This repository has been archived by the owner on Nov 27, 2023. It is now read-only.
ECS: Redid security group generation for LBs #2215
Open
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
What I did
The ECS stack includes an ingress rule to allow LB to reach the tasks.
However, the ingress was added inside the Docker network security group, exposing all containers to requests on this port from 0.0.0.0/0.
This means tasks that don't have exposed ports on the compose spec, and possibly contain unprotected sensitive endpoints, were exposed to outside access (I personally had a NodeJS Express server getting
/.env
hit by random scrapers).We now do the following:
Why is this better
Related issue
Solves #1783
Manual testing
A bit long:
Modify the slightly-complex stack to have a real VPC and subnets, then create it:
Reminder, the Compose looks like this:
Both tasks have a public IP, but they're not accessible from the outside:
However, the LB is accessible and responding:
(not mandatory) A picture of a cute animal, if possible in relation with what you did
Claro