World War II means that it holds a place in both the strategic and nostalgic imaginations of many Australians and Americans who served in the Pacific theater. Australia is the single largest donor working in PNG and has been regarded by many U.S. administrations as key to engagement in Melanesia and the Pacific Islands, especially given the relatively light U.S. footprint in the region. While it was resoundingly rejected by many Australians and regional leaders at the time, the mid-2000s image of Australian prime minister Howard as “Washington’s deputy sheriff” in the Pacific was a prevailing notion for years. Even now, there is a sense in some Australian foreign policy circles that signs of increased fragility in places like PNG do not reflect well on Australia’s role in the country or region. It is easy to imagine that Australia would welcome increased U.S. focus on PNG and opportunities to collaborate on, among other things, violent conflict prevention programming.
+
+> PNG is strategically relevant to the United States and its allies, Australia in particular.
+
+PNG is also a destination for Australian and U.S. businesses and is increasingly a place where rival geostrategic interests meet. Chinese communities have long been present in PNG, but recent fear of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) expansionism in the region has put it on the radar of U.S. and Australian officials, especially after the recent Solomon Islands–CCP security pact sent shockwaves through Washington and Canberra alike. Meanwhile, the ongoing process of Bougainvillean independence and the possibility of similar movements from other provinces suggest significant potential for fragmentation within PNG.
+
+> #### `Independence and Autonomy Movements`
+
+> _`In November 2019, Bougainville held a referendum on whether residents wanted greater autonomy or full independence from PNG. Nearly 98 percent of voters chose independence, with at least 85 percent voter turnout. This historic event on the island, located nearly 600 miles east of Port Moresby, comes after decades of unrest and displacement. Tensions over control of the island’s natural resources escalated into what became known as the Bougainville civil war, which lasted from 1988–98 and was the most violent conflict in the South Pacific since World War II. As many as 20,000 people died, many were displaced, and social services in Bougainville were disrupted. The Bougainville Peace Agreement that marked the end of the war stipulated that an independence referendum would be held 10–15 years after the first Autonomous Bougainville Government was elected in June 2005. While it was successfully and peacefully executed, the referendum vote is nonbinding, and leadership from both sides will have to negotiate a final agreement, which could take years.`_
+
+> _`Similar movements exist in the New Ireland, Enga, and East New Britain provinces, which have called for greater autonomy for over a decade. Shared grievances over the national government’s mismanagement of natural resources and failure to deliver public services have increased the prevalence of regional and provincial fragmentation. While there is no imminent threat of violence, the political legitimacy of these sentiments could generate greater factionalization throughout the country. It could also give prominence to political elites who exploit them to mobilize voters and create opportunities for geostrategic competitors to exert greater influence in newly formed nations.`_
+
+The prospect of a PNG that is increasingly poor, susceptible to foreign interference, and fragile is a stark reality for Australia. Taken to its most extreme, fragility in PNG might precipitate external intervention—just as Australia intervened in the Solomon Islands Regional Assistance Mission for a decade following civil unrest — and could also shift the balance of power in Melanesia against U.S. and allied interests.
+
+Given the proximity of the Pacific Island nations to vital trade routes and relevance to U.S. and allied security assets, PNG’s strategic profile is only growing. This is evident in the recent shift in rhetoric, funding commitments, high-level visits, and partnership-led tone of engagement by Australia’s new Albanese government, which is echoed by a significant uptick in the attention Washington has paid to the Pacific Islands since the end of World War II.
+
+
+### Four Fragility Trends in Papua New Guinea
+
+PNG gained its independence from Australia in September 1975 after roughly seven decades of colonial rule. In the years leading up to independence, a Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) was tasked with recommending priorities and mechanisms of implementation for an eventual PNG constitution. Following comprehensive, countrywide consultations, in August 1974 the CPC released its report, which recommended an endogenous state- and nation-building process, prioritizing human development over economic growth. The 350-page report specified rights and freedoms and established five national goals and directive principles to achieve a free and just society in PNG. However, the constitution that was adopted in August 1975 was a watered-down version of the unique, autochthonous features of governance the CPC proposed. Instead, the new government approved a “conventional Westminster-type constitution,” choosing to avoid contentious issues of citizenship and decentralization. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this did not translate into the nation-building process that many envisioned. This history contributes to the modern state of PNG not enjoying a high degree of legitimacy with its citizens — who, in turn, have only limited access to inclusive channels for engaging with the state. Democratic governance principles are not institutionalized, and legacies of colonialism linger, contributing to a general downward trend of instability and insecurity in PNG.
+
+This brief focuses on four phenomena that are simultaneously the cause and result of shortcomings in PNG’s development and the current dynamics of fragility. These include: (1) weak governance, (2) economic inequality, (3) vulnerability to climate change and limited adaptive capacity, and (4) intercommunal and gender-based violence.
+
+#### Weak Governance
+
+___Weak governance in PNG is a barrier to meaningful participation in civic life.___ Over the past several decades, the tenets of personal and collective wellbeing envisioned by the CPC report — and engrained in the Melanesian concept of gutpela sindaun — have been replaced by a political-economic system that has proven corrupt and whereby citizens, especially women and youth, cannot fully engage in sociopolitical affairs. A 2019 survey across six provinces of PNG revealed few citizens felt that they had “a lot of influence” over government decisionmaking at the national and local levels. Disempowerment was especially acute among women, who felt that patriarchal views and systemic gender inequality preclude their representation in leadership positions and engagement with political representatives.
+
+The structure of the Papua New Guinean state makes it difficult for citizens to interact with national, provincial, and local-level governments. The diverse physical and human geography of PNG makes the functions of a central government uniquely difficult. PNG consists of the main island and 600 offshore islands, with a population of about nine million people who speak more than 800 languages and make up about 600 distinct tribes. The 1995 Organic Law on Provincial Government and Local Level Government and its amendments instituted a model of decentralization whereby provincial and local-level governments were allocated budgets to fund and deliver public services. In principle, such a decentralized state facilitates citizen empowerment and development from the bottom up — especially considering the strong Melanesian traditions of consensus, reciprocity, and the harmonization of diversity. However, this technical and largely top-down process has failed to establish mechanisms for accountability and community participation, particularly ones that leverage the country’s latent dynamism. As a result, local governments have limited capacity, weak accountability mechanisms, funding gaps, and unqualified staff, making public administration primed for corruption and capturable by political elites.
+
+> PNG consists of the main island and 600 offshore islands, with a population of about nine million people who speak more than 800 languages and make up about 600 distinct tribes.
+
+___Women face additional barriers to participation.___ Women are historically underrepresented in Papua New Guinean politics and public administration. Since independence in 1975, only seven women have been elected to PNG’s National Parliament. Although 167 female candidates are running in the 2022 elections, as of publication in August 2022, two female representatives have been confirmed in office. Additionally, women hold only 24 percent of administrative positions in national public service; that portion further decreases to 7 percent at the executive-appointment level. At the provincial and subnational levels, women’s representation in public service is marginal, accounting for zero executive-level appointments, 6 percent of senior management, and only 10 percent of middle management.
