Made grammar changes to SQL_Injection_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet (#1549)

* Made grammar changes to SQL_Injection_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet

* Update cheatsheets/SQL_Injection_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.md

fixed typo

Co-authored-by: Shlomo Zalman Heigh <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Shlomo Zalman Heigh <[email protected]>

cheatsheets/SQL_Injection_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.md

@@ -40,13 +40,13 @@ try {
 
 ### Defense Option 1: Prepared Statements (with Parameterized Queries)
 
-When developers are taught how to write database queries, they should be told to use prepared statements with variable binding (aka parameterized queries). Prepared statements are simple to write and easier to understand than dynamic queries and parameterized queries force the developer to define all SQL code first and pass in each parameter to the query later.
+When developers are taught how to write database queries, they should be told to use prepared statements with variable binding (aka parameterized queries). Prepared statements are simple to write and easier to understand than dynamic queries, and parameterized queries force the developer to define all SQL code first and pass in each parameter to the query later.
 
-If database queries use this coding style, the database will always distinguish between code and data, regardless of what user input is supplied. Also, prepared statements ensure that an attacker is not able to change the intent of a query, even if SQL commands are inserted by an attacker.
+If database queries use this coding style, the database will always distinguish between code and data, regardless of what user input is supplied. Also, prepared statements ensure that an attacker cannot change the intent of a query, even if SQL commands are inserted by an attacker.
 
 #### Safe Java Prepared Statement Example
 
-In the safe Java example below, if an attacker were to enter the userID of `tom' or '1'='1`, the parameterized query would look for a username which literally matched the entire string `tom' or '1'='1`. Thus, the database would be protected against injections of malicious SQL code.
+In the safe Java example below, if an attacker were to enter the userID as `tom' or '1'='1`, the parameterized query would look for a username that literally matches the entire string `tom' or '1'='1`. Thus, the database would be protected against injections of malicious SQL code.
 
 The following code example uses a `PreparedStatement`, Java's implementation of a parameterized query, to execute the same database query.
 
