[VC Security & Trust Document] Improve description of holder binding

[Macke]

Imported from AB/Connect bitbucket: https://bitbucket.org/openid/connect/issues/2012

Original Reporter: danielfett

(Re “Cryptographic Holder Binding”)

Giuseppe De Marco

2023-03-06

An evil RP may receive a presentation of a VC with a signed nonce and re-present the same VC reusing the signed nonce to another RP (may we say nonce-reply?)

I’ve assumed that the presentation response should be signed with the private key linked to the public one binded in the VC.

[Macke]

Imported from AB/Connect bitbucket - Original Commenter: danielfett

@{557058:245bbbf8-3623-466b-9e2f-a9fa2f30c0ee} Can you please expand on this comment made for the Security and Trust document? How would the replay work if we assume that the verifier always expects a new nonce to be signed?