Four pirates of different ages find a treasure of 100 gold coins. On their ship, they decide to split the coins using this scheme: the oldest pirate alive will propose how the coins will be distributed among the pirates, and all pirates remaining (including the one which made the proposition) will vote for or against it. If more than 50% of the pirates vote for it, then the coins will be distributed as such. Otherwise, the pirate proposing the scheme will be thrown overboard, and the process is repeated with the pirates that remain.
Pirates base their decisions on three factors. First of all, each pirate wants to survive. Second, given survival, each pirate wants to maximize the number of gold coins he receives. Third, each pirate would prefer to throw another overboard, if all other results would otherwise be equal. The pirates do not trust each other, and will neither make nor honor any promises between pirates apart from a proposed distribution plan that gives a whole number of gold coins to each pirate.
Assuming that all four pirates are perfectly rational, what will happen?