Update sockdir security #2731
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Update sockdir security #2731
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The sockdir is only used when sesman is active. The call g_mk_socket_path() is removed from os_calls and moved to sesman. We also change the permissions on this directory to 0755 rather than 01777 (01000 is the 'sticky bit', S_ISVTX). The behaviour of g_create_dir() has been modified to not set S_ISVTX on Linux directories. This is implementation-defined behaviour according to 1003.1, and is no longer required for the sockdir.
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I'm bumping this up priority-wise as it's necessary to get the security of the PCSC socket sorted for #1825 If nobody's got time to look at it I'll merge in a week or so. I think the idea of what it's trying to do is fairly clear. |
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The top level socket directory is now called XRDP_SOCKET_ROOT_PATH. Below that are user-specific directories referred to with the XRDP_SOCKET_PATH macro - this name is hard-coded into xorgxrdp and the audio modules as an environment variable. XRDP_SOCKET_PATH now looks like $XRDP_SOCKET_ROOT_PATH/<uid> XRDP_SOCKET_PATH is only writeable by the user, and readable by the user and the xrdp process.
Now we've made the XRDP_SOCKET_PATH only writeable by root, it's safe to move the sesman socket back into this directory. We no longer need a separate sesmanruntimedir
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I will look into it. |
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Thanks. I'll merge later today if I get the time. |
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This is one of two updates which (in total) will support running xrdp as a non-privileged user without needing to patch it, as Debian/Ubuntu does at present.
The main purpose of this update is to remove the need to use the sticky bit on the socketdir and simplify the security in this area.
#2472 changed sesman to identify sessions by UID rather than username. This fixed #1823. As a result, sesman is now UID aware.
This lets us insert a UID-specific directory into the socketdir. Now users can't see each others xrdp sockets, resulting in a small security improvement.
Once we've done this, we can get rid of the sesmanruntimedir introduced by #2472, as the socketdir is no longer world-writeable. This moves all the sockets back into a single directory.
As an example, if I log on to my development box using display 11, I now get this under
/run/xrdp:-At the moment the xrdp process is running as
root, and can access sockets for user 1001 (testuser) by using group permissions.There are also some tidy-ups in here, like introducing
XRDP_SOCKETS_MAXPATHfor the maximum length of a socket path name, and simplifying the parsing of the sesman.ini[security]section.Currently draft as more testing is required. Comments welcome.