Make sure you have provided the following information:
- link to your code branch cloned from rhboot/shim-review in the form user/repo@tag
- completed README.md file with the necessary information
- shim.efi to be signed
- public portion of your certificate(s) embedded in shim (the file passed to VENDOR_CERT_FILE)
- binaries, for which hashes are added do vendor_db ( if you use vendor_db and have hashes allow-listed )
- any extra patches to shim via your own git tree or as files
- any extra patches to grub via your own git tree or as files
- build logs
- a Dockerfile to reproduce the build of the provided shim EFI binaries
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This matches https://github.com/rhboot/shim/releases/tag/15.4 and contains
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What's the justification that this really does need to be signed for the whole world to be able to boot it:
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If you use new vendor_db functionality, are any hashes allow-listed, and if yes: for what binaries ?
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Is kernel upstream commit 75b0cea7bf307f362057cc778efe89af4c615354 present in your kernel, if you boot chain includes a Linux kernel ?
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"Please specifically confirm that you add a vendor specific SBAT entry for SBAT header in each binary that supports SBAT metadata
Please provide exact SBAT entries for all SBAT binaries you are booting or planning to boot directly through shim
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Did you change your certificate strategy, so that affected by CVE-2020-14372, CVE-2020-25632, CVE-2020-25647, CVE-2020-27749,
CVE-2020-14308, CVE-2020-14309, CVE-2020-14310, CVE-2020-14311, CVE-2020-15705 ( July 2020 grub2 CVE list + March 2021 grub2 CVE list )
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* Upstream grub2 shim_lock verifier or * Downstream RHEL/Fedora/Debian/Canonical like implementation ?
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