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ try {
 }
 ```
 
-While we have shown examples in Java and .NET, practically all other languages (including Cold Fusion and Classic ASP) support parameterized query interfaces. Even SQL abstraction layers, like the [Hibernate Query Language](http://hibernate.org/) (HQL) with the same type of injection problems (called [HQL Injection](http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html))  supports parameterized queries as well:
+While we have shown examples in Java and .NET, practically all other languages (including Cold Fusion and Classic ASP) support parameterized query interfaces. Even SQL abstraction layers, like the [Hibernate Query Language](http://hibernate.org/) (HQL) with the same type of injection problems (called [HQL Injection](http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html))  support parameterized queries as well:
 
 #### Hibernate Query Language (HQL) Prepared Statement (Named Parameters) Example
 
@@ -92,21 +92,21 @@ safeHQLQuery.setParameter("productid", userSuppliedParameter);
 
 If you need examples of prepared queries/parameterized languages, including Ruby, PHP, Cold Fusion, Perl, and Rust, see the [Query Parameterization Cheat Sheet](Query_Parameterization_Cheat_Sheet.md) or this [site](http://bobby-tables.com/).
 
-Generally, developers like prepared statements because all the SQL code stays within the application, which makes your application relatively database independent.
+Generally, developers like prepared statements because all the SQL code stays within the application, which makes applications relatively database independent.
 
 ### Defense Option 2: Stored Procedures
 
-Though stored procedures are not always safe from SQL injection, developers can use certain standard stored procedure programming constructs. This approach has the same effect as the use of parameterized queries as long as the stored procedures are implemented safely (which is the norm for most stored procedure languages).
+Though stored procedures are not always safe from SQL injection, developers can use certain standard stored procedure programming constructs. This approach has the same effect as using parameterized queries, as long as the stored procedures are implemented safely (which is the norm for most stored procedure languages).
 
 #### Safe Approach to Stored Procedures
 
-If stored procedures are needed, the safest approach to using them requires the developer to build SQL statements with parameters that are automatically parameterized, unless the developer does something largely out of the norm. The difference between prepared statements and stored procedures is that the SQL code for a stored procedure is defined and stored in the database itself, and then called from the application. Since prepared statements and safe stored procedures are equally effective in preventing SQL injection, your organization should choose the approach that makes the most sense for you.
+If stored procedures are needed, the safest approach to using them requires the developer to build SQL statements with parameters that are automatically parameterized, unless the developer does something largely out of the norm. The difference between prepared statements and stored procedures is that the SQL code for a stored procedure is defined and stored in the database itself, then called from the application. Since prepared statements and safe stored procedures are equally effective in preventing SQL injection, your organization should choose the approach that makes the most sense for you.
 
 #### When Stored Procedures Can Increase Risk
 
 Occasionally, stored procedures can increase risk when a system is attacked. For example, on MS SQL Server, you have three main default roles: `db_datareader`, `db_datawriter` and `db_owner`. Before stored procedures came into use, DBAs would give `db_datareader` or `db_datawriter` rights to the webservice's user, depending on the requirements.
 
-However, stored procedures require execute rights, a role that is not available by default. In some setups where user management has been centralized, but is limited to those 3 roles, web apps would have to run as `db_owner` so stored procedures could work. Naturally, that means that if a server is breached the attacker has full rights to the database, where previously they might only have had read-access.
+However, stored procedures require execute rights, a role not available by default. In some setups where user management has been centralized, but is limited to those 3 roles, web apps would have to run as `db_owner` so stored procedures could work. Naturally, that means that if a server is breached, the attacker has full rights to the database, where previously, they might only have had read-access.
 
 #### Safe Java Stored Procedure Example
 
@@ -143,13 +143,13 @@ The following code example uses a `SqlCommand`, .NET's implementation of the sto
 
 ### Defense Option 3: Allow-list Input Validation
 
-If you are faced with parts of SQL queries that can't use bind variables, such as the names of tables or columns as well as the sort order indicator (ASC or DESC), input validation or query redesign is the most appropriate defense. When names of tables or columns are needed, ideally those values come from the code and not from user parameters.
+If you are faced with parts of SQL queries that can't use bind variables, such as table names, column names, or sort order indicators (ASC or DESC), input validation or query redesign is the most appropriate defense. When table or column names are needed, ideally those values come from the code and not from user parameters.
 
 #### Sample Of Safe Table Name Validation
 
-WARNING: If user parameter values are used for targeting different table names and column names, this is a symptom of poor design and a full rewrite should be considered if time allows. If that is not possible, developers should map the parameter values to the legal/expected table or column names to make sure unvalidated user input doesn't end up in the query.
+WARNING: Using user parameter values to target table or column names is a symptom of poor design and a full rewrite should be considered if time allows. If that is not possible, developers should map the parameter values to the legal/expected table or column names to make sure unvalidated user input doesn't end up in the query.
 
-In the example below, since `tableName` is identified as one of the legal and expected values for a table name in this query, it can be directly appended to the SQL query. Keep in mind that generic table validation functions can lead to data loss as table names are used in queries where they are not expected.
+In the example below, since `tableName` is identified as one of the legal and expected values for a table name in this query, it can be directly appended to the SQL query. Keep in mind that generic table validation functions can lead to data loss if table names are used in queries where they are not expected.
 
 ```text
 String tableName;
@@ -167,11 +167,11 @@ switch(PARAM):
 
 When we say a stored procedure is "implemented safely," that means it does not include any unsafe dynamic SQL generation. Developers do not usually generate dynamic SQL inside stored procedures. However, it can be done, but should be avoided.
 
