Updated the bcrypt description as discussed in #1532 #1551
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In OWASP#1532 there was a side discussion by @ja2048 and @jmanico on why the CS mentioned that HMAC would be vulnerable to password shucking, but the linked talk mentioned that even a hash with a pepper would prevent it. So I correcteed the guidance. I further removed the mentioning of PBKDF2, since this suggests that bcrypt + PBKDF2 would give FIPS-140 compliance. I also added that bcrypt should only be used for legacy system which don't have agron2 or scrypt, as discussed in OWASP#1532
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jmanico
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This is excellent work. Thank you. |
mackowski
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Dec 9, 2024
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In #1532 there was a side discussion by @ja2048 and @jmanico on why the CS mentioned that HMAC would be vulnerable to password shucking, but the linked talk mentioned that even a hash with a pepper would prevent it. So I correcteed the guidance.
I further removed the mentioning of PBKDF2, since this suggests that bcrypt + PBKDF2 would give FIPS-140 compliance.
I also added that bcrypt should only be used for legacy system which don't have agron2 or scrypt, as discussed in #1532