+
+There are both institutional and cultural barriers to women’s participation in government. There is no quota to ensure women are elected to the national legislature. Each one of several attempts to institutionalize women holding political office failed, most recently in March 2022, when a proposal to have 5 parliamentary seats out of 111 reserved for women was shelved until after the August general elections. PNG’s patriarchal society and gender norms, which colonial administrations reinforced, also limit women’s political participation and institutional seniority. Threats of divorce, public shame, harassment, and physical violence prevent women from exercising political agency. Elections are also highly localized and personalized; political candidates must bargain for support among those who control voting blocs through patronage networks. Since women are mostly excluded from leadership hierarchies in the first place, they often lack the resources and networks to negotiate support among local leaders. Political and public administration systems favor so-called “big men” who cultivate patronage networks, reinforcing citizens’ association of political authority with men and view of leadership as a masculine trait. The disparity in women’s engagement in sociopolitical systems and processes reinforces the conditions under which gender equality and gender-based violence (discussed in more detail below) persist.
+
+___Weak governance and limited capacity hinder the state’s provision of security and broader services.___ Governance limitations have increasingly manifested in the inability of the state to provide safety in the face of growing intercommunal violence nationwide. In Hela Province in the highlands, for example, a land dispute in January 2021 between two relatives led to the deaths of 21 people. At the time, there were only about 60 permanent police officers in the province, which has a population of approximately 250,000 people. The July 2022 death tolls from election-related assaults suggest intercommunal violence trends continue. This comes at a time when law enforcement is chronically underfunded, inadequately resourced, and understaffed across the country. Nationally, the police force has only grown by 30 percent to about 7,400 staff since PNG’s independence in 1975 while its population has more than tripled. Limited institutional capacity, combined with the absence of community-based policing capabilities, undermines public trust in the government and lessens the visibility of the state in many parts of the country.
+
+With police forces being overstretched, private security actors are an increasingly ubiquitous part of efforts to maintain stability in certain regions. These companies are often employed by businesses, community leaders, and politicians. Some government officials have significant interests in this industry, including as a source of personal revenue and employment for constituents. The official number of private security personnel is over three times that of police officers and surpasses the sum of all security sector forces.
+
+Overall, government effectiveness is unequal and limited across PNG, with the reach of the state being practically undetectable in some rural areas and highland regions, despite 87 percent of the total population living in such communities. The country’s fragile health systems, limited access to and quality of education, and low literacy levels are barriers to developing local capacity to deliver and monitor service provision. Yet another colonial legacy is uneven and underdeveloped access to educational opportunities in PNG, with girls being highly underrepresented and several districts having very low participation rates. This reinforces the conditions under which citizens cannot cultivate human capital, achieve upward social mobility, and practice active citizenship. Without these opportunities, citizens often look to traditional systems over the formal state for governance functions and public services. These conditions also create a permissive environment for corrupt elites to act against the public good in pursuit of their interests, at times cynically perpetuating narratives that young and poor populations and the country’s political immaturity, rather than their corruption, contribute to gaps in state governance.
+
+___Systemic corruption limits inclusive and sustainable development, fuels distrust and frustration with political leadership, and generates apathy toward political participation.___ The Papua New Guinean state is marred by endemic corruption, lack of accountability, and the privatization of security, all of which benefit the elite to the exclusion of the general public. Although the constitution provides a legal framework for government structures at all levels, de facto national authority revolves around clientelism. Across the archipelago, most Papua New Guineans identify closely with their local communities and use the wantok (“one talk”) system of reciprocal obligations among people who share a common language, ethnicity, or community. While this system can be a resilient safety net that compensates for insufficient governance and inadequate state services, politicians have also exploited it to serve their interests. Elected officials routinely use their power to capture and disperse state resources toward their narrow constituencies in exchange for political support.
+
+The 2021 Global Corruption Barometer found that 54 percent of Papua New Guineans paid a bribe to receive a public service in the previous 12 months and that 57 percent were offered bribes for their votes. Frequent turnover among politicians and government officials compounds the highly personalized, “short-termism” nature of PNG politics, making what many consider to be bribery a highly normalized part of cultivating a voter base. Systemic, increasingly sophisticated, and entrenched corruption at all levels of government reinforces the conditions under which citizens are excluded from providing input and oversight on essential state functions.
+
+#### Economic Inequality
+
+___Resource-based wealth is not widely distributed, and poor human development outcomes stunt the potential for women and youth to boost economic growth.___ At a macroeconomic level, PNG’s positive economic trajectory and resource-rich environment suggest strong potential for international investment and engagement. In 2022, PNG’s economy is expected to grow by 4 percent, driven largely by the industries sector, which accounts for about 43 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). However, wealth and economic opportunities are concentrated among the country’s elites, who habitually engage in rent-seeking behavior by facilitating grants and contracts for foreign companies, particularly in the extractive industries sector.
+
+PNG has one of the highest levels of economic inequality in Asia and the Pacific. In the wake of the initial stages of the Covid-19 pandemic, recovery in employment has been slower for the bottom 40 percent of households, and those with jobs have seen a significant share of their incomes fall. Profits from mining deposits and natural-gas reserves maintain the country’s middle-income status but are unevenly distributed and rarely enjoyed by average citizens. Foreign-owned businesses and corrupt officials are significant benefactors of the profits of these sectors.
+
+> PNG has one of the highest levels of economic inequality in Asia and the Pacific.
+
+These extractive industries have long caused friction and contributed to fragility in PNG. One of the most notable examples is the conflict between PNG and the Bougainville region described in the textbox above. Land disputes and environmental degradation caused by the Panguna copper and gold mine and uneven distribution of the mine’s profits significantly contributed to the outbreak of the 10-year civil war. Tensions still simmer in Bougainville, and its connections to the central government in Port Moresby remain tenuous at best. Mines throughout PNG continue to fuel disputes over land rights and profit distribution, environmental damage wrought by their activities, extractive profiteering of international companies, and the limited economic benefits reaped by local communities.
+
+___Institutional economic challenges are significant, especially for women and youth.___ These include low domestic resource mobilization, subpar human development outcomes, and limited economic growth outside the extractive resource sector. PNG’s 2019 Human Development Index score was 0.555, ranking it 155 out of 189 countries and territories. Relatedly, PNG’s 2019 Gender Inequality Index score was 0.725, ranking it 161 out of 162 countries. As detailed in the governance-focused section above, Papua New Guinean women are marginalized and excluded from the formal economy because of cultural customs and colonial legacies, which are reinforced by weak institutions, poor public service delivery, and the lack of gender-sensitive policy implementation. These conditions perpetuate health, education, and employment disparities that lead to unequal opportunities for men and women and limit overall economic growth potential.
+
+Poor economic conditions are particularly acute for women in agriculture and for urban youth. Papua New Guinean women are overrepresented in the informal and agricultural sectors, which have both been significantly affected by the pandemic; this will undoubtedly deepen economic gender inequalities. Globally, only 4 in 10 women in fragile settings are formally employed, leaving the majority more vulnerable to economic shocks. Women engaged in unpaid labor are consistently excluded from social protection measures targeted at the formal workforce, and with limited avenues for skills development, they are left with few options.
