Add yaml-mapper tool for migrating from helm to operator

[swang392]

What this PR does / why we need it:

Add yaml-mapper tool to helm charts to help users switch from installing the Datadog Agent with helm charts to using Operator. The yaml mapper script will take a values.yaml file used for helm charts and convert it into one that is compatible with the operator. (part of agent innovation week)

Special notes for your reviewer:

Checklist

[Place an '[x]' (no spaces) in all applicable fields. Please remove unrelated fields.]

• Chart Version bumped
• Documentation has been updated with helm-docs (run: .github/helm-docs.sh)
• CHANGELOG.md has been updated
• Variables are documented in the README.md
• For Datadog Operator chart or value changes update the test baselines (run: make update-test-baselines)

[datadog-datadog-prod-us1]

🟠 Library Vulnerability

helm.sh/helm/v3 → 3.14.2

Helm shows secrets in clear text (...read more)

An issue was discovered in Cloud Native Computing Foundation (CNCF) Helm. It displays values of secrets when the --dry-run flag is used. This is a security concern in some use cases, such as a --dry-run call by a CI/CD tool. NOTE: the vendor's position is that this behavior was introduced intentionally, and cannot be removed without breaking backwards compatibility (some users may be relying on these values).

    

[datadog-datadog-prod-us1]

🟠 Library Vulnerability

golang.org/x/net → 0.17.0

View all suggested fixes

Suggested change

	golang.org/x/net v0.17.0 // indirect
	golang.org/x/net vv0.30.1-0.20241011223655-5716b9813d2c// indirect

Suggested change

	golang.org/x/net v0.17.0 // indirect
	golang.org/x/net vv0.23.0// indirect

net/http, x/net/http2: close connections when receiving too many headers (...read more)

An attacker may cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data by sending an excessive number of CONTINUATION frames. Maintaining HPACK state requires parsing and processing all HEADERS and CONTINUATION frames on a connection. When a request's headers exceed MaxHeaderBytes, no memory is allocated to store the excess headers, but they are still parsed. This permits an attacker to cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data, all associated with a request which is going to be rejected. These headers can include Huffman-encoded data which is significantly more expensive for the receiver to decode than for an attacker to send. The fix sets a limit on the amount of excess header frames we will process before closing a connection.