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chore(deps): update module golang.org/x/crypto to v0.17.0 [security] (release-1.14) #702

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@renovate renovate bot commented May 30, 2024

Mend Renovate

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Adoption Passing Confidence
golang.org/x/crypto v0.14.0 -> v0.17.0 age adoption passing confidence

Man-in-the-middle attacker can compromise integrity of secure channel in golang.org/x/crypto

CVE-2023-48795 / GHSA-45x7-px36-x8w8 / GO-2023-2402

More information

Details

A protocol weakness allows a MITM attacker to compromise the integrity of the secure channel before it is established, allowing the attacker to prevent transmission of a number of messages immediately after the secure channel is established without either side being aware.

The impact of this attack is relatively limited, as it does not compromise confidentiality of the channel. Notably this attack would allow an attacker to prevent the transmission of the SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO message, disabling a handful of newer security features.

This protocol weakness was also fixed in OpenSSH 9.6.

Severity

Unknown

References

This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).


Prefix Truncation Attack against ChaCha20-Poly1305 and Encrypt-then-MAC aka Terrapin

CVE-2023-48795 / GHSA-45x7-px36-x8w8 / GO-2023-2402

More information

Details

Summary

Terrapin is a prefix truncation attack targeting the SSH protocol. More precisely, Terrapin breaks the integrity of SSH's secure channel. By carefully adjusting the sequence numbers during the handshake, an attacker can remove an arbitrary amount of messages sent by the client or server at the beginning of the secure channel without the client or server noticing it.

Mitigations

To mitigate this protocol vulnerability, OpenSSH suggested a so-called "strict kex" which alters the SSH handshake to ensure a Man-in-the-Middle attacker cannot introduce unauthenticated messages as well as convey sequence number manipulation across handshakes.

Warning: To take effect, both the client and server must support this countermeasure.

As a stop-gap measure, peers may also (temporarily) disable the affected algorithms and use unaffected alternatives like AES-GCM instead until patches are available.

Details

The SSH specifications of ChaCha20-Poly1305 (chacha20-poly1305@​openssh.com) and Encrypt-then-MAC (*[email protected] MACs) are vulnerable against an arbitrary prefix truncation attack (a.k.a. Terrapin attack). This allows for an extension negotiation downgrade by stripping the SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO sent after the first message after SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS, downgrading security, and disabling attack countermeasures in some versions of OpenSSH. When targeting Encrypt-then-MAC, this attack requires the use of a CBC cipher to be practically exploitable due to the internal workings of the cipher mode. Additionally, this novel attack technique can be used to exploit previously unexploitable implementation flaws in a Man-in-the-Middle scenario.

The attack works by an attacker injecting an arbitrary number of SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages during the initial key exchange and consequently removing the same number of messages just after the initial key exchange has concluded. This is possible due to missing authentication of the excess SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages and the fact that the implicit sequence numbers used within the SSH protocol are only checked after the initial key exchange.

In the case of ChaCha20-Poly1305, the attack is guaranteed to work on every connection as this cipher does not maintain an internal state other than the message's sequence number. In the case of Encrypt-Then-MAC, practical exploitation requires the use of a CBC cipher; while theoretical integrity is broken for all ciphers when using this mode, message processing will fail at the application layer for CTR and stream ciphers.

For more details see https://terrapin-attack.com.

Impact

This attack targets the specification of ChaCha20-Poly1305 (chacha20-poly1305@​openssh.com) and Encrypt-then-MAC (*[email protected]), which are widely adopted by well-known SSH implementations and can be considered de-facto standard. These algorithms can be practically exploited; however, in the case of Encrypt-Then-MAC, we additionally require the use of a CBC cipher. As a consequence, this attack works against all well-behaving SSH implementations supporting either of those algorithms and can be used to downgrade (but not fully strip) connection security in case SSH extension negotiation (RFC8308) is supported. The attack may also enable attackers to exploit certain implementation flaws in a man-in-the-middle (MitM) scenario.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.9 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


Configuration

📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).

🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.

Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.


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This PR has been generated by Mend Renovate. View repository job log here.

@renovate renovate bot requested review from a team as code owners May 30, 2024 00:45
@renovate renovate bot added the automated label May 30, 2024
@renovate renovate bot requested review from phisco and MisterMX and removed request for a team May 30, 2024 00:45
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renovate bot commented May 30, 2024

⚠️ Artifact update problem

Renovate failed to update an artifact related to this branch. You probably do not want to merge this PR as-is.

♻ Renovate will retry this branch, including artifacts, only when one of the following happens:

  • any of the package files in this branch needs updating, or
  • the branch becomes conflicted, or
  • you click the rebase/retry checkbox if found above, or
  • you rename this PR's title to start with "rebase!" to trigger it manually

The artifact failure details are included below:

File name: go.mod
Post-upgrade command 'earthly --strict +go-generate' has not been added to the allowed list in allowedPostUpgradeCommands

@negz negz closed this May 30, 2024
@negz negz deleted the renovate/release-1.14-go-golang.org/x/crypto-vulnerability branch May 30, 2024 01:33
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