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doc: update ADR-005 (#1389) #1392

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merged 2 commits into from
Nov 30, 2023
Merged

doc: update ADR-005 (#1389) #1392

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update ADR
sainoe Nov 6, 2023
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Merge branch 'main' into sainoe/main-ADR-update
mpoke Nov 30, 2023
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3 changes: 2 additions & 1 deletion docs/docs/adrs/adr-005-cryptographic-equivocation-verification.md
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Expand Up @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ title: Cryptographic verification of equivocation evidence
* 5/1/2023: First draft
* 7/23/2023: Add light client attacks handling
* 9/6/2023: Add double signing attacks handling
* 11/3/2023: Update limitations to clarify amnesia attacks are ignored

## Status

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -137,7 +138,7 @@ either using its infraction height or its unsigned timestamp. Note that changes
The underlying reason is that a malicious validator could take advantage of getting tombstoned
to avoid being slashed on the provider ([see comment](https://github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/pull/1232#issuecomment-1693127641)).

- Currently, the endpoint can only handle "equivocation" light client attacks. This is because the "lunatic" attacks require the endpoint to possess the ability to dissociate which header is conflicted or trusted upon receiving a misbehavior message. Without this information, it's not possible to define the Byzantine validators from the conflicting headers (see [comment](https://github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/pull/826#discussion_r1268668684)).
- Currently, the endpoint can only handle _equivocation_ light client attacks. This is because the _lunatic_ attacks require the endpoint to possess the ability to dissociate which header is conflicted or trusted upon receiving a misbehavior message. Without this information, it's not possible to extract the Byzantine validators from the conflicting headers (see [comment](https://github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/pull/826#discussion_r1268668684)). In addition, "amnesia" attacks are ignored, similar to CometBFT (see [ADR-056](https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/blob/main/docs/architecture/tendermint-core/adr-056-light-client-amnesia-attacks.md#decision)).


## Consequences
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