+
+The proportion of youth in the population of PNG is large and growing: 31 percent of the population is between the ages of 10 and 24, and 62 percent is between 15 and 64. In urban areas, 60 percent of youth are unemployed, and less than 7 percent are employed in formal jobs. Young people, especially young women, transitioning from childhood to adulthood have less personal agency because they rarely participate in community decision-making processes and have limited access to educational and vocation opportunities, yet are still expected to find formal work in the modern economy. In the absence of formal social safety nets and the informal protections wantoks provide, the growing urban youth population could be an indicator — though not a precondition — of civil unrest and political violence. Disengagement and discontent can lead to increased youth involvement in criminal activity, especially if social protections, educational pathways, and economic opportunities remain limited.
+
+Significant international research shows that youth and women’s empowerment can be drivers of overall economic development, so these challenges — and PNG’s ability to overcome them — are foundational to the country’s development and resilience. Minimizing gaps in human-capital development, including expanding health services and continuing education, could cultivate a skilled workforce that is less vulnerable to economic shocks. Additionally, improving access to production inputs and financial services could shift imbalances in decision-making and create new business opportunities. In particular, a young, educated, and empowered workforce could bring new investment opportunities, creating a virtuous cycle of formal employment. With 67 percent of businesses in PNG identifying crime as a constraint for further investment and expansion in 2014, there are both public and private incentives to improve livelihoods and opportunities for women and youth.
+
+The PNG government aims to address some of these institutional issues by transitioning to a fully industrialized economy, using evocative slogans such as “Take Back PNG.” At the same time, foreign actors are seeking regional influence through political and economic investments. In June 2022, Papua New Guinean prime minister James Marape and Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi announced a potential free trade agreement. This development follows PNG becoming the second Pacific Island country to sign onto China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2018. In 2019, China imported seafood, wood, and mineral products from the region (including PNG), amounting to about $3.3 billion in trade flows.
+
+#### Vulnerability to Climate Change and Limited Adaptive Capacity
+
+___PNG’s agriculture-based economy is highly vulnerable to climate change, and women are likely to be disproportionately affected.___ Two sectors dominate the Papua New Guinean economy: (1) subsistence agriculture, forestry, and fishing, which account for the majority of informal employment; and (2) the minerals and energy extraction sector, which accounts for most export earnings and GDP. These sectors are highly vulnerable to natural hazards and climate-related disasters, including floods, droughts, and landslides.
+
+PNG ranks 22 out of 191 countries on the 2022 European Union’s INFORM Risk index; in other words, it is high on the list of countries at risk of humanitarian crises and disasters that could overwhelm national response capacity. PNG’s resilience to potential climate change–related disruptions is low. With highly dispersed populations that are often remote, accessing communities and assessing damage in the event of a natural disaster is extremely challenging. Moreover, the prevalence of poverty, poor infrastructure, corruption, and insecurity — among other factors of fragility — heighten local populations’ vulnerability to climate change.
+
+___As with most places, climate change disproportionately affects women.___ Female labor participation in PNG is concentrated in rural work, mainly in subsistence agriculture rather than commercial farming. More than 50 percent of the female labor force is engaged in unpaid agricultural work. In addition to ensuring their families’ nutritional needs are met, women are involved in growing, harvesting, and selling crops. While selling this food in local or urban markets generates some income, women lack opportunities to engage in the more lucrative production and export of cash crops (such as coffee and cocoa) and intensive forms of agriculture because of the familial and community roles they are expected to fulfill. Because of women’s reliance on informal agricultural production, their means of food and economic security are increasingly vulnerable to climate shocks.
+
+In addition, women’s coping capacity is limited because of gender-specific barriers to accessing fixed and financial assets. Although women traditionally have access to customary land — which comprises 97 percent of PNG’s land area — this does not always extend to having ownership and decisionmaking power over the use of that land: Only 1 percent of women in PNG report being the main decisionmaker at home. Additionally, PNG has the highest gender gap in financial inclusion in the Pacific region, with women being 29 percent less likely to access formal financial services. The gap in control over land and finance means that women are more dependent on natural resources even as they have limited agency to adapt to climate change–related threats to those resources and cope when natural disasters strike.
+
+> Women are more dependent on natural resources even as they have limited agency to adapt to climate change–related threats.
+
+However, women have strong knowledge in sustainable resource management and disaster mitigation within their communities. Integrating climate considerations into gender programming — and gender considerations into climate-adaptation work — is critical to identifying and addressing the specific vulnerabilities women face in PNG. Ensuring women’s equal access to assets, information, and services can also increase the coping capacity and decisionmaking powers necessary for climate resilience.
+
+#### Intercommunal and Gender-Based Violence
+
+___Intercommunal and gender-based violence (GBV) are both symptoms and causes of state fragility.___ PNG has hundreds of ethnolinguistic groups, and research shows a long history of conflicts among them, typically over land ownership since 97 percent of the land in PNG is customarily owned. These conflicts have typically been managed and resolved through traditional mechanisms, such as village courts, which were seen as legitimate channels to address perceived wrongdoing in many communities. However, as PNG modernizes, traditional rules and customs surrounding conflict and violence are eroding; elders and authorities who once held power in their communities have seen their influence diminish over time. This has, in turn, reduced the capacity of traditional means to resolve contemporary conflicts in PNG. Rather than invoking culture as a legitimate and often singular explanation for violence in PNG (as is often the case), the authors of this brief suggest that the structural and institutional shortcomings discussed above are more significant drivers of fragility and conflict in the country.
+
+The deterioration of traditional conflict-resolution systems coincides with other trends such as shifting gender roles, increased foreign involvement, the influx of smuggled modern firearms, and climate variability. The interaction between these dynamics has led to increased violence and the displacement of tens of thousands of people. Approximately 30,000 people were displaced in 2021 alone due to communal violence, triggering further conflict between resettled populations and host communities despite strong cultural norms of shared land use.
+
+> Rather than invoking culture as a legitimate and often singular explanation for violence in PNG (as is often the case), the authors of this brief suggest that the structural and institutional shortcomings discussed above are more significant drivers of fragility and conflict in the country.
+
+Intercommunal conflict in PNG coincides with interpersonal violence, particularly gender-based, sexual, and family violence. Here culture and changing traditions do play a role. Intercommunal conflicts, once fought primarily between men, now increasingly target women and children. More than two-thirds of women in PNG are victims of domestic violence, and one woman is beaten every 30 seconds. Additionally, violence related to sorcery accusations against men and women is increasingly prevalent. Domestic violence has also increased during the Covid-19 pandemic: Between March 2020 and April 2021, the national helpline for those experiencing family violence or sexual violence, “1-Tok Kaunselin Lain,” saw a 75 percent increase in demand. This aligns with global trends, where emerging data shows that Covid-19 has resulted in an increase in cases of gender-based and domestic violence.
+
+There are movements within PNG to address GBV, including the government’s National Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender Based Violence 2016–2025, which aims to coordinate anti-GBV efforts across the country, and the 2002 Sexual Offences and Crimes Against Children Act. These efforts, while important, have had limited impact due to weak state capacity to enforce them. Even when cases of domestic violence are reported, very few are investigated. As of 2020, there were only 150 staff in the police force’s Family and Sexual Violence Unit across the whole country. Meanwhile, of 15,444 cases of domestic violence reported in 2020, only 250 people were prosecuted and fewer than 100 were convicted. The police force, lacking the resources to properly support survivors of GBV, relies on partnerships with non-governmental organizations to fill this gap in service provision.
