-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 412
New issue
Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.
By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.
Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account
test old branch check #11249
test old branch check #11249
Conversation
Datadog ReportBranch report: ❌ 238 Failed (0 Known Flaky), 39188 Passed, 26326 Skipped, 37m 7.43s Total duration (33m 12.66s time saved) ❌ Failed Tests (238)
New Flaky Tests (31)
|
run: | | ||
# Define regex for branches with major version 0 or 1, or versions from 2.0 to 2.12 | ||
old_branch_regex="^(0|1)(\\.|$)|^2\\.([0-9]|1[0-2])(\\.|$)" | ||
target_branch="${{ github.event.pull_request.base.ref }}" | ||
|
||
if [[ "$target_branch" =~ $old_branch_regex ]]; then | ||
echo "Old target branch detected: $target_branch" | ||
echo "old_branch=true" >> $GITHUB_ENV | ||
exit 1 | ||
else | ||
echo "old_branch=false" >> $GITHUB_ENV | ||
fi |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
🟠 Code Vulnerability
Possible script injection through user controlled input (...read more)
As detailed in Security hardening for GitHub Actions - GitHub Docs, it is possible for an attacker to inject scripts through PR, branch, commit names, and more.
Avoid using user input in your actions shell scripts, and if you must, consider storing them first in an environment variable to escape them properly.
Read Cycode Discovers a Supply Chain Vulnerability in Bazel - Cycode if you wanna see a concrete exploitation of such mechanism.
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ | |||
name: Check for Old Target Branch |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
🟠 Code Vulnerability
No explicit permissions set for at the workflow level (...read more)
Datadog’s GitHub organization defines default permissions for the GITHUB_TOKEN
to be restricted (contents:read
, metadata:read
, and packages:read
).
Your repository may require a different setup, so consider defining permissions for each job following the least privilege principle to restrict the impact of a possible compromise.
You can find the list of all possible permissions in Workflow syntax for GitHub Actions - GitHub Docs. They can be defined at the job or the workflow level.
|
||
- name: Old branch warning on PR | ||
if: env.old_branch == 'true' | ||
uses: thollander/actions-comment-pull-request@v2 |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
🟠 Code Vulnerability
Workflow depends on a GitHub actions pinned by tag (...read more)
When using a third party action, one needs to provide its GitHub path (owner/project
) and can eventually pin it to a Git ref (a branch name, a Git tag, or a commit hash).
No pinned Git ref means the action uses the latest commit of the default branch each time it runs, eventually running newer versions of the code that were not audited by Datadog. Specifying a Git tag is better, but since they are not immutable, using a full length hash is recommended to make sure the action content is actually frozen to some reviewed state.
Be careful however, as even pinning an action by hash can be circumvented by attackers still. For instance, if an action relies on a Docker image which is itself not pinned to a digest, it becomes possible to alter its behaviour through the Docker image without actually changing its hash. You can learn more about this kind of attacks in Unpinnable Actions: How Malicious Code Can Sneak into Your GitHub Actions Workflows. Pinning actions by hash is still a good first line of defense against supply chain attacks.
Additionally, pinning by hash or tag means the action won’t benefit from newer version updates if any, including eventual security patches. Make sure to regularly check if newer versions for an action you use are available. For actions coming from a very trustworthy source, it can make sense to use a laxer pinning policy to benefit from updates as soon as possible.
🚫 This target branch is too old or unsupported. Please update the target branch to continue. |
run: | | ||
# Define regex for branches with major version 0 or 1, or versions from 2.0 to 2.12 | ||
old_branch_regex="^(0|1)(\\.|$)|^2\\.([0-9]|1[0-2])(\\.|$)" | ||
target_branch="${{ github.event.pull_request.base.ref }}" | ||
|
||
if [[ "$target_branch" =~ $old_branch_regex ]]; then | ||
echo "Old target branch detected: $target_branch" | ||
echo "old_branch=true" >> $GITHUB_ENV | ||
else | ||
echo "old_branch=false" >> $GITHUB_ENV | ||
fi |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
🟠 Code Vulnerability
Possible script injection through user controlled input (...read more)
As detailed in Security hardening for GitHub Actions - GitHub Docs, it is possible for an attacker to inject scripts through PR, branch, commit names, and more.
Avoid using user input in your actions shell scripts, and if you must, consider storing them first in an environment variable to escape them properly.
Read Cycode Discovers a Supply Chain Vulnerability in Bazel - Cycode if you wanna see a concrete exploitation of such mechanism.
🚫 This target branch is too old or unsupported. Please update the target branch to continue. |
1 similar comment
🚫 This target branch is too old or unsupported. Please update the target branch to continue. |
|
||
- name: Old branch warning on PR | ||
if: env.old_branch == 'true' | ||
uses: thollander/actions-comment-pull-request@v2 |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
🟠 Code Vulnerability
Workflow depends on a GitHub actions pinned by tag (...read more)
When using a third party action, one needs to provide its GitHub path (owner/project
) and can eventually pin it to a Git ref (a branch name, a Git tag, or a commit hash).
No pinned Git ref means the action uses the latest commit of the default branch each time it runs, eventually running newer versions of the code that were not audited by Datadog. Specifying a Git tag is better, but since they are not immutable, using a full length hash is recommended to make sure the action content is actually frozen to some reviewed state.
Be careful however, as even pinning an action by hash can be circumvented by attackers still. For instance, if an action relies on a Docker image which is itself not pinned to a digest, it becomes possible to alter its behaviour through the Docker image without actually changing its hash. You can learn more about this kind of attacks in Unpinnable Actions: How Malicious Code Can Sneak into Your GitHub Actions Workflows. Pinning actions by hash is still a good first line of defense against supply chain attacks.
Additionally, pinning by hash or tag means the action won’t benefit from newer version updates if any, including eventual security patches. Make sure to regularly check if newer versions for an action you use are available. For actions coming from a very trustworthy source, it can make sense to use a laxer pinning policy to benefit from updates as soon as possible.
run: | | ||
# Define regex for branches with major version 0 or 1, or versions from 2.0 to 2.12 | ||
old_branch_regex="^(0|1)(\\.|$)|^2\\.([0-9]|1[0-2])(\\.|$)" | ||
target_branch="${{ github.event.pull_request.base.ref }}" | ||
|
||
if [[ "$target_branch" =~ $old_branch_regex ]]; then | ||
echo "Old target branch detected: $target_branch" | ||
echo "old_branch=true" >> $GITHUB_ENV | ||
else | ||
echo "old_branch=false" >> $GITHUB_ENV | ||
fi |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
🟠 Code Vulnerability
Possible script injection through user controlled input (...read more)
As detailed in Security hardening for GitHub Actions - GitHub Docs, it is possible for an attacker to inject scripts through PR, branch, commit names, and more.
Avoid using user input in your actions shell scripts, and if you must, consider storing them first in an environment variable to escape them properly.
Read Cycode Discovers a Supply Chain Vulnerability in Bazel - Cycode if you wanna see a concrete exploitation of such mechanism.
Checklist
Reviewer Checklist