Fix UNIX Symbolic Link (Symlink) Following not protected from untrusted code injection

[codingfromanywhere]

Problem

The server protects static routes from path traversal outside the root directory when follow_symlinks=False (default). It does this by resolving the requested URL to an absolute path and then checking that path relative to the root. However, these checks are not performed when looking for compressed variants in the FileResponse class, and symbolic links are then automatically followed when performing Path.stat() and Path.open() to send the file. Servers with static routes that contain compressed variants as symbolic links, pointing outside the root directory, or that permit users to upload or create such links, are impacted.

Solution

Upgrade new package as fix :

                # Do not follow symlinks and ignore any non-regular files.
                st = compressed_path.lstat()
                if S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
                    return compressed_path, st, file_encoding