+
+
+### Leveraging Strengths and Avoiding Pitfalls in a Challenging Environment
+
+As the previous section indicates, there is significant potential for the United States to address a broad range of fragility factors over the medium-to-long term via the Global Fragility Strategy (GFS). To do this effectively, the United States should be clear-eyed on the challenges ahead, six of which are presented below. It should be deliberate in deciding how to address them and cognizant of its unique capability to deliver on its GFS mission in PNG.
+
+#### Six Challenges in Focus
+
+In ideal circumstances, the United States could deploy the GFS’s whole-of-government strategy and trust that its execution stays true to the mission. But lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan, combined with the complex operating environment in PNG, suggest that whole-of-government efforts, while attractive for their potential, are challenging to implement in practice. These challenges will manifest in at least six broad ways for the United States in PNG:
+
+1. ___The drivers of fragility discussed above are complex.___ PNG is distinct from fragile places in which the United States generally operates. It is also unlike the other three GFS partner countries (Haiti, Libya, and Mozambique) and partner subregion (coastal West Africa). PNG is not in a state of civil conflict, terrorism has not taken root, and a significant cause for concern is personal safety (e.g., GBV). U.S. operations in the region will unfold against a backdrop of such PNG provinces as Bougainville seeking various forms of autonomy and independence, as well as analyst predictions that fragility indicators are trending in the wrong direction. This means the United States cannot bring a templated stabilization mission to PNG, nor can it rely on experience from other places. It will need to take a deliberate and iterative approach to address proximate triggers of fragility, structural causes, or a combination of both.
+
+2. ___The United States has limited experience, presence, and networks in PNG.___ Melanesian expertise within U.S. government, security, and development circles is scant, and the United States has little presence on the ground in PNG. Papua New Guineans place great value on relationships and build trust slowly over time, often outside of formal interactions or business dealings. The initial budget allocated to this work will partially dictate the scale of relationships and impact the United States can generate, but the temptation in new contexts is to rush in with money, ideas, and projects without carefully setting goals and understanding the operating environment. Both implementing partners and U.S. government officials will need to invest significant time in building the community and individual connections that will be critical to any conflict-prevention and resilience-building efforts. Failing to invest in relationships at the start of the process could have longer-term consequences.
+
+3. ___The whole-of-government ambition of the GFS will produce a unique set of operational challenges in the field.___ The GFS asks the Departments of Defense and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to identify areas of common interest and collaborate, so their work adds up to more than the sum of its parts. Interagency collaboration is hard enough in environments where there is a need to respond to easily identifiable threats (e.g., violent extremism); it is always easier to address known threats rather than ones on the horizon. However, coordination is more complicated when, as is likely to be the case for GFS implementation in PNG, the goal is to address elements of fragility so they prevent the expansion of conflict and violence. This means the United States will need to be clear in setting out the challenges it seeks to address, how agencies will be accountable for aligning their work, and how individual and collective efforts demonstrate impact.
+
+4. ___GFS implementation in PNG involves diverse stakeholders.___ These stakeholders will be found in countless time zones and include local Papua New Guinean communities, public leaders, private-sector actors, and government officials; bilateral partners such as Australia, New Zealand, and the European Union; and multilateral entities such as the United Nations and World Bank Group. GFS implementation will also require coordination among U.S. agencies, as well as between Port Moresby and Washington, presenting the risk that U.S. activities do not achieve coherence and effectiveness. This means that stakeholder management and engagement will be a critical feature of U.S. implementation and should be considered central to the strategy.
+
+5. ___The United States will not be the most significant donor to PNG.___ Australia is by far the largest contributor of development assistance to PNG, accounting for 6 percent of all aid spent in 2019. Australia’s fiscal year 2021–22 budget reflects the prioritization of gender equality, committing $120 million to its flagship program Pacific Women Lead. Funding and resources for PNG’s development agenda have concentrated on women’s empowerment. This means the United States will need to determine how to complement existing PNG leadership priorities, when to lead versus support initiatives, whether to finance efforts through existing Australian mechanisms or fund projects separately, and how to foster effective working relationships with other donors.
+
+6. ___Engagement with PNG also relates to the broader geostrategic context of competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Australia-PRC relations.___ China has historically taken an active role in the Pacific and will likely continue to do so in the future. Increased regional engagement by the PRC may also shape the nature of fragility in PNG in the coming years. The United States should respect PNG sovereignty and policy but be attuned to the dynamics of PRC operations there and be respectful of the Chinese community’s long history in the country but ready to calibrate its interagency response according to emerging dynamics. This means the United States needs to avoid its penchant for prioritizing short-term security gains at the expense of sustainable peace. The United States should also be self-aware of its own (unintentional) contributions to fragility in PNG, including through the presence of multinational corporations and their operations, as well as the reverberations of its domestic and international politics.
+
+
+### Toward A Bespoke Operating Model for Addressing Fragility in PNG
+
+In anticipation of the challenges discussed and to avoid the pitfalls of previous efforts to prevent conflict and violence in PNG, the United States should consider developing a bespoke operating model centered around deliberate and adaptive planning and implementation efforts that creates an enabling environment for violent-conflict prevention and builds on U.S. comparative advantages.
+
+#### Cultivate a Deliberate and Adaptive Planning Process
+
+___Learn first, program second.___ Time spent learning about the context during the establishment phase of U.S. presence in PNG will be time saved in the longer term. Extensive lessons learned from Australia, New Zealand, and other partners in PNG will be a rich source of guidance for the United States. Still, the most valuable lessons will be drawn from extensive engagement with PNG stakeholders, particularly at the local level.
+
+___Consult widely but prioritize PNG stakeholders, especially those outside Port Moresby.___ Operating in PNG will necessitate close cooperation with like-minded donors, including Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan, the European Union, and multilateral agencies. But there is a risk that consultation with these stakeholders becomes a proxy for consultation with PNG stakeholders. This should be avoided to ensure the United States builds robust and legitimate stakeholder relationships that are complementary to — but independent of — other donors. Care should be taken to look beneath the surface and recognize that usual “interlocutors” for the U.S. government, such as key private-sector entities or donors, may be critical to some solutions but at times also contributors to corruption or broader fragility.
+
+___Expect the unexpected from the outset.___ Change does not occur in linear ways in any country; given the complexity of PNG, this non-linearity is a certainty. Challenges and opportunities will arise, often at unexpected moments. The United States should place a high value on being informed through church, community, and people-to-people networks, finding ways to adapt quickly as contexts shift. Adaptation and flexibility should be embedded into all planning and management approaches.
+
+___Prioritize diplomatic boots on the ground as a first-order mission, even over programming if necessary.___ Building and sustaining the local knowledge networks needed to operate in PNG requires an on-the-ground presence. This should be a first-order priority and will enable better USG coordination, decision-making, and engagement. Program funding and operation in the absence of significant diplomatic engagement are likely to be ineffective or even potentially counterproductive.