-If it can't be avoided, the stored procedure must use input validation or proper escaping as described in this article to make sure that all user supplied input to the stored procedure can't be used to inject SQL code into the dynamically generated query. Auditors should always look for uses of `sp_execute`, `execute` or `exec` within SQL Server stored procedures. Similar audit guidelines are necessary for similar functions for other vendors.
+If it can't be avoided, the stored procedure must use input validation or proper escaping, as described in this article, to make sure that all user supplied input to the stored procedure can't be used to inject SQL code into the dynamically generated query. Auditors should always look for uses of `sp_execute`, `execute` or `exec` within SQL Server stored procedures. Similar audit guidelines are necessary for similar functions for other vendors.
 
 #### Sample of Safer Dynamic Query Generation (DISCOURAGED)
 
-For something simple like a sort order, it would be best if the user supplied input is converted to a boolean, and then that boolean is used to select the safe value to append to the query. This is a very standard need in dynamic query creation.
+For something simple like a sort order, it is best if the user supplied input is converted to a boolean, and then that boolean is used to select the safe value to append to the query. This is a very standard need in dynamic query creation.
 
 For example:
 
@@ -187,13 +187,13 @@ Input validation is also recommended as a secondary defense in ALL cases, even w
 
 ### Defense Option 4: STRONGLY DISCOURAGED: Escaping All User-Supplied Input
 
-In this approach, the developer will escape all user input before putting it in a query. It is very database specific in its implementation.  This methodology is frail compared to other defenses and we CANNOT guarantee that this option will prevent all SQL injections in all situations.
+In this approach, the developer will escape all user input before putting it in a query. It is very database specific in its implementation.  This methodology is frail compared to other defenses, and we CANNOT guarantee that this option will prevent all SQL injections in all situations.
 
 If an application is built from scratch or requires low risk tolerance, it should be built or re-written using parameterized queries, stored procedures, or some kind of Object Relational Mapper (ORM) that builds your queries for you.
 
 ## Additional Defenses
 
-Beyond adopting one of the four primary defenses, we also recommend adopting all of these additional defenses in order to provide defense in depth. These additional defenses are:
+Beyond adopting one of the four primary defenses, we also recommend adopting all of these additional defenses to provide defense in depth. These additional defenses are:
 
 - **Least Privilege**
 - **Allow-list Input Validation**
@@ -212,15 +212,15 @@ While you are at it, you should minimize the privileges of the operating system
 
 #### Details Of Least Privilege When Developing
 
-If an account only needs access to portions of a table, consider creating a view that limits access to that portion of the data and assigning the account access to the view instead, rather than the underlying table. Rarely, if ever, grant create or delete access to database accounts.
+If an account only needs access to portions of a table, consider creating a view that limits access to that portion of the data and assigning the account access to the view instead of the underlying table. Rarely, if ever, grant create or delete access to database accounts.
 
 If you adopt a policy where you use stored procedures everywhere, and don't allow application accounts to directly execute their own queries, then restrict those accounts to only be able to execute the stored procedures they need. Don't grant them any rights directly to the tables in the database.
 
 #### Least Admin Privileges For Multiple DBs
 
 The designers of web applications should avoid using the same owner/admin account in the web applications to connect to the database. Different DB users should be used for different web applications.
 
-In general, each separate web application that requires access to the database should have a designated database user account that the application will use to connect to the DB. That way, the designer of the application can have good granularity in the access control, thus reducing the privileges as much as possible. Each DB user will then have select access to what it needs only, and write-access as needed.
+In general, each separate web application that requires access to the database should have a designated database user account that the application will use to connect to the DB. That way, the designer of the application can have good granularity in the access control, thus reducing the privileges as much as possible. Each DB user will then have select access to only what it needs, and write-access as needed.
 
 As an example, a login page requires read access to the username and password fields of a table, but no write access of any form (no insert, update, or delete). However, the sign-up page certainly requires insert privilege to that table; this restriction can only be enforced if these web apps use different DB users to connect to the database.