Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
The Karmada components deployed with karmadactl
, karma-operator
, and helm chart
take Golang default cipher suites as part of the TLS protocol, which includes the insecure algorithm. Referring to golang/go#41476 (comment), the 3DES algorithm vulnerability is very unlikely to be attacked. However, to address the concerns and to avoid being disturbed by the security scanner, Karmada has decided to limit the cipher suites to exclude the insecure 3DES algorithm and accordingly release this security advisory.
The components affected are:
- karmada-apiserver
- karmada-aggregated-apiserver
- karmada-search
- karmada-metrics-adapter
- etcd
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
From Karmada v1.8.0, when deploying Karmada with karmadactl
, karma-operator
, and helm chart
, the default minimum TLS version of components(include karmada-apiserver
, karmada-aggregated-apiserver
, karmada-search
, and karmada-metrics-adapter
) would be set to TLS1.3
to get rid of the insecure algorithm, and set default cipher suites(TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305
) for etcd
.
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
By setting the --tls-min-version
for the affected components to TLS 1.3, or explicitly setting the --cipher-suites
to secure algorithms.
References
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
- Enhancements made from the Karmada community: karmada-io/karmada#4191
- Impact discussions from the Golang community: golang/go#41476
References
Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
The Karmada components deployed with
karmadactl
,karma-operator
, andhelm chart
take Golang default cipher suites as part of the TLS protocol, which includes the insecure algorithm. Referring to golang/go#41476 (comment), the 3DES algorithm vulnerability is very unlikely to be attacked. However, to address the concerns and to avoid being disturbed by the security scanner, Karmada has decided to limit the cipher suites to exclude the insecure 3DES algorithm and accordingly release this security advisory.The components affected are:
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
From Karmada v1.8.0, when deploying Karmada with
karmadactl
,karma-operator
, andhelm chart
, the default minimum TLS version of components(includekarmada-apiserver
,karmada-aggregated-apiserver
,karmada-search
, andkarmada-metrics-adapter
) would be set toTLS1.3
to get rid of the insecure algorithm, and set default cipher suites(TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305
) foretcd
.Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
By setting the
--tls-min-version
for the affected components to TLS 1.3, or explicitly setting the--cipher-suites
to secure algorithms.References
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
References