+
+___Mainstream gender and youth inclusion in every program activity.___ Violence against women is often a leading indicator of insecurity and instability within a state, acting as an early warning for potential widespread conflict. Increasing gender equality generally has a positive effect on preventing and countering corruption and rebuilding institutions and legal frameworks. The United States should look to mainstream gender and youth inclusion in its work to address factors of fragility in PNG within informal and formal processes, systems, and institutions.
+
+#### Embrace a Localized and Partnership-Based Implementation Approach
+
+___Work with existing momentum.___ U.S. officials should identify and cultivate relationships with church, civil-society, and public service leaders in order to work within and strengthen functioning policy architectures. They should seek out and help accelerate positive momentum in local communities. This effort should include aligning efforts with existing Papua New Guinean strategies such as the National Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender-Based Violence, the National Anti-Corruption Strategy, and anti-money laundering frameworks.
+
+___Lead from behind when appropriate.___ Under the GFS, the U.S. approach to conflict prevention and stability in PNG should bolster Papua New Guinean leadership and complement work by other donors and partners. Doing so is not only practical, it aligns with the U.S. government’s commitment to localization and effective fragility practice, which empower women and youth in particular.
+
+___Coordinate and co-finance rather than co-deliver with like-minded donors.___ Co-delivery of projects is good in principle but often challenging in practice. Issues of procurement, embassy coordination, and branding requirements can challenge otherwise well-intentioned co-leadership of projects between donors. While interoperability and coordination with other key donor partners should be a high priority, in the shorter term, co-financing rather than co-delivering will likely be an easier means of operating in-country. That said, the United States should not overlook the possibility of working in co-leadership structures with Papua New Guinean stakeholders in areas of comparative strength over the medium-to-long term, including in areas of private-security sector reform, civil-society support, anti-corruption efforts, anti-money laundering measures, digital development, and peacebuilding.
+
+___Do not avoid structural issues.___ With a limited budget and presence, it will be necessary to make clear choices about what the United States supports and what it does not. However, this risks focusing on proximate triggers to the exclusion of addressing structural drivers of fragility. U.S. officials should be receptive to opportunities that intersect and extend beyond whatever core areas of focus it identifies.
+
+#### Foster the Right Enabling Environment for Addressing Fragility
+
+___Develop integrated analysis and leadership among the United States, PNG, and like-minded allies.___ For U.S. engagement to be effective, it needs to be grounded in a shared understanding of the factors of fragility in PNG and connected to political and community leadership at all levels. Investments in trilateral fragility assessments, Track 1.5 dialogues, and U.S.-based research institutes’ increased engagement with those in the Pacific Islands and broader Oceania will improve the enabling environment for program implementation and ensure PNG analysts are connected to decisionmakers in Washington, Canberra, and other capitals through communities of practice.
+
+___Institute a clear monitoring and performance framework that tracks the impact of work done under the GFS and the country’s eventual implementation plans.___ Priority feedback on program impact should be sought first and foremost from PNG communities.
+
+___Codify and communicate strategies for implementing the GFS to key stakeholders in PNG.___ Local events, newspaper articles, radio interviews, and other efforts to communicate the mechanisms through which the United States intends to achieve its goals will go a long way toward ensuring broad-based buy-in from geographically and linguistically diverse stakeholders.
+
+___Invest heavily in whole-of-government coordination efforts to ensure coherent U.S. engagement in PNG, as well as buy-in from key U.S. stakeholders in the agencies involved in implementation.___ U.S. officials across the interagency should be incentivized to participate meaningfully in these efforts under the auspices of the chief of mission. These efforts should be tracked, assessed, and adjusted as needed.
+
+#### Leverage U.S. Comparative Advantages
+
+___Emphasize the length and seriousness of commitment.___ Papua New Guineans prioritize relationships built over time and may be sensitive to the perception that the United States is only engaging because of its regional geopolitical or geostrategic interests. The longer-term horizon of the GFS and whole-of-government approach to implementation are assets the United States should communicate clearly — alongside core GFS tenets that speak to a broad set of Papua New Guinean interests in security, economic development, and international engagement.
+
+___Lead in areas of comparative advantage.___ The United States has significant experience in development, security, and fragility that will complement the predominately economic development-focused footprints of other donors. Injecting this expertise, for example, in private security sector reform, civil society support, combating corruption, and anti-money laundering efforts may be a refreshing and welcomed approach in the donor community in the Pacific Islands. USAID’s recently released 2022–2027 Strategic Framework for the Pacific Islands sets out the agency’s comparative advantages as an “innovator and convener” working through “people-to-people programming” and “building institutional and human capacity,” all efforts that align well with an eventual GFS country strategy for PNG. Other agencies involved in PNG should consider reaching similar levels of clarity; however, more important than this is the overall coherency of the U.S. comparative advantage, including the need to avoid individual or uncoordinated agency activity.
+
+___Sport the brand.___ The United States has strong diplomatic, development, and security brands. It should use these to call international attention to issues, convene a diverse range of stakeholders, and engage in policy dialogue with PNG-based politicians and civil society leaders. The sheer fact that there will be a sustained U.S. presence — beyond a programming footprint managed by a regional USAID mission — will be a significant asset.
+
+___Take important stances that others might not.___ While care should be taken that the U.S. approach to democracy, corruption, and human rights is not regarded as an “ill-fitting” imposition in the context of Papua New Guinean society and state, the United States has a stronger appetite for work in areas of anti-corruption, civic space, human rights, and principles of democratic accountability than most other donors operating in PNG. This may benefit its efforts to address drivers of fragility and offer unique opportunities for it to achieve impact in areas where other donors have not.
+
+___Establish international precedent for effective whole-of-government engagement in a conflict-prevention setting.___ The U.S. mobilization of development, diplomacy, and defense capabilities should be aligned with, complementary to, and increasingly integrated into its operations and leadership. There is some risk that GFS engagement in PNG is only seen through a development prism; this would miss an opportunity to leverage U.S. security and diplomatic capabilities in support of conflict prevention in PNG in ways that other countries have not been able to do. With an increasing appetite for whole-of-government engagement emerging in the United Kingdom and Australia, this is an opportunity for the United States to set an international precedent for whole-of-government approaches, especially in contexts experiencing fragility.
+
+___Work the international system.___ While much of the focus under the GFS will naturally be at the community level, U.S. engagement with the government of PNG will be integral — as will international collaboration with other donors such as Australia, the United Nations, the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank. The wording of this recommendation is deliberate; while the United States should work within the international system, it should also work the system to achieve its GFS-related goals.
+
+---
+
+__Anastasia Strouboulis__ is a research assistant with the Project on Fragility and Mobility (PFM) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
+
+__Erol Yayboke__ is the director of the PFM and senior fellow with the CSIS International Security Program.
+
+__Bridi Rice__ is a Fulbright visiting scholar with the CSIS Project on Prosperity and Development.
+
+__Catherine Nzuki__ is a research associate with the CSIS Africa Program.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-18-transform-european-defense.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-08-18-transform-european-defense.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Transform European Defense
+author: Max Bergmann, et al.
+date : 2022-08-18 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/At6smIk.jpg
+#image_caption:
+description:
+excerpt_separator:
+---
+
+_Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has been a wake-up call for Europe, which has taken decisive steps to assist Ukraine and shore up European security and defense. Yet this moment could be short-lived if not followed by a sustained, collective effort to transform and rationalize European defense._ _Without this, additional European defense spending may be wasted and the continent will continue to rely on the United States for its defense. European nations should fully leverage the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other multilateral formats to overcome fragmentation and avoid a piecemeal approach to defense. By doing so, they can invest together in modern capabilities, build a strong, resilient, and open industrial base, and think creatively to pool and share forces. Importantly, the United States has a crucial role in providing both practical and political support to achieve this shared goal of a stronger and more capable European defense._
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+Russia’s brutal war of aggression in Ukraine has mobilized European nations to think more seriously about security and defense. In addition to sending an impressive surge of military equipment to Ukraine and making commitments at the Madrid summit to reinforce the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) eastern flank with troops and materiel, the European Union also took new steps in its evolution as a credible defense actor. Perhaps most critically, European nations have also announced substantial increases to their defense budgets. A burst of political will — ignited by the invasion and fanned by its brutality — has fueled this response.
+
+These developments are significant, but it would be premature to assume they mark the beginning of a new era. A true paradigm shift will require a sustained and focused effort to lock in the commitments that have already been made, ensure efficient implementation of those commitments, and build the institutional structure necessary to keep European defense moving in the desired direction.
+
+
+### A Transformational Moment?
+
+After the Cold War, European nations largely permitted their militaries to atrophy. The focus of military activity shifted from hypothetical conflict against a peer adversary to expeditionary operations focused on crisis management, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism. With the exception of the Balkans, these operations were also primarily out of area; the possibility of major war on the European continent appeared low.
+
+This began to change after the original Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Russia’s act of aggression catalyzed NATO’s European allies to commit at the Wales summit to meet the alliance’s target of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense. After decades of low-end operations, some European countries began the painful process of reconstituting their militaries for high-intensity warfare. On land, this has included a focus on rebuilding the readiness and aptitude of heavy, combat-capable brigades. At sea, it has included investments in principal surface combatants, submarines, amphibious vessels, and long-range strike, among other areas.
+
+After February 24, 2022, the argument for robust investment in the capabilities required for modern collective defense went from sensible to irrefutable. A Russian attack on a NATO member is no longer unthinkable. Indeed, NATO’s new strategic concept says as much: “We cannot discount the possibility of an attack against Allies’ sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
+
+As European security has become more perilous, U.S. attention has increasingly been pulled toward Asia. Despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. Department of Defense has continued to prioritize China, which the unclassified summary of the forthcoming National Defense Strategy calls “our most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge.” In other words, the U.S. pivot to the Indo-Pacific may have been paused or lessened in degree by events in Europe, but it has not been canceled. The need for the United States to provide precious military assets to defend Europe against Russia, support U.S. allies in Asia, and maintain other global commitments, such as in the Middle East, may put tremendous strain on the United States. Washington will therefore need more from Europe.
+
+Europe seems on its way to stepping up to this challenge. There has been strong political will in Europe to take bolder steps, which has manifested in robust EU sanctions on Russia and support for Ukraine, including lethal and non-lethal aid and working to take in refugees — an area the European Union has found difficult in the past. The European Union’s recently released A Strategic Compass for Security and Defense signals a higher level of ambition for the bloc on foreign and security policy. In NATO, Europeans will contribute to troop reinforcements on the eastern flank, and two new European nations with highly capable militaries, Finland and Sweden, will join the strategic alliance. Most pertinently, the majority of European countries — from economic powerhouse Germany to tiny Luxembourg and neutral Ireland — have announced they will increase their defense budgets, opening the door to a potential future where Europe can theoretically afford to field the majority of the military capabilities necessary for its own self-defense.
+
+> The need for the United States to provide precious military assets to defend Europe against Russia, support U.S. allies in Asia, and maintain other global commitments, such as in the Middle East, may put tremendous strain on the United States. Washington will therefore need more from Europe.
+
+
+### Sustaining Momentum
+
+However, the opportunity for bold action on European defense will not remain forever. Europe has many other policy priorities: post-Covid economic recovery, migration, climate change and the energy transition, and tackling inflation, to name a few. Furthermore, although NATO has seen promising further rises in defense spending since 2014, many of the announcements made since February 24 have yet to be realized. In the short run, turning those announcements into budgetary commitments is how Europe can retain forward momentum. In the long run, while these new developments are encouraging, Europeans will still face many challenges to sustain that momentum.
+
+Decades of declining defense budgets have led to a dramatic downsizing of European armed forces and generated major capability gaps. Competing national defense industries and diverging operational needs have also resulted in a deeply fragmented defense landscape where cooperative solutions are an exception, not the rule. Finally, endless debates on the need for, or the danger of, more European strategic autonomy have slowed down European ambitions and are still vivid today in the context of the war in Ukraine. Having a clear understanding of these limitations is critical as Europeans think about the future of their defense.
+
+#### Decades of Underinvestment
+
+Recent decisions in Europe to boost defense budgets represent good news but come after decades of budgetary cuts and anemic defense investment that has resulted in a major and lasting depreciation of European armed forces, especially compared to the Cold War period. Even though European partners started to increase their defense budgets again in 2015 (see Graph 1), primarily in reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, they had dug themselves an incredibly deep hole.
+
+
+▲ ___Graph 1: NATO Europe and Canada - defence expenditure.__ Source: “[Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2014-2022)](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_197050.htm),” NATO, June 27, 2022._
+
+Over the last two decades, European militaries have lost 35 percent of their capabilities. To take the example of European navies, European countries had almost 200 large surface combatants and 129 submarines in 1990, but only 116 and 66, respectively, in 2021. Europe’s combat power at sea is considered to be about half of what it was during the height of the Cold War. Although often justified as favoring high-tech quality over quantity, reduced operational “mass” remains concerning. For example, the war in Ukraine suggests platforms remain vulnerable in high-intensity warfare. Russia itself might attest to this: according to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Russian military may have lost 1,500 tanks, 3,600 armored vehicles, 750 artillery pieces, and 210 aircraft between the beginning of the invasion and the end of June.
+
+Declining military investments have also led to major capability gaps. As witnessed with military engagements in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and the Sahel, European armed forces are still relying on U.S. support for critical enablers such as air-to-air refueling, strategic airlift, and reconnaissance and intelligence capacities. The chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan was a sobering demonstration of these limitations, as European states were incapable of evacuating their own citizens and allies without logistical support from Washington.
+
+The war in Ukraine offers another example of such constraints: European states have struggled to supply Ukraine with needed heavy weaponry. So far, the United States has provided most of the military assistance to Ukraine, demonstrated most recently by the adoption of a massive $40 billion support package. While Europeans have stepped up militarily, restricted stocks of equipment and ammunition are limiting their support, especially as they also have to maintain national militaries.
+
+#### A Fragmented Defense Landscape
+
+It is not simply that European countries are spending too little on defense, but also that they are doing so in a piecemeal way. In fact, overall European military spending is not that low. In 2020, for example, Europe collectively spent $378 billion on defense (roughly half of total U.S. defense spending). Yet, different strategic cultures and competing defense industries have led European governments to prioritize national solutions at the expense of collective projects. As recently underlined by the European Defense Agency, EU countries conducted only 11 percent of their total equipment procurement in a European framework in 2020. This share is well below the 25 percent share reached in 2011 and far short of the commitment member states made in 2017 to reach 35 percent.
+
+This lack of joint procurement has resulted in a fragmented defense landscape. European armed forces suffer major redundancies, with 29 different types of destroyers, 17 types of main battle tanks, and 20 types of fighter planes, as compared to four, one, and six, respectively, for the United States. Some European countries have managed to develop joint platforms in the past, such as the A400M military transport aircraft, the Eurofighter combat aircraft, and the Tiger attack helicopter. But even these collaborative programs have not necessarily led to a rationalization of European capabilities. For instance, because of diverging operational requirements, the Tiger helicopter has been developed in four different models.
+
+The war in Ukraine has revealed another limitation of the European defense industrial base: the attrition of its military industrial capacity. Decades of declining defense budgets have led European countries to sacrifice scale for efficiency. As a result, they have struggled to respond to Ukraine’s needs due to limited stockpiles and slow production capacities. European defense industries are also facing vulnerable supply chains, showcased by the Covid-19 pandemic, with a growing dependence on critical raw materials from international sources, including China, for certain sectors, as NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg cautioned at the Madrid summit.
+
+> This lack of joint procurement has resulted in a fragmented defense landscape. European armed forces suffer major redundancies, with 29 different types of destroyers, 17 types of main battle tanks, and 20 types of fighter planes, as compared to four, one, and six, respectively, for the United States.
+
+#### No Clear Political Consensus
+
+There are major political obstacles to rationalizing European defense. What should amount to a largely practical and pragmatic effort often descends into an ideological squabble over “strategic autonomy” or national sovereignty. Bureaucratic turf wars erupt between ministries of defense, NATO, and the European Union over roles and responsibilities. National defense industries also each have their privileged place within national capitals and push for their interests, which are often at odds with creating a more integrated European defense landscape.
+
+The United States can also play an obstructive role. Many European countries are reliant on U.S. security guarantees, giving the United States tremendous influence over the direction of European security. The United States is often a vocal opponent of European defense industrial initiatives focused on integration, as they benefit European companies to the detriment of the U.S. defense industry. Moreover, the United States has opposed EU defense efforts, fearing that NATO, and therefore the United States, would lose its pride of place in the European security architecture. This has led to a recitation by many in the United States that there should be “no duplication” of NATO by the European Union. Yet concerns over “duplication” can be treated so broadly as to risk erasing any role for the European Union in defense when it in fact can play a crucial role in fostering integration, mobilizing resources, and coordinating investments.
+
+There are also clear strategic differences within Europe. European ambitions on security and defense have often been hampered by political debates surrounding notions of European “strategic autonomy” or “sovereignty.” These often passionate discussions reveal that European states disagree on the urgency for Europe to become capable of defending itself alone. There is a looming prospect of a future U.S. administration returning to an “America First” policy that relegates European security and multilateral institutions such as NATO. Paradoxically, the leadership position assumed by the United States since the beginning of the war in Ukraine has weakened the movement toward more European autonomy.
+
+These disputes have resulted in a Europe which still relies too much on Washington to ensure its security and defense. In a recent study called the European Sovereignty Index, the European Council on Foreign Relations underlines that “the state of European security and defense sovereignty leaves much to be desired, especially in countries seeing U.S. security guarantees as their “main form of life insurance.”
+
+
+### A Blueprint for the Next Decade
+
+These challenges to transforming European defense can be overcome. The level of ambition laid out in recent strategic documents, such as the European Union’s “Strategic Compass” and NATO’s new strategic concept, provides the requisite conceptual foundation. Practically speaking, this begins with following through on the defense spending pledges already made, but long-term success will require an ambitious vision to rationalize European defense, streamline its many national and intergovernmental processes, eliminate redundancies, and maximize efficiency. If Europe fails to do so, it will not get full value for its investments. Charting a few key lines of effort is a useful place to start.
+
+#### Toward Joint Planning in Europe
+
+There are two levels of defense planning in Europe: national and multinational. At the national level, countries regularly produce defense strategies, which set out their national priorities for defense investment. At the multinational level, the two main efforts are NATO’s defense planning process (NDPP) and the European Union’s capability development process, which involves several institutions but is led by the European Defence Agency (EDA). Both identify military capability gaps and develop procurement plans to fill them. While there is some degree of synchronization between them — “ensuring the coherence and complementarity of each other’s defence planning processes” has been a goal of EU-NATO cooperation since at least 2016 — it has not been sufficient to prevent the fragmentation and duplication discussed above.
+
+A new approach that better aligns these processes and emphasizes joint development of capabilities is needed, especially for those most relevant for collective defense. The EDA is currently reviewing its Capability Development Plan, which was last updated in 2018. Promisingly, it will reportedly emphasize high-intensity warfighting scenarios and include guidance on working with NATO. This is notable, as the next NDPP cycle will likely begin next year now that the political guidance from the new strategic concept has been set. This moment of simultaneous review represents an opportunity. Although existing EU-NATO formats already endeavor to “ensure the coherence of output” between the two processes by exchanging information, coordination could be more proactive, perhaps even creating mechanisms for jointly identifying potential projects, in conversation with national ministries and defense industries.
+
+#### Strengthening Europe’s Defense Industrial Base
+
+To sustain an ambitious investment strategy, Europe needs to take a more strategic approach to its defense industrial base. The challenges in sustaining military assistance to Ukraine have shown why European force planning should drive the development of its industrial base, for example, to ensure sufficient stockpiles of weapons and spare parts. This should also include ramping up limited defense manufacturing capacities. In the short term, Europeans could mobilize their civilian industry to help support the defense sector; France aims to do so by emulating the U.S. Defense Priorities and Allocations System Program. In the medium term, the European Union should invest in advanced manufacturing, from robotics to nanotechnologies to advanced materials technologies. In the longer term, they should also encourage industrial alliances or even integration to rationalize production capacity, as France and the United Kingdom have pursued in the missile sector.
+
+European states also need to strengthen supply chain resilience. First, they should seek to diversify their supply of raw materials and components by collectively identifying alternative suppliers or substitutions. Second, the European Union should invest in domestic production of critical components, starting with semiconductors. In February 2022, the European Commission announced the European Chips Act, which aims to substantially increase chip production. Finally, the European Union should consider joint purchasing for the most critical raw materials to help create collective strategic reserves, which it already does for gas. Facing similar challenges, the United States and European Union should deepen their coordination on supply chain resilience using recent transatlantic working groups such as the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council and the U.S.-EU dialogue on security and defense.
+
+> The challenges in sustaining military assistance to Ukraine have shown why European force planning should drive the development of its industrial base, for example, to ensure sufficient stockpiles of weapons and spare parts.
+
+Transatlantic coordination is also required to build the strong and sustainable defense and technology industrial base needed to underpin the long-term strategic advantage of NATO and the European Union. There are several fissures in transatlantic defense industrial policy that have the potential to, as one recent CEPS study puts it, “sorely undermine transatlantic unity.” These include Europe’s tendency to excessively buy non-European equipment, the controversial issue of non-EU third-party participation in joint EU capability initiatives, and export, technology, and intellectual property controls on both sides of the Atlantic that risk creating competing, rather than complementary, industrial bases. These potential pitfalls need to be addressed if the Euro-Atlantic community is to maintain the open, thriving ecosystem of technology and innovation it needs to stay competitive.
+
+#### Catalyzing Joint Development and Procurement
+
+While many European countries have decided to raise defense spending in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine, there are concerns that this will not translate into coordinated and coherent investments. This is where the European Union has an instrumental role to play in encouraging its members to jointly develop and procure defense capabilities. Fortunately, EU countries have already created promising tools to foster such a collaborative approach, such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defense Fund, which has been allocated €8 billion ($8.3 billion) for 2021 to 2027. The European Commission has also recently announced an even more innovative program of €500 million ($507 million) to incentivize EU members to pursue joint procurement.
+
+EU countries should not only fully leverage these tools but also expand their financial scope given the huge needs going forward. The €8 billion defense fund and the €500 million joint procurement program are a good start but are clearly insufficient to answer the immense investment needs. Furthermore, the joint procurement program still needs to get off the ground. Following the model of the €750 billion ($760.5 billion) Next Generation EU recovery plan, the European Commission could borrow on capital markets to either support collaborative investments or pursue joint procurements on behalf of member states. NATO’s common funding and new innovation fund could also contribute these much-needed investments. Increasing NATO’s common funding was discussed in the leadup to the Madrid summit but had limited follow-through in the strategic concept.
+
+These coordinated investments should focus on high-end capabilities, building on existing projects such as a 15-nation effort to develop a new ground-based air defense system by 2028, the French-German-Spanish next-generation fighter program, and the Italian-led project to develop a new armored fighting vehicle.
+
+#### Thinking Creatively to Pool and Share Forces
+
+Another potential avenue for rationalizing European defense is via initiatives that pool and share national forces under a multinational command. A few examples can already be found in Europe. One of the oldest is the Benelux naval integration, under which the Belgian and Dutch navies operate under the commander of the Royal Netherlands Navy, who receives the title of Admiral Benelux. Another example is the European Air Transport Command (EATC), a program under which seven Western European countries pool military air mobility assets for air transport and air-to-air refueling under a single joint command. The new Franco-German tactical air transport squadron will fly missions for the EATC. Countries benefit from these arrangements in situations where their individual capacities are insufficient to meet some threshold for reliable operational success. These initiatives also increase interoperability through joint training and exercising.
+
+Such efforts may seem niche and technical, but in fact represent a symbolic concession in a core area of national sovereignty. In these cases, as when they commit troops to NATO operations, nations decide if the security benefits outweigh any political costs. It should be noted that this concept is not new: the European Union has championed “pooling and sharing” since 2012, while NATO has focused on “Smart Defence” to achieve “greater security, for less money, by working together with more flexibility.” Both initiatives have had mixed results. Nonetheless, European countries should make a concerted effort, perhaps led by defense planners at the NATO or EU level, to explore new initiatives along these lines. Any new arrangements could constitute a new tool in NATO’s tool kit. In order to make this happen, European governments may have to make the strategic case to their own citizens that a trade-off in terms of sovereignty is worth the associated cost savings and the likely increase of overall European security.
+
+
+### A Push from Washington?
+
+If European defense is to be rationalized along some of these lines, the United States will need to play a critical role. For years, the United States has led a cadre of European nations that are critical or at least skeptical of EU ambitions to increase its capacity as a defense actor. The main fear has been the “Three Ds” of “decoupling, duplication, and discrimination.” Essentially, the United States and others are worried that unfettered EU defense and security initiatives could siphon resources and attention away from NATO. This fear of decoupling and duplication still manifests in many major documents, such as the most recent progress report on EU-NATO cooperation or the new NATO strategic concept. The fear of discrimination is present in debates about divergence in the transatlantic industrial base and the alleged exclusion of third parties from joint capability and procurement initiatives. It is time to rethink some of these assumptions.
+
+Most would agree that it is in the U.S. interest for Europe to be able to defend itself to the greatest degree possible without a large U.S. military commitment. As the late Madeline Albright wrote: “Our interest is clear: we want a Europe that can act. We want a Europe with modern, flexible military forces that are capable of putting out fires in Europe’s backyard and working with us through the alliance to defend our common interests. European efforts to do more for Europe’s own defence make it easier, not harder, for us to remain engaged.” America’s recipe for getting this done was to focus on “enhancing the practical capabilities Europe brings to our alliance.”
+
+Yet this focus on the practical over the political led to a paradox in European defense: progress on practical capabilities could only go so far in the absence of political support for their development and use. The capability gaps, fragmentation, and inefficiencies in European defense are as much due to political imperatives — to avoid the “Three Ds” — as they are down to insufficient investment, modernization, and institutional initiatives.
+
+It is therefore time for the Biden administration, and future administrations, to find a new recipe for transforming European defense to achieve Albright’s goal of “a Europe that can act.” Several questions can serve as a starting point. First, how can the United States help Europe generate the practical capabilities and political support it needs to defend itself? This could be done through several avenues including NATO, the European Union, and mini- and bilateral frameworks, but it must be coordinated and consistent. Second, how can a balance be struck between the risk of duplication versus the risk of fragmentation and capability gaps? Third, what is the role of the European Union in stepping up as an engine of joint procurement for the most vital and expensive systems and high-end capabilities?
+
+
+### A Stronger, More Capable European Defense
+
+The United States spent the last decade urging European states to spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense. Now that European partners are spending more, the United States should become the most forceful advocate for transforming European defense. The United States’ role as the key guarantor of European security puts it in a privileged position. This is especially true for the most vulnerable NATO allies on the eastern flank, all of whom are also EU members and therefore in a position to block or water down EU initiatives. It follows that Washington’s support for EU defense proposals can play a major role in determining their fate. After years of urging European allies to spend more on defense, a new diplomatic initiative is needed that does not waste the urgency that Russia’s war in Ukraine created.
+
+Washington should encourage European countries to leverage the European Union, NATO, and other, flexible formats to rationalize the fragmented defense and industrial landscape by investing together in modern capabilities, building a strong and resilient industrial base, and thinking creatively to pool and share forces. To make this happen, the United States must provide practical and political support, including through encouraging the European Union’s ambitions and assuring eastern allies that those ambitions do not reduce U.S. commitment to their defense through NATO — which, it should be noted, the European Union’s own strategic compass still recognizes as the “foundation of collective defence for its [EU] members.” When combined with some of the initiatives proposed above, this active support from the United States could kickstart a new era of European defense and achieve the shared goal of “a stronger and more capable European defense, that contributes positively to transatlantic and global security.”
+
+---
+
+__Max Bergmann__ is the director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
+
+__Pierre Morcos__ is a visiting fellow with the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program.
+
+__Colin Wall__ is a research associate with the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program.
+
+__Sean Monaghan__ is a visiting fellow with the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program.
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